Brooks v. Firestone Polymers, LLC (70 F. Supp. 3d 816, 2014)

United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas 2014-10-08

Citations

Full opinion text

SECOND AMENDED MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

MARCIA A. CRONE, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Pending before the court are Defendant Firestone Polymers, LLC’s (“Firestone”) Motions for Summary Judgment (# s 59-66). Having considered the motions, the submissions of the parties, the pleadings, and the applicable law, the court finds that Firestone’s motions should be granted in part and denied in part.

I. Background

Plaintiffs, all African-American males, allege that they were discriminated against on account of their race while employed at Firestone’s chemical manufacturing facility in Orange, Texas. Specifically, Plaintiffs claim they were denied training, promotions, and overtime opportunities, and were demoted in a racially-discriminatory manner. Moreover, Plaintiffs assert that their abusive working conditions rendered the workplace a “hostile work environment.” Plaintiffs filed their Original Complaint on June 29, 2012, and filed their First Amended Complaint on February 4, 2013, asserting violations of the following: Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000h-6; the Civil Rights Act of 1866, 42 U.S.C. § 1981; the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a); the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009 (“LLFPA”); and Executive Order 11246.

Plaintiffs are represented by the United Steel, Paper, and Forestry, Rubber, Manufacturing, Energy, Allied Industrial and Service Workers International Union (“USW” or “the Union”), and the terms of their employment with Firestone are governed by a Collective Bargaining Agreement (the “CBA”) between the Union and Firestone. According to the CBA, employees at Firestone’s facility are assigned to either A, B, or C-level positions. A-level positions provide the greatest pay, while C-level positions provide the lowest pay. Numerous positions exist within those three levels, and under the CBA, all jobs within the same classification level are paid at the same rate. The CBA also states that all promotions and demotions from one level to another are determined solely by seniority. While training within the A-level is determined by seniority, training within the B and C-levels is not.

All eight Plaintiffs allege slightly different facts.

A. Paul Brooks

Paul Brooks (“Brooks”) was hired by Firestone in June 2000 and began working in a Clevel position in the warehouse. Brooks asserts Title VII and § 1981 claims for failure' to train, failure to promote, discriminatory demotion, denial of overtime, and hostile work environment. Additionally, Brooks alleges causes of action under the LLFPA and Executive Order 11246.

B. Ellis Byrd

Ellis Byrd (“Byrd”) was hired by Firestone in 1996 and began working in a C-level position in the box-building department. Byrd asserts Title VII and § 1981 claims for failure to train, failure to promote, denial of overtime, and hostile work environment. Additionally, Byrd alleges causes of action under the LLFPA and Executive Order 11246.

C. Jonathan Greenaway

Jonathan Greenaway (“Greenaway”) was hired by Firestone in June 2000 and began working in a C-level position in the box-building department. Greenaway asserts Title VII and § 1981 claims for failure to train, failure to promote, discriminatory demotion, denial of overtime, and hostile work environment. Additionally, Greena-way alleges causes of action under the LLFPA and Executive Order 11246. Finally, unlike the other Plaintiffs, Greena-way also seeks relief under the ADA.

D. Samuel Johnson

Samuel Johnson (“S. Johnson”) was hired by Firestone in June 1977 and began working in a C-level position in the warehouse. S. Johnson asserts Title VII and § 1981 claims for failure to train, failure to promote, discriminatory demotion, denial of overtime, and hostile work environment. Additionally, S. Johnson alleges causes of action under the LLFPA and Executive Order 11246.

E. Wayne Johnson

Wayne Johnson (“W. Johnson”) worked at Firestone from November 2000 until September 2010. W. Johnson asserts Title VII and § 1981 claims for'failure to train, failure to promote, discriminatory- demotion, denial of overtime, and hostile work environment. Additionally, W. Johnson alleges causes of action under the LLFPA and Executive Order 11246.

F. Ricky Ruffin

Ricky Ruffin (“Ruffin”) was hired by Firestone in March 2000 and began working in a Clevel position in the warehouse. Ruffin asserts Title VII and § 1981 claims for failure to train, failure to promote, discriminatory demotion, denial of overtime, and hostile work environment. Additionally, Ruffin alleges causes of action under the LLFPA and Executive Order 11246.

G. Michael Spencer

Michael Spencer (“Spencer”) was hired by Firestone in 1993 and began working in a Clevel position in the box-building department. Spencer asserts Title VII and § 1981 claims for failure to train, failure to promote, denial of overtime, and hostile work environment. Additionally, Spencer alleges causes of action under the LLFPA and Executive Order 11246.

H.Erick Guillory

Erick Guillory (“Guillory”) was hired by Firestone in 1998 and began working in a C-level position in the box-building department. Guillory asserts Title VII and § 1981 claims for failure to train, failure to promote, denial of overtime, and hostile work environment. Additionally, Guillory alleges causes of action under the LLFPA and Executive Order 11246.

Each Plaintiff filed a charge of discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) on varying dates between August 2009 and March 2010. On December 19, 2012, following a two-year investigation, the EEOC sent Plaintiffs’ counsel a determination letter stating it did “not see how [Plaintiffs] can meet their statutory obligation on the underlying or amended charges.” The EEOC letter farther noted that the amended charges filed on or about March 10, 2010, as well as charges concerning events that occurred in 2008 and before, “are time barred.” Moreover, the EEOC ran statistical tests to determine whether black employees at Firestone were paid less than white employees. The EEOC concluded that any differences in pay were “statistically insignificant.” Nonetheless, the EEOC provided Plaintiffs a right to sue letter, and Plaintiffs filed suit within 90 days after receiving said letter.

II. Analysis

Rule 56(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that summary judgment shall be granted “if the movant 'shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The party seeking summary judgment bears the initial burden of informing the court of the basis for its motion and identifying those portions of the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions on file, and affidavits, if any, which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986); QBE Ins. Corp. v. Brown & Mitchell, Inc., 591 F.3d 439, 442 (5th Cir.2009); Warfield, v. Byron, 436 F.3d 551, 557 (5th Cir.2006); Lincoln Gen. Ins. Co. v. Reyna, 401 F.3d 347, 349 (5th Cir.2005). Where a defendant moves for summary judgment on the basis of an affirmative defense and, thus, bears the ultimate burden of persuasion, “evidence must be adduced supporting each element of the defense and demonstrating the lack of any genuine issue of material fact with regard thereto.” Terrebonne Parish Sch. Bd. v. Mobil Oil Corp., 310 F.3d 870, 877 (5th Cir.2002); see Exxon Corp. v. Oxxford Clothes, Inc., 109 F.3d 1070, 1074 (5th Cir.1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 915, 118 S.Ct. 299, 139 L.Ed.2d 231 (1997); Fontenot v. Upjohn Co., 780 F.2d 1190, 1194 (5th Cir.1986). To warrant judgment in its favor, the movant “ ‘ “must establish beyond peradventure all of the esséntial elements of the defense.” ’ ” Martin v. Alamo Cmty. Coll. Dist., 353 F.3d 409, 412 (5th Cir.2003) (emphasis in original) (quoting Chaplin v. NationsCredit Corp., 307 F.3d 368, 372 (5th Cir.2002) (quoting Fontenot, 780 F.2d at 1194)); accord Addicks Servs., Inc. v. GGP-Bridgeland, LP, 596 F.3d 286, 293 (5th Cir.2010).

“A fact is material only if its resolution would affect the outcome of the action .... ” Wiley v. State Farm, Fire & Cas. Co., 585 F.3d 206, 210 (5th Cir.2009); accord Poole v. City of Shreveport, 691 F.3d 624, 627 (5th Cir.2012); Cooper Tire & Rubber Co. v. Farese, 423 F.3d 446, 454 (5th Cir.2005). “Factual disputes that are irrelevant or unnecessary will not be counted.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). “An issue is ‘genuine ’ if it is real and substantial, as opposed to merely formal, pretended, or a sham.” Bazan ex rel. Bazan v. Hidalgo Cnty., 246 F.3d 481, 489 (5th Cir.2001) (emphasis in original). Thus, a genuine issue of material fact exists “if the evidence is such that a 'reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505; accord Poole, 691 F.3d at 627; Bayle v. Allstate Ins. Co., 615 F.3d 350, 355 (5th Cir.2010); Wiley, 585 F.3d at 210; EMCASCO Ins. Co. v. Am. Int’l Specialty Lines Ins. Co., 438 F.3d 519, 523 (5th Cir.2006). The moving party, however, need not negate the elements of the nonmovants’ case. See Bayle, 615 F.3d at 355; Boudreaux v. Swift Transp. Co., 402 F.3d 536, 540 (5th Cir.2005) (citing Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir.1994)); Millennium Petrochemicals, Inc. v. Brown & Root Holdings, Inc., 390 F.3d 336, 339 (5th Cir.2004).

Once a proper motion has been made, the nonmoving parties may not rest upon mere allegations or denials in the pleadings but must present affirmative evidence, setting forth specific facts, to demonstrate the existence of a genuine issue for trial. Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 322 n. 3, 106 S.Ct. 2548 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)); Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256, 106 S.Ct. 2505; Bayle, 615 F.3d at 355; EM-CASCO Ins. Co., 438 F.3d at 523; Smith ex rel. Estate of Smith, 391 F.3d at 625. “[T]he court must review the record ‘taken as a whole.’ ” Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 150, 120 S.Ct. 2097, 147 L.Ed.2d 105 (2000) (quoting Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986)); see Riverwood Int’l Corp. v. Emp’rs Ins. of Wausau, 420 F.3d 378, 382 (5th Cir.2005). All the evidence must be construed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving parties, and the court will not weigh the evidence or evaluate its credibility. Reeves, 530 U.S. at 150, 120 S.Ct. 2097; Downhole Navigator, LLC v. Nautilus Ins. Co., 686 F.3d 325, 328 (5th Cir.2012); EEOC v. Chevron Phillips Chem. Co., LP, 570 F.3d 606, 615 (5th Cir.2009); Lincoln Gen. Ins. Co., 401 F.3d at 350; Smith ex rel. Estate of Smith, 391 F.3d at 624. The evidence of the nonmovants is to be believed, with all justifiable inferences drawn and all reasonable doubts resolved in their favor. Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551, 562, 124 S.Ct. 1284, 157 L.Ed.2d 1068 (2004) (citing Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505); Cotroneo v. Shaw Env’t & Infrastructure, Inc., 639 F.3d 186, 192 (5th Cir.2011); Tradewinds Envtl. Restoration, Inc. v. St. Tammany Park, LLC, 578 F.3d 255, 258 (5th Cir.2009).

Furthermore, “only reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party can be drawn from the evidence.” Mills v. Warner-Lambert Co., 581 F.Supp.2d 772, 779 (E.D.Tex.2008) (citing Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 469 n. 14, 112 S.Ct. 2072, 119 L.Ed.2d 265 (1992)); accord Cannata v. Catholic Diocese of Austin, 700 F.3d 169, 172 (5th Cir.2012). “If the [nonmoving party’s] theory is ... senseless, no reasonable jury could find in its favor, and summary judgment should be granted.” Eastman Kodak Co., 504 U.S. at 468-69, 112 S.Ct. 2072; accord Shelter Mut. Ins. Co. v. Simmons, 543 F.Supp.2d 582, 584-85 (S.D.Miss.), aff'd, 293 Fed.Appx. 273 (5th Cir.2008). The nonmovants’ burden is not satisfied by “ ‘some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts,’ by ‘conclusory allegations,’ by ‘unsubstantiated assertions,’ ” by speculation, by the mere existence of some alleged factual dispute, or “by only a ‘scintilla’ of evidence.” Little, 37 F.3d at 1075 (quoting Lujan v. Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n, 497 U.S. 871, 888, 110 S.Ct. 3177, 111 L.Ed.2d 695 (1990); Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 475 U.S. at 586, 106 S.Ct. 1348; Hopper v. Frank, 16 F.3d 92, 97 (5th Cir.1994); Davis v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 14 F.3d 1082, 1086 (5th Cir.1994)); accord Thibodeaux v. Vamos Oil & Gas Co., 487 F.3d 288, 294-95 (5th Cir.2007); Warfield, 436 F.3d at 557; Boudreaux, 402 F.3d at 540. “Unsubstantiated assertions, improbable inferences, and unsupported speculation are not sufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment.” Brown v. City of Houston, 337 F.3d 539, 541 (5th Cir.2003); accord RSR Corp. v. Int’l Ins. Co., 612 F.3d 851, 857 (5th Cir.2010); Hugh Symons Grp., plc v. Motorola, Inc., 292 F.3d 466, 468 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 950, 123 S.Ct. 386, 154 L.Ed.2d 295 (2002); see Hockman v. Westward Commc’ns, LLC, 407 F.3d 317, 332 (5th Cir.2004).

Summary judgment is mandated if the nonmovants fail to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to their case on which they bear the burden of proof at trial. Nebraska v. Wyoming, 507 U.S. 584, 590, 113 S.Ct. 1689, 123 L.Ed.2d 317 (1993); Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548; EMCASCO Ins. Co., 438 F.3d at 523; Cutrera v. Bd. of Supervisors of La. State Univ., 429 F.3d 108, 110 (5th Cir.2005); Patrick v. Ridge, 394 F.3d 311, 315 (5th Cir.2004). “[W]here the nonmoving party fails to establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial, no genuine issue of material fact can exist.” Apache Corp. v. W & T Offshore, Inc., 626 F.3d 789, 793 (5th Cir.2010). “In such a situation, there can be ‘no genuine issue as to any material fact,’ since a complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party’s case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial.” Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 322-23, 106 S.Ct. 2548.

A. Title VII

Title VII provides that “[i]t shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-(l) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1); accord Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, — U.S. —, 133 S.Ct. 2517, 2525, 186 L.Ed.2d 503 (2013); Vance v. Ball State Univ., — U.S. —, 133 S.Ct. 2434, 2440, 186 L.Ed.2d 565 (2013); Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 92-93, 123 S.Ct. 2148, 156 L.Ed.2d 84 (2003). “The purposes of Title VII are to achieve equality of employment opportunity and to make persons whole for injuries suffered on account of unlawful employment discrimination.” Floca v. Homcare Health Servs., Inc., 845 F.2d 108, 111 (5th Cir.1988) (citing Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 417, 95 S.Ct. 2362, 45 L.Ed.2d 280 (1975)); see also Nassar, — U.S. —, 133 S.Ct. at 2522.

“Title VII discrimination can be established through either direct or circumstantial evidence.” Laxton v. Gap Inc., 333 F.3d 572, 578 (5th Cir.2003) (citing Wallace v. Methodist Hosp. Sys., 271 F.3d 212, 219 (5th Cir.2001), cert. denied, 535 U.S. 1078, 122 S.Ct. 1961, 152 L.Ed.2d 1022 (2002)); accord Washburn v. Harvey, 504 F.3d 505, 510 (5th Cir.2007); Alvarado v. Tex. Rangers, 492 F.3d 605, 611 (5th Cir.2007); McCoy v. City of Shreveport, 492 F.3d 551, 556 (5th Cir.2007). ‘“Direct evidence is evidence that, if believed, proves the fact of discriminatory animus without inference or presumption.’” West v. Nabors Drilling USA, Inc., 330 F.3d 379, 384 n. 3 (5th Cir.2003) (quoting Sandstad v. CB Richard Ellis, Inc., 309 F.3d 893, 897 (5th Cir.2002), cert. denied, 539 U.S. 926, 123 S.Ct. 2572, 156 L.Ed.2d 602 (2003)); accord Ogletree v. Glen Rose Indep. Sch. Dist., 443 Fed.Appx. 913, 917 (5th Cir.2011); Fahim v. Marriott Hotel Servs., Inc., 551 F.3d 344, 349 (5th Cir.2008); Jones v. Robinson Prop. Group, LP, 427 F.3d 987, 992 (5th Cir.2005).

“Absent direct evidence of discriminatory intent, as is typically the case, proof via circumstantial evidence is assembled using the framework set forth in the seminal case of McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 ... (1973).” Russell v. McKinney Hosp. Venture, 235 F.3d 219, 222 (5th Cir.2000); see Reeves, 530 U.S. at 142-43, 120 S.Ct. 2097; Fahim, 551 F.3d at 349; Nasti v. CIBA Specialty Chems. Corp., 492 F.3d 589, 593 (5th Cir.2007); Turner v. Baylor Richardson Med. Ctr., 476 F.3d 337, 346 (5th Cir.2007). This method of analysis is utilized for both Title VII and § 1981 claims. See Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 186, 109 S.Ct. 2363, 105 L.Ed.2d 132 (1989); Mendoza v. Bell Helicopter, 548 Fed.Appx. 127, 128 (5th Cir.2013); Jones, 427 F.3d at 992; Roberson v. Alltel Info. Servs., 373 F.3d 647, 651 (5th Cir.2004); Raggs v. Miss. Power & Light Co., 278 F.3d 463, 468 (5th Cir.2002).

Where, as here, there is no direct evidence of discrimination, a plaintiff must initially establish a prima facie case by satisfying a multi-factor test from which a discriminatory motive may be inferred, thus creating a rebuttable presumption of intentional discrimination. See Reeves, 530 U.S. at 142-43, 120 S.Ct. 2097; Haire v. Bd. of Supervisors of La. State Univ. Agric. & Mech. Coll., 719 F.3d 356, 362-63 (5th Cir.2013); Turner v. Kan. City S. Ry. Co., 675 F.3d 887, 892 (5th Cir.2012); Alvarado, 492 F.3d at 611; Burrell v. Dr. Pepper/Seven Up Bottling Grp., Inc., 482 F.3d 408, 411 (5th Cir.2007). “To establish a prima facie case, a plaintiff need only make a very minimal showing.” Nichols v. Loral Vought Sys. Corp., 81 F.3d 38, 41 (5th Cir.1996) (quotation omitted)); accord Turner, 675 F.3d at 892 (“The burden of establishing a prima facie case of disparate treatment is not onerous.”); Bauer v. Albemarle Corp., 169 F.3d 962, 967 (5th Cir.1999).

Once the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, the burden then shifts to the defendant to articulate — but not prove — a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its employment decision. Raytheon Co. v. Hernandez, 540 U.S. 44, 49 n. 3, 124 S.Ct. 513, 157 L.Ed.2d 357 (2003); Reeves, 530 U.S. at 142, 120 S.Ct. 2097; McDonnell Douglas Corp., 411 U.S. at 802, 93 S.Ct. 1817; Haire, 719 F.3d at 363; Moss v. BMC Software, Inc., 610 F.3d 917, 922 (5th Cir.2010); Fahim, 551 F.3d at 349; Alvarado, 492 F.3d at 611; Nasty 492 F.3d at 593. “This burden is one of production, not persuasion; it ‘can involve no credibility assessment.’ ” Reeves, 530 U.S. at 142, 120 S.Ct. 2097 (quoting St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 509, 113 S.Ct. 2742, 125 L.Ed.2d 407 (1993), overruled in part on other grounds by Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc. 557 U.S. 167, 169-70, 129 S.Ct. 2343, 174 L.Ed.2d 119 (2009)); accord Vaughn v. Woodforest Bank, 665 F.3d 632, 636 (5th Cir.2011); Alvarado, 492 F.3d at 611. “The [employer] must clearly set forth, through the introduction of admissible evidence, reasons for its actions which, ‘if believed by the trier off act,’ would support a finding that unlawful discrimination was not the cause of the employment action.” Bauer, 169 F.3d at 966 (quoting Hicks, 509 U.S. at 507, 113 S.Ct. 2742) (emphasis in original)); accord Vaughn, 665 F.3d at 636; Brown v. Bunge Corp., 207 F.3d 776, 781 (5th Cir.2000).

If the employer meets its burden, “ ‘the McDonnell Douglas framework — with its presumptions and burdens’ — disappears], ... and the sole remaining issue [is] ‘discrimination vel non.’ ” Reeves, 530 U.S. at 142-43, 120 S.Ct. 2097 (quoting Hicks, 509 U.S. at 510, 113 S.Ct. 2742); Black v. Pan Am. Labs., L.L.C., 646 F.3d 254, 271 (5th Cir.2011)); Nasti, 492 F.3d at 593j Wheeler v. BL Dev. Corp., 415 F.3d 399, 405 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 1061, 126 S.Ct. 798, 163 L.Ed.2d 627 (2005); Machinchick v. PB Power, Inc., 398 F.3d 345, 350 (5th Cir.2005). “Although intermediate eviden-tiary burdens shift back and forth under this framework, ‘[t]he ultimate burden of persuading the trier of fact that the defendant intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff remains at all times with the plaintiff.’ ” Reeves, 530 U.S. at 143, 120 S.Ct. 2097 (quoting Tex. Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253, 101 S.Ct. 1089, 67 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981)); accord Hicks, 509 U.S. at 507, 113 S.Ct. 2742; Nasti, 492 F.3d at 593; Baker v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 430 F.3d 750, 753-54 (5th Cir.2005). In attempting to satisfy this burden, under the modified McDonnell Douglas approach, the plaintiff must offer sufficient evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact “ ‘either (1) that the defendant’s reason is not true, but is instead a pretext for discrimination (pretext alternative); or (2) that the defendant’s reason, while true, is only one of the reasons for its conduct, and another “motivating factor” is the plaintiffs protected characteristic (mixed-motive[s] alternative).’ ” Rachid v. Jack In the Box, Inc., 376 F.3d 305, 312 (5th Cir.2004) (quoting Rishel v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 297 F.Supp.2d 854, 865 (M.D.N.C.2003)); accord Vaughn, 665 F.3d at 636; Fahim, 551 F.3d at 349; Berquist v. Wash. Mut. Bank, 500 F.3d 344, 349 (5th Cir.2007), cert. denied, 552 U.S. 1166, 128 S.Ct. 1124, 169 L.Ed.2d 950 (2008); Keelan v. Majesco Software, Inc., 407 F.3d 332, 341 (5th Cir.2005). “In assessing whether a protected characteristic was ‘a motivating factor,’ a court must consider 'the evidence presented by the plaintiff as a whole.” Taylor v. Peerless Indus. Inc., 322 Fed.Appx. 355, 365 (5th Cir.2009) (citing Machinchick, 398 F.3d at 355).

Under the pretext alternative approach, the “plaintiff may establish pretext either through evidence of disparate treatment or by showing that the employer’s proffered explanation is false or ‘unworthy of credence.’ ” Laxton, 333 F.3d at 578 (citing Reeves, 530 U.S. at 143, 120 S.Ct. 2097; Wallace, 271 F.3d at 220); accord Nasti, 492 F.3d at 593. “An explanation is false or unworthy or credence if it.is not the real reason for the adverse employment action.” Laxton, 333 F.3d at 578 (citing Sandstad, 309 F.3d at 899); accord Vaughn, 665 F.3d at 637; Burrell, 482 F.3d at 412. “[I]t is permissible for the trier of fact to infer the ultimate fact of discrimination from the falsity of the employer’s explanation.” Reeves, 530 U.S. at 147, 120 S.Ct. 2097 (emphasis in original); accord Carmona v. Sw. Airlines Co., 604 F.3d 848, 861 (5th Cir.2010); Bryant v. Compass Grp. USA Inc., 413 F.3d 471, 476 (5th Cir.2005), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 1090, 126 S.Ct. 1027, 163 L.Ed.2d 855 (2006); Kanida v. Gulf Coast Med. Pers. LP, 363 F.3d 568, 574 (5th Cir.2004); West, 330 F.3d at 385. “Evidence demonstrating that the employer’s explanation is false or unworthy of credence, taken together with the plaintiffs prima facie case, is likely to support an inference of discrimination without further evidence of defendant’s true motive.” Laxton, 333 F.3d at 578 (citing Sandstad, 309 F.3d at 897); accord Black, 646 F.3d at 276; Machinchick, 398 F.3d at 351 (citing Reeves, 530 U.S. at 147-48, 120 S.Ct. 2097). “ ‘[OJnce the employer’s justification has been eliminated, discrimination may well be the most likely alternative explanation, especially since the employer is in the best position to put forth the actual reason for its decision.’ ” Russell, 235 F.3d at 223 (quoting Reeves, 530 U.S. at 147, 120 S.Ct. 2097); accord Black, 646 F.3d at 276; Laxton, 333 F.3d at 578; West, 330 F.3d at 385. Hence, the plaintiff need not, as a matter of course, introduce additional, independent evidence of discrimination to avoid summary judgment. See Reeves, 530 U.S. at 148, 120 S.Ct. 2097; Ratliff v. City of Gainesville, 256 F.3d 355, 361-62 (5th Cir.2001); Blow v. City of San Antonio, 236 F.3d 293, 298 (5th Cir.2001); Russell, 235 F.3d at 223.

Ultimately, “[wjhether summary judgment is appropriate depends on numerous factors, including ‘the strength of the plaintiffs prima facie case, the probative value of the proof that the employer’s explanation is false, and any other evidence that supports the employer’s case’ ” that properly may be considered by the court when ruling on a motion for summary judgment. Price v. Fed. Express Corp., 283 F.3d 715, 720 (5th Cir.2002) (quoting Reeves, 530 U.S. at 148-49, 120 S.Ct. 2097); accord Machinchick, 398 F.3d at 351 n. 14; Laxton, 333 F.3d at 579; Crawford v. Formosa Plastics Corp., 234 F.3d 899, 902 (5th Cir.2000).

Because the plaintiff has the ultimate burden of proving intentional discrimination, “[a]n employer is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on this ultimate question ‘if the evidence taken as a whole would not allow a jury to infer that the actual reason for the [employer’s decision] was discriminatory.’ ” Brown v. Kinney Shoe Corp., 237 F.3d 556, 565 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 817, 122 S.Ct. 45, 151 L.Ed.2d 17 (2001) (quoting Vadie v. Miss. State Univ., 218 F.3d 365, 372 (5th Cir.2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1150, 121 S.Ct. 1092, 148 L.Ed.2d 966 (2001)). “A mere scintilla of evidence of pretext does not create an issue of material fact in all cases.” Crawford, 234 F.3d at 902 (citing Wyvill v. United Cos. Life Ins. Co., 212 F.3d 296, 301 (5th Cir.2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1145, 121 S.Ct. 1081, 148 L.Ed.2d 957 (2001)). “It is, therefore, possible for a plaintiff’s evidence to permit a tenuous inference of pretext and yet be insufficient to support a reasonable inference of discrimination.” Crawford, 234 F.3d at 903 (citing Travis v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Tex. Sys., 122 F.3d 259, 263 (5th Cir.1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1148, 118 S.Ct. 1166, 140 L.Ed.2d 176 (1998)). “The determination must be made on a case-by-case basis, depending on the nature, extent, and quality of the evidence, as to whether a jury could reasonably infer discrimination.” Id.

Plaintiffs’ race-based Title VII’ claims can be divided into five categories: (1) failure to train; (2) failure to promote; (3) discriminatory demotion; (4) denial of overtime; and (5) hostile work environment. Firestone moves for summary judgment on the basis that Plaintiffs’ “failure to train” and “failure to promote” claims are time-barred; that nondiscriminatory reasons account for any demotions; and that Plaintiffs failed to plead hostile work environment claims. Firestone does not directly address Plaintiffs’ denial of overtime claims. Aside from asserting that “Defendant’s pleadings fail to give ‘fair notice’ to the Plaintiffs as to the exact nature of its [limitations] . defenses,” Plaintiffs failed to respond in any substantive detail to Firestone’s arguments.

1. Failure to Train

Plaintiffs each assert “failure to train” causes of action. In their, motions for summary judgment, Firestone argues that Plaintiffs’ claims fail as a matter of law because “failure to train” claims are not actionable. Specifically, Firestone asserts that' in order to establish a prima facie case of discrimination based on dispárate treatment, a plaintiff must show that he suffered one or more “adverse employment actions.” According to Firestone, established Fifth Circuit precedent holds that “a refusal to train is not an adverse employment action under Title VII.” Plaintiffs fail to respond to Firestone’s argument and cite no case law supporting their theory.

To establish a prima, facie case of disparate treatment, a plaintiff must show that:

(1) he is a member of a protected class;

(2) he is qualified for the position;

(3) he suffered an adverse employment action; and

(4) others outside the class who were similarly situated were treated more favorably than he.

See Nasti, 492 F.3d at 593; Keelan, 407 F.3d at 339; Abarca v. Metro. Transit Auth., 404 F.3d 938, 941 (5th Cir.2005) (citing Rios v. Rossotti, 252 F.3d 375, 378 (5th Cir.2001)); Laxton, 333 F.3d at 579 n. 1; Okoye v. Univ. of Tex. Houston Health Sci. Ctr., 245 F.3d 507, 512-13 (5th Cir. 2001).

He must demonstrate that employees outside his protected class received more favorable treatment under nearly identical circumstances. See Turner, 675 F.3d at 893-96; Bryant, 413 F.3d at 478; Keelan, 407 F.3d at 345; Perez v. Tex. Dep’t of Crim. Justice, 395 F.3d 206, 210 (5th Cir.2004), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 976, 126 S.Ct. 545, 163 L.Ed.2d 459 (2005) (emphasizing that assessment of similarity of employees must be viewed from employer’s perspective); Wallace, 271 F.3d at 221. “ ‘The employment actions being compared will be deemed to have been taken under nearly identical circumstances when the employees being compared held the same job or responsibilities, shared the same supervisor or had their employment status determined by the same person, and have essentially comparable violation histories.’ ” Turner, 675 F.3d at 893 (quoting Lee v. Kan. City S. Ry. Co., 574 F.3d 253, 260 (5th Cir.2009)); accord Hernandez v. Yellow Transp., Inc., 670 F.3d 644, 659 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, -U.S.-, 133 S.Ct. 136, 184 L.Ed.2d 29 (2012). Also, “the conduct that drew the adverse employment decision must have been ‘nearly identical’ to that of the proffered comparator who allegedly drew dissimilar employment decisions.” Lee, 574 F.3d at 260. But “[e]ach employee’s track record at the company need not comprise the identical number of identical infractions, albeit these records must be comparable.” Id. at 260-61.

The Fifth Circuit continues to hold that with respect to discrimination claims, adverse employment actions include only ultimate employment decisions. Thompson v. City of Waco, 764 F.3d 500, 503-04 (5th Cir.2014); Phillips v. Leggett & Platt, Inc., 658. F.3d 452, 456 n. 2 (5th Cir.2011); see also McCoy, 492 F.3d at 559 (reasoning that the Supreme Court’s holding in Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 126 S.Ct. 2405, 165 L.Ed.2d 345 (2006) applies solely to retaliation claims). Title VII was only designed to address “ultimate employment decisions, not to address every decision made by employers that arguably might have some tangential effect upon those ultimate decisions.’ ” Thompson, 764 F.3d at 503-04 (quoting McCoy, 492 F.3d at 560); see also Preston v. Tex. Dep’t of Family & Prot. Servs., 222 Fed.Appx. 353, 358 (5th Cir.2007) (quoting Dollis v. Rubin, 77 F.3d 777, 781-82 (5th Cir.1995)), overruled on other grounds by White, 548 U.S. at 67, 126 S.Ct. 2405. “[A]n employment action that ‘does not affect job duties, compensation, or benefits’ is not an adverse employment action.” Pegram v. Honeywell, Inc., 361 F.3d 272, 282 (5th Cir.2004) (quoting Banks v. E. Baton Rouge Parish Sch. Bd., 320 F.3d 570, 575 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 817, 124 S.Ct. 82, 157 L.Ed.2d 34 (2003)); see also Hunt v. Rapides Healthcare Sys., LLC, 277 F.3d 757, 769 (5th Cir.2001) (“[A] shift change, without more, is not an adverse employment action.”); Benningfield v. City of Houston, 157 F.3d 369, 377 (5th Cir.1998) (holding that changes in work hours are not adverse employment actions); Johnson v. Tune, No. 4:10-cv-124, 2011 WL 3299927, at *4 (E.D.Tex. Apr. 29, 2011) (holding that the “decision to deny Plaintiff weekends off is not enough to allege an adverse employment action sufficient to state an actionable claim”).

Actionable adverse employment. actions are generally limited to tangible employment actions that constitute a “significant change in employment status, such as hiring, firing, failing to promote, reassignment with significantly different responsibilities, or a decision causing a significant change in benefits.” Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 761, 118 S.Ct. 2257, 141 L.Ed.2d 633 (1998); see Robison v. Tex. Dep’t of Crim. Justice, 94 Fed.Appx. 225, 228 (5th Cir.2004) (affirming district court’s grant of summary judgment as to plaintiffs Title YII claim on the basis that plaintiff suffered no adverse employment action where he failed to submit evidence that he was “fired, reassigned, denied promotion, suffered a. change in benefits, or disciplined”); Banks, 320 F.3d at 575; Mota v. Univ. of Tex. Houston Health Sci. Ctr., 261 F.3d 512, 519 (5th Cir.2001); Watts v. Kroger Co., 170 F.3d 505, 510 (5th Cir.1999); Burger v. Cent. Apartment Mgmt., Inc., 168 F.3d 875, 878 (5th Cir.1999); Webb v. Cardiothoracic Surgery Assocs. of N. Tex., P.A., 139 F.3d 532, 540 (5th Cir.1998); accord Thompson, 764 F.3d at 503-04. An ultimate employment decision, in itself or through its direct consequences, must effect a material change in the terms or conditions of employment. See Burger, 168 F.3d at 879; Ledergerber v. Stangler, 122 F.3d 1142, 1144 (8th Cir.1997). “An employer’s action does not rise to the level of an ‘adverse employment action’ when it fails to have more than ‘mere tangential effect on a possible future ultimate employment decision.’ ” Mota, 261 F.3d at 519 (quoting Walker v. Thompson, 214 F.3d 615, 629 (5th Cir.2000), overruled on other grounds by White, 548 U.S. at 67, 126 S.Ct. 2405; accord Clayton v. Rumsfeld, 106 Fed.Appx. 268, 270 (5th Cir.2004); see Messer v. Meno, 130 F.3d 130, 140 (5th Cir.1997), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1067, 119 S.Ct. 794, 142 L.Ed.2d 657 (1999); Farquhar v. Tex. Alcoholic Beverage Comm’n, No. A-12-CA-1042-SS, 2014 WL 2700476, at *3 (W.D.Tex. June 13, 2014) (quoting McCoy, 492 F.3d at 559).

“[Employment actions are not adverse where pay, benefits, and level of responsibility remain the same.” Watts, 170 F.3d. at 512; accord Mora v. Ashcroft, 142 Fed.Appx. 206, 207 (5th Cir.2005); Mota, 261 F.3d at 522. “ ‘Although actions short of termination may constitute an adverse employment action within the meaning of the statute, not everything that makes an employee unhappy is an actionable adverse action.’ ” Greaser v. Mo. Dep’t of Corr., 145 F.3d 979, 984 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1056, 119 S.Ct. 620, 142 L.Ed.2d 559 (1998) (quoting Manning v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 127 F.3d 686, 692 (8th Cir.1997)); accord Garrison v. Gambro, Inc., 428 F.3d 933, 939 (10th Cir.2005); Montandon v. Farmland Indus., Inc., 116 F.3d 355, 359 (8th Cir.1997); Smart v. Ball State Univ., 89 F.3d 437, 441 (7th Cir.1996). Interlocutory or mediate decisions, even those that can lead to an ultimate employment decision, are not adverse employment actions for purposes of the employment discrimination statutes. See Mattern v. Eastman Kodak Co., 104 F.3d 702, 708 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 932, 118 S.Ct. 336, 139 L.Ed.2d 260 (1997).

Notably, the Fifth Circuit has consistently declined to find that a denial of training can constitute an adverse employment action. Hollimon v. Potter, 365 Fed.Appx. 546, 549 (5th Cir.2010) (“[A] refusal to train is not an adverse employment action under Title VII.”) (citing Shackelford v. Deloitte & Touche, LLP, 190 F.3d 398, 406 (5th Cir.1999)); Roberson v. Game Stop/Babbage’s, 152 Fed.Appx. 356, 361 (5th Cir.2005), cert. denied, 548 U.S. 924, 126 S.Ct. 2982, 165 L.Ed.2d 986 (2006) (finding no adverse employment action where plaintiff was denied training on a computer system); Shackelford, 190 F.3d at 406 (finding no adverse employment action where plaintiff was denied access to training on specialized filing software); Dollis, 77 F.3d at 779; Jones v. BP Amoco Chem. Co., No. H-10-1399, 2012 WL 1424986, at *5 (S.D.Tex. Apr. 23, 2012) (holding that plaintiffs “failure to train” claim lacked merit because it was not an adverse employment action); Wojciechowski v. Nat’l Oilwell Varco, L.P., 763 F.Supp.2d 832, 857 (S.D.Tex.2011) (holding that plaintiffs failure to train claim failed under Fifth Circuit precedent); Veal v. Schlumberger, No. Civ. A. H-04-3550, 2006 WL 237006, at *9 (S.D.Tex. Jan. 31, 2006) (dismissing plaintiffs denial of training claims because plaintiff did not show an adverse employment action).

In light of clear Fifth Circuit precedent, as well as Plaintiffs’ failure to support their position with any law, the court finds that Plaintiffs’ Title VII failure to train claims do not implicate any adverse employment actions. Consequently, these claims do not survive summary judgment.

Further, even assuming arguendo that Plaintiffs’ “failure to train” claims are actionable, the vast majority of them are time-barred. In Texas, because there is a state agency with the authority to grant or seek relief for discriminatory employment practices, a plaintiff must file his charge of discrimination with the EEOC or the designated state agency within “three hundred days after the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1); Lewis v. City of Chicago, 560 U.S. 205, 210-11, 130 S.Ct. 2191, 176 L.Ed.2d 967 (2010); Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618, 623-24, 127 S.Ct. 2162, 167 L.Ed.2d 982 (2007), superseded in part by statute on other grounds, LLFPA, Pub.L. No. 111-2, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(3); Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 109, 122 S.Ct. 2061, 153 L.Ed.2d 106 (2002); Kirkland v. Big Lots Store, Inc., 547 Fed.Appx. 570, 572-74 (5th Cir.2013); Frank v. Xerox Corp., 347 F.3d 130, 136 (5th Cir.2003). Pursuant to a work-sharing agreement between the EEOC and the Texas Commission on Human Rights (“TCHR”) , whenever the EEOC receives a charge of discrimination, “the TCHR, for all legal and practical purposes, [also] receive[s] the [charge].” Griffin v. City of Dallas, 26 F.3d 610, 612-13 (5th Cir.1994). Generally, the limitations period begins on the date the discriminatory act occurred, and a plaintiff cannot sustain his claims based on incidents that occurred more than 300 days before the filing of a charge of discrimination. Ledbetter, 550 U.S. at 623-24, 127 S.Ct. 2162; Morgan, 536 U.S. at 110, 122 S.Ct. 2061; Ikossi-Anastasiou v. Bd. of Supervisors of La. State Univ., 579 F.3d 546, 549 (5th Cir.2009), cert. denied, 559 U.S. 904, 130 S.Ct. 1285, 175 L.Ed.2d 1075 (2010). When considering whether discriminatory acts that fall outside the limitations period are actionable under Title VII, the United States Supreme Court has distinguished claims alleging discrete discriminatory acts from those alleging a hostile work environment. Ledbetter, 550 U.S. at 638, 127 S.Ct. 2162; Morgan, 536 U.S. at. 110, 122 S.Ct. 2061; see also Pegram, 361 F.3d at 279.

In Morgan, the [United States] Supreme Court noted that “[a] discrete retaliatory or discriminatory act ‘occurred’ on the day that it ‘happened.’ ” 536 U.S. at 110, 122 S.Ct. 2061; see also Nelson v. Univ. of Tex. at Dallas, 535 F.3d 318, 323 (5th Cir.2008). “A party, therefore, must file a charge within either 180 or 300 days of the date of the act or lose the ability to recover for it.” Morgan, 536 U.S. at 110, 122 S.Ct. 2061; accord Ledbetter, 550 U.S. at 647, 127 S.Ct. 2162; Pegram, 361 F.3d at 279. Certain discrete acts of discrimination, such as termination, failure to promote, denial of transfer, or refusal to hire, are “easy to identify.” Morgan, 536 U.S. at 114, 122 S.Ct. 2061; accord Ledbetter, 550 U.S. at 647, 127 S.Ct. 2162; Pegram, 361 F.3d at 280 n. 5. Although not an exhaustive list, each discrete act “constitutes a separate actionable unlawful employment practice.” Morgan, 536 U.S. at 114, 122 S.Ct. 2061; Pegram, 361 F.3d at 280 n. 5.

“[Discrete discriminatory acts are not actionable if time barred, even when they are related to acts alleged in timely filed charges.” Morgan, 536 U.S. at 113, 122 S.Ct. 2061; accord Pegram, 361 F.3d at 279; Mack v. John L. Wortham & Son, L.P., No. H-10-4881, 2012 WL 5456117, at *5 (S.D.Tex. Nov. 7, 2012). Hence, “claims based on discrete acts are timely only where such acts occurred within the limitations period.” Pegram, 361 F.3d at 279 (citing Morgan, 536 U.S. at 113, 122 S.Ct. 2061); Mack, 2012 WL 5456117, at *5. Moreover, “[e]ach discrete discriminatory act starts a new clock for filing charges alleging that act.” Morgan, 536 U.S. at 113, 122 S.Ct. 2061; accord Pegram, 361 F.3d at 279; Liddell v. Northrop Grumman Shipbuilding, Inc., 836 F.Supp.2d 443, 451 (S.D.Miss.2011). Any act occurring outside the applicable filing period “may constitute relevant background evidence in a proceeding in which the status of a current practice is at issue, but separately considered, it is merely an unfortunate event in history which has no present legal consequences.” United Air Lines, Inc. v. Evans, 431 U.S. 553, 558, 97 S.Ct. 1885, 52 L.Ed.2d 571 (1977); accord Morgan, 536 U.S. at 112, 122 S.Ct. 2061; Ramsey v. Henderson, 286 F.3d 264, 270 (5th Cir.2002); Ray v. Tandem Computers, Inc., 63 F.3d 429, 434 n. 12 (5th Cir.1995). “[C]urrent effects alone cannot breathe life into prior, uncharged discrimination.” Ledbetter, 550 U.S. at 619, 127 S.Ct. 2162; Garcia v. Brockway, 526 F.3d 456, 463 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 555 U.S. 1069, 129 S.Ct. 724, 172 L.Ed.2d 725 (2008).

Here, Plaintiffs’ “failure to train” claims are considered discrete acts. Pegram, 361 F.3d at 280 (“discrete acts such as failure to train ... may not be pursued outside the relevant limitations period.”). Accordingly, any instance of a “failure to train” that occurred more than 300 days before Plaintiffs’ filed their charges of discrimination is time-barred.

a.Brooks

Brooks fails to direct the court to any evidence specifying the date(s) on which his alleged “failure to train” occurred. In response to Firestone’s first set of interrogatories which asked Brooks to identify “every instance in which [he] sought and [was] denied training -by Defendant,” Brooks listed only one year — 2003—and did not specify an exact date or month. See Docket No. 59, Exhibit 3, Page 3. Nonetheless, Brooks argues that Firestone’s limitations argument is irrelevant due to the fact that the EEOC issued each Plaintiff a Letter of “Intent to Sue.”

Brooks’s argument is not well taken because a right-to-sue letter does not immunize a plaintiff from statutorily-mandated timeliness requirements. Here, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e — 5(e)(1) is clear: a plaintiff must file his charge of discrimination with the EEOC or the designated state agency within “three hundred days after the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred.” Id. Indeed, the letter the EEOC sent to Plaintiffs’ counsel on February 10, 2012, stated that there were “concerns about the timeliness of several of the issues raised in almost all of the charges and that the Commission’s investigative authority is limited to issues filed within 300 days of the disputed action.” See Docket No. 61, Exhibit 4. Accordingly, the court rejects Brooks’s contention that the EEOC’s right-to-sue letter shields him from complying with the applicable statute of limitations.

Brooks’s original - chárge of discrimination was filed on December 3, 2009, and his amended charge was filed on March 9, 2010. As a result, any instances of an alleged “failure to train” that occurred before February 6, 2009 — 300 days before the original charge was filed — are time-barred. Here, Brooks’s alleged instance of a “failure to train” in 2003 occurred several years before his February 6, 2009, deadline. Consequently, the claim is time-barred.

b.Byrd

Byrd fails to direct the court to evidence specifying the date(s) on which his alleged “failure to train” occurred. Firestone notes, however, that at deposition, Byrd did not specify any “denial of training” that occurred after the middle of 2008. See Docket No. 60, Exhibit 2, Page 44. Byrd’s charge of discrimination was filed on December 9, 2010. As a result, his allegations of a “failure to train” occurred more than 300 days before the charge was filed. Hence, these claims are time-barred.

c.Greenaway

Greenaway fails to direct the court to evidence specifying the date(s) he was denied training. Firestone notes, however, that at deposition, Greenaway maintained that he was denied training on three occasions. See Docket No. 61, Exhibit 2, Pages 69-80.

The first incident allegedly occurred in 2008 when the BCP unit was still operational and Greenaway requested to train for an A-operator position in the BCP unit. Id. at 78-80. Greenaway’s charge of discrimination was filed on March 9, 2010. This incident occurred more than 300 days before the charge was filed and is thus time-barred.

The second incident allegedly occurred in 2011 when Greenaway was denied training for a vacation relief job. Id. at 70-72. The third incident allegedly occurred in 2012 when Greenaway was denied training for a position in the Crumb Line control room. Id. at 74-78. These claims, while not time-barred, fail because a “failure to train” is not an adverse employment action.

d. S. Johnson

S. Johnson fails to direct the court to evidence specifying the date(s) on which he was denied training. Firestone notes, however, that at deposition, S. Johnson vaguely referenced three instances in which he was denied training. The first incident allegedly occurred between 1997 and 2003. See Docket No. 62, Exhibit 2, Page 8. The second incident allegedly occurred sometime in 2009 when S. Johnson was purportedly denied training for a vacation relief recovery job. Id. at 32. The third incident allegedly occurred in 2012 when he was denied training on the reinst-ituted 3rd Crumb line. Id. at 81.

S, Johnson’s charge of discrimination was originally filed on December 3, 2009, and was later amended on March 9, 2010. The first incident — -occurring between 1997 and' 2003 — occurred more than 300 days before the original charge was filed and is thus time-barred. As previously discussed, S. Johnson’s 2009 and 2012 “failure to train” claims, while not time-barred, are not viable because a “failure to train” does not constitute an adverse employment action.

e. W. Johnson

W. Johnson fails to direct the court to evidence specifying the date(s) on which his alleged “failure to train” occurred. Firestone points out, however, that at deposition, W. Johnson identified three instances in which he was reportedly denied training. The first incident occurred in 2005 when W. Johnson was purportedly denied training for a B-level Drum Dryer position. See Docket No. 63, Exhibit 2, Page 26. The second incident occurred sometime in 2004 or 2005 when W. Johnson was reportedly denied training for a B-level position in utilities. Id. at 30. The third incident occurred “pre-2007” when W. Johnson claims he was refused training for a B-level recovery unit job. Id. at 39.

W. Johnson’s original charge of discrimination was filed on December 3, 2009, and was amended on March 9, 2010. As a result, each instance mentioned above occurred more than 300 days before the original charge was filed. Consequently, these claims are untimely and therefore time-barred.

f. Ruffin

Ruffin fails to direct the court to evidence specifying the date(s) on which he was allegedly denied training. At deposition, however, Ruffin testified that he was denied training for “preferred” B-level positions in both 2003 and 2006. See Docket No. 76, Exhibit 9, Pages 12, 22. Ruffin’s charge of discrimination was filed on March 9, 2010. As a result, these instances occurred more than 300 days before the charge was filed and are thus time-barred.

g. Spencer

Spencer fails to direct the court to evidence specifying the date(s) on which he was denied training. Firestone notes, however, that at deposition, Spencer repeatedly stated that he did not remember when he was denied training. When Firestone asked Spencer whether he had requested training in the week preceding the deposition, Spencer declared that he “did not remember.” See Docket No. 76, Exhibit 11, Page 29. In fact, when asked whether he remembered making “any-training requests,” Spencer replied, “No.” Id. at 30. Nonetheless, Spencer finally stated he was denied training in the 200/300 area sometime in the 1990s. Id. at 27. He further testified that he was denied training when he worked as a helper and a B-level operator, which occurred “so long ago.” Id. at 100-01. In fact, Spencer last worked as a B-level operator in 2005. Id. at 102.

Spencer’s EEOC charge was filed on March 9, 2010. As a result, the aforementioned incidents occurred more than 300 days before the charge was filed and are thus time-barred.

h. Guillory

Guillory fails to direct the court to evidence specifying the date(s) he was denied training. Firestone notes, however, that at deposition, Guillory stated that he was denied training in six different positions “about 50 times apiece.” See Docket No. 66, Exhibit 2, Page 36. Despite his claim that he was denied training on 300 separate occasions, Guillory specifies only one instance that allegedly occurred in 2008. Id. at 21. Guillory contends that he was denied training for a Drum Dryer Recovery position from April 21, 2008, until the Di;um Dryers were permanently shut down as a result of Hurricane Ike in September 2008. Id. at 21.

Guillory’s charge of discrimination was filed on March 9, 2010. As a result, his 2008 claim occurred more than 3(30 days before the charge was filed and is thus time-barred.

2. Failure to Promote

Plaintiffs next allege that they were denied promotions on account .of their race in violation of Title VII. Firestone first argues that nearly all of Plaintiffs’ promotion claims are barred by limitations. Second, Firestone asserts that the one claim not barred by limitations— Greenaway’s 2012 claim — nonetheless fails because Greenaway did not exhaust his administrative remedies as required under Title VII. Plaintiffs do not respond to Firestone’s arguments.

Plaintiffs’ “failure to promote” claims are also discrete acts. Morgan, 536 U.S. at 114, 122 S.Ct. 2061 (“Discrete acts such as ... failure to promote ... are easy to identify.”); accord Ledbetter, 550 U.S. at 647, 127 S.Ct. 2162; Pegram, 361 F.3d at 280 n. 5. As a result, in order to maintain a Title VII claim, Plaintiffs must have filed their charges of discrimination with the EEOC within 300 days of when any alleged “failure to promote” occurred. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e — 5(e)(1); Lewis, 560 U.S. at 210-11, 130 S.Ct. 2191.

a. Brooks

Brooks fails to direct the court to evidence specifying the date(s) on which he was denied a promotion. Firestone notes, however, that at deposition, Brooks testified that he was denied a promotion “sometime between 2000 and 2003.” See Docket No. 59, Exhibit 2, Page 12. Further, in his EEOC charge, Brooks claimed that he was denied a promotion “in the latter part of 2008.”

Brooks’s EEOC charge was filed on March 9, 2010. As a result, the aforementioned incidents occurred more than 300 days before the charge was filed and are thus time-barred.

b. Byrd

Byrd fails to direct the court to evidence specifying the date(s) on which he was denied. a promotion. Firestone acknowledges, however, that Byrd stated at deposition that he was denied a promotion at a time when a different union, the Oil, Chemical and Atomic Workers International Union (“OCAW”), represented workers at the Orange Plant. See Docket No. 60, Exhibit 2, Page. 60. Record evidence demonstrates that OCAW has not represented the bargaining unit at Firestone’s Orange plant since January 4, 1999. See Docket No. 60, Exhibit 3. Further, in his EEOC charge, Byrd claims that he was denied a promotion “in the latter part of 2008.”

Byrd’s charge of discrimination was filed on March 9, 2010. Therefore, both incidents mentioned above occurred more than 300 days before the charge was filed. Hence, the claims are time-barred,

c. Greenaway

Greenaway fails to direct the court to evidence specifying the date(s) on which he was denied a promotion. Firestone asserts, however, that at deposition, Greena-way stated that he was denied promotions on account of his race on seven occasions. Six out of the seven alleged promotion denials occurred in 2002, 2007, and 2008. See Docket No. 61, Exhibit 2, Pages 10,11, 12, 16, 20^ 23, and 29. Those claims occurred more than 300 days before the charge was filed and are thus time-barred.

Firestone argues that the seventh incident, which allegedly occurred in 2012, fails because Greenaway did not exhaust his administrative remedies. “Title VII requires employees to exhaust their administrative remedies before seeking judicial relief.” McClain v. Lufkin Indus., Inc., 519 F.3d 264, 273 (5th Cir.2008) (citing Pacheco v. Mineta, 448 F.3d 783, 788 (5th Cir.2006)). It is well settled that courts may not entertain claims brought under Title VII as to which an aggrieved party has not first exhausted his administrative remedies by filing a charge of discrimination with the EEOC. See Filer v. Donley, 690 F.3d 643, 647 (5th Cir.2012); McClain, 519 F.3d at 273; Taylor v. Books A Million, 296 F.3d 376, 378-79 (5th Cir.2002), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1200, 123 S.Ct. 1287, 154 L.Ed.2d 1041 (2003); see also 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1). While not uniformly viewed as a jurisdictional prerequisite, the filing of an EEOC charge “ ‘is a precondition to filing in district court.’” Taylor, 296 F.3d at 379 (quoting Dao v. Auchan Hypermarket, 96 F.3d 787, 789 (5th Cir.1996) (citing Cruce v. Brazosport Indep. Sch. Dist., 703 F.2d 862, 863 (5th Cir.1983))).

The primary purpose of the EEOC charge is to provide notice to the respondent of the discrimination alleged and to activate the voluntary compliance and conciliation functions of the EEOC. See Manning v. Chevron Chem. Co., 332 F.3d 874, 878-79 (5th Cir.2003), cert. denied,. 540 U.S. 1107, 124 S.Ct. 1060, 157 L.Ed.2d 892 (2004); Fine v. GAF Chem. Corp., 995 F.2d 576, 577-78 (5th Cir.1993); Sanchez v. Standard Brands, Inc., 431 F.2d 455, 466 (5th Cir.1970). The charge triggers an investigation by the EEOC so, through a conciliation process, voluntary compliance may be obtained and discriminatory practices and policies eliminated. See Barnes v. Levitt, 118 F.3d 404, 409 (5th Cir.1997), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1136, 118 S.Ct. 1839, 140 L.Ed.2d 1090 (1998); EEOC v. Hearst Corp., 103 F.3d 462, 464 (5th Cir.1997). Requiring the plaintiff first to state his allegations of employment discrimination in an EEOC charge serves “Congress’ intention to promote conciliation rather than litigation in the Title VII context.” Burlington Indus., 524 U.S. at 764, 118 S.Ct. 2257.

Civil complaints filed under Title VII may only encompass discrimination “ ‘like or related to allegation^] contained in the [EEOC] charge and growing out of such allegations during the pendency of the case before the Commission.’ ” McClain, 519 F.3d at 273 (quoting Sanchez, 431 F.2d at 466); Nat’l Ass’n of Gov’t Emps. v. City Pub. Serv. Bd., 40 F.3d 698, 711 (5th Cir.1994); see Dollis, 77 F.3d at 781. Accordingly, the scope of the complaint is limited to “ ‘the discrimination stated in the charge itself or developed in the course of a reasonable [EEOC] investigation of that charge.’ ” Nat’l Ass’n of Gov’t Emps., 40 F.3d at 712 (quoting King v. Seaboard Coast Line R. Co., 538 F.2d 581, 583 (4th Cir.1976)); see Pacheco, 448 F.3d at 789-90; Thomas v. Tex. Dep’t of Crim. Justice, 220 F.3d 389, 395 (5th Cir.2000). As the Fifth Circuit has stated, although “the actual scope of an EEOC investigation does not determine whether a claim is exhausted, we are also mindful that investigation of a particular claim creates a strong inference that such a claim was presented.” Clark v. Kraft Foods, Inc., 18 F.3d 1278, 1280 (5th Cir.1994). Thus, the failure to assert a claim of discrimination in an EEOC charge and/or its lack of 'development in the course of a reasonable investigation of that charge precludes the claim from later being brought in a civil suit. See Thomas, 220 F.3d at 395; Nat’l Ass’n of Gov’t Emps., 40 F.3d at 711-12; Young v. City of Houston, 906 F.2d 177, 179 (5th Cir.1990); Sanchez, 431 F.2d at 465-66. Several district courts have applied these principles to disallow a variety of claims not raised in the EEOC charge. See, e.g., Jefferson v. Christus St. Joseph Hosp., 374 Fed.Appx. 485, 490 (5th Cir.2010) (affirming district court’s ruling that certain claims were unexhausted where plaintiffs failed to either check the appropriate box or describe the discriminatory conduct in the charge); Butler v. Shinseki, No. 10-0857, 2011 WL 3419619, at *6 (E.D.La. Aug. 4, 2011) (dismissing racial discrimination claim that was not alleged in the EEOC charge); Harvill v. Westward Commc’ns, LLC, 311 F.Supp.2d 573, 585 (E.D.Tex.2004) (refusing to allow a constructive discharge claim that was not asserted in the EEOC charge); Stanley v. Univ. of Tex. Med. Branch, 425 F.Supp.2d 816, 822-23 (S.D.Tex.2003) (dismissing hostile work environment claim because Plaintiff failed to articulate any facts in his EEOC charge that would have put the EEOC on notice).

Here, Greenaway’s EEOC charge makes no mention of any 2012 incident involving a failure to promote due to a disability. In fact, Greenaway failed to mention or even allude to any facts in his EEOC charge that would have put the EEOC on notice about the possibility of a “failure to promote” claim resulting from an alleged disability. Consequently, Greenaway’s 2012 “failure to promote” claim cannot be deemed to fall within the scope of the investigation that reasonably could have been expected to grow out of his EEOC charge. As a result, Greenaway failed to exhaust his administrative remedies before the EEOC and is now foreclosed from pursuing his 2012 failure to promote claim premised on an alleged disability in this forum.

d. S. Johnson

S. Johnson fails to direct the court to evidence specifying the date(s) on which he was denied a promotion. Firestone notes, however, that at deposition, S. Johnson referenced an incident involving a “failure to promote” that allegedly occurred sometime before 2003. See Docket No. 62, Exhibit 2, Page 31. Additionally, in his EEOC charge, S.’ Johnson claims that he was “passed over” for a promotion “in the latter part of 2008.”

S. Johnson’s original EEOC charge was filed on December 3, 2009. Therefore, S. Johnson’s promotion denials, which occurred more than 300 days before the charge was filed, are time-barred.

e. W. Johnson

W. Johnson fails to direct the court to evidence specifying the date(s) on which he was allegedly denied a promotion. Firestone notes, however, that at deposition, W. Johnson claimed he was denied a “production foreman” promotion in 2004 or' 2005. See Docket No. 63, Exhibit 2, Page 16. In his amended EEOC charge, W. Johnson states that he was “passed over” for a promotion “in the latter part of 2008.”.

W. Johnson’s EEOC charge was filed on December 3, 2009. As a result, his claims occurred more than 300 days before the charge was filed and are thus time-barred,

f.Ruffin

Ruffin fails to direct the court to evidence specifying the date(s) on which he was denied a promotion. In his original EEOC charge, Ruffin claims that on August 6, 2009, he was “bypassed” for a B-operator promotion when two white employees with less seniority were promoted ahead of him. Ruffin also asserts that he was “passed over” for a promotion “in the latter part of 2008.”

■ Ruffin’s 2009 “failure to promote” claim is better characterized as a discriminatory demotion. At deposition, Ruffin stated that when the 3rd Crumb Unit was shut down in “August or October 2009,” he and several other workers were demoted from B-operator to C-operator positions while a less-senior white employee was permitted to continue working as a B-operator in contravention of the seniority system outlined in the CBA. See Docket No. 76, Exhibit 9, Pages 17-18. In essence, Ruf-fin argues that he should have retained the B-operator position while James Cooper (“Cooper”), who is white, should have been demoted to the C-operator position. Id. Because this incident did not involve a “promotion” per se, it will be analyzed in the subsequent secti