Full opinion text
OPINION AND ORDER KENNETH M. KARAS, District Judge: This is a case that demonstrates that law, like life, can be a game of inches. Plaintiff Brendan Cunney brought the instant Complaint against Defendants Board of Trustees of the Village of Grand View, New York (“Board”); Zoning Board of Appeals for the Village of Grand View, New York (“ZBA”); and Joseph Knizeski, in his official capacity as Building Inspector of the Village of Grand View-on-Hudson (“Knizeski”) (collectively, “Defendants” or ‘Village”), alleging multiple claims arising out of Defendants’ application of a height-restriction zoning ordinance to Plaintiffs property. Before the Court is Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment. For the following reasons, the Court grants Defendants’ Motion in part and denies it in part. I. BACKGROUND A. Factual Background Gladstone Estates, LLC (“Gladstone”) is a New York limited-liability company that Plaintiff and his brother formed in mid-2005. (See Pl.’s Resp. to Defs.’ Local Rule 56.1 Statement (“Pl.’s 56.1 Statement”) ¶¶ 1, 3 (Dkt. No. 69).) On October 28, 2005, Gladstone, which is not a party in this Action, took title to a piece of property within the Village of Grand View-on-Hudson, NY. (See Decl. in Support (“Defs.’ Deck”) Ex. N, at unnumbered 2 (Dkt. No. 58) (unofficial copy of recorded deed).) Since at least September 30, 2005, when Plaintiff accepted a proposal from John Atzl (“Atzl”), made on behalf of Atzl, Sca-tassa & Zigler Land Surveyors, P.C. (“ASZLS”), for “surveying and planning services,” Plaintiff intended to develop this piece of property for residential use. (See Defs'.’ Deck Ex. P (Atzl proposal, submitted on August 29, 2005, and accepted by Plaintiff on September 30, 2005).) Of the two “residential districts” within the Village, the subject property was located in “Zone B,” also known as “R-10.” (See Defs.’ Deck Ex. L, at unnumbered 3 (excerpt of the village’s zoning law); Defs.’ Local Rule 56.1 Statement (“Defs.’ 56.1 Statement”) ¶ 16 (Dkt. No. 65).) The requirements applicable to that zone are contained in Chapter IX of the Village of Grand View-on-Hudson Zoning Law (‘Village Zoning Law”). (See Aff. in Opp’n (“PL’s Deck”) Ex. A (‘Village Zoning Law”) (Dkt. No. 67).) At the time Gladstone took title to the property, and at all relevant times during this litigation, section E of that chapter (“section E”) contained a restriction on the height of any building constructed within Zone B: It being the purpose of this section, among others, to preserve as nearly as practicable the remaining views [of] the Hudson River from River Road, no building shall be erected in Zone B ... which shall rise more than two stories in height nor more than four and one-half ... feet above the easterly side of River Road. Where the lot lies substantially at the same level as River Road, no building or construction shall rise more than one story or fifteen feet in height. (Id. at IX.E.) Moreover, the Village Zoning Law separately defined “easterly side of River Road” to mean “the point at which the road surface of River Road intersects with the easterly curb adjacent to River Road,” adding that the referenced “point of intersection is commonly referred to as the ‘gutter.’ ” (Defs.’ Decl. Ex. L, at 4.) In addition to outlining the requirements applicable to houses constructed within Zone B, the Village Zoning Law also outlined the procedures a property owner had to follow in order to build, and then occupy, a house. First, to commence construction, the owner had to obtain site-plan approval and a building permit: (See Village Zoning Law, at XII.A.1, XIV. D.l(c)(l).) To obtain the former, the owner had to submit an application to the Village’s Planning Board (“Planning Board”). (See id. at XIV.D.l(cX2).) The Planning Board then had to hold a public hearing, after which it would approve or disapprove the application. (See id. at XIV.D.l(c)(3)-(5).) Having received site-plan approval, the owner, or “the agent, architect, landscape architect, engineer or builder employed in connection with the proposed work,” had to submit an application for a building permit to the Village’s Building Inspector — who was, at all relevant times, Defendant Knizeski — along with copies of relevant building plans, site plans, surveys, and supporting documents. (See id. at XII.A.2-5.) The Building Inspector could then, in his discretion, approve the application, at which point construction could commence. (See id. at XII. C.l.) Second, after constructing but before occupying a house, the owner had to obtain a certificate of occupancy (“CO”). (See id. at XII.H.) To do so, “[t]he owner or his/her agent” had to “make [an] application.” (Id. at XII.H.4.) Prior to issuing a CO, the Building Inspector was required to “examine or cause to be examined all buildings, structures and sites for which an application for a Building Permit ... has been filed.” (Id. at XII.I.) Thereafter, the Building Inspector would determine whether “the proposed work ha[d] been completed in accordance with the applicable building codes, local laws, rules and regulations, and also in accordance with the application, plansf,] and specifications filed in connection with the issuance of the Building Permit.” (Id. at XII.J.l.) Upon finding that the work was completed “in accordance” with these requirements, the Building Inspector was required to issue the CO. (See id. (“When ... it is found that the proposed work has been completed in accordance with the applicable [requirements], the Building Inspector ... shall issue a [CO].” (emphasis added)).) However, if the Building Inspector “found that the proposed work ha[d] not been properly completed,” he was required to deny the application. (See id. at XII.J.1-2 (“If it is found that the proposed work has not been properly completed, a [CO] ... shall not be issued .... ” (emphasis added)).) Plaintiff first sought approval a site plan for the subject property in early 2006. At a February public hearing before the Planning Board, Atzl (the surveyor) presented a proposal that involved construction of a two-story home and relocation of a “small home” that was already on the site and that Plaintiff wished to use as a pool house. (See Defs.’ Decl. Ex. I, at 1 (Planning Board hearing minutes).) The Planning Board voted to “grant preliminary site plan approval” subject to the condition that Plaintiff obtain a height variance from the ZBA. (Id. at 4.) However, at an April hearing, the ZBA denied Plaintiffs request. Atzl testified that he had determined that “[t]he elevation at the bottom of the curb at the edge of River Road [was] 29.1 feet,” meaning that, to comply with section E, the proposed house could be no taller than 33.6 feet-four-and-a-half feet above River Road. (Defs.’ Decl. Ex. J, at unnumbered 1 (ZBA April 2006 hearing minutes).) Atzl then testified that the “height of the highest point of the highest roof’ of the proposed house was 43.7 feet, meaning that Plaintiff was requesting a variance of 10.1 feet. (Id.) Initially, one of the ZBA members noted that “the primary issue is where the measurement was taken,” because “[t]he elevation of River Road varie[d] significantly along the boundary of the [subject] property” — from 30 feet at the southern end to 24 feet at the northern end. (Id.) Atzl testified that “he measured from the middle of the lot,” where the elevation was 29.1 feet, because “there is no statement [in the code] as to where the height is derived.” (Id. at unnumbered 2.) One ZBA member offered an interpretation of section E that appeared to support Atzl, stating that the measurement should be taken “at any given point above River Road.” (Id. at unnumbered 9.) However, another member stated that “[t]he height should be measured at the lowest point of the road” because “the ordinance was written to protect the views of the community along River Road.” (Id.) A third member appeared to support this interpretation, which would effectively require applicants to obtain “the maximum variance.” (Id.) Applying that interpretation to Plaintiffs application, that member calculated that the elevation at the lowest point of the road was 24 feet, triggering an allowable height of 28.5 feet, and thus requiring Plaintiff to obtain a 15.2-foot variance (53 percent higher than the allowed height) for his 43.7-fooh-high house. (See id.) Ultimately, although the ZBA did not appear to adopt a particular interpretation of section E, the hearing minutes indicate that the ZBA construed Plaintiffs application to request a 53 percent variance (implying that the ZBA measured from the lowest point of the road), and that it unanimously denied the application so construed. (See id. at unnumbered 10.) Plaintiff then sought approval of a revised site plan at a Planning Board hearing held on September 14, 2006. Although the Planning Board did not grant approval at that hearing, it ultimately granted approval after Plaintiff made necessary changes. (See Defs.’ 56.1 Statement ¶ 33.) Apparently, none of the changes related to the height of the proposed house, and Plaintiff did not have to request a height variance. Notably, Defendants concede that this site plan “was within the height and size restrictions of the Village Zoning Law,” but it is unclear, from the record, how the Planning Board made this determination. (See id.) Subsequently, Knizeski approved Plaintiffs building-permit application on October 19, 2006, (see Defs.’ Decl. Ex. Q, at unnumbered 3 (building permit); see also PL’s Decl. Ex. K, at unnumbered 2 (Letter from Knizeski to Plaintiff, Oct. 19, 2006)), and construction began. Within a month of. granting the building permit,- and then approximately two weeks after that, Knize-ski conducted discretionary on-site inspections of the property and reported “satisfactory results.” (See Defs.’ Dec 1. Ex. K, at unnumbered 1-2 (Knizeski’s “daily log entries” related to Plaintiffs property); Defs.’ Decl. Ex. R, at unnumbered 3-4 (inspection reports).) Then, in January 2007, apparently after a neighboring property owner alerted him to a potential issue with the house’s height, Knizeski requested that Atzl submit a letter certifying that the house would comply with section E. (See Defs.’ Decl. Ex. K, at unnumbered 2; Defs.’ Decl. Ex. S (Letter from Knizeski to Plaintiff, Jan. 17, 2007 (“[B]e advised that a letter from your engineer will be required as soon as possible to certify that the height of your new house does not exceed that as stated in [section E].”).) Five days later, Atzl submitted the requested letter, noting that his office “performed an ‘under construction’ survey of the home” and that “[t]he elevations taken [were] in conformance with the approved site [p]lan,” in that “[t]he elevation of the highest part of the roof line [would] not be more than [four-and-a-half] feet of the easterly side of River Road.” (Defs.’ Decl. Ex. T (Letter from Atzl to Knizeski, Jan. 22, 2007).) Knizeski received the letter, but no further action was taken until May 23, 2007, when, at a Department Chair meeting attended by Knizeski, the Planning Board Chair, the ZBA Chair, the Village Clerk, and the Village Attorney, the Village Clerk promised to ask John Collazuol (“Collazuol”), the Village Engineer, to confirm Atzl’s height certification. (See Defs.’ Decl. Ex. K, at unnumbered 2; Defs.’ 56.1 Statement ¶ 57.) Collazuol conducted his own survey and reported the results in a July 2007 letter to the Village Clerk, which stated that “the roof ridge of the new dwelling [was] [four feet nine inches] above the high point of pavement on the easterly side of River Road. Therefore, the ridge of the building [was] [three inches] greater than allowed.” (Defs.’ Decl. Ex. U, at unnumbered 1 (Letter from Collazuol to Village Clerk, July 17, 2007).) The Parties do not dispute that, in making this determination, Colla-zuol measured from the highest point of River Road. (See Defs.’ 56.1 Statement ¶ 59; Defs.’ Decl. Ex. U, at unnumbered 2 (survey drawing, indicating that Collazuol used an elevation of 30 feet and measured a roof-ridge height of 34.75 feet); see also Defs.’ Decl. Ex. DD, at 15 (Collazuol Dep.) Plaintiff submitted an application for a CO on August 29, 2007. (See Defs.’ 56.1 Statement ¶ 61; Defs.’ Decl. Ex. Q, at unnumbered 15 (CO application, submitted by Plaintiff and his wife).) Shortly thereafter, on September 13, the Planning Board Chair sent a letter to Collazuol requesting “a survey of the roof heights at ... [five] locations” Atzl used in the site plan as measurement reference points. (Defs.’ Decl. Ex. V (Letter from Planning Board Chair to Collazuol, Sept. 13, 2007).) Collazuol completed the survey on October 22 and thereafter submitted his results to the Village Clerk in an October 30 letter. According to Collazuol, [t]he [as-built] roof heights ... [were] somewhat consistent with the site plan ... except for at [one of the five stations] .... However, due to the circumstances [he found] that the building and roofs [had] been constructed substantially in accordance with the plans submitted by the Architect in that the building [was] no greater in height than that as proposed. (Defs.’ Decl. Ex. U, at unnumbered 3 (Letter from Collazuol to Village Clerk, Oct. 30, 2007).) Furthermore, Collazuol recommended that “[t]he diminimous [sic] difference in roof height should be neglected as [it fell] within typical building tolerances, ie. [sic] 0.90 ft. or 10 inches.” (Id.) In his letter, Collazuol also included a finding “that the elevations of the road surface [were] inconsistent with the site plan and are lower than previously indicated.” (Id.) This statement referred to an error in the site plan that Atzl discovered in an as-built survey he completed on September 18, 2007. (See Defs.’ 56.1 Statement ¶ 71.) In short, although Atzl had conducted field measurements of the road elevations when he prepared the site plan, in the final site plan he unintentionally used data from Rockland County topographical maps that turned out to be incorrect. (See Defs.’ Decl. Ex. J, at unnumbered 17-18 (ZBA February 2008 hearing minutes).) This resulted in a two-foot discrepancy between the site-plan elevations and the real-world elevations, such that the allowable height was two feet lower than expected. (See id. at unnumbered 18.) Atzl reported his error to Collazuol before Collazuol submitted his October 30 letter, but Collazuol’s finding that the house exceeded the height restriction by 10 inches did not account for the error. (See Defs.’ 56.1 Statement ¶¶ 75-78.) In response to Collazuol’s letter, the Planning Board Chair requested a meeting with Collazuol to discuss his findings. (See Defs.’ Decl. Ex. V, at unnumbered 2 (Letter from Planning Board Chair to Colla-zuol, Nov. 9, 2007).) At that meeting, which was also attended by the ZBA Chair and the Village Attorney, it was determined that Collazuol would prepare a new report based on the real-world elevation measurements. (See Defs.’ 56.1 Statement ¶¶ 82-85.) Collazuol .submitted that report on December 11, 2007, in a letter to Knizeski. (See Defs.’ Decl. Ex. U at unnumbered 5-6 (Letter from Collazuol to Knizeski, Dec. 11, 2007).) A “Grade Sheet” attached to the letter contained Collazuol’s final measurements for the road elevations and as-built roof elevations at the same five measurement stations used in the site plan and in his October 30 report. (See id. at unnumbered 6.) According to Collazuol’s calculations, at the two stations measuring garage-roof elevations, the as-built elevation was lower than the planned elevation, and the as-built elevation fell below the allowable elevation under section E. (See id.) However, at the other three stations, all of which measured a roof elevation at the “highest ridge,” the as-built elevation was higher than the planned elevation, and the as-built elevation exceeded the allowable elevation by between 0.83 inches and 2.95 inches. (See id.) In the letter, Colla-zuol explained that “[t]he as-built difference in the chart shows that at [one of the five stations], the dimension of 2.95 ft. is greater than allowed,” and he noted that “[t]his [was] the maximum difference of all the locations.” (Id. at unnumbered 5.) He further explained that the “roof elevation” at that station was “0.25 ft. greater than the allowable when measured from the edge of River Road along the south property line projected (which elevation [was] 29.25 ft.).” (Id.) Based entirely on this report, Knizeski sent a letter to Plaintiff on December 12, 2007, informing him that, “[a]t this time, [his] Application for Certifí-cate of Occupancy must be denied based on the Report received from [ Collazuol] ... that confirms that the elevation of roof height exceeds that as described in [section E].” (Defs.’ Decl. Ex. Q, at unnumbered 17 (Letter from Knizeski to Plaintiff, Dec. 12, 2007).) Plaintiff appealed Knizeski’s denial of the CO to the ZBA, requesting that the Village either grant" his CO application or grant a height variance. (See Defs.’ Decl. Ex. J, at unnumbered 12-14.) Notably, with regard to the former, Plaintiffs specific request was “for an interpretation of the definition of ‘height’ in the Zoning Law.” (Id. at 12.) The ZBA held two hearings, one on February 26, 2008, and the other on April 7, 2008, to consider Plaintiffs.appeal. (See Defs.’ Decl. Ex. J, at unnumbered 12, 25.) At the second hearing, in response to Plaintiffs request for an interpretation of ‘height,’ the ZBA unanimously passed a motion finding that the Zoning Law is not ambiguous with respect to the manner in which building height is measured in the R-10 Zoning District for the reasons that the definition of “Height” in the Zoning Law states that buildings are measured vertically and, when read together with the definition of “Easterly Side of River Road” clearly requires that to determine whether a building height exceeds [four- and-a-half] feet above River Road, the measurement is taken from the point at which the road surface intersects with the curb vertically to the highest point of the roof. The word “vertical” in Webster’s New World Dictionary is defined as “perpendicular, or at a right angle, ... upright, straight up or down, (Id. at unnumbered 35.) In this context, the ZBA also found that Plaintiff “[did] not have standing to raise the question of ambiguity inasmuch as he and his consultants measured the height of the building in accordance with the Zoning Law definition.” (Id.) In other words, the ZBA found that the methodology Plaintiff employed was consistent with the Village Zoning Law. The ZBA then proceeded to consider Plaintiffs request, in the alternative, for “a variance from [section E] to permit the maintenance and use of a single family dwelling having a height of 7.5 feet above the easterly side of River Road instead of the máximum permitted of 4.5 feet.” (Id. at unnumbered 12.) In light of Plaintiffs argument that lowering the roof would be too costly and disruptive, the ZBA considered whether Plaintiff would agree to move his pool house to a different part of the property, and thereby open up a view to the river. (See id. at unnumbered 21). Plaintiffs attorney stated that “[Plaintiff] would agree to this,” and noted that it would be “less expensive than re-configuring the top of the house.” (Id. at unnumbered 36.) The ZBA also asked Plaintiff whether it would be less expensive to demolish the pool house instead of moving it, but Plaintiff noted that “it would still be costly.” (Id. at unnumbered 37.) Plaintiffs wife then testified that “it [was] financially devastating to [her and her husband] to carry two homes” and, in an apparent effort to achieve a quick resolution of the dispute, Plaintiff stated that “he would remove the pool house from its current location to mitigate the view if the height variance [were] granted.” (Id. at unnumbered 37-38.) The ZBA then moved to close the hearing. (Id. at unnumbered 38.) Ultimately, the ZBA unanimously granted Plaintiffs request for a variance, subject to three conditions: 1. That the [pool house] shall be removed from its present location prior to issuance of a [CO] for the residence; 2. That there shall be an open and unobstructed view on the northerly side of the property for the entire northerly side yard plus an area running in a diagonal line from the northeasterly corner of the residence through the northeasterly corner of the existing pool, then to the River ...; 3. That no structures shall be constructed at any time within the open, unobstructed area described in [the paragraph outlining the second condition] .... (Id. at unnumbered 40.) The ZBA also made findings necessary to support their decision, including that “although the variance [was] substantial, the removal of the poolhouse [sic] and maintenance of the unobstructed river view mitigates the negative impact of the height of the residence,” that “the removal of the poolhouse [sic] is a feasible alternative to requiring the applicant to remove three feet from the height of the house,” and that “the benefit to [Plaintiff] by not requiring the removal of three feet of the height of the house [was] great and the detriment to the community [was] lessened by the” variance’s conditions. (Id. at unnumbered 41.) B. Procedural History Although at the ZBA hearing Plaintiff appeared to indicate that he would agree to the conditions the ZBA ultimately imposed, Plaintiff ultimately did not .comply with the conditions, and he therefore did not obtain either the variance or the CO. Instead, Plaintiff initiated lawsuits in state and federal court challenging the Village’s denial of his CO application. 1. State Court On October 9, 2008, Plaintiff filed an Article 78 Petition in New York Supreme Court, alleging that, procedurally, the ZBA’s decision failed to comply with New York state laws and that, substantively, the ZBA’s “imposition of conditions” on Plaintiff was “unreasonable,” “outside of [ZBA’s] jurisdiction,” and was “not consistent with the spirit and intent of the zoning local law.” (See Defs.’ Decl. Ex. D (petition).) On March 31, 2009, the court issued an order denying the petition on the substantive ground, finding that “there [was] nothing irrational or unreasonable about the ZBA’s interpretation of the term ‘height’ in the Village’s zoning code,” and that there was “nothing impermissible about the conditions [the ZBA] imposed” on Plaintiffs variance. (See Defs.’ Decl. Ex. E, at unnumbered 1 (Supreme Court decision).) However, the court granted the petition with regard to one of Plaintiffs procedural arguments, holding that the ZBA violated New York’s Open Meetings Law, N.Y. Pub. Off. Law §§ 100 et seq., because the ZBA “vot[ed] on the resolution in question in closed session at the April 7, 2008 meeting.” (Id. at unnumbered 2.) The court then “annulled” the ZBA’s decision and remanded the matter to the ZBA “for formal decision in open session on the petitioner’s application for a variance.” (Id. at unnumbered 1.) Defendants appealed that decision, and on April 20, 2010, the Appellate Division reversed the Supreme Court’s judgment on the procedural ground, holding that the lower court correctly found that the ZBA violated the Open Meetings Law, but that the court “improperly annulled the ZBA’s determination on th[at] basis.” (Defs.’ Decl. Ex. F, at 2-3 (Appellate Division decision).) The court therefore “confirmed” the ZBA’s determination and “dismissed [the proceeding] on the merits.” (Id. at 2.) 2. Federal District Court On'the same day that Plaintiff filed his Article 78 Petition, he filed a civil action in New York Supreme Court against Defendants and against Atzl and Atzl’s firm (“Atzl Defendants”), alleging that section E was unconstitutionally vague, both on its face and as applied to Plaintiff, and that Defendants deprived him of substantive due process, entitling him to damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and alleging that Atzl Defendants “were negligent in the performance of surveying” Plaintiffs land, entitling him to damages under state law. (See Compl. ¶¶ 22-40 (Dkt. No. 1).) Defendants removed the action to federal court on November 5, 2008. (See Dkt. No. 1.) The case was originally assigned to Judge Conner, who allowed Plaintiff to file a Motion for Summary Judgment against Defendants in January 2009. (See Dkt. No. 6.) In addition to opposing that Motion, Defendants filed a Motion To Dismiss in February 2009. (See Dkt. No. 13.) Before Judge Conner decided those motions, the case was reassigned to this Court in July 2009. (See Dkt. No. 27.) Shortly thereafter, the case was again reassigned, this time to Judge William Young, a judge, from the District of Massachusetts who was sitting by designation in the Southern District of New York. (See Dkt. No. 28.) After holding oral argument on the Parties’ motions in October 2009, Judge Young issued an Order, on December 18, 2009, granting summary judgment for Defendants in full. (See Mem. & Order (Dkt. No. 31).) First, Judge Young rejected Plaintiffs as-applied claim, holding that “a person of reasonable intelligence could dis-cerní ] what activities are prohibited,” (id. at 8), and recognizing that “the ordinance could encourage potentially arbitrary or ad hoc enforcement,” (id. at 11), but nevertheless holding that Plaintiffs property “[fell] within the core goals of [section E]” and that it “fell squarely within the proscribed height” as defined by the statute’s “core meaning,” (id. at 11-12). Second, Judge Young rejected Plaintiffs facial claim, holding that Plaintiff could not meet his burden to show that section E “is imper-missibly vague in all of its applications” where he had failed to show that section E was impermissibly vague in his own application. (See id. at 14-15.) Finally, Judge Young rejected Plaintiffs substantive-due-process claim, holding that Plaintiff had no constitutionally protected property interest in the CO “[bjecause the property was not in compliance with a zoning law,” and thus Knizeski “used his discretion to properly deny the [CO].” (Id. at 16.) Accordingly, Judge Young granted summary judgment for Defendants and he entered an Order dismissing the case. (See Dkt. No. 32 (Judgment, filed Dec. 21, 2009).) Shortly after Judge Young entered the judgment, Plaintiff filed what Judge Young interpreted to be a motion for reconsideration, arguing that Judge Young should not have dismissed the entire case because the Parties’ motions addressed only Plaintiffs claims against Defendants, and thus the court’s order should not have dismissed Plaintiffs claim against Atzl Defendants. (See Dkt. No. 33).) Judge Young granted Plaintiffs Motion, and on January 20, 2010, he entered an amended judgment vacating the prior judgment in full, entering judgment “in "favor of the Village defendants only,” and remanding the case “to the New York Supreme Court for the state law malpractice claim against [Atzl Defendants].” (Dkt. No. 34 (Amended Judgment, filed Jan. 20, 2010).) In January 2012, Plaintiff and Atzl Defendants settled their claim for $175,000. (See Defs.’ 56.1 Statement ¶ 112 & n. 1.) 3. The Second Circuit Plaintiff appealed Judge Young’s decision to the Second Circuit, which reversed in part and vacated in part. See Cunney v. Bd. ofTrs., 660 F.3d 612 (2d Cir.2011). With regard to Plaintiffs void-for-vagueness claim, the Second Circuit held that section E was unconstitutionally vague as applied to Plaintiff for two independent reasons. First, it found that section E “fail[ed] to give specific notice of how a permit applicant should design his site plan so that [a] proposed building complies with that restriction,” and that “it also fail[ed] to provide an objective standard that the Village itself [could] apply in determining the project’s compliance once an application has been submitted and thereafter when an approved project has been built.” Id. at 621. In this way, section E violated Plaintiffs right to due process because “ ‘it fail[ed] to provide people of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to understand what conduct it prohibits.’ ” Id. (quoting Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 732, 120 S.Ct. 2480, 147 L.Ed.2d 597 (2000)). Second, it found, like Judge Young, that section E “could encourage potentially arbitrary or ad hoc enforcement,” id. at 623 (quoting Cunney v. Bd. of Trs., 675 F.Supp.2d 394, 400 (S.D.N.Y.2009)); see also id. at 621 (noting that “a law is unconstitutionally vague ‘if it authorizes or even encourages arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement’” (quoting Hill, 530 U.S. at 732, 120 S.Ct. 2480)), but it also found, unlike Judge Young, that section E “as applied to the design and construction of [Plaintiffs] house [was] not saved by resort to a clear core .... because, under a reasonable interpretation of the ordinance, [Plaintiffs] house, as built, does comply with section E.” Id. at 623-24. The court therefore “reverse[d] the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of [Defendants] on [this] claim” and “directed] the district court to enter summary judgment in favor of [Plaintiff].” Id. at 626. Next, with regard to Plaintiffs substantive-due-process claim, the court recognized that “[t]he district court’s rationale in denying [that] claim turned on its denial of his void-for-vagueness claim, which [the court] [had] [just] reversed.” Id. at 626. Indeed, Judge Young had held that Plaintiff did not have a constitutionally protected property interest in the CO because his house violated section E, but the Second Circuit had held that section E “may not be applied as a basis for denying [Plaintiff] [the] CO” because it was “unconstitutionally vague.” Id. The court therefore opted to “leave it to the district court to decide in the first instance the viability and merits of [Plaintiffs] substantive due process claim.” Id. Accordingly, it “vacate[d] the grant of summary judgment in favor of [Defendants] on [this] claim, and re-mandad] for further proceedings consistent with [its] opinion.” id. Following the Second Circuit’s ruling, the Village issued a CO for the subject property on November 9, 2011. (See Defs.’ Decl. Ex. Q, at unnumbered 14 (Certificate of Occupancy).) The CO was issued after a final inspection and was apparently unaccompanied by any height-related conditions or a variance. (See Defs.’ 56.1 Statement ¶ 111.) Moreover, the CO was issued to Gladstone, (see Defs.’ Decl. Ex. Q, at unnumbered 14), which was the property owner at the time of issuance and remained the property owner until August 9, 2013, when Gladstone conveyed the property to Plaintiff, {see Defs.’ Decl. Ex. N, at unnumbered 4-6 (unofficial copy of recorded conveyance, dated Aug. 9, 2013)). J. Remand After the Second Circuit issued its order, the case was reassigned to this Court. (See Dkt. No. 37 (notice of reassignment, dated Nov. 20, 2011).) On December 22, 2011, Defendants sent a letter requesting permission “to file a motion to determine whether [Plaintiff] may recover compensatory damages for the [Second Circuit’s] finding that [section E] was void for vagueness.” (See Dkt. No. 42 (Letter from Samantha Vélez to Court, Dec. 22, 2011).) At a hearing held on December 11, 2012, after a review of case law from within and outside of the Second Circuit, the Court concluded that “Plaintiff may be awarded damages solely on his ... void for vagueness claim.” (Defs.’ Decl. Ex. H, at 20-21 (Hr’g Tr., Dec. 11, 2012 Hr’g).) But the Court clarified that its conclusion “[did not] mean that the Court [had] made any particular finding as to what could be qualified or what could constitute such damages and whether or not Plaintiff has made. out a case that the damages he claims he suffered were the result of the vague statute itself or the vague ordinance.” (Id. at 21.) The Court continued, [W]hat [Plaintiff] is going to have to do is prove actual injury resulting from his due process violation as a result of the void for vagueness. So he’s going to have to show damages that were directly caused by the due process violation as explained by the Second Circuit in the context of the void for vagueness doctrine. In other words, that but for the due process violation, [Plaintiff] would not have suffered the claimed damages. (Id.) It then issued an Order memorializing its conclusion “that Plaintiff may receive damages for his void-for-vagueness claim.” (Dkt. No. 47 (Order, dated December 12, 2012).) The Parties then proceeded to discovery, which continued throughout late 2013. Near the end of that process, the Court adopted a scheduling order at a conference held on October 18, 2013. (See Dkt. No. 55.) Pursuant to that Order, Defendants filed their Motion for Summary Judgment on January 17, 2014, (see Mot. (Dkt. No. 57); Mem. of Law in Supp. of the Village Defs.’ Mot. for Summ. J. (“Defs.’ Mem.”) (Dkt. No. 66)), Plaintiff filed his Opposition Memorandum on February 18, 2014, (see PL’s Revised Mem. of Law in Opp’n to Defs.’ 3d Mot. for Summ. J. (“PL’s Mem.”) (Dkt. No. 70)), and Defendants filed their Reply Memorandum on March 3, 2014, (see Reply Mem. of Law in Opp’n & in Further Supp. of the Village Defs.’ Mot. for Summ. J. (“Defs.’ Reply Mem.”) (Dkt. No. 72)). The Court now turns to a discussion of Defendants’ Motion. II. DISCUSSION A. Standard of Review Summary judgment shall be granted where the movant shows that there is “no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a); see also Psihoyos v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 748 F.3d 120, 123-24 (2d Cir.2014) (same). “On a motion for summary judgment, a fact is material if it might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law.” Royal Crown Day Care LLC v. Dep’t of Health & Mental Hygiene of City of N.Y., 746 F.3d 538, 544 (2d Cir.2014) (internal quotation marks omitted). Moreover, “[t]he role of the court is not to resolve disputed issues of fact but to assess whether there are any factual issues to be tried.” Brod v. Omya, Inc., 653 F.3d 156, 164 (2d Cir.2011) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also In re Methyl Tertiary Butyl Ether (“MTBE”) Prods. Liab. Litig., MDL No. 1358, No. M21-88, 2014 WL 840955, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 3, 2014) (same). Thus, a court’s goal should 'be “to isolate and dispose of factually unsupported claims.” Geneva Pharm. Tech. Corp. v. Barr Labs. Inc., 386 F.3d 485, 495 (2d Cir.2004) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323-24, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986)); see also Schatzki v. Weiser Capital Mgmt., LLC, No. 10-CV-4685, 2013 WL 6189465, at *14 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 26, 2013) (same). “In determining whether summary judgment is appropriate,” a court must “construe the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and ... resolve all ambiguities and draw all reasonable inferences against the movant.” Brod, 653 F.3d at 164 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Borough of Upper Saddle River, N.J. v. Rockland Cnty. Sewer Dist. No. 1, 16 F.Supp.3d 294, 314, 2014 WL 1621292, at *12 (S.D.N.Y.2014) (same). Additionally, “[i]t is the movant’s burden to show that no genuine factual dispute exists.” Vt. Teddy Bear Co. v. 1-800 Beargram Co., 373 F.3d 241, 244 (2d Cir.2004); see also Aurora Commercial Corp. v. Approved Funding Corp., No. 13-CV-230, 2014 WL 1386633, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 9, 2014) (same). “However, when the burden of proof at trial would fall on the nonmov-ing party, it ordinarily is sufficient for the movant to point to a lack of evidence to go to the trier of fact on an essential element of the nonmovant’s claim,” in which case “the nonmoving party must come forward with admissible evidence sufficient to raise a genuine issue of fact for trial in order to avoid summary judgment.” CILP Assocs., L.P. v. PriceWaterhouse Coopers LLP, 735 F.3d 114, 123 (2d Cir.2013) (alterations and internal quotation marks omitted). Further, “[t]o survive a [summary judgment] motion ..., [a non-movant] need[s] to create more than a metaphysical possibility that his allegations were correct; he need[s] to come forward with specific facts showing that there is' a genuine issue for trial,” Wrobel v. Cnty. of Erie, 692 F.3d 22, 30 (2d Cir.2012) (emphasis and internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586-87, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986)), and “cannot rely on the mere allegations or denials contained in the pleadings,” Walker v. City of New York, No. 11-CV-2941, 2014 WL 1244778, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 26, 2014) (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing, inter alia, Wright v. Goord, 554 F.3d 255, 266 (2d Cir.2009) (‘When a motion for summary judgment is properly supported by documents or other evidentiary materials, the party opposing summary judgment may not merely rest on the allegations or denials of his pleading-”)). B. Analysis Defendants’ Motion raises four issues. First, Defendants argue that Defendants Knizeski and the ZBA should be dismissed from the case because, respectively, the Village is the real party in interest, and the ZBA is not a suable entity. (See Defs.’ Mem. 16-17.) Second, Defendants argue that Plaintiff lacks standing to bring his claim because he was not the owner of the subject property until August 9, 2013, when Gladstone conveyed the property deed to Plaintiff. (See id. at 4-6.) Third, Defendants seek summary judgment on Plaintiffs substantive-due-process claim, arguing that Plaintiff did not have a constitutionally protected property interest in the CO and that Defendants’ actions were not so arbitrary and outrageous that they violated Plaintiffs constitutional rights. (See id. at 6-10.) Fourth, Defendants argue that Plaintiff cannot establish proximate cause for certain of his damages claims, and that, to the extent Plaintiff receives damages, Defendants are entitled to a set-off of the award in light of Plaintiffs settlement with Atzl Defendants. (See id. at 11-16, 18-19.) After an overview of Plaintiffs claims and the issues left open to the Court on remand, the Court will address each argument in turn. 1. Plaintiff’s Claims Plaintiffs Complaint alleges a single cause of action against Defendants under § 1983, but it has been interpreted throughout this litigation to allege three constitutional violations — namely, a facial vagueness challenge, an as-applied’ vagueness challenge, and a substantive-due-process challenge. (See Dkt. No. 8, at 2-7 (Pl.’s Mem. of Law in Supp. of Mot. for Partial Summ. J.); Dkt. No. 31 (district court Order granting summary judgment for Defendants); Dkt. No. 39 (Second Circuit order reversing in part and vacating in part the district court Order).) In general, void-for-vagueness claims and substantive-due-process claims challenging state action arise under the same constitutional provision, which protects individuals from “depriv[ations] ... of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” U.S. Const. amend, xiv; see also Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108, 92 S.Ct. 2294, 38 L.Ed.2d 222 (1972) (“It is a basic principle of due process that an enactment is void for vagueness if its prohibitions are not clearly defined.”); Farrell v. Burke, 449 F.3d 470, 485 (2d Cir.2006) (“The vagueness doctrine is a component of the right to due process.”); Monserrate v. N.Y. State Senate, 695 F.Supp.2d 80, 95 (S.D.N.Y.2010) (analyzing vagueness claim under Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause), aff'd, 599 F.3d 148 (2d Cir.2010). Perhaps for this reason, the Complaint itself is somewhat unclear as to how Plaintiffs claims differ from each other. However, subsequent conduct in the litigation has helped resolve some of the ambiguity, and the Court will take this opportunity to hopefully add additional clarity. In his void-for-vagueness claim, Plaintiff challenges the text of section E, arguing, essentially, that the ordinance’s vagueness denied Plaintiff his due process right to understand what the ordinance says in the context of his specific desire to comply with it. (See Compl. ¶ 27 (alleging that “[t]he definition for measuring ... height ... was undertaken in a manner that a reasonable and prudent person would not understand when the actions of any individual property owner would or would not be in violation of any height or any other restrictions or requirements”); id. ¶ 32 (“The Village Defendants violated Plaintiffs clearly established constitutional ... rights regarding what a reasonable person would know regarding limitations under building height with the Village Zoning Code.”).) This characterization is consistent with the Second Circuit’s treatment of Plaintiffs as-applied-vagueness claim, which, according to the court, implicated one of “the most fundamental protections of due process[,] ... that no one may be required at peril of life, liberty or property to speculate as to the meaning of ... statutes,” and that “[a]ll are entitled to be informed as to what the State commands or forbids.” Cunney, 660 F.3d at 620 (emphasis added) (some alterations and internal quotation marks omitted). Moreover, it is consistent with the court’s recognition that, in its review of this claim, it was “relegated to the words of the ordinance itself’ and to the “interpretations” of the statute given to it by lower courts and “those charged with enforcing it.” Id. at 621 (alterations and internal quotation marks). Finally, it is consistent with the court’s description of the deprivation of due process the Plaintiff suffered in the context of this claim. See id. (finding that section E “fail[ed] to give specific notice of how a permit applicant should design his site plan so that the proposed building complies with th[e] restriction”); id. at 622 (holding that “section E ... provides no standard that can be objectively applied to determine if the conduct at issue ... complies with the ordinance’s restrictions”). By contrast, in his substantive-due-process claim, Plaintiff challenges Defendants’ denial of his CO application, arguing that Defendants’ actions denied Plaintiff his due process right to be free from arbitrary and irrational conduct. (See Pl.’s Mem. 14 (alleging that “Defendants acted in an arbitrary and irrational manner in depriving [Plaintiff] of [his] property interest” in the CO (emphasis added)); Defs.’ Decl. Ex. H, at 4 (“THE COURT: ... [w]hat is the substantive due process claim as distinguished from the void for vagueness claim? MS. MARZOLLA: I believe it was exactly that [Plaintiff] [was] entitled to the C.O. but for this application and this deliberate indifference to the standards set forth in the Code.... [Knizeski] was acting according to [an instruction by the Village] as opposed to what he should have been doing under the law.” (emphasis added)).) It is important to recognize this distinction between the words of the ordinance and the actions of Defendants because the denial of due process related to each claim implicates separate and distinct interests. Whereas Plaintiffs vagueness claim alleges that he was forced to speculate as to the meaning of the ordinance and was thereby deprived of liberty and/or property interests associated with the speculation, Plaintiffs substantive-due-process claim alleges that Defendants acted arbitrarily and outrageously and thereby deprived him of his property interest in the CO. This distinction becomes even clearer when one recognizes that'Plaintiff may have had a cognizable vagueness claim even if Defendants granted the CO; in that context, he could argue that his efforts to comply with section E, though ultimately successful, deprived him of his right to understand the meaning of the ordinance while attempting to comply with it, and he could claim damages associated with the speculation itself. (See Defs.’ Decl. Ex. H, at 12) (recognizing Plaintiffs possible damages claim based on the fact “that he went to great expense to try to get the C.O. and the reason why he had to endure such expense was because the ordinance was vague”).) Moreover, although the Second Circuit has granted summary judgment for Plaintiff on what courts commonly characterize as an “as-applied” void-for-vagueness claim, the meaning of the “as-applied” label in this context should not be misconstrued. It cannot be true, in this case, that because Plaintiff won his as-applied-vagueness claim, he is automatically entitled to damages resulting from the actual application of the vague law. Such a rule would effectively supplant the relatively high standards courts have applied to substantive-due-process claims analyzing a defendant’s conduct with the comparatively lower standards courts have applied to as-applied-vagueness claims analyzing a law’s abstract ambiguity in the context of a plaintiffs particular fact pattern. Compare Cunney, 660 F.3d at 620-21 (recognizing that “a statute’s language may be so vague as to deny due process of law” if it, (1) “fails to provide people of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to understand what conduct it prohibits,” or (2) “authorizes or even encourages arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement” (emphasis added)), with Natale v. Town of Ridgefield, 170 F.3d 258, 263 (2d Cir.1999) (“Substantive due process is an outer limit on the legitimacy of governmental action. It does not forbid governmental actions that might fairly be deemed arbitrary or capricious and for that reason correctable in a state court lawsuit seeking review of administrative action. Substantive due process standards are violated only by conduct that is so outrageously arbitrary as to constitute a gross abuse of governmental authority.” (emphasis added)). Therefore, in analyzing Plaintiffs claims, the Court is mindful that the void-for-vagueness claim involves only the constitutional violation associated with Plaintiffs speculation, whereas the substantive-due-process claim involves only the constitutional violation associated with Defendants’ allegedly arbitrary actions. With this in mind, the Court turns to Defendants’ arguments. 2. Defendants Knizeski and ZBA At the outset, the Court will address Defendants’ argument that neither Defendant Knizeski nor Defendant ZBA is a suable party for the purposes of Plaintiffs claim for damages under § 1983. Plaintiff has sued Defendant Knizeski only in his official capacity as Building Inspector for the Village, and he has sued Defendant ZBA, a municipal department of the Village, in addition to suing the Village itself. (See Compl.) Defendants argue, with respect to Defendant Knizeski, that “[i]t is well settled that a suit against a municipal official in his official capacity is tantamount to a suit against the municipality,” (Defs.’ Mem. 16), and, with respect to Defendant ZBA, that “municipal departments ... which are ‘merely administrative arms of a municipality do not have a legal identity separate and apart from the municipality’ and cannot be sued as an entity,” (id. at 17 (quoting Fanelli v. Town of Harrison, 46 F.Supp.2d 254, 257 (S.D.N.Y.1999))). Plaintiff, as Defendants point out, failed to address these arguments in his Memorandum. (See Defs.’ Reply 1.) In Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 105 S.Ct. 3099, 87 L.Ed.2d 114 (1985), the Supreme Court explained that [o]fficial-capacity suits ... generally represent only another way of pleading an action against an entity of which an officer is an agent.... It is not a suit against the official personally, for the real party in interest is the entity. Thus, while an award of damages against an official in his personal capacity can be executed only against the official’s personal assets, a plaintiff seeking to recover on a damages judgment in an official-capacity suit must look to the government entity itself. Id. at 165-66, 105 S.Ct. 3099 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Lore v. City of Syracuse, 670 F.3d 127, 168 (2d Cir.2012) (same); cf. Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71, 109 S.Ct. 2304, 105 L.Ed.2d 45 (1989) (“[A] suit against a state official in his or her official capacity is not a suit against the official but rather is a suit against the official’s office. As such, it is no different from a suit against the State itself.” (citation omitted)). Therefore, because, in addition to suing the Village, Plaintiff has sued Knize-ski only in his official capacity, the Court dismisses Plaintiffs claims against Knize-ski. See Liang v. City of New York, No. 10-CV-3089, 2013 WL 5366394, at *17 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 24, 2013) (dismissing official-capacity claims, under Rule 12(b)(6), where the plaintiff alleged identical claims against a municipality); Mercier v. Kelly, No. 10-CV-7951, 2013 W 4452486, at *1, *6-7 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 19, 2013) (granting summary judgment for the same reason); see also Phillips v. Cnty. of Orange, 894 F.Supp.2d 345, 384 n. 35 (S.D.N.Y.2012) (“Within the Second Circuit, where a plaintiff names both the municipal entity and an official in his or her official capacity, district courts have consistently dismissed the official capacity claims as redundant.”). With respect to Plaintiffs claims against Defendant ZBA, “[i]t is well-established that under New York law, departments that are merely administrative arms of a municipality do not have a legal identity separate and apart from the municipality and therefore, cannot sue or be sued.” Martinez v. Cnty. of Suffolk, 999 F.Supp.2d 424, 429 (E.D.N.Y.2014) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Mulvihill v. New York, 956 F.Supp.2d 425, 427 (W.D.N.Y.2013) (same); Henry-Lee v. City of New York, 746 F.Supp.2d 546, 559 n. 11 (S.D.N.Y.2010) (same). Here, the ZBA is “merely [an] administrative arm[ ]” of Defendant Village. (See Village Zoning Law, at XII I (establishing ZBA and granting it specific powers and duties).) See also N.Y. Town Law § 267(2) (mandating that “[e]aeh town board which adopts a [zoning law or ordinance] ... shall appoint a board of appeals”); id. § 261 (authorizing a town board “by local law or ordinance to regulate and restrict the height, number of stories[,] and size of buildings and other structures,” and specifying that “[s]uch regulations may provide that a board of appeals may determine and vary their application”); cf. Roman Catholic Diocese of Rockville Centre, N.Y. v. Inc. Vill. of Old Westbury, No. 09-CV-5195, 2011 WL 666252, at *17 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 14, 2011) (noting that, in the context of an application to the municipality “for a modification of [a] special use permit,” a zoning board of appeals “acted as the lead agency for purposes of the SEQRA review”); Omnipoint Commc’ns, Inc. v. Town of LaGrange, 658 F.Supp.2d 539, 552 (S.D.N.Y.2009) (finding, where the plaintiff sued a town and its zoning board of appeals, its building department, and its planning board under the federal Telecommunications Act, that “the only proper municipal party defendant” was the town); Ultimate Custom Cycles, Inc. v. Town of Greenburgh, No. 98-CV-5914, 1999 WL 135201, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 11, 1999) (noting that a defendant town was “a municipal entity created and authorized under the laws of the State of New York,” that it was “authorized by law to maintain a Zoning Board of Appeals,” and that a defendant zoning board of appeals was “an agency created by [the defendant town] to act for [the town] in matters related to zoning,” but denying the claims against the town and the zoning board on the merits without considering whether the zoning board was a suable entity). The Court thus dismisses Plaintiffs claims against ZBA. See Martinez, 999 F.Supp.2d at 429-30 (dismissing claims against a police department where the plaintiff also sued the county); Burbar v. Inc. Vill. of Garden City, 961 F.Supp.2d 462, 471-72 (E.D.N.Y.2013) (same, where plaintiff also sued a village instead of a county); Mulvihill, 956 F.Supp.2d at 427-28 (dismissing claims against a department of. social services while noting that “the proper defendant would be [the county]”). 3. Standing Defendants next argue that Plaintiff does not have Article III standing to litigate his claims. {See Defs.’ Mem. 4-6.) Essentially, they claim that “[i]t is undisputed that the plaintiff was not the owner of the ... property at the time that the request for a [CO] was denied, the [ZBA] hearings were conducted, when he filed the Complaint[,] or even during most of the time that this case has been proceeding,” and therefore Plaintiff cannot recover damages for injuries suffered by the true property owner. (Id. at 4.) Plaintiff concedes that he did not own the property during the period Defendant identified, but nevertheless argues that he was “prevented from living at the newly constructed home and incurred significant associated financial loss as a direct result of Defendants’ enforcement of the unconstitutional ordinance.” (Pl.’s Mem. 3.) “To establish Article III standing, a plaintiff must show (1) an ‘injury in fact,’ (2) a sufficient ‘causal connection between the injury and the conduct complained of,’ and (3) a ‘likelihood]’ that the injury ‘will be redressed by a favorable decision.’ ” Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, — U.S. -, 134 S.Ct. 2334, 2341, 189 L.Ed.2d 246 (2014) (quoting Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992)); see also E.M. v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ., 758 F.3d 442, 449-50 (2d Cir.2014) (same). Moreover, “[t]he party invoking federal jurisdiction bears the burden of establishing standing.” Driehaus, 134 S.Ct. at 2342 (internal quotation marks omitted). Here, Plaintiff satisfies that burden. First, Plaintiff alleges that, notwithstanding Gladstone’s ownership of the subject property, he has personally suffered various forms of “financial loss,” including but not limited to “permanent loss in value assessed at $902,080,” “lost interest on profit,” “temporary loss of use assessed at $8,000 per month,” “carrying costs on the property in excess of $315,000,” and “attorney and professional fees in the’underlying ZBA and state court challenges ... in excess of $30,000.” (Pl.’s Mem. 3; see also Pl.’s Decl. Ex. D (Pl.’s Aff.) ¶¶ 15-16 (averring that “Gladstone Estates had no income so [Plaintiff] had to put the money in, directly or via [another] account,” and that he and his wife “had spent approximately $2,500,000” on the house by the time the CO was issued); Pl.’s Decl. Ex. E (Aff. of Michael Cunney) ¶ 4 (averring that Plaintiff “capitalize [d]” Gladstone “to purchase, develop, and build the property, at his own expense”).) This satisfies the injury-in-fact requirement. See Natural Res. Def Council, Inc. v. U.S. Food & Drug Admin., 710 F.3d 71, 85 (2d Cir.2013) (“Even a small financial loss is an injury for purposes of Article III standing.”); Miller v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 994 F.Supp.2d 542, 550 (S.D.N.Y.2014) (“Clearly, economic injuries ... are judicially cognizable.”). Second, Plaintiff alleges that he suffered this financial loss as a direct result of Defendants’ unconstitutional enforcement of the zoning law. Specifically, Plaintiff argues that he incurred expenses associated with section E’s vagueness, such as commissioning multiple sets of plans and attempting to conform with the ordinance. (See Defs.’ Decl. Ex. H, at 12.) Plaintiff also argues that Defendants’ actions deprived him of the CO and that, “[a]bsent the CO, the home was rendered without use or value.” (PL’s Mem. 9.) These allegations satisfy Article Ill’s causation requirement, which, in the context of this case, tests only whether Plaintiffs injuries are “fairly traceable” to Defendant’s conduct. See Garelick v. Sullivan, 987 F.2d 913, 919 (2d Cir.1993) (“The causation component of the Article III standing test insures that the injury alleged by a plaintiff is attributable to the defendant.... The plaintiffs injury ... must be fairly traceable to the allegedly illegal government conduct, .... [and a] plaintiff does not lack standing merely because her injury is an indirect product of the defendant’s conduct.”); see also DeFalco v. Dechance, 949 F.Supp.2d 422, 429-30 (E.D.N.Y.2013) (finding Article III standing where the plaintiffs “adequately alleged that but for the [zoning board of appeals’s] decision, they would have been able to develop the premises ... so that they suffered a concrete injury”); cf. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 507, 95 S.Ct. 2197, 45 L.Ed.2d 343 (1975) (noting that, in cases where “the plaintiffs challenged zoning restrictions as applied to particular projects that would supply housing ... of which they were intended residents,” standing existed because “[t]he plaintiffs .... were able to demonstrate that ... their ... personal interests would be harmed”). Third, where Plaintiff seeks compensatory damages under § 1983 for economic injuries sustained as a result of these constitutional violations, an order from the Court awarding Plaintiff monetary relief will redress his injury. See Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 248, 99 S.Ct. 2264, 60 L.Ed.2d 846 (1979) (“By virtue of [§ 1983], a damages remedy is ... available to redress injuries [resulting from unconstitutional actions] when they occur under color of state law.”); see also Maxineau v. City of New York, No. 11-CV-2657, 2013 WL 3093912, at *11 (E.D.N.Y. Jun. 18, 2013) (finding that even nominal damages under § 1983 are “sufficient ... redress for the purposes of Article III standing”); cf. Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of WorldCom, Inc. v. S.E.C., 467 F.3d 73, 77 (2d Cir.2006) (finding Article III standing where the plaintiff “suffered economic injuries” and “[sought] financial compensation to redress those losses”). Fourth, this holding is consistent with numerous cases holding that a party has standing to challenge an unconstitutionally applied zoning law even if the party is not the owner of the subject property. See, e.g., Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Housing Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 262, 97 S.Ct. 555, 50 L.Ed.2d 450 (1977) (finding Article III standing where the plaintiff was not the owner of the property subject to a rezoning-petition denial but had “expended thousands of dollars on the plans for [the property] and on the studies submitted to the [defendant village] in support of the petition for rezoning” — which studies and plans “[would] be worthless” “[u]n-less rezoning [was] granted”); Tsombanidis v. West Haven Fire Dep’t, 352 F.3d 565, 574 n. 6 (2d Cir.2003) (finding Article III standing where an organization would suffer injury from enforcement of a zoning ordinance against a third-party property owner); Fair Housing in Huntington Comm. Inc. v. Town of Huntington, N.Y., 316 F.3d 357, 360, 363 (2d Cir.2003) (finding Article III standing where the plaintiffs alleged that a town’s discriminatory “facilitation] [of] [a] development” project owned by a third party caused an injury in fact through perpetuating and exacerbating segregation); Anderson Grp., LLC v. City of Saratoga Springs, No. 05-CV-1369, 2011 WL 2472996, at *2-3 (N.D.N.Y. June 21, -2011) (finding Article III standing where the plaintiff demonstrated “economic injuries .... fairly traceable to [the defendant city’s] zoning policies and practices” — including “expending] time, money, and effort in developing the plans for [the property], soliciting and receiving professional services, and preparing and submitting its proposals and applications to [the city]” — even though the defendant argued that the plaintiff “had an insufficient interest in, i.e., no legally enforceable rights relating to,” the property at issue); Lynn v. Vill. of Pomona, 373 F.Supp.2d 418, 427-28 (S.D.N.Y.2005) (finding Article III standing where the plaintiffs “sufficiently alleged that they suffered economic losses and other hardships as a result of defendants’ allegedly discriminatory application of the [zoning law], and [sought] to recover this loss,” even though the defendant v