Watson v. Edelen (76 F. Supp. 3d 1332, 2015)

ORDER

M. CASEY RODGERS, Chief Judge.

This cause comes on for consideration upon the chief magistrate judge’s Report and Recommendation dated November 18, 2014. (Doc. 166). The parties have been furnished a copy of the Report and Recommendation and have been afforded an opportunity to file objections pursuant to Title 28, United States Code, Section 636(b)(1). I have made a de novo determination of any timely filed objections.

Having considered the Report and Recommendation, and any objections thereto' timely filed, I have determined that the Report and Recommendation should be adopted.

Accordingly, it is now ORDERED as follows:

1. The chief magistrate judge’s Report and Recommendation is adopted and incorporated by reference in this order.

2. The motion for summary judgment filed by Defendants (doc. 124) is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART AS FOLLOWS:

a. Defendants’ motion for summary judgment (doc. 124) is DENIED as to Plaintiffs Eighth Amendment claims against Defendants Edelen and Johnson regarding the use of force '(ie., slamming Watson onto the concrete face first, striking his head, nose, back, and feet, and twisting his wrists and fingers) on March 1, 2012;

b. Defendants’ motion for summary judgment (doc. 124) is DENIED as to Plaintiffs Eighth Amendment claim of excessive force against Defendants Edelen and Rogers regarding the use of force (ie., three applications of chemical agents) on March 4, 2012;

c. Defendants’ motion for summary judgment is DENIED as to Plaintiffs claims for compensatory and punitive damages related to the uses of force of March 1 and 4, 2012;

d. Defendants’ motion for summary judgment is GRANTED as to Plaintiffs remaining claims; and

e. Defendant Hawkins is DISMISSED from this action.

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

ELIZABETH M. TIMOTHY, United States Chief Magistrate Judge.

Plaintiff Tyson N. Watson (‘Watson”), an inmate of the Florida Department of Corrections (“FDOC”), proceeds pro se and in forma pauperis in this action brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Watson sues Lieutenant Christopher Ede-len (“Lieutenant Edelen”), Correctional Officer Robert Johnson (“Officer Johnson”), Sergeant Daryle Rogers (“Sergeant Rogers”), and Senior Licensed Practical Nurse Bobby Hawkins (“SLPN Hawkins”), all of whom were employed by the FDOC at Santa Rosa Correctional Institution (“SRCI”) at the time of the events giving rise to this action. Presently before the court is Defendants’ Motion for Sanctions or Alternative Motion for Summary Judgment (doc. 124), to which Plaintiff has responded in opposition (doc. 155).

The case was referred to the undersigned for the issuance of all preliminary orders and any recommendations to the district- court regarding dispositive matters. See N.D. Fla. Loe. R. 72.2(C); see also 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B), (C), and Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b). For the reasons set forth below, the court recommends that Defendants’ motion for summary judgment be granted in part and denied in part.

I. BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Watson initiated this action on July 23, 2012, by filing a civil rights complaint under § 1983 (doc. 1). His Second Amended Complaint (doc. 33), which is the operative pleading, includes three counts:

Count 1: Defendants Edelen and Johnson used excessive force against him on March 1, 2012, and Defendants Edelen, Rogers, and Hawkins used- excessive force against him on March 4, 2012, in violation of the Eighth Amendment; Count 2: Defendants Edelen and Hawkins were deliberately indifferent to his serious mental health needs on March 1, 2012, and Defendants Edelen, - Rogers, and Hawkins were deliberately indifferent to his serious mental health needs on March 4, 2012, in violation of the Eighth Amendment; and

Count 3: Defendants Edelen, Rogers, and Hawkins were deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs on March 4, 2012, in violation of the Eighth Amendment.

(id. at 19-20). Suing Defendants in their individual capacities (see id. at 1), Watson seeks nominal, compensatory, and punitive damages, as well as costs and attorney’s fees (id. at 19, 21).

Defendants filed a Motion for Sanctions or Alternative Motion for Summary Judgment on April 14, 2014 (doc. 124). They argue they are. entitled to dismissal of some of Watson’s claims, as a sanction for his malicious fabrication of those claims (id. at 15-22). Defendants argue they are entitled to summary judgment on all of Watson’s claims, because he cannot establish a constitutional violation against any Defendant, and they are entitled to qualified immunity (id. at 22-43). Defendants submitted evidence in support of their arguments (doc. 124, Exhibits). The undersigned issued an order on April 16, 2014, informing the parties of the importance and ramifications of summary judgment consideration, providing them with information as to the requirements for materials submitted for review pursuant to Rule 56, directing Watson to respond to the motion by a certain date, and advising the parties that the court would take the motion under advisement upon Watson’s filing his response (doc. 126). On September 17, 2014, Watson responded in opposition to Defendants’ motion and submitted evidence in support of his position (docs. 155, 159). Defendants’ motion is now ripe for review.

II. WATSON’S ALLEGATIONS OF DEFENDANTS’ SPOLIATION OF EVIDENCE AND FAILURE TO PRODUCE EVIDENCE DURING DISCOVERY

Before addressing the merits of Defendants’ motion for summary judgment, the court first turns to Watson’s contention that Defendants’ motion should be denied as a sanction for spoliation of evidence and failure to produce evidence during discovery (doc. 155, Declaration of Tyson N. Watson ¶¶ 227-44). Watson alleges Lieutenant Edelen destroyed the handheld video camera recordings filmed by Officer Jacobus on March 1, 2012, and Officer Burt on March 4, 2012 (Watson Decl. ¶¶ 227-41, see also doc. 155 at 82-88). He contends the alleged spoliation entitles him to an “adverse inference” at the summary judgment stage and an “adverse inference” jury instruction at trial (id.). Watson also asserts Defendants objected to certain discovery requests, specifically, requests for production of inmate grievances' concerning his medical and mental health treatment, his entire medical record, and documents showing “bed assignments” of inmates (Watson Decl. ¶¶242-44).

Watson has not shown he is entitled to sanctions for Defendants’ alleged discovery violations. If Watson believed that Defendants’ objections to his discovery requests violated the discovery rules, he could have and should have filed a motion to compel or for sanctions under Rule 37 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Watson obviously knew of the availability of this procedural mechanism because he used it during this litigation (see docs. 102, 137). Further, Watson has not made any showing that Defendants’ discovery objections were not well-founded or that he was otherwise entitled to an order compelling production. Moreover, the summary judgment record demonstrates Watson has submitted copies of numerous inmate grievances, medical records, and inmate declarations, and he has not shown that Defendants’ alleged failures to produce additional grievances, medical records, and documents showing inmate bed assignments would have meaningfully assisted him in responding to Defendants’ summary judgment motion. Therefore, Watson failed to demonstrate he is entitled to sanctions for Defendants’ alleged discovery violations.

The court next addresses Watson’s spoliation claim. “[Spoliation is defined as the destruction of evidence or the significant and meaningful alteration of a document or instrument.” Green Leaf Nursery v. E.I. DuPont De Nemours and Co., 341 F.3d 1292, 1308 (11th Cir.2003). The doctrine of spoliation permits the trier of fact to draw an inference that, if evidence was destroyed in bad faith, the evidence would have been unfavorable to the party responsible for its destruction. See Aramburu v. Boeing Co., 112 F.3d 1398, 1407 (10th Cir.1997); Brewer v. Quaker State Oil Refining Corp., 72 F.3d 326, 334 (3d Cir.1995); Coates v. Johnson & Johnson, 756 F.2d 524, 551 (7th Cir.1985). At the summary judgment stage; the spoliation doctrine provides a basis for denying a motion for summary judgment where there is sufficient probative evidence for a jury to find an act of spoliation and to draw the inference derived from such an act. A factual finding of spoliation is necessary only where the court seeks to impose a particular sanction beyond submitting the issue to the jury. Upon a finding of spoliation, the court may impose the sanction of a jury instruction on spoliation, which instructs the jury that it may infer that the destroyed evidence would have been unfavorable to the party responsible for the destruction. See Flury v. Daimler Chrysler Corp., 427 F.3d 939, 945 (11th Cir.2005); see also Med. Lab. Mgmt. Consultants v. Am. Broad. Co., Inc., 306 F.3d 806, 824 (9th Cir.2002) (citations omitted).

For a spoliation sanction to apply, it is essential that the evidence in question be within the party’s control, that is, the party actually destroyed or was privy to the destruction of the evidence. See Brewer, 72 F.3d at 334. Further, the party having control over the evidence must have an obligation to preserve it at the time it was destroyed, and generally be on notice of a claim or potential claim at the time of the destruction. See Jandreau v. Nicholson, 492 F.3d 1372, 1375 (Fed.Cir.2007). No unfavorable inference arises when the circumstances indicate that the evidence in question has been lost or accidentally destroyed, or where the failure to produce it is otherwise properly accounted for, such as where the destruction was a matter of routine. See Gumbs v. Int’l Harvester, Inc., 718 F.2d 88, 96 (3d Cir.1983); see also 31A C.J.S. Evidence § 251; 29 Am.Jur.2d Evidence § 256.

“[A] party moving for sanctions must establish, among other things, that the destroyed evidence was relevant to a claim or defense such that the destruction of that evidence resulted in prejudice.” Eli Lilly and Co. v. Air Exp. Intern. USA, Inc., 615 F.3d 1305, 1318 (11th Cir.2010) (citing Flury, 427 F.3d at 943). In the Eleventh Circuit, courts consider five factors in determining whether spoliation sanctions are warranted:

(1) whether the [party seeking sanctions] was prejudiced as a result of the destruction of evidence; (2) whether the prejudice could be cured; (3) the practical importance of the evidence; (4) whether the [spoliating party] acted in ■good or bad faith; and (5) the potential for abuse [if a sanction is not imposed] ....

Flury, 427 F.3d at 945; see also, e.g., Graff v. Baja Marine Corp., 310 Fed.Appx. 298, 301 (11th Cir.2009) (unpublished) (“To determine whether spoliation sanctions are warranted, a court must consider the factors identified in Flury.... ”). The Eleventh Circuit cases applying the Flury factors illustrate that the first three elements (the importance of the evidence, the degree of prejudice to the other party, and whether the prejudice can be cured).are of critical importance, and “bad faith” depends in large part upon the importance of the evidence to a fair trial and the extent to which the spoliating party had notice of that importance and of the need to preserve the evidence. See Flury, 427 F.3d at 946; Bashir v. Amtrak, 119 F.3d 929, 932 (11th Cir.1997) (per curiam); Graff, 310 Fed.Appx. at 301-02. In the Eleventh Circuit, “an adverse inference is drawn from a party’s failure to preserve evidence only when the absence of that evidence is predicated on bad faith.” Bashir, 119 F.3d at 931. While this Circuit does not require a showing of malice in order to find bad faith, mere negligence in losing or destroying records is not sufficient to draw an adverse inference. See Mann v. Taser Intern., Inc., 588 F.3d 1291, 1310 (11th Cir.2009) (citing Bashir, 119 F.3d at 931).

In support of Watson’s spoliation claim, he submitted a declaration of Inmate Eric Evans, dated March 8, 2012, stating that on March 1, 2012, Evans heard Lieutenant Edelen tell another officer that he intended to destroy the camcorder tapes because “We are gonna get the doctor to take him [Watson] off SHOS [Self-Harm Observation Status] later today and he won’t have the tape to prove he really went crazy” (doc. 159, Ex. B, Declaration of Eric Evans ¶ 5). Evans also states that on March 4, 2012, he heard Edelen tell Officer Burt (the handheld camera operator) that he (Burt) should not include the disc from the video camera in the use Of force paperwork and instead should give it to him (Edelen) (Evans Deck ¶ 21). Inmate Evans states Edelen further told Officer Burt that Watson was known to file grievances and lawsuits, and that he (Edelen) was going to destroy the camcorder disc to prevent Watson from relying on it to prove'that he had metal in his stomach and was injured when the officers came to “get him” (id.). In another declaration dated July 15, 2012, Inmate Evans states that on that day, he saw SLPN Hawkins stop at Watson’s cell and heard him tell Watson that he did not care if Watson sued him because “Without any camcorder tapes and with all my notes on your file fabricated to reflect you have no injuries then you have no evidence to base your lawsuit on” (doc. 159, Ex. I, Declaration of Eric Evans ¶¶ 2-3). Watson also submitted a declaration of Inmate Willie Davis, dated July 17, 2012, stating that on July 15, 2012, he heard SLPN Hawkins tell Watson that he “destroyed a video in March of Watson with something stuck in his stomach” (doc. 159, Ex. J, Declaration of Willie Davis ¶¶ 2-3).

Watson also submitted a copy of a formal grievance he filed with the SRCI warden on March 26, 2012, appealing a disciplinary report issued against him involving the use of force of March 4, 2012, and he also referenced the use of force on March 1, 2012 (Watson Declaration ¶227; doc. 159, Ex. R-6). On the last page of the ten-page grievance, Watson requested that video evidence be preserved “for duration of statutory limits for filing a civil complaint, which I undoubtably will be filing against Lt. Edlin [sic], Sgt Rogers [sic], Offcs. Johnson and John Doe, and Nurse Hawkins....” (id.). The grievance was denied on April 3, 2012, by “C. Bishop,” the employee responding to the grievance, and “R. Tifft,” the warden (id.).

Additionally, Watson submitted copies of the Incident Reports from the uses of force on March 1 and March 4 (doc. 159, Exs. A-7, R-l). Each Incident Report, which Lieutenant Edelen read and signed as the Shift Supervisor, documents the existence of a handheld video recording (id.). The Incident Reports document that Officer Jacobus was the camera operator on March 1, and Officer Burt was the camera operator on March 4, and that each operator completed a DC1-801 Chain of Custody form for the handheld videotape and submitted the form and the digital video disc with the use of force documentation (id.). The Reports of Use of Force Used regarding the March 1 and March 4 incidents indicate that the han-dheld video recordings, fixed wing video recordings, and all documents pertaining to the uses of force were submitted with the Reports of Use of Force, and the Warden reviewed the videos from both the handheld and fixed wing video cameras, as well as documents attached to the Reports' on March 2 and March 5, respectively (doc. 124-23; doc. 124-17; doc. 159, Ex. K-l). The Reports and attachments were submitted to the Use of Force Unit of the Inspector General’s Office for review, and the Inspector General’s Office approved them on April 6 and April 10, 2012, respectively (id.).

Watson also submitted an e-mail chain between Defendants’ counsel (specifically, counsel’s paralegal) and two members of the SRCI staff, beginning August 27, 2013, and ending November 26, 2013, regarding the existence and location of fixed wing and handheld videos of the March 1 and March 4 incidents (doc. 159, Ex. R-7). The e-mails reflect that on August 27, 2013, Defendants’ counsel communicated to Officer Robert Olson, a Use .of Force Analyst, that counsel was representing the Defendants in this case, and that due to FDOC retention schedules, no videos were available from the FDOC’s Central Office regarding the incidents (id.). Defendants’ counsel asked Officer Olson to determine whether SRCI may have stored any videos (id.). On the next day, August 28, 2013, Officer Olson downloaded the video clips from the fixed wing videos from the institution’s secured hard drive to two CD’s and mailed the CD’s to counsel (id.; see also doc. 1248, Declaration of Robert Olson). On November 26, 2013, after Watson had sent Defendants a request for production of documents dated September 26, 2013, which included a request for any and all videotaped footage from the portable handheld camcorders of him on March 1, 2012, and March 4, 2012 (see doc. 159, Ex. U), Defendants’ counsel e-mailed Colonel John Kolodziej, stating'that the Inspector General’s Office “disposed” of all videos in compliance with the retention policy effective at the time of the approved uses of force (as discussed infra, the uses of force were approved by the Inspector General’s Office in April of 2012). Counsel acknowledged that Officer Olson had provided copies of the fixed wing videos, but asked that Kolodziej determine whether a “disposition form” was completed documenting the destruction of the handheld videos and, if not, to confirm that the videos were in fact destroyed (id,.). Colonel Kolodziej responded the same day that SRCI currently did not have any handheld video files on .retention, and that as of May 2012, the files were required to be retained by the Inspector General’s Office (id.). Colonel Kolodziej further responded that he verified that the videos were not at SRCI (id.). Kolodziej stated- that if the videos were returned to SRCI from the Inspector General’s Office following that office’s approval of the uses of force, SRCI would have retained them for ninety days and then destroyed them. He further stated that FDOC policy did not require the institution to complete disposition documentation for videos that were destroyed after the retention period had expired (id.). Defendants’ counsel then responded to Watson’s discovery request, stating that any handheld video footage was destroyed pursuant to the applicable FDOC retention policy (doc. 159, Ex. U at 4).

Defendants submitted evidentiary material in response to Watson’s spoliation claim (doc. 164, Exhibits). They submitted a declaration of Dean Glisson, a Senior Law Enforcement Inspector in the Office of Inspector General (“OIG”) explaining the policies and procedures regarding uses of force and processing and retention of handheld video footage of use of force in effect in March of 2012, when the uses of force occurred in the instant case (doc. 164-3, Declaration of Dean Glisson ¶¶ 2, 3). Senior Inspector Glisson attached copies of the relevant policies, Florida Administrative Code Rule 33-602.210 and FDOC Procedure 602.004, to his declaration (see id., Exs. 1, 2). Glisson explains the relevant policies and procedures, and his explanations are supported by the plain language of those policies and procedures.

Per FDOC Procedure 602.004(3), the complete use of force package will be forwarded to the Use of Force Unit in the Office of the Inspector General, including the Use of Force Checklist and all items specified therein (Glisson Decl., Ex. 2). The OIG will retain any video recording associated with incidents that-are disapproved or referred for investigations (id.). Video recordings returned to the Warden will be retained by the Chief of Security for 90 days from the date the tape was received from the OIG (id.). If the 90-day retention period has expired and the video has no further value in retention or is not part of an OIG investigation, the video will be erased (id.).

The March 1, 2012, use of force involving Watson was approved by the OIG on April 6, 2012 (Glisson Decl. ¶ 5). The March 4, 2012, use of force involving Watson was approved by the ’OIG on April 10, 2012 (id.). Neither use of force was referred for investigation (id.). Pursuant to the FDOC’s retention schedule, the han-dheld videos associated with these uses of force would have been destroyed approximately 90 days later, depending upon when they were physically received by the institution, unless they were part of an OIG investigation (Glisson Decl. ¶ 5; see also Ex. 2, Procedure 602.004(3)(h)).

In May of 2012, attorneys from the Florida Office of the Attorney General met with FDOC officials to discuss the retention of videotapes from use of force incidents (Glisson Decl. ¶ 6). The decision was made at this meeting that the OIG’s Use of Force Unit would retain all use of force videos regardless of whether the use of force was referred for investigation or disapproved (id.). Although the FDOC did not issue a formal directive or memorandum regarding the newly agreed-upon video retention policy in May of 2012, the FDOC began retaining all use of force videos in the OIG’s Use of Force Unit’ at that time (id.). The FDOC later incorporated the new video retention policy into the December 16, 2012, version of Rule 33-602.210 (Glisson Decl. ¶ 7). Under that version of the Rule, specifically subpart (ll)(h), the following language was added: “AU video recordings submitted with use of force reports shall be retained and maintained by the OIG in accordance with records retention statutes.” (id.). Had Watson’s use of force incidents on March 1, 2012, and March 4,2012, been submitted to the OIG after the FDOC’s May 2012 meeting with attorneys from the Office of the Attorney General, the videos would have been retained by the OIG (Glisson Decl. ¶ 8).

When an incident report regarding a use of force is created, the incident report and any associated video are reviewed by the Shift Supervisor, the Correctional Officer Chief, and the Warden (Glisson Decl. ¶ 10). Each person signs the incident report indicating that they have performed the review and writes any comments they have in the space provided (id.). In March and April of 2012, the Report of Force Used contained a checklist of items that are required to be included in the use of force report (Glisson Decl. ¶ 11; see also docs. 164-5, 164-7). The Warden and the Institutional Inspector were both required to review this checklist (form DCI-813) to verify the presence or absence of the documentation listed (id.). Their signatures verified that the form correctly reflects whether the listed documentation was included with the use of force report (id.). During that time the Report of Force Used, including all documentation and video referenced on the Use of Force Checklist, had to be reviewed by the Warden (Glisson Decl. ¶ 12). The Warden’s signature verifies that he has reviewed all of the documentation and that the use of force appears to comply with Florida Administrative Code Rule 33-602.210 (Glisson Decl. ¶ 12; see also docs. 1645, 164-7). During that time the Report of Force Used, including all documentation referenced on the Use of Force Checklist, also had to be reviewed by the Institutional Inspector (Glisson Decl. ,¶ 13). The Institutional Inspector’s signature verifies that he has reviewed all of the documentation and all required documentation appears to be complete (Glisson Decl. ¶ 13; see also docs. 164-5,164-7).

During that time the Report of Force Used, including all documentation and video referenced on the Use of Force Checklist, had to be'reviewed by an Inspector from the OIG’s Use of Force Unit before the use of force can be approved or disapproved (Glisson Decl. ¶ 14). The Use of Force Unit Inspector’s signature verifies that he/she has reviewed all of the documentation and based upon that review the use of force is either approved or disapproved (id.). If video referenced in the Report of Force Used or listed on the Use of Force Checklist is not included when the Report of Force Used is received by the Use of Force Unit, the institution will be contacted and asked to provide the video (Glisson Decl. ¶ 15). In the event that the video is not available at the institution, the institution will be asked to provide a memorandum or an e-mail explaining the absence of the video (id.). A copy of the memorandum or e-mail will be included as a part of the Report of Force Used (id.). Depending upon the response from the institution an investigation may be initiated (id.). If the video included with the Report of Force Used does not match up with videotaping of the incident as described in the Report of Force Used, the Inspector in the Use of Force Unit will contact the institution and ask to be provided with the correct video (Glisson Decl. ¶ 16). In the event that the correct video is not available at the institution, the institution will be asked to provide a memorandum or an e-mail explaining the absence of the correct video (id.). A copy of the memorandum or e-mail will be included as a part of the Report of Force Used (id.). Depending upon the response from the institution an investigation may be initiated (id.). The absence of any memoranda or e-mails indicates that the correct videos from these uses of force were received by the OIG’s Use of Force Unit (Glisson Decl. ¶ 17).

Defendants also submitted a declaration from Defendant Edelen (doc. 164-4, Declaration of Christopher ■ Edelen). With regard to the handheld videos from March 1, 2012, Edelen states that because there was no force used in removing Watson from his cell after he had barricaded himself in, the videotape was not burned onto a disc or submitted for review (Edelen Decl. ¶ 2). Regarding the spontaneous use of force during Watson’s escort to the infirmary to be evaluated by mental health personnel, Edelen státes after the use of force, Officer Jeffrey Jacobus arrived with a han-dheld video camera (id., ¶ 3). Edelen states Officer Jacobus initiated videotaping procedures and videotaping continued until Watson was secured in a cell (id.). Edelen states the video was burned onto a disc and the disc was included with the use of force report (id., ¶ 4). Edelen states he placed the disc and the use of force paperwork into the security hallway lockbox, and he never saw the disc again (id., ¶ 4).

With regard to the handheld video from March 4, 2012, Defendant Edelen states Officer Joshua Burt retrieved a handheld video camera and began videotaping at approximately noon, in response to a report’ of Watson creating a disturbance (Edelen Decl. ¶ 5). Edelen states Watson declared a psychological emergency and subsequently ceased his disruptive behavior, so video recording ceased (id.). Ede-len states Office Burt resumed videotaping-approximately 90 minutes later, after chemical agents had been administered (id., ¶ 6). Videotaping continued while Watson was removed from his cell, escorted to the shower, escorted to the medical triage room, and returned to his cell (id.). Edelen states he downloaded the video from the handheld video camera onto a disc and placed the disc and the use of force paperwork into the security hallway evidence locker (id., ¶ 7). Edelen states he never saw the disc again (id.).

Edelen states once he submitted the ■handheld videos from both March 1, 2012, and .March 4, 2012, to the hallway security evidence locker, he never saw them again (Edelen Decl. ¶ 12). He states he had no responsibility for maintenance or retention of those handheld videos beyond placing them in the evidence locker (id.). Edelen states he played no role in any decision to retain or destroy the handheld videos (id.). He states Procedure 602.004(3)(e) indicates-that use of force video recordings returned from the OIG’s Office will be returned to the Warden or the Chief of Security for 90 days from the date of receipt (id.). He states he has never been the Warden or' the Chief of Security at Santa Rosa C.I. (id.). Edelen states he does not know what became of the handheld videos once they left his possession (id.).

Edelen adamantly denies he ever ordered Officer Burt to give him the disc of the handheld video recording from the March 4, 2012, use of force (Edelen Decl. ¶ 8). In fact, he states, no disc existed until he burned the disc himself (id.). Edelen also adamantly denies he ever ordered Officer Burt not to include the disc with the use of force paperwork, and he states he was the person who burned the video onto a disc and submitted the disc with the use of force paperwork (id., ¶ 9).

Defendants also submitted the use of-feree paperwork for March 1' and 4, 2012, and the chain of custody .forms for the related videotapes (docs. 164-5, 164-6, 164-7, 164-8). The chain of custody form for the handheld video of the March 1 use of force indicates Major Kolodziej retrieved the videotape from the security hallway lockbox at 3:00 p.m. on March 1, 2012 (see doc. 164-6).. Major Kolodziej signed the use of force paperwork on March 2, 2012, indicating he reviewed the use of force evidence, completed required reports, and determined that the use of force appeared to comply with FDOC policies (see doc. 164-5). Major Kolodziej provided the handheld videotape to Officer Robert Olson (the Use of Force Analyst) at 7:00 a.m. on March 2, 2012 (see doc. 164-6). On March 2, 2012, the Warden signed the use of force paperwork regarding the March 1 incident, indicating he reviewed the handheld video recording and all relevant documents and determined that the use of force appeared to comply with FDOC policies (see doc. 164-5). The Institutional Inspector reviewed the use of force file on April 3, 2012, and indicated that all of the documentation appeared to be complete (see id., Checklist). The Use of Force Checklist for the March 1, 2012, incident indicates the chain of custody form for the video and the video itself were part of the use of force paperwork sent to the OIG (see doc. 164-5; doc. 164-6). The OIG approved the use of force on April 6, 2012 (doc. 164-5).

The chain of custody form for the han-dheld video of the March 4 use of force indicates Major Kolodziej retrieved the videotape from the security hallway lock-box at 3:00 p.m. on March 4, 2012 (see doc. 164-8). Major Kolodziej signed the Use of force paperwork on March 5, 2012, indicating he reviewed the use of force evidence, completed required reports, and determined that the use of force appeared to comply with FDOC policies (see doc. 164-7). Major Kolodziej provided the han-dheld videotape to Officer Robert Olson (the Use of Force Analyst) at 4:00 p.m. on March 5, 2012 (see doc. 164-8). On March 5, 2012, the Warden signed the use of force paperwork regarding the March 4 incident, indicating he reviewed the handheld video recording and all relevant documents (see doc. 164-7). The Report was signed by the Institutional Inspector on April 4, 2012, indicating he reviewed the Report and all attachments, and all of the documentation appeared to be complete (id.). The Use of Force Checklist for the March 4, 2012, use of force indicates the Chain of Custody form , for the video and the video itself was part of the Use of Force Paperwork sent to the OIG (see doc. 164-7; doc. 164-8). The OIG approved the use of force on April 10, 2012 (doc. 164-7).

Watson has not shown that the first three Flury factors (the importance of the evidence, the degree of prejudice to him, and whether the prejudice can be cured) weigh in his favor. Viewing the evidentia-ry material in the light most favorable to Watson, he does not allege that the han-dheld videos show something that is not evidenced by another evidentiary source, for example, Watson’s own extremely detailed description of the relevant events, the accounts of other inmate witnesses, and Watson’s medical records, to name a few. Therefore, he has not shown that the handheld videos were important, that their destruction prejudiced him, or that any prejudice cannot be cured.

Watson has also failed to satisfy the fourth Flury factor, that the. spoliating party acted in bad faith. Although it is undisputed that the videos from the han-dheld cameras were destroyed, Watson’s evidence fails to show that any named Defendant actually destroyed either of them or was privy to the destruction. While Watson submitted evidence that Lieutenant Edelen verbalized an intent to exclude the videos from the use of force documentation and destroy them, there is no evidence he actually did so. Indeed, the evidence refutes Watson’s assertions, because it shows that the handheld videos were included in the use of force reports that were sent to and reviewed by the OIG. Further, the handheld videos were destroyed pursuant to FDOC policies and procedures in effect at that time, and Watson has not shown that at the time they were destroyed, the custodian of the videos (i.e., the Chief of Security per FDOC Procedure 602.004(3)(e)) had an obligation to preserve them or was on notice of a need to preserve them beyond the 90-day retention period.

Watson has not shown that the Flury factors weigh in favor of imposition of sanctions. Therefore, his request for an “adverse inference” is denied.

III. MATERIAL FACTS FOR PURPOSES OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT

As this case comes before the court on Defendants’ motion for summary judgment, the court views the facts in the light most,favorable to Watson, the non-moving party, see Hairston v. Gainesville Sun Publ’g Co., 9 F.3d 913, 918 (11th Cir.1993), drawing those facts from the pleadings, depositions, and other evidentiary materials on file. Nevertheless, the court observes that what are stated as “facts” herein for purposes of summary judgment review may not be the actual facts. See Montoute v. Carr, 114 F.3d 181, 182 (11th Cir.1997).

With regard to the factual positions asserted by the parties, the court must apply the standard set forth in Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides in relevant part:

(1) Supporting Factual Positions. A party asserting that a fact cannot be or is genuinely disputed must support the assertion by:

(A) citing to particular parts of materials in the record, including depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations (including those made for purposes of the motion only), admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials; or

(B) showing that the materials cited do not establish the absence or presence of a genuine dispute, or that an adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence to support the fact.

(4) Affidavits or Declarations. An affidavit or declaration used to support or oppose a motion must be made on personal knowledge, set out facts that would be admissible in evidence, and show that the affiant or declarant is competent to testify on the matters stated.

Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c) (2010). Facts asserted in hearsay statements which are not subject to a hearsay exception, and thus would not be admissible in evidence, are insufficient to show that a fact is genuinely disputed.

If a party fails to properly support an assertion of fact or fails to properly address -another party’s assertion of fact as required by Rule 56(c), the court will consider the fact undisputed for purposes of the motion for summary judgment, or grant summary judgment if Defendants’ motion and supporting materials' — -including the facts considered undisputed — show that Defendants are entitled to it. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e)(2, 3) (2010).

Any facts included in Defendants’ statement of material facts that are not controverted in Watson’s response are deemed admitted. See N.D. Fla. Loe. R. 56.1(A) (all material facts set forth in moving party’s statement of undisputed material facts will be deemed admitted unless controverted by the statement required to be filed and served by opposing party). Additionally, the court notes that some the events at issue were captured by fixed wing video cameras. The digital videos from the fixed wing cameras are part of the record (doc. 125, Exs. M, N). The facts presented here are viewed in the light depicted by. the videos to the extent those facts are captured on camera. See Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 127 S.Ct. 1769, 1776, 167 L.Ed.2d 686 (2007) (stating that when a videotape of an incident is part of the record, the court should view the facts in the light depicted by the videotape). Applying these standards, the court conveys the following as the material facts.

On March 1, 2012, at approximately 7:11 a.m., Lieutenant Edelen, who was assigned to C-dormitory, entered wing two of C-dormitory in response to a report that Watson had covered his cell window and was kicking his cell door and yelling onto the wing (Defendants’ Statement of Material and Genuine Facts ¶ 1; doc. 124-2, Declaration of Christopher Edelen ¶ 2; doc. 164-4, Declaration of Christopher Edelen ¶ 2; doc. 125, Ex. Ml, Fixed Wing Video at 07:11:19). Edelen ordered Watson to cease his disruptive behavior, but Watson refused (Defendants’ Statement of Material and Genuine Facts ¶ 1; Edelen Decl. ¶ 2). Edelen exited the wing at 7:12 (Defendants’ Statement of Material and Genuine Facts ¶ 1; Edelen Decl. ¶ 2; Fixed Wing Video at 07:12:34). Edelen initiated videotaping procedures for a possible use of force, and at 7:19 a.m., he and other officers, one of whom operated a handheld video camera, entered the wing (Defendants’ Statement of Material and Genuine Facts ¶ 1; Edelen Decl. ¶ 2; Ex. Ml, Fixed Wing Video at 07:19:32). After officers arrived at Watson’s cell, Watson declared a psychological emergency and made threats and gestures of self harm (Defendants’ Statement of Material and Genuine Facts ¶ 1; Edelen Decl. ¶ 2). Watson states earlier that morning he had attempted to cut his arms and head, but his efforts were unsuccessful because he was using a “very dull” razor blade (Second Amended Complaint at 11,14; Watson Decl. ¶ 8). He admits he had covered his cell window so that officers were unable to see whether he was all right, and he admits he refused an order to remove the covering (doc. 164-4, Watson Dep. 30:3-18, 43:22-24). Mental Health Specialist Lena Lyons was notified of the situation (Defendants’ Statement of Material and Genuine Facts ¶ 1; Edelen Decl. ¶ 2). Edelen issued several verbal orders to Watson to cease his disruptive behavior and submit to hand restraints (id.). Upon hearing Ms. Lyons’s voice, Watson complied with Ede-len’s order and submitted to restraints, and video recording ceased (Watson Dep. 30:9-18, 43:9-24; Defendants’ Statement of Material and Genuine Facts ¶ 1; Edelen Decl. ¶ 2). When officers, including Defendant Johnson, attempted to open the door of Watson’s cell, it would not move because Watson had used his state-owned and personal property to barricade his cell door (Defendants’ Statement of Material and Genuine Facts ¶ 2; Edelen Decl. ¶ 3; doc. 124-3, Declaration of Robert Johnson ¶ 3). Defendant Edelen instructed Officer John Gaynor to retrieve'the cell-breaching tool, so that Watson could be-removed from his cell (Defendants’ Statement of Material and Genuine Facts ¶2; Edelen Decl. ¶ 3). Mental Health Specialist Lyons arrived on the wing at approximately 7:37 a.m., proceeded to Watson’s cell, and attempted to reassure Watson that he was safe and should allow her to counsel him and medical staff to treat his wounds (Second Amended Complaint at 14, ¶ 10; Ex. Ml, Fixed Wing Video at 07:37:12). Lyons remained in the wing until 7:43 a.m., when officers successfully removed Watson from his cell and escorted him to the mental health group room, where Lyons initially evaluated him (Second Amended Complaint at 14, ¶ 22; Defendants’ Statement of Material and Genuine Facts ¶ 2; Edelen Decl. ¶ 3; Johnson Decl. ¶ 3; Exs. M1-M2, Fixed Wing Video at 07:37:12-07:44:29)..

At 7:47 a.m., Watson was removed from the mental health group room and escort-' ed to a secure shower cell- (Defendants’ Statement of Material and Genuine Facts ¶ 2; Edelen Decl. ¶ 3; Johnson Decl. ¶ 3; Ex. Ml, Fixed Wing Video Ml at 07:43:16-07:43:47, Ex. M3, Fixed Wing Video). At 7:52 a.m., Watson was removed from the shower cell and escorted to the medical triage room for treatment (Defendants’ Statement of Material and Genuine Facts ¶ 3; Edelen Decl. ¶ 3; Johnson Decl. ¶ 3; Ex. M4, Fixed Wing Video at 07:52:07-07:52:20). SLPN Hawkins examined Watson and noted self-inflicted superficial lacerations to Watson’s bilateral forearms and scratches to his bilateral forehead (Defendants’ Statement of Material and Genuine Facts ¶ 3; doc. 124-4, Declaration of Bobby Hawkins ¶ 2, attached Abrasion/Laceration Protocol). The dimensions of the lacerations were approximately one centimeter long, .less than one centimeter ■wide, and less than one centimeter deep (id.). There was no embedded foreign ma-. terial in any of the wounds, and there was minimal bleeding (id.). Hawkins cleaned the lacerations and scratches with Beta-dine solution and dressed them with gauze and tape (id.). Watson was placed on SHOS at approximately 8:11 a.m. (doc. 159, Ex. C — 1, Observation Checklist).

Watson states that while he and Defendants Edelen, Hawkins, and Johnson were in the medical triage room, Defendants verbally agreed that Watson should be beaten during his escort to the infirmary and sprayed with chemical agents over the weekend as punishment for the “extra work” he created by injuring himself (Watson Decl. ¶¶ 15, 16, 19; Second Amended Complaint at 14). Defendants Edelen, Johnson, and Hawkins deny any such statements were made (Edelen Decl. ¶ 4; Johnson Decl. ¶ 4; Hawkins Decl. ¶ 3).

Watson left the medical triage room at approximately 8:15 a.m. (doc. 124-16, Declaration of Jeffrey Quesenberry ¶ 2, incorporated facts from attached Incident Report). Defendants state while Edelen, Johnson, and Officer Quesenberry were escorting Watson from C-dormitory to the infirmary to be evaluated by mental health personnel, Watson stopped walking (Defendants’ Statement of Material and Genuine Facts ¶ 4; Edelen Decl. ¶ 5; Johnson Decl. ¶ 5; Quesenberry Deck ¶ 2, incorporated facts from attached Incident Report). Defendants state Watson was given several verbal orders to continue walking to the infirmary (id.). They also state Watson attempted to pull away from the custodial grasp of Johnson and Quesenber-ry (id.). Defendants state they had to force Watson to the sidewalk in order for Johnson and Quesenberry to regain control of him (id.). Defendants state Watson continued resisting while on the ground, thus requiring them to hold him on the ground until he ceased his combative behavior (id.). Watson states Defendants slammed him onto the concrete sidewalk face first, while Edelen snatched his ankle shackles out from under him (Watson Deck ¶ 17). He states even though he screamed for help, the officers then struck his head, nose, back, and feet, and twisted his wrists and fingers (id., ¶ 18). Watson states he was not combative, aggressive, violent, or “physically resistant in any other way to any lawful command” (id. ¶ 20). He states he “did nothing wrong to justify the force used” (id. ¶21). During Watson’s deposition, he stated he believed that the officers intended to cause him pain but did not intend to leave visible physical injuries such that they would be required to initiate use-of-force reporting procedures (doc. 124-14, Watson. Dep. 98:18-99:21). After the use of force ceased, Officer Jeffrey Jacobus arrived with a han-dheld video camera from B-dormitory (Edelen Deck ¶ 5). Officer Jacobus initiated videotaping procedures, and Edelen gave a brief lead-in statement explaining what had occurred (id.). Edelen ordered Watson to stand up (id.). Officers assisted Watson to his feet and escorted him to the infirmary (id.).

Upon Watson’s arrival in the infirmary at approximately 8:25 a.m., Watson received a post-use-of-force physical by Registered Nurse Specialist Allen (Defendants’ Statement of Material and Genuine Facts ¶ 5; doc. 124-6, Declaration of Doctor Jordan Iserman, attached medical records). At approximately 8:30 a.m., Nurse Allen notified Dr. Iserman, a psychiatrist, that Watson was placed in an Isolation Management Room (“IMR”) for monitoring after a self-harm incident that resulted in superficial lacerations (id.). During Nurse Allen’s examination, Watson refused to have his vital signs checked (id.). Nurse Allen noted that Watson was verbally combative, ambulatory, oriented to person, place, time, and situation, and responding to questions verbally (id.). Nurse Allen noted only .the following injuries: “superficial lacerations to R[ight] A[nte] C[ubital], no active bleeding; wound to L[eft] knee— bloody; nose bleeding” (id.). No other injuries were noted (id.). In the section of the medical records marked “Treatment provided,” Nurse Allen checked “no” and wrote: “None needed, no active bleeding on wounds — dried blood” (Defendants’ Statement of Material and Genuine Facts ¶ 5; Iserman Deck, attached medical records). Watson made no complaints of pain to Nurse Allen (id.). Watson admits that the lacerations to his arm were self-inflicted (Watson Deck ¶ 8). Watson testified at his deposition that the nurse documented all of his physical injuries (bloody nose and scraped knee) associated with the use of force that day, except for pain and possibly a bruise to his left shoulder (Watson Dep. 124:1-125:23). During Nurse Allen’s examination, Watson alleged that staff attempted to sexually abuse him during the use of force (Edelen Deck ¶ 7). Defendant Edelen contacted the institutional inspector to advise him of the allegation of sexual abuse, and a Prison Rape Elimination Act number was assigned to the incident, separate from the Use of Force reference number assigned to the incident (id.).

After the post-use-of-force physical examination, Watson was secured in an IMR under SHOS (Defendants’ Statement of Material and Genuine Facts ¶ 6; Iserman Decl. ¶ 2; doc. 159, Ex. C-l). Lieutenant Edelen gave a closing statement on the video, and recording ceased (Edelen Decl. ¶ 8). Watson’s behavior was observed at fifteen-minute intervals by security or nursing staff during the nearly six-hour period he was on SHOS (doc. 159, Ex. C-1). According to staffs recorded observations, Watson was mostly lying or sitting, and occasionally standing still while talking to staff (id.). He refused a meal and fluids at approximately 10:00-10:15 a.m. (id.). Dr. Iserman evaluated Watson at approximately 2:10 p.m. (Iserman Decl. ¶ 3). His professional observations were the following:

Inmate has recently [complained of] “slowly losing it” since most recently removed from psychotropic medication (Lithium) which he specifically requested then refused on multiple occasions. Has provided rambling note which suggests psychotic, delusional preoccupation yet previous records of treatment do not document, psychotic thought processes, only manipulative behavior designed to obtain [secondary] gain.

M[ental] S[tatus] E[xam] Inmate has refused to speak [with] this examiner today. Observed in infirmary over the course of the day and has made no attempt to harm self or act out in dangerous fashion.

Impression: Axis I — Mood disorder N[ot]0[therwise]S[pecified] Axis II — A[nti]S[ocial]P[ersonality]D[isorder]

Plan: In light of current presentation, refusal to cooperate and past [history] indicative of repeated attempts to manipulate and failure to comply with treatment interventions, I believe he should be [discharged] to security as I can find no basis or reason in fact to refer for a higher level of psychiatric treatment.

(Defendants’ Statement of Material and Genuine Facts ¶ 6; Iserman Decl. ¶ 3, attached medical records). Dr. Iserman did not receive any input from SLPN Hawkins (id.). All of Dr. Herman’s psychiatric evaluations of Watson on March 1, 2012, were based upon his own professional opinion in light of his objective obseiwa-tions and his review of Watson’s medical records (id.). Based upon this observation, Dr. Iserman released Watson to security in stable condition (id.). Watson was last observed in SHOS at 2:15 p.m. (doc. 159, Ex. C-l).

Watson was returned to C-dormitory at approximately 2:20 p.m., and placed on property restrictions due to his using state and personal property to barricade his cell door earlier that morning (Defendants’ Statement of Material and Genuine Facts ¶ 7; Edelen Decl. ¶ 9, attached Daily Record of Special Housing).

Continuing to the second use of force at issue in this case, Defendants state that at approximately 11:25 a.m. on March 4, 2012, Defendant Sergeant Rogers was conducting security checks in C-dormitory when he observed Watson yelling obscenities into the wing and kicking on his cell door (Defendants’ Statement of Material and Genuine Facts ¶ 8; doc. 124-5, Declaration of Daryle Rogers' ¶ 2). Inmates may not yell and disrupt the operations of the dormitory for security and safety reasons (Rogers Decl. ¶ 3; Edelen Dec. ¶ 11). Yelling and kicking on cell doors inhibits the ability of correctional officers to hear what is going on in that wing (id,.). Officers may not be able to hear calls for assistance from inmates or other correctional officers (id.). Officers will also have difficulty communicating with each other if an inmate is yelling into the wing or kicking on his cell door (id.). Yelling obscenities into the wing could also initiate a riot on the wing (id.). Additionally, yelling into the wing is against the rules of the FDOC, and inmates must follow the rules as part of their rehabilitation process (id.).

Defendants state Sergeant Rogers attempted to counsel with Watson and gave Watson several orders to cease his disruptive behavior, but Watson refused all orders and continued to yell obscenities into the wing, kick on his door, and create a disturbance in the housing unit (Defendants’ Statement of Material and Genuine Facts ¶ 8; Rogers Decl. ¶ 4). Defendants state that at approximately 11:30 a.m., Sergeant Rogers contacted Lieutenant Edelen regarding Watson creating a disturbance on the wing (Defendants’ Statement of Material and Genuine Facts ¶ 8; Edelen Decl. ¶ 10; Rogers Decl. ¶ 4). Defendants state Lieutenant Edelen attempted to counsel with Watson and gave Watson several verbal orders to cease his disruptive behavior, but Watson refused all orders given to him (Defendants’ Statement of Material and Genuine Facts ¶ 8; Edelen Decl. ¶ 10). Edelen then reviewed Watson’s DC6-650B form, which indicated that Watson had no known medical conditions that would be exacerbated by the use of chemical agents (Defendants’ Statement of Material and Genuine Facts ¶ 8; Edelen Decl. ¶ 12, attached Risk Assessment for the Use of Chemical Restraint Agents and Electronic Immobilization Devices). SLPN Hawkins advised Edelen that Watson had no known medical conditions that would be exacerbated by the use of chemical agents (Defendants’ Statement of Material and Genuine Facts ¶ 8; Edelen Decl. ¶ 12). Edelen contacted the Duty Warden, Michael Booker, who authorized the use of chemical agent Oleoresin Capsicum (“OC”) if necessary to quell the disturbance Watson was creating (Defendants’ Statement of Material and Genuine Facts ¶ 8; Edelen Decl. ¶ 12, attached Authorization for Use of Force).

Lieutenant Edelen instructed Officer Joshua Burt to retrieve the C-dormitory handheld digital video camera for a possible chemical agent use of force on Watson (doc. 124-10, Declaration of Joshua Burt ¶¶ 2-3, incorporated facts from attached Incident Report). Officer Burt began videotaping procedures, and Lieutenant Ede-len gave a lead-in statement explaining the efforts made to quell the disturbance with non-force intervention efforts and the failure of those non-force intervention efforts (Defendants’ Statement of Material and Genuine Facts ¶ 9; Edelen Decl. ¶ 13; Burt Decl. ¶ 2, incorporated facts from attached Incident Report). At 12:01 p.m., Lieutenant Edelen, Sergeant Rogers, and Officer Burt approached Watson’s cell (Ex. Nl, Fixed Wing Video 12:01:34). Lieutenant Edelen ordered Watson to cease his disruptive behavior (Defendants’ Statement of Material and Genuine Facts ¶ 9; Edelen Decl. ¶ 13; Rogers Decl. ¶ 6; Burt Decl. ¶ 2, incorporated facts from attached Incident Report). At that time, Watson declared a psychological emergency (Defendants’ Statement of Material and Genuine Facts ¶ 9; Edelen Decl. ¶ 13; Rogers Decl. ¶ 6). Watson had engaged in self-injurious behavior by cutting his arms (id). Lieutenant Edelen ordered Officer Mark Delavega and Sergeant Rogers to put on personal protective equipment in response to Watson cutting his arms (Defendants’ Statement of Material and Genuine Facts ¶ 9; Edelen Decl. ¶ 13). Edelen observed Watson holding a razor blade and ordered him to flush the razor blade down the toilet, and Watson complied (id). Lieutenant Edelen advised Watson that this was his final order to cease his disruptive behavior and that chemical agents would be administered if Watson did not cease his disruptive behavior (Defendants’ Statement of Material and Genuine Facts ¶ 10; Edelen Decl. ¶ 14). Edelen advised Watson that this warning would not be repeated prior to the application of chemical agents in the event Watson resumed his disruptive behavior after Edelen and the caméra operator (Officer Burt) left the wing (id). Defendants state Sergeant Rogers ordered Watson to submit to wrist restraints, but Watson refused to comply (Defendants’ Statement of Material and Genuine Facts ¶ 10; Rogers Decl. ¶ 7; De-lavega Decl. ¶¶2, 5, incorporated facts from attached Incident Report).

SLPN Hawkins was notified that Watson was declaring a psychological emergency and threatening acts of self-harm (Hawkins Decl. ¶ 6). At approximately 12:08 p.m., Hawkins entered the wing to perform a cell-front examination of Watson (Hawkins Decl. ¶ 6; Ex. Nl, Fixed Wing Video at 12:08:47). Defendants states Hawkins advised Watson to submit to wrist restraints so that his wounds could be treated, but Watson refused (Defendants’'Statement of Material and Genuine' Facts ¶ 10; Hawkins Decl. ¶ 6). Defendants state Watson subsequently ceased his disruptive behavior, so Lieutenant Edelen gave a brief closing statement, video recording ceased, and Edelen, Hawkins, and Officer Burt left the wing at approximately 12:09 p.m. (Defendants’ Statement of Material and Genuine Facts ¶ 10; Ede-len Decl. ¶ 14; Rogers Decl. ¶ 7; Burt Decl. ¶ 2, incorporated facts from attached Incident Report; Ex. Nl, Fixed Wing Video at 12:09:39). At approximately 12:23 p.m., Watson submitted to wrist restraints and exited his cell (Ex. Nl, Fixed Wing Video at 12:23:48).

Watsoh tells a very different version of the events that morning. He states Lieutenant Edelen came to his cell door and told him to get ready to be tortured with chemical agents to deter him and other inmates from “trying to go psych” (Watson Decl. ¶ 58). Watson states Edelen offered to spray him with chemical agents only once and return Watson’s property, bedding, linen, and clothing the next day if Watson agreed not to resist the application of chemical agents by “go[ing] psych” (id. ¶ 59). Watson states at 11:25 a.m., Sergeant Rogers came to his cell door and asked if he still accepted Edelen’s offer of returning Watson’s property, bedding, linen, and clothing if Watson allowed Edelen to spray him only once without resisting by trying to “go psych” (id. ¶ 62). Watson states he told Rogers yes (id.). Watson states he then attempted to cut his antecu-bital veins and stabbed two pieces of metal partway into his abdomen to avoid being sprayed with chemical agents (id. ¶¶ 64). Watson states he was not participating in or inciting a disturbance on the wing, and he specifically denies he ever kicked or banged on his cell door at .any time (Watson’s Statement of Disputed Facts ¶ 82). He states he was not verbally loud at any time, except for his “self-harm expressions” (id.).

Upon Watson’s exiting his cell at 12:23 p.m., Sergeant Rogers and Officer Delave-ga began escorting Watson to the medical triage room; however, during the escort, Watson laid down on the floor (Defendants’ Statement of Material and Genuine Facts ¶ 10; Rogers Decl. ¶ 8; Delavega Decl. ¶ 2, incorporated facts from attached Incident Report; Ex. Nl, Fixed Wing Video at 12:23:46-12:24:04). Sergeant Rogers and Officer Delavega state Watson refused to walk (Rogers Decl. ¶ 8; Delavega Decl. ¶ 2, incorporated facts from attached Incident Report). Watson states he was walking “sluggishly” due to the pain he was experiencing from his self-inflicted wounds (Watson Decl. ¶83). He states he “collapsed” to the floor on his side and saw the metal “rods” still sticking out of his stomach, and he admits he continued to lie on the floor (id. ¶¶ 83-85). SLPN Hawkins and Lieutenant Edelen returned to the wing at 12:25, and Hawkins advised Watson that he needed to continue walking to medical so he could be medically assessed and treated (Defendants’ Statement of Material and Genuine Facts ¶ 10; Edelen Decl. 15; Hawkins Decl. ¶ 6; Ex. Nl, Fixed Wing Video at 12:25:11-12:25:32). Sergeant Rogers and Officer Delavega assisted Watson to his feet and escorted Watson ther rest of the way to the medical triage room (Defendants’ Statement of Material and Genuine Facts ¶ 10; Rogers Decl. ¶ 8; Delavega Decl. ¶ 2, incorporated facts from attached Incident Report; Hawkins Decl. ¶ 6; Edelen Decl. ¶ 15; Ex. Nl, Fixed Wing Video at 12:25:32-12:26:05). Lieutenant Edelen and Sergeant Rogers state that at no time did they see any metal rods sticking out of Watson’s abdomen (Edelen Decl. ¶ 15; Rogers Decl. ¶ 8). Watson states the metal pieces were visible when he exited his cell (Watson Decl. ¶ 83). Additionally, Inmate Eric Evans states he saw a “shinny metal-like object” sticking out of Watson’s abdomen before Watson fell on the floor and after he got up (doc. 159, Ex. B, Declaration of Eric Evans ¶ 12).

Watson arrived at the medical triage room at approximately 12:27 p.m. (Ex. N4, Fixed Wing Video 12:27:36). Once inside the medical triage room, SLPN Hawkins assessed Watson’s injuries. He noted that Watson had self-inflicted superficial lacerations to his right arm, left arm, and abdomen (Defendants’ Statement of Material and Genuine Facts ¶ 11; Hawkins Decl. ¶ 7, attached Abrasion/Laceration Protocol). SLPN Hawkins noted the approximate size and depth of the lacerations as 2 centimeters in length, less than 1 centimeter in width, and less than 1 centimeter in depth (id.). Hawkins also noted an old abrasion to Watson’s left knee (id.). Hawkins did not observe any active bleeding or embedded material in Watson’s wounds (id.). Hawkins noted Watson’s voiced pain■ level was a zero on a scale of one to ten (id.). Hawkins cleaned Watson’s self-inflicted wounds with Betadine solution and dressed them with gauze and tape (id.). Watson states he still had two pieces of metal sticking out of his stomach when he arrived in the medical triage room (Watson Decl. ¶ 92). He states after Hawkins cleaned and dressed the wounds to his arms, Hawkins “snatched” one piece of metal out of Watson’s abdomen, and then forced the other piece completely into his stomach (id.). In Watson’s deposition, he admitted he did not actually see Hawkins do anything with the metal pieces (Watson Dep. 160:2-161:13). Further, he made vague and somewhat contradictory statements about why he believed that Hawkins had forced one piece of metal into his abdomen and removed the other. Watson stated he “felt” Hawkins remove one piece of metal (Watson Dep. 161:4); yet he also stated he did not know until “months and months later” that Hawkins had removed one piece of metal (Watson Dep. 159:25-160:3). Regarding the other piece of metal, Watson stated he “thought” Hawkins had removed both pieces (Watson Dep. 161:3-5); yet he also stated he “felt it when he [Hawkins] hit it i