Center for Biological Diversity v. United States Environmental Protection Agency (90 F. Supp. 3d 1177, 2015)

AMENDED ORDER ON CROSS MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

JAMES L. ROBART, District Judge.

I. INTRODUCTION

Before the court are the parties’ cross motions for summary judgment. (See CBD Mot. (Dkt. # 33); ' EPA Mot. (Dkt. # 34).) This case concerns the water quality problem of ocean acidification and its effects on aquatic life in the coastal and estuarine waters of the states of Washington and Oregon. Plaintiff Center for Biological Diversity (“CBD”) claims that Defendant United States Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) arbitrarily and capriciously approved Washington’s and Oregon’s decisions not to identify any waters experiencing ocean acidification as impaired under Section 303(d) of the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1251 et seq. Having considered the submissions of the parties, the submissions of amici curiae, the administrative record, and the relevant law, and having heard oral argument, the court denies CBD’s motion for summary judgment and grants EPA’s motion for summary judgment.

II. BACKGROUND

A. Ocean Acidification

Ocean acidification is a long-term decrease in pH of the earth’s oceans. On a worldwide scale, the primary driver of ocean acidification is carbon uptake: seawater absorbs increased carbon dioxide (C02) emissions, which leads to a series of chemical reactions that make the seawater more acidic. WA-00731 (“Pelejero 2010”) at l. The leading cause of increased atmospheric C02 is combustion of fossil fuels. Id. It is estimated that anthropogenic sources of atmospheric carbon dioxide have increased the acidity of average open-ocean surface waters by about 30%. WA-000731 (“Feely 2010”) at 4. In coastal regions, other local factors can exacerbate the acidification process. WA-000712 (“Blue Ribbon Panel”) at 4. Regional drivers include both natural phenomena, such as upwelling of deep ocean water and freshwater inputs from rivers, and anthropogenic factors such as nutrient deposits from agricultural runoff, carbon deposits from stormwater runoff and industrial pollution, and local emissions of nitrogen and sulfur oxides. Id. at xii; WA-000712 (“Feeley 2012”) at xii, 33, 37.

The changing ocean chemistry affects marine organisms and ecosystems in various ways, with some of the clearest impacts being felt by organisms whose shells and skeletons are composed of calcium carbonate (CaC032-). Pelejaro 2010 at 1; Blue Ribbon Panel at 10. Specifically, the same chemical reactions that increase the acidity of the ocean reduce the concentration of carbonate ions (CO32-) that shellfish rely on to build shells. Pelejaro 2010 at 1; Blue Ribbon Panel at 10. As a result, marine organisms face difficulties forming and maintaining calcium carbonate-based shells and skeletons. Pelejaro 2010 at 1; Blue Ribbon Panel at 10. Additionally, the reduction of precipitated carbonate ions decreases the saturation states of important biominerals such as aragonite and calcite. Blue Ribbon Panel at 10; Feely 2010 at 3. Seawater with such decreased saturation states is chemically corrosive and can dissolve the shells of small crustaceans and immature shellfish. Feeley 2010 at 4; Blue Ribbon Panel at 10. Because many small calcifiers provide habitat, shelter, or food for other marine plants and animals, ocean acidification is also a threat to the broader marine environment. Blue Ribbon Panel at xiv, 16-20; see also Feeley 2012.

B. The Clean Water Act

The Clean Water Act employs two main regulatory approaches to achieve water quality: (1) technological controls on effluents discharged from point sources and (2) water quality standards. This case concerns water quality standards. See Pronsolino v. Nastri, 291 F.3d 1123, 1126 (9th Cir.2002); see generally 33 U.S.C. § 1251 et seq.

Each state is required to set water quality standards for all waters within its boundaries. Pronsolino, 291 F.3d at 1126; 33 U.S.C. § 131(a)-(c); 40 C.F.R. § 130.3. These standards, which include designated beneficial uses, numeric and narrative criteria, and anti-degradation policies, set goals for improving or maintaining water quality. 40 C.F.R. § 130.3. Wherever attainable, the standards should “provide water quality for the protection and propagation of fish, shellfish, and wildlife and for recreation.” Id.

Pursuant to Section 303(d) of the Clean Water Act, every two years each state must generate a list of impaired water bodies for which existing pollution controls are insufficient to meet the water quality standards applicable to the water body. 33 U.S.C. § 1313(d); 40 C.F.R. § 130.7(d)(1). Section 303 requires the states to submit their impaired waters lists to the EPA for approval. 33 U.S.C. § 1313(d); 40 C.F.R. § 130.7(d)(1). If EPA disapproves a list, it must identify within 30 days the waters that should have been listed as impaired. 33 U.S.C. § 1313(d); 40 C.F.R. § 130.7(d)(1).

After a water body is listed as impaired, the state must establish a total maximum daily load (“TMDL”) of each pollutant that the water body can receive and still meet water quality standards. 33 U.S.C. § 1313(d); 40 C.F.R. § 130.7(d)(1); see also Pronsolino, 291 F.3d at 1127-28. The state must incorporate TMDLs into the state’s statutorily required water quality management plan. 33 U.S.C. § 1313(e); Pronsolino, 291 F.3d at 1128. The state, however, retains the responsibility and discretion to implement the TMDLs by controlling pollution from nonpoint and point sources. 33 U.S.C. § 1313(e); Pronsolino, 291 F.3d at 1128. As such, “TMDLs are primarily informational tools that allow the states to proceed from the identification of waters requiring additional planning to the required plans.” Pronsolino, 291 F.3d at 1128.

In 2010, EPA issued a memorandum recognizing the “seriousness of aquatic life impacts associated with” ocean acidification, and instructing that “States should list waters not meeting water quality standards, including marine pH [water quality criteria], on their 2012 303(d) lists.” WA-01116-31 (“EPA 2010 OA Memo”) at 1, 4.

Several of Washington’s water quality standards implicate ocean acidification. Most of Washington’s coastal waters are designated as “extraordinary quality” or “excellent quality” for aquatic life uses, which include “clam, oyster, and mussel rearing and spawning; crustaceans and other shellfish (crabs, shrimp, crayfish, scallops, etc.) rearing and spawning.” WAC 173-201A-612; WAC 173-201A-210(l)(a). With respect to numerical criteria, waters of extraordinary or excellent quality must meet a pH range of 7.0-8.5 with a human-caused variation within that range of 0.2 or 0.5 units, respectively. WAC 173-201A-612; WAC 173-201A-210(l)(f). Additionally, for .both aquatic life uses and shellfish harvesting, “deleterious material concentrations must be below those which have the potential ... to adversely affect characteristic water uses [or] cause acute or chronic conditions to the most sensitive biota dependent upon those waters.” WAC 173-201A-260(2)(a). Finally, “[n]o degradation may be allowed that would interfere with, or become injurious to, existing or designated uses.” WAC 173-201A-310.

C. Washington’s and Oregon’s Section 303(d) Lists

Washington’s 2010 Section 303(d) list, however, did not identify any coastal or estuarine waters as impaired due to pollutants associated with or conditions attributable to ocean acidification. When reviewing Washington’s list, EPA independently evaluated numerous relevant ocean acidification references, as well as Washington’s analysis of ocean acidification data and information. WA-00011-20 (EPA review of Washington’s analysis of ocean acidification data); WA-000021-65 (EPA’s review of ocean acidification references). EPA approved Washington’s 303(d) list in full in December, 2012. WA-000001-2 (“WA Approval”).

Similarly, several of Oregon’s water quality standards implicate ocean acidification. Oregon’s coastal waters are designated for the beneficial uses of “fish and aquatic life,” as well as fishing. See OAR 340-041-0220 et seq. Narrative water quality criteria provide that “[w]aters of the state must be of sufficient quality to support aquatic species without detrimental changes in the resident biological communities,” OAR 340-041-0011, and that the “creation of ... conditions that are deleterious to fish or other aquatic life ... may not be allowed,” OAR 340-041-0007(10). Oregon’s anti-degradation policy provides that any existing level of water quality necessary to support propagation of fish and shellfish must be maintained and protected. Id. at -0004(6).

Oregon’s 2010 Section 303(d) list, however, did not identify any coastal or estuarine waters as impaired due to pollutants associated with or conditions attributable to ocean acidification. EPA originally partially disapproved Oregon’s 303(d) list, finding that Oregon had not reasonably assembled and evaluated all readily available data and water-quality information. OR1-000001 (“OR Disapproval”). Specifically, Oregon had failed to consider data for numerous pollutants available in Oregon’s own Laboratory Analytical and Storage Retrieval (“LASAR”) database. OR1-00008. Accordingly, EPA independently reviewed this and other available water quality data and, on December 14, 2012, issued a decision adding 870 additional impaired segments to Oregon’s 303(d) list. OR1-00008-9; see also OR2-000001-9 (“OR Approval”). These additions, however, were unrelated to ocean acidification: EPA independently evaluated Oregon’s ocean acidification information and approved Oregon’s assessment that the information did not require listing any marine waters as impaired. See OR2-0000286-91.

D. CBD’s Challenge

During the appropriate notice and comment periods, CBD submitted comments and scientific studies to Washington, Oregon, and EPA arguing that Washington’s and Oregon’s water quality standards were violated due to ocean acidification. See, e.g., WA-000066-70; WA-000071-86; WA-000198; WA-00813; OR2-000286; OR2-004614; OR004557. In this lawsuit, CBD challenges EPA’s approval of Washington’s and Oregon’s 303(d) lists as arbitrary and capricious because the lists do not identify any coastal waters as impaired by ocean acidification. (See generally Compl.)

The court previously denied the Western States Petroleum Association and American Petroleum Institute’s (collectively, “API”) motion to intervene, but granted API amicus curiae status. (See 2/18/14 Order (Dkt. # 22).) Later, the court also granted amicus curiae status to the Ecology Department of the State of Washington (“Ecology”), the Pacific Coast Federation of Fishermen’s Association, Southern California Trawlers’ Association and Institute of Fisheries Resources (collectively, “Fishing Associations”), and climate Ken Cal-deira and Jane Lubchenco (collectively, “the Scientists”). (Dkt. ##23, 46, 49.) CBD and EPA stipulated to a modified briefing schedule for their cross-motions for summary judgment. (Sched. Ord. (Dkt. #26).) These motions, as well as the amici curiae briefs, are now before the court.

III. ANALYSIS

A. Summary Judgment Standard

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 permits a court to grant summary judgment where the moving party demonstrates (1) the absence of a genuine issue of material fact and (2) entitlement to judgment as a matter of law. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986); see also Galen v. Cnty. of L.A., 477 F.3d 652, 658 (9th Cir.2007). The moving party bears the initial burden of showing the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548.

If the moving party does not bear the ultimate burden of persuasion at trial, it can show the absence of an issue of. material fact in two ways: (1) by producing evidence negating an essential element of the nonmoving party’s case, or (2) by showing that the nonmoving party lacks evidence of an essential element of its claim or defense. Nissan Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Fritz Cos., 210 F.3d 1099, 1106 (9th Cir.2000). If the moving party will bear the ultimate burden of persuasion at trial, it must establish a prima facie showing in support of its position on that issue. UA Local 343 v. Nor-Cal Plumbing, Inc., 48 F.3d 1465, 1471 (9th Cir.1994). That is, the moving party must, present evidence that, if uncontroverted at trial, would entitle it to prevail on that issue. Id. at 1473.

If the moving party meets its burden of production, the burden then shifts to the nonmoving party to identify specific facts from which a factfinder could reasonably find in the nonmoving party’s favor. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548; Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). In determining whether the fact-finder could reasonably find in the non-moving party’s favor, “the court must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party, and it may not make credibility determinations or weigh the evidence.” Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 150, 120 S.Ct. 2097, 147 L.Ed.2d 105 (2000). When adjudicating cross-motions for summary judgment, a court “evaluated] each motion separately, giving the nonmoving party in each instance the benefit of all reasonable inferences.” A.C.L.U. of Nevada v. City of Las Vegas, 466 F.3d 784, 790-91 (9th Cir.2006).

B. Standing

Before reaching the merits of the action,- the court addresses CBD’s standing to bring this challenge. API raises the issue of Article III standing in its amicus curiae brief (API Br. (Dkt. #44)), and even if it did not, the court has “an independent duty to assure that standing exists, irrespective of whether the parties challenge it.” Washington Envtl. Council v. Bellon, 732 F.3d 1131, 1139 (9th Cir.2013) (citing Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488, 499, 129 S.Ct. 1142, 173 L.Ed.2d 1 (2009)).

A plaintiff must demonstrate standing for each claim that he or she seeks to press and for each form of relief sought. DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 352, 126 S.Ct. 1854, 164 L.Ed.2d 589 (2006). A plaintiff also bears the burden of proof to establish standing “with the manner and degree of evidence required at the successive stages of the litigation.” Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992). At the summary judgment stage, a plaintiff cannot rest on mere allegations, “but must set forth by affidavit or other evidence specific facts, which for purposes of the summary judgment motion will be taken to be true.” Bellon, 732 F.3d at 1139 (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561, 112 S.Ct. 2130).

Where, as here, the plaintiff is an organization, it may assert standing on behalf of its members as long as the “members would otherwise have standing to sue in their own right, the interests at stake are germane to the organization’s purpose, and neither the claim asserted nor the relief requested requires the participation of individual members in the lawsuit.” Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs., Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 181, 120 S.Ct. 693, 145 L.Ed.2d 610 (2000); see also Bellon, 732 F.3d at 1139. The court finds that CBD meets the last two criteria, which API does not challenge. As such, the crux of the standing inquiry is the first criterion: whether CBD’s members would otherwise have standing to sue in their own right. An individual has Article III standing to sue if (1) he or she suffered an injury in fact that is concrete, particularized, and actual or imminent; (2) the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged conduct; and (3) the injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable court decision. Bellon, 732 F.3d at 1139-40 (citing Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560-61, 112 S.Ct. 2130); see also Friends of the Earth, 528 U.S. at 180-81, 120 S.Ct. 693. The court addresses each element below.

1. Injury in fact

“[Ejnvironmental plaintiffs adequately allege injury in fact when they , aver that they use the affected area and are persons for whom the aesthetic and recreational values of the area will be lessened by the challenged activity.” Friends of the Earth, 528 U.S. at 183, 120 S.Ct. 693; see also Natural Res. Def Council v. EPA, 526 F.3d 591, 601 (9th Cir.2008) (stating that an environmental plaintiff can satisfy the injury requirement by showing that the challenged activity impairs his or her “aesthetic and environmental well-being”). “[Njothing necessitates a showing of existing environmental harm.” Ocean Advocates v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 402 F.3d 846, 860 (9th Cir.2005). Rather, “an increased risk of harm can itself by injury in fact for standing.” Id.; Ecological Rights Found. v. Pac. Lumber Co., 230 F.3d 1141, 1151-52 (9th Cir.2000) (“ ‘A plaintiff need not wait until his lake becomes barren and sterile or assumes an unpleasant color and smell before he can invoke the protections of the Clean Water Act.’ ”) (quoting Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Gaston Copper Recycling Corp., 204 F.3d 149, 160 (4th Cir.2000) (internal punctuation omitted)). Therefore, an individual can establish ‘injury in fact’ by “showing a connection to the area of concern sufficient to make credible the contention that the person’s future life will be less enjoyable-— that he or she really has or will suffer in his or her degree of aesthetic or recreational satisfaction — if the area in question remains or becomes environmentally degraded.” Ecological Rights Found., 230 F.3d at 1149.

CBD submits declarations from several of its members attesting to specific aesthetic and recreational injuries they are suffering or will suffer due to ocean acidification. Specifically, Jessica Antoine regularly visits the beaches in Netarts Bay, Pacific City, and Oswald West State Park in Oregon to go tidepooling, clamming, and purchase oysters, and is concerned that her ability to harvest clams and other shellfish and explore tidepools with her family will decrease due to ocean acidification. (Antoine Decl. ¶¶ 1-17.)

David Weitzer visits the Washington and Oregon coastlines, including Willapa Bay in Washington and Gearhart, Seaside, Indian Beach, Canon Beach, Hug Point, Arch Cape, Falcon Cove, and Manzanita in Oregon, on average six times per year in order to dig for butter, steamer, and razor clams; harvest oysters, mussels, and barnacles; surf; and investigate tidepools to observe hermit crabs, small fish, chitons, starfish, anenomes, urchins, and other organisms. (Weitzer Decl. ¶¶ 6-15.) Over the last 10 years he has noticed that there are fewer and fewer oysters and clams available to harvest, the quality of the oyster shells has declined (they are now more brittle), the number and diversity of species in the tidepools has declined, and the number of shells washed ashore is reduced. (Id.) He is concerned that ocean acidification is responsible for these changes. (Id.)

Anna Moritz regularly visits Puget Sound, including Golden Gardens Park, Richmond Beach, and Whidbey Island, as well as the coasts of Washington and Oregon, including Fort Stevens State Park, Nehalem Bay, Manzanita, and Westport, to go tidepooling and beachcombing with her family. (Moritz Decl. ¶¶ 5-17.) Additionally, she plans to camp with her family at Rialto Beach on the Olympic Peninsula this upcoming summer. (Id.) She is concerned that if the region’s coastal waters continue to increase in acidification, fewer shelled animals will survive, limiting her and her family’s opportunities for and enjoyment in finding shells, sea stars, sand dollars, and tidepool creatures during their trips to Puget Sound and the Washington coast. (Id.)

Katherine Easton owns a house on the water on Camano Island, in Puget Sound, which she visits almost every weekend during the summer, fall, and spring to walk through the extensive tideflats by her house and examine crabs, clams, and other creatures. (Easton Decl. ¶¶ 6-12.) She worries that ocean acidification is harming shellfish and small prey species that will affect the entire food web, making it more difficult for her to view not only shellfish, but also whales, seals, and other marine creatures in the Sound. (Id.)

These alleged harms and increased risk of harms fall squarely into the category of aesthetic and recreational injuries countenanced by the Supreme Court in Friends of the Earth. See Friends of the Earth, 528 U.S. at 183, 120 S.Ct. 693; Ocean Advocates, 402 F.3d at 860. Moreover, these alleged harms span a sample set of beaches and coastline that is geographically representative of Washington’s and Oregon’s coastlines and estuaries. See Alaska Center for Environment v. Browner, 20 F.3d 981, 985 (9th Cir.1994) (finding that a plaintiff seeking state-wide environmental relief was not required to demonstrate harm over the entire state ' but was only required to establish that a representative number of areas were adversely affected by the government’s action); Defenders of Wildlife v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 420 F.3d 946, 957 (9th Cir.2005) rev’d and remanded sub nom. on unrelated grounds Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders v. Defenders of Wildlife, 551 U.S. 644, 127 S.Ct. 2518, 168 L.Ed.2d 467 (2007); Sierra Club v. Johnson, No. C 08-01409 WHA, 2009 WL 482248, at *3 (N.D.Cal. Feb. 25, 2009). Moreover, API does not challenge the legal sufficiency of CBD’s members’ statements regarding injury. Accordingly, the court finds that the declarations of CBD’s members adequately provide “specific facts” regarding their imminent, concrete injuries to establish injury in fact. See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561, 112 S.Ct. 2130; Natural Res. Def. Council, 526 F.3d at 601; Friends of the Earth, 528 U.S. at 183, 120 S.Ct. 693.

2. Causation and redressability

The “fairly traceable” and “re-dressability” components for standing overlap and are “two facets of a single causation requirement.” Bellon, 732 F.3d at 1146 (quoting Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 753 n. 19, 104 S.Ct. 3315, 82 L.Ed.2d 556 (1984)). “The two are distinct insofar as causality examines the connection between the alleged misconduct and injury, whereas redressability analyzes the connection between the alleged injury and requested judicial relief.” Id.

To satisfy the causality element, CBD must show that the injury is causally linked or “fairly traceable” to the EPA’s alleged misconduct, and not the result of misconduct of some third party not before the court. Id. (citing Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560-61, 112 S.Ct. 2130). The causal connection “cannot be too speculative or rely on conjecture about the behavior of other parties, but need not be so airtight at this stage of litigation as to demonstrate that the plaintiffs would succeed on the merits.” Ocean Advocates, 402 F.3d at 860 (quoting Ecological Rights Found., 230 F.3d at 1151). A “causal chain does not fail simply because it has several ‘links,’ provided those links are not hypothetical or tenuous and remain plausible.” Maya v. Centex Corp., 658 F.3d 1060, 1070 (9th Cir.2011) (quoting Nat’l Audubon Soc., Inc. v. Davis, 307 F.3d 835, 849 (9th Cir.2002)) (internal punctuation omitted). Moreover, CBD need not show that EPA is the “sole source” of its members’ injuries, and “need not eliminate any other contributing causes to establish its standing.” Barnum Timber Co. v. EPA, 633 F.3d 894, 901 (9th Cir.2011); see also Ocean Advocates, 402 F.3d at 860 (finding causation because although other factors also caused the plaintiffs’ injury, the link between the agency’s action and the injury was “not tenuous or abstract”).

A plaintiff meets the redressability requirement if it is likely, even if not necessarily certain, that his injury can be redressed by a favorable decision. See Bonnichsen v. United States, 367 F.3d 864, 873 (9th Cir.2004); Beno v. Shalala, 30 F.3d 1057, 1065 (9th Cir.1994) (stating that a plaintiff “must show only that a favorable decision is likely to redress his injury, not that a favorable decision will inevitably redress his injury”). However, relief “that does not remedy the injury suffered cannot bootstrap a plaintiff into federal court.” Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 107, 118 S.Ct. 1003, 140 L.Ed.2d 210 (1998).

a. Washington Environmental Council v. Bellon

API argues that Washington Environmental Council v. Bellon, 732 F.3d 1131, 1139 (9th Cir.2013) precludes CBD from establishing that the EPA’s approval of the 303(d) lists caused its members’ injuries and that a favorable ruling would redress those injuries. {See API Br.) In Bellon, the Ninth Circuit held that plaintiffs alleging aesthetic and recreational injuries linked to climate change in Washington did not have standing to challenge EPA’s approval of Washington’s decision not to regulate the greenhouse gas emissions of the state’s five local oil refineries under the Clean Air Act. See id. at 1136-43. The Court reasoned that, because climate change was the cumulative result of greenhouse gas emissions from numerous independent sources intermingling- on a global scale, the plaintiffs were unable to show that their localized injuries were either fairly traceable to or redressable by EPA’s failure to require greenhouse gas emission limits on the local oil refineries. Id. at 1143-44; but see Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. at 524, 127 S.Ct. 1438; Covington v. Jefferson Cnty., 358 F.3d 626, 654 (9th Cir.2004) (Gould, J., concurring); Washington Envtl. Council v. Bellon, 741 F.3d 1075, 1080 (9th Cir.2014) (Gould, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc).

The parties here agree that oceanic uptake of atmospheric, anthropogenic carbon is the primary driver of ocean acidification on a global scale. {See CBD Resp. at 16; API Br. at 7); see also Feeley 2012 at 9. API reasons that, because CBD cannot point to a mechanism under the Clean Water Act that addresses global carbon emissions in an appreciable way, and because the record lacks evidence regarding the effect of local carbon emissions on local ocean acidification, Bellon precludes CBD from showing causation and redressability. {See API Br. at 9-11.)

CBD, however, bases its causation and redressability arguments on a different premise. CBD contends that regional human-caused drivers exacerbate ocean acidification along Washington’s and Oregon’s coasts, and that local pollution controls can reduce the input from these drivers. {See, e.g., CBD Mot. at 15.) CBD maintains that, if its suit to add acidified-impaired waters to the states’ 303(d) lists is successful, these local measures could be employed to implement the applicable TMDLs, thereby alleviating its members’ injuries. {See CBD Resp. at 14.); see also 33 U.S.C. § 1313(e); Pronsolino, 291 F.3d at 1128.

Framed as such, causation and redressability are two sides of the same coin: CBD’s members’ injuries are traceable to EPA’s conduct and redressable by a favorable ruling to the extent that coastal waters improperly not identified as acidified-impaired are influenced by sources that can be mitigated by local actions. Accordingly, the court addresses these two standing elements together in the following sections.

b. CBD’s evidence

CBD relies on several scientific studies in the administrative record, as well as the 2012 report by the Washington State Blue Ribbon Panel on Ocean Acidification, and a declaration by Dr. Burke Hales, Professor of Oregon Ecology and Biogeochemis-try at Oregon State University (Hales Decl. (Dkt. # 57-1)) to establish causation and redressability. This evidence shows that “although atmospheric C02 is the major driver of acidification globally, near the coasts — particularly highly populated or developed areas — other drivers that generate additional C02 in the water column also contribute significantly to acidification..” Feeley 2012 at 9. In particular, “acidification in Washington State coastal waters is driven by a combination of factors, particularly in the deep waters of Puget Sound and the nearshore regions.” Id. at 13. Similarly, regional drivers also affect the acidification of Oregon’s coastal waters. Id. at 9-15.

CBD identifies the following regional drivers that influence Pacific Northwest coastal waters. First, the “near-surface coastal wáters off Washington and Oregon” are unusually susceptible to conditions of respiration and hypoxia (low oxygen levels), which are caused by algae growth stimulated by excessive nutrients. Feeley 2012 at 12. These processes are “acknowledged to be important drivers of ocean acidification, particularly when the land nearby is highly populated or agriculturally developed.” Id. In such areas, “human activity increases the amount of nutrients such as nitrate, phosphate, and iron flowing off the land” from sources such as wastewater treatment facilities, stormwa-ter outfalls, concentrated animal feedlots, grazing lands, and urban runoff. Id.; Blue Ribbon Panel at 43. For example, human sources of nitrogen in Puget Sound have increased steadily to the point where they form a “considerable contribution” to nitrate levels that exceed natural conditions. Feeley 2012 at 29, 33. “In particular, Hood Canal, South Puget Sound, and other shallow, enclosed bays and estuaries are particularly susceptible to periodic, sometimes catastrophic low oxygen levels that can lead to fish kills and other biological impacts.” Blue Ribbon Panel at 44.

Second, “Washington’s marine waters are affected by several major rivers (the Columbia, Frasier, and Skagit), and thousands of smaller rivers and streams draining the watershed.” Feeley 2012 at 14. Dissolved and organic carbon inputs from rivers “can have a substantial influence on the marine carbon system in coastal waters.” Feeley 2012 at 15. Anthropogenic sources of dissolved carbon include storm-water runoff and municipal and industrial wastewater, as well as land use change and road development. Id.; Blue Ribbon Panel at 12, 43. Additionally, anthropogenic sources of iron and silicate pollutants contribute to hypoxia and acidification. Blue Ribbon Panel at 14. The Columbia River plume delivers a “large supply” of nutrients and particulates to the Columbia Estuary and adjacent Washington and Oregon coasts. Feeley 2012 at 19; Blue Ribbon Panel at 14-15. Smaller estuaries, such as Willapa Bay in Washington, face similar problems on a smaller scale. Blue Ribbon Panel at 29, 43.

Finally, deposition of nitrogen and sulfur compounds from anthropogenic nitrous oxides and sulfur oxide emissions “can lead to reduced pH and alkalinity.” Feeley 2012 at 14. Estimates based on data and model results “show that in coastal regions fossil fuel combustion and agricultural practices produce increased atmospheric inputs of strong acids ... and bases ... to the coastal ocean that can further reduce the pH by as much as an additional 50 %. Feeley 2010 at 446. The effect of these gases is more important in coastal areas than in the open ocean due to the coastal areas’ proximity to the sources of the emission. Feeley 2012 at 37.

In addition, CBD’s evidence shows that “Washington’s marine waters are particularly vulnerable to ocean acidification because of regional factors that exacerbate the acidifying effects of global carbon dioxide emissions.” Blue Ribbon Panel at xii; see also Feeley 2012 at xi (“Washington State is particularly vulnerable because of its location and regional oceanography.”) One of the most important natural regional factors is coastal upwelling. Id. With respect to natural regional drivers, Dr. Hales agrees that “[t]he coastal and estuarine waters of the Pacific Northwest have always been naturally poised near important biological thresholds.... The addition of a small amount of additional C02 has combined with the natural character of the system to dramatically increase the frequency, intensity, and duration of ... low-pH events.” (Hales Deck (Dkt. #57-1) ¶ 8.) Dr. Hales confirms that “[l]ocal inputs from human activities such as runoff, erosion, pollution, or sewage can contribute to carbonate chemistry and pH changes in coastal areas in Oregon and Washington.” (Id. ¶ 11.) He warns that, for systems such as the Pacific Northwest “with carbonate-chemistry conditions that are already showing impact on local organisms,” intensification caused by local anthropogenic sources “can have significant consequences.” (Id.)

CBD’s evidence also identifies multiple local mitigation measures that can address “local and regional ‘hot spots’ of ocean acidification.” See generally WA-000731 (“Kelly 2011”) at 1036-37; Blue Ribbon Panel at 44-46; (Hales Decl. ¶ 12 (“[I]n certain systems, management of local inputs and proactive mitigation measures can counteract the trend towards ocean acidification.”).) For example, pollution controls, improved onsite water treatment facilities, reduction of coastal erosion, and stormwater surge prevention can reduce residential and agricultural runoffs that contain nutrients and organic carbon pollutants. Kelly 2011 at 1036-37; Blue Ribbon Panel at 44-46. The Blue Ribbon Panel found: “Reducing inputs of nutrients and organic carbon from local sources will decrease acidity in Washington’s marine waters that are impacted by these local sources and thereby decrease the effects of ocean acidification on local marine species.” Blue Ribbon Panel at 43. After noting that it is important to “gather more data regarding the relative importance of local sources of acidifying pollutants,” the Blue Ribbon Panel cautioned:

We should not put nutrient control efforts on hold while this scientific work is done, however. On the contrary, the Panel recommends that existing nutrient and organic carbon reduction programs be enhanced and strengthened; these pollutants are already lowering dissolved oxygen levels and causing a variety of significant ecosystem impacts in some areas.

Id. at 44-46 (identifying, as an example mitigation tactic, a sewage treatment plant in South Puget Sound that “has been removing nitrogen for its effluent for several years, with significant benefits to [the inlet] where the plant’s discharge is located”). Similarly, emission limits on nearby sources of airborne pollutants can reduce nitrous and sulfur oxide deposition. Kelly 2011 at 1037.

In addition to methods to reduce harmful inputs, on-site remediation options include coastal and riparian buffers, as well as wetland and seawater restoration, such as the addition of crushed shells to counter corrosive conditions. Kelly 2011 at 1037; Blue Ribbon Panel at 56-57. With respect to estuarine restoration, Dr. Hales reports that restoration of marsh grasses and tidal ecosystems in Coos Bay, Oregon, has gradually increased the pH of the estuary, counter to the global trend. (Hales Decl. ¶ 12). As such, the “local drawdown of carbon by seaweeds and seagrasses holds some promise for local and short-term mitigation effects in Puget Sound and other areas of Washington State.” Feeley 2012 at 67.

Finally, CBD provides ample evidence regarding the negative effects that ocean acidification can visit on shellfish and other marine animals. See, e.g., Feeley 2012 at 5790 (discussing various taxonomic groups’ and ecosystems’ negative responses to ocean acidification conditions that influence biological processes); Blue Ribbon Panel at 17-23 (summarizing the effects of carbonate reduction on small marine organisms and overall marine habitat response and concluding: “Acidification-driven changes in populations of keystone species could have strong domino effects on local ecosystems.”); Feeley 2010 at 3.

c. API’s arguments

API argues that CBD’s evidence is insufficient to show causation and redressa-bility for two reasons, neither of which are persuasive. First, API contends that CBD has not shown standing because the relative contributions of global and regional anthropogenic sources to local ocean acidification remain unclear, and therefore it is uncertain that reductions by local mitigation techniques will be sufficient to ameliorate harm to shellfish and other marine animals. (API Br. at 17; API Reply at 7); see, e.g., Feeley 2012 at 9 (“These inputs and their relative importance will vary' with space and time, and some may not be appreciable drivers in all locations.”); Blue Ribbon Panel at 45 (“[W]e know that nutrients and organic carbon exacerbate local ocean acidification but we do not yet know the specific magnitude of that impact. The relative contribution of local sources has not been quantified in Washington

CBD, however, need not establish causation and redressability with “scientific certainty.” See Ecological Rights Found., 230 F.3d at 1152-53. The record establishes that local anthropogenic sources do have some acidifying effect on nearby coastal waters, and that acidified waters are harmful to marine animals. See, e.g., Feeley 2012 at 9-15; Blue Ribbon Panel at 17-23. The fact that research regarding the extent of those effects is ongoing is not fatal to CBD’s challenge. After all, CBD is not required to show that sources addressable under the Clean Water Act are the “sole source” of its members’ injuries, and it “need not eliminate any other contributing causes to establish its standing.” Barnum Timber Co., 633 F.3d at 901. Even if the effect of local sources is relatively small, the Supreme Court has made clear that it is an “erroneous assumption that a small incremental step, because it is incremental, can never be attacked in a federal judicial forum.” Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 524, 127 S.Ct. 1438. To the contrary: “That a first step might be tentative does not by itself support the notion that federal courts lack jurisdiction to determine whether that step conforms to law.” Id. This principle rings especially true here, where CBD has put forth evidence that the waters of the Pacific Northwest are naturally poised near a tipping point, such that the even a small increment of acidity can have dramatic biological consequences. (See Hales Deck ¶¶ 8, 11); Feeley 2012 at xi; Blue Ribbon Panel at xii; Feeley 2010 at 18 (“The additional pH ... decreases associated with these anthropogenic stressors may cross critical thresholds for organisms living near the edge of their physiological tolerances and may thus appear' as abrupt and major changes in the health of an ecosystem.”). As the Blue Ribbon Panel concluded:

Washington’s shellfish industry and native ecosystems cannot rely on emissions reductions alone.... Our marine waters are continuing to acidify and reducing carbon dioxide emissions takes time. To rely solely on those reductions would result in significant — and in some eases irreversible — economic, cultural, and environmental impacts. Additional local actions, including local source reduction and adaptation and remediation, are necessary to “buy time” while society collectively works to reduce global carbon dioxide emissions.

Blue Ribbon Panel at xvii. While it may be true that local mitigation will not reverse the global trend of ocean acidification, it by no means follows that the court lacks jurisdiction to address EPA’s decisions regarding steps to slow or mitigate it in local waters. See Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 525, 127 S.Ct. 1438. Because CBD’s evidence shows that local drivers of ocean acidification can have disproportionate and biologically significant effects on local Pacific Northwest waters, standing is established.

Second, API contends that CBD has not shown standing because CBD has not identified which specific local mitigation techniques are applicable to the beaches identified in its members’ declarations. (API Br. at 18; API Reply at 7.) CBD, however, has shown that a range of human causes contribute to ocean acidification in the coastal regions its members visit, which causes are significant in each region, and which mitigation or remediation techniques are applicable to each cause. For example, Puget Sound, and in particular shallow areas in south Puget Sound, suffers from high anthropogenic nutrient loading, which can be addressed by various point source and non-point source pollution controls. Feeley 2012 at 12, 29, 33; Blue Ribbon Panel at 43-46; Kelly 2011 at 1036-37. CBD members regularly visit beaches and islands in Puget Sound, including Camano Island, Whidbey Island, Golden Gardens Park, and Richmond Beach. (Moritz Decl. ¶¶ 5-17; Easton Decl. ¶¶ 6-12.) Similarly, the Oregon and Washington coasts adjacent to the Columbia River estuary are affected by nutrients and particulates delivered by the Columbia River plume, which can also be addressed by a variety of point source and non-point source pollution controls. Feeley 2012 at 14, 15, 19; Blue Ribbon Panel at 12,14,15, 29,43; Kelly 2011 at 1036-37. CBD members regularly visit nearby beaches, including Gearhart, Canon Beach, Netarts Bay, and Hug Point in Oregon, and Willapa Bay, Washington. (Weitzer Decl. ¶¶ 6-15; Antoine Decl. ¶¶ 7-17.) Smaller bays visited by CBD members, such as Willapa Bay, are similarly influenced by freshwater inputs, and are candidates for estuary restoration efforts. See Kelly 2011 at 1037; Blue Ribbon Panel at 29, 43, 56-57; Hales Decl. ¶ 12; Feeley 2012 at 67; (Weitzer Decl. ¶¶ 6-15; Antoine Decl. ¶¶ 7-17.) Additionally, the effects of anthropogenic pollution and emissions are intensified in coastal areas near populated or developed areas. Feeley 2012 at 9, 13, 37; Feeley 2010 at 446. Almost all of the coastline segments identified by CBD’s members fit that bill, particularly the segments in Puget Sound. See Feeley 2012 at 95; (Easton Decl. ¶¶ 6-12; Moritz Decl. ¶¶ 5-17; Weitzer Decl. ¶¶ 6-15; Antoine Decl. f ¶ 7-17.)

By connecting local anthropogenic causes to the regions visited by its members and identifying potential local mitigation techniques, CBD has set forth “specific facts” establishing a plausible connection between CBD’s members’ injuries and EPA’s decision to approve the states’ 303(d) lists without including acidification-impaired waters. See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561, 112 S.Ct. 2130; Defenders of Wildlife, 420 F.3d at 957 (finding standing where plaintiffs members described general regions within the state where they engaged in activities related to endangered species and where commercial and residential development that depended on the challenged permitting decision was occurring). The connection is neither abstract nor hypothetical. Nat'l Audubon Soc., Inc., 307 F.3d at 849; Ocean Advocates, 402 F.3d at 860. Those same “specific facts” show that the connection between CBD’s members’ injuries and the requested relief — a designation of impaired coastal waters or a remand for EPA to reconsider the 303(d) lists — is likely rather than merely “speculative.” See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561, 112 S.Ct. 2130; Beno, 30 F.3d at 1065. Ninth Circuit precedent “requirefs] no greater precision.” Defenders of Wildlife, 420 F.3d at 957.

This conclusion is bolstered by the EPA’s own guidance that “if a designated use is not supported and the segment is impaired or threatened, the fact that the specific pollutant is not known does not provide a basis for excluding the segment from being listed as impaired.” EPA OA Memo at 9 (“[I]f marine pH exceeds the State’s criterion, but the source-stressor is unknown (e.g., carbon deposition, nutrient enrichment, industrial discharge, natural background) then EPA expects the segment to be listed.”); see also WA-01170; 33 U.S.C. § 1313; Pronsolino, 291 F.3d at 1138 (“Water quality standards reflect a state’s designated uses for a water body and do not depend in any way upon the source of pollution.”). After all, the purpose of the TMDLs triggered by a 303(d) listing is to gather the information necessary to guide states’ implementation of remedial measures. Pronsolino, 291 F.3d at 1128 (upholding EPA’s determination that TMDLs are required even for waters affected only by non-point sources); City of Arcadia v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 411 F.3d 1103, 1105 (9th Cir.2005). For that reason; the Ninth Circuit confirmed an environmental organization’s standing to challenge the EPA’s failure to establish TMDLs for Alaska’s listed waters notwithstanding the argument that the organization could not show that Alaska’s discretionary implementation of any TMDLs would in fact improve water quality. Alaska Ctr. for Env’t v. Browner, 20 F.3d 981, 984 (9th Cir.1994). The Ninth Circuit ruled that the “argument is untenable, because Congress has determined that the relief plaintiffs seek is the appropriate means of achieving desired water quality.” Id. So, too, here. The relief CBD seeks — ■ the listing of acidifled-impaired waters — is the necessary forerunner to the establishment of TMDLs or other water quality improvement techniques, and, according to Congress, the appropriate means of achieving desired water quality. See 33 U.S.C. § 1313; see also Florida Pub. Interest Research Grp. Citizen Lobby, Inc. v. EPA, 386 F.3d 1070, 1085 (11th Cir.2004) (finding causation and redressability because “the continued pollution of the state’s waterbodies ... is fairly traceable to the EPA’s failure to review [Florida’s] Impaired Waters Rule, since use of the Rule could result in polluted waterbodies being left off the Impaired Waters List and not being cleaned.”) For this reason, also, the court finds that CBD has shown causation and redressability.

3. Summary

Because CBD has set forth “specific facts” establishing injury in fact, causation, and redressability, as well as the remaining prerequisites for organizational standing, CBD’s claims are properly before the court. See Bellon, 732 F.3d at 1139.

C. Merits

Having found standing, the court turns to the merits of CBD’s claims. CBD raises two arguments: (1) EPA’s explanation, for its decision to approve Washington’s and Oregon’s Section 303(d) lists runs counter to the evidence before the agency and is implausible in light of that evidence, and (2) Washington and Oregon failed to consider all existing and readily available water quality data when creating their impaired waters lists. The court reviews both of these challenges under the arbitrary and capricious standard.

1. Arbitrary and Capricious Standard

EPA’s decision to approve the 303(d) lists is renewable under the Administrative Procedures Act (“APA”). 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A); Dioxin/Organochlo-rine Ctr. v. Clarke, 57 F.3d 1517, 1521 (9th Cir.1995); Envtl. Def. Fund, Inc. v. Costle, 657 F.2d 275, 283 (1981). Specifically, the court must set aside EPA’s action if it was “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.” 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A). A decision is arbitrary and capricious within the meaning of the APA only if “the agency has relied on factors which Congress has not intended it to consider, entirely failed to consider an important aspect of the problem, offered an explanation for its decision that runs counter to the evidence before the agency, or is so implausible that it could not be ascribed to a difference in view or the product of agency expertise.” Dioxin/Organochlorine Ctr., 57 F.3d at 1521; see also Motor Vehicle Mfr. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins., 463 U.S. 29, 44, 103 S.Ct. 2856, 77 L.Ed.2d 443 (1983). The arbitrary and capricious standard is “highly deferential, presume[s] the agency action to be valid and requires affirming the agency action if a reasonable basis exists for its decision.” Kern Cnty. Farm Bureau v. Allen, 450 F.3d 1072, 1076 (9th Cir.2006) (internal punctuation omitted). The reviewing court may not substitute its judgment for that of the agency; rather, the agency’s decision must be affirmed if the agency has articulated a “rational connection between the facts found and the choice made.” Motor Vehicle Mfr. Ass’n, 463 U.S. at 44, 103 S.Ct. 2856. The court’s deference to the agency’s judgment “is highest when reviewing an agency’s technical analyses and judgments involving the evaluation of complex scientific data within the agency’s technical expertise.” League of Wilderness Defenders Blue Mountains Biodiversity Project v. Allen, 615 F.3d 1122, 1130 (9th Cir.2010).

2. Motions to Strike

EPA has moved to strike various evidence introduced by CBD and amici Fishing Associations and the Scientists as improper extra-record evidence. (See 1st Mot. to Strike (Dkt. #50); 2d Mot. to Strike (Dkt. # 51); EPA Reply at 19-20.) Judicial review pursuant to the APA is based solely on the administrative record in existence at the time of the agency’s decision. 5 U.S.C. § 706; Camp v. Pitts, 411 U.S. 138, 142, 93 S.Ct. 1241, 36 L.Ed.2d 106 (1973); Friends of the Earth v. Hintz, 800 F.2d 822, 828 (9th Cir.1986). There are, however, exceptions to this rule. Hintz, 800 F.2d at 828. Specifically, district courts are permitted to admit extra-record evidence “(1) if admission is necessary to determine whether the agency has considered all relevant factors and has explained its decision, (2) if the agency has relied on documents not in the record, (3) when supplementing the record is necessary to explain technical terms or complex subject matter, or (4) when plaintiffs make a showing of agency bad faith.” Lands Council v. Powell, 395 F.3d 1019, 1030 (9th Cir.2005) (citing Sw. Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. U.S. Forest Serv., 100 F.3d 1443, 1450 (9th Cir.1996) (internal punctuation omitted)); see also Asarco, Inc. v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 616 F.2d 1153, 1160 (9th Cir.1980) (“If the reviewing court finds it necessary to go outside the administrative record, it should consider evidence relevant to the substantive merits of the agency action only for background information ... or for the limited purposes of ascertaining whether the agency fully explicated its course of conduct or grounds of decision.”). “Though widely accepted, these exceptions are narrowly construed and applied.” Lands Council, 395 F.3d at 1030. Moreover, regardless of these exceptions, “[p]arties may not use ‘post-decision information as a new rationalization either for sustaining or attacking the agency’s decision.’ ” Hintz, 800 F.2d at 829 (quoting Ass’n of Pac. Fisheries v. EPA, 615 F.2d 794, 811-12 (9th Cir.1980)).

In their respective briefs, the Scientists cite to 13 and the Fishing Associations cite to 3 extra-record articles, studies, and websites that they contend fall under the exceptions either for material necessary to explain technical terms and complex subject matter or for background material. {See generally Fishing Br. (Dkt. # 47); Scientists Br. (Dkt. # 43-1); Fishing Resp. (Dkt. # 54); Scientists Resp. (Dkt. # 53).) The court is-grateful for the amici’s involvement in the case and willingness to educate the court on the topic of ocean acidification. Nonetheless, the court concludes that it must strike this evidence for the following reasons.

First, to the extent the references explain the basic scientific concepts and consequences associated with ocean acidification, they are cumulative of the extensive administrative record already before the court. See Northcoast Envtl. Ctr. v. Glickman, 136 F.3d 660, 665 (9th Cir.1998) (upholding district court’s decision to “strike cumulative and unnecessary documents outside the administrative record”); (see, e.g., Scientists Br. at 1 n. 2 (citing NOAA, PMEL Carbon Program, What is Ocean Acidification? to explain the basics of ocean acidification).)

Second, as amici concede, most of the references post-date EPA’s decisions to approve Washington’s and Oregon’s 303(d) lists in December 2012. See WA Approval; OR Approval; (Fishing Resp. at 9; Scientist Br. at 10 n. 27; Mot. to Strike 1 at 5 n. 4.) Although post-decision information may be admissible to the extent it can be “deemed a clarification or an explanation of the original information before the [ajgency,” the Ninth Circuit has made clear that parties may not use “post-decision information as a new rationalization either for sustaining or attacking the agency’s decision.” Ass’n of Pac. Fisheries, 615 F.2d at 811-12; see also Bunker Hill Co. v. EPA, 572 F.2d 1286, 1292 (9th Cir.1977) (permitting extra-record evidence because it was “merely explanatory of the original record” and “[n]o new rationalization of the [agency’s decision] was offered”). The Scientists, however, use the post-decision evidence not merely to explain information originally before EPA, but rather to advance a substantive rationale for overturning EPA’s decisions. (See, e.g., Scientists Br. at 18 (arguing that EPA should have listed Willapa Bay as impaired because a 2013 article “conclusively linked” oyster deaths at a local hatchery to ocean acidification and a 2014 article stated that wild oysters in the bay were unable to reproduce successfully).)

Precedent forecloses the Scientists’ arguments that EPA’s decisions should be reversed in light of the post-decision evidence cited in their briefs. See Sw. Ctr. for Biological Diversity, 100 F.3d at 1450-51 (upholding district court’s decision to strike extra-record reference that constituted post-decision information). Although scientific knowledge regarding ocean acidification has continued to evolve since the date of EPA’s decisions, those decisions must not be judged with hindsight. See Ass’n of Pac. Fisheries, 615 F.2d at 811-12; Asarco, 616 F.2d at 1160 (“Consideration of [extra-record] evidence to determine the correctness or wisdom of the agency’s decision is not permitted.”). The referenced information is more appropriate for consideration by the states and EPA during the next update of the states’ 803(d) lists. See 33 U.S.C. § 1313(d); 40. C.F.R. § 130.7(d)(1) (requiring states to update their impaired waters lists every two years). Accordingly, the court strikes these references, as well as the text related to such references, from amici’s briefs.

CBD and the Fishing Associations also provide evidence of pH monitoring data-sets for Washington waters that are not included in the administrative record. (See Fishing Br. at 8-12; CBD Resp. at 13, Attach. A.) Specifically, the Fishing Associations cite the Washington Department of Ecology’s own long-term marine monitoring data, which is published on Ecology’s website, and provide tables summarizing the pH data from various monitoring points in recent years. (Fishing Br. at 9-11; Append. A.) CBD relies on the same data and summaries. {See CBD Resp. at 13.) In addition, CBD cites to pH monitoring datasets from the United States Geological Survey (“USGS”), Storage Retrieval (“STORET”), and National Ocean and Atmospheric Administration (“NOAA”) databases, and provides tables and text summaries of pH data from recent years. (CBD Resp. at 13, n. 16, n. 17.)

CBD and the Fishing Associations rely on this evidence to support their argument that EPA’s failure to evaluate these data-sets was arbitrary and capricious and in violation of EPA’s regulations. (CBD Resp. at 10-13; Fishing Br. at 9-10.) EPA does not dispute the authenticity of these databases. (Mot. to Strike 1 at 5.) Rather, EPA argues that admission of the data “presents an unnecessary risk of confusion.” {Id. at 6.)

The court concludes that this evidence falls within the exception for evidence necessary to determine whether the agency has considered all relevant factors. See Lands Council, 395 F.3d at 1030. The Ninth Circuit has recognized that “[i]t will often be impossible, especially when highly technical matters are involved, for the court to determine whether the agency took into consideration all relevant factors unless it looks outside the record to determine what matters the agency should have considered but did not.” Asarco, Inc., 616 F.2d at 1160. Here, the court cannot evaluate CBD’s claim that EPA failed to evaluate monitoring data in violation of EPA’s regulations without knowing which data EPA allegedly failed to evaluate and whether that data is relevant to EPA’s decision to approve Washington’s 303(d) list. See, e.g., Sierra Club, Inc. v. Leavitt, 488 F.3d 904, 920 (11th Cir.2007) (holding that documents showing that EPA’s categorical failure to consider data older than 7.5 years led to impaired waters being excluded from Florida’s 303(d) list could be considered on remand “as extra-record material necessary to determine whether EPA considered all relevant factors in making its decision”). Therefore, this evidence is admissible for the purpose of determining whether EPA considered all relevant factors before approving Washington’s 303(d) list. See Inland Empire Pub. Lands Council v. U.S. Forest Serv., 88 F.3d 754, 760 n. 5 (9th Cir.1996) (“To the extent [the extra-record] declaration is submitted to show that the [agency] overlooked factors relevant to a proper population viability analysis, we will consider it.”).

CBD and the Fishing Associations, however, go beyond that and also argue that these datasets show repeated violations of Washington’s numerical pH water quality standard that compel EPA to include numerous waters on Washington’s 303(d) list. .(CBD Resp. at 13, n. 16, n. 17; Fishing Br. at .10-11.) Yet, courts that go outside the record must consider that evidence only for the “limited purpose” of ascertaining whether the agency considered all the relevant factors. Asarco, Inc., 616 F.2d at 1160. “Consideration of the evidence to determine the correctness or wisdom of the agency’s decision is not permitted.” Id. If a court determines that an agency’s course of inquiry was insufficient, the proper course is to “remand the matter to the agency for further consideration and not compensate for the agency’s dereliction by undertaking its own inquiry into the merits.” Id. (finding that district court “went too far” in considering extra-record evidence because the “technical testimony [that] was plainly elicited for the purpose of determining the scientific merit of the EPA’s decision” necessarily “led the district court to substitute its judgment for that of the agency”).

Accordingly, the court admits the extra-record dataset evidence only for the limited purpose of showing that additional pH data from Washington coastal and estuarine locations and relevant time periods were available to Washington and Oregon, and later to EPA, at the times of their respective decisions regarding the states’ impaired waters lists, and that this data may show violations of Washington’s water quality standards. The court does not consider CBD’s or the Fishing Associations’ substantive arguments regarding what listing conclusions the extra-record data would support or compel, if any.

The court deals with EPA’s remaining motions to strike below, in the context of the arguments that the contested evidence supports.

3. Evidence before the agency

CBD’s first argument is that the evidence before EPA at the time of EPA’s decision to approve Washington’s and Oregon’s 303(d) lists showed violations of Washington’s numerical pH standard, as well as violations of Washington’s and Oregon’s narrative standards regarding aquatic life. The court addresses each contention in turn below.

a. Washington’s numerical pH standard

CBD’s argument regarding Washington’s numerical pH standard is founded on the Wootton study and accompanying data, which CBD submitted to Washington’s Ecology Department (“Ecology”) for review. WA-000731 (‘Wootton 2008”); WA-000092-93. The Wootton study analyzed eight years of pH data from a tidepool on Tatoosh Island, which' is located off the northwestern tip of Washington’s Olympic Peninsula at the mouth of the Strait of Juan de Fuca. See generally Wootton 2008; WA-000092-93. The data show a decline in pH that can be fitted to a linear trend with a rate of change of 0.046 units per year, for an estimated total of 0.368 units over eight years. Wootton 2008 at 18849; WA-000824-25 (Dr. Wootton’s comments on Washington’s 2010 draft assessment). The study concluded that the best-fit parameter for explaining the change was the contribution of atmospheric C02. WA-000825; Wootton 2008 at 18850. CBD argues that, because the data show a decline in more than 0.2 units from 2000 to 2008 and the study attributes the decline to atmospheric carbon dioxide, EPA’s failure to list the Strait of Juan de Fuca or other adjacent Washington waters as i