Full opinion text
REDACTED OPINION SWEET, District Judge. There are several motions currently pending in this action between plaintiffs Paul Spinelli, Scott Boehm, Paul Jasienski, George Newman Lowrance, David Stluka,' David Drapkin, and Thomas E. Witte (“Plaintiffs”) and defendants National Football League (“NFL”), NFL Properties, LLC, (“NFLP”), NFL Ventures, L.P., NFL Productions, LLC, NFL Enterprises, LLC (together with NFL, NFLP, NFL Ventures, L.P., and NFL Productions, “NFL Entities”), Arizona Cardinals Holdings, Inc., Atlanta Falcons Football Club LLC, Baltimore Ravens Limited Partnership, Buffalo Bills, Inc., Panthers Football LLC, Chicago Bears Football Club, Inc., Cincinnati Bengals, Inc., Cleveland Browns LLC, Dallas Cowboys Football Club, Denver Broncos Football Club, Detroit Lions, Inc., Green Bay Packers, Inc., Houston NFL Holdings LP, Indianapolis Colts, Inc., Jacksonville Jaguars Ltd., Kansas City Chiefs Football Club, Inc., Miami Dolphins, Ltd., Minnesota Vikings Football Club LLC, New England Patriots, LP, New Orleans Louisiana Saints, LLC, New York Football Giants, Inc., New York Jets Football Club, Inc., Oakland Raiders LP, Philadelphia Eagles Football Club, Inc., Pittsburgh Steelers Sports, Inc., San Diego Chargers Football Co., San Francisco Forty Niners Ltd., Football Northwest LLC, The Rams Football Co. LLC, Buccaneers Limited Partnership, Tennessee Football, Inc., and Washington Football Inc. (Arizona Cardinal Holdings, Inc. through Washington Football Inc., “NFL Clubs,” and together with NFL Entities, “NFL Defendants”), Replay Photos, LLC (“Replay”), Getty Images (US), Inc. (“Getty”), and Associated Press (“AP,” together -with NFL Defendants, Replay, and Getty, “Defendants”). NFL Defendants, Replay and AP have moved to dismiss the amended complaint (the “AC”). Getty has moved to dismiss the AC and compel arbitration, or stay the action as to Getty. For the reasons set forth below, NFL Defendants’, Replays’, and AP’s motions to dismiss, and Getty’s motion to compel arbitration, are granted. Prior Proceedings Plaintiffs filed their initial complaint (“Complaint”) against the NFL Entities, Replay, Getty, and AP on October 21, 2013. On December 16, 2013, Getty moved to dismiss or, in the alternative, to stay the action as against it based on arbitration clauses contained within contracts at issue in this dispute. (See Dkt. Nos. 21, 22, 24.) At the same time, Getty filed a demand for arbitration with the American Arbitration Association (“AAA”). (See Bloom Decl. Ex. A.) On December 18, 2013, AP and the NFL Entities, and on December 26, 2013, Replay filed motions to dismiss the complaint. On February 12, 2014, in lieu of opposing Defendants’ motions to dismiss, Plaintiffs filed the AC against all currently named Defendants. (See Dkt. No. 42.) On March 31, 2014, Defendants renewed their motions to dismiss. (Dkt. No. 51.) Getty and Plaintiffs have agreed to hold the arbitration proceeding in abeyance pending resolution of Getty’s motion to compel arbitration. (See Bloom Decl. Ex. B.) The instant motions were heard and marked fully submitted on October 1, 2014. Subsequently, and while the motions to dismiss have been pending, motions to stay discovery were filed by Defendants and granted by the Court. (See Dkt. Nos. 99, 100.) Facts The following facts are taken from the Plaintiffs AC, which are taken to be true for the purposes of disposing of the instant motions, and the terms of certain agreements either directly referenced by Plaintiffs or integral to the AC. Plaintiffs are seven “professional photographers who make their living taking and licensing sports-related photographs, including but not limited to content related to [NFL] practices, games, functions, and other events.” (AC ¶ 1.) Plaintiffs, collectively, have photographed “hundreds, if not thousands” of NFL and NFL Club games, practices and events, and have taken “literally hundreds of thousands of NFL-related photographs.” (AC ¶ 31.) Among these photographs, Plaintiffs allege there are “tens of thousands of photos ... that do[ ] not include any marks, logos, or other intellectual property owned by the NFL Entities.” (AC ¶¶ 34-35.) The NFL has collectively licensed and protected NFL and NFL Club trademarks, including names, nicknames, logos, colors, designs, slogans, symbols, and other identifying indicia for decades. (See AC ¶¶ 44-45; NFL Def.’s Mot. 7) [Redacted] NFL and NFL Clubs, [Redacted] provided NFL with exclusive licensing rights for certain business operations [Redacted] Prior to 2004, NFL maintained an in-house department that directly licensed the rights to NFL-related photographs. (AC ¶¶ 44-46.) For many years, Plaintiffs obtained media credentials — either through their agents, Getty and AP, or directly from the NFL Clubs via the NFL’s in-house department, NFL Photos, to photograph events for the NFL and individual NFL Clubs. (AC ¶ 30.) In July 2004, NFL — through NFLP— entered into a five-year licensing agreement with Getty (“Getty Agreement”), whereby Getty acquired rights to license photographs of NFL content to: (i) NFL business partners (including sponsors and licensees of the NFL, and other NFL-approved companies) for commercial uses; and (ii) media organizations for editorial uses. (Getty Agreement [Redacted]; see also AC ¶ 46.) The rights granted under the Getty Agreement covered a “worldwide” territory (Getty Agreement [Redacted] ), and became exclusive in 2007 when Getty acquired Wirelmage, another stock photography agency. (AC ¶ 46.) Among the images covered by the Getty Agreement were photographs in which Getty owned the copyrights (Getty Agreement [Redacted]), and photographs from independent contributors such as Plaintiffs (“Contributor Photographs”), [Redacted] (Getty Agreement [Redacted]) [Redacted], Getty had entered into agreements with each of the Plaintiffs (“Getty Contributor Agreements”), pursuant to which Plaintiffs became contributing photographers for Getty, and Getty received the right to license Plaintiffs’ works, including NFL photographs. (AC ¶ 47.) The Getty Agreement authorized “NFL Entities” — defined to include the NFL (and its affiliates, subsidiaries, and successors in interest), and NFL Clubs (Getty Agreement [Redacted]) — to make royalty-free use of photographs owned by Getty for a wide variety of uses, including: [Redacted] (Id.) The right of NFL Entities to make such uses extended to Contributor Photographs, [Redacted] (Getty Agreement [Redacted] ) Plaintiffs each submitted images to Getty of NFL games and other NFL-related matters pursuant to the Getty Contributor Agreements. (AC ¶ 47.) Plaintiffs allege that “[d]espite the fundamental obligations to license Plaintiffs’ works ... Getty ... granted the NFL nearly unfettered access to Plaintiffs’ photo collections and, either expressly or by inaction, allowed the NFL to make free or ‘complimentary’ use of Plaintiffs’ copyrights photos.” (AC ¶ 72.) Plaintiffs further allege that Getty “lacked authority to grant such unfettered usage rights or complimentary and indefinite use licenses to the NFL without obtaining separate and express permission from Plaintiffs for each such ‘complimentary’ license or use,” (AC ¶ 77) and that the Getty Contributor Agreements “precluded Getty ... from granting usage rights at no cost and Getty[’s] ... own standard terms and conditions for usage licenses pertaining to its Rights Managed collections photos prohibited such use.” (AC ¶ 78.) ] The Getty Agreement expired on March 31, 2009. (Getty Agreement [Redacted]) In 2009, “[NFLP] entertained bids for exclusive commercial licensing rights for NFL and NFL Club photos and eventually selected AP to be the sole commercial licensor [of] such photographs.” (AC ¶¶ 26, 54.) Under the resulting agreement (the “First AP Agreement”), AP became the NFLP’s exclusive agent and distributor for licensing commercial uses of images of NFL content to NFL business partners, and a nonexclusive agent for licensing editorial uses of those images. (First AP Agreement [Redacted].) As a direct consequence of the switch to AP, Plaintiffs allege they lost their ability to sell higher-value commercial licenses (as opposed to editorial licenses) through Getty and thus were forced to transition their entire NFL collections to AP if they wished to continue offering commercial licenses for their NFL content. (AC ¶ 55.) Plaintiffs also allege that because they owned the copyrights and licenses for other non-NFL sports-related content, and Getty had exclusive licensing deals and/or significant licensing partnerships with other sports entities, such as Major League Baseball and National Collegiate Athletic Association, they were presented with an “impossible choice.” (AC ¶¶ 56, 58.) Getty, Plaintiffs allege, threatened to remove Plaintiffs’ other sports content from its distribution networks and/or terminate its relationship with Plaintiffs entirely if they did not agree to continue licensing their NFL content through Getty even after its commercial licensing deal with the NFL expired, and made it clear that it would not “welcome back” any contributors who moved their NFL content to AP should Getty ever regain the rights to license NFL content in the future. (AC ¶ 57.) Because certain Plaintiffs had significant non-NFL content at Getty, Getty’s position forced Plaintiffs to choose between losing commercial licensing opportunities for their NFL content by not going to AP or giving up commercial licensing opportunities for their non-NFL content by leaving Getty. (AC ¶ 58.) Five of the Plaintiffs, Jasienski, Stluka, •Spinelli, Witte, and Drapkin, ended their relationships with Getty (AC ¶ 62), entered into license agreements with AP (“AP Contributor Agreements”), and transferred their existing images of NFL content from Getty to the AP photo library. (AC ¶ 59.) Subsequently, Plaintiffs Low-rance and Boehm entered into license agreements with AP and moved their NFL images from Getty to AP. (AC ¶ 62.) As a result of terminating their relationships with Getty, Plaintiffs allege that they have lost significant revenue due to the loss of licensing opportunities for their non-NFL content. (AC ¶ 63.) The First AP Agreement encompassed the use and licensing of images in which AP owned copyrights (First AP Agreement [Redacted]), as well as Contributor Photographs [Redacted] (First AP Agreement [Redacted]). The First AP Agreement covered a “worldwide” territory (First AP Agreement [Redacted]), and authorized the NFL (and its affiliates, subsidiaries, and successors) and NFL Clubs to make a wide range of editorial, charitable, afid marketing uses of photographs owned by AP on a royalty-free basis. (First AP Agreement [Redacted]) When the First AP Agreement expired, “[NFLP] again entertained bids for the exclusive commercial licensing rights for NFL and NFL Club photos and eventually renewed its agreement with AP.” (AC ¶ 27.) AP and the NFL thus entered into a new license agreement, with a term from April 1, 2012 through March 31, 2015 (the “Second AP Agreement”). (Second AP Agreement [Redacted]) The Second AP Agreement, while not identical to the First AP Agreement, states that AP is: (i) the “exclusive” and “worldwide agent and distributor” for licensing commercial uses of NFL photographs to NFL business partners (Second AP Agreement [Redacted]); and (ii) a non-exclusive worldwide agent and distributor for licensing editorial uses. (Second AP Agreement [Redacted].) The Second AP Agreement permits “NFL Entities,” i.e., NFL (and its affiliates, subsidiaries, and successors) and the NFL Clubs, to make royalty-free use of AP-owned and Contributor Photographs for a wide range of editorial, charitable, and marketing uses, including: [Redacted] (Second AP Agreement [Redacted].) The Second AP Agreement expressly authorizes the foregoing uses of photographs by the NFL and NFL Clubs from April 1, 2009 through the end of the agreement’s term. (Id.) Plaintiffs allege that at one time they contacted the NFL to “demand that it cease and desist using their copyrighted works without permission and without paying the requisite licensing fees.” (AC ¶ 83.) The NFL responded that the First AP Agreement included an express license that allowed complimentary use of any NFL-related photos licensed by AP. (Id.) Plaintiffs then contacted AP regarding the NFL’s response and contend that AP denied the NFL’s claim and “assured Plaintiffs that not only did the [First AP Agreement] ... not include such a license, but the AP was currently renegotiating its agreement with the NFL to address the widespread misuse of photos by the NFL.” (AC ¶ 84.) Subsequently, AP granted NFL a license that was “Royalty Free” and “retroactive” to 2009, which Plaintiffs contend was granted due to “threats and coercive pressure by the NFL, including the threat of moving its exclusive license back to Getty ..., which also had submitted a bid to reacquire the NFL’s business.” (AC ¶ 86.) Plaintiffs allege that despite repeated cease and desist demands, the NFL Defendants continue to use thousands of Plaintiffs’ photographic works to promote the NFL’s brand, sell NFL-related products, and “enhance the NFL’s image” in order to generate revenue both as an independent entity and on behalf of the NFL Clubs. (AC ¶ 98.) To that end, Plaintiffs allege that NFL permits visitors to NFL. com to access large resolution copies of Plaintiffs’ photos “without appropriate copyright management information or protection against illegal copying,” as well as “eneourage[] visitor to ‘tweet’ on Twitter.com or ‘share’ on Facebook.com copies of Plaintiffs’ works.” (AC ¶ 111.) Plaintiffs allege that if it were not for “the NFL’s illegal efforts to control the commercial licensing market for NFL-related stock photos, Plaintiffs’ licensing agents would not have been forced to purportedly grant the NFL ‘complimentary’ usage of Plaintiffs’ photos ... [and], [instead ..., Plaintiffs’ agents could have negotiated licensing agreements with individual NFL [Clubs] on better terms and/or Plaintiffs could have negotiated agreements with other licensing agents that precluded such unfair and inequitable terms.” (AC ¶ 148.) Effective as of April 1, 2012, AP entered into an “NFL Photo Store Services and License Agreement” with Replay (“Replay Agreement”), under which Replay agreed to operate the “NFL Photo Store” for AP and fulfill customer orders. (Replay Agreement; AC ¶ 114 (“AP and Replay ... also sell copies of photographs directly to consumers through the NFL Photo Store.”).) Plaintiffs allege that Replay is an online retailer that specializes in selling sports-related photographs, and that owns and operates the website located at www. replayphotos.com. (AC ¶ 19.) Plaintiffs contend that Replay “infringed Plaintiffs’ copyrights by copying, publishing, displaying, exporting, and otherwise using and exploiting photographic works to which Plaintiffs own all copyrights without a valid license.” (AC ¶ 166.) Plaintiffs further allege that AP requested that Plaintiffs agree to amendments in their contributor agreements to allow such sales and Plaintiffs expressly rejected AP’s request. (AC ¶ 116.) The AC sets forth seven counts: Count I alleges violations of the Sherman Act against NFL Defendants, Getty, and AP for conspiring to “restrain trade” through exclusive licensing agreements (AC ¶¶ 122-59); Count II alleges copyright infringement against all Defendants (AC ¶¶ 160-200); Counts III through VI allege vicarious copyright infringement, contributory copyright infringement, breach of contract, and breach of fiduciary duties against Getty and AP (AC ¶¶ 201-46); and Count VII alleges unjust enrichment against all Defendants (AC ¶¶ 24755). The Contributor Agreements Central to the success of Plaintiffs’ claims are the Getty Contributor Agreements and the AP Contributor Agreements. As such, the relevant terms of each will be briefly outlined below. 1. The Getty Contributor Agreements Each of the Getty Contributor Agreements requires arbitration of any disputes arising in connection with the agreements. Specifically, Section 9.5 of the Lowrance Agreement provides that “[a]ny dispute arising out of or in connection with the Agreement shall be finally settled under the Commercial Rules of the [AAA] or International Chamber of Commerce (‘ICC’).... ” (Lowrance Getty Contributor Agreement § 9.5.) In virtually identical language, Section 11.8 of the Getty Images Standard Terms and Conditions, which is incorporated into the remaining six Getty Contributor Agreements, provides that “[a]ny dispute arising out of or in connection with the Brand Agreement shall be finally settled under the Commercial Rules of the [AAA] or [ICC].... ” (See Lindquist Decl. Exs. B-G.) 2, The AP Contributor Agreements a. The Relationship Between the Par- ■ ties The AP Contributor Agreements are all governed by New York law. (AP Contributor Agreements § 10.) Each of the Plaintiffs agrees to “provide contributing photography services to AP.” (Id. § 1 or § 1.1.) AP agrees to use commercially reasonable efforts to assign each Plaintiff to cover NFL events and to obtain NFL credentials for that photographer to permit him to take photographs at the NFL events. (Id., §§ 2 or 2.22.3). Each Plaintiff agrees to make a selection of photos from the event available to AP, and AP agrees to review these photos and reasonably limit the rejection of tendered photos. (Id., §§ 3 or 3.1-3.4). While each Plaintiff retains copyright in his photos, he provides a broad copyright license to AP in all of his photos that are not rejected by AP. (AP Contributor Agreements, § 4 or § 4.2). In exchange for the license, AP agrees to pay royalties to each Plaintiff for certain sublicenses that AP grants to third parties. (Id., §§ 5.1-5.2). Either AP or the Plaintiff is entitled to terminate an AP Contributor Agreement, with or without cause, upon thirty days written notice. (Id., §§ 7 or 7.1). Obligations under the license section of the AP Contributor Agreements survive termination. (Id.) In the AP Contributor Agreements, each Plaintiff agrees that he is an independent contractor to AP and that he has no agency relationship with AP: Photographer shall be acting as an independent contractor and shall not represent himself or herself as an employee of AP, but only as an independent contractor.... Neither the making of this Agreement nor the performance of its provisions shall be construed to constitute either Party an agent, partner, joint venture, employee or legal representative of the other Party. (AP Contributor Agreements, § 1 or § 1.3.) b. The License Provisions Section 4 of eách AP Contributor Agreement, with slight variation, contains a broad license to AP of the photographer’s rights in his photos, which grants AP the right to copy, disseminate and otherwise use those photos, and permits AP to transfer and sublicense all these rights to “other entities”: Photographer hereby provides to AP a perpetual, irrevocable, transferable, worldwide, right and license to reproduce, edit, translate the caption of, prepare derivative works of, publicly perform, publicly display, load into computer memory, cache, store and otherwise use the Event Photos and to transfer or sublicense these rights to other entities. With respect to NFL Event Photos taken at NFL Events for which AP directly or indirectly arranges for Photographer to obtain a credential, the foregoing rights shall be exclusive for so long as the NFL (or one of its affiliates) confers to AP (or one of its affiliates) the exclusive rights to operate as an NFL commercial use licensing agent, and nonexclusive thereafter. With respect to all other Event Photos, the foregoing rights shall be nonexclusive. AP shall present the Event Photos through AP’s image database currently known as “AP Images” and other image databases at AP’s discretion. (Boehm and Drapkin AP Contributor Agreements § 4.2.) Subject to Section 7.1, Photographer hereby provides to AP a perpetual, irrevocable, transferable, worldwide, right and license to reproduce, edit, translate the caption of, prepare derivative works of, publicly perform, publicly display, load into computer memory, cache, store and otherwise use the Final Photos and to transfer or sublicense these rights to other entities. With respect to NFL Event Photos taken at NFL Events for which AP directly or indirectly arranges for Photographer to obtain a credential, the foregoing rights shall be exclusive for so long as the NFL (or one of its affiliates) confers to AP (or one of its affiliates) the exclusive rights to operate as an NFL commercial use licensing agent, and non-exclusive thereafter. With respect to all other Event Photos and the Archival Event Photos, the foregoing rights shall be non-exclusive. AP shall present the Final Photos through AP’s image database currently known as “AP Images” (the “AP Images Platform”) and other image databases at AP’s discretion. (Spinelli, Stluka, Witte and Jasienski AP Contributor Agreements § 4.2.) Photographer hereby provides to AP a non-exclusive, transferable, perpetual, irrevocable, worldwide right and license to reproduce, edit, translate the caption of, prepare derivative works of, publicly perform, publicly display, load into computer memory, cache, store and otherwise use the Event Photos and to transfer or sublicense these rights to other entities. AP shall present the Final Photos through AP’s image database currently known as “AP Images” and other image databases at AP’s discretion. (Lowrance AP Contributor Agreement § 4.2) In all but Lowrance’s AP Contributor Agreement, the photographer has granted AP an exclusive license for NFL Event Photos taken. by him at an NFL event where AP directly or indirectly arranges for the photographer to be credentialed for the event. The license is to be exclusive for the period of time that AP remains the NFL’s exclusive licensing agent, and is non-exclusive thereafter. The Low-rance AP Contributor Agreement grants AP the same broad rights as the other AP Contributor Agreements, but on a non-exclusive basis. As with the other AP Contributor Agreements, the Lowrance Contributor Agreement expressly authorizes AP to transfer and sublicense to other entities to the full extent of AP’s own license rights. c. The Royalty Provisions Each of the AP Contributor Agreements sets forth AP’s agreement to pay royalties to the contributor, “[i]n exchange for the license granted in Section 4.” The Boehm, Drapkin, and Lowrance Agreements require AP to pay the photographer a royalty equal to a defined percentage of “Net Revenue” on “qualifying Event Photo Sales.” “Event Photo Sales” are defined as “mean[ing] only the a la carte sale of licenses for Event Photos through AP’s online database service, currently known as ‘AP Images.’ ” “A la carte sales” are further defined as “the sale of licenses for individual photos for which a per-image price is established.” “Net Revenue” is defined as “all cash actually collected by AP from the sale of copies of a particular Event Photo, less sales commission.” The AP Contributor Agreements also recognize that AP may offer the Event Photos for a la carte sale at a “bulk rate” which may include the photographs of photographers other than the contributor. In such a case, to determine royalties, AP is to apportion the cash received on an equal pro-rata basis across all photos included in the a la carte bulk rate. (AP Contributor Agreements § 5.1). Section 5.1 of the Jasienski, Spinelli, Stluka and Witte AP Contributor Agreements provide that upon a “qualifying Event Photo Sale,” AP will provide the contributor with the greater of royalties calculated on the revenue-share basis described in the above paragraph, and “a royalty equal [to] twenty-five dollars ($25.00) per Final Photo.” However, these AP Contributor Agreements also provide that these minimum royalties are only due on “qualifying Event Photo Sales,” which means “the a la carte sale of licenses for Event Photos.” (Id.) The AP Contributor Agreements do not require AP to license the contributors’ photographs to third parties only through a “sale” that would generate revenue and therefore royalties. Nothing in the AP Contributor Agreements requires AP to issue only royalty-bearing sublicenses. Additionally there is nothing in the AP Contributor Agreements that compels AP to limit the uses that NFL (or any other sublicensed third party) makes of a subli-censed photo, or to “track and manage” such sublicensee uses. (Cf AC ¶¶ 69-72). Applicable Standard On a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), all factual allegations in the complaint are accepted as true, and all infer-. enees are drawn in favor of the pleader. Mills v. Polar Molecular Corp., 12 F.3d 1170, 1174 (2d Cir.1993). However, a complaint must contain “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’ ” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 663, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007)). A claim is facially plausible when “the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 663, 129 S.Ct. 1937 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556, 127 S.Ct. 1955). In other words, the factual allegations must “possess enough heft to show that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557, 127 S.Ct. 1955 (internal quotation marks omitted). When determining whether parties have agreed to arbitrate a dispute, courts cpnsider two questions: (1) whether a valid agreement to arbitrate under the contract in question exists and (2) whether the particular dispute in question falls within the scope of that arbitration agreement. See Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Swiss Reins. Am. Corp., 246 F.3d 219, 226 (2d Cir.2001) (quoting Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Belco Petrol. Corp., 88 F.3d 129, 135 (2d Cir.1996)). I. The Motion To Compel Arbitration Of Plaintiffs’ Claims Against Getty Is Granted Arbitration is “strictly a matter of contract.” Ross v. Am. Express Co., 478 F.3d 96, 99 (2d Cir.2007) (citing Thomson-CSF, S.A. v. Am. Arbitration Ass’n, 64 F.3d 773, 779 (2d Cir.1995)). The Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) provides that “an agreement in writing to submit to arbitration an existing controversy ... shall be valid, irrevocable and enforceable....” 9 U.S.C. § 2. The FAA “requires the federal courts to enforce arbitration agreements, reflecting Congress’ recognition that arbitration is to be encouraged as a means of reducing the costs and delays associated with litigation.” Vera v. Saks & Co., 335 F.3d 109, 116 (2d Cir.2003) (citation omitted); see also Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., - U.S. -, 133 S.Ct. 2304, 2309, 186 L.Ed.2d 417 (2013) (noting that courts “must ‘rigorously enforce’ arbitration agreements according to their terms”) (citation omitted). The Second Circuit has “often and emphatically applied” the strong federal policy in favor of arbitration. Arciniaga v. Gen. Motors Corp., 460 F.3d 231, 234 (2d Cir.2006). Because of this policy favoring arbitration, “the burden of persuasion falls on the party attempting to escape an arbitration agreement, not the one attempting to enforce it.” Marubeni Am. Corp. v. M/V “OHFU” her Engines, No. 94 CIV. 626KSAS), 1996 WL 84485, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 27, 1996). When the existence of an arbitration agreement is undisputed, “doubts as to whether a claim falls within the scope of that agreement should be resolved in favor of arbitrability.” ACE Capital Re Overseas Ltd. v. Cent. United Life Ins. Co., 307 F.3d 24, 29 (2d Cir.2002) (citing Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24-25, 103 S.Ct. 927, 74 L.Ed.2d 765 (1983)). Courts in this Circuit have held that, where a valid arbitration clause has been found to exist, they must abstain from adjudicating plaintiffs’ claims. See, e.g., Robinson Brog Leinwand Greene Genovese & Gluck P.C. v. John M. O’Quinn & Assoc., LLP, 523 Fed.Appx. 761, 764 (2d Cir.2013). The Second Circuit has directed courts to classify arbitration clauses as either broad or narrow. JLM Indus., Inc. v. Stolt-Nielsen SA 387 F.3d 163, 172 (2d Cir.2004) (quoting Louis Dreyfus Negoce S.A. v. Blystad Shipping & Trading Inc., 252 F.3d 218, 224 (2d Cir.2001)). Clauses requiring arbitration of disputes “arising out of or in connection with” underlying contracts are considered “broad” arbitration clauses. See, e.g., Googla Home Decor LLC v. Uzkiy, No. 09-CV-1049 (CPSXRML), 2009 WL 2922845, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 8, 2009) (finding clause requiring arbitration of “[a]ny dispute, controversy, or claim arising out of or in connection with this Agreement” to be broad). Indeed, an arbitration clause covering “any claim or controversy arising out of or relating to” an agreement is “the paradigm of a broad clause,” Collins & Aikman Prods. Co. v. Bldg. Sys., Inc., 58 F.3d 16, 20 (2d Cir.1995) (citation omitted) — broader than one covering all claims and disputes “arising under th[e] contract.” Genesco, Inc. v. T. Kakiuchi & Co., Ltd., 815 F.2d 840, 845, 848 (2d Cir.1987). A “presumption of arbitrability” arises from contracts containing broad arbitration clauses. ACE Capital, 307 F.3d at 34. In particular, a broad arbitration clause is “presumptively applicable to disputes involving matters going beyond the ‘interpretation] or enforce[ment of] particular provisions’ of the contract which contains the arbitration clause.” JLM, 387 F.3d at 172 (citation omitted). a. The Arbitration Clauses Are Enforceable Plaintiffs contend that they should not be subject to arbitration because the Getty Contributor Agreements as a whole were procedurally and substantively unconscionable. (See Pis.’ Opp’n to Getty Mot. 11-18.) The United States Supreme Court has, however, held that “a challenge to the validity of the contract as a whole, and not specifically to the arbitration clause, must go to the arbitrator.” Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440, 448-49, 126 S.Ct. 1204, 163 L.Ed.2d 1038 (2006); see also Preston v. Ferrer, 552 U.S. 346, 128 S.Ct. 978, 169 L.Ed.2d 917 (2008) (holding that a dispute concerning the legality of a contract must be resolved by an arbitrator since respondent sought invalidation of the contract as a whole, and made no discrete challenge to the validity of the arbitration clause); Cole v. Pearson Educ., Inc., No. 10 Civ. 7523(JFK)(RLE), 2011 WL 4483760, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 28, 2011) (“[a]n arbitration clause is not rendered invalid by a challenge to the contract as a whole”) (citing Rent-A-Center, West, Inc. v. Jackson, 561 U.S. 63, 71, 130 S.Ct. 2772, 177 L.Ed.2d 403 (2010) (holding that “basis of challenge [need] to be directed specifically to the agreement to arbitrate before the court will intervene”)). Because Plaintiffs do not challenge the validity of the arbitration provision specifically, their arguments regarding the unenforceability of the arbitration provisions fail. b. Breach Of Contract Claims Must Be Arbitrated Plaintiffs’ breach of contract claims are arbitrable. The allegation that Getty failed to honor its obligations under the Getty Contributor Agreements (see AC ¶¶ 219-20, 223-26) obviously “aris[es] out of or in connection with” the Getty Contributor Agreements. (See Lindquist Decl. Exs. A § 9.5, B-G § 11.8); World GTL Inc. v. Petroleum Co. of Trinidad & Tobago Ltd., No. 10 Civ. 1542(LMM), 2010 WL 3291673, at *3-4 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 11, 2010) (holding that breach of contract claims were covered by broad arbitration clause). As stated above, Plaintiffs have not argued that the arbitration clauses themselves are unenforceable. Accordingly, the breach of contract claims must be arbitrated. c.Breach Of Fiduciary Duties Claims Must Be Arbitrated The breach of fiduciary duties claims also clearly arise out of and in connection with the Getty Contributor Agreements. Claimed breaches of fiduciary duty arising out of agreements with broad arbitration clauses are subject to arbitration. See, e.g., Syncora Guar. Inc. v. HSBC Mexico, S.A., 861 F.Supp.2d 252, 259 (S.D.N.Y.2012) (“This claim alleges that HSBC, as [t]rustee, owes Syncora a fiduciary duty under the Trust Agreement, and that HSBC breached its fiduciary duty owed to Syncora, and falls within the plain meaning of [a]ny controversy] arising pursuant to [the] Trust Agreement” (quotation marks and internal citations omitted) (alterations in original)). Plaintiffs base their allegation of fiduciary duties owed to them by Getty on the Getty Contributor Agreements. (See AC ¶¶ 229-80 (“Plaintiffs’ contributor agreements with Getty Images expressly provided that Plaintiffs were permitted to select the licensing model of their photos at the time of submission. ... Plaintiffs’ contributor agreements with Getty Images expressly provided that Plaintiffs were permitted to specify any other restrictions on the licensing of any photos ... and that Getty Images would honor such restrictions.”).) Moreover, the allegation that Getty held itself out as Plaintiffs’ agent {see AC ¶ 232) squarely implicates the provision in the Getty Contributor Agreements that the contributor “agrees that he/she is an independent contractor” and that the parties’ relationship “is one of contract only and is not one of partnership, employment, joint venture, principal-agent or any other legal identity.” (Getty Contributor Agreements §§ 9.3 (Lowrance), 11.7.) In short, the breach of fiduciary duties claims are encompassed by the arbitration clauses and must be arbitrated. d. Unjust Enrichment Claims Must Be Arbitrated It is well established that unjust enrichment claims fall within the scope of broad arbitration clauses. See, e.g., Grenawalt v. AT & T Mobility, LLC, 937 F.Supp.2d 438, 459 (S.D.N.Y.2013) (compelling arbitration of unjust enrichment claim that cited agreement containing broad arbitration provision as “substantial support”). Plaintiffs’ unjust enrichment claim is predicated on Getty allegedly having “used Plaintiffs’ photos without paying any license fees, royalties, or other compensation to Plaintiffs” pursuant to the Getty Contributor Agreements. (AC ¶ 250.) This claim thus expressly “aris[es] out of or in connection with” the Getty Contributor Agreements and therefore, as in Grenawalt, must be arbitrated. • e. Federal Copyright Infringement Claims Must Be Arbitrated As noted, the FAA establishes a strong federal policy in favor of arbitration, and courts have long considered arbitration to be “presumptively an appropriate and competent forum for federal statutory claims.” MBNA Am. Bank, N.A. v. Hill, 436 F.3d 104, 110 (2d Cir.2006). Statutory claims may be arbitrated “so long as the prospective litigant effectively may vindicate his or her statutory cause of action in the arbitral forum.” Green Tree Fin. Corp.-Ala. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 90, 121 S.Ct. 513, 148 L.Ed.2d 373 (2000) (citation omitted). “The burden is on the party opposing arbitration ... to show that Congress intended to preclude a waiver of judicial remedies for the statutory rights at issue.” Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 227, 107 S.Ct. 2332, 96 L.Ed.2d 185 (1987); see also Green Tree, 531 U.S. at 91-92, 121 S.Ct. 513 (“We have held that the party seeking to avoid arbitration bears the burden of establishing that Congress intended to preclude arbitration of the statutory claims at issue.”). The Supreme Court has set forth a two-step inquiry for determining whether statutory claims arising out of a contract are arbitrable. First, courts must determine “whether the parties’ agreement to arbitrate reached the statutory issues.” Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 628, 105 S.Ct. 3346, 87 L.Ed.2d 444 (1985). Second, courts must consider whether legal constraints external to the parties’ agreement foreclosed the arbitration of those claims — namely, if a party has “made the bargain to arbitrate,” it “should be held to it unless Congress ... has evinced an intention to preclude a waiver of judicial remedies for the statutory rights at issue.” Id.; see also Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 26, 111 S.Ct. 1647, 114 L.Ed.2d 26 (1991) (holding that claims under federal statutes generally are arbitrable so long as the arbitration agreement is broad enough to encompass the statutory claim and Congress has not indicated its intent to prohibit arbitration of the claim). ■ Finally, where Congress has not clearly precluded arbitration, arbitration of a statutory claim will be compelled unless, as noted, the prospective litigant shows that it “cannot effectively vindicate [its] statutory rights in the arbitral forum.” In re Cotton Yarn Antitrust Litig., 505 F.3d 274, 282 (4th Cir.2007); see also Italian Colors, 133 S.Ct. at 2314. Under this test, Plaintiffs cannot avoid arbitration of their copyright infringement or Sherman Act claims. It is well settled that copyright claims asserted in connection with licensing disputes are encompassed by broad arbitration clauses like those contained in the Getty Contributor Agreements. In Kamakazi Music Corp. v. Robbins Music Corp., 684 F.2d 228 (2d Cir.1982), the Second Circuit affirmed that an arbitration clause requiring the parties to arbitrate claims “arising out of, or relating to” their contract covered copyright claims. See id. at 229-31. Similarly, in Cole the arbitration clause at issue required that “[a]ny dispute in connection with this stock picture invoice including its validity, interpretation, performance, or breach shall be arbitrated....” 2011 WL 4483760 at *4 (emphasis added). The court held that the arbitration clause “include[d] disputes arising under the copyright law. Defendant licensed all of the works claimed by the Plaintiff to have been infringed, and any dispute about the publication of the licensed photographs [wa]s a ‘dispute in connection’ with the license agreements ...” and dismissal of the claims was warranted. Id. at *6. The arbitration provisions in the Getty Contributor Agreements are substantially similar to those held in Kamaka-zi and Cole to encompass both contract and related copyright claims. Moreover, Plaintiffs’ copyright claims clearly arise “out of or in connection with” their agreements with Getty, as they are predicated on Getty’s alleged authorization of or failure to prevent the NFL from engaging in uses of Plaintiffs’ images that purportedly fell outside the scope of the Getty Contributor Agreements. (See AC ¶¶ 71-78, 167-71, 203-06, 21215.) In other words, the claimed infringements are defined by the scope of the Getty Contributor Agreements. The copyright claims therefore must be arbitrated. f. Sherman Act Claims Must Be Arbitrated The Supreme Court has made clear that Sherman Act antitrust conspiracy claims are arbitrable. See Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 633-34, 105 S.Ct. 3346; Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 28, 111 S.Ct. 1647 (claims under the Sherman Act “are appropriate for arbitration”); see also In re Cotton Yarn, 505 F.3d at 282 (“We ... have no difficulty concluding that domestic antitrust claims, as a class, are suitable for arbitration.”). Indeed, the Court in Mitsubishi found no “explicit support” in either the Sherman Act or in the FAA for holding Sherman Act claims to be nonarbitrable. 473 U.S. at 628-29, 105 S.Ct. 3346. The Second Circuit has held that if the allegations underlying claims “touch matters covered by the parties’ contracts,” those claims must be arbitrated “whatever the legal labels attached to them.” JLM, 387 F.3d at 172 (emphasis added). Conspiracy allegations may “touch matters” covered by a contract even if the alleged conspiracy includes non-parties to the contract or involves alleged wrongdoing that occurred before or after the formation of the contract. Alghanim v. Alghanim, 828 F.Supp.2d 636, 655-56 (S.D.N.Y.2011) (“independent conspiracies may lie within the scope of arbitration clauses”). In JLM, the plaintiffs alleged an antitrust conspiracy among owners of tankers in the business of shipping liquid chemicals. The plaintiffs — corporations in the business of shipping, buying, selling, and trading chemicals in bulk — had entered into contracts with the defendants that directed “[a]ny and all differences and disputes of whatsoever nature arising out of this Charter ... be put to arbitration.” See 387 F.3d at 167. The plaintiffs argued that because the alleged conspiracy was formed independently of the contractual relationship between the parties, the Sherman Act claims were not covered by the broad arbitration clause. See id. at 175. The Second Circuit disagreed: [T]he damages which JLM asserts it suffered as a result of the conspiracy among the Owners result from the fact that it entered into the charters, each of which specifies price terms which are variously characterized in the amended complaint as “artificially high” and as “overpayments.” We therefore conclude that this is a dispute “arising out of’ the charters, and is therefore within the scope of the [ ] arbitration clause. Id. The court added that in dealing with broad arbitration clauses, it “ha[s] not limited arbitration claims to those that constitute a breach of the terms of the contract at issue,” id. at 176 (quoting Mehler v. Terminix Int’l Co., 205 F.3d 44, 50 (2d Cir.2000)), and it cited earlier cases in which it had held claims based on alleged conspiratorial conduct by a party with whom the plaintiffs were in privity to be arbitrable. See JLM, 387 F.3d at 176. Plaintiffs’ Sherman Act conspiracy allegations against Getty are analogous to those at issue in JLM. Plaintiffs allege, for example, that [t]he NFL’s illegal monopoly and NFL Properties’ agreement to grant an exclusive license to Getty Images and then AP also artificially undermined Plaintiffs’ ability to bargain fairly with Getty Images and AP to obtain more favorable terms in their contributor contracts.... Because other licensors could not offer commercial licenses for NFL photos, Plaintiffs were forced into an impossible dilemma of either accepting the contract terms being offered by the NFL’s licensing partner or losing the ability to earn revenue from the sale of more lucrative commercial licenses. (AC ¶ 144.) As in JLM, Plaintiffs contend that the damages they purportedly suffered as a result of the alleged conspiracy among the NFL Defendants and Getty flowed from the Getty Contributor Agreements. See JLM, 387 F.3d at 175. Given these allegations, any assertion that the antitrust claims are not sufficiently connected to Getty Contributor Agreements to be arbitrable must fail. Nor are there any “legal constraints external to the parties’ agreement,” Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 628, 105 S.Ct. 3346, that should prevent arbitration of the antitrust claims despite the agreement to arbitrate. In their response and objection to Getty’s arbitration demand, Plaintiffs argued that the Sherman Act claims should not be arbitrated because Getty is “a necessary and indispensable party to several of [Plaintiffs’] claims against the Getty Images co-defendants,” which are not subject to arbitration. {See Bloom Decl. Ex. C at 2.) However, alleged co-conspirators “are not necessary parties; a plaintiff can prove the existence of a conspiracy in an action against just one of the members of the conspiracy.” In re Cotton Yarn, 505 F.3d at 284 (citing Georgia v. Pa. R.R. Co., 324 U.S. 439, 463, 65 S.Ct. 716, 89 L.Ed. 1051 (1945) (“In a suit to enjoin a[n anti-trust] conspiracy not all the conspirators are necessary parties defendant.”); Cf. Doctor’s Assocs., Inc. v. Distajo, 66 F.3d 438, 445-46 (2d Cir.1995) (noting that individuals not party to an arbitration agreement cannot be “indispensable” for Rule 19 purposes); see also Wilson P. Abraham Constr. Corp. v. Tex. Indus., Inc., 604 F.2d 897, 904 n. 15 (5th Cir.1979) (“A private plaintiff need not sue all co-conspirators but may choose to proceed against any one or more of them.”)). In In re Cotton Yam, the plaintiffs sought to evade a broad arbitration clause by arguing that “the inability to join all defendants in a single proceeding [by virtue of a no-joinder clause in the arbitration agreements] prevented] them from vindicating their statutory rights.” 505 F.3d at 283. They argued that “severing the conspiracy into separate parts would deprive [them] of the full benefit of their proof, and make the proving of the conspiracy, if not impossible, extremely difficult.” Id. In rejecting this argument, the Fourth Circuit found that potential inconvenience to the plaintiffs was trumped by congressional intent: [C]o-conspirators are not necessary parties in an action against a single conspirator. There is nothing in the arbitration agreements that would prevent the plaintiffs from presenting evidence about the actions of non-party defendants in order to establish the existence of the price-fixing conspiracy alleged by the plaintiffs. Accordingly, the mere fact that the plaintiffs may not join the defendants in a single arbitration proceeding does not prevent the plaintiffs from effectively vindicating their statutory rights. While individual proceedings may be less efficient than a single proceeding, that inefficiency is a function of Congress’s preference for resolution of disputes by arbitration and cannot be a basis for defeating the arbitration that Congress was seeking to encourage. Id. at 285. The same reasoning' applies here. Plaintiffs’ assertion of nonarbitrable claims against alleged coconspirators should not prevent arbitration of the claims against Getty. Indeed, the principle that co-conspirators are not necessary parties applies in this case because the alleged conspiracy is based on separate, successive exclusive licenses between the NFL and Getty and AP, respectively. (See AC ¶ 134 (alleging the NFL granted exclusive licenses to “Getty Images and then AP”).) Plaintiffs allege that Getty held exclusive NFL licensing rights until 2009, (AC ¶ 46) after which AP entered into its own exclusive license agreement with the NFL (AC ¶ 46). The lack of any alleged temporal overlap between these licensing deals undermines Plaintiffs’ assertion that Getty is a necessary party to this litigation. Plaintiffs argue that their antitrust claims are collateral to any contracts between Plaintiffs and Getty and that the claims do not depend on the interpretation of the Getty Contributor Agreements. (Pis.’ Opp’n to Getty Mot. 24-26.) However, the AC expressly links the claimed conspiracy to the Getty Contributor Agreements by alleging that the purported adverse impact of the alleged conspiracy between NFL and Getty is manifested in the Getty Contributor Agreements. (See AC ¶ 144.) As such, the Sherman Act claims appear to “touch matters covered by the parties’ contracts!.]” See JLM, 387 F.3d at 172 (“[T]he damages which JLM asserts it suffered as a result of the conspiracy among the Owners result from the fact that it entered into the charters,, each of which specifies price terms which are variously characterized in the amended complaint as ‘artificially high’ and as ‘over-payments.’ We therefore conclude that this is a dispute ‘arising out of the charters, and is therefore within the scope of the [ ] arbitration clause.”). Plaintiffs also argue that the Court is “required to determine whether the claims would actually require construction of contract terms or determining rights under contract provisions.” (Pis.’ Opp’n to Getty Mot. 24.) However, a broad arbitration clause is “presumptively applicable to disputes involving matters going beyond the ‘interpret[ation] or enforce[ment of] particular provisions’ of the contract which contains the arbitration clause.” JLM, 387 F.3d at 172 (citation omitted). Plaintiffs’ reliance on Collins & Aikman Prods. Co. v. Bldg. Sys., Inc., 58 F.3d 16 (2d Cir.1995) to assert otherwise is misplaced. In sum, because Plaintiffs’ antitrust claims touch and concern the Getty Contributor Agreements, the antitrust claims are properly referred to arbitration. g. Objections Based On Cost Do Not Bar Arbitration Finally, Plaintiffs’ objection that they will incur additional expense or inconvenience from having to arbitrate their claims against Getty (see Bloom Decl. Ex. C at 2) cannot defeat the strong federal policy in favor of enforcing arbitration agreements. The “possibility that a party to an arbitration clause will be inconvenienced and will incur some extra expense ... does not necessarily mean that the party cannot effectively vindicate its statutory rights through arbitration.” In re Cotton Yarn, 505 F.3d at 285. As the Supreme Court stated in Italian Colors, the antitrust laws “do not guarantee an affordable procedural path to the vindication of every claim.” 133 S.Ct. at 2309. “It would be unwieldy ... to require courts to proceed case by case to tally costs and burdens to particular plaintiffs in light of their means.... ” Vimar Seguros y Reaseguros, S.A. v. M/V Sky Reefer, 515 U.S. 528, 536, 115 S.Ct. 2322, 132 L.Ed.2d 462 (1995). Additionally, “uninformed speculation about cost” is insufficient to carry the burden of proving that proceeding against antitrust defendants individually would prevent the plaintiffs from effectively vindicating their statutory rights. In re Cotton Yarn, 505 F.3d at 285; see also Green Tree, 531 U.S. at 90, 121 S.Ct. 513 (rejecting argument that statutory claims could not be arbitrated due to prohibitive costs as “too speculative to justify the invalidation of an arbitration agreement”) While Plaintiffs note the high costs of federal court litigation, they do not provide support for the proposition that arbitration would be more expensive (see Pis.’ Opp’n to Getty Mot. 20), or that the expense would be so great as to impede prosecution of their claims. See AT & T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 131 S.Ct. 1740, 1749, 179 L.Ed.2d 742 (2011) (“the informality of arbitral proceedings is itself desirable, reducing the cost and increasing the speed of dispute resolution”); see also Vera, 335 F.3d at 116 (noting Congress’ determination that arbitration “is to be encouraged as a means of reducing the costs and delays associated with litigation”) (citation omitted). Finally, Plaintiffs note in passing that “there is a tremendous risk that Plaintiffs will not be able to effectively vindicate their claims against Getty Images because the NFL Defendants certainly will not agree to participate in arbitration and thus Plaintiffs cannot be assured of necessary discovery from those parties.” (Pis.’ Opp’n to Getty Mot. 30 n. 16.) However, any limitations on discovery in arbitration do not establish grounds to defeat the agreement to arbitrate. Because Plaintiffs have failed to adequately plead or establish their objections based on cost, these objections are disregarded. II. The Motion To Dismiss Plaintiffs’ Sherman Act Antitrust Claims (Count I) Against NFL Defendants and AP Is Granted a. Antitrust Claims Against NFL Defendants In order to state a claim against the NFL Defendants, Getty, and AP under Sections 1 and 3 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1 and 3, that will withstand a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), Plaintiffs must allege sufficient facts to support a plausible inference that NFL Defendants, Getty, and AP took part in an agreement that unreasonably restrained trade. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955; Port Dock & Stone Corp. v. Oldcastle Northeast, Inc., 507 F.3d 117, 121 (2d Cir.2007); In re Elevator Antitrust Litig., 502 F.3d 47, 50 (2d Cir.2007). The AC asserts that the NFL Defendants, in concert with Getty and AP, “eonspire[d] to create a monopoly in favor of NFL in order to illegally restrain trade and otherwise fix and control the market for commercial licensing of NFL-related ‘stock’ photos.” (AC ¶¶ 28, 37.) According to Plaintiffs, the NFL Defendants conspired to restrain trade in two ways. First, Plaintiffs allege that each NFL Club “authorized the NFL and/or [NFLP] to make decisions regarding [its] separately owned intellectual property [and] to grant an exclusive license to a single licensing company to market and sell commercial licenses for all stock photography of NFL-related photos.” (Id. ¶ 24.) As such, according to Plaintiffs, in the absence of the alleged conspiracy, their “agents [i.e., Getty, AP or their competitors] could have negotiated licensing agreements with individual NFL Teams on better terms.” (Id. ¶ 148.) Second, Plaintiffs allege that the NFLP and NFL granted “illegal” exclusive licenses to Getty in 2007 and then AP in 2009 and 2012 (id. ¶¶ 25-27, 136), which prevented Plaintiffs “from seeking or obtaining fair market value for commercial uses of their NFL photographs” and “undermined [their] ability to bargain fairly with Getty Images and AP to obtain more favorable terms in their contributor contracts.” (Id. ¶¶ 143-44.) Plaintiffs also claim that they were harmed by the NFL’s decision in 2009 to switch exclusive li-censors from Getty to AP because Getty, with whom Plaintiffs had a continuing relationship, distributed their other photo collections (e.g., MLB and NCAA photos). (Id. ¶¶ 55-58,147.) As a threshold matter, “Congress did not intend the antitrust laws to provide a remedy in damages for all injuries that might conceivably be traced to an antitrust violation.” Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. Cal. State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 534, 103 S.Ct. 897, 74 L.Ed.2d 723 (1983) (quoting Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251, 263 n. 14, 92 S.Ct. 885, 31 L.Ed.2d 184 (1972)). To have standing, a plaintiff must, among other things, be “an ‘efficient enforcer’ of the antitrust laws.” Gatt Commc’ns, Inc. v. PMC Assocs., L.L.C., 711 F.3d 68, 78 (2d Cir.2013). The Second Circuit has identified four factors to determine whether a plaintiff is an “efficient enforcer:” (1) the directness or indirectness of the asserted injury; (2) the existence'of an identifiable class of persons whose self-interest would normally motivate them to vindicate the public interest in antitrust enforcement; (3) the speculativeness of the alleged injury; and (4) the difficulty of identifying damages and apportioning them among direct and indirect victims so as to avoid duplicative recoveries. Id. (quoting Paycom Billing Servs., Inc. v. MasterCard Int'l, Inc., 467 F.3d 283, 290-91 (2d Cir.2006)). Here, all four factors Weigh against Plaintiffs’ ability to establish antitrust standing, requiring dismissal of Plaintiffs’ antitrust claims. Gatt Commc’ns, Inc., 711 F.3d at 75 (“[A]nti-trust standing is a threshold, pleading-stage inquiry and when a complaint by its terms fails to establish this requirement we must dismiss as a matter of law.” (citation omitted)). Generally speaking, “[i]n order to limit the class of plaintiffs with antitrust standing to the most efficient enforcers of the antitrust laws, courts have typically limited the types of individuals that may bring an antitrust action to direct competitors or consumers.” Port Dock & Stone Corp. v. OldCastle Ne., Inc., No. 05 Civ. 4294, 2006 WL 2786882, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 26, 2006), aff'd, 507 F.3d 117 (2d Cir.2007); see also Solent Freight Servs., Ltd. v. Alberty, 914 F.Supp.2d 312, 319 (E.D.N.Y.2012) (“Generally, a plaintiff that is ‘neither a consumer nor a competitor in the market in which trade was restrained’ does not have standing to allege an antitrust injury to that market.” (citation omitted)). Plaintiffs are neither consumers nor competitors in the alleged market for commercial licensing of NFL-related photographs. Plaintiffs do not purchase the rights to use NFL-related photographs for commercial purposes. Nor do they enter into license agreements with commercial enterprises that wish to use NFL photographs. Instead, they supply photographs to stock photography agencies, like Getty and AP, which compete in the alleged market. See Reading Int’l, Inc. v. Oaktree Capital Mgmt. LLC, 317 F.Supp.2d 301, 335 (S.D.N.Y.2003) (“Under Associated General Contractors, courts have held that suppliers to direct market participants ‘typically cannot seek recovery under the antitrust laws because their injuries are too secondary and indirect.’ ” (citation omitted)). Plaintiffs contend in their opposition that they “directly competed with agencies such as Getty Images and AP,” (Pis.’ Opp’n to NFL Def.’s Mot. 28) and that “prior to the NFL’s decision to restrict licensing rights to a single agency, Plaintiffs were permitted to and did license their works directly to the NFL Teams and the NFL’s fans, as well as other typical customers and end users” (id., at 27-28). However, no such allegation is contained within the AC. The AC states that Plaintiffs are professional photographers who initially submitted their photos to NFL Photos, which then licensed those photos “to media outlets and commercial entities,” and after the NFL outsourced licensing to Getty and AP, Plaintiffs supplied their NFL-related photos to those agencies for licensing to commercial end-users. (AC ¶¶ 1, 17-18, 36, 44, 145.) Indeed, the AC clearly states that Plaintiffs have always “licensed the photos that they shot ‘on spec’ through third-party licensing agents (formerly NFL Photos and then Getty Images and currently AP).” (AC ¶ 36.) As such, Plaintiffs argument on this point must fail. Specifically, with respect to the first “efficient enforcer” factor, to satisfy the antitrust injury requirement, see Atl. Richfield Co. v. USA Petroleum Co., 495 U.S. 328, 344, 110 S.Ct. 1884, 109 L.Ed.2d 333 (1990), a plaintiff must plead facts showing that it has suffered “injury of the type the antitrust laws were intended to prevent and that flows from that which makes defendants’ acts unlawful.” Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 489, 97 S.Ct. 690, 50 L.Ed.2d 701 (1977). “The antitrust injury requirement obligates a plaintiff to demonstrate, as a threshold matter, ‘that the challenged action has had an actual adverse effect on competition as a whole in the relevant market.’ ” George Haug Co. v. Rolls Royce Motor Cars Inc., 148 F.3d 136, 139 (2d Cir.1998) (emphasis in original) (citation omitted). In other words, a plaintiff must allege “that its loss comes from acts that reduce output or raise prices to consumers.” Chi. Prof'l Sports Ltd. P’ship v. NBA 961 F.2d 667, 670 (7th Cir.1992). Here, Plaintiffs’ purported injury is at most an indirect result of the challenged agreements. The AC contains no facts to suggest that the challenged conduct reduced output of commercial licenses for NFL photographs or raised prices for consumers. Plaintiffs do not allege that fewer commercial entities are licensed to use NFL photographs, nor do they allege that the prices those entities or consumers pay are higher because of the NFL Clubs’ collective licensing or the exclusive licenses with Getty and AP. The injury alleged by Plaintiffs is damage to their personal economic interests, namely that they received from Getty and AP insufficient royalties for the commercial use of their NFL-related photographs. (See, e.g., AC ¶¶ 146-49.) But “underpayment of royalties ... is not an antitrust injury because it has no adverse effect on competition or consumers.” Elliott Indus. Ltd. P’ship v. BP Am. Prod. Co., 407 F.3d 1091, 1125 (10th Cir.2005) (affirming dismissal of complaint because it “makes no allegation of any harm other than the economic loss which [Appellant] itself allegedly suffered”). Because Plaintiffs’ alleged injury amounts to personal economic loss, Plaintiffs have failed to allege antitrust injury. See Carell v. Shubert Org., Inc., 104 F.Supp.2d 236, 266-67 (S.D.N.Y.2000) (no antitrust injury because plaintiffs inability to license intellectual property “has had negligib