United States v. Ashburn (76 F. Supp. 3d 401, 2014)

MEMORANDUM & ORDER

NICHOLAS G. GARAUFIS, District Judge.

I. INTRODUCTION

This Memorandum and Order addresses Defendant Jamal Laurent’s Omnibus PreTrial Motion. (Not. of Mot. (Dkt. 171).) Laurent, along with Defendants Yassa Ashburn and Trevelle Merritt, are charged by a fourteen count indictment with numerous racketeering crimes committed in connection with their membership in the Six Tre Outlaw Gangsta Disciples Folk Nation (“Six Tre Folk Nation” or “Six Tre”), which was allegedly responsible for numerous acts of gang-related violence, including homicides, non-fatal shootings, and commercial robberies in Brooklyn and elsewhere beginning in 2007 through 2011. (Fourth Superseding Indictment (the “Indictment”) (Dkt. 237); Gov’t Mem. in Opp’n (Dkt. 180) at 1.) According to the Government, Six Tre is part of the Folk Nation, a nationwide gang founded in Chicago, Illinois in the early 1990s. (Gov’t Mem. in Opp’n at 1.) The Government alleges that Six Tre has approximately 20 to 25 identified members and has been operating in and around the Ebbets Field housing projects in the Flatbush section of Brooklyn, New York for several years. (Id.) Specifically, Defendants are charged with being directly responsible for three murders and two attempted murders, as well as several “smash-and-grab” robberies of high-end jewelry stores (id. at 3), and robberies of individuals solicited via the Craigslist website — among other crimes — between April 2008 and October 2011. (See generally Indictment.)

The Indictment, filed on December 4, 2014, charges each defendant with racketeering (Count One) and racketeering conspiracy (Count Two), on the basis of twelve predicate Racketeering Acts (“RAs”), which include, among others: conspiracy to murder members of a rival Crips gang (RA 1); the murders of Courtney Robinson on or about April 20, 2008, and Brent Duncan on or about June 19, 2010 (RAs 2, 4); the attempted murder of an individual known as John Doe # 2 on or about July 7, 2010 (RA 7); Hobbs Act robbery conspiracy targeting employees of various jewelry stores (RA 3); Hobbs Act robberies and a robbery conspiracy concerning individuals targeted through Craigslist (RAs 5, 6, 8, 9); and robbery resulting in the murder of Dasta James on or about January 28, 2011 (RA 12). (Id. ¶¶ 7-34.) In addition, these defendants are charged in Counts Three through Fourteen with various federal crimes predicated on the same or similar conduct at issue in the Racketeering Acts. Laurent, in particular, is charged with murder in-aid-of racketeering; assault with a dangerous weapon in-aid-of racketeering; and Hobbs Act robbery and robbery conspiracy. (Id. at ¶¶ 35, 39-46.)

In advance of the upcoming trial pursuant to this Indictment, Laurent has moved the court for an order: (1) suppressing historical cell-site- information and text messages obtained from two cellular telephones; (2) excluding testimonial statements made by Defendant Merritt, or in the alternative, severing his and Merritt’s trials; (3) suppressing statements made by Laurent during questioning by law enforcement while incarcerated at Rikers Island; (4) suppressing Laurent’s statements and conduct in response to attempts by law enforcement to execute DNA sample search and seizure warrants; (5) excluding mention of Laurent’s alias from the Government’s ease-in-chief and the Third Superseding Indictment; and (6) compelling the Government to provide discovery under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 16 and Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963). (See Not. of Mot. at 1; Mem. of Law in Support of Déf. Laurent’s Omnibus Pre-Trial Mots. (“Omnibus Mot.”) (Dkt. 172).) Merritt joins Laurent’s motion to sever their trials. (Oct. 2, 2014, Ltr.(Dkt. 191).) In the Memorandum and Order that follows, the court addresses each motion in turn.

II. MOTION TO SUPPRESS HISTORICAL CELL-SITE DATA

Laurent first moves to suppress certain historical mobile phone location (“cell-site”) data the Government has requested and received from cellular service providers. He argues that each request for information amounted to a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, and as a result, the Government was required to first obtain a warrant supported by a showing of probable cause. (Omnibus Mot. at 6-7.) Because it did not, Laurent maintains, the cell-site data should be suppressed. (Id. at 7.) As the Government points out, however, the historical cell-site data was obtained pursuant to court orders authorized under both state and federal law. (Gov’t Mem. in Opp’n at 10.) Thus,even if each request constituted a Fourth Amendment search requiring a warrant, which the Government disputes, the exclusionary rule does not apply because law enforcement relied in good faith on both the constitutionality of the relevant statutes as well as the authorization provided by judicial officers. (Id. at 12-13.) Since the court agrees that the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule applies, regardless of whether the requests for historical cell-site data constituted Fourth Amendment searches, Laurent’s motion to suppress is DENIED-.

A. Background

Laurent’s motion concerns historical cell-site data pertaining to two cell phone numbers. First, an officer of the West Hartford Police Department (“WHPD”) • sought and obtained this data with respect to (917) 214^1017 (the “4017 phone”) in August 2010, in connection with an investigation into a June 2010 robbery at Lux Bond & Green, a jewelry store in West Hartford, Connecticut. Second, in April 2011, federal prosecutors in the Eastern District of New York sought and obtained cell-site data regarding (347) 455-6638 (the “6638 phone”) during the course of their investigation into the murder of Dasta James in Brooklyn, New York in 'January 2011. The following circumstances were involved in each request for cell-site data, respectively.

1. The Í017 Application and Order

According to the WHPD application for cell-site data, WHPD officers initially responded to a robbery at Lux Bond & Green on June 25, 2010. (Gov’t Mem. in Opp’n, Ex. A, Application and Ex Parte Order to Disclose Telephone or Internet Records (“4017 Application and Order”) (Dkt. 180-1) at l.) Witnesses, including employees and customers, reported that two black males had smashed the display cases, grabbed jewelry, and left the store. (Id.) According to witness reports and video surveillance, two masked men entered the store, and one of them began to smash the watch display cases with a sledgehammer, while the other one removed the watches from the displays. (Id.) The two men then fled from the store, but dropped the sledgehammer (id. at 3), and were observed entering a car bearing the license plate number EYD2881. (Id.) WHPD Officer Mark Puglielli, who was investigating the robbery, subsequently learned that a 1998 Nissan Maxima bearing that license plate had been reported to the New York Police Department (“NYPD”) in Brooklyn, New York as having been stolen. (Id.) On June 28, 2010, the NYPD located the vehicle, which had been towed and impounded at a lot in Brooklyn alter having accumulated two parking tickets. (Id.) During a search of the vehicle, to which the owners consented, WHPD officers recovered a small piece of white paper bearing the telephone number (917) 214^1017, which they determined was registered to cellular service provider T-Mobile. (Id. at 4-5, 6.) The owners of the vehicle confirmed that the piece of paper did not belong to them and had not been in the vehicle before it was stolen. (Id. at 4.)

Officer Puglielli subsequently learned that the NYPD and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”) had been investigating a group of males in Brooklyn who were thought to be responsible for a series of jewelry store robberies similar to the one that took place at Lux Bond & Green on June 25, 2010. (Id.) These other robberies had taken place between May 2009 and August 2010 at jewelry stores that were located in New York, New Jersey, and Connecticut, and that sold high priced watches, including those manufactured by Patek Philippe. (Id.) One such theft took place on August 18, 2010, when three individuals robbed a jewelry store in Manhattan. (Id.) The suspects drove to the store in a stolen Nissan Maxima, used a sledgehammer to smash a glass window of the store, and stole an “undetermined amount of antique watches.” (Id.) One of the three suspects was apprehended and arrested by the NYPD later that day. (Id.) After receiving Miranda warnings, the suspect waived his rights and agreed to speak with law enforcement officers without the presence of counsel. (Id. at 5.) The suspect told officers, among other things, that the group had been responsible for these robberies and that they typically used another car to “take possession of the stolen jewelry and run interference if the police became involved.” (Id.) The suspect also explained that he had been recruited by another individual, whose nickname and telephone numbers the suspect provided. (Id.)

Based on this information, along with other details, Officer Puglielli filed an application for an ex parte court order pursuant to section 54-47aa of the General Statutes of Connecticut, seeking subscriber information, call logs, and cell-site data from the 4017 phone for the period from June 1, 2010 to August 18, 2010. • (Id. at 6.) On the application, Officer Puglielli indicated that he believed the foregoing constituted evidence that “a particular person participated or may have been knowing in the commission of the offense[s]” of first degree robbery and larceny. (Id.) On August 30, 2010, Connecticut Superior Court Judge Miaño granted the application, thereby finding that, “[t]he foregoing reasonable and articulable suspicion or exigent circumstances having been presented to and considered by the undersigned ... the undersigned (a) is satisfied therefrom that grounds exist for said application and (b) finds that said affidavit established grounds for the undersigned to issue [the ex parte] order.” (Id. at 1, 2.) Pursuant to the order, Judge Miaño required T-Mobile to provide “basic subscriber information” and “call-identifying information,” which included “dialing or signaling information that identifies the origin, direction, destination or termination of each communication generated or received by a subscriber or customer” for the 4017 phone as well as for two phone numbers provided by the suspect on August 18, 2010. (Id. at 1.) According to the Government, T-Mobile only provided this information for the period from June 24, 2010, to July 8, 2010. (Gov’t Mem. in Opp’n at 7.) T-Mobile did indicate, however, that the subscriber associated with the 4017 account was Peter Laurent, Defendant Jamal Laurent’s father. (Omnibus Mot., Ex. A (Dkt. 172 — 1) at 2.) Ultimately, Jamal Laurent was charged in connection with these robberies in Racketeering Act 3 of Count One (racketeering) and Count Eight (Hobbs Act robbery conspiracy) of the Indictment. (See Indictment ¶¶ 11, 44.)

2. The 6638 Application and Order

Whereas T-Mobile provided the 4017 phone records to the WHPD in response to a Connecticut state court order under section 54-47aa, the 6638 phone records were obtained by the federal government pursuant to section 2703 of the Stored Communications Act (“SCA”), 18 U.S.C. § 2703, in connection with an investigation conducted by the United States Attorney’s Office for the Eastern District of New York in April 2011. At that time, the FBI was investigating a murder that took place on January 28, 2011, at 47 McKeever Place, in Brooklyn, New York. The victim, who was later determined to be Dasta James, had been shot twice, once in the back of his head and once in his shoulder. (Gov’t Mem. in Opp’n at 7; id., Ex. B (“6638 Application and Order”) (Dkt. 180-2) at 3.) At the time of his death, James was found to be in possession of marijuana and approximately $1,960 in cash. (6638 Application and Order at 3.) Just over two months later, law enforcement officers interviewed a suspect — who was later identified as Defendant Trevelle Merritt — regarding his involvement in the James murder. (Gov’t Mem. in Opp’n at 7.) On April 6, 2011, Merritt told the officers that on January 28, he conspired with Laurent to rob James, who was a marijuana dealer. (6638 Application and Order at 3.) Merritt explained that after he called James to arrange a purchase of marijuana, Merritt and Laurent met James at 47 McKeever Place. (Id.) After Merritt purchased the marijuana from James, Laurent “pulled out a gun and demanded that the victim give Laurent everything he had.” (Id. at 3-4.) When James refused, Merritt stated, Laurent shot at James several times. (Id. at 4.)

In the application for cell-site data, Assistant United States Attorney (“AUSA”) Zainab Ahmad explained that Laurent used the 6638 phone in furtherance of the murder of Dasta James on January 28, 2011. (Id. at 2.) According to AUSA Ahmad’s application, Merritt gave James’s phone number to Laurent, who called James in Merritt’s presence. (Id. at 4.) Merritt also stated that Laurent was using the 6638 phone at the time. (Id.) The application further indicated that toll records from the 6638 phone showed that Laurent called Merritt several times on January 28, 2011. (Id.) These records also showed that while Laurent called James five times between 4:48 p.m. and 4:57 p.m. on the date of the murder, there were no calls between Laurent and James before 4:48 p.m. or after 4:57 p.m. that day. (Id.) Lastly, the Government submitted that according to the subscriber records, the 6638 phone was registered to Peter Laurent, Jamal Laurent’s father. (Id.) Moreover, on or about December 3, 2010, law enforcement officials interviewed Peter Laurent about another phone registered in his name but believed to be used by Jamal Laurent. (Id.) During that interview, Peter Laurent confirmed that Jamal Laurent was his son and that he typically provided Jamal Laurent with cell phones, adding that Jamal Laurent “switched cell phone numbers often.” (Id. at 4-5.)

On this basis, the Government filed an application pursuant to the SCA, 18 U.S.C. § 2703(c) and (d), seeking historical cell-site information regarding the 6638 phone for the period from January 28, 2011, to 11 a.m. on the date the application was made, April 19, 2011. (Id. at 1, 6.) In support of the application, AUSA Ahmad submitted that the Government had offered “specific and articulable facts showing that there [were] reasonable grounds to believe the information sought [was] relevant and material to an ongoing criminal investigation.” (Id. at 3.) Magistrate Judge Viktor V. Po-horelsky granted the Government’s application that same day, finding that the Government had in fact “offered specific and articulable facts showing that there [were] reasonable grounds to believe that the historical cell-site information [was] relevant and material to an ongoing criminal investigation into possible violations of federal criminal laws, including racketeering, murder, robbery and conspiracy offenses in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 924(j), 1951(a), 1959, 1962(c) and 1962(d).” (Id. at 8.) According to the Government, while Magistrate Judge Pohorelsky ordered the cellular service provider — Metro PCS (id. at 7) — to produce historical cell-site data for the entire period requested, Metro PCS only provided this data for January 28, 2011. (Gov’t Mem. in Opp’n at 9.) Nevertheless, the Government eventually charged all three defendants with racketeering conspiracy in Count Two of the Indictment, which requires the Government to prove that each defendant, including Laurent, agreed that he or a co-eon-spirator would commit at least two acts of racketeering in the conduct of the affairs of the enterprise. (See Indictment ¶ 34.) Especially since the Government has indicated that it will introduce the cell-site evidence at trial (see, e.g., Gov’t Mem. in Opp’n at 24), one such act could be the attempted robbery and murder of Dasta James. (Id. at 21.)

B. Legal Standard

Laurent contends that the Government obtained this historical cell-site data in violation of the Fourth Amendment. (Omnibus Mot. at 2.) The Fourth Amendment guarantees that “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.” U.S. Const. amend. IV. “A search conducted without a warrant is ‘per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment — subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions.’” United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, 566 (D.C.Cir.2010) (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357, 88 S.Ct. 507, 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967)), aff'd in part sub nom. United States v. Jones, — U.S. —, 132 S.Ct. 945, 181 L.Ed.2d 911 (2012). Thus, if obtaining the records sought by the Government here constitutes a search as defined by the Fourth Amendment, it is presumed that the Government must, at a minimum, obtain a warrant supported by a showing of probable cause. In re Application of United States for an Order Authorizing the Release of Historical Cell-Site Info. (“Historic Cell-Site Info ”), 809 F.Supp.2d 113, 116 (E.D.N.Y.2011).

In this context, the SCA provides a federal statutory framework for obtaining historical data from cellular service providers. Pursuant to § 2703, “[a] governmental entity may require a provider of electronic communication service or remote computing service to disclose a record or other information pertaining to a subscriber to or customer of such service ... only when the governmental entity ... obtains a court order for such disclosure under subsection (d) of this section.” 18 U.S.C. § 2703(c)(1)(B). Such an order “shall issue only if the governmental entity offers specific and articulable facts showing that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the contents of a wire or electronic communication, or the records or other information sought, are relevant and material to an ongoing criminal investigation.” Id. § 2703(d). This showing, however, is lower than the probable cause standard required for a search warrant. United States v. Herron, 2 F.Supp.3d 391, 401 (E.D.N.Y.2014).

As Laurent points out, this court has previously found that a request for prolonged historical cell-site records pursuant to § 2703 constitutes a search for the purpose of the Fourth Amendment, thus requiring the issuance of a warrant upon a showing of probable cause. See Historical Cell-Site Info, 809 F.Supp.2d at 116. In Historical Cell-Site Info, the court explained that in determining whether governmental action constituted a Fourth Amendment search, two factors control: whether “(1) the individual has ‘manifested a subjective expectation of privacy’ in the thing searched; and (2) ‘society is willing to recognize that expectation as. reasonable.’” Id. (quoting Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 33, 121 S.Ct. 2038, 150 L.Ed.2d 94 (2001)). Recounting the Supreme Court’s decisions in United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 103 S.Ct. 1081, 75 L.Ed.2d 55 (1983), and United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 104 S.Ct. 3296, 82 L.Ed.2d 530 (1984), this court explained that the two cases together stood for the proposition that “the Government’s obtaining of some electronically collected location information constitutes a search under the Fourth Amendment depending on the location (Karo) and, potentially, quantity (Knotts) of that information.” Historical Cell-Site Info, 809 F.Supp.2d at 117.

This court then looked to the reasoning in Maynard, 615 F.3d at 555. There, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held that prolonged electronic surveillance of an individual’s location — via the attachment of a GPS tracking device to a vehicle — constituted a Fourth Amendment search. Id. In Maynard, however, the Government’s warrantless surveillance had continued for four weeks. Id. By contrast, in Historical Cell-Site Info, the Government had obtained at least 113 days of cumulative cell-site location records. 809 F.Supp.2d at 118. Based on “Maynard’s persuasive reasoning,” the- court found that the cell-site location records sought captured “enough of the user’s location information for a long enough time period ... to depict a sufficiently detailed and intimate picture of his movements to trigger the same constitutional concerns as the GPS data in Maynard.” Id. at 119. On this basis, the court concluded that “cell-phone users maintain a reasonable expectation of privacy in long-term cell-site location records,” and therefore, that the Government’s obtaining 113 days of cumulative cell-site location records from the target’s cell phone — though obtained pursuant to a court order under § 2703— constituted a Fourth Amendment search. Id. at 119-20, 127.

C. Discussion

Laurent argues that here, as in Maynard and Historical Cell-Site Info, the Government’s collection of cell-site location data from both the 4017 and 6638 phones for an extended period of time constituted a warrantless search in violation of the Fourth Amendment, and that as a result, this evidence should be suppressed at trial. (Omnibus Mot. at 7.)

1. Standing

As the proponent of a motion to suppress, a defendant bears the burden of establishing that he has “standing” to challenge the search or seizure. Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 130 n. 1, 99 S.Ct. 421, 58 L.Ed.2d 387 (1978). To establish Fourth Amendment standing, the defendant must demonstrate a subjective expectation of privacy in the invaded area or object that “society is prepared to recognize as reasonable.” Id. at 143 n. 12. Moreover, “[ljegitimation of expectations of privacy by law must have a source outside of the Fourth Amendment, either by reference to concepts of real or personal property law or to understandings that are recognized and permitted by society.” Id.

As Laurent himself points out, T-Mobile has advised that Peter Laurent, Defendant’s father, is the customer associated with the 4017 phone (Omnibus Mot. at 3), and Metro PCS has disclosed that Peter Laurent was the subscriber for the 6638 phone as well (id. at 4). Moreover, Jamal Laurent told Connecticut law enforcement officers in December 2010 that “his own cell phone number was (646) 400-7110,” an account for which phone records have not been subpoenaed or produced. (Id. at 3 n. 4.) Nevertheless, he points out that according to the Government’s application with respect to the 6638 phone, Peter Laurent stated in an interview that “although the phone was registered to him, he typically provided his son ... with cell phones.” (Id. at 4 n. 6.) Consequently, Jamal Laurent asserts that “there is no question that [he] has standing to move to suppress the records” for both the 4017 and 6638 phones. (Id.) In further support of his argument, Laurent explains that an investigating case agent testified at his bail hearing in a different case, United States v. Laurent, No. 11-CR-322 (JBW) (E.D.N.Y.), that the Government was aware that Peter Laurent provided cell phones to his son, Jamal. (Omnibus Mot. at 4 n. 6; see also Bail Hr’g Tr. at 32, Laurent, No. 11-CR-322, ECF No. 12.) The Government itself has stated as much. (Gov’t Menu in Opp’n at 9.)

Nevertheless, this court has previously noted that case law in the Second Circuit is “sparse” on the question of whether a defendant who used a cell phone subscribed to another person has standing to move to suppress information gathered from that phone. See Herron, 2 F.Supp.3d at 400. In Herron, the court noted that this situation may be analogized to cases involving storage lockers, hotel rooms, and mail packages. Id. Such cases establish that “[o]ne need not be the owner of the property for his privacy interest to be one that the Fourth Amendment protects, so long as he has the right to exclude others from dealing with the property.” United States v. Perea, 986 F.2d 633, 639-40 (2d Cir.1993) (citing Rakas, 439 U.S. at 144 n. 12, 99 S.Ct. 421).

For example, one who, with permission of the owner, is in possession of and control over a residence that is not his own home, and who can exclude others from it, can have a legally sufficient privacy interest to establish Fourth Amendment standing to challenge a search of such premises. Id. Similarly, a person who possesses personal property belonging to another and who has the right to exclude third persons from possession of that property has an interest that is similarly protected. United States v. Ochs, 595 F.2d 1247, 1253 (2d Cir.1979) (defendant had Fourth Amendment standing to object to search of car where car owner allowed defendant to use it whenever he wished and defendant could exclude others from it); see also United States v. Finley, 477 F.3d 250, 259 (5th Cir.2007) (defendant had standing to challenge retrieval of call records and text messages from cell phone issued by his employer — his uncle’s business; although defendant could have expected employer to read his messages, employer permitted personal use and thus defendant reasonably expected to be free from intrusion by the government and the general public). This court need not decide, however, whether Laurent in fact had a sufficient privacy interest in his father’s cell phones to have standing to object to the introduction of historical cell-site data, for the reasons that follow.

2. Fourth Amendment Search

Even if Laurent has a legally sufficient privacy interest in his father’s cell phones, the next issue is whether the Government’s actions constituted a Fourth Amendment search subject to the warrant and probable cause requirement. . Laurent argues that here, just as in Historical Cell-Site Info, the Government’s request for historical cell-site records constituted such a search. (Omnibus Mot. at 7.) The Government, however, has challenged the continuing validity of this court’s decision in that case. {See generally Gov’t Mem. in Opp’n at 16-19.)

Following this court’s decision in Historical Cell-Site Info, the Supreme Court affirmed Maynard, although on different grounds. Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, found that the attachment of a GPS device to a vehicle amounted to a search by virtue of the government’s physical trespass of private property. Jones, 132 S.Ct. at 949. In a concurrence joined by Justices Ginsberg, Breyer, and Kagan, however, Justice Alito stated that the Fourth Amendment inquiry in Katz provided the proper analytic lens, which was “whether respondent’s reasonable expectations of privacy were violated by the long-term monitoring of the movements of the vehicle he drove.” Id. at 960. Applying this framework, Justice Alito found that while short-term monitoring of a person’s movements was not a search, extended surveillance surely became a search by the time it crossed the four-week mark. Id. at 963. Justice Sotomayor agreed that the question was whether the Government had violated the target’s reasonable expectation of privacy. But in a separate concurring opinion, she addressed the issue of whether advances in technology might require the Court to revisit the third-party disclosure doctrine, noting that “it may be necessary to reconsider the premise that an individual has no reasonable expectation of privacy in information voluntarily disclosed to third parties.” Id. at 957.

On this basis, Laurent concludes that this court’s decision in Historical Cell-Site Info is firmly supported by a majority of the Supreme Court, and that as a result, the court should conclude here that the Government violated Laurent’s reasonable expectation of privacy by obtaining his cell-site data pursuant to § 2703. (Def. Reply Mem. at 7-8.) In response, the Government cautions the court against deciding this motion based on the anticipated evolution of Supreme Court decisions. (Gov’t Mem. in Opp’n at 19 (citing Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 237, 117 S.Ct. 1997, 138 L.Ed.2d 391 (1997) (holding that where more recent Supreme Court cases appear to overrule earlier precedent by implication, district courts should not act accordingly “unless and until this Court reinterpreted the binding precedent”)).) Nevertheless, the Government suggests that Jones requires this court to reconsider its prior decision in Historical Cell-Site Info. (Id. at 17-19 (“Although the majority decided the case on the ground that the government’s conduct involved a physical trespass to property, the two concurring opinions suggest that at least five Justices may be inclined to view reliance on the SCA as constitutional.”).) Even if the court declines to do so, the Government further argues that this case can be distinguished on its facts, which “do not implicate the Court’s concern regarding long-term cell-site-location records.” (Id. at 19 n. 11.) As support, the Government points to that fact that while this court previously held in Historical Cell-Site Info that obtaining 113 days of cell-site records “was tantamount to the prolonged, constant surveillance discussed in Maynard >” here, it obtained only fourteen days of cell-site records with respect to the 4017 phone, and just one day of cell-site records with respect to the 6638 phone. (Id. (citing Historical Cell-Site Info, 809 F.Supp.2d at 118-20).)

In Maynard, which the Supreme Court affirmed on different grounds, the D.C. Circuit held that constant GPS surveillance of a suspect for four weeks constituted a Fourth Amendment search. Maynard, 615 F.3d at 555. Although it drew heavily from Maynard in finding that the collection of 113 days of location records violated individuals’ reasonable expectations of privacy, in Historical Cell-Site Info this court did not establish a lower threshold for when government tracking becomes “cumulative” and therefore a search under the Fourth Amendment. See Historical Cell-Site Info, 809 F.Supp.2d at 127. Nor is it necessary to do so here. See infra Part II.C.3. Because the admissibility of historical cell-site records in this case can be decided based on the basis of the good faith exception, the court declines the invitation to either reconsider' or distinguish its prior decision.

3. Good Faith Exception

As the Supreme Court has explained, “[t]he fact that a Fourth Amendment violation occurred ... does not necessarily mean that the exclusionary rule applies.” Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 140, 129 S.Ct. 695, 172 L.Ed.2d 496 (2009). In fact, evidence is only suppressed “if it can be said that the law enforcement officer had knowledge, or may properly be charged with knowledge, that the search was unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment.” United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 919, 104 S.Ct. 3405, 82 L.Ed.2d 677 (1984) (quoting United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531, 542, 95 S.Ct. 2313, 45 L.Ed.2d 374 (1975)) (internal quotation marks omitted). First, under this so-called good faith exception, evidence seized pursuant to a warrant for which actual probable cause does not exist, or which is technically deficient, is nevertheless admissible if the executing officers relied on the warrant in “objective good faith.” Id. at 923, 104 S.Ct. 3405. Second, even in the absence of a judicially obtained warrant, the good faith exception applies to evidence obtained by police acting in objectively reasonable reliance upon a statute that is subsequently found to violate the Fourth Amendment. See Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340, 350, 107 S.Ct. 1160, 94 L.Ed.2d 364 (1987) (“Unless a statute is clearly unconstitutional, an officer cannot be expected to question the judgment of the legislature that passed the law.”); see also Davis v. United States, — U.S. -, 131 S.Ct. 2419, 2429, 180 L.Ed.2d 285 (2011) (“[Penalizing the officer for the legislature’s error ... cannot logically contribute to the deterrence of Fourth Amendment violations.” (quoting Krull, 480 U.S. at 350, 107 S.Ct. 1160) (internal quotation marks omitted)). And most recently, in Davis, the Supreme Court extended the holding in Krull to an officer’s objectively reasonable reliance on binding appellate precedent. Davis, 131 S.Ct. at 2429.

Laurent argues that the good faith exception should not apply to the Government’s conduct in this case. (Omnibus Mot. at 20.) In support, Laurent points out that before the Government applied for historical cell-site data with respect to the 6638 phone, Eastern District of New York Magistrate Judge James Orenstein had issued two decisions rejecting similar applications under § 2703(d) on the basis of the targets’ Fourth Amendment right to privacy. See In re Application of United States for an Order Authorizing the Release of Historical Cell-Site Info. (“In re Application of United States”), 736 F.Supp.2d 578 (E.D.N.Y.2010), rev’d, No. 10-MC-550 (RRM) (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 29, 2010) (Order), ECF No. 11; In re Application of United States for an Order Authorizing the Release of Historical Cell-Site Info., No. 10-MC-897 (JO), 2010 WL 5437209 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 23, 2010). In addition, Laurent notes that the D.C. Circuit and the Southern District of Texas had also held that individuals have a reasonable expectation of privacy in historical cell-site data. See Maynard, 615 F.3d 544; In re Application of United States for Historical Cell Site Data, 747 F.Supp.2d 827 (S.D.Tex.2010), vacated, 724 F.3d 600 (5th Cir.2013). According to Laurent, this put the Government “on notice” that changing technology was shifting the Fourth Amendment analysis. As a result, he argues, “[t]here is no question here that the Government knew that their reliance on less than probable cause to obtain historical cell site [data] was definitely questionable.” (Omnibus Mot. at 20.)

This is not enough to render the Government’s reliance on court orders issued under the SCA and section 54-47aa objectively unreasonable. Laurent does not argue that either statute was “clearly unconstitutional,” or that Congress or the Connecticut legislature “wholly abandoned [their] responsibility to enact constitutional laws.” Krull, 480 U.S. at 355, 107 S.Ct. 1160. Nor does Laurent argue that law enforcement officials were not entitled to rely on the validity of the judicial authorizations. In Leon, the Supreme Court held that notwithstanding the good faith exception, the government’s reliance on a court order is not reasonable where: (1) the magistrate “wholly abandoned his judicial role,” (2) the magistrate was misled by the government’s dishonesty or recklessness in preparing its application; or (3) the authorization was “so facially deficient” that the executing officers could not reasonably presume it to be valid. Leon, 468 U.S. at 923, 104 S.Ct. 3405. Laurent does not argue, however, that the judges who issued the authorization orders were misled by false information, that they wholly abandoned their detached and neutral roles, or that the authorization orders were “so facially deficient” that the government could not reasonably presume them to be valid. See id.; see also United States v. Suarez-Blanca, No. 07-CR-23 (MHS) (AJB), 2008 WL 4200156, at *12-13 (N.D.Ga. Apr. 21, 2008) (report and recommendation) (applying Leon to § 2703(d) order for cell-site records). Instead, citing Magistrate Judge Orenstein’s August and December 2010 orders, Laurent maintains only that “there was precedent within this very district court” for the proposition that a warrant supported by probable cause was necessary to obtain historical cell-site records. (Omnibus Mot. at 19.) These two decisions, however, are insufficient to render either authorization order “clearly unconstitutional” and thus objectively unreasonable at the time it was issued. See Krull, 480 U.S. at 355, 107 S.Ct. 1160.

a. The SCA and the 6638 Phone Records

With respect to the 6638 records, at the time of the authorization order, the only court of appeals to address the constitutionality of the SCA had concluded that it complied with Fourth Amendment. See In re Application of United States for an Order Directing a Provider of Elec. Commc’n Serv. to Disclose Records to the Gov’t, 620 F.3d 304 (3d Cir.2010). The Second Circuit, for its part, had not rendered a decision on this issue. Nevertheless, at the time of the order in April 2011, most federal courts had concluded that defendants have no reasonable expectation of privacy in historical cell-site data. See, e.g., United States v. Jones, 908 F.Supp.2d 203, 211-12 (D.D.C.2012) (citing cases). It is .therefore no surprise that magistrate and district judges in this district regularly authorized § 2703(d) orders at the time AUSA Ahmad made her application. In fact, even this court had previously approved applications for historical cell-site data under § 2703(d), before its decision in August 2011 (which was over four months after the 6638 Application). See Historical Cell-Site Info, 809 F.Supp.2d at 114 (citing In re Application of United States for an Order Authorizing the Use of Two Pen Register and Trap and Trace Devices, 632 F.Supp.2d 202 (E.D.N.Y.2008)).

Moreover, as the Government points out, Magistrate Judge Orenstein’s August 2010 order was actually reversed by District Judge Roslynn R. Mauskopf in November 2010 — before the Government’s application was made in this case. See Order, In re Application of United States, No. 10-MC-550 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 29, 2010), ECF No. 11. Thus, at the time Magistrate Judge Pohorelsky issued his order, it was objectively reasonable for prosecutors to have relied upon § 2703 to obtain historical cell-site data based on an application alleging only “specific and articulable facts.” 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d). While a few district courts may have just begun to challenge the constitutionality of the SCA in this context, it cannot be said that the Government had knowledge that this search was unconstitutional when it was approved by Magistrate Judge Pohorelsky in April 2011, and where similar requests had been routinely granted by judges in this district and elsewhere. Therefore, because the Government is entitled to the good faith exception, the court will not apply the exclusionary rule to the 6638 phone records obtained pursuant to the § 2703 order. See Davis, 131 S.Ct. at 2429 (“[T]he harsh sanction of exclusion ‘should not be applied to deter objectively reasonable law enforcement activity.’” (quoting Leon, 468 U.S. at 919, 104 S.Ct. 3405)).

b. Section 5k~U7aa and the 1017 Phone Records

Significantly, Laurent has not set forth any argument with respect to the constitutionality of the order authorizing the WHPD to obtain cell-site records for the 4017 phone. Nor has- the court been able to identify any Connecticut or federal court decision holding that section 54-47aa violates the Fourth Amendment in the context of a request for historical cell-site data. Cf. O’Meara v. Terra, No. 10-CV-1424 (MRK), 2012 WL 1575435, at *3-4 (D.Conn. May 3, 2012) (finding, in § 1983 action, that officer’s acquisition of internet subscription information pursuant to a section 54-47aa court order was “neither unlawful nor unreasonable” under the Fourth Amendment).. In addition, the Government argues that Officer Puglielli’s reliance on section 54-47aa was objectively reasonable because the statute requires law enforcement officials to meet a more stringent standard than the SCA requires. (Gov’t Mem. in Opp’n at 12.) The SCA requires “specific and articulable facts showing that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the contents of a wire or electronic communication, or the records or other information sought, are relevant and material to an ongoing criminal investigation.” 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d). By contrast, under section 54-47aa, an officer must provide “a reasonable and articulable suspicion that a crime has been or is being committed or that exigent circumstances exist and such call-identifying or basic subscriber information is relevant and material to an ongoing criminal investigation.” Conn. Gen.Stat. Ann. § 54-47aa(b) (amended 2011). Regardless of whether the Government’s assessment of the two standards is correct, however, at the time Judge Miaño issued the order in August 2010, section 54-47aa was neither “clearly (unconstitutional” nor such an abdication of the legislature’s constitutional responsibility that the officer’s reliance on the statute and the subsequent authorization order was objectively unreasonable. See Krull, 480 U.S. at 350, 107 S.Ct. 1160. Laurent has also failed to show that Judge Miaño was misled in any way or wholly abandoned his judicial role in issuing the authorizing order. See Leon, 468 U.S. at 923, 104 S.Ct. 3405.

Thus, both Connecticut and federal law enforcement officials, viewed objectively, acted reasonably in relying on judicially authorized search orders pursuant to the SCA and section 54-47aa. As a result, the applications for and collection of historical cell-site records with respect to both 6638 and 4017 phones were completed in good faith. Accordingly, Laurent’s Motion to Suppress is DENIED.

III. MOTION TO EXCLUDE MERRITT’S STATEMENTS

Laurent has also moved to exclude statements made by Defendant Trevelle Merritt to law enforcement officials regarding the murder of Dasta James. (Omnibus Mot. at 25.) Laurent argues that unless Merritt testifies at trial, these statements must be excluded pursuant to Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 124 S.Ct. 1354, 158 L.Ed.2d 177 (2004), because they implicate Laurent in James’s murder and .their introduction would therefore violate his right under the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment. (Omnibus Mot. at 25.) In response, the Government submits that exclusion is not warranted because: (1) the Merritt statements will be introduced at trial without any specific reference to Laurent, in accordance with Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 88 S.Ct. 1620, 20 L.Ed.2d 476 (1968), and its progeny; and (2) the Government will request that the court instruct the jury not to consider the Merritt statements as evidence against Laurent or Ashburn. (Gov’t Mem. in Opp’n at 20.) For the reasons that follow, Laurent’s motion to exclude is DENIED.

A. Background

According to the Government, on or about January'28, 2011, Defendants Merritt and Laurent conspired to rob Dasta James, who was selling marijuana at an apartment building in Brooklyn. (Gov’t Mem. in Opp’n at 20.) In his statements to law enforcement officers, Merritt said that he initially called James to purchase marijuana that evening. (Omnibus Mot. at 23.) Merritt said that he then met Laurent at the Ebbets Field housing projects, where he told Laurent he was planning to purchase marijuana before heading to downtown Brooklyn. (Id.) When Laurent asked Merritt who he was purchasing marijuana from, Merritt identified James, and Laurent asked Merritt for James’s cell phone number. (Id.) Laurent then called James, but Merritt was unsure if Laurent and James spoke. (Id.) According to Merritt’s statements, before Laurent and Merritt met James, Laurent told Merritt that he was going to rob James, but that Merritt should buy the marijuana and do nothing else. (Id. at 24.) Merritt and Laurent then met James on the 16th floor of 47 McKeever Place, where Merritt purchased marijuana from James. (Id.) Merritt told law enforcement that he then told James “he had to take a piss,” and walked to the building stairwell to urinate. (Id.)

Merritt claims that while he was in the stairwell he heard Laurent and James arguing, and when he returned to the hallway, Merritt saw Laurent and James wrestling and throwing punches at each other. (Id.) Merritt told law enforcement officers that during this fight, he saw Laurent pull out a silver, long-barreled handgun and shoot James once “in the torso or upper body area.” (Id.) Merritt then saw James fall to the ground, at which point Merritt ran down the stairwell to the lobby. (Id.) Merritt told law enforcement that while he was running down the stairs, he heard approximately five or six shots, and then ran through the lobby, into the garage and back to his apartment. (Id.) According to the Government, however, Merritt and Laurent fled through the building together and then split up once they were outside. (Gov’t Mem. in Opp’n at 20-21; see also id., Ex. C, Proposed Amendments to Statements by Trevelle Merritt (“Proposed Redacted Statements”) (Dkt. 180-3) at 2.) In support, the Government has provided defense counsel with surveillance video of the garage, “which shows two males leaving the apartment building just after the time of the homicide.” (Omnibus Mot. at 24.) The Government also indicates that James was shot twice, once in the left shoulder and once in the back of his head, and that James died as a result of his injuries. (Gov’t Mem. in Opp’n at 20-21.)

On April 6, 2011, Merritt was arrested and interviewed by NYPD detectives regarding James’s murder. (Id. at 21.) Over the next several days, Merritt made five separate statements to law enforcement officials: (1) an oral statement to an NYPD detective at 9:15 p.m. on April 6; (2) a handwritten statement, signed at 11:15 p.m. that same night; (3) another handwritten statement, signed at 12:45 a.m. on April 7; (4) an oral statement to a Kings County Assistant District Attorney at 1:19 PM on April 7; and (5) an oral statement to FBI agents on April 11. (Id. at 22.) Merritt was ultimately charged in connection with James’s murder in Racketeering Act 12 of Counts One and Two of the Indictment, as well as in Count Eleven (Hobbs Act robbery conspiracy), Count Twelve (attempted Hobbs Act robbery), Count Thirteen (unlawful use of a firearm), and Count Fourteen (causing death through use of a firearm). (Indictment ¶¶ 28-31, 47-50.)

At trial, the Government “anticipates offering to admit some or all of Merritt’s statements,” by eliciting testimony from the interviewing detectives and agents. (Gov’t Mem. in Opp’n at 22.) As Laurent concedes, he is not named in the charges specifically related to these crimes. (See Omnibus Mot. at 26.) Nevertheless, all three defendants are charged with racketeering conspiracy in Count Two, which will require the Government to prove that each defendant, including Laurent, agreed that he or a co-conspirator would commit at least two acts of racketeering in the conduct of the affairs of the enterprise. (See Indictment ¶ 34.) As the Government admits, one such act could be the attempted robbery and murder of Dasta James. (Gov’t Mem. in Opp’n at 21.)

B. Legal Standard

“The crux of [the Confrontation Clause] is that the government cannot introduce at trial statements containing accusations against the defendant unless the accuser takes the stand against the defendant and is available for cross examination.” United States v. Taylor, 745 F.3d 15, 28 (2d Cir.2014) (quoting United States v. Jass, 569 F.3d 47, 55 (2d Cir.2009)) (internal quotation marks omitted). As a result, “[w]hen the confession of one defendant implicates his co-defendants, Bruton demands a redaction and substitution adequate to remove the overwhelming probability that a jury will not follow a limiting instruction that precludes its consideration of a redacted confession against a defendant other than the declarant.” Id. (quoting Jass, 569 F.3d at 60) (emphasis added) • (internal quotation marks omitted). Where “the confession is redacted to eliminate not only the defendant’s name, but any reference to his or her existence,” however, “the Confrontation Clause is not violated by the admission of a nontestify-ing codefendant’s confession with a proper limiting instruction.” Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200, 211, 107 S.Ct. 1702, 95 L.Ed.2d 176 (1987). Thus, redactions or substitutions are consistent with Bruton “if the altered statement uses words ‘that might actually have been said by a person admitting his own culpability in the charged conspiracy while .shielding the specific identity of his confederate.’” Taylor, 745 F.3d at 28 (quoting Jass, 569 F.3d at 62); see also United States v. Tutino, 883 F.2d 1125, 1135 (2d Cir.1989) (upholding redacted statement where “the jury ‘ never knew that [the declarant’s] original statement named names”). For example, the Second Circuit has previously allowed proper names to be replaced , by “another person,” Jass, 569 F.3d at 59; “my neighbor,” United States v. Yousef, 327 F.3d 56, 149 (2d Cir.2003); “he,” United States v. Kyles, 40 F.3d 519, 526 (2d Cir.1994); “this guy,” “another guy,” and “similar language,” United States v. Williams, 936 F.2d 698, 699, 701 (2d Cir.1991); “friend,” United States v. Benitez, 920 F.2d 1080, 1087 (2d Cir.1990); and “others,” “other people,” and “another person,” Tutino, 883 F.2d at 1135.

Conversely, redacted confessions “that simply replace a name with ... obvious indications of alteration” violate Bru-ton because they “refer[] directly to the ‘existence’ of the noneonfessing defendant.” Jass, 569 F.3d at 58 (quoting Gray v. Maryland, 523 U.S. 185, 192, 118 S.Ct. 1151, 140 L.Ed.2d 294 (1998)). Moreover, a neutral-word substitution can be “so conspicuously awkward,” that the alteration becomes obvious. Taylor, 745 F.3d at 29 (citing Jass, 569 F.3d at 61). For example, in Taylor, the Second Circuit found that modified statements containing otherwise neutral redactions nonetheless suggested that the original statements contained actual names. Id. (“Once it becomes obvious that names have been pruned from the text, the choice of implied identity is narrow”). There, the court held that where the redacted statements (1) included one co-conspirator’s actual name alongside references to additional, unnamed co-conspirators (e.g., “Luana Miller and two other individuals”), and (2) required wording that suffered from “stilted circumlocutions,” (e.g., “[t]he robbery was the idea of the person who waited with Luana Miller and [the declarant] at the gas station”), the result was so “unnatural, suggestive, and conspicuous as to offend Bruton, Gray, and Jass.” Id. at 29, 30 (“The jury could immediately infer, on the evidence of the redacted confession alone, that [the declar-ant] had likely named the codefendants.”).

Ultimately, as the Second Circuit explained in Tutino, and confirmed in Jass, “a Bruton challenge to a redacted confession [is] properly analyzed by reference to two questions: (1) did the redacted statement give any ‘indication to the jury that the original statement contained actual names,’ and (2) did the ‘statement standing alone ... otherwise connect co-defendants to the crimes.’” Jass, 569 F.3d at 58 (emphasis added) (quoting Tutino, 883 F.2d at 1135). In other words:

The critical inquiry is ... not whether a jury might infer from other facts (whether evidence admitted at trial or circumstances such as the number of defendants on trial) that a declarant’s neutral allusion to a confederate might have referenced the defendant. It is whether the neutral allusion sufficiently conceals the fact of explicit identification to eliminate the overwhelming probability that a jury hearing the confession at a joint trial will not be able to follow an appropriate limiting instruction.

Id. at 61. Accordingly, these cases “do not construe the Confrontation Clause to demand further that a confession be redacted so as to permit no incriminating inference against the non-declarant defendant. To the contrary, the law assumes that even a redacted statement will prejudice a defendant if it is considered against him.” Id. at 60-61 (emphasis in original). While “the line between testimony that falls within Bruton’s scope and that which does not is often difficult to discern,” United States v. Lung Fong Chen, 393 F.3d 139, 149 (2d Cir.2004), the court is persuaded that with two slight modifications, the Government’s proposed substitutions in this case are sufficient to overcome Laurent’s Sixth Amendment challenge.

C. Discussion

The Government maintains that Laurent’s Sixth Amendment rights will be protected by the following measures. First, the Government has proposed making a set of substitutions for all references to Laurent in Merritt’s statements. (See Proposed Redacted Statements.) The vast majority of these substitutions consist of replacing references to Laurent with “the guy,” except where the context of the reference appears to require additional clarification — for example, “the guy who had called him about going downtown.” (Id. at 1.) Accordingly, the Government submits that this will prevent error under Bruton, 391 U.S. 123, 88 S.Ct. 1620. (Gov’t Mem. in Opp’n at 23.) Second, “[rjather than seeking to admit the handwritten statements or audio recordings themselves,” the Government indicates that it will call witnesses to testify regarding the substance of those statements “in such a way as to avoid any specific reference to Laurent.” (Id. at 22, 27.) Third, the Government suggests that the court provide a limiting instruction advising the jury that Merritt’s statements may not be considered as evidence against either of his code-fendants, in order to preserve Laurent’s Confrontation Clause right under Crawford, 541 U.S. 36, 124 S.Ct. 1354. (Id. at 25.)

In response, Laurent maintains that the Government’s proposed redactions will not cure the prejudicial effect of Merritt’s statements, and that a limiting instruction would not sufficiently protect his Sixth Amendment rights. (Def. Reply Mem. at 8.) First, Laurent argues that the proposed redactions are insufficient to comply with requirement that the statements be redacted to “eliminate not only the defendant’s name, but any reference to his or her existence.” (Id. at 9 (emphasis in original) (quoting Richardson, 481 U.S. at 211, 107 S.Ct. 1702); see also Omnibus Mot. at 30 (“The frequent mention of Mr. Laurent’s name renders redaction impracticable, awkward, and ultimately prejudicial ... because of the obviousness of the re-dactions.”).) Second, he contends that no matter how the statements are redacted, “unless they are so redacted that they do not mention or allow for the inference of another individual’s presence” at James’s robbery and murder, the risk that the statements will implicate Laurent is so significant that violation of his Sixth Amendment rights is inevitable. (Omnibus Mot. at 30; see also Def. Reply Mem. at 10 (arguing that instructing the jury that it should consider the statements “only against the self-confessed bystander/witness and not against the alleged shooter is absurd”).) In particular, he argues that given the limited number of additional co-defendants at trial, any redaction or substitution of his name “would not avoid prejudice” to Laurent because Merritt’s statement “denies all responsibility” for James’s death and “places full culpability” on Laurent. (Omnibus Mot. at 29, 30 (“[Cjonsidering the totality here of the statement and the context of the trial, any redaction would nonetheless, lead to the inference that Mr. Merritt was accusing Mr. Laurent in the murder of Dasta James.”).) Ultimately, Laurent maintains that in light of the other evidence that will be introduced, “the Government’s argument that Mr. Merritt’s statement will not be ‘admitted against’ Mr. Laurent because redactions will omit mention of his name attributes superhuman powers of compartmentalization and differentiation to the prospective jurors and is not supported by common sense.” (Def. Reply Mem. at 9.) Nevertheless, the court finds Laurent’s arguments to be unavailing.

1. Adequacy of Proposed Redactions

In support of his first argument, Laurent points to the Second Circuit’s instruction in Jass, “urg[ingj district courts, wherever possible, to eliminate completely ... any mention of a non-declarant defendant’s existence.” (Def. Reply Mem. at 10 (quoting United States v. Defreitas, 701 F.Supp.2d 309, 313 (E.D.N.Y.2010) (quoting Jass, 569 F.3d at 56 n. 5)).) As Laurent further notes, the court went on to advise district judges that “[njeutral pronoun substitution should be employed only when complete redaction would distort the confession, for example, by ‘exclud[ing] substantially exculpatory information, or changing] the tenor of the utterance as a whole.’” Jass, 569 F.3d at 56 n. 5 (alterations in original) (quoting Yousef, 327 F.3d at 150). Here, Laurent is surely correct that it is impossible to eliminate any mention of Laurent’s existence from Merritt’s statements, since Merritt told law enforcement officers that it was Laurent who shot Dasta James during the attempted robbery, while Merritt was merely a bystander. (Def. Reply Mem. at 10.) But as the Second Circuit has advised, it is precisely in this type of situation that neutral pronoun substitution is appropriate.

For example, in Jass itself, the court permitted substitution of “another person” where “complete redaction would have changed the substance” of the confession “because acknowledgement of a confederate was critical to proving that [the declar-ant’s admission was to conspiratorial, as well as substantive” crimes, both of which had been charged in the indictment. Jass, 569 F.3d at 56 n. 5; see also Defreitas, 701 F.Supp.2d at 315 (“[T]he contention that a Bruton analysis is different when applied to a conspiracy charged against all defendants is baseless in light of [Second Circuit precedent].”). Similarly, with respect to the James murder, Merritt is charged with Hobbs Act robbery conspiracy (Count Eleven) in addition to attempted Hobbs Act robbery (Count Twelve), among other crimes. (Indictment ¶¶ 28-31, 47-50.) Thus, complete redaction is also impossible here, where Merritt’s claims regarding a confederate’s involvement in the James robbery and murder are critical to proving that Merritt is guilty of not just substantive but also conspiracy charges. See Jass, 569 F.3d at 56 n. 5.

As a result, neutral pronoun substitution is appropriate, so long as the substituted language does not otherwise violate Laurent’s Sixth Amendment right to confrontation. The question then becomes whether the redacted statements manifest “ ‘obvious indications of alteration,’ or' otherwise signal to the jury that the statements had originally ‘contained actual names.’” Jass, 569 F.3d at 62 (quoting Gray, 523 U.S. at 192, 118 S.Ct. 1151; Tutino, 883 F.2d at 1135). These standards reflect that the purpose of the substitutions is not to eliminate references to the fact of a confederate, but rather, to use words “that might actually have been said by a person admitting his own culpability in the charged conspiracy while shielding the specific identity of his confederate.” Taylor, 745 F.3d at 28 (emphasis added) (quoting Jass, 569 F.3d at 62) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Here, the Government’s proposed redacted statements do not manifest obvious signs of alteration, or otherwise signal to the jury that they originally contained actual names. See Jass, 569 F.3d at 62. The neutral pronoun substitutions that the Government has proposed for replacing all references to Laurent’s name, “the guy,” “the other guy,” or “a guy he knows,” are not analogous to obvious alterations such as a blank space, “deleted,” or “redacted,” which the Supreme Court has .previous rejected. See Gray, 523 U.S. at 192, 118 S.Ct. 1151. Moreover, the Second Circuit has specifically sanctioned the use of the neutral pronoun substitutions proposed in this case. See Williams, 936 F.2d at 699, 701. In addition, no other aspect of the Government’s proposed substitutions would signal to a jury that the statements originally contained names — by, for example, identifying some co-conspirators but not others, or through other “awkward circumlocution[s].” Taylor, 745 F.3d at 29-30. Almost every proposed substitution consists of “the guy” or “the other guy.” (See generally Proposed Redacted Statements.) The only two notable exceptions come from Merritt’s April 6, 2011, oral statement to NY