Borrell v. Bloomsburg University (63 F. Supp. 3d 418, 2014)

MEMORANDUM

A. RICHARD CAPUTO, District Judge.

Presently before the Court are three motions: Plaintiff Angela Borrell’s' (“Bor-rell”) Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, (Doc. 86); Defendant Michelle Fic-ca’s (“Dr. Ficca”) Motion for Summary Judgment, (Doc. 114); and Defendants Geisinger Medical Center (“Geisinger”) and Arthur Richer’s (“Richer”) Motion for Summary Judgment, (Doc. 116). Borrell was dismissed as a student from Blooms-burg University (“Bloomsburg”) and Geis-inger’s collaborative Nurse Anesthesia Program (the “NAP”) in September 2012 after she refused to submit to a drug test. Shortly thereafter, Borrell commenced this action asserting, among others claims, deprivation of her equal protection and due process rights. With discovery now complete, Borrell seeks summary judgment as to liability on her procedural due process liberty and property interest claims, while Defendants move for summary judgment on all claims.

Because Borrell fails to present any evidence that she was treated differently from an individual that was “alike in all relevant aspects,” Defendants will be granted summary judgment on the “class of one” equal protection claim. Furthermore, since Defendants did not make pub-lie any false statements in relation to Bor-rell’s dismissal from the NAP, Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on the due process liberty interest claim will be granted. Conversely, because Defendants deprived Borrell of a property interest while acting under color of state law when they dismissed her from the NAP without due process, her motion for summary judgment as to liability on the procedural due process deprivation of property interest claim will be granted.

I. Factual Background

A. The Nurse Anesthesia Program

In 2006, Richer was instructed by Geis-inger’s Executive Leadership Team to explore options with universities in order to create a joint or collaborative accreditation program. (Doc. 115, Defendants’ Statement of Material Facts, ' “Defs.’ SMF,” ¶ 1; Doc. 139, Plaintiffs Counter-statement of Facts, “Plf.’s CSF,” ¶ 1.) The following year, Geisinger decided to form a collaborative program, known as the Nurse Anesthesia Program (the “NAP”), with Bloomsburg, an educational institution of the System of Higher Education of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania that provides a Masters of Science degree accredited by the Commission of Collegiate Nursing Education in the area of nursing for graduates of accredited programs. (Defs.’ SMF, ¶¶2-3; Plf.’s CSF, ¶¶2-3.) The NAP was designed to be distinct from Geisingér’s previous programs for registered nurses. (Defs.’ SMF, ¶4; Plf.’s CSF, ¶ 4.) Under the NAP, students in the program are given the opportunity to perform hands-on work at Geisinger under the supervision of Certified Registered Nurse Anesthetists. (Defs. ’ SMF, ¶ 5; Plf.’s CSF, ¶ 5.)

In August 2007, Geisinger and Bloom-burg entered into the “Collaboration Agreement for Nurse Anesthesia Education” (the “Agreement”). (Plf.’s Ex. 10.) As set forth in the Agreement, Blooms-burg “wishes to collaborate with Geisinger to support the Academic Training portion of the Program and provide the Program educational expertise and facilities,” and Geisinger “wishes to collaborate with University to support the Clinical Training portion of the Program and provide the Program clinical expertise and facilities.” (Id.) The Agreement provides that “none of the provisions of this Agreement are intended to create nor shall be deemed or construed to create any relationship between the parties other than that of independent entities contracting with each other solely for the purpose of effecting the provisions of this Agreement.” (Id. at ¶ 9.7.)

The parties’ duties and responsibilities are enumerated in the Agreement. For example, students that complete the Clinical Training portion of the NAP receive a Certificate of Completion from Geisinger, while Bloomsburg provides a MS Degree in Nursing to students that successfully complete the program. (Id. at ¶ 2.1) Both parties were also required to assist with meeting the necessary criteria for accreditation standards. (Id. at ¶ 2.2.) The Agreement further provides that “[b]oth parties shall:” (1) “develop a joint Admissions Committee to finalize admission criteria and recommend admission of Students into the Program;” (2) “designate at least three (3) representatives to serve on an advisory council for the program;” (3) “establish and mutually agree upon the number of Students that will be allowed to participate in the Program for each class;” (4) “develop and approve the curricula for Students while they are participating in the Clinical Training at Geisinger;” and (5) “develop guidelines for the Clinical Training portion of the Program with incorporation into University’s Department of Nursing Graduate Student Handbook and based on University academic policies.” (Id. at ¶ 2.2.) The Agreement also requires both parties to promote and market the NAP. (Id. at ¶ 2.6.) Bloomsburg further agreed to “advise Students that Students will, while participating in the Clinical Training portion of the Program, be expected to adhere to all applicable policies and standards of Geisinger,” including Geisinger’s Drug and Alcohol Policy. (Id. at ¶ 2.8.) And, “[s]ubject to the terms- of this Agreement, Geisinger shall have sole authority and control over all aspects of Clinical Training provided to Students pursuant to this Agreement including, without limitation, designation of patients and facilities.” (Id. at ¶ 2.4.) Similarly, the Agreement provides that Geisinger may exclude a Student from participation in the Clinical Training if “(i) the Student’s performance is unsatisfactory to Geisinger; (ii) the Student fails to comply with applicable policies and standards of Geisinger; or (iii) the Student’s health status may prevent attendance and successful completion of the Clinical Training portion of the Program. Geisinger will notify University in the event a student is excluded.” (Id. at ¶ 8.2.)

As to compensation, Bloomsburg is required to pay Geisinger “at the beginning of each semester, at the rate of 50% of the billed tuition and related fees.” (Id. at ¶ 5.1.) Bloomsburg is also obligated to hire “the Program Director as a full-time tenure track graduate faculty member of the Department of Nursing.” (Id.) “Program Director” is defined as:

the individual interviewed, approved and employed by both University and Geis-inger to oversee the Program and serve as the liaison between Geisinger and University relative to the Program. As an employee of both Geisinger and University, Program Director shall be entitled to any benefits or entitlements associated with such employment with each party in accordance with each party’s policies....

(Id at ¶ 1.4.)

The Agreement provides that the NAP is approximately thirty-three (33) months in duration. (Id at ¶ 2.2.) Approximately twenty-three (23) to twenty-five (25) months are dedicated to the Clinical Training portion of the program. (Id) During the Clinical Training portion of the NAP, the students work with and under the supervision of Geisinger employees. (Defs.’ SMF, ¶ 41; Plfs. CSF, ¶ 41.) Geisinger owns the buildings in which it operates. (Defs.’SMF, ¶37; Plfs. CSF, ¶37.)

Geisinger and Bloomsburg have joint employees. (Doc. 88, Plaintiffs Statement of Material Facts, ‘Plf.’s SMF,” ¶¶ 10-11; Doc. 132, Defendants’ Counterstatement of Facts, “Defs. ’ CSF, ” ¶¶ 10-11.) Defendant Richer worked as the Interim Program Director from 2008 until 2010 solely as a Geisinger employee. (Defs. ’ SMF, ¶ 23; Plfs. CSF, ¶ 23.) In 2010, once students arrived to begin the clinical training in the NAP, Richer became a joint employee of Bloomsburg and Geisinger. (Richer Dep., 375:10-13; Plf.’s Ex. 11.) Richer was the Director of the NAP at that time. (Plf.’s SMF, ¶ 10; Defs. ’ CSF, ¶ 10.) Richer’s pay did not change after he became a joint employee of Bloomsburg and Geisinger, as he continued to receive a yearly salary of $190,000.00. (Defs.’SMF, ¶26; Plfs. CSF, ¶ 26.) However, Bloomsburg began paying approximately twenty-five percent (25%) of Richer’s salary, in the annual amount of $45,225.97. (Defs.’ SMF, ¶27; Plfs. CSF, ¶ 27.) Prior to becoming a joint employee of Bloomsburg and Geisinger, Richer worked exclusively for Geisinger. (Defs.’SMF, ¶28; Plfs. CSF, ¶28.)

Other joint Bloomsburg-Geisinger employees were Brenda Wands (“Dr. Wands”) and Debra Minzola (“Minzola”). (Plf.’s SMF, ¶ 11; Defs.’CSF, ¶ 11.) Dr. Wands was the assistant Program Director, (Dr. Wands Dep., 16:1-6, 17:3-8), and Minzola is now the assistant Program Director. (Minzola Dep., 11:4-7.)

The NAP makes up only a small percentage of Geisinger’s annual budget. (Defs.’ SMF, ¶53; Plfs. CSF, ¶53.) For example, in 2012, Geisinger’s overall budget was $65,485,379, while its annual investment in the NAP is approximately $870,979. (Defs. ’ SMF, ¶¶ 54-55; Plfs. CSF, ¶ 54-55.) And, while Geisinger indicates that its net loss on its investment in the NAP is approximately $749,979 per year, (Defs. ’ SMF, ¶ 56), Geisinger leadership desired to develop the NAP “as a source of recruitment for future nurse anesthetists to staff the Geisinger entities.” (Richer Dep., 56:16-19.)

B. Bloomsburg and Geisinger Policies and Procedures

Bloomsburg’s Department of Nursing prepared a Graduate Student Handbook for its students seeking a Master of Science in Nursing. (Plf.’s Ex. 16.) Specifically, the Departmental Code of Academic and Professional Conduct indicates that it' applies “to all student activities on University owned property, any location affiliated with Bloomsburg University, or in the community at large.” (Id. at 67.) Under the Alcohol and Substance Abuse Policy, students are required to “comply with the drug and alcohol policies and drug testing procedures as required by agencies affiliated with the Department of Nursing.” (Id. at 70.) The Alcohol and Substance Abuse Policy further states: “[departmental sanctions will be rendered for a student in the nursing program who ... refuses to comply with affiliated agencies drug and alcohol policies and drug screening policies and procedures.” (Id.) The Handbook also sets forth a “review process” which is to “be initiated for a student in the nursing program who has a suspected violation of university, department, clinical agency alcohol/substance use and abuse policies. ...” (Id.)

Section V of the Geisinger Health System/Bloomsburg University of Pennsylvania Nurse Anesthesia Program Administrative Manual is entitled the “Student Nurse Anesthetist Handbook.” (Doc. 82, 122.) The purpose of the Student Nurse Anesthetist Handbook is to provide a “guide for students intended to promote student understanding of the [NAPJRelat-ed policies, procedures and academic/clinical issues.” (Id. at 123.) Among the various policies and procedures set forth in the Nurse Anesthesia Program Administrative Manual is the “Grievance Procedure,” which defines a grievance as “a complaint by a student concerning the clinical experiences, didactic evaluation, and/or disciplinary action during the Student’s period of enrollment in the Clinical Core Course portion of the Program.” (Id. at 194.) The Administrative Manual also contains a “Code of Condud/Discipline” policy, which provides that the NAP and Geisinger have established rules and regulations, and that “in the event there is a violation of one of these rules, we are committed to being reasonable in an attempt to correct the offense.” (Id. at 196.) Under the Code of Condud/Discipline policy, the “Faculty Organization” is the agency responsible for the discipline of students, except in minor instances. (Id.) This policy further enumerates offenses which are cause for immediate suspension and/or expulsion, one of which is the “unauthorized use, possession or distribution of controlled substances.” (Id.) The policy provides that it is “the student’s right to initiate a grievance in the event that there is a disagreement with the decision of the Faculty Organization. Please refer to the Grievance Policy.” (Id.)

Geisinger also has a Drug and Alcohol Policy for purposes of outlining “Geisinger Health System standards and procedures for dealing with Alcohol and Drug use or abuse by employees, ...” (Plf.’s Ex. 13, 1.) Students are considered to be “Geisinger Health System Employee[s]” under the Drug and Alcohol Policy. (Id. at 2.) The Drug and Alcohol Policy provides that no Geisinger Health System Employees “may-use, possess, transport, promote or sell Alcohol, or any Drug or Drug Paraphernalia while performing work for Geisinger ..., while on Geisinger Health System Premises, ...” (Id. at 5.) Furthermore, Geisinger Health System Employees are prohibited from reporting to work or remaining on duty while under the influence of or impaired by alcohol or any drug. (Id.) Geisinger Health System Employees are obligated under the Drug and Alcohol Policy to comply with substance abuse testing procedures. Those procedures provide that “[s]uch tests may be administered upon reasonable suspicion of substance abuse, (this may include situations on a case by case basis where HR is made aware of alleged. drug/aleohol abuse and deems it as reasonable cause to test the employee)----” (Id. at 6.). And, “[a]ny Geisinger Health System Employee who refuses to cooperate in any aspect of the Drug and/or Alcohol testing process described in this Policy shall be subject to disciplinary action, including termination, for a first refusal or any subsequent refusal.” (Id. at 4.)

C. Borrell’s Enrollment, Participation, and Termination from the NAP

Borrell applied for entrance into the NAP for the class beginning Fall 2011. (Plf.’s Ex. 74.) Borrell'was accepted into the NAP by letter dated December 10, 2010. (Id.) The acceptance letter was signed by Dr. Ficca as Graduate Coordinator and Assistant Chairperson and Richer as Interim Program Director on joint Bloomsburg-Geisinger letterhead. (Id.) The only program within Bloomsburg that Borrell applied for and was accepted by was the NAP. (Plf.’s Ex. 75, ¶7.) Borrell ultimately started in the NAP in 2011, (Borrell Dep., 43:13), and her clinical course work began at Geisinger in May 2012. (Id. at 59:8-10.) While a student in the NAP, Borrell paid her tuition, maintained her GPA at approximately 3.63-3.69, and performed her clinical work appropriately. (Plf.’s SMF, ¶ 15; Defs.’ CSF, ¶ 15.)

Shortly after Borrell’s class (the class of 2014) began their clinical work, Dr. Wands noticed that Borrell would show up to class looking disheveled, tired, and moody. (Dr. Wands Deel., ¶ 6.) However, Dr. Wands never documented her observations. (Dr. Wands Dep., 83:8-22.) Richer also noticed that Borrell appeared disheveled on a few occasions, but, like Dr. Wands, he never documented these observations. (Richer Dep., 103:1-23.)

On the evening of September 20, 2012, Monica Masemer (“Masemer”), a student in the class of 2013, alerted Dr. .Wands that a student would be coming forward about one of the registered nurses in the class of 2014. (Defs.’ SMF, ¶67; Plfs. CSF, ¶ 67.) Masemer knew through Justin Young (“Young”), also a student in the class of 2013, that either Lindsey Reilly (“Reilly”) or Young would come forward regarding Borrell having & potential drug problem. (Defs.’ SMF, ¶ 68; Plfs. CSF, ¶ 68.) Reilly had previously spoken with Young, her mentor, about her concern that Borrell was having issues with drug use. (Defs. ’ SMF, ¶ 69; Plfs. CSF, ¶ 69.) Young spoke of that conversation with Ma-semer, who then communicated with Dr. Wands. (Defs.’ SMF, ¶71; Plfs. CSF, ¶ 71.)

The next day, Friday, September 21, 2012, Reilly met with Dr. Wands. (Defs. ’ SMF, ¶ 72; Plfs. CSF, ¶ 72.) Reilly informed Dr. Wands that she witnessed Bor-rell use cocaine once in July 2012. (Reilly Dep., 9:12-18, 47:13-14.) Reilly also informed Dr. Wands that Borrell acted erratically the previous weekend when they were in New York City. (Id. at 46:22-47:17.) According to Borrell, Reilly reported this story because the two had gotten into an argument while they were in New York City. (Borrell Dep., 156:17-24.)

The same day, Dr. Wands reported what she learned from Reilly to Dr. Ficca and Richer. (Dr. Wands Decl, ¶ 18.) Dr. Wands spoke with Dr. Ficca and Richer at Bloomsburg while the three were preparing to start the interview process for the next class of anesthesia students. (Dr. Ficca Dep., 50:7-51:11.) Dr. Wands stated that she had contact with students who reported to her that they had witnessed Borrell using cocaine and that she acted inappropriately on a weekend trip to New York. (Id. at 51:13-18.)

On Monday, September 24, 2012, Borrell reported as usual to her clinical assignment at Geisinger at 6:00 a.m. (Plf.’s SMF, ¶ 44; Defs. ’ CSF, ¶ 44.) Under the supervision of a certified registered nurse anesthetist, Borrell performed work, including administering anesthesia, on a patient or patients for three to five hours. (Id.)

Also that morning, Dr. Wands, Richer, and Dr. Ficca met with Susan Hallick (“Hallick”), Geisinger’s Executive Vice President, System Chief Nursing Officer, to discuss Reilly’s report of Borrell’s use of cocaine. CDefs.’ SMF, ¶77; Plfs. CSF, ¶ 77.) Hallick is “responsible for ensuring that any matters of significance occurring in the NAP are handled consistently with GMC and Geisinger Health System’s overall policies, procedures, and practices.” (Hallick Decl., ¶ 7.) The meeting took place in Hallick’s office which was located at Geisinger. (Ficca Dep., 61:6-9.) At that meeting, it was decided that Richer should contact Brion Lieberman (“Lieberman”), Geisinger’s Director of Human Resources, (Lieberman Dep., 5:8), for further guidance. (Ficca Dep., 63:18-19.) It was also decided at that meeting that Borrell needed to be taken out of the clinical area and drug tested. (Richer Dep., 90:17-19.) Richer then met with Lieberman and Dr. Wands in his office at Geisinger to discuss the allegation that a student had witnessed Borrell using cocaine. (Lieberman Dep., 41:1-19.)

Thereafter, Richer asked Minzola to get Borrell out of clinical and bring her to his office. (Minzola Dep., 19:25-20:12.) Bor-rell was instructed to change out of her scrubs and bring her personal effects. {Richer Dep., 116:20-22.)

Beginning at 11:15 a.m., Richer and Lieberman met with Borrell for approximately one hour in Richer’s office. {Defs.’ SMF, ¶ 81; Plfs. CSF, ¶ 81.) Richer indicated to Borrell that there were concerns about changes in her appearance and demeanor, as well as suspicions of drug use, and that they wanted her to take a drug test. {Richer Dep., 117:6-18.) Richer and Lieberman, however, did not inform Bor-rell that they had a report that she had been witnessed using cocaine. {Plf’s SMF, ¶54; Defs.’CSF, ¶54.) According to Richer, Borrell became verbal, “saying a bunch of things,” and asking for an explanation as to what was meant by her appearance and demeanor changing. {Richer Dep., 117:16-118:22.) Borrell stated that she believed she was being discriminated against and that she had been under a lot of stress. {Id. at 118:9-22.) And, when Richer explained that they wanted her to take a drug test, Borrell indicated that she did not know if she was willing to submit to one. {Id. at 118:23-25.) Borrell was then permitted to call her mother at her request. {Id. at 119:8-14.)

Borrell stated that she was refusing to take the drug test because she did not want her record to show that she submitted to a drug/urine screen. {Defs. ’ SMF, ¶ 91; Plfs. CSF, ¶ 91.) Although Lieberman told Borrell that the results would be kept confidential, she did not believe him. {Defs.’ SMF, ¶ 92; Plfs. CSF, ¶ 92.) Bor-rell was adamant that she would not submit to a drug test that day, but she expressed to Richer and Lieberman that she might be willing to submit to the drug test another day after she had time to think about it. {Defs. ’ SMF, ¶93; Plfs. CSF, ¶ 93.) Lieberman informed Borrell that testing at a later date was not an option, {Lieberman Dep., 88:14-18.) And, while Richer maintains that Borrell was made aware that refusal to take a drug test could result in “consequence[s], up to and including termination from the program,” {Richer Dep., 121:10-14), Borrell denies that he ever indicated that she could be terminated at that meeting. {Borrell Dep., 172:8-10.) Rather, Borrell testified that she was only told that she would “face consequences” if she did not submit to the drug test. {Borrell Dep., 192:11-15.) Ultimately, Borrell refused to take' the drug test. {Defs.’ SMF, ¶95; Plfs. CSF, ¶95.) Following the meeting, Borrell contacted multiple classmates and her sister to tell them about the meeting and that she refused to take a drug test. {Defs.’ SMF, ¶¶ 107-108; Plfs. CSF, ¶¶ 107-108.) Bor-rell also contacted Dr. Robert Marande (“Dr. Marande”), the Dean of the College of Science and Technology at Bloomburg, about the request to take a drug test and her refusal. (Defs. ’ SMF, ¶ 109; Plfs. CSF, ¶ 109.)

That evening, a draft letter to Borrell was sent by email from Lieberman to Richer indicating that she was not to “report back to the program until further notice,” and that she would be contacted in the near future to discuss the next steps. (Plf.’s Ex. 41.) However, Richer testified that by the end of business on Monday, September 24, 2012, it was decided that Borrell would be terminated from the program. (Richer Dep., 161:13-21.)

The next day, Tuesday, September 25, 2012, a draft letter informing Borrell of her termination from the NAP was circulated by email between Lieberman, Dr. Ficca, Richer, Dr. Wands, Minzola, and Brenda Webb. (Plf.’s Ex. 41.) Lieberman, Dr. Ficca, Richer, and Dr. Wands all provided comments and suggestions as to the contents of the letter. (Id.) Richer subsequently sent an email to Ficca and Lieberman entitled “Final copy ... font reduced so that the letter fits on GHS/BUP stationary.” (Id.)

By letter dated September 25, 2012, Borrell was informed of her termination from the NAP. (Plf.’s Ex. 23.) The letter is on joint Bloomsburg University-Geisinger letterhead. (Id.) The letter is signed by Richer as Director of the NAP, and he indicates in the letter that Borrell had been informed that she “would be required to cooperate with a drug test as a condition of the Nurse Anesthesia Program.” (Id.) The letter further states: “[a]s a result of your refusal to comply with the drug test, you are terminated from the Nurse Anesthesia Program effective September 25, 2012.” (Id.) The letter is also signed by Dr. Ficca, indicating that she “reviewed the above information and agree[d] with the decision to terminate Angela Borrell from the Nurse Anesthesia Program.” (Id.) Noted on the letter as enclosures are both the Bloomsburg University Department of Nursing Student Handbook pages 67 and 70-74, i.e., the Departmental Code of Academic and Professional Conduct, as well as the Geisinger Drug and Alcohol Policy. (Id.)

Borrell attempted to contact Richer and others at both Geisinger and Bloomsburg on September 25, 2012 to state her willingness to submit to a drug test. (Plf.’s SMF, ¶63; Defs.’ CSF, ¶63; Plf.’s Ex. 25.) In particular, Borrell, at the instruction of the Dean at Bloomsburg, emailed Richer indicating her willingness to comply with the drug test request. (Plf.’s Ex. 25.) Richer forwarded that email, stating that if Bor-rell “grieves her dismissal, I believe we are going to be forced to share other information regarding her witnessed use of cocaine.” (Plf.’s Ex. 41.) Lieberman responded by noting that “we will need to provide the information that was available to us to a review board if she grieves.” (Id.) Despite Borrell’s request, however, she was not permitted to take a drug test at that point. (Plf.’s SMF, ¶64; Defs.’ CSF, ¶ 64.)

The next morning, Wednesday, September 26, 2012, Richer sent Hallick an email to update her on what had developed over the previous twenty-four hours. (Plf.’s Ex. 27.) Richer informed Hallick that he had meetings with Dr. Marande, Dr. Ficca, and Lieberman. (Id.) Dr. Ficca had explained the situation to Dr. Marande, and Dr. Ma-rande supported the decision to terminate Borrell from the program. (Id.) Richer also informed Hallick that Borrell contacted Bob Gates, Dean of Graduate Studies, and stated that “she wanted to file ‘a nonacademic grievance,’ a process which does not exist.” (Id.) Richer further indicated to Hallick that Borrell’s access identification badge had been suspended and that they would take further steps once she received her termination letter. (Id.)

On September 27, 2012, Borrell sent Dr. Ficca an email indicating that she wished to appeal her termination from the NAP and requesting the review process take place and a review panel hearing.- (Plf.’s Ex. 30A.) Borrell. stated in her letter that she was never informed by Lieberman or Richer that she would be terminated from the program. (Id.) She also indicated that she attempted to contact Richer the morning after she refused to submit to a drug test, but she did not receive a response. (Id.) Thus, she concluded by “asking for a formal meeting and a formal review process of this decision.” (Id.)

Borrell also contacted a few of her classmates and informed them she was terminated from the NAP. (Defs.’ SMF, ¶ 114; Plfs. CSF, ¶ 114.) In addition, Borrell contacted Dr. Marande about her dismissal from the NAP. (Defs.’ SMF, ¶ 115; Plfs. CSF, 115.) Dr. Marande instructed Bor-rell that if she wanted to get the issue resolved, she should contact Geisinger’s Human Resources Department. (Defs. ’ SMF, ¶ 116; Plfs. CSF, ¶ 116). Dr. Ma-rande informed Borrell about other graduate options that were available to her because she could not complete the clinical requirement of the NAP. (Defs.’ SMF, ¶ 117; Plfs. CSF, ¶ 117.) Borrell did not want to hear about those options. (Dr. Marande Dep., 33:12-15.) However, for Borrell to have pursued one of these other graduate options, she would have needed to apply for that specific program, such as the nurse practitioner program or the community health program. (Dr. Ficca Dep., 89:29-90:4.)

On Monday, October 1, 2012, Richer sent an email to Lieberman to inform him that Borrell decided to grieve her termination. (Plf.’s Ex. 28.) Richer indicated that he had a meeting scheduled with Dr. Ficca, and, also, that Dr. Ficca had spoken to the Graduate School Dean and as far as he was concerned, her termination was a “ ‘non-academic grievance’ of which they do not have a process to deal with.... ” (Id.)

On October 2, 2012, Richer emailed Hal-lick and Lieberman, informing .them that “Bloomsburg University has determined that the student’s termination cannot be grieved since it is a ‘non-academic’ grievance,” and that “the contract between Geisinger and Bloomsburg indicated that the university abides by or agrees to support Geisinger’s drug and alcohol policy,” and the decision to refuse a drug test was in violation of that policy. (Plf.’s Ex. 29.) By letter dated October 3, 2012 to Richer and Dr. Ficca, Borrell’s former counsel demanded an immediate review process/hearing and reinstatement to the NAP. (Plf’s Ex. 31.)

On October 4, 2012, Dr. Ficca sent an email to Lieberman and Richer attaching a draft letter responding to Borrell’s letter sent on September 27, 2012. (Plf.’s Ex. 32.) The draft letter stated that because Borrell refused to submit to the drug test, she was “no longer eligible to complete your clinical experiences at Geisinger and, thus, you are unable to complete the requirements of the nurse anesthesia options of the MSN.” (Id.) The draft letter further provided that as part of the Department of Nursing’s affiliation agreements with health care institutions, students are required to comply with the policies of the affiliated institutions. (Id.) And, the draft letter indicated: “[t]his situation is a nonacademic issue and does not qualify for the grievance procedure at Bloomsburg University.” ' (Id.)

Dr. Ficca responded to Borrell by letter dated October 19, 2012. (Plf.’s Ex. 19.) That letter, on Bloomsburg University letterhead, states: •

Dear Ms. Borrell:

As part of the Department of Nursing’s affiliation agreements with health care institutions, students and faculty are required to abide by policies and procedures of the affiliating institutions. Because you refused to participate in a drug screening test when required on September 24, 2012, you violated the contractual relationship we have with Geisinger Medical Center and as a result, you cannot provide patient care at Geisinger Medical Center as a student in the nurse anesthesia option of the MSN program. This situation is a non-academic issue.

(Id.)

On November 8, 2012, Richer sent an email to the NCBRNA (the National Board of Certification and Recertification for Nurse Anesthetists). (Plf.’s Ex. 33.) The email signature block identifies Richer as “Program Director, Geisinger Health System/Bloomsburg University of PA Nurse Anesthesia Program.” (Id.) Attached to that email was a completed 2012 Change of Student Status Form for Bor-rell. (Id.) That form identifies Borrell’s date of termination, and provides the following explanation for termination: “[s]tu-dent terminated for failure to comply with a request to submit to a drug test.” (Id.) Also attached to the Change of Student Status Form was a copy of the September 25, 2012 letter to Borrell informing her that she was dismissed from the NAP. (Id.)

D. Procedural History

Based on the foregoing events, Borrell commenced this action against Dr. Ficca, Bloomsburg, Richer, and Geisinger by filing a Complaint and Motion for Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order on October 24, 2012. (Docs. 1; 2.) After multiple requests to continue the preliminary injunction hearing were granted,. (Docs. 10; 13; 15), Borrell voluntarily dismissed the request for preliminary in-junctive relief. ' (Docs. 16; 18.)

On February 19, 2013, Borrell, through newly retained counsel, filed her Amended Complaint. (Doc. 21.) The Amended Complaint set forth claims for violations of Borrell’s due process and equal protection rights,' as well as state law breach of contract claims. (Id.) Dr. Ficca, Bloomsburg, Richer, and Geisinger moved to dismiss the Amended Complaint. (Docs. 29; 32.)

By Memorandum and Order dated June 28, 2013, the motions to dismiss were granted in part and denied in part. See Borrell v. Bloomsburg Univ., 955 F.Supp.2d 390 (M.D.Pa.2013). The claims against Bloomsburg, Dr. Ficca in her official capacity, and Richer in his official capacity as an employee of Bloomsburg were dismissed with prejudice on Eleventh Amendment grounds. See id. at 399-400. The breach of contract claims against Dr. Ficca, Richer, and Geisinger'were also dismissed with prejudice for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. See id. at 407-09. Borrell was permitted, however, to proceed with her due process and equal protection claims against Geis-inger, Dr. Ficca in her individual capacity, and Richer in his individual capacity. See id. at 410.

The action proceeded to discovery, and following the close of discovery, the parties filed the instant motions for summary judgment. Borrell seeks partial summary judgment as to liability on her procedural due process claims in Count I of the Amended Complaint. (Doc. 86.) Conversely, Richer and Geisinger seek summary judgment on both the due process claims in Count I and the equal protection claim in Count II of the Amended Complaint. (Doc. 116.) Dr. Ficca likewise requests summary judgment in her favor on both Counts I and II of the Amended Complaint. (Doc. 114.) The parties’ motions for summary judgment have been fully briefed and are ripe for disposition.

II. Legal Standard

Summary judgment shall be granted “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). “Summary judgment is appropriate when ‘the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.’ ” Wright v. Corning, 679 F.3d 101, 103 (3d Cir.2012) (quoting Orsatti v. N.J. State Police, 71 F.3d 480, 482 (3d Cir.1995)). A fact is material if proof of its existence or nonexistence might affect the outcome of the suit under the applicable substantive law. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242; 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986).

Where there is no material fact in dispute, the moving party need only establish that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Edelman v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 83 F.3d 68, 70 (3d Cir.1996). Where, however, there is a disputed issue of material fact, summary judgment is appropriate only if the factual dispute is not a genuine one. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505. An issue of material fact is genuine if “a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Id. Where there is a material fact in dispute, the moving party has the initial burden of proving that: (1) there is no genuine issue of material fact; and (2) the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Howard Hess Dental Labs., Inc. v. Dentsply Int'l, Inc., 602 F.3d 237, 251 (3d Cir.2010). The moving party may present its own evidence or, where the non-moving party has the burden of proof, simply point out to the court that “the non-moving party has failed to make a sufficient showing on an essential element of her case.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986).

“When considering whether there exist genuine issues of material fact, the court is required to examine the evidence of record in the light most favorable to the party opposing summary judgment, and resolve all reasonable inferences in that party’s favor.” Wishkin v. Potter, 476 F.3d 180, 184 (3d Cir.2007). Once the moving party has satisfied its initial burden, the burden shifts to the non-moving party to either present affirmative evidence supporting its version of the material facts or to refute the moving party’s contention that the facts entitle it to judgment as a matter of law. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256-57, 106 S.Ct. 2505. The Court need not accept mere conclusory allegations, whether they are made in the complaint or a sworn statement. Lujan v. Nat'l Wildlife Fed’n, 497 U.S. 871, 888, 110 S.Ct. 3177, 111 L.Ed.2d 695 (1990).

“To prevail on a motion for summary judgment, the non-moving party must show specific facts such that a reasonable jury could find in that party’s favor, thereby establishing a genuine issue of fact for trial.” Galli v. New Jersey Meadowlands Comm’n, 490 F.3d 265, 270 (3d Cir.2007) (citing Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e)). “While the evidence that the non-moving party presents may be either direct or circumstantial, and need not be as great as a preponderance, the evidence must be more than a scintilla.” Id. (quoting Hugh v. Butler County Family YMCA 418 F.3d 265, 267 (3d Cir.2005)). In deciding a motion for summary judgment, “the judge’s function is not himself to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249, 106 S.Ct. 2505.

Where cross-motions for summary judgment are filed, as is the case here, the summary judgment standard remains the same. Lawrence v. City of Phila., 527 F.3d 299, 310 (3d Cir.2008). Of course, when presented with cross motions for summary judgment, the Court must consider the motions separately, see Williams v. Phila. Hous. Auth., 834 F.Supp. 794, 797 (E.D.Pa.1993), aff'd, 27 F.3d 560 (3d Cir.1994), and view the evidence presented for each motion in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986).

III. Discussion

Borrell’s claims against Dr. Ficca, Richer, and Geisinger are brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Section 1983 provides that “[ejvery person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage ... subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen ... or other person ... to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured, ...” 42 U.S.C. § 1983. “To establish liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must show that the defendants, acting under color of law, violated the plaintiffs federal constitutional or statutory rights, and thereby caused the complained of injury.” Elmore v. Cleary, 399 F.3d 279, 281 (3d Cir.2005) (citing Sameric Corp. of Del., Inc. v. City of Phila., 142 F.3d 582, 590 (3d Cir.1998)). In this case, Borrell asserts procedural due process claims for: (1) deprivation of a property interest in the continuation of her course of study; and (2) deprivation of a liberty interest in reputation. Borrell also asserts a “class of one” equal protection claim.

As indicated, all parties move for summary judgment on the procedural due process claims, while only Defendants seek summary judgment on the equal protection claim. In addition, Richer and Geis-inger contend as a threshold matter that they are entitled to summary judgment because they were not acting under color of state law. I will first address the color of state law issue. I will then proceed to consider, in the following order, Borrell’s equal protection claim, her deprivation of liberty interest claim, and her deprivation of property interest claim.

At the outset, however, I note that while the parties’ submissions address in detail the meaning of the terms of the policies and procedures in the record, i.e., the Department of Nursing Graduate Student Handbook, the Drug and Alcohol Policy, and the Nurse Anesthesia Program Administrative Manual, and whether they were followed in this case, the matter before me for resolution is not Defendants’ compliance (or lack thereof) with these policies and procedures. See, e.g., Le v. Univ. of Med. & Dentistry of N.J., 379 Fed.Appx. 171, 175 (3d Cir.2010) (“A school’s failure to follow its own policies is not, in itself, a violation of due process.... So long as the procedural protections actually provided were sufficient and fairly administered, due process is satisfied.”). While the policies and procedures in the record provide relevant background and context underlying the dispute at bar, because the claims here are brought pursuant to § 1983, at issue is whether Defendants, in terminating Borrell .from the NAP, violated her procedural due process and equal protection rights.

A. Under Color of State Law

To prevail on her § 1983 claims, Borrell must demonstrate that she was deprived of a federal constitutional or statutory right by an individual acting under color of state law. See Kach v. Hose, 589 F.3d 626, 646 (3d Cir.2009). Richer and Geisinger both dispute that they acted under color of, state law. (Doc. 117, 4-13.)

There is no “simple line” between state and private actors. Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Second Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 531 U.S. 288, 295, 121 S.Ct. 924, 148 L.Ed.2d 807 (2001). And, “[although little is straightforward in determining whether a private actor has acted ‘under color of state law,’ one directive emerges clearly from the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence: the facts are crucial.” Crissman v. Dover Downs Entm’t Inc., 289 F.3d 231, 234 (3d Cir.2002) (en banc); see also Groman v. Twp. of Manalapan, 47 F.3d 628, 638 (3d Cir.1995) (the state actor “inquiry is fact-specific”).

In considering Supreme Court precedent, the Third Circuit has noted that state action cases can be broadly divided into two factual categories. “The first category involves an activity that is significantly encouraged by the state or in which the state acts as a joint participant.” Leshko v. Servis, 423 F.3d 337, 340 (3d Cir.2005) (citations and emphasis omitted). The second category “involves an actor that is controlled by the state, performs a .function delegated by the state, or is entwined with government policies or management.” Id. (citations and emphasis omitted). The Third Circuit has thus articulated “three broad tests” to determine if a private defendant is a state actor: (1) whether the defendant exercised powers that are “traditionally the exclusive prerogative of the state;” (2) whether the defendant acted “with the help of or in concert with state officials;” or (3) whether the “state has so far insinuated itself into a position of interdependence with the acting party that it must be recognized as a joint participant in the challenged activity!.]” Kach v. Hose, 589 F.3d 626, 646 (3d Cir. 2009) (citing Mark v. Borough of Hatboro, 51 F.3d 1137, 1142 (3d Cir.1995)). And, regardless of which test applies, “the basic question” is whether Geisinger and Richer’s conduct “can be fairly attributed to the state.” Crissman, 289 F.3d at 239.

To determine whether actions that allegedly caused the deprivation of a right are fairly attributable to the state, the Supreme Court has set forth a two-part approach:

First, the deprivation must be caused by the exercise of some right or privilege created by the State or by a rule of conduct imposed by the state or by a person for whom the State is responsible. Second, the party charged with, the deprivation must be a person who may fairly be said to be a state actor.

Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 936, 102 S.Ct. 2744, 73 L.Ed.2d 482 (1982).

In their brief in opposition to Borrell’s motion for summary judgment, Richer and Geisinger argue that Borrell fails to satisfy the first Lugar prong because she was dismissed pursuant to the Drug and Alcohol Policy, which they characterize as a “private rule of conduct.” (Doc. 131, 6-7.) However, as explained in detail below, Borrell was deprived of her due process rights by, among others, Richer, a joint Bloomsburg-Geisinger employee, i.e., a person for whom the state is responsible. See, e.g., Cruz v. Donnelly, 727 F.2d 79, 81 (3d Cir.1984) (finding first Lugar prong satisfied where the alleged deprivation of constitutional rights occurred by borough police officers).

Moreover, there is evidence in the record that, for students participating in the NAP, Bloomsburg adopted the Drug and Alcohol Policy. Cf. Florer v. Congregation Pidyon Shevuyim, N.A., 639 F.3d 916, 923 (9th Cir.2011) (plaintiff failed to offer evidence that the private defendants “were enforcing a DOC or governmental policy prohibiting him from consulting with a rabbi or possessing a Torah or calendar, or that Defendants’ internal policy was adopted by the DOC.”). In the Collaboration Agreement, Bloomsburg agreed to advise students in the NAP that they were “expected to adhere to all applicable policies and standards of Geisinger,” including the Drug and Alcohol Policy. (Plf.’s Ex. 10.) Additionally, Bloomsburg’s Department of Nursing Graduate Student Handbook specifically states: “[sjtudents will comply with the drug and alcohol policies aild drug testing procedures as required by agencies affiliated with the Department of Nursing.” (Plf.’s Ex. 16, 70.) And, the Department of Nursing Graduate Student Handbook provides that departmental sanctions will be rendered for a student in the nursing program who “refuses to comply with affiliated agencies drug and alcohol policies and drug screening policies and procedures.” (Id.) Borrell therefore satisfies Lugar’s first prong. As to the second prong, Borrell relies on the joint action and entwinement tests to establish state action.

1. Geisinger acted under color of state law.

The Supreme Court has held that private activity may be deemed state action when “a private actor operates as a ‘willful participant in joint activity with the State or its agents.’ ” Brentwood Acad., 531 U.S. at 296, 121 S.Ct. 924 (quoting Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 941, 102 S.Ct. 2744, 73 L.Ed.2d 482 (1982)). And, the Third Circuit has indicated that the “joint action test” is an appropriate means by which to examine a private entity’s contractual relationship with the state. See Cahill v. Live Nation, 512 Fed.Appx. 227, 230 (3d Cir.2013) (citing Tsao v. Desert Palace, Inc., 698 F.3d 1128, 1140 (9th Cir.2012)). “The Supreme Court’s language requiring joint action or action in concert suggests that some sort of common purpose or intent must be shown.” Harvey v. Plains Twp. Police Dep’t, 421 F.3d 185, 195 (3d Cir.2005) (citation omitted). “This requirement can be satisfied either ‘by proving the existence of a conspiracy or by showing that the private party was ‘a willful participant in joint action with the State or its agents.’ ’ ” Tsao, 698 F.3d at 1140 (quoting Franklin v. Fox, 312 F.3d 423, 445 (9th Cir.2002)); Harvey, 421 F.3d at 195 (joint action requires that “the private actor at least be a willful participant in joint activity with the state or its agents.”).

Under the facts and circumstances of this case, Geisinger acted under color of state law. Here, the NAP was a collaboration between Bloomsburg and Geisinger. (Plf.’s Ex. 10.) As part of this collaboration, Bloomsburg provided the academic education, while Geisinger provided the clinical education to students in the program. (Id.) For students to finish the program, both the academic and clinical components needed to be completed. (Id.)

Bloomsburg and Geisinger jointly participated in operating the NAP. For example, both parties assisted with meeting the accreditation standards for the program. The admissions criteria for entrance into the NAP was developed jointly by Blooms-burg and Geisinger. For each class entering the NAP, Bloomsburg and Geisinger mutually agree as to the size of the class. Also indicative of joint activity in this case is that “[b]oth parties shall develop and approve the curricula for Students while they are participating in Clinical Training at Geisinger.” (Id. at ¶ 2.2.) The guidelines for the Clinical Training portion of the program were to be developed by both parties and then incorporated into the Department of Nursing Graduate Student Handbook.

Likewise, the parties were both obligated to jointly promote and market the NAP. As part of this obligation, promotional and marketing material is subject to the review and approval of both parties, and the parties equally share the expenses of the promotional and marketing materials and services. Bloomsburg and Geis-inger also share the tuition and fees due from students in the NAP, and Blooms-burg is obligated to pay Geisinger, at the beginning of each semester, at the rate of fifty percent (50%) of the billed tuition and related fees. Bloomsburg and Geisinger, in addition, have joint employees, and, at least with respect to the Program Director, they both pay a portion of his salary.

In view of this evidence, Geisinger was a willful participant in joint activity, the NAP, with Bloomsburg. And, while the Third Circuit has indicated that “not every partnership or venture with state will re-suit in a finding of state action,” the relationship in this case suffices to establish action that is “fairly attributable to the state.” Crissman, 289 F.3d at 245 n. 18. As detailed, with respect to the operations of the NAP, both Bloomsburg and Geisinger have obligations and responsibilities, many of which are shared between the two jointly. In that regard, multiple individuals have been employed jointly by Blooms-burg and Geisinger, including Richer, Dr. Wands, and Minzola. Moreover, Blooms-burg and Geisinger mutually benefit from the program. Geisinger obtained “a source of recruitment for future nurse anesthetists to staff the Geisinger entities,” (Richer Dep., 56:16-19), while Bloomsburg obtained access to a clinical facility and clinical training to support its academic and educational expertise.

Borrell’s termination from the NAP is also fairly attributable to the state. Bor-rell was dismissed from the collaborative NAP by Richer, an employee of both Bloomsburg and Geisinger. (Plf.’s Ex. 23.) Borrell was informed of her dismissal from the NAP by letter on joint Bloomsburg-Geisinger stationary. That letter reflects Dr. Ficca’s agreement with the decision to terminate Borrell from the NAP. And, the letter dismissing Borrell from the NAP involved the input of Bloomsburg, Geisinger, and joint Bloomsburg-Geisinger employees. (Plf.’s Ex. 41.) Thus, because Bloomsburg and Geisinger jointly participated in terminating Borrell from the NAP, Geisinger is a state actor for that activity.

2. Richer acted under color of state law.

Although Richer acknowledges that he was jointly employed by both Blooms-burg and Geisinger, (Plf.’s SMF, ¶ 10; Defs. ’ CSF, ¶ 10), he contends that Borrell is nevertheless unable to show that his “relationship with the state transforms him into a state actor.” (Doc. 117, 11.) In his brief in support of his motion for summary judgment, Richer contends that “[wjithin the NAP, [he] was not subject to any Bloomsburg University employee’s supervision .... ” (Id. at 12.) Richer also argues that he was not a state actor despite his relationship with Bloomsburg because: (1) Geisinger paid the majority of his salary; (2) his salary did not increase >once he became a joint Bloomsburg-Geisinger employee; and (3) he was subject to Geisinger’s policies and supervision regarding the clinical aspect of the NAP. (Id. at 12.)

There is no genuine issue of material fact that Richer acted under color of state law. According to the Supreme Court, “state employment is generally sufficient to render the defendant a state actor.” Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., Inc., 457 U.S. 922, 935 n. 18, 102 S.Ct. 2744, 73 L.Ed.2d 482 (1982). “Thus, generally, a public employee acts under color of state law while acting in his official capacity or while exercising his responsibilities pursuant to state law.” West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 50, 108 S.Ct. 2250, 101 L.Ed.2d 40 (1988) (citations omitted). And, whether an individual is a state actor depends on his function while working for the state, “not the amount of time he spends in performance of those duties or the fact that he may be employed by others to perform similar duties, that determines whether he is acting under color of law.” Id. at 56, 108 S.Ct. 2250 (noting that the fact that the physician’s employment contract in that case “did not require him to work exclusively for the prison make him any less a state actor than if he performed those duties as a fulltime, permanent member of the state prison medical staff.”).

Here, Richer acted under color of state law in regard to his participation in the NAP and the dismissal of Borrell from that program. Richer was a “full-time employee of Bloomsburg University.” (Richer Dep., 20:22-23.) At the times relevant to this action, Richer served as “Program Director,” which was defined as “an employee of both Geisinger and University.” (Plf. ’s Ex. 10.) Thus, Bloomsburg and Geisinger, on their own, designated Richer as a joint employee. Among other responsibilities, Richer, as “Program Director,” was required to “oversee the Program and serve as the liaison between Geisinger and University relative to the Program.” (Id.) Richer was also required to “coordinate[ ] all academic and clinical activities for students in the Program,” and to “plan[], direet[], and administer[] the School of Nurse Anesthesia in collaboration with the Chairperson, Department of Nursing at Bloomsburg University of PA.” (Doc. 82, 114.) Richer’s responsibilities also included planning and designing the curriculum, and planning “all instructional activities of the program to include classroom and clinical instruction by qualified faculty.” (Id.) The Program Director was also tasked with developing and maintaining policies and procedures consistent with the mission statement of the program. (Id.) In view of his functions and responsibilities as Program Director of the NAP, Richer was acting under color of state law in regard to his joint employment with Bloomsburg and Geisinger.

Moreover, Richer terminated Borrell in his capacity as a joint Bloomsburg-Geis-inger employee. Following Reilly’s report of Borrell’s purported drug use, Richer communicated with Bloomsburg employees, ie., Dr. Ficca, joint Bloomsburg-Geis-inger employees, ie., Dr. Wands, and Geisinger employees, ie., Hallick and Lieberman, before Borrell was requested to submit to a drug test. After Borrell declined to take a drug test, Richer communicated with these same individuals discussing her dismissal from the NAP. On September 25, 2012, the day after Borrell refused to submit to a drug test, Richer completed a “Statement of Violation of the Departmental Code of Academic and Professional Conduct Agreement.” (Plf.’s Ex. 18.) By letter that same day, Borrell was terminated from the NAP. (Plf.’s Ex. 23.) Richer signed that letter, which was on joint Bloomsburg-Geisinger letterhead, as “Director, Nurse Anesthesia Program.” (Id.) Similarly, in - Richer’s notification to the NBCRNA about Borrell’s dismissal from the NAP, his communication designated him as “Program Director, Geisinger Health System/Bloomsburg University of PA.” (Plf.’s Ex. 33.) Richer dismissed Borrell from the NAP while acting as Program Director, ie., as a joint employee of Geisinger and Bloomsburg. His action is properly attributable to the state, and he acted under color of state law for purposes of § 1983.

B. Equal Protection

Borrell contends that her equal protection rights were violated in relation to her dismissal from the NAP. Although Borrell originally asserted this claim against Dr. Ficca, Richer, and Geisinger, she has withdrawn her equal protection claim as to Dr. Ficca. (Doc. 138, 20.) Thus, at issue is whether Richer and Geisinger are entitled to summary judgment on the equal protection claim.

The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution directs that no state shall “deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” U.S. Const, amend. XIV, § 1. Borrell’s equal protection claim is based on a “class of one” theory. The Supreme Court, in Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 120 S.Ct. 1073, 145 L.Ed.2d 1060 (2000), outlined this theory of equal protection. Under a “class of one” claim, a plaintiff asserts that “he has been intentionally treated differently from others similarly situated and there is no rational basis for the difference in treatment.” Id. at 564, 120 S.Ct. 1073. To recover on a “class of one” equal protection claim, Borrell “must, ‘at the very least,’ establish ‘that (1) the defendants] treated [her] differently from others similarly situated, (2) the defendants] did so intentionally, and (3) there was no rational basis for the difference in treatment.’ ” Mun. Revenue Servs., Inc. v. McBlain, 347 Fed.Appx. 817, 825 (3d Cir.2009) (quoting Hill v. Borough of Kutztown, 455 F.3d 225, 239 (3d Cir.2006)).

Among other arguments advanced by Richer and Geisinger, they contend that no reasonable person could conclude that Borrell was treated worse than a similarly situated nurse. (Doc. 117, 16-20.) According to Richer and Geisinger, Borrell’s comparator must be “nearly identical,” and she is unable to “provide evidence of other nurses who refused to take a drug test and were not terminated.” (Id. at 18.) In that regard, Richer and Geisinger note that the record contains evidence that in the last few years, only four registered nurses employed by Geisinger have refused a drug test, and each one was subsequently terminated. (Id. at 20-21.)

In opposition, Borrell argues that she has identified two comparators. The first comparator relates to Richer and Geisinger’s involvement with a nurse anesthesia program with a different university in 1985. (Doc. 137, 13.) A student in that program was caught stealing narcotics from Geisinger, but was nonetheless permitted to remain in the program. (Id.) That student also had a change in performance, failed to perform at the level expected of a student with that experience, and there were complaints about the attitudes and skills of that student. (Richer Dep., 248:11-251:4.) Borrell argues, however, that while there are some differences between herself and that comparator, they are not fatal to her “class of one” claim because they demonstrate “that the person whose actions were far worse and far more dangerous was treated far better than Ms. Borrell.” (Doc. 137, 13-14.)

The second comparator identified by Borrell is Elizabeth Peterman (“Peter-man”), who was a student in the NAP. There were efforts in 2010 by Richer and Geisinger to dismiss Peterman from the NAP for unsuitability. (Id. at 14.) In response to the charges of unsuitability, Peterman was provided with: (1) the opportunity to submit evidence to refute the claim; (2) information about the procedures related to the dismissal from the program; (3) a meeting so she could learn what was stated against her and to explain herself; and the option to have a representative at that meeting. (Id. at 15.) In addition, Peterman attended a meeting with Richer and Lieberman. And, during that meeting, they were honest with Peter-man about why she was being charged with unsuitability and they did not withhold information from her. (Id. at 15-16.) Although Peterman lost the initial hearing, she appealed and was reinstated to the NAP. (Id. at 16-17.) Borrell argues that she was similarly situated to Peterman but nevertheless treated differently. Borrell acknowledges that the stated reasons for termination were different, but this distinction, she contends, is immaterial because she and Peterman were both in the NAP and their terminations involved the same parties and non-parties. (Id. at 17.) And, unlike Peterman who was afforded ample procedural safeguards, Borrell was denied notice, a hearing, and any other protections. (Id.) Thus, she concludes that there is sufficient evidence to survive summary judgment on her equal protection claim.

“Persons are similarly situated under the Equal Protection Clause when they are alike in all relevant aspects.” Startzell v. City of Phila., 533 F.3d 183, 203 (3d Cir.2008) (quotation marks and citation omitted). But, “the law in the Third Circuit does not require [the plaintiff] to show that the [comparators] are identical in all relevant respects but only that they are alike.” Southersby Dev. Corp. v. Borough of Jefferson Hills, 852 F.Supp.2d 616, 628 (W.D.Pa.2012) (citing Startzell, 533 F.3d at 203). The Third Circuit’s recent non-precedential decision in Spiker v. Whittaker, 553 Fed.Appx. 275 (3d Cir.2014) is instructive on the required similarity between a plaintiff and his or her comparator to be “similarly situated” for a “class of one” claim. In Spiker, the plaintiff pled guilty to two crimes and was required to register as a sex offender. See id. at 276-77. Twenty-three days after his guilty plea, the plaintiff was attested for failing to register as a sex offender. See id. at 277. He registered that same day. See id. The plaintiff was subsequently arrested and charged with failing to comply with the registration requirement, but he was acquitted of that charge. The plaintiff then filed a civil rights action asserting, among other claims, a “class of one” equal protection claim. See id. According to the plaintiff, “twenty other unregistered sex offenders were not arrested or prosecuted—they were simply prompted to register.” Id. at 280. The Third Circuit rejected the plaintiffs claim because he failed to show the comparators were similarly situated. Id. at 280-81. The court noted that nineteen of his comparators were convicted of different crimes, and the only comparator that was convicted of one of the same crimes as the plaintiff registered thirteen days sooner. Id. Thus, the Third Circ