Joint Heirs Fellowship Church v. Ashley (45 F. Supp. 3d 597, 2014)

Citations

45 F. Supp. 3d 597

Full opinion text

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

SIM LAKE, District Judge.

Plaintiffs Joint Heirs Fellowship Church, Houston’s First Church of God, and Faith Outreach International Center (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) brought this action against the Executive Director and members of the Texas Ethics Commission, in their official capacities (collectively, “Defendants”) challenging certain provisions of the Texas Election Code. Pending before the court are Plaintiffs’ Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and Expedited Preliminary Injunctive Relief (“Motion for Preliminary Injunction”) (Docket Entry No. 2), Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (Docket Entry No. 52), and Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment and Memorandum in Support (“Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment”) (Docket Entry No. 53). For the reasons explained below, Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment will be denied, Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment will be granted in part, Plaintiffs’ Motion for Preliminary Injunction will be denied, and this case will be dismissed.

I. Background

Plaintiffs are incorporated churches that wish to become involved in efforts to recall certain elected officials. Plaintiffs Joint Heirs Fellowship Church and Houston’s First Church of God are located in Houston, Texas, and plaintiff Faith Outreach International Center is located in San Antonio, Texas.

When Plaintiffs filed their Motion for Preliminary Injunction, there was “a recall effort under way in San Antonio, Texas, to recall Mayor Julián Castro and council members Diego Bernal, Rebecca Viagran, Rey Saldaña, Shirley Gonzales, Ray Lopez, Cris Medina and Ron Nirenberg.” According to Plaintiffs, the “recall effort [was] premised on a proposed ordinance that these council persons and Mayor proposed and supported that is contrary to religious freedom and freedom of speech.” Plaintiffs desired “to immediately initiate their involvement in support of the San Antonio efforts.” Plaintiffs also contend that “some Houston city officials have supported policies that Plaintiffs feel are contrary to moral values and religious freedom,” and that “[p]laintiffs Joint Heirs Fellowship Church and Houston’s First Church of God would like to engage in immediate involvement in support of a recall election regarding one or more such officials.”

Plaintiffs allege that under certain provisions of the Texas Election Code they “cannot be involved in supporting the recall efforts through raising money, donating money, coordinating people’s activities, promoting the recall effort on church websites, allowing petitions to be signed and distributed on church grounds, speech supporting the effort, or in any way public[ly] supporting recall efforts.” Defendants are charged with enforcing the provisions of the Texas Election Code.

A. Plaintiffs’ Intended Conduct

Plaintiffs allege that they intend to engage in the following conduct:

a. Circulating recall petitions,

b. Submitting recall petitions,

c. Obtaining signatures and support for recall petitions or in opposition to recall petitions,

d. Promoting recall efforts in communications to the public, including but not limited to the posting of information on the Plaintiffs’ websites, church communications, bulletins, in the media, in interviews, and in other communications;

e. Encouraging others to circulate, support, or oppose recall petitions,

f. Utilizing or providing facilities, equipment, supplies, or personnel to assist in the signing and circulation of recall petitions and in connection with recall petitions,

g. Notifying the public that recall petitions are available for signing at their church[es] or other locations,

h. Raising and spending funds in support of recall petitions or in opposition to recall petitions,

i. Sending out emails and other communications to church members and to the public encouraging them to get involved in matters regarding recall petitions, including, without limitation, circulating and signing recall petitions,

j. Speaking from the pulpit and other venues in support of or in opposition to recall efforts,

k. Coordinate with the two other Plaintiff churches in this matter, and with other individuals and organizations, for the principal purpose of circulating and submitting recall petitions and otherwise advocating recalls, including through the raising and spending of funds, and the other actions mentioned above.

l. [Each Plaintiff] intends to contribute funds from its regular budget to support the recall or other measures-only efforts. Also, when raising funds for a recall effort or a measures-only effort, they intend to inform potential contributors that the funds will be used in connection with the recall effort or measures-only effort.

m. Doing any of the above activities in connection with a measures-only issue in addition to recall petition matters.

B. Procedural History

Plaintiffs filed their Original Complaint and Motion for Preliminary Injunction on January 17, 2014. On January 23, 2014, the court held a scheduling conference “to discuss an expedited schedule for the filing of motions and briefs” related to Plaintiffs’ Motion for Preliminary Injunction. A preliminary injunction hearing was scheduled for February 5, 2014. Defendants filed a response to Plaintiffs’ Motion for Preliminary Injunction on January 29, 2014. Plaintiffs filed a reply on February 3, 2014.

On February 4, 2014, Plaintiffs filed their proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law related to the preliminary injunction hearing. The court held the preliminary injunction hearing on February 5, 2014, and ordered the parties to submit a proposed schedule for the submission of supplemental briefing. The court urged the parties to confer and attempt to stipulate to conduct that they agree does not violate the Texas Election Code. On February 7, 2014, the parties filed a Joint Status Report and Proposed Scheduling Order. Plaintiffs filed their First Amended Complaint the same day. On February 10, 2014, the court entered a scheduling order on supplemental briefing.

On February 19, 2014, Defendants filed their proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law, and their supplemental briefing on Plaintiffs’ Motion for Preliminary Injunction. On February 21, 2014, Defendants filed a motion to dismiss. On March 3, 2014, Plaintiffs filed their supplemental briefing on their Motion for Preliminary Injunction. The parties subsequently indicated that they could not agree on a proposed order detailing specific conduct that does not violate the Texas Election Code.

On March 18, 2014, Plaintiffs filed their Second Amended Complaint. On March 21, 2014, Plaintiffs filed a response to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss. On April 2, 2014, Defendants filed an answer to Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Complaint.

On June 13, 2014, the parties submitted the pending motions for summary judgment. On July 3, 2014, the parties filed their responses. On July 18, 2014, the parties filed their replies.

II. Standard of Review

Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure mandates summary judgment “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). A party moving for summary judgment “bears the burden of identifying those portions of the record it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.” Lincoln Gen. Ins. Co. v. Reyna, 401 F.3d 347, 349 (5th Cir.2005). When the nonmoving party would bear the ultimate burden of proof at trial, the moving party may satisfy its summary judgment burden by “ ‘showing’—that is, pointing out to the district court—that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party’s case.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2554, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). Rule 56 does not require such a movant to negate the elements of the nonmovant’s case. Boudreaux v. Swift Transp. Co., 402 F.3d 536, 540 (5th Cir.2005). Where the moving party would bear the burden of proof at trial, it must present evidence that would require “a directed verdict if the evidence went un-controverted at trial.” Int’l Shortstop, Inc. v. Rally’s, Inc., 939 F.2d 1257, 1264-65 (5th Cir.1991).

Once the movant has carried this burden the nonmovant must show that material facts exist over which there is a genuine issue for trial. Reyna, 401 F.3d at 349 (citing Celotex, 106 S.Ct. at 2553-54). The parties may support the existence or nonexistence of a genuine fact issue by either (1) citing to particular parts of the record, including depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations, admissions, and interrogatory answers, or (2) showing that the materials cited do not establish the absence or presence of a genuine dispute or that an adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence to support the fact. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e)(l)(A)-(B). In reviewing this evidence “the court must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party, and it may not make credibility determinations or weigh the evidence.” Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 120 S.Ct. 2097, 2110, 147 L.Ed.2d 105 (2000).

III. Article III Standing

“Article III of the Constitution limits federal ‘Judicial Power,’ that is, federal-court jurisdiction, to ‘Cases’ and ‘Controversies.’ ” U.S. Parole Comm’n v. Geraghty, 445 U.S. 388, 100 S.Ct. 1202, 1208, 63 L.Ed.2d 479 (1980). “[T]he requirement that a claimant have standing is an essential and unchanging part of the case- or-controversy requirement of Article III.” Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind of Texas, Inc. v. Abbott, 647 F.3d 202, 208 (5th Cir.2011) (quoting Davis v. FEC, 554 U.S. 724, 128 S.Ct. 2759, 2768, 171 L.Ed.2d 737 (2008)) (internal quotation marks omitted). “To qualify for standing, a claimant must present an injury that is concrete, particularized, and actual or imminent; fairly traceable to the defendant’s challenged behavior; and likely to be redressed by a favorable ruling.” Id. (citing Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 2136, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992)). “To engage in a pre-enforcement review of a statute, as is the case here, a plaintiff must show an ‘intention to engage in a course of conduct arguably affected with a constitutional interest, but proscribed by statute, and ... a credible threat of prosecution thereunder.’ ” Hoyt v. City of El Paso, Tex., 878 F.Supp.2d 721, 731 (W.D.Tex. 2012) (quoting Babbitt v. United Farm Workers Nat’l Union, 442 U.S. 289, 99 S.Ct. 2301, 2309, 60 L.Ed.2d 895 (1979)). “The party invoking federal jurisdiction bears the burden of establishing these elements.” Lujan, 112 S.Ct. at 2136.

“When the plaintiff has alleged an intention to engage in a course of conduct arguably affected with a constitutional interest, but proscribed by a statute, and there exists a credible threat of prosecution thereunder, he ‘should not be required to await and undergo a criminal prosecution as the sole means of seeking relief.’ ” Babbitt, 99 S.Ct. at 2309 (quoting Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 93 S.Ct. 739, 745, 35 L.Ed.2d 201 (1973)). “But ‘persons having no fears of state prosecution except those that are imaginary or speculative, are not to be accepted as appropriate plaintiffs.’ ” Id. (quoting Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 91 S.Ct. 746, 749, 27 L.Ed.2d 669 (1971)); see also Hoyt, 878 F.Supp.2d at 730 (“An injury for standing purposes must be (a) concrete and particularized, and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.” (citing Lujan, 112 S.Ct. at 2136)). “In determining whether a threat is credible or speculative, the Fifth Circuit ‘look[s] to the practical likelihood that a controversy will become real.’ ” Hoyt, 878 F.Supp.2d at 731 (quoting Shields v. Norton, 289 F.3d 832, 835 (5th Cir.2002)). “In all cases, however, a plaintiff must intend to engage in statutorily proscribed activity.” Id. “Specifically, plaintiffs must demonstrate a serious [] interest [ ] in acting contrary to a statute.” Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind, 647 F.3d at 209 (quoting Miss. State Democratic Party v. Barbour, 529 F.3d 538, 545 (5th Cir.2008) (internal quotation marks omitted)). Because Defendants do not contest that Plaintiffs’ proposed conduct is affected by a constitutional interest, the court will look to whether such conduct is proscribed by statute and whether there is a credible threat of prosecution. Cf. Hoyt, 878 F.Supp.2d at 733-34 (acknowledging that “[i]t is well-established that ‘[petition circulation ... is ‘core political speech[ ]’ ” for which “First Amendment protection ... is ‘at i[t]s zenith’ ” and assuming without deciding that such activity is affected with a constitutional interest (quoting Buckley v. Am. Constitutional Law Found., Inc., 525 U.S. 182, 119 S.Ct. 636, 639-40, 142 L.Ed.2d 599 (1999))).

IV. Analysis

Plaintiffs challenge the constitutionality of eight provisions of the Texas Election Code: (1) § 253.094(b), (2) § 253.096, (3) § 253.094(a), (4) § 251.001(12), (5) § 252.001, (6) § 253.031(b), (7) § 251.001(2), and (8) § 251.001(6) With respect to each of the eight provisions, the court will first address whether Plaintiffs have met their burden to establish standing to challenge the provision. The court will then address the merits of those claims for which Plaintiffs have established standing.

Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Complaint raises both facial and as-applied challenges. “[F]acial and as-applied challenges have different substantive requirements.” Catholic Leadership Coal. of Texas v. Reisman, 764 F.3d 409, 425 (5th Cir.2014) (citing Doe v. Reed, 561 U.S. 186, 130 S.Ct. 2811, 2817, 177 L.Ed.2d 493 (2010)). “[T]o categorize a challenge as facial or as-applied [the court] look[s] to see whether the ‘claim and the relief that would follow reach beyond the particular circumstances of the [ ] plaintiffs.’ ” Id. (quoting Reed, 130 S.Ct. at 2817). If so, then the claim must “ ‘satisfy [the] standards for a facial challenge to the extent of that reach.’ ” Id. (quoting Reed, 130 S.Ct. at 2817).

Plaintiffs have two ways to prevail on a facial challenge. Id.; see also United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 130 S.Ct. 1577, 1587, 176 L.Ed.2d 435 (2010). “First, Plaintiffs can ‘establish that no set of circumstances exists under which [the law] would be valid or that the statute lacks any plainly legitimate sweep.’ ” Catholic Leadership, 764 F.3d at 426 (quoting Stevens, 130 S.Ct. at 1587). “Second, Plaintiffs may also invalidate a statute as overbroad if they demonstrate that ‘a substantial number of [the law’s] applications are unconstitutional, judged in relation to the statute’s plainly legitimate sweep.’.” Id. (quoting Stevens, 130 S.Ct. at 1587).

A. Plaintiffs’ Challenge to § 253.094(b)

Plaintiffs argue that § 253.094(b) “is a categorical ban on corporate contributions to recall matters and is still the law of Texas.” Defendants argue that Plaintiffs lack standing to challenge § 253.094(b) because they have failed to “plead any specific facts to demonstrate that the conduct in which they wish to engage will constitute a ‘political contribution’ that is actually barred by Defendants’ enforcement of § 253.094(a) or (b),” and, furthermore, Plaintiffs have failed to establish a credible threat of prosecution by the Texas Ethics Commission.

1. Plaintiffs’ Standing to Challenge § 258.094(b)

Section 253.094(b) states that “[a] corporation or labor organization may not make a political contribution in connection with a recall election, including the circulation and submission of a petition to call an election.” Tex. Elec.Code Ann. § 253.094(b) (West Supp.2014). Defendants point out that § 253.094(b) only prohibits the circulation and submission of a petition to call an election when such activity constitutes a “political contribution.” See Hoyt, 878 F.Supp.2d at 734 (“[T]he Texas legislature intended to prohibit only corporate political contributions, and not other types of campaign finance activity.”).

“The Texas Election Code distinguishes political contributions from political expenditures.” Hoyt, 878 F.Supp.2d at 735; see also Catholic Leadership, 764 F.3d at 415 (“Texas ... has two broad categories of political spending: contributions and expenditures.”)- Relevant to the facts of this case, a “political contribution” is a “direct or indirect transfer of money, goods, services, or any other thing of value,” “including the circulation and submission of a petition to call an election,” to a “political committee that is offered or given with the intent that it be used ... on a measure.” Tex. Elec.Code Ann. §§ 251.001(2), (3), (5) (West 2012), § 253.094(b) (West Supp. 2014); see also Hoyt, 878 F.Supp.2d at 734-35. A “political expenditure,” on the other hand, is “payment of money or any other thing of value” “made by any person .. on a measure.” Tex. Elec.Code Ann. §§ 251.001(6), (7), (10) (West 2012); see also Hoyt, 878 F.Supp.2d at 735.

A “measure” is “a question or proposal submitted in an election for an expression of the voters’ will and includes the circulation and submission of a petition to determine whether a question or proposal is required to be submitted in an election for an expression of the voters’ will.” Tex. Elec.Code Ann. § 251.001(19) (West 2012). It is undisputed that the term “measure” “includes a recall election as well as any effort to circulate petitions in support of holding a recall election.”

“Whether a particular activity constitutes a political contribution depends on the specific facts of the situation.” Hoyt, 878 F.Supp.2d at 735. “[A] political contribution requires contributions be made ‘to a ... political committee’ and be given with the ‘intent that it be used ... on a measure.’” Id.

Defendants allege that “to the extent each church wishes to engage in [efforts related to recall elections] on its oum and without coordinating with a candidate or political committee—such as by funding their own ads to support a recall effort, or by advertising a recall effort on a church website” such activity would constitute a “direct campaign expenditure,” rather than a political contribution, “and therefore would not be activity implicated by [§ 253.094(b) ].” Defendants further allege that “to the extent the pastor of each of the Plaintiff churches wishes to advocate independently to his or her congregation in support of a particular recall effort, that activity is neither covered nor prohibited by § 253.094.” Defendants contend that “such speech would not constitute a transfer of money, goods or services in coordination with a candidate or political committee, and therefore would not constitute a prohibited ‘contribution.’ ”

The court agrees that to the extent Plaintiffs wish to engage in recall efforts independently of each other or any political committee, such activity is not implicated by § 253.094(b). Plaintiffs therefore cannot show that such activity is “proscribed by statute.” Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind, 647 F.3d at 208 (quoting Miss. State Democratic Party, 529 F.3d at 545). Accordingly, Plaintiffs lack standing to challenge § 253.094(b) with regard to such conduct.

However, Plaintiffs allege that they also intend to coordinate with each other “and with other individuals and organizations, for the principal purpose of circulating and submitting recall petitions and otherwise advocating recalls, including through the raising and spending of funds, and the other actions” identified in their Second Amended Complaint. Plaintiffs specifically allege that they

are Texas corporations and want to engage in the circulation and submission of petitions to call for a recall election, by working in concert with each of the other plaintiffs and other interested individuals and organizations, to circulate and submit petitions, and publicly advocate the recall petition efforts, including through the concerted raising and spending of funds and contribution of facilities and resources.

Defendants acknowledge that Plaintiffs’ proposed coordination will render the three churches a “political committee” under Texas law. See Tex. Elec.Code Ann. § 251.001(12) (West 2012) (“‘Political committee’ means a group of persons that has as a principal purpose accepting political contributions or making political expenditures.”); Catholic Leadership, 764 F.3d 409 at n. 27 (“Texas does not make the political committee label voluntary-groups wishing to engage in collective political speech must comply with the burdens imposed by Texas law.”). Thus, Plaintiffs intend to engage in conduct that is proscribed by § 253.094(b) to the extent that each intends to make a “direct or indirect transfer of money, goods, services, or any other thing of value,” toward their coordinated efforts “with the intent that it be used ... on a measure.” Tex. Elec. Code Ann. §§ 251.001(2), (3), (5) (West 2012). For example. Plaintiffs allege that they each “intend[] to contribute funds from [their] regular budget to support the recall” and to “[cjoordinate with the two other Plaintiff churches in this matter ... for the principal purpose of circulating and submitting recall petitions,” among other things. Any contribution of “funds” from their budgets to their coordinated recall effort would constitute a prohibited political contribution under § 253.094(b).

Defendants acknowledge that such activity is barred by § 253.094(b) Defendants argue, however, that Plaintiffs cannot establish a credible threat of prosecution in light of Plaintiffs’ ability to register as a “direct campaign expenditure only committee” and a recent federal court injunction barring Defendants from enforcing “laws, rules, or regulations” that prohibit corporate political contributions to direct campaign expenditure only committees.”

(a) The Texans for Free Enterprise Injunction

The injunction at issue arose out of a challenge to § 258.094(a) and states:

Defendants TEXAS ETHICS COMMISSION, DAVID A. REISMAN, and their commissioners, agents, servants, employees, any other persons or entities in active concert or participation with Defendants are permanently enjoined from:

1. Enforcing or attempting to enforce the contribution restrictions of Sections 258.008(b) and 253.094(a) of the Texas Election Code, and any applicable rules and regulations regarding those provisions when applied to contributions to Texans for Free Enterprise and all other similarly situated corporations for the purpose of making direct campaign expenditures; and,

2. Enacting or attempting to enforce any other laws, rules, or regulations that violate the First Amendment rights of Texans for Free Enterprise and all other similarly situated corporations by directly or indirectly prohibiting contributions to a direct campaign expenditure-only committee for the purpose of making direct campaign expenditures.

Plaintiffs argue that the Texans for Free Enterprise Injunction does not protect them from prosecution for their intended conduct. Plaintiffs point out that the injunction arose out of a challenge to § 253.094(a), that “Free Enterprise did not involve a challenge to subsection (b), and the resulting injunction does not mention subsection (b).” Plaintiffs observe that “Part T.’ of the injunction only concerned the statutes at issue in that case—sections 253.003(b) and 253.094(a)—and rules and regulations ‘regarding those provisions.’ ” Plaintiffs further argue that “Part ‘2.’ ... does not cover Plaintiffs’ intended conduct because Plaintiffs’ activities are assured to take them outside the definition of a direct campaign expenditure-only committee.”

(b) Direct Campaign Expenditure Only Committees

Plaintiffs argue that any political committee they form by coordinating their efforts to, among other things, circulate recall petitions, cannot qualify as a direct campaign expenditure only committee because the committee will inevitably make political contributions to other political committees working on the recall. Plaintiffs’ argument rests on Texas’s definition of “direct campaign expenditure.” Under Texas law a “direct campaign expenditure” is defined to mean “a campaign expenditure that does not constitute a campaign contribution by the person making the expenditure.” Tex. Elec.Code Ann. § 251.001(8) (West 2012).

Regulations issued by the Texas Ethics Commission state:

(5) A campaign expenditure is not a contribution from the person making the expenditure if:

(A) it is made without the prior consent or approval of the candidate or officeholder on whose behalf the expenditure was made; or

(B) it is made in connection with a measure, but is not a political contribution to a political committee supporting or opposing the measure.

1 Tex. Admin Code § 20.1. Plaintiffs contend that because their political committee “plans to coordinate its recall activity with other committees ‘supporting or opposing the measure,’ this results in a contribution to the other committee.” Therefore, because the committee cannot limit itself to direct campaign expenditures, it cannot register as a direct campaign expenditure only committee.

However, as Defendants explain in their Reply, under Texas law a “direct campaign expenditure only committee” is not a political committee that only makes “direct campaign expenditures.” Instead, under Texas law a “direct campaign expenditure only committee” is a political committee that files an affidavit stating that it “will not use its political contributions to make political contributions to any candidate for elective office, officeholder, or political committee that makes a political contribution to a candidate or officeholder.” 1 Tex. Admin. Code § 22.5. Thus, a “direct campaign expenditure only committee” may make both direct campaign expenditures and political contributions to other direct campaign expenditure only committees. Accordingly, Defendants state that éven if Plaintiffs’ political committee makes political contributions to another political committee, it may still register as a “direct campaign expenditure only committee,” as long as such contributions are not made to political committees that make “political contribution^] to a candidate or officeholder.” Id.

Although it appears that Plaintiffs’ proposed political committee may organize and register as a “direct campaign expenditure only committee,” whether it will do so is unclear. Plaintiffs have disclaimed any intention to coordinate their activities with any person who is a candidate for, or who plans to be a candidate for, the offices for which they plan to seek a recall. Yet, Plaintiffs also allege that they do not want to be a political committee at all and challenge Texas’s political committee disclosure requirements. Plaintiffs have made no representation that they would organize and register their proposed political committee as a “direct campaign expenditure only committee” if permitted to do so. Although Plaintiffs testified to their willingness to file “something with the Ethics Commission” stating that they would not coordinate with any candidate, they also testified that they are opposed to registering their political committee in any form and have made no affirmative representation that they will file the required affidavit. Indeed, Plaintiffs have suggested that they may not organize a political committee at all if required to comply with Texas’s treasurer-appointment and disclosure requirements. The court therefore cannot discern whether Plaintiffs’ proposed political committee would constitute a “direct campaign expenditure only” committee, or some other general—or specific-purpose committee under Texas law.

2. Plaintiffs Have Not Established Standing to Challenge S 253.09Mb)

Because the court cannot discern the nature of Plaintiffs’ proposed political committee, the court cannot determine whether political contributions to that committee would fall within the realm of activity that Defendants are barred from enforcing under the Texans for Free Enterprise Injunction. Moreover, although

§ 253.094(b) prohibits political contributions in connection with a recall election, without any indication from Plaintiffs that their committee would organize and register as a “direct campaign expenditure only committee” the court cannot determine whether political contributions to that committee would be permissible under Texans for Free Enterprise or would be lawfully proscribed in furtherance of Texas’s interest in preventing circumvention of its ban on corporate contributions to candidates. See Catholic Leadership Coal. of Texas v. Reisman, 764 F.3d 409, 442-45 (5th Cir.2014) (upholding Texas Election Code § 253.094(a)’s restriction on corporate contributions to political committees as applied to the in-kind contribution of an email mailing list from a corporation to a political committee that engaged in “both independent expenditures and direct contributions to candidates” because “Texas’s ban on corporate contributions to political committees engaging in political contributions serves as an antieireumvention measure to prevent corporations from using a political committee to do an end-run around Texas’s direct contribution ban”).

Accordingly, the court concludes that Plaintiffs have failed to plead a justiciable controversy with regard to their claims that § 253.094(b) prohibits them from-lawfully “raising and spending funds in support of recall petitions” or making other political contributions to their proposed political committee. See Hoyt, 878 F.Supp.2d at 730 (“An injury for standing purposes must be (a) concrete and particularized, and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.” (citing Lujan, 112 S.Ct. at 2136)).

Plaintiffs also allege that § 253.094(b) is overbroad. “The over-breadth doctrine permits a litigant to ‘challenge a statute not because their own rights of free expression are violated, but because of a judicial prediction or assumption that the statute’s very existence may cause others not before the court to refrain from constitutionally protected speech or expression.’” Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind, 647 F.3d at 210 (quoting Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 93 S.Ct. 2908, 2916, 37 L.Ed.2d 830 (1973)). “But the overbreadth doctrine applies on a provision by provision basis: the plaintiff must establish injury under a particular provision of a regulation that is validly applied to its conduct, then assert a facial challenge, under the overbreadth doctrine, to vindicate the rights of others not before the court under that provision.” Id. (quoting SEIU, Local 5 v. City of Hous., 595 F.Sd 588, 598 (5th Cir.2010) (internal quotation marks omitted)). Thus, “ ‘Article III standing retains rigor even in an overbreadth claim.’ ” Id. (quoting Fairchild v. Liberty Indep. Sch. Dist., 597 F.3d 747, 754 (5th Cir.2010)). “ ‘Although various prudential standing principles have been relaxed in some First Amendment cases, this relaxation does not eliminate the distinct and independent requirement of Article III that the dispute between the parties must amount to a case or controversy.’ ” Id. (quoting Henderson v. Stalder, 287 F.3d 374, 385 n. 4 (5th Cir.2002) (Jones, C.J., concurring)).

Even if the court were to accept Plaintiffs’ argument that the Texans for Free Enterprise Injunction does not enjoin Defendants from enforcing § 253.094(b), in light of Plaintiffs’ failure to indicate whether they will engage in their proposed conduct if required to comply with Texas’s political committee disclosure requirements, the court is not convinced that Plaintiffs have demonstrated a “ ‘practical likelihood that a controversy will become real.’ ” Hoyt, 878 F.Supp.2d at 731 (quoting Shields, 289 F.3d at 835). As explained in § IV.A.l(c) above, Plaintiffs have testified that they are opposed to registering their proposed political committee in any form and have suggested that they may not organize a political committee at all if required to comply with Texas’s treasurer-appointment and disclosure requirements. Plaintiffs have made no subsequent effort to disavow their testimony.

In light of Plaintiffs’ equivocation about whether they would in fact engage in their proposed conduct if doing so would subject them to Texas’s political committee disclosure requirements, and because Plaintiffs have not developed the factual basis for standing with sufficient particularity, the court is not convinced that Plaintiffs have met their burden to demonstrate either a serious interest in acting contrary to § 253.094(b) or a threat of enforcement beyond mere speculation. See Lujan, 112 S.Ct. at 2136-37 (holding that “[t]he party invoking federal jurisdiction bears the burden of establishing” each of the elements of standing “in the same way as any other matter on which the plaintiff bears the burden of proof, i.e., with the manner and degree of evidence required at the successive stages of the litigation,” which, “[i]n response to a summary judgment motion,” requires the plaintiff to “set forth by affidavit or other evidence specific facts” to establish standing); cf. Eyikogbe v. Texas State Dep’t of Highways & Pub. Transp., 990 F.2d 1252 (5th Cir.1993) (“Under Rule 56, a district court is not required to scour the record in search of evidence to support the non-movant; nor is the district court required to concoct arguments in opposition to the movant.”). Accordingly, the court concludes that Plaintiffs have not met their burden to establish standing to challenge § 253.094(b). Plaintiffs’ claims challenging § 253.094(b) will therefore be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Cf. Hoyt, 878 F.Supp.2d at 725, 744 (dismissing claims that “ § 253.094(b) of the Election Code violates Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights of freedom of speech, freedom of religion, due process, and equal protection” upon a finding that Plaintiffs lacked standing to challenge § 253.094(b)).

B. Plaintiffs’ Challenge to § 253.096

Plaintiffs bring facial and as-applied challenges to § 253.096. Section 253.096 provides that'“[a] corporation or labor organization may make campaign contributions from its own property in connection with an election on a measure only to a political committee for supporting or opposing measures exclusively.” Tex. Elec.Code Ann. § 253.096 (West 2012).

Plaintiffs allege that under § 253.096, “[i]f an incorporated church desires to circulate recall petitions or otherwise speak in favor of a recall election or against a recall election, it can only do so by forming a measures-only political committee.” Plaintiffs contend that “[rjequiring a corporation to form a [political committee] before making a political contribution, or requiring the corporation to only make a contribution through a [political committee] is an unconstitutional infringement on free speech.”

1. Plaintiffs’ Standing to Challenge § 253.096

Defendants argue that Plaintiffs lack standing to challenge § 253.096 because it does not apply to Plaintiffs’ proposed conduct. Instead, Defendants contend that § 253.094(b)’s narrower prohibition on corporate political contributions “in connection with a recall election” controls.

(a) The Applicability of § 253.096 to Plaintiffs’ Proposed Recall-Related Activities

Emphasizing the interplay of §§ 253.094(a), 253.096, and 253.094(b) in the Texas Election Code’s regulatory scheme, Defendants state that § 253.094(a) “prohibits all political contributions by a corporation,” unless “the contribution is authorized by some other section of the Election Code.”

Relevant here, Election Code § 253.096 permits corporations to make political contributions “in connection with an election on a measure only to a political committee for supporting or opposing measures exclusively.” Because corporations are authorized under § 253.096 to make contributions to political committees in connection with a “measure,” and because a recall election is a type of “measure,” contributions to political committees in connection with a recall election would, at first glance, appear to be authorized by § 253.096. However, the more specific statute, § 253.094(b), which expressly prohibits corporate political contributions in connection with a recall, trumps the more general authority corporations are given in § 253.096 to make political contributions to support measures.

Plaintiffs appear to acknowledge that § 253.094(b), rather than § 253.096, is the controlling provision in this case. Nonetheless, citing Cook, 385 S.W.3d at 594, Plaintiffs contend that § 253.096 chills protected speech because it has “been enforced against other churches and individuals in Texas for allegedly doing some of the same things the Plaintiffs seek to do here.”

(b) Cook v. Tom Brown Ministries

In Cook a Texas appellate court instructed the El Paso City Clerk to decertify recall petitions after concluding that an incorporated church had made prohibited political and campaign contributions in connection with a recall election. 385 S.W.3d at 601-03, 608. The court in Cook found that an incorporated church “made campaign contributions from its own property in connection with a measure-only recall election without properly making the contributions to a measure-only committee” in violation of § 253.096. Id. at 603.

Defendants have disavowed the Cook court’s interpretation of §§ 253.094(b) and 253.096. Defendants argue that despite Cook, “§ 253.096 does not even apply to the facts of this case because it is not applicable in the recall election context.” Defendants argue that because political contributions in connection with recall elections are prohibited in their entirety, they cannot be restricted to measures-only committees. Moreover, Defendants argue that § 253.096 is not a prohibition of campaign contributions. Rather, it authorizes campaign contributions that are otherwise separately prohibited under § 253.094(a).

Plaintiffs argue that “[t]he Attorney General wants this Court to accept his opinion on how the law should be interpreted and ignore binding precedent in Texas as to how the law is actually being enforced.” Plaintiffs farther contend that “any assurances by Defendants that the law will not be applied in an unconstitutional manner rings hollow” because “the Attorney General’s Office was presented with an opportunity to prevent or correct the misapplications of the law in Cook but chose not to do so.” Accordingly, Plaintiffs argue that the Cook court’s “interpretation of the state Election Code is currently the law in Texas,” and “[t]he Attorney General’s opinion as stated in a brief to a court does not supersede a Texas Appellate Court opinion, especially when it is not backed up by any concrete regulations or advisory opinions limiting the scope of the laws.” Given the controversy in Cook and the resulting opinion from the Texas court of appeals, Plaintiffs argue with .some force that “the law is in such a state of disarray that not even lawyers at the top of their field can agree as to the scope and reach of § 253.094(b) and § 253.096.”

2. Plaintiffs’ have not established that they have standing to challenge § 253.096.

As noted above, Plaintiffs acknowledge that because they are prohibited from making corporate political contributions under § 253.094(b), they cannot take advantage of § 253.096’s authorization of campaign contributions “in connection with an election on a measure.” See Tex. Elec.Code Ann. § 253.096 (West 2012). Plaintiffs contend, however, that “if th[e] Court enjoins the enforcement of the ban on recall contributions [in § 253.094(b) ], recalls will remain defined as a type of ‘measure,’ and therefore § 253.096 would be applicable to the contributions at issue here.” Because, as explained in § IV.A above, Plaintiffs have not met their burden to establish standing to challenge § 253.094(b), the court need not consider whether § 253.096 would apply to Plaintiffs’ conduct were § 253.094(b) enjoined.

Plaintiffs also allege that they intend to coordinate their “activities in connection with a measures-only issue in addition to recall petition matters.” However, they have identified no measures-only issue other than the recall efforts in San Antonio and Houston for which they wish to make a campaign contribution. Nor have they identified any political committee engaged in measures-only issues other than recall elections to which such a contribution could be made. The court therefore concludes that Plaintiffs have not met . their burden to establish a serious intent to act contrary to § 253.096 with regard to non-recall measures.

In addition, because Plaintiffs have presented no evidence or made any affirmative representation that they would file the affidavit necessary to designate their proposed political committee as a “direct campaign expenditure only committee,” the court need not consider whether, in light of the Fifth Circuit’s opinion in Texans for Free Enterprise, § 253.096 might apply to any “direct campaign expenditure only committee” Plaintiffs might form. Moreover, Plaintiffs have not alleged whether any political committee they might form by coordinating their efforts will constitute a “committee for supporting or opposing measures exclusively” under Texas law. See Tex. Elec.Code Ann. § 253.096 (West 2012); see also id. § 251.001(4) (defining “general-purpose committee” under Texas law); id. § 251.001(3) (defining “specific-purpose committee” under Texas law). Plaintiffs have simply failed to show that § 253.096 proscribes any of their proposed activity. The court therefore concludes that Plaintiffs have not met their burden to establish standing to challenge § 253.096.

C. Plaintiffs’ Challenge to § 253.094(a)

Plaintiffs allege that § 253.094(a) “is facially unconstitutional under the First Amendment to the United States Constitution to the extent it prohibits corporations from making political contributions in connection with a recall election or, in the alternative, § 253.094(a) is unconstitutional as applied to Plaintiffs.” Section 253.094(a) “prohibits corporations from ‘makfing] a[n unauthorized] political contribution.’ ” Texans for Free Enterprise v. Texas Ethics Commission, 732 F.3d 535, 536 (5th Cir.2013) (quoting Tex. Elec.Code Ann. § 253.094(a)). Like § 253.094(b), by its plain language § 253.094(a) only prohibits “political contributions” as that term is defined in the Texas Election Code. See Texas Elec.Code Ann. § 251.001(5) (West 2012), § 253.094(a) (West Supp. 2014). As explained in Texans for Free Enterprise, however, some “political contributions” under Texas law-those made to “direct expenditure only committees”-are the equivalent of “independent expenditures” under the Supreme Court’s campaign finance jurisprudence. See Texans for Free Enterprise, 732 F.3d at 536, 538.

1. Plaintiffs’ Standing to Challenge § 25S.09ffa)

Section 253.094(a) was recently declared unconstitutional by the Fifth Circuit to the extent that it barred political contributions to a “direct campaign expenditure only committee.” Texans for Free Enterprise, 732 F.3d at 537-38. The resulting injunction, discussed in § IV.A above, enjoins Defendants from enforcing § 253.094(a) “by directly or indirectly prohibiting contributions to a direct campaign expenditure-only committee for the purpose of making direct campaign expenditures.”

Defendants argue that because Plaintiffs “disclaim any intention to coordinate their activities with any person who is a candidate for, or who plans to be a candidate for, the offices for which they plan to seek a recall,” their proposed political committee may register as a “direct campaign expenditure only committee” and that the Texans for Free Enterprise Injunction would bar Defendants from enforcing § 253.094(a) against Plaintiffs to prevent political contributions to that committee. Defendants therefore argue that in light of the Texans for Free Enterprise Injunction Plaintiffs have failed to establish a credible threat of prosecution by the Texas Ethics Commission.

Moreover, as Defendants point out, the Texas Ethics Commission has promulgated rules to conform with the holding in Texans for Free Enterprise. Section 22.5(c) of the Texas Administrative Code specifically states that “[a] corporation’s or labor organization’s making of a political contribution to a political committee that has filed an affidavit [as a direct campaign expenditure only committee] does not constitute a violation of § 253.094(a) of the Election Code.” 1 Tex. Admin. Code § 22.5(c). Thus, if Plaintiffs’ proposed political committee were to register as a direct campaign expenditure only committee, any contributions Plaintiffs made to that committee would not “constitute a violation of § 253.094(a).” Id.

2. Plaintiffs have not met their burden to establish standing to challenge § 253.09f (a).

As explained in §§ IV.A.l(c), PV.A.2, and IY.B.2 above, Plaintiffs have not alleged that they intend to file the affidavit necessary to register their proposed political committee as a “direct campaign expenditure only committee.” Although Plaintiffs testified to their willingness to file “something with the Ethics Commission” stating that they would not coordinate with any candidate, they also testified that they are opposed to registering their political committee in any form and have made no affirmative representation that they will file the required affidavit or otherwise organize as a direct campaign expenditure only committee. The court therefore cannot determine whether Plaintiffs’ proposed conduct would constitute a political contribution to a “direct campaign expenditure only committee” subject to the exacting scrutiny applicable to limitations on core First Amendment rights of political expression; a political contribution to a political committee subject to a lesser level of scrutiny and perhaps lawfully proscribed in furtherance of Texas’s interest in preventing circumvention of its ban on corporate contributions to candidates; or even whether, in light of the perceived burden of complying with Texas’s political committee disclosure requirements, Plaintiffs will actually engage in conduct rendering them a political committee. Any ruling by the court would be contingent on how Plaintiffs choose to organize and register their proposed political committee, if they choose to do so at all. For the court to opine on the constitutionality of § 253.094(a) should Plaintiffs choose to form a general purpose committee, special purpose committee, direct campaign expenditure only committee, “committee for supporting or opposing measures exclusively,” or some combination thereof, especially when Plaintiffs have not indicated that they would, and in fact suggest that they would not, make a choice at all, would constitute an advisory opinion. See Alabama State Fed’n of Labor, Local Union No. 103, United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners of Am. v. McAdory, 325 U.S. 450, 65 S.Ct. 1384, 1389-90, 89 L.Ed. 1725 (1945) (“This Court is without power to give advisory opinions. It has long been its considered practice not to decide abstract, hypothetical or contingent questions, or to decide any constitutional question in advance of the necessity for its 'decision, or to formulate a rule of constitutional law broader than is required by the precise facts to which it is to be applied, or to decide any constitutional question except with reference to the particular facts to which it is to be applied.” (citations omitted)). Accordingly, the court concludes that Plaintiffs have failed to establish a justiciable controversy with regard to their challenges to § 253.094(a).

D. Plaintiffs’ Challenges to §§ 251.001(12), 252.001, and 253.031(b)

Plaintiffs allege that § 251.001(12) “impose[s] political committee status” on them, requiring them to appoint a campaign treasurer and triggering Texas’s political committee disclosure requirements, which, Plaintiffs argue, “unconstitutionally infringes free speech.” Section 251.001(12) defines “political committee” to mean “a group of persons that has as a principal purpose accepting political contributions or making political expenditures.” Tex. Elec.Code Ann. § 251.001(12) (West 2012).

Plaintiffs allege that if they “work together for the primary purpose of accepting political contributions and making political expenditures^] they are a political committee under Texas Law.” See also Catholic Leadership, 764 F.3d 409 at n. 27 (“Texas does not make the political committee label voluntary-groups wishing to engage in collective political speech must comply with the burdens imposed by Texas law.”). “Thus the Plaintiffs, who only want to speak out in support of even one measure, would be forced to incur the burdens of becoming a political committee under Texas law.” Since Plaintiffs have refrained from engaging in their intended conduct because of the perceived burdens of being deemed a political committee under Texas law, the court concludes that Plaintiffs have established standing to challenge §§ 251.001(12), 252.001, and 253.031(b). See, e.g., Human Life of Washington Inc. v. Brumsickle, 624 F.3d 990, 1001 (9th Cir.2010) (“Because Human Life’s decision to refrain from implementing its educational program was based on a reasonable fear of enforcement of the Disclosure Law, we conclude that Human Life has established a case or controversy.”).

Plaintiffs contend that “[pjolitieal committee status and its attendant burdens— which follow from the [treasurer] appointment requirement contained in § 252.001—are unconstitutional (I) facially with respect to political committees active on measures and ... (ii) as applied to groups with minimal financial activity such as Plaintiffs.”

1. The Level of Scrutiny to be Applied

Because § 251.001 simply defines the terms used in other provisions of the Election Code, the level of scrutiny to be applied to § 251.001 depends upon the level of scrutiny to be applied to those other challenged statutes. See Vermont Right to Life Comm., Inc. v. Sorrell, 758 F.3d 118, 137 (2d Cir.2014). Addressing a challenge to Vermont’s definition of “political committee,” the Second Circuit explained in Vermont Right to Life:

A defined term such as “political committee” is simply a useful drafting tool. The definition sets out the domain of a series of separate statutory provisions. For example, the statute currently defines “political committee” in section 2901(13), then subjects every “political committee” to disclosure requirements in section 2964. The statute could be rewritten to dispense with the defined term “political committee” by making the disclosure requirements a standalone provision. The same process could be followed with every other provision, including the contribution limitations in section 2941(a)(4). This process would not alter the substance of the statute, and the resulting statute likely would be unwieldy; it would be more difficult to apply and review. But it would lack a “political committee” definition that could be subjected to the type of challenge envisioned by [the plaintiffs].

It is the challenged regulation, not the [political committee] definition, therefore, that determines what level of scrutiny should apply.

Id. Here, the conduct-regulating provisions that Plaintiffs challenge are §§ 252.001 and 253.031(b) of the Texas Election Code. Section 252.001 states that “[e]ach candidate and each political committee shall appoint a campaign treasurer as provided by [Chapter 252 of the Texas Election Code].” Tex. Elee.Code Ann. § 252.001 (West 2012). Section 253.031(b) provides that “[a] political committee may not knowingly accept political contributions totaling more than $500 or make or authorize political expenditures totaling more than $500 at a time when a campaign treasurer appointment for the committee is not in effect.” Tex. Elee.Code Ann. § 253.031(b) (West 2012). “[T]he treasurer serves as the cornerstone of Texas’s entire general-purpose committee campaign-finance disclosure regime.” Catholic Leadership, 764 F.3d at 441.

Plaintiffs argue that the treasurer-appointment requirements of §§ 252.001 and 253.031 are a prior restraint on speech. This argument was considered and rejected by the Fifth Circuit in Catholic Leadership. id. at 436-41. Instead, the Fifth Circuit analyzed “the treasurer-appointment requirement” of § 253.031(b) “as a disclosure and/or organizational requirement.” Id. at 439. The Fifth Circuit provided two justifications for its conclusion:

First, and foremost, the treasurer-appointment requirement is. a disclosure requirement: all that the provision requires is that a general-purpose committee take simple steps to formalize its organizational structure and divulge additional information to the government. And ... general-purpose committees remain fully in control of their compliance with the treasurer-appointment requirement. No external factor limits the Committee’s ability to speak.... Accordingly, a lower level of scrutiny is appropriate because any limit on speech created by the requirement arises solely from the committee’s own choice to not provide information to the government.

Second, to the extent we still have concerns regarding prior restraints in the campaign-finance context, those concerns can be addressed through the existing constitutional test for disclosure requirements.

Id. at 439 (footnote omitted) (citations omitted); see also Vermont Right to Life, 758 F.3d at 137 (“[The plaintiff] highlights the following obligations that apply to an organization once it is defined as a political committee: registration, recordkeeping necessary for reporting, and reporting requirements. It asserts these are the very burdens that are onerous as a matter of law. These requirements amount to the establishment of a disclosure regime.” (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)).

“Disclosure and organizational requirements receive a further lessened level of scrutiny [than either expenditure limitations or contribution limitations].” Catholic Leadership, 764 F.3d at 424. “To defend disclosure and organizational requirements, the government must show a ‘sufficiently important governmental interest that bears a substantial relation’ to the requirement.” Id. (quoting Speech-Now.org v. FEC, 599 F.3d 686, 696 (D.C.Cir.2010) (en banc)).

2. Sufficiently Important Governmental Interest

The Fifth Circuit has recognized that “Texas has a sufficiently important interest to justify the constitutionality of the treasurer-appointment requirement,” explaining that

the public has an interest in knowing who is speaking about a candidate and who is funding that speech, no matter whether the contributions were made toward administrative expenses or independent expenditures. Further, requiring disclosure of such information deters and helps expose violations of other campaign finance restrictions such as those barring contributions from foreign corporations or individuals. These are sufficiently important governmental interests to justify requiring [the plaintiffs] to organize and report ... as a political committee.

Id. at 440 (quoting SpeechNow.org, 599 F.3d at 698). The Fifth Circuit also recognized Texas’s “informational interest in ensuring the smooth functioning of its campaign finance disclosure scheme.” Id. at 441. In holding that the treasurer-appointment requirement was properly tailored, the Fifth Circuit observed that “any burden created by the treasurer-appointment requirement-essentially filling out and putting a three-page form that asks for basic information in the mail-appears to be exceedingly minimal.” Id. at 440 (footnote omitted).

Plaintiffs allege that “[t]here are no candidates involved in measures-only recall elections.” Accordingly, Plaintiffs argue, “imposing political committee status on groups wanting to make political expenditures for a measure does not satisfy ‘exacting’ scrutiny as it does not have a substantial relation to a ‘sufficiently important’ governmental interest.”

Defendants argue that “[b]y its very nature, advocating for an elected official to be recalled entails advocating in opposition of an identified person, for the purpose of holding an election to recall that person from his or her position” and that “[t]his type of political committee advocacy is precisely the type of activity that courts have found may be regulated through political committee disclosure requirements.”

The court is not convinced that the State’s informational interest in disclosure is limited to advocacy for or against an identified candidate. See, e.g., Buckley v. Am. Constitutional Law Found., Inc., 119 S.Ct. at 647 (“[T]he State and supporting amici stress the importance of disclosure as a control or check on domination of the initiative process by affluent special interest groups. Disclosure of the names of initiative sponsors, and of the amounts they have spent gathering support for their initiatives, responds to that substantial state interest.” (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)); Family PAC v. McKenna, 685 F.3d 800, 806 (9th Cir.2012) (“We have repeatedly recognized an important (and even compelling) informational interest in requiring ballot measure committees to disclose information about contributions.”); Human Life of Washington Inc., 624 F.3d at 1005 (upholding disclosure requirements in the context of ballot initiatives, noting that the considerations justifying disclosure requirements in candidate elections “ ‘apply just as forcefully, if not more so, for voter-decided ballot measures’ ” (quoting California Pro-Life Council, Inc. v. Getman, 328 F.3d 1088, 1105 (9th Cir.2003))).

Moreover, Texas has a sufficient “informational interest in ensuring the smooth functioning of its campaign finance disclosure scheme.” Catholic Leadership, 764 F.3d at 441; see also Doe v. Reed, 561 U.S. 186, 130 S.Ct. 2811, 2819-20, 177 L.Ed.2d 493 (2010) (“The State’s interest in preserving the integrity of the electoral process is undoubtedly important. States allowing ballot initiatives have considerable leeway to protect the integrity and reliability of the initiative process, as they have with respect to election processes generally---- [T]he State’s interest in preserving electoral integrity extends more generally to promoting transparency and accountability in the electoral process, which the State argues is essential to the proper functioning of a democracy.”); Buckley v. Valeo (“Buckley”), 424 U.S. 1, 96 S.Ct. 612, 658, 46 L.Ed.2d 659 (1976) (“[N]ot least significant, recordkeeping, reporting, and disclosure requirements are an essential means of gathering the data necessary to detect violations of the contribution limitations.... ”). Accordingly, the court concludes that Texas has a sufficiently important governmental interest for its treasurer-appointment and concomitant disclosure requirements.

3. Substantial Relation to the Government’s Interest

In determining whether a disclosure requirement bears a substantial relation to a sufficiently important governmental interest, the court looks to the burden imposed by the requirement. See Buck ley, 96 S.Ct. at 658 (“[Disclosure requirements, as a general matter, directly serve substantial governmental interests. In determining whether these interests are sufficient to justify the requirements [the court] must look to the extent of the burden that they place on individual rights.”). “This inquiry is ‘one of degree, not kind, for it is well