In re Volkswagen & Audi Warranty Extension Litigation (89 F. Supp. 3d 155, 2015)

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

YOUNG, District Judge.

I. INTRODUCTION

Before the Court are numerous motions for attorneys’ fees and costs incurred in the course of a protracted multidistrict class action litigation, undertaken on behalf of a class of consumers (the “Class Plaintiffs”) who owned or leased certain Volkswagen Passat and Audi A4 vehicles. After settling their consolidated case against Volkswagen of America, Inc., Volkswagen AG, and Audi AG (collectively, the “Defendants”), the Class Plaintiffs moved for attorneys’ fees and expenses pursuant to their settlement agreement, and this offshoot of the underlying litigation ensued. Judge Joseph L. Tauro (“Judge Tauro”), then the presiding judge in this case, awarded $30,000,000 in fees to lead counsel for the Class Plaintiffs (“Class Counsel”), but the judgment was vacated by the 'First Circuit and remanded for further proceedings.

This Court’s task is to determine the appropriate fees and expenses (1) for Class Counsel’s work undertaken before Judge Tauro’s award, (2) for Class Counsel’s work undertaken after the award, and (3) for the work of other counsel representing subsets of the Class Plaintiffs (“Non-Class Counsel”) since the beginning of this litigation.

A. Procedural Posture

As the prior procedural history of this litigation has by now been recounted in several opinions, it will .be reviewed here with a primary focus on the attorneys’ fees motions pending before this Court. On August 29, 2006, the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation (“JPML”) ordered four statewide class actions pending in separate districts to be consolidated and transferred to the District of Massachusetts, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1407. In re Volkswagen & Audi Warranty Extension Litig., 452 F.Supp.2d 1354, 1355 (J.P.M.L. 2006). The case was assigned to Judge Tauro, id. at 1356, who ably managed the litigation and approved its settlement on March 24, 2011. Mem., Mar. 24, 2011 (“Final Settlement Approval”), ECF No. 271.

On the same day, Judge Tauro granted the Class Plaintiffs’ motion for attorneys’ fees and costs, Mot. Attys.’ Fees & Costs (“Class Counsel Motion for Attorney Fees”), ECF No. 174, awarding Class Counsel $30,000,000 in fees. See In re Volkswagen & Audi Warranty Extension Litig. {“In re VW (Original Award)”), 784 F.Supp.2d 35 (D.Mass.2011). On appeal, however, the First Circuit vacated the award and remanded on July-27, 2012, so that Class Counsel’s fees could be calculated in accordance with Massachusetts, not federal, law. See In re Volkswagen & Audi Warranty Extension Litig. (“In re VW (First Circuit)”), 692 F.3d 4 (1st Cir. 2012). The remanded case was reassigned to this Court on October 10, 2012, pursuant to Local Rule 40.1(k)(2). Elec. Notice, Oct. 10, 2012, ECF No. 344.

In addition to Class Counsel’s initial motion for attorneys’ fees and costs, other fees-related motions are pending before the Court. Class Counsel has filed a motion for additional attorneys’ fees and costs incurred after Judge Tauro’s original award. Mot. Add’l Attys.’ Fees & Costs, ECF No. 373; Class Counsel’s Br. Supp. Mot. Add’l Attys.’ Fees & Costs (“Class Counsel Add’l Fees Mem.”), ECF No. 374. Moreover, numerous motions for fees and costs from the beginning of this litigation have been filed by Non-Class Counsel:

(1)Shapiro Haber & Urmy LLP seeks fees and expenses for work it performed as liaison counsel to Class Counsel. Appl. Liaison Counsel Shapiro Haber & Urmy LLP Award Attorneys’ Fees & Reimbursement Expenses, ECF No. 371; see also Aff. Thomas G. Shapiro Supp. Liaison Counsel Shapiro Haber & Urmy LLP’s Appl. Award Attys.’ Fees & Reimb. Exps. (“Shapiro Aff.”), ECF No. 372.

(2) Jonathan Waller, who worked as an attorney at Campbell, Waller and Poer, LLC, Waller Law Office, PC, and Haskell Slaughter Young & Re-diker, LLC during his involvement in this litigation, seeks fees and expenses for the work he and his colleagues undertook at the direction of Class Counsel. Mot. Waller Firms Award Attys.’ Fees & Exps., ECF No. 378; see also Mem. Law Waller Firms Supp. Mot. Award Attys.’ Fees & Exps. (‘Waller Memorandum”), ECF No. 382.

(3) Chimicles & Tikellis LLP seeks fees and reimbursement of expenses for work they completed at the request of Class Counsel. Mot. Chimicles & Tikellis LLP Award Attys.’ Fees & Reimb. Exps., ECF No. 361; see also Mem. Law Supp. Mot. Chimi-cles & Tikellis LLP Award Attys.’ Fees & Reimb. Exps. (“Chimicles & Tikellis Memorandum”), ECF No. 362.

(4) Fox Rothschild LLP seeks fees and expenses for its work initiating and litigating a statewide class action in New Jersey, and for the work it undertook for Class Counsel after consolidation. Mot. Fox Rothschild LLP Award Attys.’ Fees & Reimb. Exps., ECF No. 367; see also Mem. Law Supp. Mot. Fox Rothschild LLP Award Attys.’ Fees & Reimb. Exps. (“Fox Rothschild Memorandum”), ECF No. 380.

(5) The four firms, Progressive Law, Reinhardt Wendorf & Blanchfield, Wayne, Richard & Hurwitz LLP, and Bock & Hatch, LLC, jointly seek fees and expenses for their work representing a member of the Class Plaintiffs in the Northern District of Illinois and assisting Class Counsel. Mot. Yarkony’s Counsel Award Attys.’ Fees & Reimb. Exps. (“Yarkony Motion”), ECF No. 376; see also Mem. Law Supp. Yarkony Counsel’s Mot. Attys.’ Fees & Reimb. Exps. (“Yakorny Memorandum”), ECF No. 377.

(6) Resnick & Moss, P.C., a firm that served as co-counsel in an Illinois class action lawsuit which was eventually absorbed into this litigation, seeks fees and expenses for the work it undertook on behalf of its clients that benefited the entire Class. Resnick & Moss, P.C.’s Mot. Award Atty. Fees & Reimb. Exps. (“Res-nick & Moss Motion”), ECF No. 385; see also Mem. Supp. Resnick & Moss, P.C.’s Mot. Award Atty. Fees & Reimb. Exps. (“Resnick & Moss Memorandum”), ECF No. 386.

(7) Jackson & Tucker, Sacks & Weston, and Vaughan Law Group (collectively, “Jackson Counsel”), firms that initiated statewide class actions in Florida, Pennsylvania, and Illinois which were eventually absorbed into the present litigation, jointly seek an award of fees and expenses incurred since the beginning of their separate lawsuits. Jackson & Tucker, Sacks & Weston, & Vaughan Law Group’s Mot. Award Attys.’ Fees & Reimb. Exps., ECF No. 365; see also Jackson & Tucker, Sacks & Weston, & Vaughan Law Group’s Br. Supp. Mot. Award Attys.’ Fees & Reimb. Exps. (“Jackson Counsel Supplemental Brief’), ECF No. 366.

(8) Mark Schlachet and Brian Ruschel, attorneys who initiated a statewide class action in Ohio that was eventually absorbed into the present litigation, seek compensation for their efforts in Ohio and their contribution to this case’s settlement. Mot. & Appl. Attys.’ Fees, Costs, & Exps.— & Submission Time Rs. ( & Req. Evidentiary Hr’g) (“Schlachet & Ruschel Original Request for Attorneys’ Fees”), ECF No. 168; Mot. Brian Ruschel Award Atty. Fees & Costs, ECF No. 358; see also Mem. Supp. Ohio Counsel Mark Sehla-chet’s Mot. Award Attys.’ Fees & Costs (“Schlachet Memorandum”), ECF No. 357; Mem. Supp. Ohio Counsel Brian Ruschel’s Mot. Award Attys.’ Fees & Costs (“Ruschel Memorandum”), ECF No. 359; Am. Mot. Brian Ruschel Award Atty. Fees & Costs, ECF No. 375.

(9)Thomas Sobran, who is the counsel of record for two members of the Class Plaintiffs and who originally initiated a Massachusetts-based class action lawsuit, seeks fees and expenses for the work he performed for his clients and at the direction of Class Counsel after consolidation. Mot. Thomas P. Sobran Award At-tys.’ Fees & Reimb. Exps., ECF No. 370; see also Decl. Thomas P. So-bran Supp. Appl. Attys.’ Fees & Reimb. Exps. (“Sobran Decl. Supp. Appl. Attys.’ Fees”), ECF No. 353; Supp. Mot. Thomas P. Sobran Award Attys.’ Fees & Reimb. Exps., ECF No. 398.

In addition to these motions, Jackson Counsel has jointly filed a request, separate from their joint fees motion, for this Court to establish a formal process for allocating fee awards among Class Counsel and Non-Class Counsel. Jackson & Tucker, Sacks & Weston, & Vaughan Law Group’s Req. Joint Appl. Attorneys’ Fees & Establishment Process Distribution, ECF No. 356. Class Counsel has filed a brief in opposition to this request. Resp. Class Counsel Req. Jackson & Tucker, Sacks & Weston & Vaughan Law Group Joint Appl. Attys.’ Fees & Est. Process Dist., ECF No. 360. Jackson Counsel have filed a reply and a number of supplemental briefs. Jackson & Tucker, Sacks & Weston, & Vaughan Law Group’s Reply Class Counsel’s Resp. Req. Joint Appl. Attys.’ Fees & Est. Process Dist., ECF No. 364; see also, e.g., Jackson & Tucker, Sacks & Weston, & Vaughan Law Group’s Supp. Req. Est. Process Dist., (“Jackson Fee Supplement Request”), ECF No. 388; Jackson & Tucker, Sacks & Weston, & Vaughan Law Group’s Supp. Br. Supp. Mot. Award Attys.’ Fees & Reimb. Exps. (“Jackson Fee Supplement Brief’), ECF No. 389.

Class Counsel has submitted briefing commenting on all of Non-Class Counsel’s requests and their respective contributions to the resolution of this consolidated litigation. Comments Class Counsel Concerning Non-Class Counsel’s Submissions Fees & Costs (“Class Counsel Comments”), ECF No. 394. Some Non-Class Counsel have disputed these comments in opposition briefing. See Resp. Thomas P. So-bran Comments Class Counsel Concerning Non-Class Counsel’s Submissions Fees & Costs (“Sobran Response to Class Counsel Comments”), ECF No. 399; Jackson & Tucker, Sacks & Weston, and Vaughan Law Group’s Cons. Reply to Defs.’ Opp’n Mot. Award Attys.’ Fees & Reimb. Exps. & Class Counsels’ “Comments” Concerning Non-Class Counsels’ Submissions Fees & Costs, ECF No. 407.

On February 26, 2013, the Defendants submitted an omnibus opposition to all of Class Counsel and Non-Class Counsel’s pending motions for attorneys’’ fees. Defs.’ Opp’n Pis.’ Class & Non-Class Counsel’s Mots. Atty. Fees & Exps. (“Defs.’ Opp’n”), ECF No. 395. Several replies from Class and Non-Class Counsel followed. E.g., Reply Mem. Law. Supp. Yarkony Counsel’s Mot. Attys.’ Fees & Reimb. Exps., ECF No. 402; Reply Br. Chúmeles & Tikellis LLP Supp. Mot. Award Attys.’ Fees & Reimb. Exps. (“Chi-micles & Tikellis Reply”), ECF No. 403; Reply Mem. Further Support Fox Rothschild LLP’s Mot. Award Attys.’ Fees & Reimb. Exps. (“Fox Rothschild Reply”), ECF No. 404; Waller Firms’ Reply Br. Supp. Appl. Attys.’ Fees &. Exps., ECF No. 405; Class Counsel’s Reply Br. Supp. Mot. Add’l Attys.’ Fees & Costs, (“Reply. Additional Attorneys’ Fees”), ECF No. 406; Jackson & Tucker, Sacks & Weston, and Vaughan Law Group’s Cons. Reply to Defs.’ Opp’n Mot. Award Attys.’ Fees & Reimb. Exps. & Class Counsels’ “Comments” Concerning Non-Class Counsels’ Submissions Fees & Costs, ECF No. 407.

B. Facts

1. The Lawsuit and Substantive Terms of Settlement

This litigation, and the separate class action lawsuits which gave rise to it, stemmed from allegations of defectively-designed engines in certain Audi and Volkswagen automobiles. In re VW (First Circuit), 692 F.3d at 8. Purportedly, the 1.8 liter turbo-charged engines in Audi vehicles from the 1997 to 2004 model years and Volkswagen Passat vehicles from the 1998 to 2004 model years were unusually prone to the formation of oil sludge and coking deposits, even when maintained according to the Defendants’ recommendations. Id. at 7-8; Class Counsel Add’l Fees Mem. 1. These substances allegedly cause engine damage and failure, necessitating costly repairs or total engine replacement. Class Counsel Add’l Fees Mem. 1.

The case settled pursuant to the terms of an agreement first proposed to Judge Tauro on September 13, 2010, and which he finally approved without changes on March 24, 2011. See Final Settlement Approval 1-2, ECF No. 271; see also Agrmt. Of Settl. (“Settlement Agreement”), ECF No. 160. The First Circuit has aptly summarized the substantive terms of the agreement:

The settlement stated it was “not an admission by Defendants of any liability or wrongdoing whatsoever.” The settlement class consisted of all current and former owners and lessees of model year 1997-2004 Audi A4 vehicles or model year 1998-2004 Volkswagen Passat vehicles equipped with 1.8 liter turbo engines, comprising a total of 479,768 vehicles. The proposed settlement offered several benefits to the class, including (1) payment for engine repair or replacement costs, (2) a warranty extension for a subset of the vehicles, (3) a one-time $25 oil change discount for a subset of the vehicles, and (4) an education and information program designed to inform class members of the risks to their engines and means to prevent those risks. The proposed settlement did not place a monetary value on these benefits.

The proposed settlement created an “Oil Sludge Settlement Administrator” to oversee the claims process for class members. The administrator was to record every claim for reimbursement, to determine whether the claim was to be allowed or denied, and to explain the basis for any claim that was denied. The proposed settlement contained a procedure for providing notice to all settlement class members of the certification and fairness hearing and the settlement agreement. Notice of the proposed settlement was to be prepared by defendants, reviewed and approved by class counsel, and disseminated by the settlement administrator. The proposed settlement also “reserve[d] to the [district] [c]ourt exclusive and continuing jurisdiction over this action, the [p]arties, ... and this Settlement Agreement for purposes of administering, supervising, construing, and enforcing this Settlement Agreement.”

In re VW (First Circuit), 692 F.3d at 9 (quoting Settlement Agreement).

2. Attorneys’ Fees

On February 7, 2007, early in the life of the consolidated case, Judge Tauro entered a procedural pretrial order organizing, among other things, primary roles for Plaintiffs’ counsel. See Pretrial Order No. 1, ECF No. 4. Merrill G. Davidoff and Edward W. Millstein of Berger & Montague, P.C. (“Berger & Montague”) were designated lead counsel. Id. at 3. Kirk D. Tresemer and Randal R. Kelly of Irwin & Boesen, P.C. (“Irwin & Boesen”), and Peter J. McNulty of McNulty Law Firm (“McNulty”) were collectively designated as co-chairs of the Plaintiffs’ Executive Committee (collectively, with Berger & Montague, “Class Counsel”). Id. The Boston-based firm of Shapiro Haber & Urmy LLP (“Shapiro”) was designated liaison counsel to the Plaintiffs. Id.

Understandably, due to the size and complex nature of this case, Class Counsel have engaged the assistance of not only Shapiro, but also a plethora of other law firms, most of which became involved with this case because their individual class action lawsuits were consolidated with this litigation. At least some of these firms allege that they were actively persuaded by Class Counsel to absorb their lawsuits into this one.

A few other Non-Class Counsel firms indicate that they have been involved with this specific case since well before its transformation into a multidistrict action. In March and April 2006, several months before the JPML’s order, McNulty entered into an agreement with four other firms pursuing similar lawsuits against the Defendants: Campbell, Waller & Poer, LLC, Vaughan & Maxwell, Jackson & Tucker, P.C., and Sacks & Weston. See Jackson Fee Supplement Request, Ex. 1, Agreement Regarding Division Fees (“Pre-Consolidation Fee Agreement”) 2, ECF No. 388-1. The agreement established a structure for the firms to coordinate litigation strategies and allocate responsibilities among them. See id. at 2-7. The agreement also provided for the division of fees. Each firm, for example, was allocated an equal interest in “up front” fees, comprising the first thirty percent of the contingency fees received by the parties. Id. at 3. The remaining seventy percent of fees, termed “hold-back” fees, were to be distributed according to the consensus of all five participating firms. Id. at 3-5. The parties further agreed to submit any dispute relating to the interpretation or application of the agreement to mediation and then binding arbitration, to take place in Atlanta, Georgia. Id. at 6.

Usually, the Court is not burdened to address the details of these kinds of arrangements between class and non-class counsel. But the attorneys’ fees issue in this case only has become more unraveled over time. Early on in the fees portion of this case, Judge Tauro and Special Master Allan van Gestel, a distinguished former justice of the Massachusetts Superior Court, established a clear procedure for determining fees, providing that the Special Master would consider one attorneys’ fees petition from Class Counsel and then award a single fee amount, to be allocated at Class Counsel’s discretion. See Mem. & Order Regarding Procedure Fees & Costs Appl. (“Fees Procedures Order”) 2-3, ECF No. 178; Supp. Mem. Process Attys.’ Fees & Costs Hr’g (“Supp. Fees Procedures Order”) 7-8, ECF No. 211. Judge Tauro and Special Master van Gestel further prescribed that after the conclusion of this process and any appeals, Non-Class Counsel would “have a right to a hearing and evaluation by the Special Master should any of those firms disagree with the amount of compensation allocated to them.” Fees Procedures Order 3; see also Supp. Fees Procedures Order 8 (emphasizing that “the Special Master, in his discretion, will be able to craft a process appropriate for the next steps in the fee allocation distribution” only after the exhaustion of appeals, “for only then will the extent and nature of any concerns or complaints by non-class counsel be known”).

The parties never reached the final phase of this procedure. On March 24, 2011, Judge Tauro issued his order adopting the Special Master’s recommendation to award $30,000,000 in fees and $1,195,234.43 in costs and expenses to Class Counsel. In re VW (Original Award), 784 F.Supp.2d at 47. As is permitted by federal law, the award was based on a percentage of fund method of calculating fees. See id. at 46-47. A lodestar calculation was made, but perhaps because the number was used simply as a cross-check against the percentage of fund fee amount, id. at 47, the Special Master calculated only the lodestar attributable to Class Counsel’s hours in determining the appropriateness of his recommended award, In re VW (First Circuit), 692 F.3d at 22. He recommended and Judge Tauro adopted a base lodestar calculation of $7,734,000 and an attendant multiplier of 2.5, yielding a $19,335,000 lodestar. In re VW (Original Award), 784 F.Supp.2d at 47.

On appeal, however, the First Circuit rejected the use of a percentage of fund method of calculating fees, holding that Massachusetts, not federal, law ought govern the determination of appropriate attorneys’ fees in this matter. In re Volks wagen (First Circuit), 692 F.3d at 21. It also noted that in conducting a lodestar cross-check analysis, “[t]he district court’s choice of a multiplier figure was not based on Massachusetts law nor justified by the record, and it is therefore vacated.” Id. at 22. Consequently, the First Circuit remanded, directing that Special Master van Gestel’s base lodestar calculation ought “be the base figure used on remand as to class counsel, save for an increase in extra work.” Id. at 22. The Court of Appeals further instructed that “[b]ecause no lodestar calculation was performed as to plaintiffs’ attorneys who were not class counsel, the district court will need to perform a separate lodestar calculation as to those attorneys.” Id.

II. LEGAL FRAMEWORK

In accordance with the First Circuit’s mandate, Diaz v. Jiten Hotel Mgmt., Inc., 741 F.3d 170, 175 (1st Cir.2013), this Court will analyze the fee petitions before it under Massachusetts law. In Massachusetts, the “traditional approach [is] to prohibit recovery of attorney’s fees and expenses in a civil case in the absence of either an agreement between the parties, or a statute or rule to the contrary.” Preferred Mut. Ins. Co. v. Gamache, 426 Mass. 93, 95, 686 N.E.2d 989 (1997). Here, a settlement agreement between the parties expressly provided for an award of “reasonable attorneys’ fees and expenses” to be paid. Settlement Agreement 20. Although much of the state jurisprudence on attorneys’ fees concerns awards allocated by statutory fee-shifting provisions, see, e.g., Pinto v. Aberthaw Const. Co., 418 Mass. 494, 637 N.E.2d 219 (1994) (awarding fees for the litigation of workers’ compensation injuries pursuant to Mass. Gen. Laws c. 152, § 15), the Court observes that the principles distilled in these cases largely are applicable to the determination of “reasonable” attorneys’ fees allocated by contractual agreement. The First Circuit has identified two available methods for calculating such fees under this body of law: the multi-factor approach and the lodestar approach. In re VW (First Circuit), 692 F.3d at 21.

Under either approach, “[w]hat constitutes a reasonable fee is a question that is committed to the sound discretion of the judge.” Berman v. Linnane, 434 Mass. 301, 302-03, 748 N.E.2d 466 (2001). Massachusetts law does not require the Court “to review and allow or disallow each individual item in the bill,” it is permitted simply to “consider the bill as a whole.” Id. at 303, 748 N.E.2d 466. In so doing, the Court ought consider “several factors, including ‘the nature of the case and the issues presented, the time and labor required, the amount of damages involved, the result obtained, the experience, reputation and ability of the attorney, the usual price charged for similar services by other attorneys in the same area, and the amount of awards in similar cases.” Id. (quoting Linthicum v. Archambault, 379 Mass. 381, 388-389, 398 N.E.2d 482 (1979)). This is the essence of the multi-factor approach. The Supreme Judicial Court has recognized, however, that “[w]hen arranged as a simple checklist, ... these criteria do not lead with any certainty to a number of dollars.” Stratos v. Dep’t of Pub. Welfare, 387 Mass. 312, 321, 439 N.E.2d 778 (1982).

Accordingly, in lieu of a “factor-by-factor analysis,” Berman, 434 Mass, at 303, 748 N.E.2d 466, Massachusetts courts are permitted and even encouraged to account for these elements by way of . the lodestar method of analysis, under which “an amount [is] calculated by multiplying the number of hours reasonably spent on the ease times a reasonable hourly rate.” Fontaine v. Ebtec Corp., 415 Mass. 309, 324, 613 N.E.2d 881 (1993). After the Court calculates a base lodestar amount, “[t]he lodestar is then adjusted upward or downward on the basis of those [factors] that are not subsumed within the lodestar itself.” Stratos, 387 Mass, at 322, 439 N.E.2d 778. “The lodestar approach has the advantage of producing generally consistent results from case to case.” Fon-taine, 415 Mass, at 325, 613 N.E.2d 881.

The courts of the Commonwealth also employ the practice of enhancing lodestar amounts by applying a multiplier — a multiplier of two, for example, doubles the amount of the lodestar to determine the final fee award. E.g., In re AMICAS, Inc. S’holder Litig., 27 Mass. L.Rptr. 568, 2010 WL 5557444 (Mass.Super.Ct. Dec. 6, 2010) (Neel, J.) (applying a multiplier of five to fees incurred in a shareholder litigation); Commonwealth Care Alliance v. AstraZeneca Pharms. L.P., No. 05-0269 BLS 2, 2013 WL 6268236, at *2 (Mass.Super.Ct. Aug. 5, 2013) (Sanders, J.) (applying a multiplier of two to fees incurred in a Chapter 93A class action). Multipliers are an accepted means of enhancing a lodestar appropriately to reflect, for example, the scale of the results achieved by prevailing counsel or the risks counsel took in pursuing contingent fees. See, e.g., Commonwealth Care Alliance, 2013 WL 6268236 at *2; see also Buston v. Zoll Med. Corp., No. 12-1190, 2013 WL 5612566, at *3 (Mass.Super.Ct. Mar. 15, 2013) (Kaplan, J.) (asserting that “in shareholder litigation where the efforts of plaintiffs’ counsel generate [substantial benefits], that favorable result should weigh heavily in determining the appropriate fee award, including a significant lodestar multiplier” (internal quotation marks omitted)).

At the same time, the Supreme Judicial Court appears to favor a conservative approach to multiplier enhancements. “[F]air market rates for time reasonably spent should be the basic measure of reasonable fees, and should govern unless there are special reasons to depart from them.” Stratos, 387 Mass, at 322, 439 N.E.2d 778. A case that does not “involve any novel issues of law” or “implicate the public interest,” for example, may be a poor candidate for an attorneys’ fees multiplier. Eldridge v. Provident Cos., Inc., No. 971294, 2004 WL 1690382 at *9 (Mass.Super.Ct. July 6, 2004) (Sanders, J.) (declining to apply a multiplier in the absence of these factors, even though counsel did risk nonpayment by taking the case).

In the case at bar, the lodestar method has much to recommend it, not least because a base lodestar amount for class counsel’s pre-award fees has already been calculated and affirmed by the First Circuit, in “the absence of any direct challenge to [the] figure.” In re VW (First Circuit), 692 F.3d at 22. Determining the remaining contested fees and issues using lodestar calculations would ensure consistency both with Judge Tauro’s previous determinations and the First Circuit’s instructions on remand. Moreover, counsel for the Plaintiffs do not oppose a lodestar approach to determining their fees, see, e.g., Class Counsel Add’l Fees Mem. 3-5, the Defendants urge this Court to adopt the method, see Defs.’ Opp’n 9, and both sides have submitted sufficient records and briefing for the Court to apply a lodestar analysis to all disputed issues. Given these controlling legal and practical considerations, the Court will determine all disputed fees and expenses under the lodestar approach and then consider what adjustments are appropriate.

III. CLASS COUNSEL’S AWARD

A. Pre-Award Fees and Expenses

This Court has a limited role to play in determining the amount of reason-

able attorneys’ fees owed to Class Counsel for pre-award work — that is, the work undertaken before Judge Tauro’s original award. Per the First Circuit’s mandate, this Court will not disturb the $7,734,000 lodestar calculated by the Special Master and adopted by Judge Tauro. In re VW (First Circuit), 692 F.3d at 22.

Judge Tauro’s original award also provided for the payment of $1,195,234.43 in costs and expenses to Class Counsel. In re VW (Original Award), 784 F.Supp.2d at 47. Both Class Counsel and Defendants recognize that these costs were not challenged on appeal, suggesting that the Court ought leave intact this part of Judge Tauro’s award. See Class Counsel Add’l Fees Mem. 3; Defs.’ Opp’n 24. The Court is content to do so, as there appears to be no reason to depart from Judge Tauro and the Special Master’s determination. The Court notes that this award grants to Class Counsel the full amount of its request for pre-award costs and expenses, and that it includes pre-award costs and expenses claimed by Non-Class Counsel. Class Counsels’ Updated Statement Costs & Expenses (“Updated Statement of Costs”) 2, ECF No. 246 (requesting $1,195,234.43 for costs incurred through February 15, 2011, including $112,454.96 in expenses claimed by non-Class Counsel).

The Court’s primary task is to determine whether, and by how much, Class Counsel’s pre-award base lodestar ought be enhanced. In so doing, the Court must consider, among other things, the risks counsel undertook in pursuing this contingency fee litigation and the actual value obtained by class members as a result of the settlement agreement. In re VW (First Circuit), 692 F.3d at 22. “As to this last question, the actual claims data collected by the settlement administrator is relevant to the enhancement question and in determining the appropriate fee.” Id. Class Counsel requests a multiplier of 2.5 to 3.5, translating to a fee award ranging from $19,335,000 to $27,069,000. Class Counsel Add’l Fees Mem. 20. The Defendants counter that the base lodestar ought be reduced, in effect applying a negative multiplier, to yield an amount that is “proportionate” to the value of the benefits which have actually been collected by class members. Defs.’ Opp’n 26, 29.

1. Nature of the Litigation

It is evident from the record that this was a complex, well-fought, and largely well-managed case. Class Counsel are skilled and experienced trial advocates and, through hard work, obtained a settlement that inured meaningful benefits to its class members. The alleged product defects addressed by this litigation were serious ones, with the potential to impose significant costs and burdens on Volkswagen and Audi consumers. What’s more, the Defendants were alleged to have evaded accountability by offering minimal or misleading assistance to their customers. Class Counsel’s Add’l Fees Mem. 1-2. When such claims are not frivolous — and they were not frivolous in this case — it is in the public interest for them to be tested by our adversarial judicial process. Although the case was settled before the end of the motion to dismiss stage, Plaintiffs’ counsel “accomplish[ed] something of value to class members and society” by seeing this case through to its resolution. Deborah R. Hensler & Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., Beyond “It Just Ain’t Worth It”: Alternative Strategies for Damage Class Action Reform, 64-SUM Law & Contemp Probs. 137, 150 (2001) (quoting Deborah Hensler et ah, RAND, Class Action Dilemmas: Pursuing Public Goals for Private Gain— Executive Summary 33 (1999)).

Further, by working on a contingency fee basis, Class Counsel expended thousands of hours of labor without the certainty of compensation. Any argument by Defendants that taking on this case was a low-risk proposition for Class Counsel because of the work accomplished by earlier, similar lawsuits, is belied by the years it took for the parties to reach settlement and by the additional time and effort Class Counsel has had to dedicate to attempting to collect the fees the Defendants agreed to pay. The Defendants, having ably and vigorously advocated for their interests throughout the life of this case, are in a poor position to suggest that this case was a predictable one for Class Counsel to litigate.

2. Value of the Benefits Collected by the Class

The Court must also give due consideration, however, to the actual value of the benefits which have been put in the hands of class members. The Court is obliged to do so not only by the First Circuit’s mandate, but also because of this Court’s own antipathy toward the practice of awarding class plaintiff attorneys’ fees in excess of the value of benefits actually obtained by the class. See In re TJX Cos. Retail Sec. Breach Litig. (“In re TJX”),. 584 F.Supp.2d 395, 401 (D.Mass.2008); In re Relajen Antitrust Litig., 231 F.R.D. 52, 79 (D.Mass.2005).

The Settlement Agreement makes four types of benefits available to class members: (1) reimbursement of claims which should have been paid under warranty but which were denied by the Defendants, (2) a free ten-year warranty extension, (3) information and literature containing revised oil maintenance recommendations, which will help owners avoid future repair costs, and (4) a one-time oil change discount of $25. In re VW (Original Award), 784 F.Supp.2d at 43; Class Counsel Add’l Fees Mem. 13-15. There is not a finite pot of money which has been set aside to fund these benefits. Each class member is enti-tied to some combination of benefits, depending on her individual circumstance, and the Defendants have agreed to cover the costs for all claimed benefits. As Judge Tauro has observed, “only the onetime $25 discount for an oil change can be seen as coming close to an arithmetically measurable fund.” In re VW (Original Award), 784 F.Supp.2d at 43.

At the time of the original award, projected outcomes were the only data available to guide Judge Tauro in assigning a monetary value to this settlement. On that basis, he gave credence to the Special Master’s proposed finding that the settlement’s aggregate value was $222,932,831, which fell in between the wildly divergent valuations proposed by Class Counsel and the Defendants. Id. at 44; see id. at 43 (citing Class Counsel’s proposed valuation of $420,986,855, and the Defendants’ proposed valuation of $50,093,787).

Two and a half years later, this Court is in a different position, as actual claims data documenting the extent of the benefits given to class members is now available.

a. The Parties’ Proposed Valuations

According to Defendants’ calculations, approximately $11,500,000 in benefits were allocated to class members as of February 2013, with the total amount of benefits unlikely to exceed $12,700,000 before the expiration of all relevant claims periods. Defs.’ Opp’n 6. These figures represent the sum of: (1) the amount of cash paid out in reimbursements for engine repairs and replacement claims that were originally denied by the Defendants, (2) the aggregate value of claimed $25 oil change discounts, and (3) the aggregate value of free repairs claimed under a warranty extension. Id.

Class Counsel contends that these figures do not properly account for the true value conferred on class members by the Settlement Agreement. First, they argue that the value of the warranty extension to consumers is not measured by the aggregate value of free repairs actually claimed under the warranty extension, but rather by the aggregate price the consumers would have had to pay out of pocket to purchase such a warranty extension. Reply Additional Attorneys’ Fees, Ex. 1, Decl. Kirk D. Kleckner, CPA, MBA, ABV, ASA, CFF (“Kleckner Supp. Decl.”) 3-4, ECF No. 406-1. Class Counsel’s proposed method of valuation dramatically increases the estimated value of the warranty extension; as 274,548 vehicles were eligible for the extension, which Class Counsel estimates would have cost $1,399 to $1,842 out of pocket for each vehicle, this benefit alone has been valued by the Plaintiffs’ expert at $73,938,851. Id. at 5.

Second, Class Counsel argues that class members also benefited from the Settlement Agreement’s provisions for a campaign to notify and educate class members as to proper maintenance of their vehicle. Reply Additional Attorneys’ Fees 3-4. All class members, the collective owners of about 349,612 vehicles, received literature notifying them of the need to use synthetic oil in their engines, an engine sticker notifying maintenance personnel of same, and additional materials explaining the rights and benefits conferred on the class as a result of the Settlement Agreement. Id. These materials, Class Counsel says, benefited class members by giving them requisite knowledge to extend the life of their vehicle engines and avoid costly repairs. Id. at 4. The Plaintiffs’ expert has valued this benefit at $56,249,605. Kleckner Supp. Decl. 5.

Third, Class Counsel asks the Court to take into account the value conferred on class members by the appointment of the Oil Sludge Settlement Administrator. Reply Additional Attorneys’ Fees 2. The claims administrator has received approximately $3,000,000 in payment. Kleckner Supp. Decl. 4.

b. The Court’s Valuation

As is usually the case, the best valuation of benefits is somewhere between these two extremes.

i. Reimbursements for Previously Denied Claims and Oil Change Discounts

On the one hand, Defendants are correct to seek reliance on the actual claims data collected by the Oil Sludge Settlement Administrator, with regard to two of the benefit categories: the reimbursements for previously-denied repair and replacement claims and the oil change discounts. Defs.’ Opp’n 6. As these benefits were designed to be realized on a claims-made basis, they are the two categories for which actual claims data provides real aid in determining benefit value to consumers. Class members who did not make claims have derived no benefit from the inclusion of these benefits in the settlement, and determining the aggregate value conferred on class members who did claim these benefits requires only basic arithmetic. After consulting the supporting documentation in the record, the Court is prepared to accept the Defendants’ position that the value of these benefits totaled $8,489,859. Id.

ii. Extended Warranties and Educational Campaign

On the other hand, Defendants construe far too narrowly the value of the other two categories of benefits obtained by class members — the extended warranties and the education/information campaign coordinated by Plaintiffs’ counsel.

aa. Extended Warranties

The Court does not accept Defendants’ argument that the value of the extended warranties is limited to the value of repairs provided gratis during the extended warranty period. Id. That valuation method reflects the costs the extended warranties imposed on the Defendants, but not the value the warranties conferred .on class members. Warranties cost a manufacturer nothing unless repairs are claimed, but from a consumer’s perspective, a warranty against repair has value even when no repairs are claimed during the period of coverage. The fact of coverage is its own benefit; for a price, a consumer can purchase certainty as to what repairs will cost if they are needed.

To achieve a result equivalent to this settlement agreement, each car owner in the class would have had to pay a certain price out-of-pocket for an extended warranty, and each car owner would have been charged that price regardless whether she ever actually needed repairs during the relevant time period. It follows that the retail value of the extensions — assigned by Defendants themselves in the course of setting the retail price of an extended warranty — is a more sensible measure of what the class members gained from free extended coverage.

Moreover, valuing the extended warranties at their retail price is consistent with the approach to valuation this Court previously took in In re TJX. In that case, class members were provided with three years of credit monitoring for free, a service which would have cost $177,000,000 in the aggregate if each qualifying class member had paid for it out-of-pocket. 584 F.Supp.2d at 409. The Court accepted this figure as a measure of the value conferred on class members by the In re TJX settlement, and it is content to take a similar approach in this case. See id. Although credit monitoring services are different from extended warranties in that the former requires some level of continuous service to be rendered during the subscription period, the two benefits are similar from a consumer’s point of view in that the consumer derives benefit from the fact of coverage even when nothing goes wrong.

For these reasons, the Court is comfortable accepting Class Counsel’s argument that the extended warranties are properly valued by reference to the price a class member would have paid for such a service absent settlement. Kleckner Supp. Decl. 5. Particularly as the Defendants have not offered a viable alternative based on these considerations, the Court accepts Class Counsel’s proposed figure and holds that the provision of free extended warranties transferred $73,938,851 in value to the class members. Id.

bb. Education/Information Campaign

The matter of the educational literature and other materials disseminated to the ■ class presents a more difficult valuation challenge. Defendants’ current position appears to be that this element of the Settlement Agreement was of no cognizable value to class members. Defs.’ Opp’n 6. This represents an unexplained departure from their previous position; in 2011, Defendants’ expert prospectively estimated that the revised oil maintenance recommendations would confer benefits to class members valued at $18,719,788. Mem. Points & Auth. Supp. Mot. Final App. Sett., Opp. Pis. Mot. Attys.’ Fees & Costs Supp. Appl. Defer Ruling Pis. Mot. Attys.’ Fees & Costs until After June 27, 2011. (“Defs.’ Opposition to Pis.’ Motion”) 7, ECF No. 206. In contrast, Class Counsel adheres to its original prospective estimate that the revised oil maintenance recommendations are worth over $56,000,000 in repair costs avoided by class members. Kleckner Supp. Decl. 5.

Defendants’ current valuation of this benefit strikes the Court as untenable. It is more than reasonable to assume that at least some class members switched to synthetic oil as a direct result of the instructions they received from the campaign, and that at least some subset of this group avoided damage to their engines that otherwise would have been sustained. To value the educational campaign at zero would unfairly ignore the obvious value that these class members received from the materials.

The Court is extremely wary, however, of adopting the $56,000,000 valuation proffered by Class Counsel. Unlike the extended warranty benefit, the valuation of the educational campaign is directly affected by the number of people who actually changed their behavior as a result of the literature they received. The $56,000,000 estimate was introduced to this litigation in Class Counsel’s original fee petition before Judge Tauro as part of Class Counsel’s original estimate that the value of benefits collected by the class would exceed $420,000,000. In re VW (Original Award), 784 F.Supp.2d at 43. Because the actual claims data for two of the benefit categories, the claim reimbursements and oil change discounts, show that Class Counsel’s original estimates of how many class members would claim these benefits was wildly optimistic, it stands to reason that Class Counsel likely also overestimated how many class members actually avoided repair costs by paying attention to and heeding the Defendants’ educational literature.

Unfortunately, there simply is no data available on what the actual value of avoided repairs has been, and calibrating an accurate figure would be difficult even had extensive information been collected from class members. In the absence of actionable data, the Court adopts the Defendants’ original estimate valuing the educational campaign benefit at $18,719,788. Defs.’ Opposition to Pis.’ Motion 7. The Defendants’ expert report supporting this figure is detailed, considered, and grounded in more conservative assumptions than those undergirding Class Counsel’s $56,000,000 expert valuation. Decl. Opp. Pis.’ Appl. Attys.’ Fees & Exps., Ex. 1, Expert Report of Janusz A. Ordover (“Ordover Report”) 8, 16-19, ECF No. 204-1. As there has been no suggestion by the Defendants that their expert’s original estimates were flawed, it would appear that they continue to believe that reliance on his work is appropriate and reasonable,

iii. Oil Sludge Claims Administrator

Finally, there are the fees which have been paid to the Oil Sludge Claims Administrator overseeing the claims process. The Court will not consider these costs to be part of the benefits conferred on the class. Although there is no doubt that funds to organize a professional and helpful claims process are essential in a case like this one, such costs are corollary to the actual benefits placed in the hands of class members. Counting administration fees as part of the settlement valuation for attorneys’ fees purposes might also inadvertently incentivize the establishment of costly and inefficient administration procedures which would inflate the benefits valuation without increasing actual benefit for class members.

iv. The Total Value of Benefits Conferred on the Class

Taking these rulings into account, the Court calculates the aggregate value of benefits conferred on the class as follows:

(1) Reimbursement of pre-settlement repair claims: $8,486,959

(2) Claimed oil-change discounts: $2,900

(3) Extended warranties given to all class members: $73,938,851

(4) Repairs avoided as a result of revised maintenance recommendations: $18,719,788

These components add up to a total settlement value of $101,148,498.

c. The Appropriate Multiplier and Total Pre-Award Fees

This Court is convinced by this valuation and by a multi-factor assessment of the nature of this litigation that a multiplier of 2 is an appropriate enhancement to Class Counsel’s pre-award base lodestar of $7,734,000.

The Defendants are therefore ordered to pay Class Counsel $15,468,000 in fees and $1,195,284-43 in costs and expenses, for work undertaken prior to Judge Tauro’s original award.

B. Post-Award Fees and Expenses

The Court now turns to the matter of the additional fees and expenses requested by Class Counsel. They have submitted a motion seeking a $1,705,693 lodestar, a multiplier enhancement of 1.5 to 2.0, and additional costs of $310,353.59. Class Counsel Add’l Fees Mem. 20. The Defendants oppose the motion, primarily arguing that Class Counsel’s proposed lodestar contains a number of excesses that the Court ought disallow. Defs.’ Opp’n 4-5.

1. Uncompensable Pre-Award Time

A portion of the additional fees sought by Class Counsel is attributable to work completed between December 13, 2010, and March 23, 2011. See, e.g., Class Counsel Add’l Fees Mem., Ex. 13, Berger Montague Time. Summary for the Period 12/13/10-11/30/12 (“Montague Time Summary”), ECF No. 374-13. According to their submitted billing records, they completed 1,326 collective hours of work during the time period beginning one week before December 20, 2010, the date of Class Counsel’s original motion for attorney’s fees to Judge Tauro, Class Counsel Motion for Attorney Fees, and ending the day before the publication of Judge Tau-ro’s order awarding to Class Counsel fees of $30,000,000. Mem. & Order, Mot. At-tys.’ Fees, ECF No. 272. The aggregate value of this time is $645,059.50. Defs.’ Opp’n 17.

Defendants oppose awarding Class Counsel these fees, relying on a strict reading of the First Circuit’s direction that this Court is to increase Judge Tauro’s base lodestar calculation “only ... to the extent that [the figure does] not include additional work, undertaken after the district court’s award of fees.” In re VW (First Circuit), 692 F.3d at 21-22 (emphasis added); see Defs.’ Opp’n 17. According to Defendants, this instruction means that this Court ought only award additional fees to Class Counsel for work completed on or after March 24, 2011, the day Judge Tauro published his opinion establishing the original award. Defs.’ Opp’n 17. Class Counsel disagrees, pointing out that because Judge Tauro’s base lodestar calculation was based on billing records submitted on December 20, 2010, his base lodestar does not account for nearly three months of work completed between December 20 and March 24, 2011. See Reply Additional Attorneys’ Fees 11. Class Counsel posits that any work completed from December 2010 forward is eligible for consideration by this Court, because “[t]he only fair and reasonable interpretation of ‘additional fees’ [under the First Circuit’s analysis] is the fee for the time expended after the period of time considered by [Judge Tauro] in the 3/24/11 award.” Id. at 13.

As a preliminary matter,- the Court rules that Class Counsel is not entitled to additional fees for work completed before December 20, 2010. Berger & Montague and Irwin & Boesen seek additional fees for work completed from December 13 through December 19 of that year, including work on the December 20 motion. See Montague Time Summary 2 (containing entries, for example, for work “[d]rafting and editing sections of the Approval Brief and Fee Petition Brief’ on December 15, 2010). These fees ought have been submitted to Judge Tauro and Special Master Van Gestel in the first place, and no suggestion has been made that Class Counsel did not have a full opportunity to do so in December 2010. In fact, McNulty did manage to submit time records to Judge Tauro for work completed through December 19, 2010. See Pis. Br. Supp. Mot. Attys.’ Fees Csts., Ex. 8, Peter J. McNulty Time Record 50-51, ECF No. 175-8. Even under the Plaintiffs’ approach, hours incurred in this time period cannot be construed as work undertaken after Judge Tauro’s award of fees.

The issue of fees for work completed after December 20, 2010, and before March 23, 2011, merits further consideration. On the one hand, the plain meaning of the phrase “after the district court’s award of fees” indicates that this Court ought only consider fees incurred on or after March 24, 2011. 692 F.3d at 22. In using this phrase, the First Circuit adopted Class Counsel’s own choice of words. This Court also observes that Class Counsel failed to mention their entitlement to fees for post-December 20 work when they had the opportunity to do so before Judge Tauro. The Supreme Judicial Court has held that when attorneys fail to press a claim for supplemental fees incurred in the course of preparing and defending a fee petition in the trial court, they waive their ability to seek those fees later in the litigation. See Twin Fires Inv., LLC v. Morgan Stanley Dean Witter & Co., 445 Mass. 411, 432-33, 837 N.E.2d 1121 (2005) (declining to award additional fees incurred in the trial court when counsel did not “bring their [additional fees] claim to the attention of the [trial] judge” or refer to the issue of additional fees in counsel’s notice of appeal). Accord Beal Bank, SSB v. Enrich, 448 Mass. 9, 12-14, 858 N.E.2d 722 (2006) (denying counsel’s request for appellate fees and expenses when counsel failed to state its request in its original appellate brief). In the case at bar, Class Counsel had at least three clear opportunities to assert an entitlement for supplemental fees incurred before Judge Tauro’s award was appealed. Class Counsel reserved objections to the lodestar calculation twice, and discussed the fee award at length with Judge Tauro at a fairness hearing two weeks before his order entered. There was no mention of additional fees.

On the other hand, even a cursory examination of this case’s docket reveals that Class Counsel completed meaningful and substantive work during this time period. “As a general rule, time spent in establishing-and defending a fee, or objecting to an unduly small award, should be included in the final calculation of the award. Exclusion of such services would dilute the value of the award, and so frustrate the purpose of [awarding attorneys’ fees].” Stratos, 387 Mass, at 325, 439 N.E.2d 778 (ruling in the context of the fee-shifting provision of 42 U.S.C. § 1988). Among other things, Class Counsel prepared numerous briefs and other submissions to Judge Tauro regarding their fee petition, the negotiation of the settlement, agreement, and the actions of Non-Class Counsel. E.g., Class Pis. Resp. Mot. Ohio Counsel Desig. Addt’l Settl. Counsel Under Def. 3 of Sett. Agrmt., ECF No. 213; Pis.’ Reply Br. Supp. Mot. Attys.’ Fees & Costs, ECF No. 237; Pis.’ Resp. Class Member Ashley Riley Birkeland’s Obj. Finds. Fact, Concl. Of Law and Rec. of Spec. Master Relating to Class Pis.’ Mot. Attys.’ Fees & Costs, ECF No. 260. It is unreasonable to deny consideration of these efforts based on a parsimonious reading of the First Circuit’s quotation of Class Counsel — particularly when it is unlikely that Class Counsel intended, by their choice of words, to disclaim a full three months of meaningful work. The Court declines to rule that the First Circuit’s opinion prevents it from considering additional fees for work undertaken between December 20, 2010 and March 24, 2011. The work completed during this period will be considered alongside the remainder of Class Counsel’s additional fees sought.

Accordingly, the Court only disallows 106.7 hours of work from Class Counsel’s post-award billings. This corresponds to a $34,047.50 reduction from Irwin & Boe-sen’s lodestar, Class Counsel Add’l Fees Mem., Ex. 8, Kirk D. Tresemer Time Summary 12/14/10-12/22/12 (“Tresemer Time Summary”), ECF No. 374-8; Class Counsel Add’l Fees Mem., Ex. 9, Darren A. Natvig Time Summary 12/15/10-12/7/12 (“Natvig Time Summary”), ECF No. 374-9; Class Counsel Add’l Fees Mem., Ex. 10, Roxanna Torrez Time Summary 12/17/10-12/13/12 (“Torrez Time Summary”), ECF No. 374-10; and a $57,241 reduction from Berger & Montague’s lodestar, Montague Time Summary.

2. Internal disputes and agreements

Second, Defendants argue that certain time spent on disputes between counsel ought be struck. Defs.’ Opp’n 18. They highlight two disputes: first, attorney Mark Schlachet objected to certain fee allocation decisions made by Class Counsel, and second, a dispute over a “side fee agreement” that was later litigated in Alabama state courts. Id.

The case law on intra-counsel fee disputes is not well-developed. There are, however, several principles in the Commonwealth’s attorney fee canon that inform this Court’s considerations. On one hand, fees are not recoverable for “work on unrelated issues.” Crop Prod. Servs., Inc. v. Albert, 18 Mass.L.Rptr. 97, 2004 WL 1894800, at *5 (Mass.Super.Ct.2004) (Josephson, J.). To that end, “a court must be assured that the time expended by counsel was actually in furtherance of the underlying litigation.” E.E.O.C. v. AutoZone, Inc., 934 F.Supp.2d 342, 353 (D.Mass.2013); see also Specialty Retailers, Inc. v. Main St. NA Parkade, LLC, 804 F.Supp.2d 68, 74 (D.Mass.2011) (Neiman, M.J.) (excluding time spent by counsel on the “resolution of potential conflicts of interest between his two clients”). On the other hand, though, the time spent preparing a fee application is recoverable under Massachusetts law, at least with respect to statutory fees, although unreasonable time spent on such an application is to be reduced. See, e.g., Office One, Inc. v. Lopez, No. 962519, 1998 WL 1184117, at *2 (Mass.Super.Ct. Jan. 5, 1998) (Cowin, J.); see also Jacobs v. Mancuso, 825 F.2d 559, 563 (1st Cir.1987).

Guided by these principles, this Court will not credit these fees to the extent that they are disputes among counsel about how fees will be divided among them, but will credit these fees to the extent that these hours are spent attempting to recover reasonable fees from the Defendants. Said differently, time spent trying to expand the pie will be credited; time spent quibbling over how to divide the pie will not.

The Court is satisfied by the Defendants’ calculation that Class Counsel’s records contain time entries reflecting 140.68 hours of work spent on addressing intra-counsel fee disputes and responding to the litigious actions of certain Non-Class Counsel. Defs.’ Opp’n 18. This time will be disallowed from the additional fees award, resulting in a reduction of $7,870 from Irwin & Boesen’s lodestar, $7,350 from McNulty’s lodestar, and $60,315.14 from Berger & Montague’s lodestar. Id.

3. Travel Time

The Defendants also challenge Plaintiffs billing of travel time at a full rate. Id. at 23. Under Massachusetts law, if an attorney works while she travels, she may bill a full rate; if she is traveling without working, she may only recover half of her rate for those hours (or, said differently, she may recover half of her hours at her full rate). See, e.g., Diaz v. Jiten Hotel Mgmt., Inc., 822 F.Supp.2d 74, 79 (D.Mass.2011) (collecting cases), aff'd in part, rev’d in part, on other grounds, 704 F.3d 150 (1st Cir.2012); see also Stratos, 387 Mass. at 323, 439 N.E.2d 778 (“Rates may differ according to the type of service performed — courtroom work, research, travel, or other tasks.”).

This Court thus adjusts accordingly. From Irwin & Boesen’s billings, 43.25 hours valued at $23,787.50 are disallowed. No hours are disallowed from the McNulty billings. From Berger & Montague’s billings, 7.5 hours valued at $4,500 are disallowed. In calculating these reductions, the Court has taken special care to exclude from consideration hours which were already disallowed for other reasons.

4. Appellate Fees and Costs

In their petition for additional fees, Class Counsel includes $143,050 in fees and $151,217.36 in costs for time and expense spent on defending the fee awarded by Judge Tauro on appeal. Reply Additional Attorneys’ Fees 15. The Defendants object to the inclusion of these amounts in any award from this Court.

As a procedural matter, it is not clear that this Court has authority to decide this issue. Massachusetts courts hold that fee awards for time spent on an appeal are to be adjudicated by the judges “who heard and decided the appeal.” Fabre v. Walton, 441 Mass. 9, 10, 802 N.E.2d 1030 (2004); see Bonofiglio v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 412 Mass. 612, 613, 591 N.E.2d 197 (1992) (“The power to award [appellate] counsel fees is discretionary in the appellate court.”). This rule has been preferred in the state courts since even before the Supreme Judicial Court made it a mandatory one:

An appellate court is in a far better position to evaluate the worth of the appellate work than the trial judge. The Justice of the appellate court who writes the opinion for the court develops nothing short of an intimacy with the record on appeal and the briefs. An appellate Justice on the quorum or panel which hears and decides the appeal develops a knowledge of the case and the value of the work of the attorney who seeks compensation. A trial judge simply cannot bring to bear this familiarity with the appellate work.

Yorke Mgmt. v. Castro, 406 Mass. 17, 20, 546 N.E.2d 342 (1989).

Whether it is appropriate or prudent to hold the parties in this case to the precise procedures for seeking attorneys’ fees in state court, in addition to the substantive state law of attorneys’ fees, is uncertain. In any event, the First Circuit’s opinion in this case, indicates that the responsibility lies fully with this Court to determine what award is appropriate for Class Counsel’s additional post-award work. See In re VW (First Circuit), 692 F.3d at 22 (“That claim of increase due to additional work is preserved for remand.”). In compliance with this directive and in the interests of judicial efficiency, the Court will render a decision on the issue of appellate fees under Massachusetts law.

In the context of fee-shifting statutes which allocate reasonable attorneys’ fees to the prevailing party — one of the better analogues in the state case law for the instant fee situation — Massachusetts law allows fees for work undertaken on appeal to be counted as part of an attorney’s award. Stratos, 387 Mass, at 325, 439 N.E.2d 778 (“As a general rule, time spent in establishing and defending a fee ... should be included in the final calculation of the award. Exclusion of such services would dilute the value of the award, and so frustrate the purpose of the act authorizing fees.”); see id. (“In determining a final award, the judge should consider time spent on the appeal.”). Appellate fees are usually awarded, however, only when the party seeking fees prevailed in his own appeal. See also Twin Fires, 445 Mass. at 433, 837 N.E.2d 1121 (“A prevailing plaintiff may recover for the successful claims of an appeal.”); Kapp v. Arbella Mut. Ins. Co., 426 Mass. 683, 687, 689 N.E.2d 1347 (1998) (“Because [the party seeking fees] did not prevail on his appeal, he is not entitled to costs and attorney’s fees arising from that appeal.”); Bonofiglio, 412 Mass, at 613, 591 N.E.2d 197 (“In general, a litigant must qualify as a ‘prevailing party’ in order to qualify for an award of [appellate] attorney’s fees.”).

There is some indication that Massachusetts courts relax their adherence to this principle when the party seeking fees was the respondent to an unsuccessful appeal initiated by the opposing side. Kapp, 426 Mass, at 687-88, 689 N.E.2d 1347 (denying the plaintiff fees related to his unsuccessful appeal, but awarding the plaintiff fees related to the defendant’s unsuccessful cross-appeal); Bonofiglio, 412 Mass, at 614, 591 N.E.2d 197 (same). There are equitable reasons to apply such logic to the instant case; since the Defendants were the ones to appeal Judge Tauro’s original fees award, they left Class Counsel no choice but to spend time an