Jones-Bartley v. McCabe, Weisberg & Conway, P.C. (59 F. Supp. 3d 617, 2014)

United States District Court for the Southern District of New York 2014-11-06

Citations

Full opinion text

OPINION AND ORDER

KENNETH M. KARAS, District Judge:

Plaintiff Mureen Jones-Bartley (“Plaintiff’) filed the instant Complaint on behalf of herself and a class of similarly situated individuals, alleging that Defendant McCabe, Weisberg & Conway, P.C. (“Defendant”) violated the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”), 15 U.S.C. § 1692 et seq., when in early 2013 it sent a letter attempting to collect a debt. (See Compl. (Dkt. No. 1).) Before the Court is Defendant’s Motion To Dismiss the Complaint pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) for, respectively, lack of subject matter jurisdiction and failure to state a claim. (See Mot. To Dismiss PL’s Compl. Pursuant to Rules 12(b)(1) & 12(b)(6) (“Mot.”) (Dkt. No. 24).) For the following reasons, the Court grants Defendant’s Motion in part and denies it in part.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Factual History

The Complaint alleges that Defendant “sent [Pjlaintiff [a] letter .... regarding [a] debt” that Defendant “has been attempting to collect from [Pjlaintiff’ and that concerns “an alleged residential mortgage debt incurred for personal, family or household purposes,” (Compl. ¶¶ 12-14). Plaintiff attached the letter to the Complaint. (See Compl. Ex. A (“MWC Letter”).)

The letter, which Defendant appears to have sent to Plaintiff on behalf of a third-party mortgage company that is not named in this suit, comprises three pages. The first page, in relevant part, contains Plaintiffs name and a “Loan [Number],” informs the recipient that there has been a “failure to make ... payments [on a loan] when due,” notifies the recipient that “the mortgagee has elected to ... declare the entire principal balance of the loan due and payable,” and makes a “demand ... for the amount due.” (Id. at 1.) The letter then states that the “[tjotal principal due as of the date of this notice” is $462,634.03. (Id.) The second page, in relevant part,

notifies the recipient that, “[djespite [the] demand for payment, if any portion of this claim is disputed, [the recipient is] to notify [the sender] within 30 days, indicating the nature of the dispute as to the amount due or any part thereof.” (Id. at 2.) It also contains a valediction and the signature of Megan R. Sterback. (See id.) Finally, the third page, entitled “Validation of Debt Notice,” notifies the recipient, in bold, capitalized letters, that “THIS NOTICE AND LETTER ARE AN ATTEMPT TO COLLECT A DEBT AND ANY INFORMATION OBTAINED WILL BE USED FOR THAT PURPOSE.” (Id. at 3.) It also contains, in relevant part, language purporting to satisfy the sender’s notification obligation under the FDCPA:

Pursuant to the [FDCPA], a consumer debtor is required to be sent the following notice: (1) unless the consumer, within thirty (30) days after receipt of this notice, disputes the validity of the debt or any portion thereof, the debt will be assumed to be valid by the debt collector, (2) if the consumer sends notice the [sic] debt collector in writing within the thirty-day period that the debt or any portion thereof, is disputed, the debt collector will obtain verification of the debt or a copy of a Judgment against the consumer and [the] copy of such verification or Judgment will be mailed to the consumer by the debt collector; and (3) upon the consumer’s written request, sent by [the] consumer within the thirty-day period, the debt collector will provide the consumer with the name and address of the original creditor, if different from the current creditor.

(Id.) The bottom of the third page also contains the signature of Megan R. Ster-back, along with Defendant’s name, address, and telephone number. (See id.)

The Complaint alleges that Defendant sent this letter to Plaintiff “[o]n or about January 28, 2013.” (Compl. ¶ 13.) It also alleges that this was “the first letter [P]laintiff received from [Defendant regarding the debt described therein,” and that this was “a form letter used by [Defendant as the initial letter it sends to a consumer.” (Id. ¶¶ 14,16.)

The Complaint alleges that the letter “fails to comply” with the FDCPA in four ways. (Id. ¶ 18.) First, the Complaint alleges that the letter violates 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a)(l) (requiring a debt collector to provide a consumer with “a written notice containing ... the amount of the debt”) because the letter provides notice only of the “total principal due as of the date of th[e] notice,” whereas the “amount of the debt” owed would “include[ ] accrued but unpaid interest and other fees and charges,” which “generally amount to thousands of dollars.” (Id. ¶ 19.) Second, the Complaint alleges that the letter violates 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a)(2) (requiring a debt collector to provide a consumer with “a written notice containing ... the name of the creditor to whom the debt is owed”) because the letter “completely fails to disclose who the current owner of the debt is.” (Id. ¶ 20.) Third, the' Complaint alleges that the letter violates 15 U.S.C. § 1692e (prohibiting “[t]he use of any false representation or deceptive means to collect or attempt to collect any debt or to obtain information concerning a consumer”) because the letter does not “specify that the debtor has 30 days after receipt of the letter to dispute, the debt,” but rather states that the recipient has “30 days” to dispute the debt, “making the most logical interpretation 30 days from the date of the ... letter.” (Id. ¶ 21.) Finally, the Complaint alleges that the letter violates 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a)(3) (requiring a debt collector to provide a consumer with “a written notice containing ... a statement that unless the consumer, within thirty days after receipt of the notice, disputes the validity of the debt, or any portion thereof, the debt will be assumed to be valid by the debt collector”) because the letter states that notification of a dispute within the 30-day period must “state ‘the nature of the dispute as to the amount due or any part thereof,’” despite the lack of a statutory requirement to do so. (Id. ¶22 (quoting MWC Letter 2.)

In addition to alleging claims on behalf of Plaintiff, the Complaint alleges the same claims “on behalf of .a class” of individuals who received a similar letter. (Compl. ¶¶ 25-26.) The Complaint specifically defines a proposed class to include

(a) all natural persons with New York addresses (b) who were sent a letter in the form represented by [the letter sent to Plaintiff and attached to the Complaint] (c) addressed to the same address as that of the mortgaged property (d) on or after a date one year prior to the filing of this action, and (e) on or before a date 20 days after the filing of this action.

(Id. ¶ 26.) The Complaint further alleges that, “[o]n information' and belief, there are more than 50 members of the class.” (Id. ¶ 27.)

Based on these allegations, the Complaint seeks a “judgment in favor of [P]laintiff and the class and against [D]e-fendant for: (1) [statutory damages; (2) [ajttorney’s fees, litigation expensesf,] and costs of suit; [and] (3) [s]uch other and further relief as the Court deems proper.” (Id. at 6-7.)

B. Procedural History

Plaintiff filed the Complaint on July 11, 2013, (see Dkt. No. 1), and served Defendant four days later, (see Dkt. No. 4 (Affidavit of Service)). Then, in a letter dated July 16, 2013 and filed pursuant to Rule II.A of the Court’s Individual Rules of Practice, Plaintiff requested a pre-motion conference to discuss her “anticipated motion for class certification and motion to enter and continue [her] motion for class certification.” (Letter from Tiffany N. Hardy to Court (July 16, 2013)) (“PMC Letter”) 1 (Dkt. No. 5).) Plaintiff specifically noted that she requested the conference “in order to avoid having the class claims mooted by a Rule 68 Offer of Judgment or other tender,” noting further that “the class needs to be protected” from such an outcome. (Id.) On July 30, the Court endorsed the letter and directed Defendant “to respond to [the] letter by August 5, 2013.” (Id. at 2.)

Defendant submitted two responses on August 5. First, Defendant submitted a letter requesting a 20-day extension to respond, to Plaintiffs letter, which request the Court granted, with Plaintiffs consent. (See Letter from Swartz Campbell LLC to Court (Aug. 5, 2013) (Dkt. No. 8).) Second, Defendant submitted a separate letter “agreeing] to [Plaintiffs] request” for a pre-motion conference. (Letter from Edmund K. John to Court (Aug. 5, 2013) (Dkt. No. 9).) The Court endorséd this letter, directing Defendant, “[p]er the Court’s Individual Practices, ... to respond to the substance of Plaintiffs July 16 letter by August 15, 2013.” (Id.)

On August 15, Defendant submitted a two-part response to Plaintiffs letter. First, Defendant filed a document entitled “Offer of Judgment Pursuant to [Fed. R.Civ.P.] 68.” (Nee Offer of J. Pursuant to F.R.C.P. 68 (“Rule 68 Offer”) (Dkt. No. 10).) The substance of that document reads, in full: “Defendant offers to allow judgment to be entered in favor of plaintiff, Mureen Jones-Bartley, and against defendant in amount [sic] of $1,000, plus attorneys’ fees, litigation expensesf,] and costs of suit in amount [sic] to be determined by the Court.” (Id.) Second, Defendant submitted a letter purporting to comply with the Court’s order to respond to the substance of Plaintiffs pre-motion letter. (See Letter from Edmund K. John to Court (Aug. 15, 2013) (Dkt. No. 29).) Although Defendant, in its second August 5 letter, had previously agreed to Plaintiffs request for a pre-motion conference, Defendant opposed Plaintiffs request in its August 15 letter. Specifically, Defendant stated that it “believe[d] that [Plaintiffs proposed] motion [for class certification] [would] not [be] necessary in light of the offer of judgment in an amount to compensate plaintiff for the maximum statutory damages and attorneys’ fees and costs incurred to date.” (Id.) In Defendant’s view, “[t]his action is no longer justiciable because plaintiffs individual claim is moot as a result of the offer of judgment sufficient to make plaintiff, who admittedly suffered no actual damages and sought only to obtain statutory damages, whole.” (Id.)

Shortly after August 15, Plaintiff sent a letter to the Court responding to Defendant’s letter. (Nee Letter from Tiffany N. Hardy to Court (Dkt. No. 17).) In that letter, Plaintiff renewed her request for a pre-motion conference “for leave to file her motion for class certification,” but also separately requested a pre-motion conference “for a motion to strike” Defendant’s Rule 68 Offer. (See id.) In a letter dated August 23, 2013, Defendant responded to the substance of Plaintiffs letter, arguing that the letter was “factually and legally inaccurate” and maintaining that “Plaintiffs claim remains moot as a result of the offer of judgment served on August 15, 2013.” (Letter from Swartz Campbell LLC to Court (Aug. 23, 2013) 1-2 (Dkt. No. 14.) After reviewing both letters, the Court endorsed Plaintiffs letter on September 5, informing the Parties that it “[would] hold a pre-motion conference on October 15, 2013.” (Dkt. No. 17 at 3.)

On September 18, approximately two weeks later, Defendant filed a Motion To Dismiss the Complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1). (See Dkt. No. 15.) Because Defendant had failed to request a pre-motion conference before filing the motion, the Court, on September 25, summarily denied the motion “without prejudice for failure to follow the Court’s Individual Practices.” (See Dkt. No. 18.)

The Court then held the pre-motion conference on October 15, at which conference the Court neither granted nor denied Plaintiffs request to file a motion for class certification. (See Dkt. (minute entry for Oct. 15, 2013).) Instead, it granted Defendant permission to file a Motion To Dismiss the Complaint. (Id.) Pursuant to a scheduling order adopted at the conference, Defendant filed the instant Motion and accompanying Memorandum of Law on November 18, 2013, (see Mot. To Dismiss (Dkt. No 24); Mem. of Law in Supp. of the Mot. To Dismiss Pl.’s Compl. (“Def.’s Mem.”) (Dkt. No. 25)), Plaintiff filed an Opposition Memorandum on December 16, 2013, (see Pl.’s Resp. to Def.’s Mot. To Dismiss (“Pl.’s Mem.”) (Dkt. No. 26)), and Defendant filed a Reply Memorandum on January 3, 2014, (see Reply Brief in Further Supp. of the Mot. To Dismiss (“Def.’s Reply”) (Dkt. No. 27)). The Court now turns to a discussion of Defendant’s Motion.

II. DISCUSSION

Defendant moves to dismiss Plaintiffs Complaint pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). With regard to the 12(b)(1) motion, Defendant argues that “the Court no longer has subject-matter jurisdiction” over the Complaint “[b]ecause the offer of judgment provides compensation to plaintiff for the maximum statutory damages,” and therefore “there is no longer a justiciable claim.” (Def.’s Mem. 2.) In the alternative, Defendant argues that, “to the extent plaintiffs FDCPA claims are based on” two of the four FDCPA violations alleged in the Complaint, the Court should dismiss the FDCPA claims pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) because “plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.” (Id.)

A. Standard of Review

“A case is properly dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1) when the district court lacks the statutory or constitutional power to adjudicate it.” John Brady v. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, Theatrical Drivers & Helpers Local 817, 741 F.3d 387, 389 (2d Cir.2014) (internal quotation marks omitted). Dismissal under Rule 12(b)(1) is therefore proper when a case becomes moot. Doyle v. Midland Credit Mgmt., Inc., 722 F.3d 78, 80 (2d Cir.2013) (per curiam) (“Under Article III of the U.S. Constitution, when a case becomes moot, the federal courts lack subject matter jurisdiction over the action.” (alterations and internal quotation marks omitted)). In making this determination, “the district court must take all uncontroverted facts in the complaint ... as true, and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the party asserting jurisdiction.” Tandon v. Captain’s Cove Marina of Bridgeport, Inc., 752 F.3d 239, 243 (2d Cir.2014). “But where jurisdictional facts are placed in dispute, the court has the power and obligation to decide issues of fact by reference to evidence outside the pleadings, such as'affidavits.” Id. (alterations and internal quotation marks omitted). Ultimately, “the party asserting subject matter jurisdiction has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that it exists.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).

“To survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), a complaint must allege sufficient facts which, taken as true, state a plausible claim for relief.” Keiler v. Harlequin Enters. Ltd., 751 F.3d 64, 68 (2d Cir.2014). In reviewing the Complaint, the Court “accept[s] all factual allegations as true and draw[s] every reasonable inference from those facts in the plaintiffs favor.” In re Adderall XR Antitrust Litig., 754 F.3d 128, 133 (2d Cir.2014) (internal quotation marks omitted). “But this indulgence does not relieve the plaintiff from alleging ‘enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’ ” Id. (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007)). Moreover, along with the Complaint itself, the Court “may consider ... any written instrument attached to the complaint as an exhibit, any statements or documents incorporated in it by reference, and any document upon which the complaint heavily relies.” ASARCO LLC v. Goodwin, 756 F.3d 191, 198 (2d Cir.2014) (internal quotation marks omitted).

B. ■ Analysis

1. Rule 12(b)(1)

Defendant first moves to dismiss the Complaint in its entirety because, in its view, the Rule 68 Offer “provides compensation to plaintiff for the maximum statutory damages,” and therefore “there is no longer a justiciable claim.” (Def.’s Mem. 2.) Because the Complaint asserts claims on behalf of Plaintiff and, separately, on behalf of a potential class, the Court must decide (a) whether Plaintiffs individual claim is moot, and, if so, (b) whether the Court retains subject matter jurisdiction over the class claim after dismissing Plaintiffs individual claim but before certifying the class.

a. Plaintiffs Claim

As discussed, Defendant submitted an “Offer of Judgment” pursuant to Rule 68 on August 15, 2013. (See Rule 68 Offer.) Per the terms of the Rule 68 Offer, Defendant “offer[ed] to allow judgment to be entered in favor of plaintiff, Mureen Jones-Bartley, and against defendant in amount [sic] of $1,000, plus attorneys’ fees, litigation expenses and costs of suit in amount [sic] to be determined by the Court.” (Id.) Defendant argues that this offer “provides plaintiff maximum relief,” and that Plaintiffs claim is therefore “no longer ‘live’ ” in the Article III sense. (Def.’s Mem. 4.) In so doing, Defendant relies on two Seventh Circuit cases upholding district court dismissals of complaints on mootness grounds after a plaintiff rejected an offer for complete relief. (See Def.’s Mem. 4-5 (citing Damasco v. Clearwire Corp., 662 F.3d 891, 895 (7th Cir.2011) (“[Ojnce the defendant offers to satisfy the plaintiffs entire demand, there is no dispute over which to litigate, and a plaintiff who refuses to acknowledge this loses outright, under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1), because he has no remaining stake.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Greisz v. Household Bank (Ill.), N.A., 176 F.3d 1012, 1015 (7th Cir.1999) (“[An] offer[] [for] more than [the plaintiffs] claim [is] worth ... in a pecuniary sense .... eliminates a legal dispute upon which federal jurisdiction can be based.”)).)

Before addressing Defendant’s argument, it is worth analyzing what the Second Circuit has to say about the interaction between Rule 68 offers and mootness. In Abrams v. Interco Inc., 719 F.2d 23 (2d Cir.1983), two named plaintiffs had brought a private antitrust action on behalf of themselves and a class, alleging that the defendant had engaged in an illegal price-fixing scheme, and that they had personally outlaid $408.10 in purchases related to this scheme. See id. at 25. They also sought treble damages. Id. at 25. The defendant thereafter “offered to allow that judgment be taken against it in the sum of $1,224.30, three times the amount of plaintiffs’ purchases ..., together with costs and reasonable attorneys’ fees.” Id. at 25-26.. The district court then “granted the [defendant’s 12(b)(1) ] motion ..., ordered the parties to settle a judgment, and provided that if they could not agree on the attorneys’ fees, the court would fix them.” Id. at 26. Approximately three months later, the district court entered judgment dismissing the complaint, “without agreement on the subject of attorneys’ fees.” Id. On appeal, the Second Circuit upheld the district court’s judgment dismissing the case as moot under Rule 12(b)(1). Noting that “all that remained] [in the case] [was] [the plaintiffs’] individual claims, for which [the defendant] admittedly ha[d] offered to pay much more than plaintiffs could obtain by suit,” the court recognized that, “[i]n substance, what defendant did by its offer was no different (except in being more favorable to the' plaintiffs) than if it had submitted to a default judgment on the individual claims.” Id. at 32. It further recognized that, in the context of “a final judgment fully satisfying [the] named plaintiffs’ private substantive claims, ... there [was] no justification for taking the time of the court and the defendant in the pursuit of minuscule individual claims which defendant ha[d] more than satisfied.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). It therefore upheld the district court’s judgment dismissing the complaint based on the court’s prior order that the parties settle a judgment. Id. at 34.

Next, in McCauley v. Trans Union, L.L.C., 402 F.3d 340 (2d Cir.2005), the plaintiff, litigating pro se, had filed a complaint seeking $240 in compensatory damages for alleged violations of the Fair Credit Reporting Act. Id. at 340. The defendant thereafter made a Rule 68 offer of judgment for $240 plus costs, but the offer specified that judgment would “not be construed as an admission of liability and that it [would] remain confidential and [be] filed under seal.” Id. at 341. After the plaintiff rejected the offer, the defendant moved for summary judgment, arguing that the offer covered the entirety of plaintiffs compensatory-damages claim and that, consequently, there was no longer a live case or controversy. Id. The district court denied the defendant’s motion for summary judgment, finding that the offer did not moot plaintiffs claim because “there remained a possibility that [the plaintiff] could recover punitive damages at the time of the settlement offer,” and that the offer therefore “did not encompass everything [the plaintiff] could possibly have been entitled to recover from his claims.” Id. But because, at that point, the district court had separately found that “punitive damages were no longer available” to the plaintiff and that he could only recover $240 in compensatory damages plus costs, the court noted that, “[w]ere [the defendant] to make [a renewed] Rule 68 offer of judgment [identical to the one] that it made prior to filing [the summary judgment] motion ... the [c]ourt”would be compelled to dismiss the action if [the plaintiff] were to reject the offer.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). The defendant thereafter made an identical Rule 68 offer of judgment, the plaintiff refused to accept it, and the court dismissed the case without entering judgment in plaintiffs favor. Id.

On appeal, the plaintiff argued that the defendant’s offer did not moot his case because he “ha[d] a legal and cognizable interest in obtaining a judgment that is not confidential and sealed, and thus [could] be used as precedent in future matters”; in the alternative, he argued that the district court erred in dismissing his claim without entering a judgment of $240 plus costs in his favor. Id. Addressing the plaintiffs first argument, the Second Circuit, citing Abrams, characterized as “clear” the proposition that the defendant’s “unwillingness to admit liability is insufficient, standing alone, to make [the] case a live controversy.” Id. (citing Abrams, 719 F.2d at 33 n. 9). It also cited, with approval, Chathas v. Local 134 IBEW, 233 F.3d 508 (7th Cir.2000), wherein the Seventh Circuit held that “a party [cannot] force his opponent to confess to having violated the law, as it is always open to a defendant to default and suffer judgment to be entered against him without his admitting anything.” Id. at 512; see also Abrams, 719 F.2d at 32 (“In substance, what defendant did by its offer was no different ... than if it had submitted to a default judgment on the individual claims.”). The Second Circuit thus agreed with the district court that the plaintiff “[was] not entitled to keep litigating his claim simply because [the defendant] ha[d] not admitted liability.” Id. at 342.

However, addressing the plaintiffs second argument, the Second Circuit held that the district court improperly dismissed the case as moot as a result of the rejected offer:

In the absence of an obligation to pay [the plaintiff] the $240 in claimed damages, the controversy between [the plaintiff] and [the defendant] is still alive. When [the defendant] acknowledged that it owe[d] [the plaintiff] $240, but offered the money with the requirement that the settlement be confidential, [the defendant] made a conditional offer that [the plaintiff] was not obliged to take. Because judgment was then entered in [the defendant’s] favor, [the defendant] was relieved of the obligation to pay the $240 it admittedly owe[d], and [the plaintiff], by his refusal of a conditional settlement offer, wound up with nothing. We therefore cannot conclude that the rejected settlement offer, by itself, moots the case so as to warrant entry of judgment in favor of [the defendant].

Id. In other words, the Second Circuit held that neither the offer itself, either when it was made or when it was rejected, nor the district court’s judgment of dismissal, mooted the claim; instead, only entry of judgment in the plaintiffs favor, thereby legally obligating the defendant to satisfy plaintiffs claim, can moot the claim.

Having found that the district court improperly dismissed the case, the Second Circuit then offered what it described as a “better resolution” of the case — namely, “entry of a default judgment against [defendant] for $240 plus reasonable costs.” Id. “Such a judgment would remove any live controversy from this case and render it moot. Moreover, a default judgment would serve [the defendant’s] desire to end the case, would award [the plaintiff] his damages and, like the Rule 68 settlement offer, would have no preclusive effect in other litigation.” Id. The court then noted that, “[a]t oral argument, both parties agreed that entry of a default judgment would satisfactorily resolve th[e] case,” and it therefore “vacate[d] the judgment entered in favor of [the defendant] and remand[ed] the case to the district co'urt for the limited purpose of entering a default judgment in favor of [the plaintiff] for $240 plus such costs as the district court deems reasonable.” Id.

McCauley left several issues unresolved, some of which the Second Circuit has confronted. In ABN Amro Verzekeringen BV v. Geologistics Americas, Inc., 485 F.3d 85 (2d Cir.2007), the plaintiff sought $500,000 in damages in a breach-of-contract claim, but the district court had held that the plaintiff was legally entitled to only $50 in damages from each defendant. Id. at 88. The defendants thereafter submitted offers of judgment for $50, the plaintiff rejected the offers, and the district court “entered judgment against defendants in the amount of $50 each and dismissed with prejudice [the plaintiffs] claims for damages in excess of $50 .... solely on [the grounds of] ... subject matter jurisdiction and the doctrine of mootness.” Id. at 89 (internal quotation marks omitted) (alteration in original). On appeal, the Second Circuit held that the district court erred when it dismissed the case on mootness grounds. As it explained, “[t]he defendants’ consent to judgment against them in the amount of $50 satisfied only a tiny portion of the $500,000 dispute between the parties.... The parties thus retained a practical stake in the dispute, and the court continued to be capable of rendering a judgment that would have a practical effect on the legal rights of the parties.” Id. at 95. In dismissing the case as moot, the district court “confused the mootness of an issue with the mootness of a case or claim in the Constitutional sense.” Id. at 94. “So long as the district court’s ruling limiting the liability to $50 remained in force, all litigable issues pertaining to the defendants’ liability ceased to have practical importance, because of the defendants’ tender of that amount. The case, however, was not moot, and the court did not lose subject matter jurisdiction.” Id. at 95. In other words, “[t]he defendants’ tender of $50 did not moot the plaintiffs claim for $500,000.” Id. at 96. Notably, the court specifically distinguished the case from Abrams on this ground, explaining that, “[i]n Abrams, ... the defendant tendered every cent (and more) to which the plaintiff claimed entitlement,” -but in the case at bar, “the defendants tendered only a portion — indeed, only a small portion — of the damages plaintiff claimed.” Id. “The district court’s ruling that the plaintiff had no entitlement to any amount exceeding what the defendants had tendered resolved the dispute between the parties but did not negate its existence.” Id. The court therefore “affirm[ed] the district court’s ... entry of judgment against each defendant for $50 ..., and its dismissal of the claim for damages in excess of $50,” but it held that the district court “erred in its view that the dismissal of the case was based on mootness and lack of subject matter jurisdiction.” Id. at 89.

Next, in Doyle v. Midland Credit Management, 722 F.3d 78 (2d Cir.2013) (per curiam), the plaintiff had filed a complaint alleging multiple claims under the FDCPA and seeking both statutory and actual damages. Id. at 79-80. At a hearing on the defendant’s motion to dismiss, the defendant orally “offered to pay [the plaintiff] $1,001, in addition to costs, disbursements, attorney’s fees, and an additional $10 to cover actual damages.” Id. at 80. The plaintiffs counsel “agreed that this offer provided for all of the relief that [the plaintiff] sought,” but the plaintiff “nonetheless refused to settle the case for that amount.” Id. The district court thereafter “held that the case was ... moot, and it granted [the defendant’s] motion to dismiss” but did not enter judgment in the plaintiffs favor. Id. On appeal, the plaintiff argued, with respect to the district court’s ruling that the offer mooted the case, only that the defendant’s oral offer “could [not] have rendered his action moot because [it did not] compl[y] with Rule 68,” id. at 79, which the plaintiff argued does not allow oral offers, id. at 81. The Second Circuit easily rejected this argument, holding that “an offer need not comply with [Rule 68] in order to render a case moot under Article III.” Id. at 81. “Consequently,” the court explained, it “agree[d] with the district court that [the plaintiffs] refusal to settle the ease in return for [the defendant’s] offer ..., notwithstanding [the plaintiffs] acknowledgment that he could win no more, was sufficient ground to dismiss [the] case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.” Id. It therefore affirmed the district court judgment dismissing the case without entering judgment in the plaintiffs favor. Id.

Finally, in Cabala v. Crowley, 736 F.3d 226 (2d Cir.2013) (per curiam), which postdated Doyle by almost four months, the plaintiff had filed a complaint under the FDCPA seeking statutory damages alone. Id. at 227. Shortly after the complaint was filed, the defendant’s attorney contacted the plaintiffs attorney “and offered to settle [the case] for $1000, the maximum statutory damages mandated by the FDCPA, and also offered, as mandated by the statute, to pay [the plaintiffs] attorney’s fees and costs, with the amount of such fees to be determined by the court.” Id. Instead of rejecting the offer, the plaintiff proposed a counter-offer, “requesting] a lump sum settlement including attorney’s fees.” Id. Ultimately, the parties agreed to a joint stipulation “for judgment in favor of [the plaintiff], with damages set at the statutory maximum as provided in [the defendant’s] initial settlement offer,” and with a request for a “judicial determination of attorney’s fees and costs.” Id. at 228. Following the joint stipulation, the parties engaged in “subsequent discovery and litigation over the amount of the fee award to which [the plaintiff] was entitled,” with the parties specifically disputing whether the plaintiff was entitled to fees and costs following the defendant’s original offer. Id. “The district court, observing that there was a sincere dispute over the ‘nature and form’ of the settlement — specifically about whether the settlement would include a judgment that would make the attorney’s fee award judicially enforceable — concluded that [the defendant’s] original offer did not moot the action,” and it therefore concluded that “any reasonable attorney’s fees incurred by [the plaintiff] during the continuing litigation should be borne by [the defendant].” Id.

The defendant appealed the district court’s award of post-offer attorney’s fees, arguing, in part, that “his initial offer for the maximum recovery available under the FDCPA ... rendered the underlying action moot,” and, in the alternative, that any attorney’s fees incurred after the offer were not “reasonable attorney’s fees” because “[the plaintiff] and his attorney acted unreasonably in continuing to litigate after communication of the” offer. Id. at 228-29. The Second Circuit first rejected the defendant’s argument that the settlement offer, by itself, rendered the case moot. Relying entirely on McCauley, the court described that case as “rejecting] the argument that an unaccepted offer of settlement for the full amount of damages owed ‘moots’ a case such that the case should be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction if the plaintiff desires to continue the action.” Id. at 228. “father, [McCauley] held, the typically proper disposition in such a situation is for the district court to enter judgment against the defendant for the proffered amount and to direct payment to the plaintiff consistent with the offer. Only after such a disposition is the controversy resolved such that the court lacks further jurisdiction.” Id. (emphasis added) (citing McCauley, 402 F.3d at 342). Applying those principles to the case at bar, the court h’eld that the defendant’s offer, which was an offer for settlement and which “specifically sought to avoid entry of judgment,” was insufficient to moot the case:

Upon [the plaintiffs] rejection of his proposal, [the defendant] neither offered a Rule 68 entry of judgment ... nor sought entry of judgment as authorized by McCauley, which under the terms of that case would have ended the litigation .... Instead, the parties continued to dispute a substantive issue relevant to the disposition of the case. Because the parties continued to dispute the form and extent of the relief to which [the plaintiff] was entitled, the case never became moot.

Id. at 228-29.

Turning to the question of whether the plaintiff “acted unreasonably in continuing to litigate after communication of the ... settlement offer,” id. at 229, the court held that the plaintiff did not act unreasonably because, even where a defendant offers a settlement for complete relief, a plaintiff may reasonably insist on an offer of judgment. See id. (“It takes two to stage a useless litigation;, [the plaintiffs] insistence on a judgment was no more rigid than [the defendant’s] equally determined opposition to such a judgment.”). Separately, the court also “rejected] [the defendant’s] argument that his settlement offer should be treated as equivalent to a Rule 68 offer of judgment.” Id. at 230 (“Failure to pay the negotiated settlement gives rise to a breach of contract action, while a judgment may be enforced using all the remedies available to a judgment creditor.”). It therefore affirmed the district court’s award of attorney’s fees, finding that, “[bjecause [the defendant’s] initial offer to settle did not include an offer of judgment, it did not fully resolve the dispute between the parties, and thus further litigation by [the plaintiff] was not per se unreasonable.” Id. at 231 (italics omitted).

Two clear principles emerge from this line of cases. First, to moot a plaintiff’s claim, the defendant must make an offer of judgment; an offer of settlement is insufficient. See id. at 229 (“Because the parties continued to dispute the form and extent of the relief to which [the plaintiff] was entitled, the case never became moot.”). Defendant need not make that offer in strict compliance with Rule 68; courts should focus on the substance of the offer, not the procedure employed. See Doyle, 722 F.3d at 81 (“[A]n offer need not comply with [Rule 68] in order to render a case moot under Article III.”). Second, the offer of judgment must fully satisfy the plaintiffs claim; a genuine dispute over whether the offer satisfies the entirety of the claim may, by itself, constitute a live case or controversy. See ABN Amro, 485 F.3d at 96 (“The district court’s ruling that the plaintiff had no entitlement to any amount exceeding what the defendants had tendered resolved the dispute between the parties but did not negate its existence.... There unquestionably was, and still is, a case and controversy for the court to adjudicate.”).

In this case, there is no dispute with regard to the first issue — Defendant has made an offer of judgment under Rule 68, and thus the Court need not analyze the aforementioned issues present in Cabala and Doyle. Regarding the ABN Amro issue, Plaintiff does dispute whether Defendant’s Rule 68 Offer provides complete relief, describing it in her Memorandum as “defective.” (See PL’s Mem. 8-9.) However, Plaintiffs objection does not concern the offer of $1,000 for her FDCPA claim, but rather relates only to the scope of the offer’s provision for attorney’s fees and costs. (See id.) Because the Court denies Defendant’s Motion on other grounds, it need not address whether the narrow dispute over the scope of the Court’s determination of the costs and attorney’s -fees award is sufficient to preserve a live case or controversy at this stage in the case.

In this context, the disposition of Defendant’s Motion first turns on a fourth issue, one explicitly or implicitly raised in the -previously discussed cases, but resolved in apparently conflicting ways. Assuming that Defendant’s offer of judgment is for full relief, the Court must determine whether an offer of judgment for full relief, by itself, moots a case and warrants a 12(b)(1) dismissal, as the Second Circuit appeared to hold in Doyle, see 722 F.3d at 81 (holding that the plaintiffs “refusal to settle the case ... was sufficient ground to dismiss th[e] case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction”), or whether a case becomes moot only after a court enters judgment in the plaintiffs favor, as the Second Circuit appeared to hold in McCauley, see 402 F.3d at 340 (“[W]e find- that the plaintiffs refusal did not, in and of itself, moot the case.... ”). This dispute is outcome determinative in- this case because, if Doyle applies, then Defendant’s offer mooted Plaintiffs claim and. the Court must grant Defendant’s Motion, but if McCauley applies, then Plaintiffs claim is not moot unless and until the Court enters judgment in Plaintiffs favor.

For multiple reasons, the Court finds McCauley to be controlling in' this case. First, although the effect of Doyle was to affirm a district court’s dismissal of case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction without entering judgment for the plaintiff, the decision did not directly address the issue of whether such a disposition was appropriate. True, the Doyle court was clear that the district court “properly dismissed” the case as moot. See 722 F.3d at 81 (holding that “the district court properly dismissed the entirety of [the plaintiffs] case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction”); id. (concluding “that the district court properly dismissed th[e] case as moot”). But it did so only in the context of the plaintiffs sole argument raised on appeal, which was that the defendant’s offers “could [not] have rendered his action moot because neither offer complied with Rule 68.” Id. at 79. Directly responding to that argument, the court held that “an offer need not comply with Rule 68 in order to render a case moot under Article III.” Id. It was in that specific context, therefore, that it “agree[d] with the district court that [the plaintiffs] refusal to settle the case ... was sufficient ground to dismiss th[e] case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.” Id. at 81. By contrast, in McCauley, the court directly addressed the question of “whether a plaintiffs rejection of an offer of judgment under [Rule 68] moots the case so that entry of judgment in favor of the defendant is appropriate.” 402 F.3d at 340. In response to that question, which is almost identical to the question presented in this case, the court found “that the plaintiffs refusal did not, in and of itself, moot the ease.” Id. (emphasis added). Thus, McCauley should control because it directly addressed the issue.

Second, in light of the Second Circuit’s procedures for overruling a prior panel decision, it is unlikely that the Doyle court intended to overrule McCauley’s, holding. “In general, a panel of [the Second Circuit Court of Appeals] is bound by the decisions of prior panels until such time as they are overruled either by an en banc panel of [that] Court or by the Supreme Court.” Lotes Co., Ltd. v. Hon Hai Precision Indus. Co., 753 F.3d 395, 405 (2d Cir.2014) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Fed. Grievance Comm. v. Williams, 743 F.3d 28, 29-30 (2d Cir.2014) (“Prior panels of this Court have held that [a certain standard] applies to [this case], and we are not free to revisit those holdings.” (citations omitted)). Thus, “where there has been an intervening Supreme Court decision that casts doubt on [the Second Circuit’s] controlling precedent, one panel of [the Second Circuit Court of Appeals] may overrule a prior decision of another panel.” Lotes Co., 753 F.3d at 405 (internal quotation marks omitted). Or, in certain circumstances, the Second Circuit may engage in a “mini-en banc, ” where a panel “circulate^] [an] opinion to all active members of [the] Court prior to filing” and overrules a prior panel decision when it “reeeive[s] no objection” to the circulated opinion. See Diebold Found., Inc. v. C.I.R., 736 F.3d 172, 183 n. 7 (2d Cir.2013). But here, there is no indication that either of these events occurred. Indeed, the Supreme Court explicitly declined to resolve this very issue in a recently decided case. See Genesis Healthcare Corp. v. Symczyk, — U.S. —, 133 S.Ct. 1523, 1528-29, 185 L.Ed.2d 636 (2013) (“While the Courts of Appeals disagree whether an unaccepted offer that fully satisfies a plaintiffs claim is sufficient to render the claim moot, we do not reach this question, or resolve the split, because the issue is not properly before us.” (footnote omitted)). And the four dissenting justices in that case who did address the issue adopted a position directly contrary to Doyle. See id. at 1533 (Kagan, J. dissenting) (“[A]n unaccepted offer of judgment cannot moot a case. When a plaintiff rejects such an offer— however good the terms — her interest in the lawsuit remains just what it was before. And so too does the court’s ability to grant her relief. ... As every first-year law student learns, the recipient’s rejection of an offer leaves the matter as if no offer had ever been made.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). Furthermore, it is unlikely the Doyle court engaged in a “mini-en banc” to overrule McCauley, as the Second «Circuit, when it later recognized the potential inconsistency between Doyle and McCauley, did not note that the former case overruled the latter. See Cabala, 736 F.3d at 230 n. 4 (“Since Doyle is not inconsistent with our holding here, we need not address whether it is inconsistent with McCauley .... ”).

Third, the Second Circuit’s treatment of Doyle in Cabala appears to suggest that the Court should follow McCauley instead of Doyle. As discussed, the Cabala court engaged in a separate analysis of, first, whether an offer, by itself, mooted the case, and, second, whether it was reasonable for the plaintiff to reject the offer for the purpose of awarding reasonable attorney’s fees. See 736 F.3d at 228-29. To answer the former question, the court applied McCauley alone, noting that, under that case, where a plaintiff rejects an offer of judgment, “the typically proper disposition ... is for the district court to enter judgment against the defendant for the proffered amount and to direct payment to the plaintiff consistent with the offer,” and

then further noting that “[o ]nly after such a disposition is the controversy resolved such that the court lacks further jurisdiction.” Id. at 228 (emphasis added) (citing McCauley, 402 F.3d at 342). Where the Cabala court cited Doyle, it did so only in the second part of the analysis, noting that Doyle was not inconsistent with its finding that there was no “precedent holding that [the defendant’s] settlement proposals were equivalent to Rule 68 offers,” and describing Doyle as holding that an offer of judgment need not comply with Rule 68 to moot a cause of action. Id. at 230 (“To hold that an offer of judgment that fails to meet the technical requirements' of Rule 68 is nevertheless an offer of judgment is not equivalent to holding that an offer of an informal settlement without judgment is equivalent to a Rule 68 offer of judgment.”). And although the Cabala court declined to “address whether [Doyle] is inconsistent with McCauley, ” it also noted that “McCauley ... was not cited by the Doyle court,” further confirming this Court’s view that Doyle did not intend to overrule McCauley. Id. at 230 n. 4. Caba la is thus further evidence that the Court should follow McCauley, rather than Doyle, in deciding Defendant’s Motion. See also Rivero v. Cach LLC, No. 11-CV-4810, 2014 WL 991721, at *4 n. 9 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 13, 2014) (“[I]n Cabala the Second Circuit called into question whether any Rule 68 offer of judgment should be held to moot a case, notwithstanding its recent decision in Doyle.”).

Fourth, if the Court were to interpret Doyle to hold that an offer of judgment, by itself, mooted a case, then it would follow that Doyle conflicts not only with McCauley, but also with ABN Amro. As discussed, in ABN Amro, the district court had held that “once the defendants tendered [the offer of judgment], ... the case had become moot, and the court was compelled to dismiss it for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1)” and enter judgment in the plaintiffs favor. 485 F.3d at 94. Holding that this was error, the Second Circuit noted that “[i]f the case had truly become moot and the court had lacked subject matter jurisdiction, the court would have been without power to enter a judgment in plaintiffs favor.... It would have been compelled simply to dismiss, leaving the dispute unadjudicated.” Id. The court then went on to explain that, where “parties ... retain! ] a practical stake in [a] dispute, and [a] court continued] to be capable of rendering a judgment that would have a practical effect on the legal rights of the parties[,] [t]here [is] no -mootness of the sort that deprives the court of subject matter jurisdiction,” even if “[c Certain issues that would otherwise have been in dispute became moot.” Id. at 95; see also Chafin v. Chafin, — U.S. —, 133 S.Ct. 1017, 1023, 185 L.Ed.2d 1 (2013) (“[A] case becomes moot only when it is impossible for a court to grant any effectual relief whatever to the prevailing party.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). ABN Amro is thus entirely consistent with McCauley’s holding that a “rejected [Rule 68] offer, by itself, [does not] moot[] [a] case so as to warrant entry of judgment in favor of [a defendant],” see 402 F.3d at 342, even though ABN Amro, like Doyle, did not cite McCauley at all. It is thus even less likely that the Doyle court intended to silently overrule both of these cases, which are independently in agreement on this point, while addressing a narrow question only tangentially related to the primary issue present in McCauley and ABN Amro.

For all of these reasons, the Court believes that McCauley provides the appropriate legal standard to apply in this case, and it thus finds that Plaintiffs “refusal [of Defendant’s offer] did not, in and of itself, moot the case.” McCauley, 402 F.3d at 340. But see Franco v. Allied Interstate LLC, No. 13-CV-4053, 2014 WL 1329168, at *2, 5 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 2, 2014) (citing Doyle for the proposition that “[a] valid offer of judgment that would satisfy a plaintiffs entire claim for relief ... renders a plaintiffs claim moot, even if plaintiff refuses the offer of judgment”; dismissing the case as moot, and entering judgment in the defendant’s favor); Foos v. Monroe-2 Orleans BOCES, No. 10-CV-6221, 2014 WL 122408, at *2-3 (W.D.N.Y. Jan. 13, 2014) (citing Doyle for the proposition that “an offer for a plaintiffs maximum recovery will render an action moot,” dismissing the case as moot, and entering judgment in the defendant’s favor).

Having determined the correct standard to apply, the Court now must decide whether to dismiss Plaintiffs claim as moot. Initially, the Court notes that, because the Rule 68 Offer itself did not moot Plaintiffs claim, and because the Court has not entered judgment in Plaintiffs favor, there is no doubt that the Plaintiffs claim is currently not moot. See Cabala, 736 F.3d at 228 (“Only after [entering judgment against defendant for the proffered amount and directing payment to the plaintiff consistent with the offer] is the controversy resolved such that the court lacks further jurisdiction.”). But this observation does not resolve Defendant’s Motion, because the Court is also mindful of the Second Circuit’s oft-cited dicta in Abrams that “there is no justification for taking the time of the court and the defendant in the pursuit of miniscule individual claims which defendant has more than satisfied.” 719 F.2d at 32; see also Doyle, 722 F.3d at 80 (citing this language from Abrams); ABN Amro, 485 F.3d at 93 (same). The Court therefore must decide whether this case warrants the “typically proper disposition” in this situation, which is “for the district court to enter judgment against the defendant for the proffered amount and to direct payment to the plaintiff consistent with the offer.” Cabala, 736 F.3d at 228; see also McCauley, 402 F.3d at 342 (noting that “entry of a default judgment against [the defendant]” is a “better resolution” than dismissing the case on mootness grounds).

For the following reasons, the Court declines to follow that approach in this case. Initially, as a technical matter, it is unclear whether Defendant still consents to entry of default judgment in its favor. Defendant made its offer under Rule 68, and per the terms of that rule, an offer not accepted within 14 days “is considered withdrawn.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 68(b). Defendant has not submitted a renewed offer, and no part of the record, including Defendant’s letters to the Court and its Memo-randa in support of its Motion, indicates that Defendant’s offer remains viable. Furthermore, Defendant’s Motion does not seek entry of judgment in Plaintiffs favor, but rather seeks “an order dismissing [P]laintiffs complaint” pursuant to Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). (Mot.) See Cabala, 736 F.3d at 229 (noting that the defendant never “sought entry of judgment as authorized by McCauley, which under the terms of that case would have ended the litigation”). The Court cannot enter a default judgment absent a specific request from a party. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 55(b)(1)-(2) (“If the plaintiffs claim is for a sum certain or a sum that can be made certain by computation, the clerk — on the plaintiffs request ... — -must enter judgment for that amount and costs against a defendant who has been defaulted for not appearing and who is neither a minor nor an incompetent person.... In all other cases, the party must apply to the court for a default judgment.” (emphasis added)). And the Court is aware of no other procedural mechanism by which it could enter judgment absent such a request. Indeed, in McCauley, the court remanded the case “for the limited purpose of entering a default judgment in favor of [the plaintiff]” only after “both parties agreed [at oral argument] that entry of a default judgment would satisfactorily resolve the case.” 402 F.3d at 342. Here, however, Defendant’s offer has expired, and Defendant has not moved for a judgment in Plaintiffs favor. Instead, Defendant appears to make the very argument the Court has rejected in this Opinion — i.e., that the offer itself mooted Plaintiffs claim, warranting dismissal under Rule 12(b)(1) and making entry of judgment unnecessary. (See Dkt. No. 29 (Defendant’s letter to the Court, filed the same day as its Rule 68 Offer, arguing that “[t]his action is no longer justiciable because plaintiffs individual claim is moot as a result of the offer of judgment”); Dkt. No. 14 at 2 (Defendant’s letter to the Court, filed eight days after the Rule 68 Offer, arguing that “Plaintiffs claim remains moot as a result of the offer of judgment”); Def.’s Mem. 4 (“Because plaintiff has been offered maximum relief, this matter is no longer ‘live’ and the Court does not have jurisdiction.”); Def.’s Reply 3 (“Plaintiffs claim is moot as a result of the offer of judgment ... and, therefore, this Court no longer has subject-matter jurisdiction. Accordingly, the Court should dismiss Plaintiffs Complaint as moot.”).) Defendant thus does not appear to seek the “typically proper disposition” in a case where, at least at one point, it offered the Plaintiff arguably complete relief for her claim. Accordingly, the Court declines in this case to implement the “better resolution” outlined in McCauley. See Cabala, 736 F.3d at 229 (“It takes two to stage a useless litigation....”); see also Fernandez v. Peter J. Craig & Assocs., P.C., 985 F.Supp.2d 363, 370 (E.D.N.Y.2013) (finding that a Rule 68 offer did not moot the plaintiffs claim because it “did not provide for the entry of judgment against defendant.”).

In doing so, the Court also notes that nothing in McCauley or any other case appears to require that the Court enter judgment in Plaintiffs favor and dismiss the case. As discussed, in McCauley, the parties, “[a]t oral argument, ... agreed that entry of a default judgment would satisfactorily resolve th[e] case.” 402 F.3d at 342. McCauley was thus not a case where the court entered judgment over a plaintiffs objection. The Cabala court confirmed this reading of McCauley, describing McCauley as outlining the “typically proper disposition,” and characterizing McCauley as holding that “a court may in [the] circumstances [present in that case] enter a judgment for plaintiff and terminate the litigation.” 736 F.3d at 228 & n. 2 (emphasis added). Even in Doyle, the court held that the facts of that case provided the district court “sufficient ground to dismiss th[e] case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction,” but the court did not hold that the court necessarily had to do so. 722 F.3d at 81 (emphasis added). Finally, to the extent those cases and others base their holdings on the Abrams court’s recognition that “there is no justification for taking the time of the court and the defendant in the pursuit of miniscule individual claims which defendant has more than satisfied,” see Abrams, 719 F.2d at 32, here, there is such a justification because Defendant has thus far not satisfied Plaintiffs claim and, through this Motion, is not seeking to satisfy Plaintiffs claim. Therefore, to the extent the Court has discretion under McCauley over whether to enter judgment over Plaintiffs objection and moot her claim, the Court declines to do so at this time.

Having found that Plaintiff’s individual claim is not moot, and having refused to enter judgment in Plaintiffs favor, the Court holds that Plaintiffs individual claim still presents a live case and controversy, and that the Court therefore has subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiffs claim. See Chafin, 133 S.Ct. at 1023 (“[A] case becomes moot only when it is impossible for a court to grant any effectual relief whatever to the prevailing party.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); ABN Amro, 485 F.3d at 94 (“Mootness, in the constitutional sense, occurs when the parties have no legally cognizable interest or practical personal stake in the dispute, and the court is therefore incapable of granting a judgment that will affect the legal rights as between the parties.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). The Court thus denies Defendant’s Motion to dismiss Plaintiffs individual claim pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1).

b. Class Claim

Even if the Court were to find that Plaintiffs individual claim were moot, Plaintiff has taken sufficient steps towards filing a motion for class certification, in accordance with this Court’s individual rules, that her class claims would remain justiciable.

“[I]n general, if the claims of [a] named plaintiffi] become moot prior to class certification, the entire action becomes moot.” Comer v. Cisneros, 37 F.3d 775, 798 (2d Cir.1994). Without certification, there can be no class under Rule 23, see Fed.R.Civ.P. (23)(c)(1), with the result being that the unnamed class members are not part of the action before the named plaintiffs claims are mooted by a Rule 68 judgment. See Bd. of Sch. Comm’rs of Indianapolis v. Jacobs, 420 U.S. 128, 129, 95 S.Ct. 848, 43 L.Ed.2d 74 (1975) (holding that action was moot when named plaintiffs challenging school rules graduated before class had been certified). But, neither the Supreme Court nor the Second Circuit has ruled on whether class claims “should be dismissed ... when a Rule 68 offer of judgment for full relief is made ... prior to the filing of a motion for class certification,” Carlin v. Davidson Fink LLP, No. 13-CV-6062, 2014 WL 4826248, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 23, 2014) (emphasis added), or “on the effect [on class claims] of a Rule 68 offer made prior to resolution of a Rule 23 -... certification motion,” Franco v. Allied Interstate LLC, No. 13-CV-4053, 2014 WL 1329168, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 2, 2014). The district courts have filled the void by, naturally, splitting on these questions. “[WJhere a motion for class certification is pending at the time that the defendant makes an offer of judgment under Rule 68,” some courts “have held that the certification of the class ‘relates back’ to the time of the filing of the [c]omplaint to .... prevent defendants from attempting to circumvent a class judgment by ‘picking off ... named plaintiffs through the mooting of individual claims.” Bowens v. Atl. Maint. Corp., 546 F.Supp.2d 55, 76-77 (E.D.N.Y.2008); see also Novella v. Westchester Cnty., No. 02-CV-2192, 2004 WL 3035405, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 29, 2004) (recognizing that “[c]ourts have applied the ‘relation back’ doctrine” where “defendants are able to circumvent judgment by ‘picking off of ‘buying off named plaintiffs through the mooting of individual claims”); Nasca v. GC Servs. Ltd. P’ship, No. 01-CV-10127, 2002 WL 31040647, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 12, 2002) (recognizing exception, and noting that it is “generally concerned with situations in which the named plaintiff has already filed a motion for class certification”); cf Comer, 37 F.3d at 799 (noting “[w]here the claims of the named plaintiffs become moot prior to class certification, there are several ways in which mootness is not had,” including certain cases where “the courts permit the class certification to relate back to the filing of the complaint and hold that the plaintiffs have properly preserved the merits of the case for judicial resolution”); Robidoux v. Celani, 987 F.2d 931, 939 (2d Cir.1993) (“Even where the class is not certified until after the claims of the individual class representatives have become moot, certification may be deemed to relate back to the filing of the complaint in order to avoid mooting the entire controversy.”); White v. Mathews, 559 F.2d 852, 857 (2d Cir.1977) (holding that class certification related back to-the date when the plaintiff filed its chai-lenge of Social Security Administration hearing delays because “[r]efusing to do so would mean that the SSA could avoid judicial scrutiny of its procedures by the simple expedient of granting hearings to plaintiffs who seek, but have not yet obtained, class certification”).

Additionally, some courts in the Second Circuit have broadened the exception. These courts have found class claims to not be mooted by the filing of a Rule 68 offer of judgment even when the plaintiff had not yet filed a motion for class certification at all, provided that the “Rule 68 offer of judgment was made so early in the action that the plaintiff had not had a reasonable opportunity to move for class certification.” Bowens, 546 F.Supp.2d at 77. As this Court has recognized, “t