True the Vote v. Hosemann (43 F. Supp. 3d 693, 2014)

United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi 2014-08-29

The Congress The Public Health and Welfare Voting and Elections

Citations

Full opinion text

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

NANCY F. ATLAS, District Judge.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I. BACKGROUND'.........................................................702

A. The Primary and Primary Runoff Elections ............................702

B. Plaintiffs’Allegations and Evidence....................................703

C. Procedural Posture..........................................■.........705

II. MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT.................................706

A. Summary Judgment Standard ........................................706

B. Analysis............................................................707

1. Have Plaintiffs Sued the Proper Defendants?.........................709

a. Is the Republican Party a Proper Defendant?.....................709

b. Are the County Defendants Proper Defendants?..................709

i. Mississippi’s Registration and Election Oversight Structure and Procedure ..............................709

ii. Analysis...............................................711

c. Is Hosemann a Proper Defendant?..............................713

2. Does Section 1973gg-9 Pose a Procedural Bar to Plaintiffs’ Suit?.....713

3. What Documents Do Plaintiffs Seek?................................717

4. Are Plaintiffs Entitled Under the NVRA to Inspect the Requested Documents?....................................................718

a. Statutory Construction........................................718

i. Plain Meaning—Overall Principles........................718

ii. Statutory Context of the Public Disclosure Provision Within the NVRA ....................................720

iii. Statutory Purpose of the NVRA..........................720

iv. Context of the NVRA Public Disclosure Provision in Light of Other Federal and State Laws..................722

b.SRequested Documents........................................723

i. Voter Roll.............................................723

ii. Poll Books.............................................724

iii. Absentee Ballot Applications and Envelopes................726

iv. Federal Post Card Applications...........................728

5. Does the NVRA Preempt Mississippi Law?..........................729

a. Preemption Standard..........................................729

b. Mississippi Law..............................................731

c. Does the NVRA Require Disclosure of Unredacted Records?.....732

i. Project Vote is Distinguishable ...........................732

ii. The NVRA Does Not Require Disclosure of Unredacted Documents ..........................................733

iii. Birthdates, Like Social Security Numbers, Are “Uniquel y Sensitive.” .........................................736

d. The NVRA Public Disclosure Provision Does Not Preempt Mississippi’s Redaction Provisions.............................740

III. PLAINTIFFS’PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION MOTION...................740

A. Preliminary Injunction Standard......................................740

B. Analysis............................................................741

1. Substantial Likelihood of Success on the Merits.......................741

2. Irreparable .Injury................................................741

3. Balance of Hardships .............................................742

4. Disservice to the Public Interest....................................742

IV. THE REPUBLICAN PARTY’S SANCTIONS MOTION......................743

A. Legal Standard......................................................743

B. Analysis............................................................744

V. RULE 51(b) JUDGMENT................................................744

VI. CONCLUSION AND ORDER...........!.................................745

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

The Court in this case is required to construe the scope of the National Voter Registration Act (“NVRA”), 42 U.S.C. § 1973 et seq., a federal law that has seldom generated litigation. A particular focal point of this case is the June 24, 2014 primary runoff election held to determine the Republican Party of Mississippi’s candidate in the November 2014 U.S. Senate election. Plaintiffs state that they seek certain unredacted voting records from that election pursuant to the NVRA Public Disclosure Provision, 42 U.S.C. § 1973gg-6(i) (“Public Disclosure Provision”), in order to investigate potential irregularities or inaccuracies concerning the primary runoff election and possibly to raise a challenge to the outcome of that election. Defendants have refused some of Plaintiffs’ requests citing multiple grounds, but primarily Defendants contend that Mississippi law requires redaction of certain personal voter registrant information from the records before they are publicly disclosed.

Before the Court are the following motions, each of which is ripe for consideration:

• Plaintiffs’ Motion for Temporary 'Restraining Order [and Preliminary Injunction] [Doc. # 8] (“Preliminary Injunction Motion”);

• Plaintiffs’ Motion for Partial Summary Judgment [Docs. # 83 and # 84] (“Plaintiffs’ Summary Judgment Motion”);

• Defendant Hosemann’s Summary Judgment Request [Doc. # 114];

• Defendant Copiah County’s Motion for Summary Judgment [Doc. # 79] (“Copiah County’s Motion”);

• Defendant Hinds County’s Motion for Summary Judgment [Docs. # 80 and # 81] (“Hinds County’s Motion”);

• Defendant Jefferson Davis County’s Motion for Summary Judgment [Doc. # 82] (“Jefferson Davis County’s Motion”);

• Defendant Rankin County’s Motion for Summary Judgment [Docs. # 85 and # 86] (“Rankin County’s Motion”);

• Defendant Republican Party’s Motion to Dismiss or, in the alternative, for Summary Judgment [Docs. # 87 and # 88] (“Republican Party’s Summary Judgment Motion”);

• Defendant Lauderdale County’s Motion for Summary Judgment [Doc. # 89] (“Lauderdale County’s Motion”);

• Defendant Hosemann’s Motion to Strike [Docs. # 116 and # 117].

• Defendant Republican Party’s Motion for Sanctions [Doc. # 67] (“Republican Party’s Sanctions Motion”);

The Court held a hearing on Plaintiffs’ Preliminary Injunction Motion on July 24, 2014 (the “July 24th Hearing”). Plaintiffs and Defendants presented evidence and made legal arguments to the Court at that time. The parties have furnished additional evidence in support of their claims, defenses, and motions.

Having considered all the parties’ briefing, the parties’ oral arguments at the July 24th Hearing, all evidence of record, and the applicable legal authorities, the Court grants summary judgment to each of the moving County Defendants and to Hosem-ann, grants in part and denies in part the Republican Party’s Summary Judgment Motion, denies Plaintiffs’ Summary Judgment and Preliminary Injunction Motions, denies the Republican Party’s Sanctions Motion, and denies Defendant Hosemann’s Motion to Strike. Plaintiffs’ first two claims are dismissed with prejudice.

I. BACKGROUND

A. The Primary and Primary Runoff Elections

On June 3, 2014, Defendant Republican Party conducted a primary election to determine the party’s candidate for the November 2014 United States Senate election. The two highest vote-getters in the primary, incumbent U.S. Senator Thad Cochran (“Cochran”) and State Senator Chris McDaniel (“McDaniel”), then participated in a primary runoff election three weeks later, on June 24, 2014. According to the Republican Party, Cochran was victorious in the runoff election, receiving approximately 7,600 more votes than McDaniel. The Republican Party officially certified Cochran as the primary winner on July 7, 2014, and submitted that information to the Mississippi Secretary of State, Defendant Delbert Hosemann. McDaniel continues to challenge the outcome of the primary runoff.

B. Plaintiffs’ Allegations and Evidence

True the Vote characterizes itself as a “non-profit organization that works to protect the integrity of local, state, and federal elections.” “True the Vote monitors elections for compliance with state and federal law and identifies instances of voting irregularities or possible fraud.” True the Vote also “examines official lists of eligible voters and other voter registration data to verify their accuracy and currency ... to protect the integrity of the electoral process and to ensure that accurate and current voter rolls are maintained by each state.” True the Vote’s President, Catherine Engelbrecht (“Engel-brecht”), testified that, as part of its mission, the organization trains volunteers to get involved in elections, researches the country’s voter files to ensure their accuracy, and provides support to individuals concerned about election integrity in communities.

In June 2014, True the Vote initiated a campaign to seek “voter records” from the State of Mississippi. The purpose of True the Vote’s initiative was to determine “whether ineligible voters had been allowed to cast ballots in the Mississippi Republican Primary Runoff Election.” Engelbrecht testified that True the Vote started this initiative after Mississippi voters reached out to the organization about concerns they had regarding “whether or not their vote would be counted.”

Engelbrecht first traveled to Mississippi to request records the week prior to the June 24th runoff election. Specifically, Engelbrecht visited Hinds, Rankin, and Panola Counties. In Hinds and Rankin Counties, Engelbrecht requested absentee ballot applications and envelopes. Both counties denied her request. In Panola County, Engelbrecht requested a report of individuals who voted in the Republican Primary held on June 3rd. Panola County granted her request and provided Engel-brecht an unredacted list of voters. It is unclear exactly what list and what information about each voter was included on that list.

After the runoff election, True the Vote assembled a team of roughly twenty volunteers, organized into ten teams of two, and instructed them to go to various Mississippi Counties and examine the counties’ voting records from the runoff election. True the Vote gave the volunteers training about the Mississippi election process prior to the volunteers’ visits. True the Vote also provided its volunteers with a memo from its counsel purporting to describe the Counties’ obligations under the NVRA, blank “incident report” forms, a list of documents the volunteers were supposed to request, and a list of the counties to which each team of volunteers was assigned. True the Vote volunteers canvassed the State in early July 2014, including on July 7th and 8th.

The experiences of Ellen Swensen (“Swensen”) and Susan Morse (“Morse”), two True the Vote volunteers who are not plaintiffs in this lawsuit, are illustrative. Swensen and Morse were charged with requesting records from Covington, Leake, and Jones Counties. At each office in these Counties, Swensen and Morse requested electronic files listing everyone who voted in the primary and primary runoff elections (both Democrat and Republican voters); poll books; and absentee ballots, ballot envelopes, and applications. These requests were denied, for various reasons specific to each County Swen-sen and Morse did not expressly state to any County’s Circuit Clerk that their request was made pursuant to the NVRA.

Other individuals made similar requests from Mississippi counties. For example, on June 27, 2014, three days after the runoff, Plaintiff Roy Nicholson (“Nicholson”) requested copies of poll books from Rankin County, but the County denied his request. Nicholson made a similar request from Hinds County and was permitted to view unredacted poll books. Plaintiff Julie Patrick (“Patrick”), also after the runoff, similarly requested poll books from Marshall and Tunica Counties, but was told that she could not review the poll books, even in redacted form. Plaintiffs’ evidence indicates that other individuals made similar requests in other Mississippi Counties, and all were denied access to unredacted poll books or other records.

C. Procedural Posture

Plaintiffs filed this lawsuit on July 9, 2014. In their Amended Complaint, True the Vote seeks a declaratory judgment that it has the right, under the NVRA, to inspect certain voter records (Count l). Plaintiffs further seek a declaration that the NVRA preempts Mississippi law and that they are entitled to unredacted copies of voter records (Count 2, and together with Count 1, the “NVRA claims”). The Individual Plaintiffs also assert a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment contending that their votes were diluted by “unlawful double voting” in the Republican primary runoff election (Count 3). Contemporaneously with their Complaint [Doc. # 1], Plaintiffs filed the pending Preliminary Injunction Motion, seeking immediate relief on their NVRA claims.

In their Preliminary Injunction Motion, Plaintiffs seek a preliminary injunction preventing Defendants from destroying, tampering with, or permanently redacting information from the voting records Plaintiffs seek in this case. Plaintiffs also seek an injunction requiring Defendants to make available the requested voter records “without redaction of birthdates.” In a telephone hearing held on July 15, 2014, counsel for all Defendants that had appeared by that date agreed not to destroy or alter any requested voter records during the pendency of this lawsuit. Defendants also acknowledged that other applicable law prohibits alteration or tampering with these records. The first request in Plaintiffs’ Preliminary Injunction Motion is thus moot. Plaintiffs’ requests for unre-dacted voter records is the focus of the pending motions.

The Court held an evidentiary hearing on Plaintiffs’ Preliminary Injunction Motion on July 24, 2014. Plaintiffs presented live witness testimony and documentary evidence in support of their Motion. Defendants relied solely on cross-examination of Plaintiffs’ witnesses. The parties also presented oral argument.

Since the hearing, the parties have submitted additional evidence and extensive briefing. Plaintiffs, five of the County Defendants, Hosemann, and the Republican Party have moved for summary judgment.

II. MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

A. Summary Judgment Standard

Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure mandates the entry of summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a sufficient showing of the existence of an element essential to the party’s case, and on which that party will bear the burden at trial. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986); Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 1994) (en bane); see also Baton Rouge Oil and Chem. Workers Union v. ExxonMobil Corp., 289 F.3d 373, 375 (5th Cir.2002). Summary judgment “should be rendered if the pleadings, the discovery and disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a); Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322-23, 106 S.Ct. 2548; Weaver v. CCA Indus., Inc., 529 F.3d 335, 339 (5th Cir. 2008).

For summary judgment, the initial burden falls on the movant to identify areas essential to the non-movant’s claim in which there is an “absence of a genuine issue of material fact.” Lincoln Gen. Ins. Co. v. Reyna, 401 F.3d 347, 349 (5th Cir. 2005). The moving party, however, need not negate the elements of the non-mov-ant’s case. See Boudreaux v. Swift Tramp. Co., 402 F.3d 536, 540 (5th Cir. 2005). The moving party may meet its burden by pointing out “‘the absence of evidence supporting the nonmoving party’s case.’ ” Duffy v. Leading Edge Prods., Inc., 44 F.3d 308, 312 (5th Cir.1995) (quoting Skotak v. Tenneco Resins, Inc., 953 F.2d 909, 913 (5th Cir.1992)).

If the moving party meets its initial burden, the non-movant must go beyond the pleadings and designate specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue of material fact for trial. Littlefield v. Forney Indep. Sch. Dist., 268 F.3d 275, 282 (5th Cir.2001) (internal citation omitted). “An issue is material if its resolution could affect the outcome of the action. A dispute as to a material fact is genuine if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” DIRECTV Inc. v. Robson, 420 F.3d 532, 536 (5th Cir.2005) (internal citations omitted).

In deciding whether a genuine and material fact issue has been created, the court reviews the facts and inferences to be drawn from them in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Reaves Brokerage Co. v. Sunbelt Fruit & Vegetable Co., 336 F.3d 410, 412 (5th Cir.2003). The non-movant’s burden is not met by mere reliance on the allegations or denials in the non-movant’s pleadings. See King v. Dogan, 31 F.3d 344, 346 (5th Cir.1994) (holding that unverified pleadings do not “constitute competent summary judgment evidence”). Likewise, “conclusory allegations” or “unsubstantiated assertions” do not meet the non-movant’s burden. Delta & Pine Land Co. v. Nationwide Agribusiness Ins. Co., 530 F.3d 395, 399 (5th Cir. 2008). Instead, the nonmoving party must present specific facts which show “the existence of a genuine issue concerning every essential component of its case.” Am. Eagle Airlines, Inc. v. Air Line Pilots Ass’n, Int'l, 343 F.3d 401, 405 (5th Cir.2003) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). In the absence of any proof, the court will not assume that the non-movant could or would prove the necessary facts. Little, 37 F.3d at 1075 (citing Lujan v. Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n, 497 U.S. 871, 888, 110 S.Ct. 3177, 111 L.Ed.2d 695 (1990)).

The Court may make no credibility determinations or weigh any evidence, and must disregard all evidence favorable to the moving party that the jury is not required to believe. See Chaney v. Dreyfas Serv. Corp., 595 F.3d 219, 229 (5th Cir.2010) (citing Reaves Brokerage Co., 336 F.3d at 412-413). The Court is not required to accept the non-movant’s conclusory allegations, speculation, and unsubstantiated assertions which are either entirely unsupported, or supported by a mere scintilla of evidence. Id. (citing Reaves Brokerage, 336 F.3d at 413). Affidavits cannot preclude summary judgment unless they contain competent and otherwise admissible evidence. See Fed. R.Civ.P. 56(c)(4); Love v. Nat’l Med. Enters., 230 F.3d 765, 776 (5th Cir.2000).

Finally, “[w]hen evidence exists in the summary judgment record but the non-movant fails even to refer to it in the response to the motion for summary judgment, that evidence is not properly before the district court.” Malacara v. Garber, 858 F.3d 393, 405 (5th Cir.2003). “Rule 56 does not impose upon the district court a duty to sift through the record in search of evidence to support a party’s opposition to summary judgment.” See id. (internal citations and quotations omitted).

B. Analysis

Plaintiffs, five County Defendants, Ho-semann, and the Republican Party seek summary judgment in this case. The parties’ pending motions primarily seek summary judgment on Plaintiffs’ NVRA claims. Through these claims, Plaintiffs seek a declaration of its right to inspect unredacted versions of certain voter records. In this Memorandum and Order, the Court considers only Plaintiffs’ NVRA claims and not their Equal Protection vote dilution claim.

The crux of Plaintiffs’ allegations in their NVRA claims is that, under the NVRA, they are entitled to unredacted voting records, particularly “poll books.” Defendants raise a bevy of arguments why they- are entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiffs’ claims. First, certain Defendants argue that they are not proper parties to this litigation. Second, Defendants argue that Plaintiffs failed to comply with the notice and cure requirements of 42 U.S.C. § 1973gg-9 prior to bringing this lawsuit, and the case therefore is statutorily barred. Third, Defendants contend that the NVRA does not cover the particular documents Plaintiffs seek. Finally, Defendants contend that the NVRA does not allow Plaintiffs access to unredacted voting records. Thus, Defendants contend that Mississippi law, which requires Defendants to redact birthdates before disclosing the documents, does not “directly conflict” with the NVRA and is not preempted by the NVRA under the applicable preemption standard.

For the reasons stated below, the Court grants Hosemann’s request for summary judgment, grants the five County Defendants’ motions for summary judgment, grants in part and denies in part the Republican Party’s Summary Judgment Motion, and denies Plaintiffs’ Summary Judgment Motion. Various reasons, as set forth below, warrant granting summary judgment in Defendants’ favor on Plaintiffs’ NVRA claims. Because many issues presented are novel and because time is of the essence, the Court addresses each ground for summary judgment raised by the parties.

1. Have Plaintiffs Sued the Proper Defendants?

a. Is the Republican Party a Proper Defendant?

Defendant Republican Party contends that it is an improper Defendant under the NVRA. The Republican Party argues that it is not a “State” under the NVRA, and that only States are subject to the NVRA’s requirements. The Court agrees. The Fifth Circuit has held that “the NVRA only pertains to records maintained by the State.” Voting for Am., Inc. v. Steen, 732 F.3d 382, 399 (5th Cir.2013). The Court of Appeals concluded that the NVRA Public Disclosure Provision did not cover documents in the possession of volunteer deputy registrars “before they are officially received or maintained by the State.” Id. Steen dictates the same result in this case. The Republican Party is not an arm of the State, and the NVRA Public Disclosure Provision therefore does not apply to it. Indeed, Plaintiffs appear to concede that its NVRA claims are not directed at the Republican Party. Plaintiffs have offered no evidence that the Republican Party possesses any of the documents at issue in this case or that True the Vote or any another individual requested documents from the Republican Party other than absentee ballot applications and envelopes. Accordingly, summary judgment in favor of the Republican Party is proper on Plaintiffs’ two NVRA claims.

b. Are the County Defendants Proper Defendants?

In this case, Plaintiffs sue the Election Commissions of nine Mississippi Counties (collectively, the “County Defendants”). The County Defendants contend that they are not proper parties and seek dismissal on that basis.

i. Mississippi’s Registration and Election Oversight Structure and Procedure

Under Mississippi law, various individuals and entities oversee voter registration and elections. Indeed, both Federal and Mississippi law contemplate that voter registration activities will be conducted at the State and local (e.g., County) levels. Mississippi has created an intricate system for voter registration, updating of voter eligibility lists, and management of election ballots, ballot applications, and ballot boxes, all designed to preserve the integrity of the registration and electoral processes.

At the top of the Mississippi Equal Protection administration pyramid sits the State Board of Election Commissioners, which is comprised of “the Governor, Secretary of State and the Attorney General.” The Secretary of State also serves as Mississippi’s “chief election officer.” As the State’s chief election officer, the Secretary of State must coordinate all State responsibilities under the NVRA. The Office of the Secretary of State is responsible for implementing and maintaining the Statewide Elections Management System (“SEMS”), “a centralized database of all registered voters in the [S]tate.” Finally, the Secretary of State is authorized to collect data concerning voter participation in elections and to develop a program to train poll workers and Circuit Clerks.

In each county, the Clerk of the Circuit Court serves as the “Registrar.” The Registrar serves a four-year term of office. The Registrar is primarily responsible for registering citizens to vote.

Each County must also elect a board of five Election Commissioners (the “Election Commission”). Election Commissioners serve four-year terms. The Election Commission internally selects a chairman and a secretary. The Registrar is not a member of the County Election Commission. County Election Commissions are responsible for overseeing and running elections. The Chairman of a County’s Election Commission is charged with printing and distributing the ballots for “each general or special election.” The Election Commission as a whole must “canvass the returns, give certificates of election, and make report to the Secretary of State.”

County Executive Committees oversee primary elections. Each political party has its own Executive Committee for each County. County Executive Committees “shall perform all duties that relate to the qualification of candidates for primary elections, print ballots for primary elections, appoint the primary election officers, resolve contests in regard to primary elections, and perform all other duties required by law to be performed by the county executive committee.” After a primary is held, the County Executive Committee meets to “receive and canvass the returns” and to “declare the result” for that County. A County Executive Committee may authorize-the Circuit Clerk or County Election Commission to perform primary election-related duties.

County Registrars and Election Commissions act in concert with respect to ballots received before and during an election. Election Commissions are responsible for procuring ballot boxes for use at all general elections. These ballot boxes are also used at primary elections, and County Executive Committees are responsible for distributing the boxes before a primary election. Registrars receive absentee ballots and deposit them into ballot boxes. The Registrar is responsible, after the votes in an election have been counted, for preserving “all applications, envelopes and the list of absent voters along with the ballots and other election materials.” After an election, “the ballot boxes shall be delivered ... to the clerk of the circuit court of the county for preservation; and he shall keep them for future use, and, when called for, deliver them to the commissioners of election.”

ii. Analysis

Copiah County, Jefferson Davis County, and Lauderdale County contend that they are not proper parties to this lawsuit because Plaintiffs asked only their respective Circuit Clerks, and not the County Election Commissions (ie., the County Defendants), for specified documents. In other words, these County Defendants contend that there is no possibility that they violated the NVRA because there is no evidence that they were asked for NVRA documents.

While these County Defendants appear to be correct factually, their dismissal from this suit on this basis is not warranted. First, each County Circuit Clerk and Election Commission has access to certain voter election records at different times during the pre-election registration, election day voting, and post-election tabulation processes. Plaintiffs’ requests for documents appear to have spanned periods when the materials were in the custody of different election oversight entities, and the actual custodians for any given County are unclear. Summary judgment in favor of these County Defendants on this basis is not warranted.

Further, the Counties implement Federal and State voter registration and election laws through the coordinated work of the Circuit Clerks, Registrars, and Election Commissions. If relief were granted to Plaintiffs, various entities and officials would need to implement the ruling. The Counties, through one or more of these election-related entities and individuals, are therefore necessary parties in this action, and dismissal of the County Defendants is unwarranted. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 19(a)(1)(A) (requiring joinder of any person without whom “the court cannot accord complete relief among the existing parties”); Cornhill Insurance PLC v. Valsamis, Inc., 106 F.3d 80, 84 (5th Cir.1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 818, 118 S.Ct. 69, 139 L.Ed.2d 30 (1997).

Defendant Hinds County asserts a different argument as to why it is an improper defendant. According to Hinds County, the NVRA Public Disclosure Provision applies only to State election officials, not County Election Commissions, because the provision specifically refers to States. See 42 U.S.C. § 1973gg-6(i) (“Each State shall maintain ... ”). While State election officials are certainly responsible for enforcing Federal laws relating to elections, the Counties also must comply with these statutes, including the NVRA’s voter registration provisions and other rules and procedures dictated by the statute. Other courts confronted with NVRA lawsuits have likewise recognized that Counties or County officials were proper parties to the suit. See generally Project Vote/Voting for Am., Inc. v. Long, 682 F.3d 331 (4th Cir. 2012) (city registrar sued as defendant); Steen, 732 F.3d at 399-400 (rejecting application of NVRA to “volunteer deputy registrars,” and noting that the NVRA “pertains to records maintained by the State,” including the counties, such as was the ease in Project Vote). Accordingly, the Court denies Hinds County’s Motion on this basis.

c. Is Hosemann a Proper Defendant?

Hosemann also contends that he is an improper party because “[he] does not have any documents [PJlaintiffs claim to have requested from local Circuit Clerks, and [PJlaintiffs have never directed any NVRA requests to him.” While Hosem-ann concedes that he is Mississippi’s “chief election official,” he argues that he neither has the “authority or duty” to enforce the NVRA Public Disclosure Provision, nor the authority to compel local County Clerks to disclose documents.

The Court concludes that Hosemann is a proper Defendant in this case. The Public Disclosure Provision places the burden on “[ejach State ” to maintain records and make them available for inspection. 42 U.S.C. § 1973gg-6(i)(1) (emphasis added). The responsibility to ensure disclosure of required records thus ultimately falls on the State itself, and Hosemann as its chief election official. To the extent a State delegates record-maintenance and disclosure duties to local governments, the State nevertheless remains responsible if documents are not properly disclosed under the Public Disclosure Provision. See United States v. Missouri, 535 F.3d 844, 849 (8th Cir.2008) (“For example, Congress expressly used the term ‘ensure’ for the requirement that ‘the identity of the voter registration agency through which any particular voter is registered is not disclosed to the public.’ Missouri is directly responsible for ensuring this identity remains undisclosed, and if Missouri delegated this responsibility, it could not avoid liability for any failure to maintain such nondisclosure.”); Harkless v. Brunner, 545 F.3d 445, 452-53 (6th Cir.2008) (“Congress grafted the NVRA onto the existing.public assistance structure, under which the fifty states, not their political subdivisions, have the ultimate accountability ... [TJhe Secretary, as Ohio’s chief election officer, is responsible for “harmonious combination”—or implementation and enforcement—of that program on behalf of Ohio.”). Accordingly, Hosemann is a proper party in this lawsuit.

2. Does Section 1973gg~9 Pose a Procedural Bar to Plaintiffs’ Suit?

The NVRA creates a private right of action for individuals whose rights under the statute are violated. See 42 U.S.C. § 1973gg-9(b). The NVRA, however, requires claimants to take certain.steps before filing an action. First, “a person who is aggrieved by a violation of this subchap-ter may provide written notice of the violation to the chief election official of the State involved.” Id., § 1973gg-9(b)(l). Second, an aggrieved person must wait 90 days after the State officer’s receipt of notice (or wait 20 days if the violation occurred within 120 days before an election), and, if the violation is not corrected, the person may then bring a civil action in federal court. Id., § 1973gg-9(b)(2). If, however, “the violation occurred within 30 days before the date of an election for Federal office,” the aggrieved person does not have to provide notice to the State’s chief election official, and thus does not have to wait 90 days, before filing a lawsuit. Id., § 1973gg-9(b)(3).

Defendants contend that Plaintiffs failed to satisfy the notice requirements of Section 1973gg-9(b), and that this case therefore should be dismissed. The Court agrees in substantial part. Plaintiffs complain that Defendants violated the NVRA by failing to provide them documents in accordance with the statute’s Public Disclosure Provision, 42 U.S.C. § 1973gg-6(i). Plaintiffs requested the vast majority of these documents after the June 24, 2014 Republican primary runoff election. Testimony elicited at the July 24th Hearing and evidence Plaintiffs later submitted show that Plaintiffs’ document requests occurred largely on or about July 7 and 8, 2014. Because these alleged violations occurred after—and not within 30 days before—the primary runoff election, the NVRA required Plaintiffs to provide notice of these violations to the Mississippi Secretary of State and to give the State 90 days to correct any violations before filing suit.

Engelbrecht, the President of True the Vote, on the other hand testified that she made document requests in Panola, Hinds, and Rankin Counties prior to the election. In Panola County, Engelbrecht requested a report of individuals who voted in the June 3, 2014 Republican primary. Because Panola County granted that request, there was no NVRA violation. In Hinds and Rankin Counties, Engelbreeht requested absentee ballot applications and envelopes a few business days before the primary runoff election, and both Counties denied her request. Because these alleged violations of the NVRA occurred within 30 days prior to the election, True the Vote was not required to provide pre-suit notice to the State. Thus, Plaintiffs’ NVRA claims are statutorily barred under Section 1973gg-9(b) except to the extent that Plaintiff True the Vote sues Defendants Hinds County and Rankin County seeking disclosure of absentee ballot applications and envelopes.

Plaintiffs offer four reasons why Section 1973gg-9(b)(2) does not bar their suit. None of these contentions is persuasive. First, Plaintiffs argue that under Section 1973gg-9(b)(3), notice need not be given for any violation that occurs “within 30 days of’ a Federal election, and the violations in this case occurred within 30 days “of’ the June 24, 2014 primary runoff election. To the extent Plaintiffs urge that violations that occur within thirty-days after an election are exempt from notice, the contention is belied by the plain language of the statute. Section 1973gg-9(c) specifically limits this exemption to violations that occur “within 30 days before the date of an election.” 42 U.S.C. § 1973gg-9(b)(3) (emphasis added). Violations that occur after an election must be addressed through the statute’s notice and opportunity to cure provisions.

To the extent Plaintiffs argue that no notice was necessary for any of their requests because all of the violations in this case occurred within 30 days prior to the election, Plaintiffs’ own evidence defeats their argument. Only Engelbrecht, on behalf of True the Vote, made any document request prior to the primary runoff election. The pre-election requests that were denied were in Hinds and Rankin Counties and pertained only to absentee ballot applications and envelopes. All other requests were made, and the alleged violations at issue occurred, after the June 24, 2014 primary runoff election. Thus, True the Vote has authority to sue Hinds and Rankin Counties for these alleged NVRA violations without satisfying the NVRA notice and cure requirements. However, True the Vote and the other Plaintiffs did not meet the notice requirements regarding any of the other alleged violations.

Second, Plaintiffs argue that Section 1973gg-9(b)(2) is not jurisdictional; they contend the requirements are simply “a practical guide for enabling states in violation of the NVRA to correct the violation.” Plaintiffs’ interpretation of Section 1973gg—9(b)(2) is unpersuasive. Although the notice provision uses the term “may,” the context of this provision establishes that pre-suit notice is mandatory. See Broyles v. Texas, 618 F.Supp.2d 661, 691-92 (S.D.Tex.2009) (Rosenthal, J.), aff'd on other grounds 381 Fed.Appx. 370 (5th Cir.2010). The provision’s requirements, including the requirement to wait 90 days before bringing suit, would otherwise serve no purpose and make no sense. Reading the statute otherwise would render those requirements nugatory. See National Council of La Raza v. Miller, 914 F.Supp.2d 1201, 1208-13 (D.Nev.2012) (dismissing plaintiffs’ claims under NVRA for failure to comply with statute’s notice requirements); Broyles, 618 F.Supp.2d at 691-92 (same).

Third, Plaintiffs argue that even if the NVRA’s notice requirements are normally a bar to relief, notice was not required in this case because “the act would be futile” given that the State “openly and plainly refuses to comply with the NVRA.” The Sixth Circuit endorsed a similar view on the facts before it. See Ass’n of Community Organizations for Reform Now v. Miller, 129 F.3d 833, 838 (6th Cir.1997). The Miller Court noted that the “purpose of the notice requirement” was “to provide states in violation of the [NVRA] an opportunity to attempt compliance before facing litigation.” Id. The Court of Appeals held that because Michigan had “received actual notice” of the plaintiffs’ complaints and made clear its refusal to comply with the NVRA, requiring the plaintiffs to file individual notice would amount “to requiring performance of futile acts.” Id.

Miller is factually inapposite and its reasoning is thus unpersuasive in this case. In Miller, the defendants asserted that the NVRA violated the 10th Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and refused to enforce the statute at all. See id. at 835. In the case at bar, there is no wholesale refusal by Mississippi or the County Defendants to comply with the NVRA. Rather, the parties’ positions differ on the scope of a single section of the law, the Public Disclosure Provision. Also, the timing of Plaintiffs’ demands for inspection and copying of documents distinguishes Miller. Plaintiffs filed suit only one or two days after making the vast majority of document requests at issue. The requests here were made to several Counties directly, not to the State, and were made shortly after the June 24, 2014 primary runoff election. The Secretary of State denied receiving any NVRA requests or written notice of alleged violations prior to commencement of'this suit. Had Plaintiffs provided the Secretary of State written notice of exactly what materials they sought and their claims of NVRA violations, the parties may well have worked out an expeditious solution that would have prevented this litigation. See Ga. State Conference of N.A.A.C.P. v. Kemp, 841 F.Supp.2d 1320, 1335 (N.D.Ga.2012) (“The apparent purpose of the notice provision is to allow those violating the NVRA the opportunity to attempt compliance with its mandates before facing litigation.”). For example, Defendants could have provided Plaintiffs the age of each voter for whom information was requested, which may have obviated much of the need for Plaintiffs to obtain the exact birthdate of each voter.

Fourth, Plaintiffs appear to argue that Engelbrecht’s pre-election request to certain counties is sufficient to clear the statutory hurdle for the rest of the requests at issue. The Court disagrees. The NVRA’s notice provision provides that if a violation is not corrected within 90 days, “an aggrieved person may bring a civil action in an appropriate district court for declaratory or injunctive relief with respect to the violation.” 42 U.S.C. § 1973gg-9(b)(2) (emphasis added). In other words, the statute contemplates that an aggrieved person will file a complaint with the chief election official of a State, and, if the violation is not corrected, will file a lawsuit relating to the particular violation about which the plaintiff provided notice. Section 1973gg-9(b)(3), as noted, waives notice where a violation occurs within 30 days before an election, and allows an aggrieved person to immediately file a civil action “under paragraph (2).” Id., § 1973gg-9(b)(3) (cross-referencing subsection 9(b)(2)). Under the plain statutory language, Engelbrecht may sue to enforce only the alleged NVRA violations she experienced prior to the primary runoff election. True the Vote and the Individual Plaintiffs present no statutory basis authorizing them to bootstrap alleged post-election NVRA violations onto the alleged pre-election violations.

Accordingly, Section 1973gg-9(b)(2) is a procedural bar to the majority of Plaintiffs’ claims in this lawsuit. On this basis alone, summary judgment in favor of the Defendants is proper on Plaintiffs’ NVRA claims except with respect to True the Vote’s claim that Hinds and Rankin Counties violated the NVRA by failing to disclose absentee ballot applications and envelopes pursuant to the NVRA Public Disclosure Provision.

3. What Documents Do Plaintiffs Seek?

The Court next addresses the question of what documents Plaintiffs seek. Plaintiffs’ various pleadings, briefs, and statements at the July 24th Hearing have painted varying pictures. In their pleadings, Plaintiffs seek an injunction barring Defendants from redacting information in “voter registration applications, absentee voting envelopes, absentee ballots and any other associated applications therewith, voter rolls, voter poll books, and federal post card applications.” In various other places, Plaintiffs request disclosure of only a more limited set of documents. For example, in their Complaint, Plaintiffs request a declaration that the NVRA preempts Mississippi law “regarding the redaction of information from voter rolls and the costs of the same.” Elsewhere, Plaintiffs focus on “poll books,” which they term “the records at issue in this case.” At the July 24th Hearing, Plaintiffs’ counsel repeatedly restricted Plaintiffs’ requests to unredacted voter rolls, poll books, absentee ballot applications and envelopes, and “overseas applications to vote” (presumably, Federal Post Card Applications). Moreover, Plaintiffs’ witnesses at the hearing testified that they requested only a limited set of documents from the various Counties, namely, poll books and absentee ballot applications and envelopes. Finally, and notably, in moving for summary judgment, Plaintiffs did not brief or present evidence on the applicability of the NVRA to voter registration applications. Plaintiffs limited their submission to the documents enumerated at the July 24th Hearing, i.e., “voter rolls, pollbooks, federal post card applications and absentee ballot applications and envelopes.”

The Court accordingly deems Plaintiffs to have abandoned claims for disclosure of documents not enumerated at the July 24th Hearing or in their briefing, such as voter registration applications. The Court addresses Plaintiffs’ NVRA claims with respect to voter rolls, poll books, absentee ballot applications and envelopes, and Federal Post Card Applications (collectively, the “Requested Documents”).

4. Are Plaintiffs Entitled Under the NVRA to Inspect the Requested Documents?

The Court next addresses the merits of Plaintiffs’ NVRA claims. Central is the question whether the NVRA Public Diselo-"sure Provision, 42 U.S.C. § 1973gg-6(i), applies to the Requested Documents. The Court turns to that question.

a. Statutory Construction

i. Plain Meaning—Overall Principles

“[T]he starting point in interpreting a statute is its language, for if the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter.” Arif v. Mukasey, 509 F.3d 677, 681 (5th Cir.2007) (quoting Good Samaritan Hosp. v. Shalala, 508 U.S. 402, 409, 113 S.Ct. 2151, 124 L.Ed.2d 368 (1993)); see also United States v. Renda, 709 F.3d 472, 481 (5th Cir.2013). In interpreting a statute, a Court should look to “the particular statutory language at issue, as well as the language and design of the statute as a whole.” Renda, 709 F.3d at 481 (quoting Frame v. City of Arlington, 657 F.3d 215, 224 (5th Cir.2011)). Courts should “give the words of a statute their ordinary, contemporary, common meaning, absent an indication Congress intended them to bear some different import.” Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 420, 431, 120 S.Ct. 1479, 146 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000).

The Public Disclosure Provision provides:

(1) Each State shall maintain for at least 2 years and shall make available for public inspection and, where available, photocopying at a reasonable cost, all records concerning the implementation of programs and activities conducted for the purpose of ensuring the accuracy and currency of official lists of eligible voters, except to the extent that such records relate to a declination to register to vote or to the identity of a voter registration agency through which any particular voter is registered.

(2) The records maintained pursuant to paragraph (1) shall include lists of the names and addresses of all persons to whom notices described in subsection (d)(2) of this section are sent, and information concerning whether or not each such person has responded to the notice as of the date that inspection of the records is made.

42 U.S.C. § 1973gg-6(i). As the Fourth Circuit aptly stated, the language of the Public Disclosure Provision “embodies Congress’s conviction that Americans who are eligible under law to vote have every right to exercise their franchise, a right that must not be sacrificed to administrative chicanery, oversights, or inefficiencies.” Project Vote, 682 F.3d at 334-35.

The NVRA Public Disclosure Provision requires States to permit inspection and copying (ie., disclosure) of “all records” that: (1) concern the implementation of a program or activity; (2) that is conducted for the purpose of ensuring the accuracy and currency; (3) of official lists of eligible voters.

First, the term “all records,” as the Fourth Circuit has observed, has an “expansive meaning,” and encompasses a variety of voter registration and removal documents. See Project Vote, 682 F.3d at 336. To be within this disclosure provision, a record must “concern the implementation of programs and activities.” The word “concern” is a broad term meaning “to relate or refer to.” To “implement” means to “fulfill” or “carry out.” A “program” is “a schedule or system under which action may be taken towards a desired goal” and an “activity” is “a specific deed, action, function, or sphere or action.” Thus, records disclosable under the Public Disclosure Provision must relate to specific plans, functions, or actions carried out for the purposes of ensuring official lists of eligible voters are “accurate” and “current.”

A list of voters is “accurate” if it is “free from error or defect” and it is “current” if it is “most recent.” Thus, “a program or activity covered by the Public Disclosure Provision is one conducted to ensure that the state is keeping a 'most recent’ and errorless account” of voter lists. Project Vote, 752 F.Supp.2d 697, 706 (E.D.Va. 2010).

Further, the records must relate to “official lists of eligible voters.” A list is “official” if it is “authorized or issued authoritatively.” A voter is “eligible” if she is “fit or proper to be chosen.” Put simply, an “official list of eligible voters” is an authoritative list of those individuals in a State that are “qualified or entitled to vote.” Id.

Thus, to be subject to disclosure under the NVRA, a record must ultimately concern activities geared towards ensuring that a State’s official list of voters is error-less and up-to-date. These activities generally relate to voter registration and removal, the processes by which a State updates its lists to ensure they reflect all eligible voters. The Court must consider each component phrase or term of the Public Disclosure Provision in interpreting and applying the statute.

ii. Statutory Context of the Public Disclosure Provision within the NVRA

The Court must ensure that the NVRA Public Disclosure Provision is interpreted in light of the surrounding statutory provisions. The Public Disclosure Provision appears near the end of a detailed statute relating to voter registration and removal of ineligible voters from eligibility lists. The NVRA, as its title indicates, focuses on voter registration and removal, not on who voted in specific elections. Multiple provisions in the NVRA reflect this focus. See, e.g„ 42 U.S.C. § 1973gg-2(a) (“[I]n addition to any other method of voter registration provided for under State law, each State shall establish procedures to register to vote in elections for Federal office ... ”); id., § 1973gg-3(a) (“Each State motor vehicle’s license application ... shall serve as an application for voter registration with respect to elections for Federal office ... ”); id., § 1973gg-5 (detailing what shall serve as a “voter registration agency” and what services should be provided by those agencies); id., § 1973gg-6(b) (“Any state program or activity to protect the integrity of the electoral process by ensuring the maintenance of an accurate and current voter registration roll for elections for Federal office ... ”). The NVRA, by its terms and structure, is designed to ensure that eligible applicants in fact are registered and that ineligible registrants are removed from the States’ official voter lists. These features advance the NVRA’s goal of safeguarding the integrity of those eligibility lists. No provision of the NVRA governs the actions of States, Counties, or individuals in administering elections,

iii. Statutory Purpose of the NVRA

The Court may also look to the purposes of a statute to construe its meaning. See U.S. ex rel. Babalola v. Sharma, 746 F.3d 157, 161 (5th Cir.2014) (“This Court looks at the language of the statute as well as the design, object and policy in determining the plain meaning of a statute.”). In passing the NVRA, Congress found that:

(1) the right of citizens of the United States to vote is a fundamental right;

(2) it is the duty of the Federal, State, and local governments to promote the exercise of that right; and

(3) discriminatory and unfair registration laws and procedures can have a direct and damaging effect on voter participation in elections for Federal office and disproportionately harm voter participation by various groups, including racial minorities.

42 U.S.C. § 1973gg(a). Accordingly, Congress enacted the NVRA:

(1) to establish procedures that will increase the number of eligible citizens who register to vote in elections for Federal office;

(2) to make it possible for Federal, State, and local governments to implement this subchapter in a manner that enhances the participation of eligible citizens as voters in elections for Federal office;

(3) to protect the integrity of the electoral process; and

(4)to ensure that accurate and current voter registration rolls are maintained.

Id., § 1973gg(b). Furthermore, in considering the NVRA, the Senate Committee on Rules and Administration stressed that the law was meant to combat a trend of “declining numbers of voters who participate in Federal elections,” a contributing factor to which was “difficulties encountered by some who desire to register to vote.” The legislative record is replete with statements from Congressional Committees and Members of Congress stressing that law targeted voter registration. Thus, Congress’s stated purpose in enacting the NVRA concerned voter registration, not who voted in a particular election.

The NVRA Public Disclosure Provision is one means of ensuring compliance with the NVRA’s stated goals. By opening up voter registration records for inspection, the Public Disclosure Provision shines a light on States’ voter registration activities and practices. The Public Disclosure Provision thus helps “to ensure that accurate and current voter registration rolls are maintained.” 42 U.S.C. § 1973gg(b); see also Project Vote, 752 F.Supp.2d at 710 (“[I]t is evident that the last identified purpose of the statute is dependent upon, and is the culmination of, the fulfillment of the other purposes of the statute. Those other purposes clearly point toward increasing voter registration and ensuring that the right to vote is not disrupted by illegal and improper impediments ... ”). Congress did not express the purpose of regulating States’ supervision of individual elections, or enacting procedures to ensure the integrity of a particular round of balloting per se. The NVRA was not designed as a tool to root out voter fraud, “cross-over voting,” or any other illegal or allegedly illegal activity associated with casting a ballot on election day. Consequently, the purposes of the NVRA do not suggest that the Public Disclosure Provision mandates the disclosure of voting records from a specific election.

iv. Context of the NVRA Public Disclosure Provision in Light of Other Federal and State Laws

The statutory landscape within which the NVRA was enacted also demonstrates that Congress did not intend the NVRA to regulate voting procedures in elections or election challenges. Other Federal laws address these matters. And States have enacted detailed election codes establishing procedures for voting and election contests. In enacting the NVRA, Congress gave no indication that it intended to either supplement other Federal laws or preempt State laws concerning the election process. The NVRA establishes a uniform code for voter registration and removal. The Court declines to adopt Plaintiffs’ interpretation of the NVRA Public Disclosure Provision in a manner that would turn it into a posf-election discovery device for detecting voter fraud.

With this statutory framework in mind, the Court turns to the applicability of the NVRA to each set of records Plaintiffs request.

b. Requested Documents

i. The Mississippi Voter Roll

Plaintiffs seek access to an unredacted copy of the Counties’ voter rolls (collectively, the “Voter Roll”). In Mississippi, the Voter Roll is “a complete list of all Mississippi voters [in] all status categories”: active, inactive, pending, purged, and rejected. Mississippi has an electronic election recordkeeping system, SEMS, that contains its Voter Roll information. The Voter Roll is created from data in SEMS and is maintained by the State. Counties receive voter registration applications from individual registrants and must scan the applications and other pertinent registration documentation into SEMS.

The Voter Roll contains each voter’s name, unique identification number, residential and mailing addresses, voting precinct code, registration date, voter status, last date voted, and congressional district assignment. The Voter Roll does not contain voters’ dates of birth.

The Court concludes that there is no live controversy regarding disclosure of the Voter Roll. Defendants appear to agree that Mississippi’s Voter Roll is disc-losable under the NVRA. The Court likewise concludes that the Voter Roll is a “record” and is the “official list[ ] of eligible voters” under the NVRA Public Disclosure Provision. The process of compiling, maintaining, and reviewing the voter roll is a program or activity performed by Mississippi election officials that ensures the official roll is properly maintained to be accurate and current.

At the July 24th Hearing, Engelbrecht testified that True the Vote already has a copy of the Voter Roll. Moreover, the Voter Roll does not contain birthdates, the primary piece of information Plaintiffs seek over Defendants’ objections. Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ request for the Voter Roll is moot.

ii. Poll Books

Plaintiffs seek unredacted copies of poll books, contending that disclosure of these documents is required by the NVRA. Defendants contend poll books are not within the NVRA disclosure mandate and, alternatively, that poll books, if required to be disclosed under the NVRA, may be redacted to protect voters’ privacy interests in their birthdates (when accompanied with their names and current addresses).

“[A] poll book is a list of those voters who are eligible to vote in a particular election who are all ... on active status.” A separate poll book is printed for each voting precinct for each election approximately one week before an election. Poll books are generated from the electronically stored information on SEMS and contain each voter’s name, date of registration, voter registration number, current address, date of birth, and voting district. Additionally, poll books contain “a number of blank columns for the dates of elections.” For the elections held in Mississippi in June 2014, the poll books contained columns both for the June 3rd primary and for the June 24th primary runoff elections. Inactive, pending, purged, and rejected status voters are not listed in poll books. Voters not listed in poll books may submit a paper “affidavit ballot.” Poll books thus are not precinct-specific subsets of the voter eligibility lists maintained by the State and the Counties through SEMS.

Plaintiffs’ focus for this NVRA challenge is the June 24, 2014 primary runoff election. Under Mississippi’s “open primary” system, voters do not register by party affiliation. Thus, on a primary election day, voters may vote in either party’s primary. At polling precincts, poll workers for the Republican primary and for the Democratic primary are each given an identical copy of the county poll book. If an individual votes in a particular election, a poll worker will mark “voted” in the poll book column relevant to that election. Voters do not sign poll books. If an Election Commissioner determines that a voter is “disqualified from voting, by reason of removal from the supervisor[’]s district, or other cause, that fact shall be noted on the registration book and his name shall be erased from [that precinct’s] -pollbook.”

The Court concludes that poll books are not subject to disclosure under the NVRA Public Disclosure Provision. Poll books do not reflect all voters eligible to vote on election day. Poll books list only active status voters, which is a subset of all registered and potentially eligible voters. Inactive and pending status voters, for example, may still vote in an election despite not being listed in a poll book. The fact that these voters voted in the election will not be recorded in a precinct’s poll book.

Because poll books are only partial lists of eligible voters, they are not records that are reviewed to ensure the accuracy and currency of “official lists of eligible voters.” After an election, as in this case, poll books serve as a record of which active status voters voted in that election. Poll books are not used to update lists of eligible voters. Voter statuses do not change as a result of the State’s processing of poll books. Whether a voter in “active” status voted or failed to vote in a particular election does not affect that voter’s eligibility to vote in future elections.

Plaintiffs contend that poll books reflect whether an individual voted in a party’s primary and thus are necessary to ensure that certain voters do not illegally vote in the other party’s primary runoff election. Plaintiffs thus argue that even if poll books do not concern “the accuracy and currency of official lists of eligible voters” regarding a primary or general election, poll books do concern the eligibility of voters for a primary runoff election. Plaintiffs point out that Mississippi’s open primary system permits a registered voter to vote in any party’s primary, but prohibits an individual who voted in one party’s primary from voting in the other party’s primary runof