Ford Motor Co. v. United States (44 F. Supp. 3d 1330, 2015)

OPINION

RIDGWAY, Judge:

In this action, Plaintiff Ford Motor Company challenges, iriter alia, the determination of the U.S. Customs Service that 17 drawback claims filed by Ford prior to December 3, 2004 (the “Drawback Claims”) were not deemed liquidated pursuant to 19 U.S.C. § 1504(a)(2), the statutory amendment enacted by Congress in December 2004 to expressly provide for the deemed liquidation of aging drawback claims. See Ford’s Motion for Judgment at 1-2, 5-6, 7, 10 (“Pl.’s Brief’); 19 U.S.C. § 1504(a)(2) (2006); see also Defendants’ Response, to Plaintiffs Motion for Judgment on the Agency Record at 22 (“Defs.’ Response Brief’) (noting that “the contested determination is [Customs’] determination that Ford’s drawback entries [ie., claims] did not become deemed liquidated as of December 3, 2005”).

Specifically, in its pending Motion for Judgment, Ford argues that the 17 Drawback Claims were deemed liquidated (ie., liquidated by operation of law) as of December 3, 2005, pursua-nt to subparagraph (C) of § 1504(a)(2). See, e.g., Pl.’s Brief at 1-2, 25; Ford’s Reply in Support of Motion for Judgment at 1 (“PL’s Reply Brief’); see generally Ford Motor Co. v. United States, 35 CIT -, -, 806 F.Supp.2d 1328, 1332-33 (2011) (“Ford Motor I”) (briefly summarizing Ford’s claims, in ruling on motion to dismiss). According to subparagraph (C):

An entry or claim for drawback filed before December 3, 2004, the liquidation of which.is not final as of December 3, 2004, shall be deemed liquidated on the date that is 1 year after December 3, 2004 [ie., on December 3, 2005], at the drawback amount asserted by the claimant at the time of the [drawback] entry or claim.

19 U.S.C. § 1504(a)(2)(C).

It is undisputed that Ford filed all 17 of the Drawback Claims before December 3, 2004; and it is similarly undisputed that all 17 of the Drawback Claims remained un-liquidated as of December 3, 2005. See, e.g., PL’s Brief at 2, 3, 25; Defs.’ Response Brief at 1-2, 3. As discussed in greater detail below, however, Customs has taken the position that, notwithstanding the language of subparagraph (C), drawback claims such as the 17 at issue here—ie., drawback claims that were filed before December 3, 2004, and which remained unliquidated one year later—were not deemed liquidated pursuant to that sub-paragraph if any of the import entries underlying the drawback claims were not yet liquidated and those liquidations final as of December 3, 2005. See, e.g., id. at 2, 3. And Customs maintains that, as to each of the 17 Drawback Claims at issue, there is at least one underlying import entry that was unliquidated and not final on that date. See, e.g., id. at 2, 7.

According to Customs, Ford’s Drawback Claims therefore fall within a different subparagraph of the statute—specifically, subparagraph (B) of 19 U.S.C. § 1504(a)(2). See, e.g., Defs.’ Response Brief at 3, 7. However, a drawback claim that is covered by subparagraph (B) is deemed liquidated only if the drawback claimant first “deposit[s] ... estimated duties on the unliquidated imported merchandise” and “fil[es] with the Customs Service ... a written request for ... liquidation” of the drawback claim, which “must include a waiver of any right to payment or refund under other provisions of law.” 19 U.S.C. § 1504(a)(2)(B); see also, e.g., Defs.’ Response Brief at 7. Because there is no dispute that Ford has not taken all of these actions, Customs concluded that the 17 Drawback Claims have never been deemed liquidated. See id. at 3-4, 7,12-13,15.

In its opening brief, Ford states that it seeks both declaratory and injunctive relief—that is, “a declaratory judgment that Customs’ interpretation of 19 U.S.C. § 1504(a)(2)(C) as meaning that a drawback claim remains open and not subject to deemed liquidation as long as any underlying consumption [i.e., import] entry remains unliquidated is ... arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law,” as well as “[a] declaratory judgment that Customs has no legal authority to review, liquidate, or take any action with respect to the Drawback Claims, other than to recognize their proper status as finally liquidated at the amounts claimed .by Ford,” in addition to “permanent injunctive relief consistent with such declaratory reliefPl.’s Brief at 2, 9-10; see also Ford’s Supplemental Brief in Support of Motion for Judgment at 11 (“Pl.’s Supp. Brief’) (stating that Ford seeks a determination that “Ford’s Drawback Claims have been deemed liquidated by operation of law, ... because the Drawback Claims liquidated as aging claims subject to 19 U.S.C. § 1504(a)(2)”).

Jurisdiction lies under 28 U.S.C. § 1581(i). See Ford Motor I, 35 CIT-, 806 F.Supp.2d 1328 (denying motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, holding that action presents case or controversy that is both ripe and within Court’s (i) jurisdiction). For the reasons detailed below, Customs’ interpretation of 19 U.S.C. § 1504(a)(2) cannot stand. Plaintiffs Motion for Judgment therefore must be granted.

I. Background

For purposes of this case, “drawback” refers to Customs’ refund of duties that were paid upon the importation of an article or materials which were later exported. 19 U.S.C. § 1313; 19 C.F.R. § 191.2(i)-(k) (2006). As the Court of Appeals has explained, the purpose of such drawback is not to “compensate for duty overpayments, but instead [to] help enforce the United States’ policy of ‘encouraging] domestic manufacture of articles for export and ... allowing] those articles to compete fairly in the world marketplace.’ ” Shell Oil Co. v. United States, 688 F.3d 1376, 1382 (Fed. Cir.2012) (citing Hartog Foods Int'l, Inc. v. United States, 291 F.3d 789, 793 (Fed.Cir. 2002)). The Government notes that, generally, under circumstances such as those here, “if imported merchandise is either exported or manufactured into an article that is exported, the exporter (or [the] person to whom [has been] transferred the right) [i.e., the drawback claimant] is entitled to a refund of up to 99 percent of the duties that were paid on the merchandise upon its importation.” Defs.’ Response Brief at 10.

Given the nature of a drawback claim, there are two relevant sets of entries: (1) the underlying “import entry” or entries (also known as the “consumption entry” or entries) filed with Customs at the time of importation; and (2) the drawback entry (or “drawback claim”), filed some time after importation, which covers one or more underlying import entries. Customs finalizes the payment of drawback through the process of the “liquidation” of a drawback claim. 19 C.F.R. §§ 159.1, 191.81. Customs’ practice, memorialized in its regulations, is generally to defer the liquidation of drawback claims until either all import entries underlying the drawback claim have been liquidated and those liquidations are “final” (ie., the period for filing of any protest or claim against the liquidation of the import entries has expired), or the drawback claimant has filed a waiver with a deposit of any additional duties owed on the imported merchandise. 19 C.F.R. § 191.81(a)(1) & (2) (providing that “[drawback entries may be liquidated after: (1) [liquidation of the [underlying] import entry becomes final; or (2) [deposit of estimated duties on the imported merchandise ... before liquidation of the import entry”); see generally Defs.’ Response Brief at 10; Defendants’ Supplemental Briefing Pursuant to the Court’s June 17, 2013 Order at 2 n. 2, 3 (“Defs.’ Supp. Brief’).

In agency parlance, Customs considers a drawback claim to be “workable” (ie., ready for liquidation) when all of the import entries that underlie that' drawback claim have been liquidated and those liquidations have become final. See Defs.’ Response Brief at 10-11. The Government argues that Customs’ practice of deferring liquidation of drawback claims until after the underlying import entries have been liquidated and become final (or until the drawback claimant has filed a waiver and deposited any additional duties) is necessitated by Customs’ concern about the potential for improper double refunds of import duties, as well as by considerations of Customs’ administrative convenience (or “feasibility”)—ie., the administrative burden that would be imposed on the agency in coordinating the liquidation of import entries at 300-plus ports of entry with the liquidation of drawback claims at the four offices that Customs has designated to process drawback claims. See Defs.’ Supp. Brief at 3-5 (summarizing Customs’ rationale for deferring liquidation of drawback claims until after underlying import entries are liquidated and final). However, there is no statute that requires Customs to defer liquidation of drawback claims until after the underlying import entries have been liquidated and become final.

In certain circumstances, Customs pays a drawback claimant the estimated amount of drawback before the agency liquidates the claimant’s drawback claim, under a practice known as “accelerated payment.” 19 C.F.R. § 191.92(a)(1) (explaining that “[a]ccelerated payment of drawback consists of the payment of estimated drawback before liquidation of the drawback entry [i.e., drawback claim]”). The claimant thus benefits from being paid in advance of the processing of its claim. Later, when Customs liquidates the drawback claim, Customs reconciles the (estimated) accelerated payment and the actual liquidation amount. For drawback claims where the accelerated payment equals the amount determined at liquidation, the drawback claim liquidates as “no change,” and no bill is issued. On the other hand, where Customs has overpaid a drawback claim at the time of accelerated payment, Customs issues a bill to collect the balance owed to the United States. See Defs.’ Response Brief at 4-5.

Subject to certain limited exceptions not relevant here, drawback claims that are not affirmatively liquidated by Customs are “deemed liquidated” by operation of law, at the amount originally asserted by the claimant, pursuant to the provisions of the statute at issue in this action—that is, 19 U.S.C. § 1504(a)(2). Prior to December 3, 2004, the liquidation statute provided for the deemed liquidation of import (ie., consumption) entries, but did not expressly address the deemed liquidation of drawback claims. Concerned that growing numbers of aging drawback claims were collecting dust at Customs, and were “ereat[ing] an unwarranted liability and the possibility that the [drawback] claimant [would] have to reimburse the U.S. Treasury any drawback monies paid to the claimant—even several years [after] the claim was paid to the drawback claimant,” Congress enacted 19 U.S.C. § 1504(a)(2) as part of the Miscellaneous Trade and Technical Corrections Act of 2004, in order to “remove such liability overhanging drawback claimants.” See Ford Motor I, 35 CIT at -, 806 F.Supp.2d at 1334 (quoting S.Rep. No. 108-28, at 172-73 (2003)); Miscellaneous Trade and Technical Corrections Act of 2004, Pub.L. No. 108-249, § 1563,118 Stat. 2434 (eff. Dec. 3, 2004).

In particular, Congress intended 19 U.S.C. § 1504(a)(2) to “require] U.S. Customs (1) to liquidate existing drawback claims, and (2) to liquidate future drawback claims within a specified period of time, as U.S. Customs already [did] for merchandise entered for consumption.” S.Rep. No. 108-28, at 173. In its entirety, 19 U.S.C. § 1504(a)(2) reads:

(2) Entries or claims for drawback

(A) In general

Except as provided in subparagraph (B)or (C), unless an entry or claim for drawback is extended under subsection (b) of this section [entitled “Extension”] or suspended as required by statute or court order, an entry or claim for drawback not liquidated within 1 year from the date of entry or claim shall be deemed liquidated at the drawback amount asserted by the claimant or claim. Notwithstanding section 1500(e) of this title [which requires Customs to give notice of liquidation], notice of liquidation need not be given of an entry deemed liquidated.

(B) Unliquidated imports

An entry or claim for drawback whose designated or identified [ie., underlying] import entries have not been liquidated and become final within the 1-year period described in subparagraph (A), or within the 1-year period described in subpara-graph (C), shall be deemed liquidated upon the deposit of estimated duties on the unliquidated imported merchandise, and upon the filing with the Customs Service of a written request for the liquidation of the drawback entry or claim. Such a request must include a waiver of any right to payment or refund under other provisions of law. The Secretary of the Treasury shall prescribe any necessary regulations for the purpose of administering this subparagraph.

(C) Exception

An entry or claim for drawback filed before December 3, 2004, the liquidation of which is not final as of December 3, 2004, shall be deemed liquidated on, the date that is 1 year after December 3, 2004 [ie., on December 3, 2005], at the drawback amount asserted by the claimant at the time of the entry or claim.

19 U.S.C. § 1504(a)(2).

Of the 17 Drawback Claims that remain at issue in this action, roughly half were filed between 1996 or 1997 and 1998 or 1999, with the remainder filed between 2001 and December 3, 2004. Transcript of Oral Argument at 3-4 (“Tr.”) (counsel for Ford); Defs.’ Response Brief at 1 (indicating that dispute involves Drawback Claims filed “between 1996 and 1998 and between 2001 and 2004”). Ford sought and received accelerated payment on all 17 of the Drawback Claims. Pl.’s Brief at 3; Defs.’ Response Brief at 4 & n. 8; 19 C.F.R. § 191.92 (setting forth the requirements for accelerated payment). Thereafter, for a period of years (and, in the case of Ford’s early-filed Drawback Claims, for nearly a decade), it was radio silence. Customs had no communication with Ford concerning any of the 17 Drawback Claims; and—because all of the Drawback Claims were filed before December 3, 2004 and because they remained unliquidated one year later—Ford considered all 17 of the Drawback Claims to have been deemed liquidated by operation of law on December 3, 2005, pursuant to 19 U.S.C. § 1504(a)(2)(C). Pl.’s Brief at 3.

In 2008, however, Ford learned that Customs was in the process of reviewing a number of Ford’s old drawback claims. Pl.’s Brief at 1. Then, in 2009, Customs began to affirmatively liquidate them. In some instances, the drawback claims were liquidated as “no change.” But, in other instances, the drawback claims were liquidated adversely to Ford, and Customs issued bills for duties demanding that Ford refund the portion of the accelerated drawback that had been previously paid to Ford which Customs now claimed to be excess. Id. at 1, 21; Defs.’ Response Brief at 5.

Among other things, Customs also has threatened that Ford may be subject to “national sanctions,” and has cautioned the company that it may be required to file “live entry” and to obtain a “new continuous bond with an increased bond liability amount.” Ford Motor I, 35 CIT at -& n. 13, 806 F.Supp.2d at 1337 & n. 13 (discussing threat of placement on national sanctions list); Second Amended Complaint for Injunctive and Declaratory Relief (“Complaint”) ¶¶ 29-30, 32-33 (summarizing Customs communications warning of possible requirement to file “live entry” and to obtain new continuous bond with increased liability coverage, as well as threat of placement on national sanctions list).

As summarized above, Customs’ interpretation of 19 U.S.C. § 1504(a)(2)—me-morialized in four internal Customs memo-randa included in the record—is that a drawback claim that was filed prior to December 3, 2004 cannot be deemed liquidated unless either (1) all of the import entries on which the drawback claim is based were liquidated and final as of December 3, 2005, or (2) the importer requests that the drawback claims be deemed liquidated in accordance with the procedures set forth in 19 U.S.C. § 1504(a)(2)(B). See, e.g., Defs.’ Response Brief at 3, 7; id. at 15 (citing Administrative Record at pp. 1-20 (“A.R.”)); Pl.’s Brief at 5-6. It is undisputed that Ford has never requested that the Drawback Claims at issue here be deemed liquidated in accordance with 19 U.S.C. § 1504(a)(2)(B). See, e.g., Defs.’ Response Brief at 3-4, 7. And, according to Customs, as to each of the Drawback Claims at issue, at least one underlying import entry remained unliquidated as of December 3, 2005. See, e.g., id. at 2, 7, 16. Customs therefore maintains that Ford’s Drawback Claims have never been deemed liquidated. Id. at 7.

Ford commenced this action seeking a declaratory judgment as to the proper interpretation of 19 U.S.C. § 1504(a)(2) and the liquidation status of its Drawback Claims, as well as injunctive relief precluding Customs from, inter alia, reviewing, affirmatively liquidating, or taking any other such action as to the Drawback Claims. See Complaint, at 24-25 (Prayer for Relief ¶¶ C-H) (declaratory relief); id., at 24 (Prayer for Relief ¶¶ A-B) (injunctive relief).

II. Standard, of Review

In an action commenced under 28 U.S.C. § 1581(i), the applicable standard of review is set forth in the Administrative Procedure Act, at 5 U.S.C. § 706. See 28 U.S.C. § 2640(e); Gilda Industries, Inc. v. United States, 622 F.3d 1358, 1362-63 (Fed.Cir.2010). Under that standard, “all relevant questions of law,” including the “interpretation] ... [of] statutory provisions,” are subject to judicial review to determine whethei. inter alia> the agen_ Cy>s actjonS) findings and conclusions are “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.” 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A); Gilda Industries, 622 F.3d at 1363; see also Verizon California, Inc. v. FCC, 555 F.3d 270, 273 (D.C.Cir.2009) (explaining that, “as with all agency actions subject to the Administrative Procedure Act,” an agency’s statutory interpretations “must not be arbitrary and capricious”).

Under the fámiliar Chevron framework, an agency’s statutory interpretations are reviewed using a two-step analysis, examining first “whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue.” Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842, 104 S.Ct. 2778, 81 L.Ed.2d 694 (1984). If so, the court “must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.” id. at 842-43, 104 S.Ct. 2778. On the other hand, “if the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue,” the analysis proceeds to the second step, where “the question for the court is whether the agency’s answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute.” Id., 467 U.S. at 843, 104 S.Ct. 2778.

The Supreme Court has emphasized that “[t]he judiciary is the final authority on issues of statutory construction and must reject administrative constructions which are contrary to clear congressional intent.” Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843 n. 9, 104 S.Ct. 2778. Thus, “[i]f a court, employing traditional tools of statutory construction, ascertains that Congress had an intention on the precise question at issue, that intention is the law and must be given effect.” Id.

III. Analysis

•The Government maintains that Customs properly interpreted 19 U.S.C. § 1504(a)(2) in ruling that Ford’s Drawback Claims were not deemed liquidated on December 3, 2005 under subparagraph (C) of the statute. According to Customs and the Government, Ford’s Drawback Claims were not subject to subparagraph (C), because (according to Customs) each of the Drawback Claims had at least one underlying import entry which was unliq-uidated and not final as of December 3, 2005. Customs and the Government contend that Ford’s Drawback Claims instead were subject to subparagraph (B) of the statute, such that the Drawback Claims could be deemed liquidated only if Ford complied with the requirements specified in that provision (which Ford has not done).

As explained below, however, the Government’s position is without merit. The construction of subparagraph (C) that is advocated by Customs and the Government cannot be reconciled with the plain language of that provision—or, for that matter, with the statute’s legislative history. Nothing in the language of subpara-graph (C) even hints that the deemed liquidation of drawback claims thereunder is dependent in any way on the liquidation status of the import entries on which the drawback claims are based. Indeed, sub-paragraph (C) does not even allude to import entries. The interpretation that Customs and the Government give subpar-agraph (C) thus could be sustained only if one were to conclude that Congress did not mean what it unambiguously and unequivocally said.

Subparagraph (C) could not be more definitive or more clear. All drawback claims as to which liquidation was not final on December 3, 2004 which were not affirmatively liquidated by Customs within one year thereafter became deemed liquidated on December 3, 2005, without regard to the liquidation status of the underlying import entries. See 19 U.S.C. § 1504(a)(2)(C). Ford’s Motion for Judgment therefore must be granted.

A. Overview of the Basic Structure and Operation of 19 U.S.C. § 1501(a)(2)

Congress designed the three subpara-graphs of the statutory provision at issue—19 U.S.C. § 1504(a)(2)—to comprehensively address the liquidation of drawback claims, providing both a timetable for Customs’ affirmative liquidation of drawback claims, and, for the first time, expressly providing for the deemed liquidation of drawback claims. Moreover, mindful of the mounting numbers of drawback claims that were then pending before Customs (and the negative impact of the attendant contingent liabilities that hung indefinitely over the heads of importers and others in the international trade community), Congress both put in place a one-time mechanism for the swift resolution of the then-existing (ie., pre-December 3, 200í, or pre-enactment) drawback claims and, in addition, established a framework, for the liquidation of all future (ie., post-enactment) drawback claims.

Subparagraph (A). The parties are in agreement that subparagraph (A) of the statute (captioned “In general”) sets forth the basic rule that—on a prospective basis (ie., as to drawback entries or claims filed on or after the December 3, 2004 effective date of the statute)—any such drawback entry or claim that is “not liquidated within 1 year from the date of entry or claim shall be deemed liquidated at the drawback amount asserted by the claimant or claim,” subject to a limited number of specified exceptions. See 19 U.S.C. § 1504(a)(2)(A); see generally Pl.’s Brief at 11 (summarizing Ford’s understanding of subparagraph (A)); Defs.’ Response Brief at 11 (same, as to Government and Customs). In particular, pursuant to the express terms of subparagraph (A), the general rule set forth in that subparagraph does not apply if Customs properly extends the liquidation period, or if liquidation is suspended by statute or by court order. 19 U.S.C. § 1504(a)(2)(A).

The general rule set forth in subpara-graph (A) also is not applicable if subpara-graph (B) or subparagraph (C) applies. See 19 U.S.C. § 1504(a)(2)(A). As discussed in greater detail below, the general focus of subparagraph (B) is drawback entries or claims where the underlying import entries have not yet been liquidated and become final. See 19 U.S.C. § 1504(a)(2)(B). In contrast, the focus of subparagraph (A) is on drawback entries or claims that are (in Customs’ shorthand) “workable”—ie., drawback entries or claims where the liquidation of the underlying import entries has become final. Subparagraph (C), in turn, is addressed to drawback entries or claims that were “filed before December 3, 2004, the liquidation of which is not final as of December 3, 2004.” See 19 U.S.C. § 1504(a)(2)(C).

Subparagraph (A)’s cross-reference to subparagraph (C)—the effect of which is to carve out an exception to subparagraph (A) for drawback entries or claims that were filed before December 3, 2004—en-sures that the general rule of subpara-graph (A) operates only prospectively. Absent that carve-out, unliquidated drawback entries and claims that were filed before December 3, 2004 could have been deemed liquidated retroactively, pursuant to subparagraph (A), as of “1 year from the date of [the] entry or claim.” See 19 U.S.C. § 1504(a)(2)(A). The parties agree that subparagraph (A) has no relevance in the case at bar.

Subparagraph (B). In general, subpara-graph (B) of the statute (captioned “Unliq-uidated imports”) operates to give parties the option of having their so-called “non-workable” drawback entries and claims deemed liquidated, notwithstanding underlying import entries that are unliquidated and not yet final, provided that a party “deposits] ... estimated duties on the unliquidated imported merchandise” and files with Customs “a written request for the liquidation of the drawback entry or claim.” 19 U.S.C. § 1504(a)(2)(B). The statute mandates that any such written request “must include a waiver of any right to payment or refund under other provisions of law” (id), to ensure that duties will not be refunded to the importer via other means (such as a protest of the liquidation). See generally Defs.’ Response Brief at 19-21 (discussing in detail the potential for “double refund of duties paid on an import entry,” and citing [¶] H024645 (Dec. 1, 2008) (summarizing the potential for “a refund of the duty on the same merchandise to be paid twice” and highlighting the protection provided by the waiver required under subparagraph (B))); Defs.’ Response Brief at 10 (similar). Sub-paragraph (B) applies generally to drawback entries and claims where one or more of the import entries that underlie the drawback entry or claim “have not been liquidated and become final within the 1-year period described in subparagraph (A)” (ie., “within 1 year from the date of the [drawback] entry or claim”) or “within the 1-year period described in subpara-graph (C)” (ie., within the one-year period preceding December 3, 2005). 19 U.S.C. § 1504(a)(2)(A)-(C); see generally PL’s Brief at 11-12 (summarizing Ford’s understanding of subparagraph (B)); Defs.’ Response Brief at 12 (same, as to Government and Customs).

As noted above, the Government contends that the Drawback Claims at issue here fall within subparagraph (B) of the statute, because—according to the Government—each of the Drawback Claims had one or more underlying import entries that had not been liquidated and become final, and-—according to the Government—such drawback claims are covered only by sub-paragraph (B). See, e.g., Defs.’ Response Brief at 7. By contrast, Ford maintains that its Drawback Claims fall squarely within subparagraph (C). See, e.g., PL’s Brief at 1-2, 3,12, 25.

Subparagraph (C). Subparagraph (C) (captioned “Exception”) is retrospective in scope. 19 U.S.C. § 1504(a)(2)(C). Specifically, subparagraph (C) applies only to those drawback entries or claims that were “filed before December 3, 2004” (the effective date of the statute) and as to which liquidation was not final as of that date. Id. Under subparagraph (C), all such drawback entries and claims “[were] deemed liquidated” on the one-year anniversary of enactment (ie., on December 3, 2005) at the amounts asserted by the claimants in the respective drawback entries and claims. Id.

The aspects of the statute outlined above are not at issue. The merits of the parties’ positions on points in dispute are analyzed in detail below.

B. The Merits of the Parties’ Competing Readings of the Statute

According to Customs, deemed liquidation under subparagraph (C) of 19 U.S.C. § 1504(a)(2) applies to drawback claims that are specifically described by that subparagraph—ie., pre-enactment drawback claims that had not been liquidated as of December 3, 2004, and which remained unliquidated on December 3, 2005—but only to the extent that all import entries underlying those drawback claims had been liquidated and become final as of December 3, 2005. See, e.g., Tr. at 39 (counsel for Government argues that subparagraph (C) applies only to drawback claims that were “workable”); Defs.’ Response Brief at 2-3, 7,12 (same). In other words, Customs reads into subparagraph (C) a restrictive condition that appears nowhere in the language of that provision.

Customs contends that, as to any pre-enactment drawback claims with underlying import entries that were not yet liquidated and final on December 3, 2005, “deemed liquidation is provided for only by subparagraph (B) and only to the extent provided in that subparagraph.” Defs.’ Response Brief at 12; see also id. at 7, 15. Because—according to Customs—each of Ford’s Drawback Claims had one or more underlying import entries that had not been liquidated and become final as of December 3, 2005, Customs asserts that the Drawback Claims could only have been deemed liquidated under subparagraph (B), and “equally by operation of the statute, [the Drawback Claims] do not fall within the scope of [subparagraph (C)].” Defs.’ Response Brief at 12; Defs.’ Supp. Brief at 1-2; Defendants’ Supplemental Response Brief Pursuant to the Court’s June 17, 2013 Order at 5-6 (“Defs.’ Supp. Response Brief’); see also Defs.’ Response Brief at 7, 9, 15; Defs.’ Supp. Brief at 8-9; Defs.’ Supp. Response Brief at 3, 11-12.

It is undisputed that Ford did not fulfill the requirements set forth for deemed liquidation under subparagraph (B), including depositing estimated duties on unliquidat-ed import entries, filing a written request for liquidation of the drawback claims, and waiving any rights to payment or refund under other provisions of law. Defs.’ Response Brief at 3-4, 7, 12-13, 15; 19 U.S.C. § 1504(a)(2). Customs therefore maintains that Ford’s Drawback Claims have never been deemed liquidated. Defs.’ Response Brief at 12; Defs.’ Supp. Brief at 2, 9; Defs.’ Supp. Response Brief at 5-6,11-12.

As Ford explains, however, Customs’ construction of 19 U.S.C. § 1504(a)(2) cannot be squared with the plain language of the statute. Pl.’s Brief at 1-2, 5-6, 9-10; PL’s Reply Brief at 4-5; PL’s Supp. Brief at 10; Ford’s Reply to Defendants’ Supplemental Briefing at 3-4 (“PL’s Supp. Response Brief’). In particular, Customs strains mightily to read into the text of subparagraph (C) a drawback claim “workability” requirement that simply is not there. In the process, Customs (and the Government) misread both subparagraph (B) and subparagraph (C) alike.

The Government argues that subpara-graph (A) “sets out a general rule concerning deemed liquidation of drawback claims, subject to the exceptions ‘provided in sub-paragraph (B) or (C).’” Defs.’ Supp. Response Brief at 6 (quoting 19 U.S.C. § 1504(a)(2)(A)). Asserting that “[t]he question presented by this litigation is the relationship between subparagraphs (B) and (C),” the Government posits that “[a]s between the two [subparagraphs], ... sub-paragraph (B) controls any time the designated or identified import entries have not been liquidated and become final within the 1-year period from December 3, 2004 through December 3, 2005 (‘the 1-year period described in subparagraph (C)’).” Id. The Government accuses Ford of construing subparagraph (C) “in isolation” and “ignoring] the existence and significance” of subparagraph (B). Defs.’ Response Brief at 17; Defs.’ Supp. Response Brief at 4. According to the Government, “[w]hen a drawback claim falls squarely within the scope of subparagraph (B), sub-paragraph (C) cannot override (B) and force a deemed liquidation when the requirements of subparagraph (B) have not been met (ie., the deposit, liquidation request, and waiver requirements).” Id. at 6.

But neither Customs nor the Government identifies any ambiguity in the plain language of subparagraph (C), on which Ford relies. And the language in subpar-agraph (B) on which Customs and the Government rely—referring to “the 1-year period described in subparagraph (C)”—performs a function that is entirely different than what Customs and the Government claim.

Contrary to the assertions of Customs and the Government, subparagraph (B) operates prospectively only and has no effect on the deemed liquidation of pre-enactment drawback claims (including the 17 Drawback Claims at issue here), which are governed solely by subparagraph (C). Subparagraph (B)’s reference to “the 1-year period described in subparagraph (C)”—like subparagraph (B)’s parallel reference to “the 1-year period described in subparagraph (A)”—merely defines a time frame in non-calendar terms (as legislators often are forced to do).

Nothing in the text of subparagraph (B) plausibly can be construed to place a limitation on the operation of subparagraph (C). Contrary to the claims of Customs and the Government, the reference in subpara-graph (B) to “the 1-year period described in subparagraph (C)” did not (and was not intended to) impose a condition on deemed liquidation pursuant to subparagraph (C), a provision that is, on its face, unambiguous, unequivocal, and without restriction, limitation, reservation, or qualification. Instead, the effect of the reference to “the 1-year period described in subparagraph (C)” at the beginning of subparagraph (B) was to ensure that, under any conceivable scenario, Customs had a minimum of at least one year from the enactment of the statute to review and take appropriate action on drawback claims (including review of the unliquidated, non-final import entries associated with them) before any party could avail itself of the option of demanding deemed liquidation of a drawback claim pursuant to subparagraph (B).

Thus, for example, absent subparagraph (B)’s reference to “the 1-year period described in subparagraph (C),” any party with a drawback claim as to which there were underlying import entries that were unliquidated and not final would have had the option of invoking subparagraph (B) to demand deemed liquidation of that drawback claim as early as the effective date of the statute—ie., as early as December 3, 2004 (the date of the statute’s enactment). As such, the reference to “the 1-year period described in subparagraph (C)” operates not as a limitation on deemed liquidation under subparagraph (C) (as Customs and the Government contend), but, rather, was designed to afford Customs a measure of protection by ensuring that deemed liquidation pursuant to subparagraph (B) (ie., deemed liquidation at the option of a drawback claimant) could take place no sooner than deemed liquidation pursuant to subparagraph (C) (ie., the statutorily-prescribed deemed liquidation of pre-enactment drawback claims that remained unliquidated as of December 3, 2005)—that is, no sooner than December 3, 2005. In other words, Congress sought to ensure that, under both subpara-graphs (B) and (C), Customs had a transition period of one year to adapt to the new regime for deemed liquidation of drawback claims—a year for Customs to get its house in order.

Customs and the Government thus cannot graft onto subparagraph (C) a restriction limiting deemed liquidation under that provision to only those pre-enactment drawback claims that were (in Customs’ lingo) “workable” (ie., drawback claims where all underlying import entries were liquidated and final) as of December 3, 2005. As discussed above, Customs and the Government misread the language in subparagraph (B) on which they rely. And, more importantly, the language of subparagraph (C) admits of no ambiguity. On its face, the plain language of subpara-graph (C) provides for the deemed liquidation of any drawback claim filed before December 3, 2004, “the liquidation of which [was] not final as of December 3, 2004.” See PL’s Supp. Response Brief 4. Unlike subparagraph (B), subparagraph (C) makes no mention of underlying import entries. Thus, as Ford emphasizes, the language of subparagraph (C) “is not qualified or restricted in any way, and is without limitation with respect to the liquidation status of underlying [import] entries.” Pl.’s Brief at 12; see also id. at 13; PL’s Reply Brief at 2, 4-5; PL’s Supp. Brief at 9-10; PL’s Supp. Response Brief at 3-4. Although Congress surely could have limited deemed liquidation under sub-paragraph (C) to so-called “workable” drawback claims, Congress conspicuously did not do so.

In short, without regard to the status of underlying import entries, the plain and unambiguous language of subparagraph (C) mandated that Customs had exactly one year (ie., from December 3, 2004 to December 3, 2005) in which to liquidate drawback claims that were filed before December 3, 2004 as to which liquidation was not final as of that date, including (but not limited to) Ford’s Drawback Claims. As of December 3, 2005, all such claims that Customs had not affirmatively liquidated (for whatever reason)—including the Drawback Claims at issue here—were deemed liquidated by operation of law, at the amounts asserted by the claimants.

The Government cautions that giving subparagraph (C) its “plain meaning” reading will lead to unintended and untoward consequences. But none of the Government’s arguments and concerns can trump the clear and unambiguous language of that provision.

The Government first hypothesizes “a situation where a claimant can file a claim, [Customs] makes preliminary refund in an accelerated payment based solely on what was asserted by the claimant, the claimant refuses to file a waiver and the claim is deemed liquidated simply because the underlying import entries have not liquidated.” Defs.’ Response Brief at 17. The Government argues that Customs thus will be “strip[ped] ... of its ability to review the accuracy of the claim,” a result that the Government asserts is contrary to the statute. Id. In fact, however, as Ford points out, the “plain meaning” reading of subparagraph (C) does not strip Customs of its ability to review the accuracy of any drawback claims, except to the extent expressly contemplated by Congress.

In other words, as to drawback claims like those at issue—filed before December 3, 2004—Congress gave Customs one full year in which to review the accuracy of the claims and to decide whether to affirmatively liquidate them at amounts other than those claimed at the time of the filing of the drawback claim. Here, it was Customs’ choice not to review and affirmatively liquidate Ford’s Drawback Claims within the one-year period established by Congress.

Further, the “plain meaning” reading of subparagraph (C) will govern only the finite universe of specific cases such as this, where a drawback claim was filed prior to December 3, 2004 and Customs failed to take action on that claim before December 3, 2005—the very circumstances envisioned by Congress in enacting subpara-graph (C). The “plain meaning” reading of subparagraph (C) clearly will not apply to any drawback claims filed after December 3, 2004, including any claims that are filed in the future. See generally Pl.’s Reply Brief at 7.

Similarly unavailing is the Government’s claim that the “plain meaning” reading of subparagraph (C) will somehow render subparagraph (B) “nugatory.” Defs.’ Response Brief at 17-18. But see PL’s Reply Brief at 7. The Government asserts that, to the extent that subparagraph (B) and sub-paragraph (C) are carve-outs from subpar-agraph (A), the two subparagraphs must be read together and harmonized. Defs.’ Response Brief at 18. Based on that principle, the Government maintains that sub-paragraph (C) should not be read to override subparagraph (B) so as to “force a deemed liquidation of an entry described in (B) [ie., a drawback claim with underlying import entries that have not been liquidated and become final] in circumstances where the deposit, liquidation request, and waiver requirements [of subparagraph (B) ] are not met.” Id.

Arguing in a somewhat circular fashion, the Government contends that such an override must be avoided because, the Government claims, subparagraph (B) is the sole subparagraph under which “a drawback claim ... [can be] deemed liquidated where the [underlying] import entries have not been liquidated and become final.” Defs.’ Response Brief at 18. The Government reasons that, “where, as here, (1) the drawback claims were filed before December 3, 2004 and the liquidation of those claims was not final as of December 3, 2004 (ie., the factual conditions for application of subparagraph (Q), and (2) the import entries [underlying the drawback claims] have not been liquidated and become final ... (ie., the factual conditions for application of subparagraph (B)), sub-paragraph (B) must control, because it limits deemed liquidation to only those claims satisfying the deposit, liquidation request, and waiver requirements” imposed by sub-paragraph (B). Id. at 18-19. The Government’s argument thus seems to be that the “plain meaning” reading of subparagraph (C) renders the protections inherent in subparagraph (B) “nugatory” as to those pre-enactment drawback claims that were deemed liquidated under subparagraph (C), despite underlying import entries that remained unliquidated. See 19 U.S.C. § 1504(a)(2)(B); Defs.’ Response Brief at 17-19.

However, this argument fundamentally misreads the statute. Congress designated subparagraphs (B) and (C) as exceptions to the general one-year deemed liquidation rule of subparagraph (A). Congress did not make subparagraph (B) an exception to the rule of subparagraph (C).

Lastly, in a related argument, the Government suggests that the “plain meaning” reading of subparagraph (C) “could lead to a double refund of duties paid on an import entry or place the Government in the position of choosing between two potentially eligible claimants for the same refund.” Defs.’ Response Brief at 19. The Government emphasizes that “[t]he framework of [subparagraph (B) ] was meant to address this situation, and ensure that a double refund of duties does not occur,” by requiring drawback claimants to comply with the deposit, liquidation request, and waiver provisions of that subparagraph. Id. at 20; 19 U.S.C. § 1504(a)(2)(B).

But the Government ignores the language, the purpose, and the operation of subparagraph (C). Under that provision, Customs had one full year from the date of enactment to take any actions vis-a-vis pre-enactment drawback claims that Customs determined to be necessary to prevent double refunds; and only in the absence of Customs’ affirmative liquidation of a drawback claim during the one-year period was that drawback claim deemed liquidated on the one-year anniversary of enactment. Even more to the point, sub-paragraph (C) had no effect on any import entries underlying the pre-enactment drawback claims. Customs—not the drawback claimants—retained control of the liquidation of all underlying import entries (subject only to the statutory constraints applicable to all import entries in general), and thus Customs remained free to take any measures necessary with respect to those import entries to avoid double refunds even after related drawback claims were deemed liquidated pursuant to subparagraph (C). In sum, contrary to the Government’s suggestion, nothing about subparagraph (C) precluded Customs from taking action to protect against double refunds. See generally n. 23, supra (explaining, inter alia, various courses of action open to Customs, to protect against double refunds and related concerns).

As discussed above, Customs does not dispute that Ford’s 17 Drawback Claims were “filed before December 3, 2004.” 19 U.S.C. § 1504(a)(2)(C). Nor does Customs dispute that Ford’s Drawback Claims were not liquidated and final as of that date. Id. Similarly, Customs does not dispute that Ford’s Drawback Claims remained unliquidated as of “the date that [was] 1 year after December 3, 2004.” Id. Thus, there can be no dispute that Ford’s Drawback Claims are described precisely by the plain language of subparagraph (C). Yet Customs’ construction of the statute paradoxically would exclude from deemed liquidation under subparagraph (C) drawback claims (such as Ford’s Drawback Claims) that even Customs and the Government concede are described with precision by that provision—an anomalous outcome, by any measure. Neither Customs nor the Government can point to any language in subparagraph (C) to support the result that they advocate. Nor can they leverage any language in subparagraph (B) to create an ambiguity (or “gap”) in subpara-graph (C) where none exists.

Under Chevron, where—-as here—“Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue” (i.e., whether the deemed liquidation of pre-enactment drawback claims under subsection (C) was dependent in any way on the liquidation status of underlying import entries), and where—as here—the language of the statute is clear, then “that is the end of the matter; for the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.” Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43, 104 S.Ct. 2778.

C. The Legislative History

Because the express terms of 19 U.S.C. § 1504(a)(2)(C) are clear and unambiguous on their face, there is no cause to resort to the various other tools of statutory construction to determine whether Congress intended to deem liquidated by operation of law, on December 3, 2005, drawback claims such as the Drawback Claims at issue here (whether or not there were underlying unliquidated and non-final import entries). As the Court of Appeals has explained, “[t]o ascertain whether Congress had an intention on the precise question at issue, [the Court] employfs] the ‘traditional tools of statutory construction.’ ” Timex V.I., Inc. v. United States, 157 F.3d 879, 882 (Fed.Cir.1998) (citing Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843 n. 9, 104 S.Ct. 2778). “The first and foremost ‘tool’ to be used is the statute’s text, giving it its plain meaning.... Because a statute’s text is Congress’s final expression of its intent, if the text answers the question, that is the end of the matter.” Id. (citations omitted). “[T]he authoritative statement is the statutory text, not the legislative history or any other extrinsic material.” Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Services, Inc., 545 U.S. 546, 568, 125 S.Ct. 2611, 162 L.Ed.2d 502 (2005).

In any event, as summarized below, there is nothing in the legislative history to cast doubt on the “plain meaning” reading of the language of 19 U.S.C. § 1504(a)(2)(C). To the contrary, the legislative history is fully consonant with the plain meaning of the text of that provision, evincing Congress’s concern about Customs’ backlog of aging drawback claims, and, in particular, Congress’s desire to separately address both future and existing drawback claims, and to “wipe the slate clean” of existing drawback claims through the vehicle of subparagraph (C). Equally significant, the legislative history is devoid of any indication that Congress intended to limit deemed liquidation under subparagraph (C) to only those drawback claims where the underlying import entries were liquidated and final as of December 3, 2005 (or, for that matter, in any other way).

The legislative history of § 1504(a)(2) (addressing the liquidation of drawback claims) is properly viewed in the context of the history of 19 U.S.C. § 1504 in general, and, in particular, the provisions governing the liquidation of import entries, on which the more recent provisions relating to liquidation of drawback claims were based. Specifically, the Customs Procedural Reform and Simplification Act of 1978 imposed—for the first time—limitations on the time for Customs’ liquidation of import entries, and provided for deemed liquidation by operation of law where Customs fails to liquidate import entries in a timely fashion. The legislative history makes it clear that Congress’ enactment of limitations on Customs’ liquidation of import entries in 1978 was motivated by the same types of concerns that drove Congress to adopt similar limitations on the liquidation of drawback claims in 2004.

In introducing the 1978 Act, the Senate Committee on Finance explained that the new limitations on the liquidation of import entries were designed to “increase certainty in the customs process for importers, surety companies, and other third parties with a potential liability relating to a customs transaction.” S.Rep. No. 95-778, at 32 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2211, 2243. The Committee noted that, at that time, under the then-existing law, delays in liquidation of import entries often meant that “an importer [could] learn years after goods have been imported and sold that additional duties are due,” or that an importer “[could] have deposited more money for estimated duties than [were] actually due but be unable to recover the excess for years as he await[ed] liquidation.” Id.

By imposing strict limits on Customs’ ability to extend the period for liquidation of import entries and by providing for the deemed liquidation of such entries, Congress sought to “[e]liminate ... unanticipated requests by Customs, many years after importation, for additional duties which often resulted] in substantial losses to importers because they [were] unable to anticipate such duties when pricing their products.” S.Rep. No. 95-778, at 4, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2215. The Senate Finance Committee further noted that the new limitations on Customs’ liquidation of import entries were responsive to concerns expressed by “several of the countries 'participating in the Multilateral Trade Negotiations,” which had “requested that the United States establish a time limit within which liquidation [of import entries] must occur.” Id. at 32, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2243.

This understanding of the purpose and effect of § 1504’s limitations on Customs’ liquidation of import entries has been recognized on multiple occasions by both the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit and this Court. See, e.g., Koyo Corp. v. United States, 497 F.3d 1231, 1239-40 (Fed.Cir.2007) (noting, inter alia, that “Congress enacted the deemed liquidation statute to prevent Customs from belatedly assessing additional duties and from indefinitely retaining duties deposited in excess”); Ambassador Div. of Florsheim Shoe v. United States, 748 F.2d 1560, 1565 (Fed.Cir.1984) (explaining that “the true intent of § 1504, besides relieving importers of prolonged uncertainty, was to bring the United States into conformity with international expectations interpreted to require that duty liabilities should be ascertained and fixed generally within a year after entry”).

The legislative history of the 2004 amendments to § 1504 addressing the liquidation of drawback claims echoes many of the same reservations that Congress identified in 1978 with respect to the liquidation of import entries. The history of the 2004 amendments explains that, at that time, “[e]xisting law only set[ ] forth a time line for the liquidation of import entries and ... [did] not require the liquidation of drawback claims within a statutory time frame.” > S.Rep. No. 108-28, at 172 (2003). Congress voiced concern that, “[a]s a result, drawback claims [were] generally not liquidated by U.S. Customs within a reasonable period of time,” and often “remain[ed] outstanding for years.” Id.

Congress emphasized that “without liquidation, a contingent liability for U.S. businesses [ie., drawback claimants] ... is created for the amount of each drawback claim because U.S. Customs can challenge the drawback amount or value of the goods for which drawback was claimed until liquidation occurs.” S.Rep. No. 108-28, at 172. Congress further noted that “[i]f drawback claims are never liquidated, for an open-ended time period the drawback claimant’s claim unfairly remains subject to challenge by U.S. Customs,” “creating] an unwarranted liability and the possibility that the claimant will have to reimburse the U.S. Treasury any drawback monies paid to the claimant—even several years from when the claim was actually made and money was paid to the drawback claimant.” Id. at 172-73.

The legislative history highlights the fact that, in responding to the expressed concerns, Congress sought to address the liquidation of existing drawback claims and the liquidation of future drawback claims separately, drawing a bright line between the two and taking a different approach to the challenge that each presented:

This [amendment] would remove [the] liability overhanging drawback claimants by requiring U.S. Customs (1) to liquidate existing drawback claims, and (2) to liquidate future drawback claims within a specified period of time, as U.S. Customs already does for merchandise entered for consumption [ie., for import entries].

S.Rep. No. 108-28, at 173 (emphases added). Like the text of subparagraph (C) itself, the legislative history draws no distinction among existing (ie., pre-enactment) drawback claims based on the status of the underlying import entries. Rather, the legislative history distinguishes only between existing drawback claims on the one hand (which are the subject of subpar-agraph (C) of § 1504(a)(2)) and future drawback claims on the other (which are the focus of subparagraphs (A) and (B) of that provision).

As reflected in both the text of the provision and the legislative history, Congress intended subparagraph (C) as a onetime, retrospective, transitional, clean-up provision, designed to eliminate Customs’ backlog of aging drawback claims—one way or the other—no later than December 3, 2005. Congress could have taken a more surgical approach. For example, certainly Congress could have limited deemed liquidation under subparagraph (C) to only those drawback claims with no underlying unliquidated import entries, had it wished to do so. Instead, however, Congress, in its wisdom, allowed Customs one year from the date of the statute’s enactment to take appropriate action on all existing (ie., pre-enactment) drawback claims, providing, at the same time, for finality and repose—ie., deemed liquidation'—-as to all such claims that were not affirmatively liquidated by the statute’s one-year anniversary.

In summary, frustrated by the history of drawback claims languishing at Customs, Congress gave the agency a limited, one-year window to “clear the decks” of all existing drawback claims. That window closed on December 3, 2005. As of that date, any pre-December 3, 2004 drawback claims that Customs had not affirmatively liquidated—including the 17 Drawback Claims at issue here—were deemed liquidated by operation of law, pursuant to, 19 U.S.C. § 1504(a)(2)(C), at the amounts asserted by the claimants.

IY. Conclusion

For all the reasons set forth above, Plaintiffs Motion for Judgment on the Record must be granted.

As applied to the 17 Drawback Claims at issue, Customs’ interpretation of 19 U.S.C. § 1504(a)(2)(C) as providing for the deemed liquidation of drawback entries and claims described by that subparagraph (ie., drawback entries and claims “filed before December 3, 2004, the liquidation of which [was] not final as of December 3, 2004”) only to the extent that such drawback entries and claims had no underlying import entries (ie., consumption entries) that were not liquidated and final as of December 3, 2005 is erroneous, arbitrary and capricious, and otherwise not in accordance with law. The 17 Drawback Claims at issue were deemed liquidated by operation of 19 U.S.C. § 1504(a)(2)(C) as of December 3, 2005, without regard to the liquidation status of the import entries (ie., consumption entries) underlying those Drawback Claims. And, finally, Customs has no legal authority to review, liquidate, or take any other action with respect to the 17 subject Drawback Claims (including the five that Customs purportedly affirmatively liquidated after this action was commenced ), other than to recognize the status of those Drawback Claims as deemed liquidated as of December 3, 2005, at the amounts claimed by Ford.

Judgment will enter accordingly.

. The U.S. Customs Service—formerly part of the U.S. Department of the Treasury—is now part of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, and is commonly known as U.S. Customs and Border Protection. See Bull v. United States, 479 F.3d 1365, 1368 n. 1 (Fed. Cir.2007). The agency is referred to as "Customs” herein.

. All citations to federal statutes are to the 2006 edition of the United States Code. The pertinent text of the cited provisions has remained substantially the same at all times herein, with the exception of 19 U.S.C. § 1504(a), which was amended on December 3, 2004.

Similarly, all citations to regulations are to the 2006 edition of the Code of Federal Regulations. The pertinent text of the cited provisions has remained substantially the same at all times herein, although some provisions were renumbered in 1998.

. Ford takes strong exception to Customs' assertion that the 17 Drawback Claims had underlying import entries that were not yet liquidated and final as of December 3, 2005. See, e.g., Pl.’s Brief at 2 (arguing that "all of the consumption [i.e., import] entries underlying Ford's Drawback Claims were liquidated” prior to December 3, 2005); id. at 6-7 (same); Pl.'s Reply Brief at 3 (stating that "no unliqui-dated consumption [i.e., import] entries prevented the deemed liquidation of Ford’s Drawback Claims on or before December 3, 2005”). This factual dispute has no effect on the disposition here, however. In other words, the analysis and the outcome are the same whether or not the 17 Drawback Claims had underlying import entries that were un-liquidated and not final as of December 3, 2005. Accordingly, the analysis below does not always state that Ford disputes Customs’ assertions on this point.

. A number of the 17 Drawback Claims at issue in this action are among the drawback claims at issue in Ford Motor Company v. United States of America, Court No. 10-00142, which—like this action—challenges Customs’ construction of 19 U.S.C. § 1504(a)(2). See Defs.’ Response Brief at 6 & Exh. 1; Joint Status Report at 6 & n. 7 (filed Feb. 29, 2012) (stating, inter alia, that five of the Drawback Claims here at issue are included in the 15 drawback claims at issue in Court No. 10-00142). That action currently is on the Court’s Reserve Calendar.

A second action, also captioned Ford Motor Company v. United States of America, Court No. 10-00014, similarly challenges Customs’ construction of the same statute. However, there is no overlap between the drawback claims at issue in that action and the Drawback Claims at issue here. Defs.' Response Brief at 6 & Exh. 1; Joint Status Report at 5-6. That action too remains on the Court’s Reserve Calendar.

Likewise, a third action, Ford Motor Company v. United States, Court No. 10-00138, also appears to challenge Customs' construction of § 1504(a)(2). See Summons (April 21, 2010), filed in Court No. 10-00138; Joint Status Report at 6. But, again, there is no overlap between the drawback claims at issue in that action and those at issue here. Id.

.Ford failed to file a proposed order or judgment with its briefs. See USCIT R. 7(b)(1)(E) (requiring all motions to "be accompanied by a proposed order”). Further, although Ford’s opening brief purports to include the requisite "short conclusion stating the relief sought,” that text states only that "Ford Motor Company respectfully requests that the Court grant Ford's Motion for Judgment, and provide Ford with such other and further relief as [the] Court deems to be just[,] proper and equitable.” See USCIT R. 81(j)(9); Pl.'s Brief at 28; see also USCIT R. 7(b)(1)(D) (requiring that all motions "state the relief sought”). And peppered throughout Ford's papers are numerous statements concerning requested relief that are, in various respects, overlapping and/or conflicting, making it (as a practical matter) impossible to be certain as to the preci