Citations
- 8 F. Supp. 3d 188
Full opinion text
RULING ON DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
ALVIN W. THOMPSON, District Judge.
This action is brought by the Vietnam Veterans of America (“WA”) Connecticut Greater Hartford Chapter 120, Vietnam Veterans of America, Vietnam Veterans of America Southern Connecticut Chapter 251, Vietnam Veterans of America Connecticut Chapter 270, and Vietnam Veterans of America Connecticut State Council against defendants United States Department of Defense (the “DoD”) and its components Department of the Army, Department of the Navy and Department of the Air Force and its subcomponents the United States Marine Corps, the National Guard Bureau, the Army National Guard, and the Air National Guard; the United States Department of Homeland Security (“the DHS”) and its component, the United States Coast Guard; and the United States Department of Veterans Affairs (“VA”) and its components, the Veterans Health Administration and the Veterans Benefits Administration, alleging violations of the Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”), 5 U.S.C. § 552.
The Amended Complaint seeks declaratory and injunctive relief compelling the disclosure and release of agency records. Specifically, the plaintiffs request the release of records beginning in October 1, 2001 regarding the defendants’ use of personality disorder discharges when separating service members from the armed forces. The defendants have moved for summary judgment. For the reasons set forth below, the motion is being granted in part and denied in part.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In late October 2010, the plaintiffs sent FOIA requests to: the DoD and seven DoD components: the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, the Marine Corps, the National Guard Bureau, the Army National Guard, and the Air National Guard; the Coast Guard (a component of the DHS); and two components of the VA, the Veterans Health Administration and the Veterans Benefits Administration. The FOIA request letters requested “all records related to the use by branches of the United States Armed Forces of personality disorder discharges and adjustment disorder discharges to separate members of the Armed Forces from service since October 1. 2001.” (Am. Compl. Ex. A (Doc. No. 22) at 1; Am. Compl. Ex. C (Doc. No. 24) at 1). The letters also provided a nonexclusive list of the types of records the plaintiffs were interested in. In each of the requests, the plaintiffs agreed to pay search, duplication and review fees up to $100, but sought a fee waiver or reduction of any amount greater than $100.
By letters dated February 21, 2011, plaintiff WA Chapter 270 sent nine additional FOIA requests to the DoD, its seven components, and the Coast Guard. The requests were identical in substance to the October 2010 requests submitted to the same components. Additionally, by letters dated March 7, 2011, plaintiffs WA Chapter 251 and WA Connecticut State Council sent another nine FOIA requests to DoD, its seven components, and the Coast Guard. These requests were identical in substance to the October 2010 and February 2011 requests.
On December 15, 2010 the plaintiffs filed suit alleging that the defendants violated FOIA by failing to provide documents responsive to the plaintiffs’ requests and seeking to compel the release of such documents. Subsequent to the filing of the complaint, the defendants conducted searches for responsive documents and produced to the plaintiffs the documents they found. The plaintiffs contend, however, that the searches and the defendants’ declarations with respect to their searches are inadequate.
After this litigation was commenced, the plaintiffs expressed to the defendants that their initial FOIA requests included not just aggregate data and policy documents, as the DoD and the Coast Guard had construed the requests, but also the personnel records (hereinafter “separation packets”) of all of the service members discharged on the basis of a personality disorder since October 1, 2001. The defendants expressed skepticism as to the plaintiffs’ position, so on April 4, 2011 the plaintiffs sent letters to the DoD and the Coast Guard in an attempt to eliminate any question as to the scope of their initial requests. After sending the April 4, 2011 request letters, the plaintiffs’ counsel and the defendants’ counsel discussed how they would proceed with the new requests. The parties discussed the fact that the documents that the defendants were scheduled to release in May 2011 might sufficiently address the issues that the plaintiffs were interested in and thereby obviate the need for the individual separation packets. Thei’efore, the parties agreed that the plaintiffs would review the documents the defendants were scheduled to release in May 2011 and then determine how they wanted to proceed with respect to the separation packets.
The plaintiffs received the majority of the responsive documents on June 2, 2011. The plaintiffs also received “a handful of additional records [that] have been discovered and released as a result of supplemental searches.” (Local Rule 56(a)(1) Stmt. ¶ 10). The documents the plaintiffs received total more than 1,300 pages, and the defendants directed the plaintiffs to additional documents that were already publicly available. The defendants withheld one document, an email between a staff judge and his Air Force clients, pursuant to FOIA Exemptions 5 and 6. The Air Force also redacted the names and contact information of individuals “below the SES-level or military equivalent” pursuant to Exemption 6. (Local Rule 56(a)(1) Stmt. ¶ 11).
After reviewing the documents, the plaintiffs’ counsel informed the defendants’ counsel that the plaintiffs still sought the individual separation packets. The defendants agreed to provide the plaintiffs with several sample separation packets in order to help the plaintiffs narrow their requests. Sample separation packets from the Army, Navy and Marines were provided to the plaintiffs on July 29, 2011. At the plaintiffs’ request, another sample separation packet from the Navy was provided on September 14, 2011, and some additional documents from the sample service members’ personnel files provided by the Marines and the Army were released to the plaintiffs on September 16, 2011 and October 21, 2011, respectively. The defendants redacted certain information from the packets, invoking FOIA Exemption 6.
Based on the sample separation packets they received, the plaintiffs told the defendants that they would “narrow their request to a small, randomized sample of approximately 1,624 individual files.” (Local Rule 56(a)(2) Stmt. ¶ 21). The plaintiffs also stated their willingness to narrow their requests for the VA claims files.
II. LEGAL STANDARD
A motion for summary judgment may not be granted unless the court determines that there is no genuine issue of material fact to be tried and that the facts as to which there is no such issue warrant judgment for the moving party as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986); Gallo v. Prudential Residential Servs., 22 F.3d 1219, 1223 (2d Cir.1994). On a motion for summary judgment in a FOIA action, “the defending agency has the burden of showing that its search was adequate and that any withheld documents fall within an exemption to the FOIA.” Carney v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 19 F.3d 807, 812 (2d Cir. 1994) (citing 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B); EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 79, 93 S.Ct. 827, 35 L.Ed.2d 119 (1973)). To satisfy that burden, the agency may rely on “[ajffidavits or declarations supplying facts indicating that the agency has conducted a thorough search and [explaining in reasonable detail] why any withheld documents fall within an exemption.” Id.
To establish the adequacy of a search, an agency affidavit or declaration must be “relatively detailed and non-con-elusory” and “submitted in good faith.” SafeCard Servs., Inc. v. SEC, 926 F.2d 1197, 1200 (D.C.Cir.1991) (quotation marks omitted); see also Wood v. FBI, 432 F.3d 78, 85 (2d Cir.2005). This means, for instance, that an agency affidavit or declaration must describe in reasonable detail the scope of the search and the search terms or methods employed. See, e.g., Maynard v. CIA 986 F.2d 547, 559 (1st Cir.1993); N.Y. Times Co. v. U.S. Dep’t of Def., 499 F.Supp.2d 501, 518 (S.D.N.Y.2007). Because “[a]ffidavits submitted by an agency are accorded a presumption of good faith[,] ... discovery relating to the agency’s search and the exemptions it claims for withholding records generally is unnecessary if the agency’s submissions are adequate on their face.” Carney, 19 F.3d at 812 (quotation marks omitted).
III. DISCUSSION
A. Individual Service Member Files
The plaintiffs argue that the searches conducted by the DoD, its components, and the Veterans Health Administration are facially inadequate because the agencies did not construe the plaintiffs’ requests to include individual service member files.
1. Department of Defense Separation Packets
The DoD argues that the plaintiffs’ original requests did not encompass the individual separation packets and that it was reasonable for the DOD and its components to interpret the requests as seeking only aggregate data. The defendants argue, in the alternative, that if the requests did include the separation packets, the request is unduly burdensome.
“[A]n agency is obligated to construe a FOIA request liberally.” Servicemembers Legal Defense Network v. Dep’t of Defense and Dep’t of Justice, 471 F.Supp.2d 78, 86 (D.D.C.2007). “When the request demands all agency records on a given subject then the agency is obliged to pursue any ‘clear and certain’ lead it cannot in good faith ignore.” Halpern v. F.B.I., 181 F.3d 279, 288 (2d Cir.1999) (quoting Kowalczyk v. Dep’t of Justice, 73 F.3d 386, 389 (D.C.Cir.1996)).
Here, the plaintiffs’ FOIA request letters contain an introductory paragraph which is followed by a non-exhaustive list of specific types of information they seek. In the last sentence in the introductory paragraph, the plaintiffs state, “This letter requests all records related to the use by branches of the United States Armed Forces of personality disorder discharges and adjustment disorder and/or readjustment disorder discharges to separate members of the Armed Forces from service since October 1, 2001.” (Am. Compl. Ex. A at 1 (emphasis added); Am. Compl. Ex. C at 1 (emphasis added)). The letters define “records” as “all records or communications preserved in electronic or written form, including but not limited to correspondence, documents, data, videotapes, audio tapes, emails, faxes, files, guidance, guidelines, evaluations, instructions, analy-ses, memoranda, agreements, notes, orders, policies, procedures, protocols, reports, rules, technical manuals, technical specifications, training manuals, or studies.” (Am. Compl. Ex. A at 1 n. 1; Am. Compl. Ex. C at 1 n. 1). Although many of the specifically enumerated items refer to aggregate data and policies, the last sentence of the introductory paragraph makes it clear that the plaintiffs are seeking all records related to the use of personality disorder and adjustment disorder discharges to separate service members. See Serv. Women’s Action Network v. Dep’t of Defense (“SWAN I”), 888 F.Supp.2d 231, 242 (D.Conn.2012) (“The fact that every other request&emdash;in both the DoD and VA FOIA letters&emdash;appears to ask for aggregate data does not mean that [one specific request] may not ask for individual data. It may explain why Defendants misread the request, but it is disingenuous for Defendants to now attempt to argue that this [request] never asked for ‘all records.’ ”). The individual separation packets for members who were separated for such reasons fall squarely within the documents requested in the plaintiffs’ FOIA letters.
However, “an agency need not respond to a request that is so broad as to impose an unreasonable burden upon the agency, such as one which requires the agency to locate, review, redact, and arrange for inspection a vast quantity of material.” Serv. Women’s Action Network v. Dep’t of Defense (“SWAN II”), 888 F.Supp.2d 282, 290 (D.Conn.2012) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Halpern, 181 F.3d at 288 (“[A]n agency need not conduct a search that plainly is unduly burdensome.”).
The defendants estimate that there exist approximately 26,000 individual separation packets. The plaintiffs believe that the number is closer to 31,000. The defendants state that the separation packets contain personally identifying information and would therefore have to be heavily redacted before they could be released to the plaintiffs. Using the more conservative figure of 26,000 and assuming that the average separation packet contains 50 pages, the defendants estimate that it would take approximately 27 years and cost $571,912 in search fees and $194,985 in duplication fees to search for and produce the individual separation packets at a rate of 80 packets per month. (Herring-ton Decl. (Doc. No. 37-20) ¶¶ 23, 24).
The plaintiffs do not contest the time and cost estimates or dispute that searching for and producing all of the individual separation packets would be unduly burdensome. Rather, the plaintiffs state that they have indicated their willingness to narrow their request to a representative sample of the separation packets and that the narrowed request is not unduly burdensome. In the context of settlement negotiations, the plaintiffs initially offered to accept a sample of 8% of personality disorder separation packets. The plaintiffs then revised their offer to accept approximately 5.64% of personality disorder separation packets, which would constitute approximately 1,624 individual separation packets. In their opposition memorandum, although the plaintiffs do not state what percentage of adjustment disorder separation packets they would seek, they state that they are “willing to narrow their request.” (Pis.’ Mem. Opp. Mot. Summ. J. (Doc. No. 42) at 10).
The defendants argue, and the court agrees, that the court should not consider whether the plaintiffs’ proposed narrowed search would be unduly burdensome. Under FOIA, requesters may modify their requests after submission. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(6)(B)(ii) (“The agency shall ... provide the person an opportunity to limit the scope of the request.”). However, “no statute requires a court to allow FOIA modifications during the course of litigation.” Serv. Women’s Action Network v. Dep’t of Defense (“SWAN III”), No. 3:11-CV-1534(SRU), 2013 WL 1149946, at *3 (D.Conn. Mar. 19, 2013). Thus, it is proper for the court to rule on “the only request actually before [it].” Id. at *4; see also Wilson v. U.S. Dep’t of Transp., 730 F.Supp.2d 140, 155 (D.D.C. 2010) (“[A]n agency need only conduct a search as to the original request, and not to subsequent additions or clarifications.”).
The record here does not contain information sufficient for the court to assess the reasonableness of the narrowed search that the plaintiffs propose. While the plaintiffs have proposed to accept approximately 5.64% of personality disorder separation packets, they have not identified the scope of their request for adjustment disorder separation packets. Without knowing what the request is, the court cannot determine if it is a reasonable one. More importantly, the DoD and its components have not made an administrative determination as to whether they would grant the plaintiffs’ narrowed request for separation packets and whether the plaintiffs’ narrowed request is unduly burdensome. Ruling on the reasonableness of the scope of the narrowed request would allow an end-run around the requirement that FOIA requesters exhaust their administrative remedies. See Oglesby v. U.S. Dep’t of Army, 920 F.2d 57, 61 (D.C.Cir.1990) (“Exhaustion of administrative remedies is generally required before filing suit in federal court so that the agency has an opportunity to exercise its discretion and expertise on the matter and to make a factual record to support its decision.”).
Because the court can only consider the request actually before it&emdash;here, the request for all of the individual service members’ separation packets&emdash;the court concludes that the plaintiffs’ original request would have imposed an unreasonable burden on the defendants, and therefore they are not required to respond. See Am. Fed’n of Gov’t Emps., Local 2782 v. U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, 907 F.2d 203, 209 (D.C.Cir.1990) (“An agency need not honor a request that requires an unreasonably burdensome search.”).
2. Veterans Administration Files
With respect to the VA files, the defendant argues that the plaintiffs’ request for the individual files is unduly burdensome. The defendants state that the plaintiffs’ request would require the Veterans Benefits Administration (the ‘VBA”) to search through approximately 797,050 files located at 67 different facilities. The search for the documents itself would take approximately 890,000 hours and cost $35,284,730. The labor required to redact and duplicate the identified documents would take approximately 600,320 hours and cost $16,568,832. The estimated duplication fees would total approximately $1,125,000. Searching for and duplicating the individual files at the VHA would involve a process similar to that at the VBA. The VHA estimates that the process would take approximately 4,000,000 hours.
As with the DoD separation packets, the plaintiffs do not contest the time and cost estimates or dispute that searching for and producing all of the claims files would be unduly burdensome. The plaintiffs instead say that they are willing to narrow the scope of their request so that it is not unduly burdensome. However, it is apparent from the plaintiffs’ opposition memorandum that their offer to narrow the scope of their request to the VA was not made prior to the commencement of this litigation. The plaintiffs state that they “hereby narrow their request for all VBA claims files and VHA application files to a sample of these files that correlates with the sample of [personality disorder] and [adjustment disorder] separation packets requested from DoD and its military components.” (Pis.’ Mem. Opp. Mot. Summ. J. at 15). The plaintiffs then state that, alternatively, they would be willing to accept aggregate data from the VA.
For the reasons set forth above with respect to the separation packets, the court cannot consider the plaintiffs’ proposed narrowed search, especially where the proposal is made for the first time in the plaintiffs’ memorandum in opposition to the motion for summary judgment. The court can only consider the request that was actually made to the VA. Because the original request made by the plaintiffs was unduly burdensome, the VA is not required to respond.
B. Search and Duplication Fees
In their opposition to the motion for summary judgment, the plaintiffs’ state that the “[defendants have unlawfully charged search and duplication fees.” (Pis.’ Mem. Opp. Mot. Summ. J. at 19). While the plaintiffs’ memorandum is unclear as to which defendants have charged search and duplication fees and for which records, it appears that the plaintiffs are referring to the individual service member files discussed in Section III.A, above. Because the court has determined that the plaintiffs’ requests for the individual service member files are unduly burdensome and the defendants were not required to respond, the issue of whether search and duplication fees may be assessed is moot.
C. Adequacy of Agency Searches
The defendants have moved for summary judgment on the adequacy of the searches that each agency undertook in responding to the plaintiffs’ FOIA requests. The plaintiffs argue that the defendants have not met their burden of showing that the searches were adequate and object to the declarations submitted in support of the searches.
FOIA mandates that in responding to “a request for records, an agency shall make reasonable efforts to search for the records.... ” 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3)(C). To prevail on summary judgment when the adequacy of an agency’s search is at issue, “the defending agency must show beyond material doubt that it has conducted a search reasonably calculated to uncover all relevant documents.” Morley v. CIA, 508 F.3d 1108, 1114 (D.C.Cir.2007) (internal quotations omitted). “[T]he issue to be resolved is not whether there might exist any other documents possibly responsive to the request, but rather whether the search for those documents was adequate.” Weisberg v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 745 F.2d 1476, 1485 (D.C.Cir.1984) (emphasis in original). The adequacy of the agency’s search is judged by a standard of reasonableness. See Grand Cent. P’Ship, Inc. v. Cuomo, 166 F.3d 473, 489 (2d Cir.1999) (“[A]n agency’s search need not be perfect, but rather need only be reasonable.”).
“In adjudicating the adequacy of the agency’s identification and retrieval efforts, the trial court may be warranted in relying upon agency affidavits.” Morley, 508 F.3d at 1116. “The Second Circuit has adopted the D.C. Circuit position that such reliance is only appropriate, however, when agency affidavits are relatively detailed and nonconclusory, and submitted in good faith.” El Badrawi v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 583 F.Supp.2d 285, 298 (D.Conn.2008) (citing Grand Cent. P’Ship, 166 F.3d at 488-89) (internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, “[a] district court in a FOIA case may grant summary judgment in favor of an agency on the basis of agency affidavits if they contain reasonable specificity of detail rather than merely conclusory statements, and if they are not called into question by contradictory evidence in the record or by evidence of agency bad faith.” Grand Cent. P’Ship, 166 F.3d at 478 (emphasis in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
In reviewing affidavits for “reasonable specificity,” district courts will look for an affidavit to “set[] forth the search terms and the type of search performed, and aver[] that all files likely to contain responsive materials (if such records exist) were searched....” Oglesby v. U.S. Dep’t of Army, 920 F.2d 57, 68 (D.C.Cir.1990). Additionally, an “affidavit! ] should identify the searched files and describe at least generally the structure of the agency’s file system which renders any further search unlikely to disclose additional relevant information.” El Badrawi, 583 F.Supp.2d at 298 (internal quotation marks omitted). An agency need not describe all of its file systems, but instead “an adequate description need only provide reasonable detail about the parameters and execution of an agency’s search and aver that all files likely to contain responsive material were searched.” SWAN I, 888 F.Supp.2d 231, 245 (D.Conn.2012).
“Affidavits submitted by an agency are accorded a presumption of good faith.” Carney v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 19 F.3d 807, 812 (2d Cir.1994). Thus, if agency submissions are adequate on their face, “the plaintiff must make a showing of bad faith on the part of the agency sufficient to impugn the agency’s affidavits or declarations.” Id.
“An affidavit from an agency employee responsible for supervising a FOIA search is all that is needed to satisfy Rule 56(e); there is no need for the agency to supply affidavits from each individual who participated in the actual search.” Id. at 814. However, “the agency employee submitting an affidavit must have some personal involvement in supervising the FOIA search.” El Badrawi, 583 F.Supp.2d at 298.
“If agency affidavits fail to meet standards, a “district court will have a number of options for eliciting further detail from the government. It may require supplemental ... affidavits or may permit appellant further discovery.” ” Halpern, 181 F.3d at 295. “When the courts have permitted discovery in FOIA cases, it is generally limited to the scope of the agency’s search.” El Badrawi, 583 F.Supp.2d at 301. Further, courts have consistently held that “a court should not, of course, cut off discovery before a proper record has been developed; for example, where the agency’s response raises serious doubts as to the completeness of the agency’s search, where the agency’s response is patently incomplete, or where the agency’s response is for some other reason unsatisfactory.” Exxon Corp. v. FTC, 466 F.Supp. 1088, 1094 (D.D.C.1978).
1. Department of Defense
In support of its motion for summary judgment, the DoD submitted the declarations of William Kammer (“Kammer”), Chief, Office of Freedom of Information Division; Michael Pachuta (“Pachuta”), Deputy Director for Policy, Officer & Enlisted Personnel Management, Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Military Personnel Policy; Samuel Peterson (“Peterson”), Freedom of Information Act and Privacy Act Specialist for the Defense Manpower Data Center; Linda Thomas (“Thomas”), Director, Tricare Management Activity Privacy and Civil Liberties Office; and Robert Welch (“Welch”), Executive Officer and Chief of Staff for the Armed Forces Health Surveillance Center.
After receiving the plaintiffs’ request, the Freedom of Information Division at the DoD “tasked” the Defense Manpower Data Center (“DMDC”), the Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness (“OUSD (P & R)”), the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to conduct a search for responsive records. The Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs (“OASD (HA)”) was later tasked to conduct a search as well. The offices were chosen based on the nature of the work performed by the agency.
The DMDC maintains “the largest and most comprehensive central archive of personnel, manpower, casualty, pay, entitlements, procurement, survey, testing, training and financial data in the DoD.” (Rammer Decl. (Doc. No. 37-3) ¶ 5). DMDC informed the Freedom of Information Division that it only maintained documents responsive to Items 1 and 2 of the plaintiffs’ request. After determining how separations for personality disorder were coded in DMDC’s files, DMDC searched “its Active Duty Military Personnel Transaction File, Reserve Components Common Personnel Data System Transaction File, and Contingency Tracking System File” for separations based on personality disorder. (Samuel Peterson Decl. (Doc. No. 37-5) ¶ 12).
The declarations submitted by Rammer and Peterson are insufficient to show that DMDC conducted an adequate search. The declarations do not describe DMDC’s filing system, but instead only list the files that DMDC searched. Rammer and Peterson do not state why those files were selected to be searched at the exclusion of others. Additionally, Peterson does not describe how the search of DMDC’s files was conducted. While he explains the process whereby DMDC determined which search terms to use, he does not state which search terms ultimately were used. Thus, the court is unable to determine whether the search conducted by DMDC was adequate.
The OUSD (P & R) “develops policies, plans, and programs to ensure the readiness of the Total Force as well as the efficient and effective support of peacetime operations and contingency planning preparedness.” (Rammer Decl. ¶ 7). Pachu-ta conducted a physical search of office administrative files for documents responsive to the plaintiffs’ request. He also conducted a search for electronically stored files. Pachuta describes that the OUSD (P & R) has an “electronic file system on a shared drive that maintains folders on the various military personnel policy subjects administered by the office.” (Pachuta Supp. Decl. (Doc. No. 45-11) ¶ 1). He searched the Separations Policy folder and the Hearing Preparation folder using the key words “personality disorder,” “adjustment disorder” and “readjustment disorder.” He also used the same key words to search the Office of the Secretary of Defense Staff Action Correspondence Control Portal, which contains electronic files of all staff actions since 2007 by offices within the Office of the Secretary of Defense.
The declarations provided by Rammer and Pachuta do not adequately describe OUSD (P & R)’s search to show that it was reasonably calculated to find all responsive documents. While Pachuta describes that OUSD (P & R) maintains an electronic file system, he does not explain why he searched only two folders on the shared drive for responsive documents. Additionally, he refers to the Secretary of Defense Staff Action Correspondence Control Portal as containing files of all staff actions, but he does not describe what he means by “staff actions” or what types of documents could be expected to be found in the Portal. Thus, the declarations do not show that OUSD (P & R)’s search was adequate.
The OASD (HA) “oversees the DoD Military Health System, a global medical network within the DoD that provides healthcare to all U.S. military personnel worldwide.” (Kammer Decl. ¶ 11). Thomas states Health Affairs (“HA”) and Tricare Management Activity (“TMA”) “are logical places to search.” (Thomas Decl. ¶ 4). TMA and HA contain have databases, but they were not searched because neither database maintains military discharge status. Additionally, it was determined that DMDC could produce more comprehensive results, and therefore HA and TMA “were not the agencies of record for the requested records.” (Thomas Deck ¶ 5).
OASD (HA) also “tasked” the Office of Chief Medical Officer and the Office of Deputy Assistant Secretary for Force Health Protection and Readiness (“FHP & R”) to search for records responsive to the plaintiffs’ request. The Deputy Chief Medical Officer at the Office of Chief Medical Officer reported that based on his personal knowledge of the office, the office did not contain responsive records. However, the Deputy Chief Medical Officer suggested that searches be conducted at the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense, Military Personnel Policy and the OUSD (P & R). FHP & R searched three of its subordinate offices most likely to contain responsive records: the Armed Forces Medical Health Surveillance Center; the Defense Center of Excellence for Psychological Health and Traumatic Brain Injury; and the Office of Psychological Health Strategic Operations.
The Armed Forces Medical Health Surveillance Center “is the central epidemiological health resource for the U.S. Military.” (Welch Deck (Doc. No. 45-13) 113). The center maintains the Defense Medical Surveillance System, which contains “up-to-date and historical data on recorded health diagnoses ... and experiences of Service members throughout their military careers.” (Welch Deck ¶ 3). The center informed the plaintiffs that it was unable to respond to their request because the “data maintained in the [Defense Medical Surveillance System] do not include separation records nor contain details on the reasons Service members are separated from the military.” (Welch Deck ¶ 7).
The Defense Center of Excellence for Psychological Health and Traumatic Brain Injury reviewed its database for responsive information. It also reviewed the Armed Forces Health Longitudinal Applications system. However, “it was determined that these databases lacked the necessary data elements, chiefly, their database does not include discharge status.” (Thomas Deck ¶ 8). The center suggested that the FHP & R front office be searched. However, the front office “de-dined to search” based on their “knowledge of their mission functions and associated sets of records.” (Thomas Decl. ¶ 8).
Despite the fact that the Office of Psychological Health Strategic Operations was identified as one of the three FHP & R offices most likely to have responsive records, Thomas states that the office “would not have been tasked to search ... based on the FHP & R front office referral to [the Office of Chief Medical Officer].” (Thomas Decl. ¶ 8).
The court finds that the declarations submitted in support of OASD (HA)’s searches are insufficient to show that OASD (HA) conducted a search that was reasonably calculated to uncover all relevant documents. Thomas’s declaration shows that all but one of the offices which were directed to search for responsive records simply declined to do so, stating that they would not have responsive documents. However, her declaration does not describe what those offices do contain and why they would not have any responsive documents. In fact, Thomas’s declaration reflects that none of the offices within OASD (HA) conducted an actual search. Additionally, Thomas’s declaration shows that two offices potentially containing responsive documents were never searched. The Deputy Chief Medical Officer suggested that the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense, Military Personnel Policy might have responsive records, but Thomas does not aver that that office was ever searched or explain why it was not. Likewise, Thomas does not explain why FHP & R’s front office’s referral to the Office of the Chief Medical Officer would obviate the need to search the Office of Psychological Health Strategic Operations when it was identified as one of the three FHP & R offices likely to have responsive records. Thus, OASD (HA) has not shown that it conducted an adequate search.
Based on the foregoing, the declarations submitted by the DoD do not meet their burden of showing beyond material doubt that the search conducted by the DoD was adequate. Therefore, the motion for summary judgment is being denied as to the adequacy of the search and the plaintiffs are permitted limited discovery concerning the adequacy of the search.
2. Army
In support of its motion for summary judgment, the Army submitted the declarations of eleven individuals: Mary Nance Jordan (“Jordan”), Program Analyst, Freedom of Information and Privacy Act Specialist for the U.S. Army; Kathleen Vaughn-Burford (“Vaughn-Burford”), Management Analyst in the Department of the Army G — 1; Gerald Conway (“Conway”), Deputy Chief, Enlisted Career Systems Division; David Sproat (“Sproat”), Assistant Deputy for Health Affairs in the Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army for Manpower & Reserve Affairs; Ronald Hoggard (“Hoggard”), Information Release Specialist for the Department of the Army Human Resources Command; Lawrence Bosworth (“Bos-worth”), Chief, Operations/Training Branch, HRC PERSIND/Technology Division; Scott Kuhar (“Ruhar”), Chief, Transition Branch, HRC; Jose Burgos (“Burgos”), Chief, Freedom of Information Program for the Chief Attorney and Legal Services Directorate, Office of the Administrative Assistant to the Secretary of the Army; Rudolph Roger (“Roger”), Chief of Staff for the Army Review Boards Agency; John Peterson (“Peterson”), Chief, Freedom of Information and Privacy Act Office, Headquarters, U.S. Army Medical Command; and Jacquelyn Randolph (“Randolph”), Chief, Attitude and Opinion Research Unit, U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences.
Jordan’s declaration discusses the initial steps that were taken after the Army received the plaintiffs’ request letters. Based on, inter alia, her consultation with Peterson, Internet review of various agencies’ functions and where similar requests had been referred to in the past, Jordan determined that the request should be referred to (1) the Army G-l; (2) the Human Resources Command, which is a part of the Army Medical Command; (3) the Army Review Boards Agency; and (4) the Army Medical Command (“MEDCOM”).
After receiving the referral from Jordan’s office, the action officer responsible for the plaintiffs’ request at the Army G-l determined, based on her experience, that the Demographics Office and the Enlisted Career Systems Division were the offices within the Army G-l that were likely to have responsive records. The action officer made this determination because the Demographics Office “maintains human resources trend data, of which enlisted separations by reason for separation is a category” and because the Enlisted Career Systems Division “is responsible for enlisted Separations policy.” (Vaughn-Burford Decl. ¶ 3). The searches resulted in several responsive documents, but Vaughn-Bur-ford was unable to discern based on the case files which office had provided which documents. Thus, she directed the Demographics Office and the Enlisted Career Systems Division to conduct a new search.
The Demographics Office “collects and compiles a full-range of human resources statistical data for summary reports to evaluate and support senior level decisions relative to readiness of the Force and G-1/M & RA policies and programs.” (Vaughn-Burford Deck ¶ 7). Dr. Maxfield (“Maxfield”) of the Demographics Office “accessed her demographics files and provided the spreadsheet she maintained.” (Vaughn-Burford Deck ¶7). Based on Maxfield’s knowledge of the data and reports her office maintains or creates, she determined that the spreadsheet was the only responsive document her office contained.
The Enlisted Career Systems Division conducted a search of the “loss files” maintained in the Army’s Total Army Personnel Database. From this search, the division created a document showing all personality disorder discharges. The Deputy Chief of the Enlisted Career Systems Division, Conway, determined that there were no other responsive documents. Conway states that “[o]ther than information contained within the [Total Army Personnel Database] and AR 635-200, the two places [he has] kept information on [personality disorder separations] is a particular PST folder within Microsoft Outlook and a folder on [the] shared ‘H’ drive.” (Conway Deck (Doc. No. 45-4) ¶ 3). Based on his involvement with the Enlisted Career Systems Division’s involvement with personality discharges since “the beginning,” he avers that no other files exist on this topic. With respect to the PST folder and the H drive, Conway states that neither location contains an extremely large number of items, and therefore he was able to look at every item to determine whether it was responsive; he did not need to use search terms.
Based on her conversation with Conway, Vaughn-Burford requested that the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Manpower and Reserve Affairs conduct a search of its hardcopy and electronic records. The request was referred to the office’s subcom-ponent, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army for Manpower and Reserve Affairs (“DASA(MP)”). DASA(MP) is responsible for oversight of medical and personnel policy and programs. The office maintains files in the “action officer” folder under the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Manpower and Reserve Affairs. Sproat, Assistant Deputy for Health Affairs at DASA(MP) conducted a search of the action officer folder using the search terms “personality” and “PD.” He avers that “[biased on the way information is maintained in DASA(MP), these two terms would capture any [responsive document] ... including those regarding adjustment disorder.” (Sproat Deck (Doc. No. 45-9) ¶ 4). Sproat also searched his own folder and the folder of another DASA(MP) employee. Based on his seniority in DASA(MP), Sproat states that he would have personal knowledge and access to any responsive document in DASA(MP).
The declarations submitted on behalf of the Army G-l are insufficiently detailed to show that the Army G-l conducted a search that was reasonably calculated to uncover all relevant documents. Vaughn-Burford’s declaration does not adequately describe why her predecessor chose to refer the plaintiffs’ request to the three offices discussed above, but to no others. Thus, the court is unable to determine whether the Army G-l’s decision to search only three offices was reasonably calculated to uncover all relevant documents. As to the search conducted by the Demographics Office, Vaughn-Burford’s declaration is insufficiently detailed. She does not address the office’s filing system and does not specify how the search for documents was conducted. She states only that Maxfield “accessed her demographic files,” which is not a sufficiently detailed description of the search. With respect to the Enlisted Career Systems Division, Conway’s declaration adequately describes the office’s filing system and how he conducted his search. However, Conway mentions that information is contained within the “AR 635-200,” but does not state what the AR 635-200 contains or whether and how it was searched. Thus, the court cannot determine whether the search his office conducted was sufficient. As to DASA(MP), the court finds that Sproat’s declaration is insufficiently detailed. Sproat discusses the location of DASA(MP)’s electronic files, but his reference to his own folder and the other DASA(MP) staff member’s folder makes it is unclear whether the office also maintains paper files or whether these are electronic files maintained separately from the “action officer” folder. Additionally, Sproat’s statement that “personality” or “PD” would capture documents relating to adjustment disorder is conclusory; he does not explain why that would be so. Therefore, the court finds that the declarations submitted in support of the Army G-l’s search are insufficient to show beyond material doubt that its search was adequate.
After the Human Resources Command (“HRC”) received the plaintiffs’ request, Hoggard, an information release specialist with the HRC, contacted Vaughn-Burford because the statistical data that the plaintiffs sought was within the Army G-l’s purview and likely not located within the HRC. At that time, Vaughn-Burford informed him that HRC need not respond because the Army G-l was working on responding to the request. Subsequently, however, Vaughn-Burford asked Hoggard to verify that HRC’s Separation Branch did not have responsive documents. Hog-gard then “tasked” the Transition Branch, which maintains HRC records on separations, to conduct a search. Hoggard also later referred the plaintiffs’ request to the U.S. Army Physical Disability Agency and the PERSIND branch, both of which are within the HRC.
The Transition Branch maintains a database that contains data provided by the Army G-l on individuals separated from the Army. The database contains the following fields: name, social security number, rank, grade, sex, race, ethnicity, primary military occupational specialty, separation program designator, separation category, fiscal year, basic active service date, loss date, command, station, and unit identification code. The database only contains data back to 2008. The Transition Branch Chief, Kuhar, searched the database by using “separation codes JFX and LFX relating to personality disorders, and JFV ... and LFV relating to other physical or mental conditions.” (Kuhar Deck (Doc. No. 45-6) ¶ 4). In addition to searching the database, the Transition Branch conducted a search of their computers that “looked for the phrases ‘personality disorder,’ ‘adjustment disorder’ and ‘readjustment disorder.’ ” (Hoggard Deck (Doc. No. 37-9) ¶ 7). The Transition Branch does not maintain paper records.
The U.S. Army Physical Disability Agency responded to the referral from Hoggard stating that it did not have any responsive records. The agency advised Hoggard that it “only maintained records on individuals processed through the disability system, and not Soldiers separated administratively.” (Hoggard Deck ¶ 11).
The PERSIND branch created three spreadsheets that contain the number of members of the Army who have been separated on the basis of personality since 2001. The spreadsheets were created using the personality disorder separation codes “JFX” and “LFX.” (Bosworth Deck (Doc. No. 45-2) ¶ 2). PERSIND did not use codes “JFV” or “LFV” to search for separations based on adjustment disorder because those codes would “capture[] information unrelated to adjustment disorder discharges.” (Bosworth Deck ¶ 3).
The declarations submitted on behalf of the HRC are insufficiently detailed to show that the HRC conducted a search that was reasonably calculated to uncover all relevant documents. Hoggard and Ku-har’s declarations do not adequately describe the Transition Branch’s file system. Although they describe in sufficient detail the database that the Transition Branch maintains, they do not describe how the branch’s other electronic files are maintained. They state only that the listed search terms were used to “determine if anyone had a record of any case on their computer” with those phrases. Such description is not adequately detailed. Hog-gard’s declaration with respect to the response he received from the U.S. Army Physical Disability Agency is devoid of detail. From his declaration, the court is unable to discern how, or even if, the agency conducted a search. As to the PERSIND branch, Hoggard and Bosworth do not state what database was searched using the separation codes that they list. They also do not describe what information the database contains or whether PERSIND maintains any other filing systems. Thus, the declarations are insufficiently detailed to show beyond material doubt that the search conducted by the HRC and its offices was adequate.
The Army Review Boards Agency (ARBA) is the highest level for review of personnel actions taken by lower levels of the Army. It administers fifteen boards, including the Army Board for Correction of Military Records and the Army Discharge Review Board. After receiving the plaintiffs’ request, Rick Schweigert (“Schweigert”) conducted a search for records responsive to Item 12 of the plaintiffs’ request. Schweigert “made visual and physical searches of current and archived paper, electronic files and databases” for responsive records that were not already available to the public. (Burgos Decl. (Doc. No. 37-10) ¶ 7). The search did not produce any responsive records.
The ARBA also maintains the ARBA Case Tracking System (“ACTS”). ACTS is used to account for, process, and manage cases for the fifteen boards administered by the ARBA. “The ACTS databases contain basic information related to each applicant, application and case to include name, SSAN, and mailing address, date of receipt, applicant request, case ID, case issues, ease location, case responsibility, analyst of record, case status, board type, board date, final decision, and final decision date.” (Roger Decl. (Doe. No. 45-5) ¶ 3). The ARBA conducted a search in ACTS for cases potentially involving requests for discharge upgrades or record corrections from former service members who received a discharge for personality disorder from September 2001 to October 2010. The search did not include a separate search for “adjustment disorder” or “readjustment disorder” because those terms are not used in ACTS. The search used the following terms to search for cases potentially involving personality disorder, adjustment disorder, or readjustment disorder: “Personality Conflict; Personality Disorder (Old character & behavior disorder); No Neuropsychiatric (NP) Evaluation; Chp 5, E, Convenience, Personality Disorder, Character; Chp 5, E, Convenience, Personality Disorder, Reason; Chp 5, E, Convenience, Personality Disorder, Process; Psychiatric/Psychological Problems; Vietnam War Syndrome; and Administrative Discharge— PTSD.” (Roger Decl. ¶ 6).
The declarations submitted on behalf of the ARBA are insufficiently detailed to show that the ARBA conducted a search that was reasonably calculated to uncover all relevant documents. The Bur-gos declaration is conclusory and lacks detail regarding ARBA’s filing systems and the search conducted by Schweigert. While Roger explains one search that was conducted by ARBA of the ACTS database, that one search is insufficient to show that ARBA otherwise conducted an adequate search. Therefore, the declarations do not show beyond material doubt that the search conducted by the ARBA was adequate.
John Peterson, Chief of the FOIA Office at MEDCOM coordinated with Alvin Fahie (“Fahie”), the Office Administrator of the Directorate Health Policy & Services to determine whether any MEDCOM entities might have responsive records. The Directorate Health Policy & Services is a part of the Behavioral Health Division, which is “intended to be a central point of contact for all behavioral/psychological health policy and implementation issues in support of the U.S. Army.” (John Peterson Decl. (Doc. No. 37-8) ¶ 4). Fahie “tasked” Isaias Garcia (“Garcia”), the web developer for the Directorate Health Policy & Services, to search for responsive records. Garcia searched the Behavioral Health Division’s storage network using a Windows Explorer search for the keywords “PTSD,” “personality disorder,” “adjustment disorder,” “readjustment disorder,” “PD,” “AD” and “RD.” (John Peterson Decl. ¶ 5; John Peterson Supp. Decl. (Doc. No. 45-7) ¶ 2). Garcia then reviewed each result to determine whether it was relevant to the plaintiffs’ request. In addition to Garcia’s search, Fahie “conducted a search of his computer, desk, personal files, and office files including hard copy and electronic files.” (John Peterson Supp. Decl. ¶ 5).
The two declarations submitted by Peterson on behalf of the MEDCOM are sufficiently detailed to show that MED-COM conducted a search that was reasonably calculated to uncover all relevant documents. Peterson adequately explains why he determined that the Behavioral Health Division should be searched for responsive documents. Although the search described in his first declaration was not adequate, the subsequent searches he directed Garcia and Fahie to conduct were reasonably calculated to uncover all relevant documents and are described in sufficient detail in his supplemental declaration. Peterson describes the electronic storage network that the division maintains and how Garcia conducted the search. Additionally, he avers that Fahie searched the division’s records, which included files stored in his computer, desk, personal files and office files. Thus, Peterson’s affidavits show that MEDCOM’s search was adequate.
Based on the foregoing, the declarations submitted by the Army do not meet their burden of showing beyond material doubt that the search conducted by the Army was adequate. Although the court concludes that MEDCOM’s search was adequate, the declarations describing the other searches are insufficient to show that the entire search conducted by the Army was reasonably calculated to uncover all relevant documents. Therefore, the motion for summary judgment is being denied as to the adequacy of the search and the plaintiffs are permitted limited discovery concerning the adequacy of the searches.
3. Navy
In support of its motion for summary judgment, the Navy submitted the declarations of Robin Patterson (“Patterson”), Head of the Department of the Navy, Chief of Naval Operations, Privacy and Freedom of Information Act Policy Office; David German (“German”), Freedom of Information Act and Privacy Act Officer, Bureau of Naval Personnel (“BUPERS”) and Commander, Navy Personnel Command; and Salvatore Maida (“Máida”), Freedom of Information Act and Privacy Act Officer, Bureau of Medicine and Surgery.
Clarice Julka (“Julka”) was the processor assigned to the plaintiffs’ request. “Based on her experience and knowledge of Navy structure and commands, she determined that the commands likely and reasonably expected to maintain the records sought were the Navy Personnel Command (NPC), the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Manpower and Reserve Affairs (ASN M & RA), and the Navy Bureau of Medicine and Surgery (BUMED).” (Patterson Decl. (Doc. No. 37-12) ¶ 9). Patterson concurred in the determination and he avers that it was unlikely that any other commands would have responsive documents.
The Bureau of Naval Personnel (“BU-PERS”) and Commander, Navy Personnel Command (“CNPC”) is the “record holding activity for the U.S. Navy Official Military Personnel File.” (German Decl. (Doc. No. 37-11) ¶ 5). After receiving the plaintiffs’ request, BUPERS/CNPC determined that the Navy Personnel Command Records/Data Maintenance Quality Division (“PERS-33”) and Navy Personnel Command Conduct and Separations Division (“PERS-835”) were the two offices most likely to contain responsive records.
PERS-33 coordinated with the Defense Manpower Data Center (“DMDC”) to search DMDC’s Personnel Data Repository using a Statistical Analysis Software. The Data Repository was searched using personality disorder separation codes. PERS-33 was unable to search for adjustment disorder discharges because codes for those discharges “are comingled with other reasons for separation.” (German Decl. ¶ 8(a)). Additionally, PERS-33 was unable to search the Data Repository for readjustment disorder discharges because they “are not familiar with that term as a reason for discharge.” (German Decl. ¶ 8(a)).
BUPERS/CNPC also conducted a search of electronic data stored on the “Branch Head desk-top computer hard-drive” within PERS-835. (German Supp. Decl. (Doc. No. 45-14) ¶ 8(b)). The search was conducted “using subject knowledge and/or key words or acronyms ‘Personality Disorder/ ‘PD/ ‘Post Traumatic Stress Disorder/ ‘PTSD/ and ‘Adjustment Disorder.’ ” (German Supp. Decl. ¶ 8(b)). In addition to the electronic search, BU-PERS/CNPC found foui' responsive documents in the Navy Military Personnel Manual. BUPERS/CNPC suggested that the Board of Corrections of Naval Records and the Navy Discharge Review Board may contain responsive records as well.
German’s declarations are insufficient to show that BUPERS/CNPC conducted an adequate search. While he states that responsive documents were found in the PERS-835 hard-drive and the Navy Military Personnel Manual, he does not describe the types of filing systems that BUPERS/CNPC maintains. His reference to the Navy Military Personnel Manual suggests that certain documents are maintained in hard-copy, but he does not reference any other locations where hard-copy files and documents are stored. Additionally, German does not state how PERS-835 located the responsive documents in the Navy Military Personnel Manual other than “[tjhrough subject-matter knowledge.” (German Supp. Decl. ¶ 8(b)). Such a statement does not demonstrate with reasonable specificity how the search was conducted. Therefore, German’s declarations do not show that BU-PERS/CNPC conducted an adequate search.
Based on BUPERS/CNPC’s suggestion, Patterson asked the Board of Corrections of Naval Records (“BCNR”) and the Navy Discharge Review Board (“NDRB”) to search for responsive information. The BCNR and the NDRB review and provide administrative remedies within the Department of Navy. Most applications for relief at the BCNR request the upgrade of the characterization of an administrative discharge. Patterson’s declaration states that BCNR does not maintain a database of the types of discharges in the cases that come before it or the ratio of cases in which relief is granted or denied for different types of discharges. Patterson avers that the only place where BCNR would have information responsive to the plaintiffs’ request is in the individual case files. While BCNR takes the position that the plaintiffs’ request did not encompass the individual files, if it did, those files are publicly available online, and therefore BCNR was not required to retrieve and search through each individual case file.
Similar to BCNR, NRDC reviews service member discharges. NDRB maintains the Naval Discharge Review Board System (“NDRBS”), which is a local database designed to track applications submitted by former Navy and Marine Corps service members. The NDRBS collects basic applicant information such as “name, SSN, address, phone number, e-mail address, discharge characterization of service, and narrative reason for separation.” (Patterson Supp. Decl. ¶ 5). The NDRBS can be searched by category, such as discharge characterization of service or narrative reason for separation; whether an upgrade was granted; number of days to process a case; and case storage location. After receiving the plaintiffs’ request, NDRB conducted a search of the NDRBS using the terms “personality disorder,” “PD” and “COG(PD).” (Patterson Supp. Decl. ¶ 5). NDRB was unable to conduct a similar search for adjustment disorder and readjustment disorder because the NDRBS does not separately track those disorders. While NDRB could find information on adjustment disorder and readjustment disorder separations in individual case files, such a search would “take considerable expense” and the individual case files are already publicly available online. (Patterson Supp. Decl. ¶ 5).
Patterson’s declarations are insufficient to show that BCNR and NDRB conducted adequate searches. The declarations provide insufficient detail about the types of files the boards maintain and how they are organized. While Patterson states that BCNR does not maintain a database that would contain information responsive to the plaintiffs’ request, she does not describe whether BCNR maintains any other files that could have been searched for responsive documents. Likewise, while Patterson adequately describes the NDRBS, she does not state whether the NDRB maintains any other filing systems that would potentially contain responsive records, such as policy documents or memoranda. Therefore, the declarations are not sufficiently detailed to show that BCNR and NDRB conducted searches reasonably calculated to uncover all relevant documents.
The Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Manpower and Reserve Affairs (“ASN M & RA”) is the separation authority for most officer separations and some enlisted separations. Peter Galindez (“Galindez”), an attorney who works in ASN M & RA, conducted a search of “the entire records database for any documents that fit [the plaintiffs’] request, including electronic folder and emails.” (Patterson Decl. ¶ 11). The electronic database search “included all folders and files pertaining to the separation of officers and enlisted, folders and files that contain policy memos, as well as current and archived email for these same subjects.” (Patterson Supp. Decl. (Doc. No. 45-16) ¶ 8). The electronic search used the search terms “PD,” “personality disorder,” “disorder,” “personality issues,” “disorder,” “PD policy,” “personality policy,” “policy,” “instructions,” and “disorder instructions.” (Patterson Supp. Decl. ¶ 8). Galindez also searched all hard copy files relating to policy memos for the separation of officers and enlisted, as well as policy guidance maintained by the ASN M & RA.
ASN M & RA maintains separation records and statistics only in electronic format. The office retains a scanned copy of the final determination memo signed by the Assistant Secretary of the Navy which may or may not reference the specific reason for a service member’s separation. However, the signed separation documents are searchable only by officer/enlisted status and by name. Therefore, Galindez was unable to search for individual separation records by separation reason.
The court finds that Patterson’s declaration and supplemental declaration sufficiently describe the search that was conducted by the ASN M & RA and shows beyond material doubt that the search was reasonably calculated to uncover all relevant documents. The Patterson declarations contain reasonable specificity of detail as to the filing systems ASN M & RA maintains, the kind of information contained in each, and how the searches were conducted for responsive documents. The plaintiffs object to Patterson’s declaration on the basis that he did not personally conduct or supervise ASN M & RA’s search. However, based on the entirety of Patterson’s declarations and his statement that “[a]ll information herein contained is based upon information furnished to me in my official capacity and upon my personal review and supervision of the searches conducted,” (Patterson Deck ¶ 2), the