Grigoryan v. Experian Information Solutions, Inc. (84 F. Supp. 3d 1044, 2014)

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

MARGARET M. MORROW, District Judge.

On October 8, 2013, Gevork Grigoryan filed this action against Experian Information Solutions, Inc. (“Experian”), Equifax Information Services, LLC (“Equifax”), and Trans Union, LLC (“Trans Union”) (collectively, “defendants”), alleging violations of the Fair Credit Reporting Act (“FCRA”), 15 U.S.C. § 1681 et seq., and the California Consumer Credit Reporting Agencies Act (“CCRAA”), California Civil Code § 1785.1 et seq. On November 7, 2014, defendants filed a motion for summary judgment. Grigoryan opposes the motion.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. Factual Background

The facts are, for the most part, undisputed. Experian, Equifax, and Trans Union are each “consumer reporting agencies” as defined by the FCRA and “consumer credit reporting agencies” as defined by the CCRAA. The parties’ dispute concerns five credit accounts or trade lines that Grigoryan contends appeared inaccurately on credit reports compiled by defendants.

The creditor on two of the accounts was Bank of America (“BOA”). The first account was a mortgage on a rental property Grigoryan owned for the benefit of his real estate business; the second was a home equity line of credit (“HELOC”) secured by the same rental property as the mortgage account. These accounts appeared on credit reports compiled by each defendant as delinquent. Three other collection accounts appeared only on Gri-goryan’s Trans Union credit report: a Collection Bureau of America account (the, “CBA account”), a Sequoia Financial Services account, (the “Sequoia account”), and a Credit Management Inc. account (the “CMI account”). The CBA and CMI accounts both concern a debt Grigoryan purportedly owed Time Warner Cable. The Sequoia account involved a debt originally owed to the Department of Water and Power.

1. Grigoryan’s Reporting Disputes with Experian

On May 6, 2010, Experian received a letter from Grigoryan dated May 3, 2010, disputing the reporting of his BOA mortgage account. Grigoryan asserted that BOA had incorrectly reported late payments on the mortgage loan for the four months from December 2009 to March 2010. He stated that BOA had agreed to correct the information, but indicated the adjustment could take up to ninety days. Because he could not “tolerate another three months of inaccurate reporting,” Gri-goryan asked Experian to correct the reporting as soon as possible. As proof of his statements, Grigoryan enclosed two letters he had received from BOA. The first, dated April 20, 2010, stated that Gri-goryan’s “request for a credit adjustment related to [his] 12/2009, 01/2010, 02/2010, [and] 03/2010, mortgage installments for the [BOA mortgage]” had been received, and that “corrected information [had been] submitted [the same day] to the credit reporting agencies.” The letter did not contain any additional information concerning the nature of the “corrected information,” and advised Grigoryan that it takes an average of sixty days for credit reporting agencies to make an adjustment. The second letter from BOA that Grigoryan forwarded to Experian also concerned the BOA mortgage. It stated that his “request for a credit correction ha[d] been approved ... [and that BOA] ha[d] submitted a formal request to [each defendant].” The letter advised that the adjustment process could “take 60 to 90 days for completion.” Like the first letter, the second contained no details concerning the nature of the inaccuracy.

Experian personnel reviewed the May 3, 2010 letter, its attachments, and Grigor-yan’s credit report, and determined that it was reporting the BOA mortgage account in good standing and not delinquent. In response to Grigoryan’s letter, it sent him a consumer disclosure on May 11, 2010, stating that the account had been reported as in good standing and was not shown as delinquent. The letter enclosed a copy of an Experian credit report dated May 11, 2010, which listed a number of “BAC Home Loans/Countywide” trade lines; all were reported “Paid” and “Never late.” Experian received no further disputes from Grigoryan concerning the BOA mortgage trade line.

On' November 4, 2011, Experian received an April 4, 2011 letter from Grigor-yap disputing the reporting of a BOA account. The letter identified the account only by its first five digits, followed by four X’s. Grigoryan asserted that he had obtained a credit report on October 25, 2011, that contained inaccurate, incomplete, or misleading information in that it stated the account was “past due 30 days” and had a past due amount of $12. He demanded that Experian “immediately delete the above-referenced information from [his] credit report in full, or at least revise the entry to reflect [that] no debt presently exist[ed]”; he also requested reinvestigation of the matter.

In response to the letter, Experian reviewed Grigoryan’s credit file and found that his BOA HELOC account was in negative standing and being reported “30[ ] day[s] late.” Experian sent an automated consumer dispute verification (“ACDV”) to BOA regarding the account, which asked for verification of the account status and payment history. BOA verified the accuracy of the reported information; Ex-perian then sent Grigoryan a consumer disclosure dated November 14, 2014, indicating that BOA had verified that the 30-day late notation was accurate.

Experian then received a letter from Renatus Credit (“Renatus”) dated December 15, 2011, which was purportedly sent on Grigoryan’s behalf. The letter stated that Grigoryan’s HELOC account was being inaccurately reported, and sought information concerning Experian’s policies and procedures for ensuring accurate credit reporting. The address listed on the envelope did not correspond to any address on file for Grigoryan; thus, Experi-an requested proof of Grigoryan’s current address for security purposes. No proof of address was provided. Instead, Rena-■tus sent another letter dated January 10, 2012, stating that Experian had an obligation to respond to its method of verification request, and that it faced FCRA liability for failure to comply. The letter threatenedJegal action, but gave Experian an additional fourteen days to respond. Experian reviewed the letter, found it du-plicative of the December 15, 2011 request, and took no further action in light of the outstanding request for verification of address.

On April 30, 2012, Grigoryan contacted Experian via telephone and asked that the consumer dispute comment be removed from his BOA HELOC. Experian advised him that the dispute comment could only be removed if he confirmed the accuracy of the account information. He did so, and Experian removed the comment from the account and sent Grigoryan confirmation that it had done so. On June 6, 2012, Experian received a four-page fax requesting that the BOA HELOC account be updated to current and that the consumer dispute comment be deleted. The request included documentation from BOA showing that payments on the HELOC were “never late” and that “corrected information was submitted on 5/30/2012 to the credit reporting ageneies.” There is no evidence in the record as to whether BOA began to re-report the account as disputed 'after it removed the comment on April 30, 2012. Based on Grigoryan’s request and the accompanying information, Experian updated the BOA HELOC account to current, never late, and no longer disputed.

2. Grigoryan’s Reporting Disputes with Equifax

Grigoryan first contacted Equifax regarding his BOA mortgage on May 3, 2010, when he faxed a letter stating that BOA had reported erroneous late payments for the period from December 2009 to 2010. As he did with Experian, Gri-goryan included two letters he had received from BOA that indicated his request for a “credit report adjustment” had been approved. Equifax prepared and sent an ACDV to BOA regarding the mortgage account. In the FCRA section of the ACDV, Equifax noted it received documentation indicating that BOA had completed an adjustment concerning the allegedly late payments. BOA instructed Equifax to delete the late payment history from Grigoryan’s credit file, and Equifax did so. The results of the reinvestigation were sent to Grigoryan on May 5, 2014

On October 30, 2011, Equifax received a letter from Grigoryan in which he disputed another BOA account. This letter, like a similar letter to Experian, was erroneously dated April 4, 2011; it also failed to identify the BOA HELOC account as the one being questioned. Equifax determined that the BOA HELOC was reporting past due, and sent an ACDV to BOA regarding the account. BOA verified the accuracy of the information. As a result, Equifax ’ made no changes to the account, which was reported past-due with a balance of $12. Equifax mailed the results of the reinvestigation to Grigoryan on November 7, 2011. Prior to December 18, 2011, BOA updated the HELOC account so that it no longer reported a past-due status or any balance. No consumer reports regarding Grigoryan were issued by Equifax to any third party between October 30 and December 18, 2011.

On December 18, 2011, Equifax received a letter from Renatus dated December 15, 2011; the letter is identical to the one received by Experian. Because it was unclear which BOA account was at issue, Equifax sent ACDVs requesting verification of all information on both BOA accounts. BOA confirmed the accuracy of the information, indicating that both accounts were current with no late payments.

Grigoryan next contacted Equifax by telephone on April 30, 2012. At this time, Grigoryan’s BOA accounts both reported a “compliance code condition” stating “account information disputed by consumer.” Equifax sent ACDVs to BOA regarding both of the BOA accounts; in the FCRA field, Equifax noted that Gri-goryan “state[d] that he is no longer disputing the account and wanted this to be remove[d].” BOA responded by removing the compliance condition code on the BOA mortgage, but verified the accuracy of the reporting of the BOA HELOC account. Equifax sent Grigoryan the results of the reinvestigation on May 2, 2012.

On June 4, 2012, Equifax received a “Rapid Resolve” request concerning the BOA HELOC account, in which Grigor-yan requested that the compliance code condition be removed. On June 5, 2012, Equifax removed the compliance condition code per the Rapid Resolve request. Thereafter, Grigoryan telephoned Equifax, again disputing the accuracy of the reporting of the BOA HELOC account. At the time of the call, BOA was reporting the account as thirty days past due in September 2Ó11. Equifax sent an ACDV to BOA regarding the HELOC, and stated in the FCRA field that Grigoryan indicated he was not late with the September 2011 payment. BOA updated the account information and removed the late payment. Equifax made the requested changes on July 25, 2012. Grigoryan has not disputed the accuracy of Equifax’s reporting of either BOA account since July 25, 2012.

3. Grigoryan’s Reporting Disputes with Trans Union

a. The BOA Accounts

On May 5, 2010, Trans Union received correspondence from Grigoryan dated May 3, 2010, which disputed the accuracy of the BOA mortgage trade line, and enclosed the same letters he had sent to Experián and Equifax concerning ■ credit reporting adjustments by BOA. On May 6, 2010, Trans Union sent an ACDV to BOA using codes A9 and C7, which indicated that Grigoryan disputed the payment history and claimed that BOA had said it would change the information. On May 10, 2010, BOA responded to the ACDV and directed Trans Union to delete the negative payment information; Trans Union did so, and mailed the results to Grigoryan on May 12, 2010, ending the reinvestigation.

On October 31, 2011, Trans Union received correspondence from Grigoryan disputing the reporting of the BOA HELOC as past due with a $12 balance. On November 4, 2011, Trans Union initiated a reinvestigation; it sent an ACDV to BOA using dispute code A9, which indicated that Grigoryan disputed the account status and payment information. On November 7, 2011, BOA verified that the account was correctly reported; Trans Union made no changes and mailed the results of the reinvestigation to Grigoryan the same day.

On December 19, 2011, Trans Union received a letter from Renatus; the letter included a document that purported to be a limited power of attorney. Trans Union responded on December 21, 2011, advising that it would need a power of attorney that specifically identified Grigoryan; the limited power of attorney that Renatus had enclosed with its letter did not do so. Renatus sent further correspondence, but never provided a power of attorney. On April 30, 2012, Trans Union received a telephone call from Grigoryan disputing the accuracy of a remark code on his BOA HELOC account, which reported that he disputed the account information. Trans Union initiated an investigation and removed the consumer dispute code the same day.

On June 4, 2012, Trans Union received a “Quick Check” from Informative Research regarding Grigoryan’s BOA HELOC; enclosed was a signed statement by Grigor-yan, which indicated that he no longer disputed any reporting related to the account. As noted, the record is unclear as to whether BOA had begun re-reporting the disputed status after it was removed on April 30, 2012. After initiating a reinvestigation on June 6, 2012, Trans Union updated the BOA HELOC account on June 15, 2012 so that it no longer reflected a dispute.

b. The CBA, Sequoia, and CNH Accounts

On June 28, 2011, Trans Union received a call from Grigoryan disputing that the CBA account was his. Trans Union immediately initiated a reinvestigation using the ACDV process to confirm the accuracy . of the information. It used dispute code A2, which indicated to the furnisher of the credit information that Grigoryan disputed the account was his. The same day, the CBA account was deleted because CBA could not verify it.

On November 21, 2011, Trans Union received a call from Grigoryan in which he disputed that the Sequoia account was his. TransUnion initiated a reinvestigation using the ACDV procedure and dispute code A2. On December 19, 2011, Trans Union deleted the Sequoia account because it had received no response from Sequoia.

On May 7, 2012, Trans Union received a telephone call from Grigoryan disputing that the CMI account was his. Trans Union initiated reinvestigation and send an ACDV using code A3, which indicates that the account belongs to another individual. On May 9, 2012, Trans Union received written correspondence from Grigoryan indicating that he had no knowledge of the CMI account; Trans Union was already investigating the account based on the May 7, 2012 telephone call, however. On May 23, 2012, CMI verified that the account was accurately reported; Trans Union left the account unchanged and mailed the results of the reinvestigation to Grigor-yan on May 25, 2012.

On June 1, 2012, Trans Union received a telephone call from Grigoryan in which he again disputed that the CMI account was his. Because Trans Union had verified the accuracy of the account on May 23, 2012, it did not initiate another investigation. On June 7, 2012, Grigoryan called Trans Union again, advising that he would send a fax regarding the CMI account. At this point, Trans Union initiated a rein- , vestigation process. On June 14, 2012, Trans Union received a fax from Grigor-yan providing his social security number and a “TU Report #,” and attaching a copy of his driver’s license, and a copy of a June 11, 2012 letter he had received from CMI. On June 25, 2012, CMI once again confirmed the accuracy of the report; because CMI did not verify Grigoryan’s social security number, however, Trans Union deleted the account. On June 28, 2012, Trans Union sent the results of the reinvestigation to Grigoryan.

B. Procedural Posture

This is the second time Grigoryan has challenged the reporting of his BOA accounts. On February 15, 2012, he filed an action against BOA. On June 7, 2012, he filed a first amended complaint in that case. The first amended com.plaint alleged claims for (1) violation of Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (“RESPA”), 12 U.S.C. § 2601 el seq.; (2) violation of the FCRA; (3) violations of CCRAA; (4) violation of California’s Unfair Competition Law (“UCL”), California Business & Professions Code § 17200; and (5) defamation and credit slander. On June 29, 2012, BOA filed a motion to dismiss the first amended complaint, which the court granted in part and denied in- part on August 27, 2012. The court dismissed the third, fourth, and fifth claims as preempted by the FCRA. It denied BOA’s motion to dismiss the first and second causes of action, however. On February 18, 2013, the parties reached a settlement, and the action was dismissed on February 27, 2013.

Grigoryan filed this action against defendants on October 8, 2013. The case was initially assigned to Judge Christina Snyder. After Grigoryan filed a notice of related cases on January 3, 2014, the court accepted a transfer of the action from Judge Snyder under General Order 08-05. On November 7, 2014, defendants filed a motion for summary judgment. Grigoryan opposed the motion on November 17, 2014.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Legal Standard Governing Motions for Summary Judgment

A motion for summary judgment must be granted when “the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.PROC. 56(c). A party seeking summary judgment bears the initial burden of informing the court of the basis for its motion and identifying those portions of the pleadings and discovery responses that demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). Where the moving party will have the burden of proof on an issue at trial, the movant must affirmatively demonstrate that no reasonable trier of fact could find other than for the moving party. On an issue as to which the nonmoving party will have the burden of proof, however, the movant can prevail merely by pointing out that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party’s case. See id. If the moving party meets its initial burden, the nonmoving party must set forth, by affidavit or as otherwise provided in Rule 56, “specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986); Fed.R.Civ.PROC. 56(e). Concluso-ry, speculative testimony in affidavits or moving papers is insufficient to meet this burden, or raise genuine issues of fact defeating summary judgment. See Nelson v. Pima Community College, 83 F.3d 1075, 1081-82 (9th Cir.1996) (“mere allegation and speculation do not create a factual dispute for purposes of summary judgment”); Thornhill Pub. Co., Inc. v. GTE Corp., 594 F.2d 730, 738 (9th Cir.1979).

In judging the evidence presented in support of or opposition to summary judgment, the court does not make credibility determinations or weigh conflicting evidence. Rather, it draws all inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. See T.W. Electrical Service, Inc. v. Pacific Electrical Contractors Ass’n, 809 F.2d 626, 630-31 (9th Cir.1987). Nonetheless, conclusory, speculative testimony in affidavits and moving papers is insufficient to raise genuine issues of fact and defeat summary judgment. See Falls Riverway Realty, Inc. v. Niagara Falls, 754 F.2d 49, 56 (2d Cir.1985); Thornhill, 594 F.2d at 738.

B. Whether Grigoryan’s Claims are Barred by the Statute of Limitations

Defendants first contend that certain of Grigoryan’s claims are barred by the statute of limitations. Section 1681p(l) of the FCRA “sets the statute of limitations at ‘2 years after the date of discovery [or constructive discovery] by the plaintiff of the violation that is the basis for such liability.’ ” Drew v. Equifax Info. Servs., LLC, 690 F.3d 1100, 1109 (9th Cir.2012) (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1681p; Merck & Co., Inc. v. Reynolds, 559 U.S. 633, 653, 130 S.Ct. 1784, 176 L.Ed.2d 582 (2010) (constructive discovery is generally read into discovery statutes) (alterations original)). Section 1681p also provides a statute of repose, stating that all claims arising from the alleged violation must be brought within “5 years after the date on which the violation that is the basis for such liability occurs.” 15 U.S.C. § 1681p(2). The CCRAA provides a similar limitations period. It states that an action must be brought “within two years from the date the plaintiff knew ... or should have known of[] the violation of this title, but not more than seven years from the earliest date on which liability could have arisen, except that where a defendant has materially and willfully misrepresented any information required under this chapter to be disclosed to a consumer, ... the action may be brought at any time within two years after the discovery by the consumer of the misrepresentation.” Cal. Civ.Cobe § 1785.33. Despite the different statutes of repose provided, and the CCRAA provision concerning willful concealment, the statutes are treated “the same” by courts. See Natale v. TRW, Inc., No. CV 97-3661 CRB, 1999 WL 179678, *2 (N.D.Cal. Mar. 30, 1999) (“The statute of limitations for the CCRAA is the same [as for the FCRA]”); see also Banga v. Equifax Info. Servs., LLC, 473 Fed.Appx. 712, 713 (9th Cir.2012) (Un-pub.Disp.)- (“The district court properly granted summary judgment [on the FCRA and CCRAA claims] on statute of limitations grounds because Banga failed to file her action within two years of when she knew or should have known that defendant disclosed her credit report to third parties for promotional or other improper purposes”); Olson v. Six Rivers Nat’l Bank, 111 Cal.App.4th 1, 12, 3 Cal.Rptr.3d 301 (2003) (holding that because the CCRAA “is substantially based on the Federal Fair Credit Reporting Act, judicial- interpretation of the federal provisions is persuasive authority and entitled to substantial weight when interpreting the California provisions”).

“[T]he ultimate burden is on the defendant to demonstrate that a reasonably diligent plaintiff would have discovered the facts constituting the violation.... [Defendants must] demonstrate how a reasonably diligent plaintiff ... would have discovered the violations.” Drew, 690 F.3d at 1110 (quoting Strategic Diversity, Inc. v. Alchemix Corp., 666 F.3d 1197, 1206 (9th Cir.2012)). Thus, “[s]ummary judgment [must be denied] if [defendants] fail[] to meet this burden and material issues of fact remain as to ‘whether [Grigoryan] knew or had reason to know of the specific’ violation.” Id. (quoting Norman-Bloodsaw v. Lawrence Berkeley Lab., 135 F.3d 1260, 1266 (9th Cir.1998)).

Grigoryan filed this action on October 8, 2013; defendants contend that any § 1681e(b) and § 1785.14(b) claims concerning reports issued prior to October 8, 2011, and any § 1681i claims involving reinvestigation requests that should have, been answered prior to October 8, 2011, are barred. The court agrees. Gri-goryan contends the BOA mortgage was inaccurately reported on his February 2010 and July 22, 2010 credit reports. Because the reports in question were issued in February and July 2010, and Gri-goryan does not assert that the alleged inaccuracies ever reappeared, any claim concerning them is barred by the statute of limitations. The claims arose, at the latest, on July 22, 2010, when Grigoryan admits he discovered the violations by requesting and reviewing the credit reports. He may thus not assert claims against defendants for violation of § 1681e(b) and § 1785.14(b) based on alleged credit reporting inaccuracies concerning the BOA mortgage on his February and July 22, 2010 credit report.

The same is true of claims based on defendants’ reinvestigation of the alleged BOA mortgage inaccuracies under § 1681i and § 1785.16. There is no dispute that Grigoryan sent reinvestigation requests to each defendant on May 3, 2010, and that the requests contained documents from BOA that Grigoryan contended (as he contends now) demonstrated that the reporting was inaccurate. While it is unclear when the letters were received, the Ninth Circuit applies a rebuttable presumption that mail sent within the contiguous United States arrives at its intended destination within three days. See Dandino, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Transp., 729 F.3d 917, 921 (9th Cir.2013) (“The United States Postal Service’s regulations state that first class mail sent within the contiguous United States will arrive within three days. We and other circuits have relied on this assumption in our case law”); Mendez v. Knowles, 556 F.3d 757, 765 (9th Cir.2009) (“[T]he Postal Service advises its customers that first-class mail takes one to three days for delivery”); Lindemood v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 566 F.2d 646, 647 (9th Cir.1977) (“[T]he normal delivery time for first-class mail sent from San Francisco to Washington, D.C., is three days”). The court therefore presumes that the letters were received on May 6, 2010 — three days after having been mailed. Defendants responded by forwarding the results of their investigations to Grigoryan on May 11, 2010 (Experian), May 12 and 14, 2010 (Trans Union), and May 5, 2010 (Equifax). Accordingly, based on the three day delivery presumption, Grigoryan had the facts necessary to discover the alleged violations, i.e., failure to conduct a reasonable reinvestigation, on May 8, 14, 15, and 17, 2010. See Drew, 690 F.3d at 1111 (“As Drew noted, by 2005, Drew had provided FIA with relevant information [concerning the purported inaccuracy] himself; since he knew that FIA had this information, he also knew by that time that incorrect results could only be attributable to an unreasonable investigation”). Because he did not file this action on or before May 17, 2012 — the latest possible date on which he could have filed — Grigor-yan’s § 1681i and § 1785.16 claims relating to reinvestigation of the BOA mortgage are barred.

Grigoryan’s claims concerning the CBA account are also time-barred. Grigoryan discovered the CBA account on a June 2011 credit report generated by Trans Union Thus, his § 1681e(b) and § 1785.14(b) claims accrued sometime in June when the credit report was issued. Because Grigoryan does not provide a specific date, the court will assume the report was issued on June 28, 2011, the day he notified Trans Union he disputed the account. Because Grigoryan discovered the violation by reviewing the credit report, and because he did not file this action by June 28, 2013, two years later, his § 1681e(b) and § 1785.14(b) claims premised on the CBA account are time-barred.' Grigoryan’s § 1681i and § 1785.16 claims are likewise time-barred. Trans Union forwarded the results of its allegedly unreasonable reinvestigation to Grigoryan on June 28, 2011. Assuming he received the results within three days, he had the facts necessary to discover the violation on July 1, 2011. Because he did not file suit on or before' July 1, 2013, his § 1681i and § 1785.16 claims pertaining to the CBA are also time-barred.

For these reasons, the court grants summary judgment in favor of defendants on Grigoryan’s § 1681e(b), § 1785.14(b), § 1681i, and § 1785.16 claims insofar as they are premised on inaccurate reporting and unreasonable reinvestigation of his BOA mortgage and the CBA account. The parties do not dispute that the remaining claims — the BOA HELOC, Sequoia account, and CMI account — involve allegedly inaccurate reporting and reinvestigation that occurred after October 8, 2011. These claims are timely, therefore, and the court addresses them on the merits below.

C. Whether Triable Issues of Fact Preclude the Entry of Summary Judgment in Defendants’ Favor on Grigoryan’s § 1681e(b) and § 1785.14(b) Claims

1. Whether Grigoryan Has Identified Any Credit Report Inaccuracies

Defendants contend that Grigoryan has failed to identify any inaccuracies in his credit reports, and hence that his § 1681e(b) and § 1785.14(b) claims fail as a matter of law. These statutes require that consumer reporting agencies adopt and follow “reasonable procedures to assure “maximum possible accuracy” in consumer credit reports. Section 1681e(b) states:

“Whenever a consumer reporting agency prepares a consumer report it shall follow . reasonable procedures to assure maximum possible accuracy of the information concerning the individual about whom the report relates.” 15 U.S.C. § 1681e(b).

Section 1785.14(b) states:

“Whenever a consumer credit reporting agency prepares a consumer credit report, it shall follow reasonable procedures to assure maximum possible accuracy of the information concerning the individual about whom the report relates .... ” Cal. Civ.Code § 1785.14(b).

“Liability under § 1681e(b) [and § 1785.14(b) ] is predicated on the reasonableness of the credit reporting agency’s procedures in obtaining credit information. ... In order to make out a prima facie violation under § 1681e(b), a consumer must present evidence tending to show that a credit reporting agency prepared a report containing inaccurate information.” Guimond v. Trans Union Credit Info. Co., 45 F.3d 1329, 1333 (9th Cir.1995); Banga v. Experian Info. Solutions, Inc., No. CV 09-04867 SBA, 2013 WL 5539690, *10 (N.D.Cal. Sept. 30, 2013) (“To the extent Plaintiffs second claim for relief can be construed as alleging a violation of § 1681e(b) and/or § 1785.14(b), Plaintiff has failed to cite evidence establishing that Experian prepared a credit report containing inaccurate information about her in violation of the FCRA or CCRAA”); Cisneros v. U.D. Registry, Inc., 39 Cal.App.4th 548, 570, 46 Cal.Rptr.2d 233 (1995) (suggesting that § 1785.14(b) and § 1681e(b) are identical, and stating that, “[a]s a disseminator of consumer credit files, UDR had an obligation to ‘follow reasonable procedures to assure maximum possible accuracy of the information concerning the individual about whom the report relates’ [under § 1785.14(b) ] .... The same is true under [§ 1681e(b) of the] FCRA”); see also Dennis v. BEH-1, LLC, 520 F.3d 1066, 1069 (9th Cir.2008) (“The district court erred insofar as it held that Dennis couldn’t make the prima facie showing of inaccurate reporting required by section[ ] 1681e”); Cahlin v. Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp., 936 F.2d 1151, 1156 (11th Cir.1991) (“If he fails to satisfy this initial burden, the consumer, as a matter of law, has not established a violation of [§ 1681e(b) ], and a court need not inquire further as to the reasonableness of the procedures adopted by the credit reporting agency”). Thus, to establish a prima facie violation of § 1681e(b) and § 1785.14(b), Grigoryan must prove that at least one consumer credit report or file contained inaccurate or misleading information.

The Ninth Circuit held in Carvalho v. Equifax Information Services, LLC that “an item on a credit report can be ‘incomplete or inaccurate’ within the meaning of the FCRA’s furnisher investigation provision, [either] ‘because it is patently incorrect, or because it is misleading in such a way and to such an extent that it can be expected to adversely affect credit decisions.’ ” 629 F.3d 876, 890 (9th Cir.2010) (citing Gorman v. Wolpoff & Abramson, LLP, 584 F.3d 1147, 1163 (9th Cir.2009)). Courts have applied the “patently incorrect or materially misleading” standard indiscriminately to claims arising under provisions of the FCRA and CCRAA that involve the accuracy of information. See id. (applying the standard to reinvestigation claims under § 1785.16); Prianto v. Experian Info. Solutions, Inc., No. CV 13-03461-TEH, 2014 WL 3381578, *3 (N.D.Cal.'July 10, 2014) (“Thus, Plaintiff must allege facts sufficient to state a claim that a CRA published a report containing patently inaccurate or materially misleading-information in order to state a prima facie case for relief under section[ ] 1681e(b),” citing Chiang v. Verizon New England, Inc., 595 F.3d 26, 37 (1st Cir.2010) (deeming the term “inaccurate” as used in § 1681i(a) to be “essentially the same” as the term “incomplete or inaccurate” in § 1681s — 2(b))); Cisneros, 39 Cal.App.4th at 579, 46 Cal.Rptr.2d 233 (“a report violates [§§ 1785.14 and 1785.16] when it is misleading or incomplete, even if it is technically accurate”). ' The court must therefore decide whether Grigoryan has raised triable issues concerning the fact that defendants reported patently incorrect or materially misleading information.

Trans Union does not cite any evidence that the Sequoia or CMI accounts actually belonged to Grigoryan, i.e., that they were accurately placed on his credit report. Nor do they argue that they were. They simply assert that Sequoia and CMI furnished that information. Grigoryan, for his part, has submitted a sworn declaration stating that the accounts did not belong to him. He has therefore raised triable issues of fact as to whether Trans Union placed inaccurate information on his credit report by listing the Sequoia and CMI account as Grigoryan’s.

With respect to the BOA HELOC, defendants argue that there is evidence Gri-goryan missed a payment on September 9, 2010, and incurred late fees in September and October 2011. Defendants do not cite this evidence in their moving papers, however; this alone supports a finding that they have not shown it is undisputed the information reported concerning the BOA HELOC was accurate. See Carmen v. S.F. Unified Sch. Dist., 237 F.3d 1026, 1031 (9th Cir.2001) (holding that the district court “need not examine the entire file for evidence establishing [the absence of] a genuine issue of fact, where the evidence is not set forth in the [moving] papers with adequate references so that it could conveniently be found”); Keenan v. Allan, 91 F.3d 1275, 1279 (9th Cir.1996) (the district court has no responsibility on summary judgment to “scour the record in search of a genuine issue of triable fact”); Greenwood v. Fed. Aviation Admin., 28 F.3d 971, 977 (9th Cir.1994) (“‘[J]udges are not like pigs, hunting for truffles buried in briefs,’” quoting United States v. Dunkel, 927 F.2d 955, 956 (7th Cir.1991) (per curiam)).

The court has located three documents, however, that appear to support defendants’ position. These are Exhibits 12, 13 and 14 to the declaration of Sabrina Fernandes. Exhibit 12 is an October 18, 2011 letter from BOA to Grigoryan that states Grigoryan’s recent payment was “less than the amount needed to bring [his] loan up to date.” The letter advised that to bring the account current, Grigoryan needed to make an additional payment of $63.25. Exhibit 13 is a “detailed outline of transactions” for the BOA HELOC account. As defendants note, the exhibit shows that Grigoryan habitually incurred late fees, and suggests that he missed payments for September 2010 and August 2009 entirely. The exhibit also reflects that Grigoryan made his September 2011 payment, but incurred substantial late fees during the months of September and October. Finally, Exhibit 14 is a schedule that purportedly details payments Grigoryan made on the HELOC account; it indicates that the September 2011 payment was 30 days past due, and was changed to current in May 2012.

Grigoryan objects to this evidence, arguing that it is unauthenticated. The court must agree. “A trial court can only consider admissible evidence in ruling on a motion for summary judgment.” Orr v. Bank of America, 285 F.3d 764, 774 (9th Cir.2002) (citing Fed.R.CivPROC. 56(e); Beyene v. Coleman Sec. Servs., Inc., 854 F.2d 1179, 1181 (9th Cir.1988)). Authentication is a “condition precedent to admissibility,” which is satisfied by “evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what its proponent claims.” Fed.R.Evid. 901(a). The Ninth Circuit has “repeatedly held that unauthenticated documents cannot be considered in [ruling on] a motion for summary judgment.” Orr, 285 F.3d at 773 (collecting cases). “In a summary judgment motion, documents authenticated through personal knowledge must be ‘attached to an affidavit that meets the requirements of [Fed.R.Civ.P.] 56(e) and the affiant must be a person through whom the exhibits could be admitted into evidence.’ ” Id. (quoting Canada v. Blain’s Helicopters, Inc., 831 F.2d 920, 925 (9th Cir.1987) (alteration original)).

Exhibits 12, 13, and 14 are not authenticated because defendants failed to submit the declaration or deposition testimony of a BOA custodian of records, or someone else with personal knowledge of the contents of the documents, stating that they are what defendants represent them to be. Because defendants have attached the documents to Fernandes’ declaration, Rule 56(e) requires that she have personal knowledge of them. Fernandes is not a BOA employee, nor does her declaration contain any information suggesting she otherwise has personal knowledge of the documents or their contents. The evidence is therefore unauthenticated and inadmissible. Orr, 285 F.3d at 777-78 (“Exhibit M purports to be a letter from Walshaw to Bourdeau, permitting Tahoe Bank to ‘transact business preliminary to its organization.’ It is not authenticated because Orr has failed to submit an affidavit or deposition testimony from Wal-shaw stating that he wrote the letter. Because Orr attempted to introduce Exhibit M by attaching it to Mirch’s affidavit, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(e) requires that Mirch have personal knowledge of the letter.... The district court’s exclusion of Exhibit M was therefore proper”).

Even were it to consider the exhibits, moreover, the court would find triable issues of fact regarding the accuracy of defendants’ reporting of the BOA HELOC account. Grigoryan disputes the late páyment status, and proffers what he contends is proof of payment. Although defendants are correct that a September 2011 payment stub is not sufficient to prove inaccuracy as a matter of law, because the fact a payment was made in September 2011 does not, in and of itself, indicate that the payment was timely, a reasonable jury could accept Grigoryan’s statement that he made the payment on time, coupled with the payment stub, as true, and find that by reporting the account thirty days late, defendants issued inaccurate reports. Triable issues remain, therefore, concerning the accuracy of defendants’ reports, which listed the BOA HELOC account thirty days late in September 2011.

Defendants dispute this conclusion. Citing Garni v. Citi Mortgage, No. CV 1101387 ODW, 2012 WL 1535654 (C.D.Cal. Apr. 30, 2012), they maintain that the Ninth Circuit deems credit reports accurate under the FCRA if a credit reporting agency correctly reports information furnished by the creditor. Gaud’s holding is premised entirely on that court’s reading of the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Car-valho. The court therefore begins by discussing Carvalho.

In Carvalho, plaintiffs credit reports reflected a collection account that was $118 past due; plaintiff did not contend that the account was not hers, that the amount past due was too high or low, or that any of the listed dates were wrong. Carvalho, 629 F.3d at 891. In fact, she conceded that the data was correct on its face. The Ninth Circuit held that “[bjecause all of the relevant facts were correctly reported, there was no patent error in Carvalho’s credit report.” Id. (emphasis original). Carvalho asserted, however, that there was a latent error in the reports. She contended that she was not legally obligated to pay the creditor because it had not properly billed her insurer as allegedly required by an underlying agreement between the parties. Id. Carvalho argued that the credit reporting agencies had to undertake “a'searching inquiry” to determine the validity of her defenses to payment. As the Ninth Circuit described her argument, it was that “consumers should be deemed innocent until proven guilty by a proper reinvestigation under the FCRA and CCRAA.” Id. The court rejected this argument, stating:

“The fundamental flaw in Carvalho’s conception of the reinvestigation duty is that credit reporting agencies are not tribunals. They simply collect and report information furnished by others. Because [credit reporting agencies] are ill equipped to adjudicate contract disputes, courts have been loath to allow consumers to mount collateral attacks on the legal validity of their debts in the guise of FCRA reinvestigation claims.” Id. (citing Saunders v. Branch Banking & Trust Co. of Va., 526 F.3d 142, 150 (4th Cir.2008)).

The court noted in this regard the First Circuit’s decision in DeAndrade v. Trans Union LLC, 523 F.3d 61 (1st Cir.2008). There, the dispute centered on whether DeAndrade had ratified an allegedly fraudulent mortgage, such that his § 1681i claim was barred. Id. at 68. The First Circuit found it unnecessary to resolve this issue, deciding instead that “[w]hether the mortgage is valid turns on questions that can only be resolved by a court of law” and is “a legal issue that a credit agency such as Trans Union is neither qualified nor obligated to resolve under the FCRA.” Id. The proper recourse for DeAndrade, the court stated, was to file suit against the creditor; DeAndrade had in fact already done so. The circuit observed that “[i]f a court had ruled the mortgage invalid and Trans Union had continued to report it as a valid debt, then DeAndrade would have grounds for a potential FCRA claim.” Id. Barring this, however, it concluded that DeAndrade’s argument “crossed the line between alleging a factual deficiency that Trans Union was obliged to investigate pursuant to the FCRA and launching an impermissible collateral attack against a lender by bringing an FCRA claim against a consumer reporting agency.” For that reason, the court found no inaccuracy.

After discussing DeAndrade, the Ninth Circuit

“agree[d] [with the First Circuit] that reinvestigation claims are not the proper vehicle for collaterally attacking the legal validity of consumer debts. “With respect to the accuracy of disputed information, the CRA is a third party, lacking any direct relationship with the consumer, and its responsibility is to “re investigate” a matter once already investigated in the first place.’ Hence, a consumer disputing the legal validity of a debt that appears on her credit report should first attempt to resolve the matter directly with the creditor or furnish-er, which ‘stands in a far better position to make a thorough investigation of a disputed debt than the CRA does on reinvestigation.’ ACRA is not required as part of its reinvestigation duties to , provide a legal opinion on the merits. Indeed, determining whether the consumer has a valid defense ‘is a question for a court to resolve in a suit against the [creditor,] not a job imposed upon consumer reporting agencies by the FCRA.’ Nor is a CRA obligated not to report any information about the disputed item simply because the consumer asserts a legal defense. ‘[T]he very economic purpose for credit reporting companies would be significantly vitiated if they shaded every credit history in their files in the best possible light for the consumer.’ ” Carvalho, 629 F.3d at 892.

In Gaud, plaintiff sued various credit reporting agencies based on their reporting of late payments on her mortgage. Like the plaintiff in Carvalho, she disputed the validity of the increased mortgage payments. The court found that Carvalho “clearly settled that, under the FCRA, a credit reporting agency’s job is to correctly report information furnished by the creditorf;] ... credit reporting agencies are not supposed to adjudicate a consumer-creditor dispute in order to issue credit reports.” Id. at *6 (citing Carvalho, 629 F.3d at 891-92). Applying this principle, it held that “[w]hen a credit reporting agency correctly reports the information furnished by the creditor, the credit report is considered as ‘accurate’ within the meaning of the FCRA, even when there is an ongoing dispute as to the validity of the debt.” Id.

Defendants seize on this language in Gauci, and assert as a general proposition that if a credit reporting agency accurately reports information furnished by a creditor — even if that information is inaccurate — the consumer cannot show that the credit reporting agency prepared a report containing inaccurate information and make out prima facie violation of § 1681e(b). Carvalho and Gauci do not support such a rule; in both cases, it was undisputed that the report of the debt was not inaccurate. Rather, in both cases, plaintiffs disputed the validity of the underlying debt. Short of acting as a court of law, something they were ill-suited to do, the credit reporting agencies could do nothing to resolve the dispute. Here, by contrast, Grigoryan does not dispute the “validity” of the BOA HELOC, the Sequoia account, or the CMI account. Instead, he challenges the accuracy of the information furnished by BOA, Sequoia, and CMI to defendants. Although, as discussed infra, credit reporting agencies are entitled to rely on information provided to them by furnishers for purposes of avoiding liability under § 1681e(b) and § 1785.14(b), this does not preclude a consumer such as Gri-goryan from making a prima facie showing that information contained on a credit report is factually inaccurate.

This is born out by case law interpreting Carvalho. In Starkey v. Experian Info. Solutions, Inc., 32 F.Supp.3d 1105, 1109-10 (C.D.Cal.2014), for example, plaintiff disputed whether certain items on her credit report pertained to her. Experian contended that Carvalho foreclosed recovery, because the furnisher had reported the accounts and Experian. had merely reflected information received from the fur-nisher in its report. Id. The court disagreed. Like Grigoryan, Starkey did “not argu[e] that her report eontain[ed] a latent inaccuracy, but [ ] instead raised a genuine factual dispute as to whether' her credit report included ‘patent error[s]’ because certain items in the report did not even ‘pertain to her.’ ” Id. Accordingly, the court found Carvalho distinguishable and found that Starkey had raised trial issues concerning the inaccuracy of the report. Id. at 1109-11.

The court reached the same result in Bradshaw v. BAG Home Loans Servicing, LB, 816 F.Supp.2d 1066, 1071-72 (D.Or.2011). It found that plaintiff had made a prima facie showing of inaccuracy and rejected defendant’s contention that Carval-ho barred such a finding. It observed: “Unlike the consumer in Carvalho, [the Bradshaw ] plaintiffs [raise] several factual disputes concerning [their] [BOA] account.” Id. at 1072. Specifically, as Gri-goryan does with respect to the BOA HE-LOC, plaintiffs alleged “that they paid their mortgage on time, in contrast to the multiple listings of late payments, and that the reported monthly payment amount and amount past due are too high.” Id. Consequently, the court found Carvalho, which did not concern a patent inaccuracy, inap-posite.

Numerous other courts have reached the same conclusion. See Nelson v. Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC, No. CV 14-00419 HZ, 2014 WL 2866841, *3 (D.Or. June 23, 2014) (“Nelson argues that his report was factually inaccurate and patently misleading because he never owed the amount shown. Accordingly, his case is more analogous to cases such as Bradshaw, 816 F.Supp.2d at 1072, where the court found the plaintiffs established prima facie inaccuracy by disputing the amount owed and whether the account was actually past due”); Darrin v. Bank of Am., N.A., No. CV 12-00228 MCE, 2014 WL 1922819, *6. (E.D.Cal. May 14, 2014) (holding that because “[p]laintiff dispute[d] the accuracy of the statements, and not simply her legal obligation to pay a debt[,] ... Carvalho [did] not apply”); accord Saenz v. Trans Union LLC, 621 F.Supp.2d 1074, 1080 (D.Or.2007) (holding, prior to Carvalho, that plaintiff demonstrated a prima facie inaccuracy by adducing evidence that Trans Union continued to list a collection balance outstanding despite the fact that it had previously been satisfied with a compromise payment).

Unlike the plaintiffs in Carvalho and Gaud, and like the plaintiffs in cases distinguishing Carvalho, Grigoryan has made a prima facie showing that his credit report contained patent errors. He does not assail the validity of the BOA HELOC or his obligation to pay it; he simply argues that he did pay all outstanding sums, and that, because defendants reported the account as past due, his payments were inaccurately reflected in their reports. See Bradshaw, 816 F.Supp.2d at 1072 (finding that there was a triable issue of fact as to inaccuracy where plaintiffs alleged they paid on time and defendant reported “multiple ... late payments”).

Similarly, Grigoryan contends that the Sequoia and CMI accounts are not his accounts; the Carvalho court expressly disclaimed any intent to address such a situation. See Carvalho, 629 F.3d at 891 (“Carvalho does not contend that the CCS collection account does not pertain to her, that the amount past due is too high or low, or that any of the listed dates are wrong. Indeed, she concedes that ‘[a]ll the data that shows in my credit report is correct’ on its face. Because all of the relevant facts were correctly reported, there was no patent error in Carvalho’s credit report”); Starkey, 32 F.Supp.3d at 1110 (“[Plaintiff] has [] raised a genuine factual dispute as to whether her credit report included ‘patent error[s]’ because certain items in the report did not even ‘pertain to her’”). Thus, the court finds that Carvalho and Gaud do not bar a finding of inaccuracy here.

2. Whether Defendants Were Entitled to Rely on the Information Reported by BOA, Sequoia, and CMI and Whether Defendants’ Procedures for Ensuring Accuracy Were Reasonable

Although triable issues of fact remain concerning the accuracy of defendants’ BOA HELOC reporting and Trans Union’s Sequoia and CMI account reporting, summary judgment is nonetheless properly entered in defendants’ favor on Grigoryan’s § 1681e(b) and § 1785.14(b) claims. A credit reporting agency does not violate § 1681e(b) or § 1785.14(b) “simply by reporting information that may be inaccurate.” Darrin, 2014 WL 1922819 at *6 (citing Saenz, 621 F.Supp.2d at 1081). “If a consumer reporting agency accurately transcribes, stores and communicates consumer information received from a source that it reasonably believes to be reputable, and which is credible on its face, the agency does not violate [§ 1681e(b) or § 1785.14(b) ] simply by reporting an item of information that turns out to be inaccurate.” Id. (quoting Saenz, 621 F.Supp.2d at 1081 (in turn quoting 16 C.F.R. Pt. 600, App., § 607.3(A))); see also Garrison v. Equifax Info. Servs., LLC, No. CV 10-13990, 2012 WL 1278044, *7 (E.D.Mich. Apr. 16, 2012) (“a consumer reporting agency receiving a facially credible report from a source which it believes to be reputable is not liable merely because the report contains inaccurate information”); Elsady v. Rapid Global Bus. Solutions, Inc., No. CV 09-11659, 2010 WL 742852, *4 (E.D.Mich. Feb. 26, 2010) (“CARCO is correct; there is no evidence suggesting that it had reason to doubt the accuracy of RGBSI’s information prior to submitting the report to SAIC.... While Elsady’s subsequent dispute may have triggered a duty to reinvestigate under § 1681i, it is not relevant to CARCO’s investigative procedures under § 1681e(b)”). Athough there is no case law on point, the court concludes that California courts would interpret the CCRAA similarly, and permit a credit reporting agency, as part of its “reasonable procedures to ensure accuracy” under § 1785.14(b), to rely on facially credible reports from reputable sources. See, e.g., Olson, 111 Cal.App.4th at 12, 3 Cal.Rptr.3d 301 (stating that because the CCRAA “is substantially based on the Federal Fair Credit Reporting Act, judicial interpretation of the federal provisions is persuasive authority and entitled to substantial weight when interpreting the California provisions”); Cisneros, 39 Cal.App.4th at 575, 46 Cal.Rptr.2d 233 (citing federal cases and concluding that under § 1785.14(b) and § 1785.16, “a credit reporting agency must have in place reasonable procedures to ensure maximum possible accuracy and follow them. If it does, then the fact that it erroneously reported unfavorable information does not subject it to liability”).

Based on the undisputed evidence, the court concludes there are no triable issues of fact as to whether defendants violated § 1681e(b) and § 1785.14(b) by reporting the BOA HELOC as late in September 2011. It reaches the same conclusion with respect to Trans Union’s reporting that the Sequoia and CMI accounts belonged to Grigoryan. Assuming these reports were erroneous, there is no evidence that raises triable issues of fact concerning the reasonableness of defendants’ § 1681e(b) and § 1785.14(b) procedures to ensure accuracy. Grigoryan adduces no evidence, and does not argue, that defendants had reason to believe that BOA, Sequoia, and CMI were not reputable sources of information. Thus, before Gri-goryan disputed the thirty day late status of the BOA HELOC account and his ownership of the Sequoia and CMI accounts, thereby placing defendants on notice that the reported information might be inaccurate, defendants were entitled to rely on facially credible information received from BOA, Sequoia, and CMI. See Darrin, 2014 WL 1922819 at *6 (quoting Saenz, 621 F.Supp.2d at 1081 (in turn quoting 16 C.F.R. Pt. 600, App., § 607.3(A))); Garrison, 2012 WL 1278044 at *7; Elsady, 2010 WL 742852 at *4.

Grigoryan proffers no evidence that defendants reported anything other than the information furnished to them by BOA, Sequoia, and CMI. While Grigoryan, for example, argues that Trans Union reported accounts that did not belong to him, he does not dispute that Sequoia and CMI reported the accounts to Trans Union as his, nor that Trans Union simply reported the information that these furnishers provided to it. The fact that the information may have been inaccurate does not demonstrate that Trans Union did not employ reasonable procedures to ensure the accuracy of the information under § 1681e(b) and § 1785.14(b), as its obligations under these statutes “relate to the maintenance and operation of [its] own internal databases rather than to investigation of the accuracy of information received from external sources.” Saenz, 621 F.Supp.2d at 1081.

The same is true of all defendants’ reporting of the status of the BOA HELOC. Grigoryan asserts that reporting that he was thirty days late in making his September 2011 payment was “patently incorrect,” citing two BOA letters dated May 23 and May 30, 2012. Defendants object that the letters are unauthenticated, lack foundation, and contain inadmissible hearsay. The court agrees that the letters are hearsay to the extent Grigoryan rélies on them to prove that defendants’ reporting was inaccurate. Even if the court were to consider these documents, they make it clear that BOA was reporting the account as delinquent prior to .May 23, 2012. Indeed, the May 23, 2012 letter states that BOA “received [Grigoryan’s] request for a credit report adjustment related to [his] 09/2011 mortgage installment,” and that the “correct information was submitted on 5/23/2012 to the credit reporting agencies.” While a factfinder could certainly decide that this is evidence that BOA inaccurately reported Grigor-yan’s failure to make his September 2011 HELOC payment in a timely fashion, and while it may .suggest that defendants’ reinvestigation procedures were inadequate, the May 23, 2012 letter proves, if anything, that BOA was the source of the inaccurate information, and that the erroneous reporting was not a product of defendants’ internal procedures.

The May 30, 2012 letter, moreover, is irrelevant. It states that “[ajccording to [BOA’s] records, [Grigoryan’s] 10/2011 mortgage installment for the [HELOC] was never late,” and that corrected information was sent to the credit reporting agencies on May 30, 2012. Grigoryan has never alleged that his October 2011 mortgage payment was incorrectly reported, however. In his opposition, Grigor-yan contends that the October 2011 reference “was ... a typographical error, or perhaps a different way of characterizing the same thing [-] negative credit reporting related to a 9/2011 late payment....” The letter, however, unequivocally states that Grigoryan’s “10/2011[ ] mortgage installment ... was never late.” The court cannot ignore the actual text of the letter and indulge Gri-goryan’s suggestion that the letter contained a typographical error such that it says precisely what he wishes it to say. Moreover, the May 23, 2012 letter states that BOA “received [Grigoryan’s] request for a credit report adjustment related to [his] 09/2011 mortgage 'installment” and that the “correct information was submitted on 5/23/2012 to the credit reporting agencies.” It would make little sense for BOA to send another letter one week later concerning the same payment stating that the same information had been submitted to the credit reporting agencies a second time on May 30, 2012. In any event, the fact BOA had to “correct” the information once again indicates that it was misreporting information; the fact that BOA reported inaccurate is not proof that defendants’ internal databases were improperly operated or maintained. See Saenz, 621 F.Supp.2d at 1081 (§ 1681e(b), and by analogy § 1785.14(b), “relate to the maintenance and operation of [a credit reporting agency’s] own internal databases rather than to investigation of the accuracy of information received from external sources”).

Finally, to the extent Grigoryan adduces evidence of defendants’ procedures, his proof relates exclusively to their reinvestigation procedures. Specifically, he contends that after being alerted to inaccuracies in the credit reports, defendants did not “reach out to [him] to seek more information .... or additional supporting documents”; did not “demand more detailed information” from BOA; and, “confronted with directly contradictory ... assertions made by the consumer and their furnisher/subscriber, simply sided with the latter.” These alleged inadequacies concern defendants’ reinvestigation procedures under §. 1681i and § 1785.16, i.e., what defendants should have done in response to Grigoryan’s assertion that the BOA HELOC reporting was inaccurate. As noted, § 1681e(b) obligations concern “the maintenance and operation of [a credit reporting agency’s] own internal databases rather than to investigation of the accuracy of information received from external sources.” See Saenz, 621 F.Supp.2d at 1081 (“[W]hen a consumer reporting agency learns or should reasonably be aware of errors in its reports that may indicate systematic problems (by virtue of information from consumers, report users, from periodic review of its reporting system, or otherwise) it must review its procedures for assuring accuracy. Examples of errors that would require such review are the issuance of a consumer report pertaining entirely to a consumer other than the one on whom a report was requested, and the issuance of a consumer report containing information on two or more consumers (e.g., information that was mixed in the file) in response to a request for a report on only one of those consumers,” quoting 16 C.F.R. 600, § 607.3(A)).

Accordingly, evidence of inadequacies in defendants’ reinvestigation procedures under § 1681i or § 1785.16 is not probative of the fact that defendants have violated § 1681e(b) and § 1785.14(b). See Darrin, 2014 WL 1922819 at *6 (“[CJompliance with § 1681e(b) and § 1681i are distinct inquiries, since § 1681