Citations
- 93 F. Supp. 3d 658
Full opinion text
MEMORANDUM AND OPINION ON CLAIM CONSTRUCTION AND ON SUMMARY JUDGMENT, SANCTIONS, AND RELATED MOTIONS
LEE H. ROSENTHAL, District Judge.
This patent infringement case involves computer technology for printing on remote devices. Computer users in the 1990s and early 2000s had to download and install drivers before performing most tasks, including printing. In 2000, Prin-terOn obtained two patents for automating the driver-download process for network printing and two patents for controlling .user access to servers and printers. Although computer users still need devices with drivers under PrinterOn’s patents, the drivers need not be manually downloaded and installed. Progress for the users, and benefits for PrinterOn, whose monopoly made it the leading enterprise-grade printing software company in the world.
Progress has continued. A small company in Northern California called Breezy-Print has introduced and marketed a printing system that does not require installing or downloading drivers on end-user devices, whether manually or automatically, to translate data to printer-friendly formats. Instead, BreezyPrint’s system moves the data-translation process to the cloud. BreezyPrint’s system also allows users to preauthorize the use of a printer in the user’s network.
BreezyPrint’s new system has gained market share. Uniguest, a company that provides print, technology, and other specialized services for the hospitality industry, entered into a contract with Breezy-Print under which BreezyPrint would supply Uniguest’s printing needs. Breez-yPrint has become a kind of early Apple to PrinterOn’s Microsoft, a new Google to PrinterOn’s Ask Jeeves. PrinterOn sued both BreezyPrint and Uniguest for infringement, seeking damages and an injunction. After PrinterOn settled with Uniguest, and Uniguest ended its Breezy-Print contract, BreezyPrint counterclaimed against PrinterOn for tortiously interfering with the Uniguest contract.
The parties have presented competing claim constructions and asked the court to resolve the disputed terms. BreezyPrint has moved for summary judgment that it does not infringe any of PrinterOn’s patents, a declaratory judgment that Printer-On’s patents are invalid, and sanctions against PrinterOn’s attorneys for failing to adequately investigate before filing this suit and for making frivolous arguments about the scope of its patents. PrinterOn has cross-moved for summary judgment that BreezyPrint’s tortious-interference counterclaim and unclean-hands defense both fail as a matter of law.
Based on the pleadings, the motions, the briefs, the record, the hearings, the arguments of counsel, and the applicable law, the court:
1. construes the disputed claim terms;
2. grants BreezyPrint’s motions for summary judgment of noninfringement, (Docket Entry Nos. 32, 37);
3. grants PrinterOn’s motion for summary judgment dismissing Breezy-Print’s tortious-interference counterclaim, (Docket Entry No. 103);
4. denies BreezyPrint’s motion for sanctions, (Docket Entry No. 152);
5. denies PrinterOn’s motion for leave to file a surresponse, (Docket Entry No. 185); and
6. denies as moot BreezyPrint’s motion for summary judgment for invalidity, (Docket Entry No. 109), Printer-On’s motion for summary judgment on BreezyPrint’s unclean-hands defense, (Docket Entry No. 99), and BreezyPrint’s motion to defer a decision on that motion, (Docket Entry No. 101).
By March 27, 2015, the parties must either: (a) file a statement identifying any issues that remain to be resolved and a proposed schedule for doing so; or (b) submit a proposed form of final judgment.
The reasons for these rulings are explained below.
I. Background
Both PrinterOn and BreezyPrint design and sell mobile-printing services to print files from such devices as smartphones and tablets. PrinterOn, a Canadian company, holds several patents dating back to the late 1990s. PrinterOn uses cloud technology to enable users to print documents sent from a smartphone, tablet, or other computing device to a PrinterOn-enabled printer where it is located. PrinterOn’s technology has been used in over 10,000 printing locations in more than 120 countries.
PrinterOn’s patents teach a system, and method for a “network terminal” (such as an iPhone or iPad) to use “resource driver” software to translate the data the user wants to print into a printer-friendly format, and then to communicate that translated data to a “network resource device,” such as a printer or fax machine. Under PrinterOn’s system, the printing cannot occur unless the printer receives a recognized authorization password.
BreezyPrint, a mobile-printing start-up in the Bay Area, uses a similar system with differences. In May 2009, the founder of what became BreezyPrint, Jared Hansen, had an idea for improving mobile printing. He outlined the idea — quaintly enough, using a pen and paper — and listed four advantages. One advantage was the absence of the “need for any printer driver on [the] handheld device.” (Docket Entry No. 32, Hansen Deel., Ex. 1 (emphasis original)). As a result, the “software for [the] device can be very lightweight.” (Id.). Hansen founded BreezyPrint a few months later. (Id. ¶ 4).
BreezyPrint’s system does not require drivers or authorization passwords at the user level. Instead, BreezyPrint allows users to send untranslated data from their mobile.devices, such as an iPhone or tablet, through its own cloud server, the “Breezy Cloud.” The Breezy Cloud translates the user’s data into printer-friendly format. The Breezy Cloud then sends the printable material across a firewall to another server, the “Breezy Connector,” which transmits the material to printers that have been preauthorized for the user.
Uniguest provides streamlined technological solutions for the hospitality industry. When this lawsuit was filed, the company had “more systems deployed and five-star relationships with every major hospitality brand than any other provider in the industry.” (Docket Entry No. 120, at 2). Uniguest has more than 14,000 placements “for more than 8,000 clients covering 40 countries.” (Id.). Uniguest expected its systems to be used by “every Hilton brand and property by 2015,” which would cover “nearly 50% of the highly sought after full-service segment of the U.S. hospitality industry.” (Id.).
In November 2012, after discussions about selling a jointly developed printing product for the hospitality industry, Breez-yPriiit signed a contract to develop a printing product for Uniguest. (Docket Entry No. 120, at 3). Under the contract, Breez-yPrint would provide its mobile-printing services to more than 8,000 Uniguest customer sites in exchange for licensing revenue. Uniguest began promoting Breezy-Print over PrinterOn with its customer hotels. PrinterOn began to lose its industry dominance. In October 2013, Printer-On filed this suit.
PrinterOn alleges willful infringement (direct, inducing, and contributing) of four patents, U.S. Patent Nos. 6,990,527 ('527), 7,007,093 ('093), 7,249,188 ('188), and 7,827,293 ('293). (Docket Entry No. 1). The '527 and the '093 Patents — the “Driver Patents” — address PrinterOn’s system and method for using drivers to translate data into printer-ready format. The '188 and '293 Patents — the “Password” or “Polling Patents” — cover PrinterOn’s system and method for polling queued print jobs outside the firewall and allowing them inside the firewall only if the user has obtained and submits an authorization password.
Before BreezyPrint filed an answer, PrinterOn dismissed its claims against Un-iguest, without prejudice. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(l)(A)(i); (Docket Entry No. 6). BreezyPrint asserted defenses of nonin-fringement, unclean hands, invalidity, patent exhaustion, laches, and government sale. BreezyPrint also counterclaimed for a declaratory judgment of noninfringement and invalidity, and for damages based on PrinterOn’s alleged tortious interference with the Uniguest contract. (Docket Entry Nos. 13,143).
In June 2014, before the scheduled completion of discovery (but after allowing PrinterOn to review its source code), BreezyPrint moved for summary judgment that it did not infringe any of the four patents. (Docket Entry Nos. 32, 37). The parties submitted competing claim constructions. The court held a two-day claim-construction hearing in November 2014, to consider the parties’ disputed constructions under Markman v. Westview Instruments, 52 F.3d 967 (Fed.Cir.1995), ajfd, 517 U.S. 370, 116 S.Ct. 1384, 134 L.Ed.2d 577 (1996).
The following motions are pending:
• BreezyPrint’s motion for summary judgment that it does not infringe the Driver Patents (Docket Entry No. 32);
• BreezyPrint’s motion for summary ' judgment that it does not infringe the Polling-Password Patents (Docket Entry No. 37);
• PrinterOn’s motion for summary judgment on BreezyPrint’s unclean-hands affirmative defense (Docket Entry No. 99);
• BreezyPrint’s motion • to defer response and decision on PrinterOn’s motion for summary judgment on BreezyPrint’s unclean-hands defense, including BreezyPrint’s request to compel production of the G. Tisdall emails (Docket Entry No. 101);
• PrinterOn’s motion for summary judgment on BreezyPrint’s tortious interference counterclaim (Docket Entry No. 103);
• BreezyPrint’s motion for summary judgment that the four patents are invalid (Docket Entry No. 109);
• BreezyPrint’s motion for sanctions (Docket Entry No. 152); and
• PrinterOn’s motion for leave to file a supplemental response in opposition to BreezyPrint’s motion for sanctions (Docket Entry No. 185)
The court heard oral argument on the motions. The first part of this opinion construes, the disputed claim terms. The second part analyzes the summary judgment, sanctions, and related motions.
II. The Applicable Legal Standards
A. Claim Construction
The ‘“claims of a patent define the invention to which the patentee is entitled the right to exclude.’ ” Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312 (Fed.Cir.2005) (en banc) (quoting Innova/Pure Water, Inc. v. Safari Water Filtration Sys., Inc., 381 F.3d 1111, 1115 (Fed.Cir.2004)). “[T]he construction of a patent, including terms of art within its claim, is exclusively within the province of the court.” Markman, 517 U.S. at 372, 116 S.Ct. 1384. Claim terms are “ ‘generally given their ordinary and customary meaning,’ ” which is “the meaning that the term would have to a person of ordinary skill in the, art in question at the time of the invention.” Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1312-13 (quoting Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1582 (Fed.Cir.1996)). A court is to read the patent from the vantage of a person with ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1313. Such a person “ ‘is deemed to read the words used in the patent documents with an understanding of their meaning in the field, and to have knowledge of any special meaning and usage in the field.’ ” Id. (quoting Multiform Desiccants, Inc. v. Medzam, Ltd., 133 F.3d 1473, 1477 (Fed.Cir.1998)); see also Medrad, Inc. v. MRI Devices Corp., 401 F.3d 1313, 1319 (Fed.Cir.2005) (cautioning courts not to interpret claim terms “in a vacuum” (quotation omitted)).
When the ordinary meaning is readily apparent, claim construction “involves little more than the application of the widely accepted meaning of commonly understood words.” Id. at 1314. If this ordinary meaning is not clear, the court reviews “the intrinsic evidence of record, i.e., the patent itself, including the claims, the specification and, if in evidence, the prosecution history.” Vitronics, 90 F.3d at 1582; see also Am. Piledriving Equip., Inc. v. Geoquip, Inc., 637 F.3d 1324, 1331 (Fed.Cir.2011) (“[T]he role of a district court in construing claims is ... to give . meaning to the limitations actually contained in the claims, informed by the written description, the prosecution history if in evidence, and any relevant extrinsic evidence.”).
The court first looks “to the words of the claims themselves, both asserted and nonasserted, to define the scope of the patented invention.” Vitronics, 90 F.3d at 1582. Claim terms must be construed in context of surrounding claim language. ACTV, Inc. v. Walt Disney Co., 346 F.3d 1082, 1088 (Fed.Cir.2003) (“[T]he context of the surrounding words of the claim also must be considered in determining the ordinary and customary meaning of those terms.”); accord Lexion Medical, LLC v. Northgate Techs., Inc., 641 F.3d 1352, 1356 (Fed.Cir.2011).
Courts review the “specification to determine whether the inventor has used any terms in a manner inconsistent with their ordinary meaning.” Vitronics, 90 F.3d at 1582. The Federal Circuit has repeatedly stated that “claims ‘must be read in view of the specification, of which they are a part.’” Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1315 (quoting Markman, 52 F.3d 967, 979 (Fed.Cir.1995)). The specification, a “concordance for the claims,” id. (quoting Autogiro Co. of Am. v. United States, 384 F.2d 391, 397-98 (Ct.Cl.1967)), is the “best source for understanding a technical term,” id. (quoting Multiform Desiccants, 133 F.3d at 1478). See also Metabolite Labs., Inc. v. Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings, 370 F.3d 1354, 1360 (Fed.Cir.2004) (“In most cases, the best source for discerning the proper context of claim terms is the patent specification wherein the patent applicant describes the invention.”). When the specification “reveal[s] a special definition given to a claim term by the patentee that differs from the meaning it would otherwise possess_the inventor’s lexicography governs.” Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1316 (citing CCS Fitness, Inc. v. Brunswick Corp., 288 F.3d 1359, 1366 (Fed.Cir.2002)). “In other cases, the specification may reveal an intentional disclaimer, or disavowal, of claim scope by the inventor.” Id. (citing SciMed Life Sys., Inc. v. Advanced Cardiovascular Sys., Inc., 242 F.3d 1337, 1343-44 (Fed.Cir.2001)); see also Thorner v. Sony Computer Entm’t Am. LLC, 669 F.3d 1362, 1365 (Fed.Cir.2012) (explaining that claim construction may deviate from the ordinary and customary meaning of a disputed term only if (1) a patentee sets out a definition and acts as his own lexicographer, or (2) the patentee disavows the full scope of a claim term either in the specification or during prosecution). “ ‘The construction that stays true to the claim language and most naturally aligns with the patent’s description of the invention will be, in the end, the correct construction.’ ” Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1316 (quoting Renishaw PLC v. Marposs Societa’ per Azioni, 158 F.3d, 1243, 1250 (Fed.Cir.1998)). “There is a fíne line between construing the claims in light of the specification and improperly importing a limitation from the specification into the claims.” Retractable Techs., Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 653 F.3d 1296, 1305 (Fed.Cir.2011). Courts must “capture the scope of the actual invention, rather than strictly limit the scope of claims to disclosed embodiments or allow the claim language to become divorced from what the specification conveys is the invention.” Id.
“[A] court ‘should also consider the patent’s prosecution history, if it is in evidence.’ ” Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1317 (quoting Markman, 52 F.3d at 980). The prosecution history “can often inform the meaning of the claim language by demonstrating how the inventor understood the invention and whether the inventor limited the invention in the course of prosecution, making the claim scope narrower than it would otherwise be.” Id. (citing Vitronics, 90 F.3d at 1582-83); see also Typhoon Touch Techs., Inc. v. Dell, Inc., 659 F.3d 1376, 1381 (Fed.Cir.2011) (“[T]he specification is the primary source for determining what was invented and what is covered by the claims, elucidated if needed by the prosecution history.”). The prosecution history includes “all express representations made by or on behalf of the applicant to the examiner to induce a patent grant, or ... to reissue a patent .... including] amendments to the claims and arguments made to convince the examiner that the claimed invention meets the statutory requirements of novelty, utility, and nonobvi-ousness.” Standard Oil Co. v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 774 F.2d 448, 452 (Fed.Cir. 1985); see also Sanofi-Aventis Deutschland GmbH v. Genentech, Inc., 473 Fed.Appx. 885, 888 (Fed.Cir.2012) (“We have held that an otherwise broadly defined term can be narrowed during prosecution through arguments made to distinguish prior art.”) (citing Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1317 (“The prosecution history ... consists of the complete record of the proceedings before the PTO and includes the prior art cited during the examination of the patent.”)).
“The doctrine of prosecution disclaimer is well established in Supreme Court precedent, precluding patentees from recapturing through claim interpretation specific meanings disclaimed during prosecution.” Omega Eng’g, Inc. v. Raytek Corp., 334 F.3d 1314, 1323 (Fed.Cir.2003); see also SanDisk Corp. v. Memorex Prods., Inc., 415 F.3d 1278, 1286 (Fed.Cir.2005). The doctrine applies even if the disclaimers were not necessary to make the invention patentable. See Uship Intellectual Props., LLC v. United States, 714 F.3d 1311, 1315 (Fed.Cir.2013) (“We find no support for [the] proposition that prosecution disclaimer applies only when applicants attempt to overcome a claim rejection. Our cases broadly state that an applicant’s statements to the PTO characterizing its invention may give rise to a prosecution disclaimer.”); cf. South-wall Techs., Inc. v. Cardinal IG Co., 54 F.3d 1570, 1583 (Fed.Cir.1995) (“Estoppel extends beyond the basis of patentability.... Clear assertions made during prosecution in support of patentability, whether or not actually required to secure allowance of the claim, may also create an estoppel.”) (citing Tex. Instruments, Inc. v. U.S. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 988 F.2d 1165 (Fed.Cir.1993)). The doctrine does not apply “where the alleged disavowal of claim scope is ambiguous.” Omega Eng’g, 334 F.3d at 1324; see also id. at 1325 (“[W]e have required the alleged disavowing statements to be both so clear as to show reasonable clarity and deliberateness and so unmistakable as to be unambiguous evidence of disclaimer”) (citations omitted). Only when “the patentee has unequivocally disavowed a certain meaning to obtain his patent [does] the doctrine of prosecution disclaimer attach[] and narrow[ ] the ordinary meaning of the claim congruent with the scope of the surrender.” Id. at 1324.
Courts may also “rely on extrinsic evidence, which ‘consists of all evidence external to the patent and prosecution history, including expert and inventor testimony, dictionaries, and learned treatises.’ ” Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1317 (quoting Markman, 52 F.3d at 980). Although extrinsic evidence “ ‘can shed useful light on the relevant art,’ it is ‘less significant than the intrinsic record in determining the legally operative meaning of claim language.’ ” Zircon Corp. v. Stanley Black & Decker, Inc., 452 Fed.Appx. 966, 972-73 (Fed.Cir.2011) (quoting Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1317). Extrinsic evidence is “in general ... less reliable than the patent and its prosecution history” because it is “not part of the patent” and was not created at the time of the patent’s prosecution; “extrinsic publications may not be written by or for skilled artisans”; and expert reports and testimony created at the time of litigation may “suffer from bias not present in intrinsic evidence.” Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1318. A court must exercise “sound discretion” in admitting and using extrinsic evidence. Id. at 1319; see also Seattle Box Co. v. Indus. Crating & Packing, Inc., 731 F.2d 818, 826 (Fed.Cir.1984) (“A trial judge has sole discretion to decide whether or not he needs, or even just desires, an expert’s assistance to understand a patent. We will not disturb that discretionary decision except in the clearest case.”).
“[E]xtrinsic evidence may be useful to the court, but it is unlikely to result in a reliable interpretation of patent claim scope unless considered in the context of the intrinsic evidence.” Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1319. Although a court may consider extrinsic evidence, it must not relegate the intrinsic evidence to a mere “check on the dictionary meaning of a claim term.” Id. at 1320-21 (noting that relying on dictionaries “too often” causes “the adoption of a dictionary definition entirely divorced from the context of the written description”). “The sequence of steps used by the judge in consulting various sources is not important; what matters is for the court to attach the appropriate weight to be assigned to those sources in light of the statutes and policies that inform patent law.” Id. at 1324 (citing Vitronics, 90 F.3d at 1582).
B. Summary Judgment
Summary judgment is appropriate if no genuine dispute of material fact exists and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Crv. P. 56(a). “The movant bears the burden of identifying those portions of the record it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine [dispute] of material fact.” Triple Tee Golf, Inc. v. Nike, Inc., 485 F.3d 253, 261 (5th Cir.2007) (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-25, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986)).
If the burden of proof at trial lies with the nonmoving party, the movant may satisfy its initial burden “by ‘showing’ — that is, pointing out to the district court — that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party’s case.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325, 106 S.Ct. 2548. Although the party moving for summary judgment must demonstrate the absence of a genuine factual dispute, negating the elements of the nonmovant’s case is not required. Boudreaux v. Swift Transp. Co., 402 F.3d 536, 540 (5th Cir.2005). “A fact is ‘material’ if its resolution in favor of one party might affect the outcome of the lawsuit under governing law.” Sossamon v. Lone Star State of Texas, 560 F.3d 316, 326 (5th Cir.2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). “ ‘If the moving party fails to meet [its] initial burden, the motion [for summary judgment] must be denied, regardless of the nonmovant’s response.’ ” United States v. $92,203.00 in U.S. Currency, 537 F.3d 504, 507 (5th Cir.2008) (quoting Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir.1994) (en banc) (per curiam)).
When the moving party has met its Rule 56(a) burden, the nonmoving party cannot rest on its pleading allegations. The non-movant must identify specific evidence in the record and explain how that evidence supports the claims. Baranowski v. Hart, 486 F.3d 112, 119 (5th Cir.2007). “This burden will not be satisfied by ‘some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts, by conclusory allegations, by unsubstantiated assertions, or by only a scintilla of evidence.’ ” Boudreaux, 402 F.3d at 540 (quoting Little, 37 F.3d at 1075). In deciding a summary-judgment motion, the court draws all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Connors v. Graves, 538 F.3d 373, 376 (5th Cir.2008).
C. Patent Infringement
Patent infringement claims involve two analytic steps. Mars, Inc. v. H.J. Heinz Co., L.P., 377 F.3d 1369, 1373 (Fed.Cir.2004); Scanner Tech. Corp. v. ICOS Vision Sys. Corp., N.V., 365 F.3d 1299, 1302 (Fed.Cir.2004). The court first determines the meaning and scope of the asserted claims. Scanner Tech., 365 F.3d at 1302; Novartis Pharm. Corp. v. Eon Labs Mfg., Inc., 363 F.3d 1306, 1308 (Fed. Cir.2004). The court then compares the construed claims to the allegedly infringing method or product to determine whether the claims encompass the accused method or product. Bai v. L & L Wings, Inc., 160 F.3d 1350, 1353 (Fed.Cir.1998).
III. Claim Construction
PrinterOn alleges that BreezyPrint infringes the two Driver Patents, the '527 Patent and the '093 Patent, and the two Password or Polling Patents, the '188 Patent and the '293 Patent. (Docket Entry-No. 1). All four patents stem from a senior Canadian Priority Application, but they do not incorporate that Application into either the claim terms or specification. The contents of the Priority Application are intrinsic evidence, like claim language, the specification, or prosecution history, but cannot alone support a particular construction. See Abbott Labs. v. Sandoz, 566 F.3d 1282, 1289 (Fed.Cir.2009) (affirming the district court’s construction of “crystalline” as “Crystal A” “as outlined in the specification” despite the fact that “the Crystal B formulation actually appears in the parent ... application” because “Abbott knew exactly how to describe and claim Crystal B compounds” yet “chose to claim only the A form in the [junior] patent”); see id. at 1290 (“[T]he rest of the intrinsic evidence, including the prosecution history and the priority [ ] application, evince[d] a clear intention to limit the [junior] patent to Crystal A as defined by the seven PXRD peaks in the specification and in claim 1.”); see also AIA Eng’g Ltd. v. Magotteaux Int’l S/A 657 F.3d 1264, 1279 (Fed.Cir.2011) (noting “that evidence proffered by [the patentee] regarding statements in the specification of one of the European priority applications is, at best, equivocal as to the meaning of’ a disputed claim term and “does not alter the clear import of the claim language, specification, and relevant extrinsic evidence in this case” (citing Abbott Labs., 566 F.3d at 1290)); cf. Pfizer v. Ranbaxy Labs. Ltd., 457 F.3d 1284, 1290 (Fed.Cir.2006) (observing that statements made during the prosecution of a foreign patent are irrelevant to claim construction).
The parties dispute the meaning of the following claim terms:
• “network terminal”;
• “server”;
• “resource driver”;
• “network resource” and “network resource device”;
• “configured with”;
• “translated source data”;
• “communication of translated source data”;
• “for communication of translated source data from the network terminal to the network resource”;
• “for facilitating communication between a network terminal and a selected network resource device over a network for communication of translated source data from the network terminal to the network resource device”;
• “authorization password”;
• “application data”;
• “destination address”;
• “decompress” and “decompression”; and
• “polling server.”
Because the claim constructions affect how infringement is analyzed, the competing constructions are addressed first, organized by the two categories of asserted patents.
A. The Disputed Claim Terms in the Driver Patents (the '527 and '093 Patents)
Each of the two Driver Patents includes two independent claims. One is a method claim, and one is system claim. All four of these independent claims have two relevant limitations: “determining the network terminal is configured with the resource driver”; and the “communication of translated source data from the network terminal to the network resource device.” '527 Patent, 12:60, 13:36; '093 Patent, 13:1, 13:44. The '093 Patent includes another disputed limitation, “a degree of communication access.” '093 Patent, 13:10.
1. “network terminal”
The parties agree that “network terminal” encompasses many of the user devices familiar to electronics consumers. The parties dispute whether “network terminal” includes intermediary servers that do not belong to the end user. PrinterOn contends that it can; BreezyPrint argues that it cannot. PrinterOn proposes that “network terminal” be construed to mean “a computing device, for example, smart phone, desktop computer, or server, capable of accessing a network resource over a communications network.” (Docket Entry No. 136, at 2 (emphasis added)). Breezy-Print argues that “network terminal” should be construed to mean either: (1) a “user device, such as a personal computer, a wireless-enabled personal data assistant, or an email-enabled wireless telephone that is capable of communicating over a network,” (Docket Entry No. 136, at 2); or (2) a “device that originates the communication for the network resource,” (Docket Entry No. 142, at 1).
Claim 1 of the '527 Patent describes a system comprising “an authorization server for receiving a request from the network terminal for communication access to the selected network resource device.” '527 Patent, 13:6-7 (emphasis added). Claim 1 of the '093 Patent contains a similar description, separately addressing an intermediary server and a network terminal. '093 Patent, 13:17-20. If “network terminal” included an intermediary server, such as the authorization server, this distinction in the same sentence would be unnecessary. The claim language not only identifies these two system parts separately, it also describes the network terminal’s role as originating and sending the request for access to the network resource device, which is again inconsistent with construing network terminal to include intermediary servers as opposed to only end-user devices. The specification supports this construction. The specification explains that, “[a]s shown in FIG. 2, the network terminal comprises a network interface, a user interface, and a data processing system in communication with the network interface and the user interface .... Preferably the user interface comprises a data entry device (such as keyboard, microphone, or writing tablet), and a display device (such as a CRT or LCD display).” '527 Patent, 3:16-26 (emphasis added). The preferred embodiment of the Driver Patents is a “network terminal” that includes a user device, or, at least, a device that originates the communication across a network.
PrinterOn argues that this construction improperly limits the term based on Figure 2, an Illustrative example in the specification that shows an end-user device as a specific embodiment of a “network terminal.” (Docket Entry No. 106, at 7-8). But the specification is not the only support for this construction. The claim language, which distinguishes a network terminal from an intermediary authorization server, and the specification, which describes a preferred embodiment as an originating user device, both support this construction. The specification confirms the claim term’s ordinary meaning. Neither the claim language nor the specification support PrinterOn’s construction of network terminal to include an intermediary server.
PrinterOn argues that the “intrinsic evidence shows an embodiment of a network terminal ... as a server” in the Canadian Priority Application. This Application describes “wrapper layer software” that may “reside on an NT server” and wrap-around a driver. (Docket Entry No. 106, at 8 (citing Priority Application § 3.5.1, 13:26-14:1)). PrinterOn notes that the Priority Application refers to a “PrinterOn Driver on proxy server” and describes “performing] the translation on the server,” rather than on a user device, before sending “the print job to a printer.” (Id. (citing Priority Application, §§ 3.6, 14:12-30; 5.2.2, 26:28-35)). But while the Priority Application is intrinsic evidence, the patent claim terms and specification offer no support for construing “network terminal” to include intermediary servers. In the Priority Application, PrinterOn described an embodiment of a network terminal that encompassed intermediary servers, but PrinterOn did not do so when it in applied for the Driver and Password Patents. See Abbott Labs. v. Sandoz, 566 F.3d 1282, 1289 (Fed.Cir.2009) (affirming the district court’s construction of “crystalline” as “Crystal A” “as outlined in the specification” despite the fact that “the Crystal B formulation actually appears in the parent ... application” because “Abbott knew exactly how to describe and claim Crystal B compounds” yet “chose to claim only the A form in the [junior] patent”). As Breezy-Print argued at the Markman hearing, PrinterOn “could have included [that disclosure] in their U.S. filings” but “made the conscious choice to leave [it] behind in Canada.” Markman Trans. at 116 (Nov. 4, 2011). Although the Canadian Priority Application used the term “Network Terminal Server” and described an embodiment featuring translation on an intermediary server, the four asserted patents do not.
PrinterOn’s “wrapper layer” argument, based on the Canadian Priority Application, relies on a “chain of speculations inconsistent with the ordinary meaning and intrinsic evidence.” (Docket Entry No. 119, at 11). PrinterOn’s “wrapper layer” argument requires the following inferences: (1) the Canadian Priority Application describes that a network terminal may include “wrapper layer” software around an operating system printer driver; (2) the operating system printer driver around which the wrapper layer may be wrapped include Windows 95, 98, and NT print drivers; (3) a Windows NT print driver may run on a server version of Windows NT; so (4) a “network terminal” may be a server because it may include software that may wrap around a driver that may be capable of operation on a server. Prin-terOn’s effort to include an intermediary server in its definition of “network terminal” requires too many attenuated inferences that are inconsistent with the term’s ordinary meaning and with the intrinsic evidence.
PrinterOn’s extrinsic evidence, which is entitled to less weight than the intrinsic evidence that existed when the patents issued, does not alter this construction. PrinterOn’s expert-witness report acknowledges that “all the myriad servers, firewalls, translations,' etc. that make up the claimed inventions are arrayed between those two points [the network terminal at one end and the network resource at the other end].” (Docket Entry No. 107-5, at ¶ 27 (emphasis added)); see also Markman Trans, at 15 (Nov. 4, 2014) (“The network terminal and network resource frame the communications network . (emphasis added)). PrinterOn at times has made the same point. (Docket Entry No. 106, at 9 (“At the one end of the communication is the network terminal which accesses a network resource at the other end.”)). PrinterOn argues that using these references to oppose its own proposed construction takes them out of context. The context, however, is consistent with PrinterOn’s statements. The court’s construction is also consistent with the ordinary meaning of the term “terminal.” It derives from the Latin word “terminus, ” meaning “boundary.” See Webster’s Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary 1217 (1990) (defining “terminal” as “of or relating to an end, extremity, boundary, or terminus” and as “a device (as a video display unit) by which data can enter or leave a communication network”).
The court construes “network terminal” to mean “a device that originates the communication for the network resource.”
2. “server”
This term appears in all four patents. PrinterOn argues that construction is unnecessary. If the court disagrees, PrinterOn argues that “server” should be construed as “a service implemented by software.” (Docket Entry No. 136, at 3). BreezyPrint argues that “server” should be construed and that it means “software that receives a request from other software and provides a resource in response.” (Id.).
PrinterOn argues that its proposed construction is consistent with the preferred embodiment disclosed in the specification, which identifies many servers based on their functions. (Docket Entry No. 106, at 25 (citing the “authorization server,” “administration server,” “print server,” “polling server,” “file server,” “DNS (domain name server),” “enterprise server,” “image server,” and “local server”)). BreezyPrint responds that its construction is consistent with the ordinary understanding of one skilled in the art of typical server “architecture,” in which “client” software sends a request to server software, and the server software responds to that request. (Docket Entry No. 119, at 18). Breezy-Print points to the use of “authorization server” and the “polling server” in the claim language as two examples. See, e.g., '527 Patent, 13:6-7; '293 Patent, 12:62-63. BreezyPrint also contends that Printer-On’s proposed construction is overbroad because it makes “any software service running on a computer,” including a calculator, a word processor, and an email program, “a ‘server.’ ” (Docket Entry No. 119., at 18).
Although a “server” is a common term in the industry, it is one that needs construction to guide jurors. The court construes server to mean “software that receives a request from other software and provides a resource in response.” This is consistent with the construction of other disputed claim tekms and with the meaning one of ordinary skill in would give to the term. It also avoids the overbreadth of PrinterOn’s proposed construction, which does not distinguish between a server and other software services.
3. “resource driver”
The parties dispute whether “resource driver” includes hardware or is limited to software. PrinterOn contends that “resource driver” means “software or hardware for converting data for processing by a network resource device.” (Docket Entry No. 136, at 4). Breezy-Print asserts that it means “software for translating data to produce translated data in a format suitable for processing by a network resource device.” (Id.).
The intrinsic evidence supports Breezy-Print’s proposed construction. Claim 1 of the Driver Patents describes a “resource driver associated with the selected resource device” and a “resource driver for translating source data to produce the translated source data in a format suitable for processing by the network resource device.” '527 Patent, 13:3-5 (emphasis added); '093 Patent, 13:14-16. This claim also describes an authorization server configured “for determining the network terminal is configured with the resource driver associated with the driver identifier.” '527 Patent, 13:16-18; '093. Patent, 13:28-30. Claim 4 of the '093 Patent and Claim 5 of the '527 Patent use virtually identical language. '093 Patent, 13:56-59, 14:3-4, '527 Patent, 13:50-60. The specification for the Driver Patents states that “if a user wishes to communicate with a number of different resources, the user must install and update the resource driver....” '527 Patent, 1:43-45. The Driver Patents discuss downloading a resource driver to the user’s system if needed: “If the network terminal has not been configured with the appropriate resource driver, the administration server prompts the user’s network terminal to download the necessary resource driver.” '527 Patent, 9:21-36 (emphasis added); see also id. 6:28-30 (“The network terminal may also download the appropriate resource driver from the driver database.”). Unlike software, hardware cannot be “downloaded.” This supports limiting “resource driver” to software.
The Driver Patents’ description of the resource driver’s functionality as translating, not converting, data, also supports BreezyPrint’s proposed construction. The “application communication layer passes the application data received from the application software to the resource driver for translation into a format suitable for processing by the selected network resource.” '527 Patent, 11:14-18 (emphasis added).
PrinterOn argues that this construction is too narrow because it would not allow the claims to cover certain embodiments described in the Canadian Priority Application. PrinterOn also points out that the Priority Application uses the term “convert.” (Docket Entry Nos. 106, at 12; 122, at 7). But, as discussed above in construing “network terminal,” none of the four asserted patents incorporates the Priority Application by reference. Nor do the patents use the “conversion” language. While the Canadian Priority Application is intrinsic evidence to the extent it sheds light on what PrinterOn was not claiming in the four patents at issue here, the Application cannot broaden the claims in the asserted patents beyond their claim language and specification. See Abbott Labs., 566 F.3d at 1289; see also AIA Eng’g Ltd., 657 F.3d at 1279.
The court construes “resource driver” to mean “software for translating data to a format suitable for processing by a network resource device.”
4. “network resource” and “network resource device”
The parties agree that these terms, which appear in three of the four PrinterOn patents, are interchangeable. PrinterOn proposes construing both to mean “a device that offers a service to a network terminal.” (Docket Entry No. 136, at 3). BreezyPrint argues that the terms mean a “device accessible by communication over a network, such as a printer, a facsimile machine, an image server, a file server, an e-mail pager, or an email enabled wireless telephone.” (Id.). The parties’ dispute is over whether these terms are limited to devices that receive communications only over a network, or also over a more direct connection, such as a USB cable attaching a network terminal to a network resource device.
Claims 1 and 5 of the '527 Patent describe a system and method “for providing a network terminal with access to a selected network resource device over a network.” '527 Patent, 12:60-63, 13:36-38 (emphasis added). Claims 1 and 4 of the '093 Patent describe a system and method “for facilitating communication between a network terminal and a selected network resource device over a network.” '093 Patent, 13:1-3, 13:44-46 (emphasis added). The '093 Patent’s claim language also describes “receiving a request from the network terminal for communication access to the selected network resource device.” '093 Patent, 13:41-42. The patents summarize the invention as a “network resource access system,” which “provides network terminals with access to network resources over a network.” '527 Patent, 2:3-5 (emphasis added). This summary is consistent with the ordinary meaning of network resource, which is distinct from a “local” resource. See TechDiotionaRY.Com (defining “local resource” as “[a] peripheral device that is directly connected to a local computer”).
PrinterOn argues that this reading improperly limits the claim term to the illustrative examples in. the specification. But the specification states that “the invention is not limited to use with networked printers (IPP-compliant or otherwise), but instead can be used to provide access to any of a variety of data communication devices, including facsimile machines, image servers and file servers.” '527 Patent, 3:40-46. • This description distinguishes between printers and other networked devices, not between devices that receive communications over a network and those that receive communications over a local connection.
The court construes “network resource” and “network resource device” to mean “a device accessible by communication over a network, such as a printer, a facsimile machine, an image server, a file server, an e-mail pager, or an e-mail enabled wireless telephone.”
5. “configured with”
PrinterOn argues that this term should be construed as “related to via system settings or instructions,” which would encompass interaction between a user device and servers. (Docket Entry No. 136, at 4). BreezyPrint argues that this term must be construed as part of the surrounding claim language in which it appears. That language states: “if the network terminal is configured with the resource driver associated with the driver identifier.” (Id. (emphasis added)). In context, BreezyPrint argues, “configured with” means: “if the network terminal includes in its Random Access Memory or instead implements in electronic hardware the resource driver associated with the driver identifier.” (Id. at 4 (emphasis added)). The parties’ dispute is over whether “configured with” should be read to allow resource drivers to be located outside the network terminal, or instead must be read to require resource drivers to be located within the network terminal.
Claims 1 and 5 of the '527 Patent and Claims 1 and 4 of the '093 Patent use the phrase “associated with” to describe when two system parts are related to one another, similar to PrinterOn’s proposed construction. See '527 Patent, 13:1-3 (“a resource driver associated with the selected network device”); 13:10-12 (“user configuration data associated with the network terminal”); 13:56-57 (“the selected network resource device associated with the device identifier”); '093 Patent, Claims 1 & 4 (same). The claims do not use the words “configured with” in the way Prin-terOn asserts. The claims also use “configured for” or “configured to,” rather than “configured with,” to describe how a given system component is set up to work compatibly with another. See '527 Patent, 13:22-24 (“the authorization server configured for determining the network terminal is authorized to access ... the selected network resource device” (emphasis added)); '093 Patent, 13:61-63 (“the request configured to include a device identifier associated with the selected network resource device” (emphasis added)).
The detailed description of the preferred embodiment states that the driver and its component layers are “preferably implemented as memory objects or a memory module in the RAM 212” of the network terminal, but “may instead be implemented in [the network terminal’s] electronic hardware, if desired.” '527 Patent, 7:6-11 (emphasis added). The specification explains that “[i]f the network terminal no longer has the correct resource driver, the authorization server queries the driver database for the correct resource driver, and prompts the user of the network terminal to download the correct resource driver.” '527 Patent, 10:63-64 (emphasis added). During the patent prosecution, PrinterOn narrowed its claims by adding limitations requiring the communication of translated data and determining whether the network terminal is configured with the appropriate resource driver. In explaining these amendments, PrinterOn stated that “the authorization server configures the driver application on each network terminal for communication with a selected network resource device.” (Docket Entry No. 46, Ex. 8, PO-000121); see also id., Ex. 9, PO-000519 (“A distinguishing feature of the invention ... is a driver application on each network terminal ... the resource driver for translating source data.”).
“Configured with” should be construed as part of the broader claim language in which it appears. The phrase in which “configured with” appears states: “if the network terminal is configured with the resource driver associated with the driver identifier.” The court concludes that “configured with” means “if the network terminal includes in its Random Access Memory or instead implements in electronic hardware the resource driver associated with the driver identifier.” This interpretation is consistent with how one skilled in the art would ordinarily understand “configured with” and with this court’s construction of “resource driver” as software. If a computer technician asked a colleague if her personal computer was “configured with” Windows, she would understand the question to ask whether that software was present on the device.
PrinterOn’s proposed construction — that the network terminal is “related to [the resource driver] via system settings” — is unnecessarily vague, lacks support in the specification, and fails to account for the patents’ teachings that the resource driver is installed as software on the network terminal. PrinterOn’s proposed construction also fails to account for the use of the phrase “communication of translated source data from the network terminal to the network resource device.” '093 Patent. 13:46-47 (emphasis added).
PrinterOn argues that the court’s construction contradicts the Canadian Priority Application, which describes an example of a resource driver configured on the cloud server. (Docket Entry No. 106, at 14). The fact that PrinterOn knew how to describe this embodiment and chose not to do so in applying for the four asserted patents supports BreezyPrint’s proposed construction, not PrinterOn’s.
PrinterOn contends that BreezyPrint’s construction makes Claim 4 of the '527 Patent superfluous. Claim 4 depends on independent Claim 1, which comprises a “resource registry including resource configuration data associated with the selected network resource device,” and an authorization server configured “for determining the network terminal is configured with the resource driver associated with the driver identifier.” '527 Patent, 12:65-66, 13:16-17. Claim 4 adds limitations stating that the authorization server “is configured to establish a secure communications channel with the network terminal” and “to provide a driver application of the network terminal configured with the resource driver with the respective network terminal address over the secure communications channel.” '527 Patent, 13:30-35 (emphasis added). These limitations, which deal with establishing and communicating across a secure communications channel, make Claims 1 and 4 distinct. Claim 4 is not superfluous under the court’s construction.
The court construes “configured with” to mean “includes in its Random Access Memory or implements in electronic hardware.”
6. “translated source data”
PrinterOn argues that no construction of this term is necessary, but that if the court disagrees, it should construe “translated source data” to mean “original data converted to a different form.” (Docket Entry No. 136, at 5). BreezyPrint disagrees, arguing that the term needs construction and that it means “data, from application software, that has been translated.” (Id.). The parties’ dispute is over whether the term should be construed to allow for “content data or control data,” as PrinterOn contends, or limited to application data, as BreezyPrint argues.
The claim language supports Breezy-Print’s proposed use of the word “translated,” but does not resolve the parties’ dispute about whether the type of data translated is “application data” or “content” or “control data.” See, e.g., '093 Patent, 13:4-6; '527 Patent, 12:63-64, 13:3-5, 13:50-54. The specification refers to and discusses “application data” repeatedly, including by describing “passing] the application data received from the application software to the resource driver for translation into a format suitable for processing by the selected network resource.” '527 Patent, 11:15-18. The terms “original data” and “conversion” do not appear. Instead, the terms “translate” and “translation” are repeatedly used in the specification to discuss a binary process under which data is either not translated and the network resource devices cannot use or print it, or translated and ready for the network-resource devices to use and print. The intrinsic evidence is consistent with BreezyPrint’s proposed construction, not PrinterOn’s.
The court construes “translated source data” to mean “data, from application software, that has been translated.”
7. “communication of translated source data”
PrinterOn contends that this term means “transmission of translated source data within the communication network.” (Docket Entry No. 136, at 6). BreezyPrint argues that it means “direct communication of translated source data not over a public network.” (Id,.). The parties’ dispute is over whether the Driver Patents require the data translation to occur within the network terminal, as BreezyPrint contends, or permit data translation to occur at points along the path between the network terminal and the printing device, as PrinterOn argues. The court concludes that this dispute is best resolved by construing “communication of translated source data” as it appears in the next disputed term, “for communication of translated source data from the network terminal to the network resource.” There is no need to construe “communication of translated source data” in isolation.
8. “for communication of translated source data from, the network terminal to the network resource”
PrinterOn asks this court to construe “from” to mean “between” — that is, “communication of translated source data between the network terminal [and] the network resource.” (Docket Entry No. 136, at 6). BreezyPrint argues against PrinterOn’s construction as inconsistent with the ordinary meaning of “from” and impermissible in light of PrinterOn’s statements about this claim during patent prosecution. (Docket Entry No. 57, at 15-16).
PrinterOn’s construction would allow “a communication of an item from A to C” to include having an unfinished version of an item start at A, be finished at B, and be communicated from B to C in finished form. BreezyPrint’s construction would require that “a communication of an item from A to C” begin at A with the finished item. PrinterOn’s construction does not require that fully translated data begin at a network terminal, so long as the data is translated as it is communicated between the network terminal and the network resource, or printing device. BreezyPrint’s construction requires that the data be translated on the network terminal before the data is communicated from the network terminal to the network resource.
The court rejects PrinterOn’s proposal to construe “from” to mean “between” so as to permit the data translation to occur after the network terminal has begun to communicate the data to the network resource. Instead, “from” and “to” should be construed as describing the beginning and end points, not all the points fin between. Translated data communicated “from” the network terminal must start at the network terminal. PrinterOn’s proposed construction is inconsistent with the ordinary meaning of “from” and “to,” meaning starting at a beginning point and ending at another point.
PrinterOn’s proposed construction is also inconsistent with the claim language. Claims 1 and 4 of the '093 Patent use the word “from” in a way that is consistent with the beginning points. These claims use the word “between” in a context that is consistent “any point along the way” that separates A and B. Compare '093 Patent, 13:1-5 (“facilitating communication between a network terminal and a selected resource device”) with id. (“communication of translated source data from the network terminal”). The claim language also describes “translated” data, not data for later translation. See '527 Patent, 12:63, 13:2-3, 13: 53-54; '093 Patent, 13:3-5, 13:15-16.
The court construes “from” and “to” as requiring that the communication of translated source data start at the network terminal.
9. “for facilitating communication between a network terminal and a selected network resource device over a network for communication of translated source data from the network terminal to the network resource device”
PrinterOn argues this claim language should be construed in accordance with court’s construction of the constituent terms. BreezyPrint argues that only the “communication of translated source data” portion of this term should be separately construed. There is no need to construe this phrase separately from the constituent terms already construed.
B. The Disputed Claim Terms in the Password Patents (the '188 and '293 Patents)
The '188 Patent has three independent claims. Two are system claims and one is a method claim. The '293 Patent has two independent claims, one system and one method. All five independent claims in the Password Patents require receiving an “authorization password” “in response to” a “poll request.” Each Password Patent includes an additional, but distinct, limitation. The three independent claims of the '188 Patent require “communicating the authorization password to a destination address,” and the two independent claims of the '293 Patent require “decompression] to extract [the] authorization password.” See '188 Patent, 13:7, 35, 14:37, '293, Patent, 12:43; 14:1.
1. “authorization password”
PrinterOn contends that this term means “an identifier that allows, provides, facilitates, or controls access to a network resource or network printing device.” (Docket Entry No. 48, at 9-10). Breezy-Print asks the court to construe this term to mean “an identifier that determines whether a request to access a resource will be allowed.” (Docket Entry No. 37, at 20).
The Password Patents describe transmitting application data “if the received authorization password is valid.” '293 Patent, 11:47-49. The patents claim an “authorization password for the network resource.” '293 Patent, 12:52-53, 14:9-10; see also '188 Patent, 13:21-22, 13:50-51; 14:5152. The authorization password is what provides or controls “access to the network resource located behind the firewall.” '293 Patent, 12:54-55,14:9-10; '188 Patent, 13:30-31, 13:54-55; 14:54-55. As the detailed description of the preferred embodiment states, the identified network terminals “must provide [the authorization password] in order to access the network resource.” '293 Patent, 4:66-5:2 (emphasis added). This involves more than using the password for “facilitating” access. The authorization password itself must be verified before a request to access the network resource is granted. The patent claims describe the password as “facilitating] access to the network resource,” but the network resource itself must be “configured for authorized access.” '293 Patent, 13:58-60 & 16:7-9 (emphasis added); see also '188 Patent, 13:30-31 (“the authorization password configured for controlling access to the print data”), 13:9-11 (“the data package configured for authorized data processing by the network printing device”), 13:36-37 (same). This claim language shows that an “authorization password” is an identifier that does more than facilitate access, as PrinterOn proposes. Without a valid authorization password, there is no access.
BreezyPrint’s narrower construction is also consistent with the ordinary meaning of an authorization password as requiring verification before access is allowed. See Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1314 (“In some cases the ordinary meaning of claim language as understood by a person of skill in the art may be readily apparent, even to lay judges, and claim construction in such cases involves little more than the application of the widely accepted meaning of commonly understood words.”). To use an analogy, an authorization password is more like a passport than a plane ticket. A traveler flying home from abroad has both. The ticket “facilitates” the traveler’s access to the home country by allowing the traveler to arrive there. But the traveler may not enter — access—the home country without a passport recognized as identifying the traveler and authorizing entry. Without an authorization password, data could not successfully be released from the printer in PrinterOn’s system. It is the password that controls access.
The prosecution history supports this construction. After the PTO rejected PrinterOn’s first applications for the two Password Patents, which did not require either polling or an authorization password, PrinterOn added the following requirements: receiving an authorization password in response to a poll request (both Password Patents); communicating that password to a destination address (the '188 Patent); and decompression to extract the authorization password (the '293 Patent). (Docket Entry No. 40-3, at 58-81; 40-7, at 11-19; 40-4, at 34-35).
PrinterOn’s construction of an authorization password as an identifier that “facilitates” access is also inconsistent with the presumption that different claim terms have different meanings. PrinterOn’s proposed construction for a “destination address” is an “identifier of a print server or a printing device.” Under PrinterOn’s construction, a “destination address” would also be an “authorization password” because it is an “identifier that facilitates access.” All authorization passwords facilitate access. But as the destination address example illustrates, not all identifiers that facilitate access are authorization passwords.
BreezyPrint’s narrower construction is a more accurate description of what an authorization pas