Apple, Inc. v. Samsung Electronics Co. (67 F. Supp. 3d 1100, 2014)

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART APPLE’S MOTION FOR JUDGMENT AS A MATTER OF LAW •

[PUBLIC REDACTED VERSION]

LUCY H. KOH, United States District Judge

On May 5, 2014, after a thirteen-day trial and approximately four days of deliberation, a jury in this patent case reached a verdict. ECF No. 1884. On May 23, 2014, Apple filed a motion for judgment as a matter of law, amended judgment, new trial, and damages enhancements. ECF No. 1897-3 (“Mot.”). On June 6, 2014, Samsung filed an opposition. ECF No. 1906 (“Opp’n”). On June 13, 2014, Apple filed a reply. ECF No. 1919 (“Reply”). The Court held a hearing on the post-trial motions on July 10, 2014. Having considered the law, the record, and the parties’ arguments, the Court GRANTS Apple’s request for judgment as a matter of law of non-infringement of claim 15 of the '239 patent with respect to Apple’s iPad products, GRANTS Apple’s request for supplemental damages and prejudgment interest, and DENIES Apple’s motion for judgment as a matter of law in all other respects.

I. LEGAL STANDARD

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50 permits a district court to grant judgment as a matter of law “when the evidence permits only one reasonable conclusion and the conclusion is contrary to that reached by the jury.” Ostad v. Or. Health Scis. Univ., 327 F.3d 876, 881 (9th Cir.2003). A party seeking judgment as a matter of law after a jury verdict must show that the verdict is not supported by “substantial evidence,” meaning “relevant evidence that a reasonable mind would accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Callicrate v. Wadsworth Mfg., Inc., 427 F.3d 1361, 1366 (Fed.Cir.2005) (citing Gillette v. Delmore, 979 F.2d 1342, 1346 (9th Cir.1992)). The Court must “view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party ... and draw all reasonable inferences in that party’s favor.” See E.E.O.C. v. Go Daddy Software, Inc., 581 F.3d 951, 961 (9th Cir.2009) (internal quotations and citations omitted).

A new trial is appropriate under Rule 59 “only if the jury verdict is contrary to the clear weight of the evidence.” DSPT Int’l, Inc. v. Nahum, 624 F.3d 1213, 1218 (9th Cir.2010). A court should grant a new trial where necessary “to prevent a miscarriage of justice.” Molski v. M.J. Cable, Inc., 481 F.3d 724, 729 (9th Cir.2007).

II. ANALYSIS

A. Infringement of Claim 8 of the '721 Patent by Samsung’s Galaxy S II Products

Apple moves for judgment as a matter of law that Samsung’s accused Galaxy S II products infringe claim 8 of the '721 patent or, in the alternative, for a new trial on infringement and damages for those products. Mot. at 3. The '721 patent discloses unlocking a portable electronic device by using a predetermined gesture on a touch-sensitive screen. See generally '721 Patent col. 1. The '721 patent targeted the problem of “unintentional activation or deactivation of functions due to unintentional contact with the touch screen” in portable devices. Id. Apple asserted claim 8 of the '721 patent against Samsung. Claim 8 depends from claim 7. Both claims recite:

7. A portable electronic device, comprising:

a touch-sensitive display;

memory;

one or more processors; and

one or more modules stored in the memory and configured for execution by the one or more processors, the one or more modules including instructions:

to detect a contact with the touch-sensitive display at a first predefined location corresponding to an unlock image;

to continuously move the unlock image on the touch-sensitive display in accordance with movement of the detected contact while continuous contact with the touch-sensitive display is maintained, wherein the unlock image is a graphical, interactive user-interface object with which a user interacts in order to unlock the device; and

to unlock the hand-held electronic device if the unlock image is moved from the first predefined location on the touch screen to a predefined unlock region on the touch-sensitive display.

8. The device of claim 7, further comprising instructions to display visual cues to communicate a direction of movement of the unlock image required to unlock the device.

Apple accused six Samsung phones of infringing the '721 patent. For the Admire, Galaxy Nexus, and Stratosphere, Apple accused the “slide to unlock” feature in those phones. For the Galaxy S II, Galaxy S II Epic 4G Touch, and Galaxy S II Skyrocket (“Galaxy S II products”), Apple accused only the “slide to answer” feature. While the jury found that the Admire, Galaxy Nexus, and Stratosphere infringe claim 8, the jury found that the Galaxy S II products do not infringe. ECF No. 1884 at 5. The Court DENIES Apple’s motion, as explained below.

“To prove infringement, the plaintiff bears the .burden of proof to show the presence of every element or its equivalent in the accused device.” Uniloc USA, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 632 F.3d 1292, 1301 (Fed.Cir.2011). “If any claim limitation is absent from the accused device, there is no literal infringement as a matter of law.” Bayer AG v. Elan Pharm. Research Corp., 212 F.3d 1241, 1247 (Fed.Cir.2000). Accordingly, the jury needed to identify only one limitation missing from the accused products to reach its verdict.

The sole dispute between the parties here is whether a reasonable jury could have found that Samsung’s “slide to answer” features do not infringe, but that the “slide to unlock” features do infringe. At trial, Apple’s expert Dr. Andrew Cockburn testified that the “slide to answer” functionality in the Galaxy S II products was “very similar” to the “slide to unlock” feature utilized by the non-Galaxy S II accused phones. Id. at 633-36, 653-64, 673-76. Dr. Cockburn testified that both “slide to unlock” and “slide to answer” infringe because they “detect a contact with the touch-sensitive display” at an “unlock image”; allow the user to “continuously move the unlock image ... in accordance to the detected contact”; provide “visual cues” for the “direction of movement of the unlock image required to unlock the device”; and “unlock the device” when the unlock image is moved “to a predefined unlock region.” See id. at 673-74. Apple also argues that Figure 7 in the '721 patent discloses a form of “slide to answer,” so this feature must fall within the scope of claim 8.

The Court concludes that a reasonable jury could have distinguished “slide to answer” from “slide to unlock” for purposes of infringement. The verdict must stand unless the evidence, “construed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, permits only one reasonable conclusion, and that conclusion is contrary to the jury’s verdict.” Pavao v. Pagay, 307 F.3d 915, 918 (9th Cir.2002). Notably, neither party requested claim construction of any terms in the '721 patent. Accordingly, the jury was instructed to rely on the plain and ordinary meaning of the claim language. See ECF No. 1847 at 30; see also ePlus, Inc. v. Lawson Software, Inc., 700 F.3d 509, 520 (Fed.Cir.2012) (“In the absence of such a construction, however, the jury was free to rely on the plain and ordinary meaning.”).

Contrary to Apple’s arguments, the jury’s non-infringement verdict for the Galaxy S II products does not contradict the '721 patent or the record. As an example, the jury could have reasonably determined that the “slide to answer” functionality does not “unlock the hand-held electronic device,” as claimed. The patent describes a “lock state” as a condition where a phone ignores all inputs other than unlocking or powering off: “In the user-interface lock state (hereinafter the ‘lock state’), the device 100 is powered on and operational but ignores most, if not all, user input.... In other words, the locked device 100 responds to user input corresponding to attempts to transition the device 100 to the user-interface unlock state or powering the device 100 off, but does not respond to user input corresponding to attempts to navigate between user interfaces.” '721 patent col.7 1.64-66, col.8 11.12-17. However, in Samsung’s “slide to answer” feature, the phone allows the user to answer or decline a call directly, which indicates that the phone responds to user inputs. The Galaxy S II products also include the functionality of “Reject call with message,” which allows the user to send the caller a pre-set text message instead of accepting or declining the call. The jury could have verified this by testing the functionality on the phones in evidence. JX 32 (Galaxy S II); JX 33 (Galaxy S II Epic 4G Touch); JX 34 (Galaxy S II Skyrocket); ECF No. 1866-1 (final admitted exhibit list); see also PDX 40 (video demonstrative of “slide to answer” on Galaxy S II products). Based on at least these statements in the patent and the accused devices themselves, the jury could have decided that Samsung’s “slide to answer” screen is not a “lock state,” and that sliding to answer or decline a call does not “unlock” the device.

The verdict is also consistent with Figure 7 of the '721 patent. Apple claims that Figures 7A-7D demonstrate sliding to answer. However, that embodiment arguably does not show sliding to answer a call because it does not result in entry into an active call. Rather, Figure 7D shows that, after sliding to unlock, the user can press either “Decline” or “Accept” in response to an incoming call: “In FIG. 7D, the user completes the unlock action.... At this point, the user may interact with the virtual buttons 708 and accept or decline the incoming call.” '721 patent col. 16 11.4-11. Thus, the patent explains that a screen where the user can accept or decline a call is an “unlocked” state. However, Samsung’s accused “slide to answer” screen also permits the user to accept or decline a call, without further action:

Accordingly, a reasonable jury could have determined that sliding to answer on the accused devices is not a form of unlocking because the phone is in an “unlocked” state when it presents these multiple functions. Apple did not request a construction for “unlock”; to the extent Apple seeks such a construction now, Apple’s request is untimely. See Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Mustek Sys., Inc., 340 F.3d 1314, 1320-21 (Fed.Cir.2003) (“[Wjhere the parties and the district court elect to provide the jury only with the claim language itself, and do not provide ah interpretation of the language in the light of the specification and the prosecution history, it is too late at the JMOL stage to argue for or adopt a new and more detailed interpretation of the claim language and test the jury verdict by that new and more detailed interpretation.”).

Additionally, Apple points out that Dr. Greenberg did not testify to any infringement defense specific to the Galaxy S II products. Mot. at 5. However, Apple bore the burden of proof on infringement, and Apple cites no case holding that a jury must rely on expert testimony to find non-infringement, and courts have held otherwise. See Creative Compounds, LLC v. Starmark Labs., 651 F.3d 1303, 1314 (Fed.Cir.2011) (“If the patentee fails to meet that burden [of proving infringement], the patentee loses regardless of whether the accused comes forward with any evidence to the contrary.”); Intel Corp. v. Broadcom Corp., No. CIV.A. 00-796-SLR, 2003 WL 360256, at *14 (D.Del.2003) (denying patentee’s motion for judgment as a matter of law of infringement; “Broadcom was not required to put on its own expert to disprove infringement because it was Intel that bore the burden of proving infringement.”).

For these reasons, the Court cannot conclude that the evidence “permits only one reasonable conclusion” and substitute its judgment for the jury’s. Pavao, 307 F.3d at 918. Apple’s motion regarding infringement of the Galaxy S II products is DENIED.

B. Infringement of Claim 20 of the '414 Patent

The '414 patent covers “asynchronous data synchronization amongst devices,” which the parties nicknamed “background sync.” Apple asserted claim 20 of the '414 patent against Samsung. The jury found that none of the ten accused Samsung products infringes the '414 patent, See ECF No. 1884 at 9. Apple now moves for judgment as a matter of law of infringement or, alternatively, a new trial on infringement and damages. Claim 20 depends from claim 11. Both claims recite:

11. A computer readable storage medium containing executable program instructions which when executed cause a data processing system to perform a method comprising:

executing at least one user-level non-synchronization processing thread, wherein the at least one user-level non-synchronization processing thread is provided by a user application which provides a user interface to allow a user to access and edit structured data in a first store associated with a first database; and

executing at least one synchronization processing thread concurrently with the executing of the at least one user-level non-synchronization processing thread, wherein the at least one synchronization processing thread is provided by a synchronization software component which is configured to synchronize the structured data from the first database with the structured data from a second database.

20. The storage medium as in claim 11 wherein the synchronization software component is configured to synchronize structured data of a first data class and other synchronization software components are configured to synchronize structured data of other corresponding data classes.

'414 Patent els. 11, 20. Apple claims that it presented evidence that all Samsung ac-cused- products satisfy every limitation of claim 20, while Samsung conceded in-fringement of several limitations and presented insufficient proof of non-infringe-ment. However, as set forth below, the jury’s non-infringement verdict is sup-ported by substantial evidence and is not contrary to the clear weight of the evidence. Accordingly, Court DENIES Apple’s motion.

Apple’s theory of infringement is that the Android operating system, as installed on the accused Samsung devices, contains “Sync Adapters” that perform the synchronization functions in claim 20. It is undisputed that claim 20 requires at least three distinct “synchronization software components.” As the Court explained in its summary judgment order: “The first is the claimed synchronization software component ‘configured to synchronize structured data of a first data class’ and the other two are the ‘other synchronization software components’ configured ‘to synchronize structured data of other corresponding data classes.’ ” ECF No. 1151 at 23. Moreover, claim 20 requires that each synchronization software component be configured to “synchronize structured data” from a different data class. See '414 patent cl.20.

At trial, the parties presented opposing expert testimony from Dr. Alex Snoeren (Apple) and Dr. Jeffrey Chase (Samsung), who both analyzed relevant source code. The experts concurred that the accused software includes six Sync Adapters, two for each of three data classes: Calendar, Contacts, and Email. See Tr. at 980:1-15 (Snoeren), 2166:12-23 (Chase); see also SDX 3634. The experts further agreed that the “Google Calendar” Sync Adapter for the “Calendar” data' class and the “Google Contacts” Sync Adapter for the “Contacts” data class are “synchronization software components ... configured to synchronize structured data.” See Tr. at 981:11-17; SDX 3635. In support of Apple, Dr. Snoeren testified that the “Gmail” Sync Adapter for the “Email” data class is also a synchronization software component, and that therefore the accused software has three such components corresponding to different data classes. See Tr. at 981:18-982:3. Dr. Snoeren .reviewed Google documentation for the Sync Adapters (PX 172) and opined that all six Sync Adapters call a function called “Perform-BackgroundSync,” which allegedly establishes that the Gmail Sync Adapter can perform the claimed synchronization function. Id. at 984:23-986:16. Alternatively, Dr. Snoeren stated that three Sync Adapters that use the Microsoft Exchange protocol (“Exchange Calendar,” “Exchange Contacts,” and “Exchange Mail”) also synchronize structured data. See id. at 986:17-987:4.

Samsung argues that the jury could have determined that the accused software does not include at least three synchronization software components that were each “configured to synchronize structured data.” The Court agrees that substantial trial evidence permitted a reasonable jury to determine non-infringement on at least this basis. Dr. Chase explained to the jury that “there are no Sync Adapters of the E-mail data class” that are configured to synchronize structured data. Id. at 2167:20-2168:6. He disagreed directly with Dr. Snoeren’s analysis after reviewing the same source code for the Gmail Sync Adapter that Dr. Snoeren examined. See id. at 2170:12-2171:5. Dr. Chase opined that the Sync Adapters are not “configured to synchronize” because they do not synchronize data themselves, but rather indirectly “cause” synchronization by calling other software components. Id. at 2180:17-2181:11 (“I can call the mechanic to fix my car, and if that call causes the mechanic to fix my car, I really can’t say that I did it myself or I could do it myself.”). Furthermore, Dr. Chase told the jury that “[tjhere’s no synchronization of structured data of these classes in the Exchange Sync Adapters” because “the code passes a synchronization request along to another component of Exchange called the Exchange Service.” Id. at 2713:28-2174:6. Samsung also called Google manager Paul Westbrook, who testified that the Gmail Sync Adapter “passes messages between the Sync Manager here to this Mail Engine here,” and that it is the Mail Engine that performs synchronization, to optimize the speed of the Gmail Android application. Id. at 1649:20-1650:12. Mr. Westbrook also testified that the Exchange Sync Adapters only pass messages without synchronizing. Id. at 1653:1-17. Based on this expert and factual testimony, the jury could have decided that the accused products lack three distinct synchronization software components, and thus do not infringe.

Apple contends that Samsung made improper claim construction arguments to the jury by stating that “configured to synchronize” is different from “causing” another software component to synchronize. According to Apple, “Samsung proposed that the jury ‘import [] additional limitations into the claims’ ... by suggesting that the claim required that a sync adapter be configured to perform all synchronization or to perform synchronization in a specific way.” Mot. at 13. Apple further asserts that Samsung’s alleged claim construction “is also inconsistent with the specification and the prosecution history,” and cites portions of the '414 patent’s intrinsic record. Id. at 13-14.

Apple’s arguments regarding claim construction are unfounded. Apple relies heavily throughout its papers on Moba B.V. v. Diamond Automation, Inc. In Moba, the district court construed a method claim prior to trial, but when resolving post-trial motions, “reasoned that the jury reasonably could have determined from the testimony presented that sequential performance is a necessary characteristic” of the method claim. 325 F.3d 1306, 1313 (Fed.Cir.2003). The Federal Circuit reversed, holding that “the district court allowed the jury to add an additional limitation to the district court’s construction.” Id. Thus, Moba dealt with a situation where the district court had already construed the claim at issue, but relied on an extra limitation when reviewing the verdict. However, the Federal Circuit has clarified that parties may not re-argue claim construction in posttrial motions:

When issues of claim construction have not been properly raised in connection with the jury instructions, it is improper for the district court to adopt a new or more detailed claim construction in connection with the JMOL motion. On JMOL, the issue here should have been limited to the question of whether substantial evidence supported the verdict under the agreed instruction. See Moba, B.V. v. Diamond Automation, Inc., 325 F.3d 1306, 1313-14 (Fed.Cir.2003). In other words, where the parties and the district court elect to provide the jury only with the claim language itself, and do not provide an interpretation of the language in the light of the specification and the prosecution history, it is too late at the JMOL stage to argue for or adopt a new and more detailed interpretation of the claim language and test the jury verdict by that new and more detailed interpretation.

Hewlett-Packard, 340 F.3d at 1320-21. In ePlus, Inc. v. Lawson Software, Inc., the parties disputed whether the jury could decide that the unconstrued claim term “determining” required an element of control. 700 F.3d 509, 520 (Fed.Cir.2012). The Federal Circuit rejected the appellant’s argument as “essentially raising a claim construction argument regarding the meaning of the term ‘determining’ in the guise of a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence of infringement,” and held that in the absence of an express construetion, “the jury was free to rely on the plain and ordinary meaning of the term.” Id. Accordingly, it is improper to create a new claim construction after the verdict, and parties may not revisit claim construction for terms governed by plain and ordinary meaning.

Here, Apple seeks a post-trial construction for “configured to synchronize,” raising new arguments regarding the '414 patent’s specification and prosecution history, despite never requesting such a construction before. At trial, Apple did not object to Dr. Chase’s testimony as improperly arguing claim construction. See Price v. Kramer, 200 F.3d 1237, 1252 (9th Cir.2000) (noting that failure to object to testimony waives argument on appeal). Furthermore, this Court already addressed and rejected Apple’s argument before trial. When Apple sought summary judgment of infringement, the Court noted that: (1) the parties did not seek a construction of “configured to synchronize,” (2) that plain and ordinary meaning applied, and (3) that “a jury could reasonably conclude that the accused Sync Adapters merely direct other components to perform synchronization operations and are not themselves ‘configured to synchronize structured data’ as required by the claim.” ECF No. 1151 at 23-24. Apple’s attempt to revisit this decision is unsupported by fact or law. See Oracle Am. v. Google Inc., No. 10-CV-03561-WHA, 2012 WL 1945496 at *2, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 75026, at *9 (N.D.Cal. May 30, 2012) (“Rule .50 is not an occasion for yet another round of summary judgment based on new slants on the case law.”).

Apple’s remaining arguments challenge Samsung’s interpretation of the conflicting testimony. See Mot. at 10-11; Reply at 4-6. However, “we do not weigh the evidence or make credibility determinations in assessing the propriety of granting judgment as a matter of law.” Harper v. City of Los Angeles, 533 F.3d 1010, 1021 (9th Cir.2008). Because substantial evidence supports the jury’s non-infringement verdict, the Court DENIES Apple’s motion with respect to the '414 patent.

C. Infringement of Claim 25 of the '959 Patent

The '959 patent is directed to a “universal interface for retrieval of information in a computer system,” also colloquially called “universal search.” Apple asserted claim 25 of the '959 patent against Samsung. The jury found that none of the ten accused Samsung products infringes the '959 patent. See ECF No. 1884 at 9. Apple seeks judgment as a matter of law of infringement or, alternatively, a new trial on infringement and damages. Claim 25 depends from claim 24. Both claims recite:

24. A computer readable medium for locating information from a plurality of locations containing program instructions to:

receive an information identifier; provide said information identifier to a plurality of heuristics to locate information in the plurality of locations which include the Internet and local storage media;

determine at least one candidate item of •information based upon the plurality of heuristics; and

display a representation of said candidate item of information.

25. The computer readable medium of claim 24, wherein the information identifier is applied separately to each heuristic.

'959 Patent els. 24, 25. Apple claims that it presented evidence that all products satisfy each limitation of claim 25, while Samsung unsuccessfully challenged only one limitation. The Court disagrees and DENIES Apple’s motion. The jury’s non-infringement verdict is supported by substantial evidence and is not contrary to the clear weight of the evidence.

The parties focus on claim 25’s requirement for instructions to “provide said information identifier to a plurality of heuristics to locate information in the plurality of locations which include the Internet and local storage media.” To prove infringement of this element, Apple relied on expert testimony from Dr. Snoeren. ' See generally Tr. at 940:21-945:5, 952:8-956:23. In the accused products, Dr. Snoeren identified the infringing functionality as the Quick Search Box (or “Google Search”) in the Gingerbread, Jelly Bean, and Ice Cream Sandwich versions of Android. Id. at 940:21-941:20, 942:7-19 (Gingerbread), 943:13-944:7 (Jelly Bean and Ice Cream Sandwich). For Gingerbread, Dr. Snoeren told the jury that the “Web Module in the Samsung products” provides a heuristic for locating information on the Internet because it “combine[s] places that the user has actually previously browsed using the web browser and suggestions that the Google search suggestion server has presented.” Id. at 956:8-23. For Jelly Bean and Ice Cream Sandwich, Dr. Snoeren testified that the “Google Module” is “the heuristic module that on these versions of the phone provide the Internet searching applications.” Id. at 945:2-5; see PDX 91.24 (Apple demonstrative).

However, Samsung presented sufficient rebuttal evidence to permit the jury to decide that the accused devices lack instructions to search “a plurality of locations which include the Internet,” as claim 25 requires. Bjorn Bringert, a Google engineer who worked on “all” versions of the Google search app (Tr. at 1568:15-22), explained that the accused Google search functionality employs a software method called blendResults() that does not search the Internet, but rather “blends” data previously retrieved from a Google server and a local database. See id. at 1567:8-23 (“Q. Now this Blend Results, does that search the Internet? A. No, it doesn’t.... The blender doesn’t go and buy them or locate them.”). Samsung’s expert Dr. Martin Ri-nard testified to the same conclusion: ‘What it’s doing is taking information that has already been located, either in the local database or by the Google servers, and putting it together. So it can’t possibly be any of the heuristics in claim 25.” Id. at 1890:11-21.

Apple claims that Samsung’s positions contradicted the plain claim language because claim 25 “does not require the accused device or application to search the Internet every time the user inputs a query,” and “[t]he fact that something else initially located information on the Internet does not affect whether the heuristic also locates information on the Internet.” Mot. at 19-20. Apple’s argument is misguided. The '959 patent requires heuristics to “locate information in the plurality of locations which include the Internet.” Apple implies that a system infringes if it locates information that is stored locally but is, or was at some time, also present on the Internet. However, Apple never requested such a strained claim construction, and the jury was free to credit the testimony from Dr. Bringert and Dr. Ri-nard and conclude that the accused search features did not infringe. Apple’s reliance on Moba v. Diamond Automation is once again misplaced. As explained above, Moba held that the district court improperly added a “sequential performance” requirement to a previously construed method claim when assessing a jury verdict. 325 F.3d at 1313-14. Here, Samsung made no such argument. Rather, it is Apple that asserts a new claim construction position after trial, when Apple did not request additional claim construction, and plain and ordinary meaning applied to the terms that Apple now raises.

Apple also argues that Dr. Rinard took an inconsistent position regarding invalidity of claim 25 because he opined that the “WAIS” prior art reference applied a heuristic after data was retrieved, suggesting that the data did not need to be on the Internet. However, Dr. Rinard’s testimony was not so contradictory: he described a “relevance ranking heuristic” that sorted data entries, but separately identified searches “from the Internet” that the WAIS reference performed. Id. at 1928:8-20, 1927:20-24. Moreover, the jury concluded that claim 25 was not invalid, so it could have determined reasonably and consistently that claim 25 reads on neither the WAIS reference nor the accused devices due to lack of searches on the Internet.

Samsung further argues that the jury could have decided that the accused products lacked a “plurality” of heuristics because Dr. Snoeren identified only a single heuristic for each product — either the Web Module (for Gingerbread) or the Google Module (for Jelly Bean and Ice Cream Sandwich). See Opp’n at 14-15. Samsung fails to explain the basis for this argument, in light of Dr. Snoeren’s identification of other “modules” in the accused operating systems, such as Browser and Contacts in Jelly Bean and Ice Cream Sandwich. See Tr. at 950:22-951:8 (“I found in the case of Gingerbread two modules, the Contacts Module and the Web Module, and in the other two versions there were four.”); PDX 91.24. However, even setting this issue aside, substantial evidence supports the jury’s non-infringement verdict, as explained above. Apple’s motion regarding infringement of the '959 patent is DENIED.

D. Willful Infringement of Claim 9 of the '647 Patent

Apple also seeks judgment as a matter of law that Samsung (specifically, SEC and STA) willfully infringed the '647 patent. The Federal Circuit set the relevant standard for the willfulness inquiry for patent infringement: “a patentee must show by clear and convincing evidence that the infringer acted despite an objectively high likelihood that its actions constituted infringement of a valid patent. The state of mind of the accused infringer is not relevant to this objective inquiry. If this threshold objective standard is satisfied, the patentee must also demonstrate that this objectively-defined risk ... was either known or so obvious that it should have been known to the accused infringer.” In re Seagate Tech., LLC, 497 F.3d 1360, 1371 (Fed.Cir.2007) (internal citation omitted). Thus, the willfulness inquiry is a two-prong analysis, requiring an objective inquiry and a subjective inquiry. The objective inquiry is a question for the Court, and the subjective inquiry is a question for the jury. See Bard Peripheral Vascular, Inc. v. W.L. Gore & Assocs., Inc., 682 F.3d 1003, 1007 (Fed.Cir.2012). A patent owner must prove willfulness “by clear and convincing evidence.” Seagate, 497 F.3d at 1371.

In this case, the jury found that, as a subjective matter, Samsung did not willfully infringe the '647 patent. ECF No. 1884 at 7. In other words, the jury considered whether the “objectively-defined risk (determined by the record developed in the infringement proceeding) was either known or so obvious that it should have been known to the accused infringer,” Seagate, 497 F.3d at 1371, and determined that it was not. Apple posits that Samsung willfully infringed because Apple gave written notice to Samsung of the '647 patent in August 2010 (see PX 132), and Samsung subsequently copied the “quick links” feature and continued to infringe even after this lawsuit began. However, Samsung points to substantial evidence that supports the jury’s view to the contrary. Specifically, Apple’s expert Dr. Mowry admitted on cross-examination that his expert report noted that “the accused browser functionality has existed in Android since at least version 1.5 (Cupcake) ... and that there have been no changes in the accused functionality,” and acknowledged that Cupcake was released in April 2009. Tr. at 919:9-920:14. Because the accused features appeared before Apple notified Samsung of the '647 patent, this timing could negate any inference of copying by Samsung. The jury also, could have concluded that Samsung had reasonable defenses to infringement, despite the ultimate verdict of infringement and no invalidity. Samsung presented expert testimony from Dr. Kevin Jeffay on both non-infringement and invalidity of claim 9 of the '647 patent, and Samsung did not present evidence regarding the adequacy of Samsung’s defenses throughout the lawsuit.

As explained above, willfulness requires both that the jury find subjective willfulness and that the court find objective willfulness. Here, the jury found no subjective willfulness, and the Court agrees that substantial evidence in the record supports this finding. Therefore, even if the Court were to find the objective prong satisfied, there can be no ultimate willfulness determination. Accordingly, the Court need not reach the objective analysis. Apple’s motion is DENIED.

E. Whether Samsung Failed to Establish Affirmative Defenses

Apple moves for judgment as a matter of law that Samsung failed to prove the affirmative defenses listed in Samsung’s Answer, including waiver, acquiescence, estoppel, laches, failure to mitigate, prosecution history estoppel, prosecution laches, “acts of plaintiff,” and “actions of others.” Mot. at 22 (citing ECF No. 107). Apple notes that Samsúng did not offer any evidence at trial on these defenses. Id. The Court denies Apple’s motion.

Because Samsung did not include these defenses in the joint pretrial statement, which the parties stated specified the “issues of fact and law remaining to be litigated,” ECF No. 1455-1 at 25, Samsung abandoned those defenses and they were eliminated from the case. Cf. S. Cal. Retail Clerks Union and Food Employers Joint Pension Tr. Fund v. Bjorklund, 728 F.2d 1262, 1264 (9th Cir.1984) (“We have consistently held that issues not preserved in the pretrial order [under Rule 16(e) ] have been eliminated from the action.”). Nonetheless, Apple does not cite, nor has this Court found, any case in the Ninth Circuit or Federal Circuit holding that when a party abandons an issue pretrial, the opposing party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. To the contrary, the Federal Circuit recently clarified that judgment as a matter of law should be granted only on issues that were “litigated, or fairly placed in issue, during the trial.” Alcon Research Ltd. v. Barr Laboratories, Inc., 745 F.3d 1180, 1193 (Fed.Cir.2014) (citation omitted). In Alcon, the Circuit held that “[a] court should not render judgment [as a matter of law under Rule 50(b) ] with respect to claims ‘reference^] .in the complaint’ but not raised in the pretrial statement or litigated at trial [because] ‘a reference in the complaint is not sufficient to support a judgment.’ ” Id. Here, by analogy, because Samsung raised these defenses in its Answer but did not raise them in the pretrial statement nor litigate them at trial, this Court finds that no judgment may be rendered on these defenses. Other courts have rejected similar motions in other patent cases. See, e.g., VirnetX Inc. v. Apple Inc., 925 F.Supp.2d 816, 848-50 (E.D.Tex.2013) (denying plaintiffs motion for judgment as a matter of law on defenses which were “never presented to the jury” because both parties had agreed to narrow their claims and defenses before trial, and the court would not “penalize [defendant’s attempt to] narrow issues [for trial] by entering judgment” against the defendant).- Accordingly, the Court denies Apple’s motion.

F. Request for Enhanced Damages for the '72Í Patent and the '647 Patent

35 U.S.C. § 284 states that “the court may increase the damages up to three times the amount found or assessed.” Apple asks this Court to award enhanced damages based on Samsung’s allegedly willful infringement of the '721 and '647 patents. Mot. at 23. However, a “finding of willful infringement is a prerequisite to the award of enhanced damages.” i4i Ltd. P’ship v. Microsoft Corp., 598 F.3d 831, 858 (Fed.Cir.2010); see also Bard, 682 F.3d at 1005. Because this Court grants Samsung’s motion for judgment as a matter of law that Samsung did not willfully infringe the '721 patent in a separate Order, and denies Apple’s motion for judgment as a matter of law that Samsung willfully infringed the '647 patent, see supra Part II.D, the Court has no basis to grant enhanced damages for the '721 and the '647 patents, and thus DENIES Apple’s request.

G. Supplemental Damages

Apple seeks an award of supplemental damages through the date of judgment for infringing sales not considered by the jury. 35 U.S.C. § 284 requires that courts award compensation for every infringing sale, and the Federal Circuit has held that a patent holder is entitled to supplemental damages for infringing sales that the jury did not consider. See Finjan, Inc. v. Secure Computing Corp., 626 F.3d 1197, 1212-13 (Fed.Cir.2010). Thus, “[c]ourts routinely grant motions for a further accounting where the jury did not consider certain periods of infringing activityf.]” Metso Minerals, Inc. v. Powerscreen Int’l Distribution Ltd., 833 F.Supp.2d 333, 347 (E.D.N.Y.2011); see also Itron, Inc. v. Benghiat, Case No. 99-cv-501-JRT-FLN, 2003 WL 22037710, at *15 (D.Minn. Aug. 29, 2003) (granting motion for accounting of infringing activities); Hynix Semiconductor Inc. v. Rambus Inc., 609 F.Supp.2d 951, 960-61 (N.D.Cal.2009) (awarding supplemental damages for infringement occurring between verdict and entry of judgment).

The Court agrees that an award of supplemental damages is necessary here, as there áre sales for which the jury did not make an award, because they occurred after the jury reached its verdict. This would include sales of the Galaxy S III and the Galaxy Note II. Mot. at 29; Opp’n at 27. Consistent with Federal Circuit case law and this Court’s approach in the first case between the parties, the Court intends to calculate the supplemental damages award for these products starting from May 6, 2014, the day after the jury verdict. See Case No. 11-CV-01846, ECF No. 2271 at 3 (“Apple I Order”) (“Consistent with the Presidio Components decision, the Court intends to calculate the supplemental damages award beginning on August 25, 2012, the day after the verdict.”). The Court will calculate supplemental damages using the same methodology the Court adopted in the first case, námely that the per-product rate should be calculated based on the jury’s verdict: “[The Court will] determine the per-sale amount on a product-by-product basis, and use that per-sale amount to determine the supplemental damages amount for each product that has remained on the market for any post-verdict period. Because the jury returned an award for each product separately, the Court can simply divide the jury award for each product by that product’s number of sales to calculate this per-product amount.” Apple I Order at 5.

However, the Court denies Apple’s request that the Court calculate and award supplemental damages at this time before the Court enters final judgment. Mot. at 31. Courts have found it appropriate to delay orders for the submission of evidence of the number of post-verdict sales and hearings thereon pending the resolution of appeals, to “avoid potentially unnecessary expenditures of time and money in preparing such an accounting[.]” Itron, 2003 WL 22037710, at *16; see also Eolas Techs., Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 2004 WL 170334, at *8 (N.D.Ill. Jan. 15, 2004), vacated in part on other grounds, 399 F.3d 1325 (Fed.Cir.2005) (“I grant the motion and will require an accounting after any appeal in this case is terminated.”). Because the parties have indicated that an appeal is anticipated, proceeding without the Federal Circuit’s guidance may cause unnecessary expenditures of time and resources should the Circuit reverse any part of the jury’s verdict on liability. The Court thus finds it appropriate to delay the consideration of evidence of actual post-verdict sales and calculation of supplemental damages until after the completion of the appeal in this case. The Court made this same determination in the first case. See Apple I Order at 6, 8; Case No. 11-CV-01846, ECF No. 2947 at 3.

Finally, Samsung argues Apple is not entitled to supplemental damages because the verdict indicates the jury’s damages award was a lump-sum royalty intended to compensate Apple for all past and future infringement, and that granting supplemental damages would breach the jury’s role in awarding damages. Opp’n at 24-25. Because the jury verdict does not expressly state whether it compensates Apple for Samsung’s both past and future use of the patented technology or only compensates Apple for past use, it is ambiguous on this point. In interpreting an ambiguous verdict form, this Court has “broad discretion” to determine if “the verdict figure represented past infringement as well as ongoing infringement.” Telcordia Techs., Inc. v. Cisco Sys., Inc., 612 F.3d 1365, 1378 (Fed.Cir.2010). The Court rejects Samsung’s argument, as explained below.

In Telcordia, the district court rejected the defendant’s argument that the jury’s damages award was necessarily a lump-sum award intended to compensate the patentee for past and future infringement, reasoning that the evidence at trial provided no way of knowing one way or the other what the jury actually did. Telcordia Techs., Inc. v. Cisco Sys., Inc., 592 F.Supp.2d 727, 747 n. 8 (D.Del.2009), aff'd in part, vacated in part, 612 F.3d 1365 (Fed.Cir.2010) (rejecting defendant’s argument that the court could not grant paten-tee an ongoing royalty until expiration of the patent because the jury awarded a lump-sum that covered future infringement, reasoning that (1) the jury issued a general verdict; (2) the jury heard different sets of damages numbers from the parties’ two experts, which the jury could accept, reject, or vary; (3) the jury’s award was different from the damages award advanced by either party’s expert; and (4) there was “nothing in either the record or verdict form from which the court could determine whether the jury based its award on a lump-sum, paid-up license; running royalty rate; some variation or combination of the two; or rejected the theories and reached its own number.”). When the defendant appealed the district court’s order granting the patentee equitable relief in the form of an ongoing royalty, the Federal Circuit affirmed, reasoning that the court did not abuse its “broad discretion” in interpreting the verdict form because the verdict form was ambiguous, neither party had proposed the jury’s exact $6.5 million award, and it was “unclear whether the jury based its award on a lump-sum, paid-up license, running royalty, some variation or combination of the two, or some other theory.” Telcordia, 612 F.3d at 1378. The Federal Circuit thus implicitly affirmed the district court’s rationale that when a record is unclear as to what the jury actually did, it is appropriate to reject a defendant’s argument that the jury’s award necessarily compensated the patentee for future infringement.

Similarly, in Whitserve, LLC v. Computer Packages, Inc., 694 F.3d 10, 35-38 (Fed.Cir.2012), the Federal Circuit vacated and remanded the district court’s denial of supplemental damages for infringement after the verdict but before final judgment was entered because the court had failed to explain its reasons for denying such damages. However, in the midst of doing so, the Circuit rejected the defendant’s argument that the patentee’s supplemental damages request was properly denied because the jury had necessarily awarded a lump-sum license for all past and future infringement. Id. at 38. The Circuit noted that “nothing in the record would support” that conclusion because “the parties limited their damages arguments to past infringement rather than projected future infringement” and the “jury’s verdict did not indicate that the award was meant to cover future use of [plaintiffs] patents[J” Id. at 35, 38; see also id. at 35 (“We can not [sic] accept [defendant’s] suggestion that a paid-up' license was awarded [by the jury].”).

Here, in light of the ambiguity concerning whether the jury actually awarded a lump-sum royalty to compensate Apple for past and future infringement, the Court rejects Samsung’s argument that the jury did so. As in Whitserve and Telcordia, there is no express statement in the verdict form that the damages award would encompass damages for future infringement. See ECF No. 1884. The verdict form did not require the jury to denote which damages theories it, applied. Id. Further, as in Telcordia^ the jurors were presented with several sets of damages numbers during Dr. Chevalier and Dr. Vellturo’s testimony at trial, which the jurors could have chosen to accept, reject, or vary, and the jury’s award of $119,625,000 is different from the damages award proposed by both parties’ experts. Finally, the fact that the verdict form chárt with respect to the Galaxy S II Products expressly indicated that the award would be made for sales through the “Present” supports the interpretation that the jury could have believed that its damages awards for all products were meant to compensate Apple only for past infringing sales. See ECF No. 1884 at 10 (asking jury to provide their “dollar breakdown” for each of certain products — the Galaxy S II Epic 4G Touch, the Galaxy S II Skyrocket, and Galaxy S II — for each of the following three time periods only: (1) “August 1, 2011 — -June 30, 2012”; • (2) “July 1, 2012— August 24, 2012”; and (3) “August 25, 2012 — Present.”).

While Samsung argues the evidence is clear that the jury made' its damages award based on calculations by Samsung’s expert Dr. Chevalier, Opp’n at 25-26 (citing Chevalier Declaration, ECF No. 1907-5), Apple rebuts that there are “multiple ways the jury could have reached its total damages number by starting from Dr. Vellturo’s proposed reasonable .royalty damages[.]” Reply at 17. The Court need not dissect the verdict to resolve this dispute because even assuming the jury utilized Dr. Chevalier’s reasonable royalty numbers as a starting point, that would not prove that the jury awarded a lump-sum to compensate for past and future infringement as opposed to compensating Apple for past infringement on a per-unit, per-patent running royalty basis for all sales made through the trial. This is because although Dr. Chevalier testified her total proposed award of “roughly $38.4 million” was a “lump sum,” ECF No. 1938 at 2422, she did not testify that this lump-sum was intended to cover past and future infringement, and her damages exhibit nowhere describes her damages total as a “lump-sum,” let alone a lump-sum covering past and future infringement. See generally DX 453A. [Redacted] .Even her testimony and demonstratives at trial repeatedly referred to her $0.35 per-unit, per-patent royalty rate. See SDX 3791 (describing “royalty rate per patent per unit” of $0.35); EOF No. 1938 at 2422 (“I concluded that a reasonable royalty would be $0.35 per patent, per unit.”); id. at 2432 (noting she arrived at the $0.35 “per patent, per unit” number by applying Georgia-Pacific factors); id. at 2435 (stating that her reasonable royalty number came from “applying that $0.35 per patent, per unit [sic] to each of the accused units based on which patents they’re accused of infringing.”). If anything, the fact that Dr. Chevalier calculated her reasonable royalty damages for the Galaxy S II Products in distinct time periods only through the “Present,” [Redacted] suggests that if the jury based its calculation on Dr. Chevalier’s numbers, the jury likely would have believed her numbers were intended to compensate Apple only for past infringement.

Because the record suggests it is plausible that the jury intended to award Apple damages only for past infringing sales, the Court cannot conclude that the jury necessarily awarded a lump-sum award intended to cover past and' future infringement. Accordingly, under Whitserve and Telcor-dia, the Court rejects Samsung’s argument and finds that an award of supplemental damages is warranted.

H. Prejudgment Interest

Under 35 U.S.C. § 284, the district court has considerable discretion in awarding prejudgment interest. See Bio-Rad Labs., Inc. v. Nicolet Instrument Corp., 807 F.2d 964, 969 (Fed.Cir.1986). The purpose of prejudgment interest is to “compensate[ ] the patent owner for the use of its money between the date of injury and the date of judgment.” Oiness v. Walgreen Co., 88 F.3d 1025, 1033 (Fed.Cir.1996). Such interest is usually awarded from the date of infringement to the date of judgment. See Nickson Indus. Inc., v. Rol Mfg. Co., Ltd., 847 F.2d 795, 800 (Fed.Cir.1988). “[P]rejudgment interest should ordinarily be awarded absent some justifi-cátion for withholding such an award[.]” Gen. Motors Corp. v. Devex Corp., 461 U.S. 648, 657, 103 S.Ct. 2058, 76 L.Ed.2d 211 (1983) (holding that an award of prejudgment interest is generally appropriate after a finding of patent infringement). As in the first patent infringement case between Apple and Samsung, see Apple I Order at 7-8, the Court concludes here that Apple is entitled to an award of prejudgment interest.

The rate of prejudgment interest is left to the wide discretion of this Court, which may award interest at or above the prime rate. Uniroyal, Inc. v. Rudkin-Wiley Corp., 939 F.2d 1540, 1545 (Fed.Cir.1991). . Courts may use the prime rate, the prime rate plus a percentage, the U.S. Treasury Bill rate, state statutory rate, corporate bond rate, or whatever rate the court deems appropriate. Junker v. HDC Corp., No. C-07-05094 JCS, 2008 WL 3385819, at. *6 (N.D.Cal. July 28, 2008). The parties have proposed two different rates. Apple proposes the prime rate. Mot. at. 30-31. Samsung argues that the lower 52-week Treasury Bill rate is appropriate, consistent with this Court’s approach in the first case between the parties. Opp’n at 28; Apple I Order at 7. In determining the appropriate rate, courts have considered whether, during the period of infringement, the plaintiff “borrowed money at a higher rate, what that rate was, or [whether] there was a causal connection between any borrowing and the loss of the use of the money awarded as a result of [the defendant’s] infringement.” Laitram Corp. v. NEC Corp., 115 F.3d 947, 955 (Fed.Cir.1997) (upholding district court’s decision to use the Treasury Bill rate in case where district court found no evidence of “a causal connection between any borrowing and the loss of the use of the money awarded as a result of the infringement.”). Such factors would make an award at a higher rate more appropriate. Here, although Apple has submitted a declaration stating that Apple borrowed in the public markets at rates higher than the Treasury Bill rate, see Robinson Deck, ECF No. 1897-8 ¶ 9, Apple maintains substantial cash reserves and has not presented any evidence that it needed to borrow money because it was deprived of the damages award. Thus, here, as in Laitram, and as this Court found in the first case, the Court concludes the 52-week Treasury Bill rate is sufficient. The Treasury Bill rate has been accepted and employed by many courts in patent cases as a reasonable method of placing a patent owner in a position equivalent to where it would have been had there been no infringement. See, e.g., Datascope Corp. v. SMEC, Inc., 879 F.2d 820, 829 (Fed.Cir.1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1024, 110 S.Ct. 729, 107 L.Ed.2d 747 (1990).

Finally, the Court addresses the appropriateness of compounding. Apple seeks annual compounding. Mot. at 31. The Federal Circuit has explained that “the determination whether to award simple or compound interest [] is a matter largely within the discretion of the district court.” Gyromat Corp. v. Champion Spark Plug Co., 735 F.2d 549, 557 (Fed.Cir.1984). Courts “have recognized that compounding is necessary to fully compensate the patentee.” Sealant Sys. Int’l, Inc. v. TEK Global S.R.L., No. 5:11-CV-00774-PSG, 2014 WL 1008183, at *6 (N.D.Cal. Mar. 7, 2014) (citation omitted). “Because a patentee’s damages include the foregone use of money, compounding is needed to account for the time value of money.” Id. (citation omitted). Thus, “courts have approved annual compounding and even daily compounding.” Id. (citation omitted). As Samsung has not indi-, cated any objection to compounding, Opp’n at 28-30, the Court concludes, as it did in the first case, that annual compounding should be utilized. See Apple I Order at 7-8.

Accordingly, when the anticipated appeal of this case is resolved, and the final damages amount settled, this Court will award Apple prejudgment interest at the 52-week Treasury Bill rate, compounded annually. The Court declines Apple’s request that the Court calculate and award prejudgment interest at this time before any appeal is resolved. Mot. at 31. Because both parties have indicated that they may challenge the legal sufficiency of the jury’s award, it will be more efficient to calculate prejudgment interest after appeal, when the final amount of the judgment is known. The Court made this same decision in the first case. See Apple I Order at 8.

I. Non-infringement of Claim 27 of the '449 Patent

The '449 patent is directed to an “apparatus for recording and reproducing digital image and speech.” Samsung asserted claim 27 of the '449 patent against Apple. The jury found that all five accused Apple products infringe the '449 patent, and awarded damages of $158,400.00 for that infringement. See ECF No. 1884 at 11-12. Apple now moves for judgment as a matter of law of non-infringement or, alternatively, a new trial on infringement and damages. Claim 27 depends from claim 25. Both claims recite:

25. A digital camera comprising:

a lens,

an imaging device which converts an optical image into an analog signal;

an A/D converter which converts said analog signal from said imaging device to a digital signal;

a compressor which compresses said digital signal outputted from said A/D converter, and generates compressed data by using a different compressing method for moving image signals and for still image signals;

a recording circuit which records compressed data, said compressed data including a moving image signal, and a still image signal;

a decompressor which decompresses said compressed data by using a different decompressing method according to whether said recorded compressed data is a moving image signal or a still image signal;

a reproducing circuit which reproduces a moving image signal, a sound signal in synchronous to said moving image signal, and a still image signal; and

a display which displays said moving image signals and still image signals outputted from said reproducing circuit, and a list of said moving image signal and still image signal as a search mode, and a list of classifications as a classification mode;

wherein said recording circuit records each one of said plurality of image signals with classification data, and

said display lists a plurality of classifications and a number of images belonging to each classification.

27. A digital camera according to claim 25,

wherein said classification is able to change by a direction of a user.

'449 Patent els. 25, 27. Apple contends that Samsung’s trial evidence failed to demonstrate infringement of at least four limitations of claim 27. Considering each of these limitations in turn, the Court concludes that substantial evidence supports the jury’s finding of infringement, and the verdict is not contrary to the clear weight of the evidence, and accordingly DENIES Apple’s motion.

First, Apple contends that the accused iPhone 4S, iPhone 5, and iPod Touch 5th Generation products lack a “reproducing circuit which reproduces ... a sound signal in synchronous to said moving image signal,” as claim 27 requires. Apple states that Samsung’s expert for the '449 patent, Kenneth Parulski, identified an “audio circuit” in the accused devices (see SDX 3742), but argues this audio, circuit cannot reproduce synchronous audio. Apple points to the testimony of Apple engineer Tim Millet and allegedly contradictory testimony from another Samsung expert, Dr. Dan Schonfeld. However, the record contains sufficient evidence to support the jury’s determination. Mr. Millet did testify that Apple’s “software team” decided not to use the “audio subsystem” contained in the three disputed products for audio processing. Tr. at 2699:20-2700:13. However, Mr. Millet also testified on cross-examination that he was not an expert on Apple’s software, see id. at 2701:14-16, and the jury was free to assess the credibility of his direct testimony. Samsung’s expert explained how the accused products have reproducing circuits for sound, see id. at 2609:22-2610:14, while Apple’s expert, Dr. Jim Storer, did not offer a non-infringement opinion based on the absence of a “reproducing circuit” despite talking with Apple engineers, see id. at 2721:20-2722:6. Next, contrary to Apple’s position, the cited testimony from Samsung’s '239 patent expert did not contradict Samsung’s position for the '449 patent: Dr. Schonfeld stated that integrated circuits require software generally, but said nothing about the '449 patent or a “reproducing circuit”, in the accused devices. See id. at 2558:1-4. It is also undisputed that Apple’s products can reproduce audio — a fact that the jury could have confirmed from the representative devices admitted into the record (JX 38-46A).

Second, Apple argues that none of the five accused products contains the claimed “compressor” or “decompressor.” Apple’s theory is that these limitations require components that compress or decompress “both still images and videos,” and that its products use “separate and distinct components to compress/decompress still images and videos.” Mot. at 33-34. Apple’s argument is unpersuasive. This Court did not construe the claim terms “compressor” and “decompressor,” and instructed the jury to apply plain and ordinary meaning for terms not construed. See ECF No. 1847 at 30. On cross-examination from Apple’s counsel, Mr. Parulski testified that he “identified a single Apple design chip with the circuitry that performs both compressing methods,” even though certain components of the chip originate with different manufacturers. Tr. at 2638:25-2639:6, 2643:5-14 (“That’s one integrated circuit.”). Mr. Millet also told the jury that a system on chip (“SOC”) is “essentially a single integrated circuit that integrates a large number of different components,” and that the Apple A6 chip in the infringing devices contains circuitry for compressors and decompressors. Id. at 2688:13-20, 2701:21-2702:8. Apple’s contention that the “SOC contains dozens of different components, most unrelated to compression or decompression” (Reply at 20) is misplaced because the presence of additional components does not negate infringement. See Genentech, Inc. v. Chiron Corp., 112 F.3d 495, 501 (Fed.Cir.1997) (in a “comprising” claim, “other elements may be added and still form a construct within the scope of the claim”).

Third, Apple challenges the sufficiency of Samsung’s proof that the accused products contain a “recording circuit” that records image signals “with classification data.” Samsung identified the Camera Roll feature in Apple’s products as meeting this limitation. Apple’s non-infringement argument is that the Camera Roll includes all photos and videos taken with the device, so there is no “classification” of those i