Citations
- 99 F. Supp. 3d 920
Full opinion text
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER REGARDING DEFENDANTS’ MOTIONS PRIOR TO SENTENCING
MARK W. BENNETT, District Judge.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. INTRODUCTION.922
II. THE DEFENDANTS’ MOTIONS PRIOR TO SENTENCING .924
III. FACTUAL BACKGROUND.. CO to cn
A. Quality Egg Provided False Information and Documents CO co <1
B. Quality Egg Bribed a USDA Official. CO to oo
C. Quality Egg Changed the “Julian Dates” on Packages of Eggs and Sold Misbranded Eggs into Interstate Commerce .... CO to co
D. Quality Egg Failed to Meet FDA Regulatory Standards CO 00 i —
TV ISSUES . .934
V. DISCUSSION. CO 00
A. Whether The Sixth Amendment Was Violated By My Factual Findiny At The Defendants’ Sentencing Hearing. CO C5
1. Defendants ’ Arguments. 'sT CO 05
2. IQ CO 05
3. Analysis .. ■. CD CO 05
B. Whether the Eighth Amendment Permits a Sentence of Imprisonment for the Defendants’ Strict Liability Offenses CO CO CO
1. Defendants ’ Arguments. CO 00 CD
2. Prosecutors’ Arguments. CO CO CO
3. Analysis . CD ^ H
C. Whether The Fifth Amendment Permits a Sentence of Imprisonment for the Defendants’ Strict Liability Offenses CO rfx <3
1. Defendants’Arguments. CO -3
2. Prosecutors’Arguments. CO ^ CO
3. Analysis. CO cn h-
VI. CONCLUSION. .958
I. INTRODUCTION
Gilead is a fictional novel based in the small town of Gilead, Iowa. The main character, Reverend John Ames, is dying from heart complications and, in a Ciceronian fashion, he decides to write a letter to his seven-year-old son with the intention that his son will read that letter after Reverend Ames dies. The novel is an account of life lessons learned by Reverend Ames as well as daily occurrences with his son, wife, and other family and community members. In a theoretical sense, the imagery from one scene in Gilead aptly incorporates some of the key contents of this case — ie., chicken eggs, a father and a son, rural Iowa, and a disaster:
My mother took a great deal of pride in her chickens, especially after the old man was gone and her flock was unplun-dered. Culled judicially, it throve, yielding eggs at a rate that astonished her. But one afternoon a storm came up and a gust of wind hit the henhouse and lifted the roof right off, and hens came flying out, sucked after it, I suppose, and also just acting like hens. My mother and I saw it happen, because when she smelled the rain coming she called me to help her get the wash off the line.
It was a general disaster...
Marilynne Robinson, Gilead 66-67 (2004).
In August 2010, a disaster on a much larger scale than the one described in Gilead occurred. At that time, “a storm came up and a gust of wind hit the hen-house,” so to speak, when thousands of people across the country were sickened by adulterated eggs sold at restaurants and grocery stores. It was determined that the eggs carried Salmonella Enteritidis (SE) bacteria, and the eggs were traced back to an Iowa-based company, Quality Egg, LLC (Quality Egg). That company, for several years prior to 2010, owned and operated egg production and processing facilities in small towns, like the Actional town of Gilead, across Iowa, including: Galt, Clarion, Alden, and Dows. Austin “Jack” DeCoster owned and controlled the activities of Quality Egg. Peter DeCoster, Austin DeCoster’s son, was the Chief Operating Officer of Quality Egg. Together, the father-son duo exercised significant control over the operations of the company. After the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) presented epidemio-logic information to Quality Egg, the defendants voluntarily recalled millions of dozens of eggs in 2010.
The two executives of Quality Egg, Austin and Peter DeCoster, were later charged with shipping and selling shell eggs that contained SE across state lines as responsible corporate officers under 21 U.S.C. §§ 331(a) and 333(a)(1). The two defendants pleaded guilty to their crimes on June 3, 2014 (docket nos. 16-1, 17-1), and they appeared before me on April 13, 2015, for sentencing. On June 3, 2014, Austin DeCoster also appeared, on behalf of the defendant organization, and pleaded guilty to three counts of a three-count Information, including Bribery of a Public Official in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 201(b)(1) (Count 1); Selling Misbranded Food With Intent to Defraud or Mislead, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 331(a) and 333(a)(2) (Count 2); and Selling Adulterated Food, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 331(a) and 333(a)(1) (Count 3). On April 13, 2015, I also sentenced the organization, Quality Egg.
II. THE DEFENDANTS’ MOTIONS PRIOR TO SENTENCING
A sentencing matter arose from motions filed by the two individual defendants, Austin DeCoster and Peter DeCoster (referred to jointly below as the DeCosters or the defendants), prior to their sentencing hearing. Austin DeCoster filed his Motion That A Sentence Of Incarceration Or Confinement Is Unconstitutional (docket no. 64) on October 6, 2014. A memorandum in support of Austin Decoster’s motion was filed two days later (docket no. 67). On October 22, 2014, Peter DeCoster submitted a motion (docket no. 71), which relied on Austin DeCoster’s memorandum and adopted the same arguments and constitutional challenges.
The core of the defendants’ contention was that for their “strict liability offense, a sentence of incarceration, including intermittent, community, or home confinement, or other restriction on liberty other than probation, would be unconstitutional” on due process grounds. Austin DeCoster’s Memorandum at 2-3. This is because the defendants “had no knowledge of the violation and no knowledge of the conduct underlying the offense.” Id. at 1.
In reply, the prosecutors filed a resistance brief on October 23, 2014 (docket no. 74). The prosecutors requested that I “deny the defendants’ motions” and “impose the sentences that [I] find[ ] appropriate in light of the evidence.” Resistance Brief at 2. The prosecutors’ argument was two-fold: (1) the defendants knew about the insanitary conditions at Quality Egg, and, therefore, had knowledge that there was an increased risk of their eggs being adulterated; and (2) even if proof of mens rea is absent, a sentence of incarceration would not be unconstitutional based on either the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment or the Eighth Amendment. Id. at 4, 6.
The defendants filed a joint reply brief on November 6, 2014 (docket no. 78). That brief repeated arguments from the defendants’ initial memorandum and urged that the case law, the Due Process Clause, and the Eighth Amendment, do not permit a sentence of imprisonment or confinement for the defendants’ offenses. Defendants’ Reply Brief at 4, 7. Additionally, according to the defendants, proving the defendants’ alleged relevant “knowledge” of their offenses by a preponderance of the evidence at sentencing, rather than a trial by jury, would be a violation of the Sixth Amendment of the Constitution. Id. at 9.
III. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
On June 2, 2014, the DeCosters pleaded guilty before United States Magistrate Judge Leonard T. Strand to selling adulterated food into interstate commerce in violation of the FDCA, 21 U.S.C. § 331(a), which is a misdemeanor offense, carrying a possible term of imprisonment of up to one year. See 21 U.S.C. § 331(a); see also 21 U.S.C. § 333(a)(1). The defendants committed the crimes in their capacities as corporate officers of Quality Egg: Austin DeCoster was the trustee of the DeCoster Revocable Trust, which owned Quality Egg, and Peter DeCoster was the Chief Operating Officer.
According to his plea agreement, Austin DeCoster “exercised substantial control over the operations of Quality Egg and related entities and assets in Iowa.” Austin DeCoster’s Rule 11 Plea Agreement (docket no. 16-1), ¶ 7. Peter DeCoster “exercised some control over the production and distribution of shell eggs by Quality Egg and related entities and assets in Iowa.” Peter DeCoster’s Rule 11 Plea Agreement (docket no. 17-1), ¶ 7. The following facts quoted from the parties’ Rule 11 plea agreements are undisputed and were stipulated to by the parties: Austin DeCoster’s Rule 11 Plea Agreement at ¶ 7; Peter DeCoster’s Rule 11 Plea Agreement at ¶ 7.
Between about the beginning of 2010 and in or about August 2010, Quality Egg introduced and caused to be introduced into interstate commerce food, that is shell eggs, that were adulterated. The shell eggs were adulterated in that they contained a poisonous and deleterious substance, that is, Salmonella En-teritidis, that may have rendered them injurious to health. Quality Egg produced, processed, held, and packed the contaminated eggs in Iowa and sold and caused the distribution of the eggs to buyers in states other than Iowa. At the time Quality Egg sold the contaminated eggs, if the contamination of eggs had been known to the defendants, [they] [were] in [] position^] of sufficient authority at Quality Egg to detect, present, and correct the sale of the contaminated eggs.
According to the findings of the CDC, as set forth in the defendants’ PSIRs, there were thousands of consumers sickened by the SE outbreak in 2010. See Austin De-Coster’s PSIR at ¶ 59; see also Peter De-Coster’s PSIR at ¶ 59. In fact, “the CDC determined that approximately 1,939 reported illnesses and/or cases of salmonello-sis were likely associated with the SE outbreak in 2010.” Austin DeCoster’s PSIR at ¶ 72; Peter DeCoster’s PSIR at ¶ 72. Based on the DeCosters’ plea agreements, the parties agreed that the DeCosters did not have “knowledge, during the time frame from January 2010 through August 12, 2010, that eggs sold by Quality Egg were, in fact, contaminated with Salmonella Enteritidis.” Austin DeCoster’s Rule 11 Plea Agreement at ¶ 7; Peter DeCoster’s Rule 11 Plea Agreement at ¶ 7.
After the SE outbreak was traced back to Quality Egg’s facilities, the FDA requested that Quality Egg issue a voluntary recall of hundreds of millions of shell eggs produced at Quality Egg’s facilities. See Austin DeCoster’s PSIR at ¶ 10, 63; see also Peter DeCoster’s PSIR at ¶ 1Ó, 63. Quality Egg followed the FDA’s request. According to the parties’ stipulations, other than one occasion in 2009, “prior to July 2010, Quality Egg did not conduct SE tests on eggs or divert eggs from the market based upon the receipt of a positive environmental SE result.” Parties’ Stip. at ¶ 2; see also Austin DeCoster’s PSIR at ¶ 25; Peter DeCoster’s PSIR at ¶ 25. After Quality Egg’s recall, between August 12, 2010 and August 30, 2010, the FDA conducted a regulatory inspection of Quality Egg’s facilities in Iowa and observed “egregious unsanitary conditions,” including live and dead rodents, beetles, flies, and frogs in the laying areas, feed areas, and conveyer belts, and a room filled with manure. Austin DeCoster’s PSIR at ¶ 66; Peter DeCoster’s PSIR at ¶ 66.
It is important to note, here, that I adopt every unobjected to portion of the defendants’ PSIRs as findings of fact in this case. Because certain unobjected to portions of the defendants’ PSIRs are particularly relevant to this Memorandum Opinion and Order, I set them forth below:
A. Quality Egg Provided False Information and Documents
29.Between 2007 and 2010, one of Quality Egg’s major customers was U.S. Foodservice (“USFoods”). The broker for Quality Egg’s USFoods account was Lund Eggs, owned by Joan Lund (now deceased). As a condition for buying eggs produced by Quality Egg, USFoods required that the Quality Egg plants where the USFoods eggs were processed — primarily Quality Egg Plants 3 and 6 — undergo annual food safety audits by an independent auditing firm, one of which was AIB. Each audit consisted of a scheduled two-day plant visit: one day the auditor conducted a physical inspection of the plant; the other day the auditor reviewed the food safety and sanitation-related paperwork that Quality Egg was required to maintain, which included Quality Egg’s HACCP Plan. The HACCP Plan itself required Quality Egg to maintain documentation of certain tasks to be performed daily, weekly, or monthly. When the AIB auditor completed his review of the facilities and documentation, he produced two documents: (1) a formal AIB Audit Report that explained his findings and observations, and gave the facility a score; and (2) a US-Foods Addendum, which was a checklist of items required specifically by USFoods. The auditor provided these two documents to Joan Lund, who in turn submitted them to US-Foods. In order to supply eggs to USFoods, the audited facility had. to receive a score of “Superior,” which was 900 points or higher.
30. During every AIB audit between 2007 and 2010, Quality Egg and [redacted] made significant misrepresentations, including material omissions, to two AIB auditors with regard to Quality Egg’s food safety and sanitation practices and procedures. With respect to the documentation required for every audit, [redacted] and others at Quality Egg directed the manufacture and falsification of documents required for the audit, with the intent that the auditors and USFoods would rely on the fabricated documents. On the days leading up to each audit, [redacted] identified numerous documents that were supposed to have been completed monthly, weekly, or daily that were missing from Quality Egg’s files; many of those documents then appeared in the files on the day the auditor was to review them. On the days leading up to an audit, [redacted] gave Quality Egg employees blank, signed forms and instructed them to fill in the missing information. Among the forms that were manufactured and completed late at the direction of [redacted] and others at Quality Egg were preoperative sanitation reports, daily clean-up forms, pest control reports, daily maintenance reports, and visitor logs.
31. Both • through documents and through oral representations, [redacted] and Quality Egg misled the AIB auditors about the pest control measures that were in place in the processing plants and layer barns, [redacted] and Quality Egg represented to AIB auditors during the annual audits that Quality Egg had a pest control program in place for Plants 8 and 6 during the entire time period between 2007 and 2010. In fact, Quality Egg’s retention of a pest control company was sporadic over this time period. For various time periods between July 2006 and August 2010, Quality Egg had no outside pest control services to deal with rodents or insects in the processing plants, and had no outside pest control services at all to deal with rodents in the layer barns.
32. [redacted] and Quality Egg also misled the AIB auditors about the Salmonella prevention strategies and measures used by Quality Egg for Plants 3 and 6, with the intent that the auditors and USFoods would rely on those misrepresentations. The USFoods Addenda that the AIB auditors completed required Quality Egg’s plants to have in place “product testing protocols and appropriate intervention technologies to reduce or limit the amount of Salmonella found in fresh shell eggs,” and that such measures be included in Quality Egg’s HACCP Plan. For each AIB audit between 2007 and 2010, [redacted] and Quality Egg provided the AIB inspector with documents that indicated that Quality Egg performed flock testing to identify and control Salmonella. In fact, no such “flock testing” was ever done. For the August 2009 AIB audits for Plants 3 and 6, [redacted] and Quality Egg made the further misrepresentation B reflected in the US-Foods Addenda for those audits B that Quality Egg had a Salmonella program in place for the layer and pullet barns. Moreover, [redacted] and Quality Egg did not take preventative measures or employ strategies to reduce or limit Salmonella in Quality Egg’s table eggs when they received positive results from the sporadic SE environmental testing and necropsies that Quality Egg did perform.
33. When Quality Egg first started selling eggs to USFoods through Lund Eggs, Quality Egg represented to Lund Eggs that it had a very aggressive Salmonella prevention program that was ahead of the industry. Quality Egg told Lund Eggs that it performed blood tests for Salmonella on pullets and also environmental swab tests, [redacted] and Quality Egg represented to Lund Eggs and USFoods during an audit by USFoods that, if its tests came back positive for Salmonella, Quality Egg would divert the eggs. In fact, no eggs were ever diverted, even though [redacted] and Quality Egg received numerous positive environmental SE tests for Plants 3 and 6.
B. Quality Egg Bribed a USDA Official
45. On more than one occasion in 2010, inspectors of the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) exercised their official authority to retain pallets of shell eggs at Quality Egg’s egg production and processing facilities in Wright County, Iowa. Such pallets of eggs were retained for failing to meet minimum quality grade standards promulgated by the USDA. Pursuant to USDA procedures, USDA inspectors must retain or “red tag” pallets of eggs which, upon inspection, fail to meet appropriate standards. Pallets of retained or “red tagged” eggs are legally restricted and cannot be shipped or sold unless such eggs are properly re-processed and released for shipment or sale by appropriate USDA personnel. Specifically, the retained pallets of eggs at Quality Egg’s facility contained too great a percentage of restricted eggs under minimum USDA quality grade standards. That is, too many of these restricted eggs qualified as “checks,” “dirty eggs,” “leakers,” or “losses” as defined by 21 U.S.C. § 1033(g).
46. On or about April 12, 2010, [redacted] authorized the disbursement of $300 in Quality Egg petty cash to [redacted] knowing and intending that the cash would be used by [redacted] to bribe a USDA inspector. Specifically, [redacted] instructed Quality Egg’s Chief Financial Officer to give [redacted] $300 from Quality Egg’s petty cash fund, [redacted] and [redacted] provided the bribe to the inspector in an attempt to corruptly influence the inspector with regard to an official act, that is, to exercise his authority to release pallets of retained eggs for sale by Quality Egg without re-processing them as required by law and USDA standards. On at least one additional occasion in 2010, [redacted] and [redacted] provided a bribe to the same inspector for the same purpose. The inspector is now deceased.
47. In providing the bribes, [redacted] and [redacted] were each acting within their scope of employment at Quality Egg and were acting with intent to benefit Quality Egg.
48. The prosecutor’s investigation has revealed no evidence that, prior to the bribe made on or about April 12, 2010, either [defendant] had knowledge that the bribe was going to occur.
C. Quality Egg Changed the “Julian Dates” on Packages of Eggs and Sold Misbranded Eggs into Interstate Commerce
53. In the United States shell egg industry, shell egg producers put dates on cases of eggs to designate the date that the eggs were processed. The dates are typically expressed as a “Julian date.” In turn, as is well known in the shell egg industry, shell eggs are typically processed within 24 hours of the time the eggs are laid. Processing dates are typically applied to cases of eggs and not necessarily to each individual carton of eggs. At the relevant times, the States of California and Arizona required that shell eggs be sold within 30 and 24 days of processing; other states had similar laws restricting the sale of older eggs.
54. Beginning no later than January 1, 2006, and continuing until approximately August 12, 2010, Quality Egg personnel, under the direction and •with the approval of [redacted], shipped some eggs in interstate commerce to various wholesale customers with deliberately mislabeled processing dates and expiration dates. In fact, some of the eggs were older than indicated by the dates on the egg cases. Some of the eggs were also shipped with no labeling so that, in some instances, labeling with inaccurate processing and expiration dates could be sent to wholesalers and affixed to the cases at the destination.
55. Because Quality Egg produced in excess of one million eggs every day and the market varied up and down frequently, Quality Egg often had a surplus of eggs in storage. Quality Egg’s options were to sell the surplus eggs to a wholesale shell egg'customer or to sell them to a breaker facility that bought them for approximately one-half the market price of shell eggs. Quality Egg’s typical practice was to sell the eggs at a reduced price to a wholesale shell egg customer rather than to sell them to a breaker. These surplus eggs had been in storage for periods of time ranging from 14 days to 40 or more days, [redacted] referred to older eggs as “distressed eggs.” [redacted] also said the only way he would not sell such eggs to a wholesale shell egg customer was if the eggs were moldy. If said eggs were moldy, then [redacted] would instruct Quality Egg personnel to sell the eggs to a breaker facility.
56.There were a number of ways that, under the direction and approval of [redacted], Quality Egg mislabeled older eggs with newer processing and expiration dates prior to shipping the eggs to customers in California, Arizona, and other states. Sometimes Quality Egg personnel did not put any processing or corresponding expiration dates on the eggs when they were processed. The eggs would be kept in storage for several days and up to several weeks. Then, just prior to shipping the eggs, Quality Egg personnel labeled the eggs with processing dates that were false, in that the dates were more recent than the dates that the eggs had actually been processed, with corresponding false expiration dates. In other instances, Quality Egg personnel relabeled older eggs with processing dates that were false, in that the dates were more recent than the dates that the eggs had actually been processed, with corresponding false expiration dates. Quality Egg personnel did this by removing the original labeling and affixing new, false labeling to the egg cases, and also by placing new, false labeling over existing labeling on the egg cases. In other instances, Quality Egg personnel sent new labeling with processing dates that were false, in that dates were more recent than the dates that the eggs had actually been processed and with corresponding false expiration dates, with the drivers of the trucks in which the eggs were shipped, so the wholesale customer could apply the new labeling at the destination. In addition, at the request of certain wholesale customers, Quality Egg personnel printed new labeling with processing dates that were false, in that dates were more recent than the dates that the eggs had actually been processed and with corresponding false expiration dates, and sent false labeling to the wholesale customers so that older cases of eggs could be relabeled to falsely indicate more recent dates.
57. Through these mislabeling practices, Quality Egg personnel, including [redacted], intended to mislead, at least, state regulators and retail egg customers regarding the age of the eggs. These mislabeling practices •had the effect of misleading state regulators and retail egg customers regarding the age of these eggs.
58. In mislabeling eggs with false processing and corresponding expiration dates, [redacted] and other Quality Egg personnel were each acting within the scope of their employment by Quality Egg and were acting with intent to benefit Quality Egg.
59. The mislabeling of eggs at Quality Egg with inaccurate dates was a common practice and was well known among several Quality Egg employees. It was an ongoing practice before [redacted] became involved in Quality Egg sales in 2002.
60. As a result of the mislabeling of eggs with false processing and corresponding expiration dates, [redacted] and other Quality Egg personnel caused an actual, reasonably foreseeable, pecuniary harm to more than 250 retail egg customers in a total amount of more than $400,000 but not more than $1,000,000.
61. The prosecutor has investigated whether any persons became ill or otherwise sustained bodily injury as a result of ingesting eggs sold with false processing and corresponding expiration dates. To date, the prosecutor’s investigation has not identified any such persons.
62. To date, the prosecutor’s investigation has revealed no evidence that Peter DeCoster and/or [Austin] DeCoster had knowledge of these mislabeling practices.
D. Quality Egg Failed to Meet FDA Regulatory Standards
66. Between August 12, 2010, and August 30, 2010, the FDA conducted a regulatory inspection of the following Quality Egg facilities: Layers 1, 2, 3, 4, and 6, and the feed mill. Many egregious unsanitary conditions were observed. Items noted were: live and
dead rodents (mice) and frogs found in, the laying areas, feed areas, conveyer belts, and outside of the buildings; skeletal remains of a chicken on a conveyer belt; numerous holes in walls and baseboards in the feed and laying buildings; missing vent covers; rodent traps were broken, did not have bait in them, and some traps still had dead rodents in them; manure piled to the rafters in one building, which was below the laying hens; a room was so filled with manure that it pushed the screen out of the door, allowing rodents access to the building; and live and dead beetles and flies throughout the chicken barns.
67. Based upon the inspection, the FDA issued a “Form 483 Inspectional Observations” report (“483 Report”) and subsequently issued a more detailed “Establishment Inspection Report.” The following observations were included in the 483 Report:
A. DeCoster failed to implement and follow its written SE prevention plan (by failing to effectively implement various aspects of its egg bio-security plan related to dogs, cats, rodents and other wild animals, and manure management);
B. DeCoster failed to take steps to ensure there was no introduction or transfer of SE into or among poultry houses (including, with regard to inadequate doorway accesses, protective clothing, cleaning/saniti-zation of equipment, uncaged chickens using manure eight feet high to access the laying area, and a door being blocked by excess manure);
C. DeCoster failed to achieve satisfactory rodent and pest control (as evidenced by the observation of specified numbers of live mice, and numerous live and dead maggots and live and dead flies);
D. DeCoster failed to adequately document the monitoring of rodents and other pest control measures;
E. DeCoster failed to adequately document compliance with biosecurity measures;
F. Regarding the feed mill, wild birds were observed in the storage and milling areas (and nesting material was in the “closed” mixing system, ingredient storage, and truck filling areas), ingredient bins had rusted holes and were otherwise inadequately closed, and outside grain bins had topside doors/ lids open to the environment with pigeons entering and leaving the bins; and
G. Samples were collected during the inspection that tested positive for SE.
68. As of October 14, 2010, the FDA had made several determinations regarding SE contamination at Quality Egg facilities and the steps necessary to address the contamination. According to the FDA, Quality Egg’s environmental and egg testing and the FDA’s environmental and feed testing established that the SE contamination at Quality Egg’s facilities was widespread. Given the extremely high level and pervasive nature of the contamination and the conditions identified at Quality Egg’s facilities that were not sufficient to prevent the spread of SE, the FDA determined that depopulation of each of Quality Egg’s hen houses was the appropriate action to minimize the likelihood of a recurrence of a food borne outbreak. The FDA offered the following reasons for its determination that lesser measures would be insufficient:
• Pervasive Salmonella Enteritidis (SE) contamination throughout the entirety of Wright County Eggs’ (WCE) operation. SE was found in 63% (46/73) of house environments and in eggs from 40% (31/77) of houses. Additionally, SE was isolated from the wash water, feed mill, feed samples, feed ingredients, and a pullet house. These data are indicative of widespread SE contamination that is not localized to any one part of WCE’s operation, but is instead spread throughout the entirety of the WCE operation.
• The known presence of an additional egg-associated pathogen, Salmonella Heidelberg (SH), at the pullet houses. The younger a bird is, the more susceptible it is to infection. Since this pathogen was present at a time when the pullets were susceptible to colonization, it is possible that these birds, if they are now laying eggs, are producing eggs that contain SH.
• An incidence rate of SE positive eggs that is approximately 39 times higher than the estimate cited in the FDA’s egg safety rule as being the current national incidence rate. Based on WCE’s egg tests, the FDA calculated that 1 out of every 516 eggs at WCE was positive for SE compared to the expected rate of 1 in 20,000. This data is for the operation as a whole and importantly, all WCE farms have been determined to be producing SE positive eggs.
• The likelihood that current layers in production now have been exposed to SE positive feed. Current layers (Sites 2 and 4) would have been placed at WCE pullet rearing facilities sometime (approximate) between April and May 2010. These birds would have been fed potentially contaminated feed for several months prior to the FDA’s identification of SE in the feed. As stated above, younger birds are more susceptible to colonization. Thus, current layers at Sites 2 and 4 may be producing eggs that contain SE.
• The likelihood that houses will be recontaminated. In light of the inter-connectivity of houses in an inline operation, the fact that WCE houses are connected through a common walkway and biosecurity concerns revealed during the FDA’s inspections, such as the lack of doors to some houses, the FDA is concerned about the possibility of recontamination. Given the pervasive nature of SE at WCE, even if a house environment is presently SE-negative, there is a distinct possibility that it will not remain SE-negative but will become contaminated with SE present elsewhere in WCE’s facilities.
• An SE negative environmental test is not always indicative of SE negative eggs. At WCE there are eight houses with SE negative environmental tests that produced eggs that tested positive for SE (Farm 2 House 1; Farm 3 House I; Farm 4 Houses 1 and 4; and Farm 6 Houses 1, 4, 5, and 8). These observations, coupled with the pervasive nature of SE at WCE’s facilities, suggest that environmental negatives in WCE houses at present must be viewed with caution.
• A house with a negative environment and negative egg test still has the potential to produce positive eggs. Because only one — 1,000 egg sample has been taken and because infected hens are known to lay SE positive eggs intermittently, it is very plausible that the full extent of SE contamination of eggs being produced at WCE has not yet been discovered and that the 40% figure mentioned above is an underestimation of the extent of contamination.
• An inefficacious vaccination program in place at the time current layers were being grown out.' A total of 54 flocks were vaccinated but 57% (31/54) of houses with vaccinated layers had SE positive environments and 17% (9/54) of houses with vaccinated layers produced eggs that tested positive for SE. The vaccination program appears to be in-efficacious regardless of whether one or two doses were administered.
• While WCE claims to be operating a new and improved vaccination scheme presently, no data has been provided to the FDA which would demonstrate efficacy of that program.
69. In addition, the FDA emphasized that depopulation alone would not be sufficient, but should be done in conjunction with the following “necessary actions”:
removal of manure from all sites, cleaning and disinfection of all houses subsequent to manure removal, verification that cleaning and disinfection has rendered facilities free of SE and SH, repair of facilities to prevent ingress by rodents or birds, and resolution of all items described on the FDA Form 483. Such actions should be completed before repopulating any facility with chickens at any stage of maturity. In addition, we also believe you (WCE) must make certain that your (WCE’s) feed mill and pullet rearing facilities are free of SE and SH. Once the entirety of WCE operations is free of SE and SH, adequate biosecurity measures must be followed to prevent a reoccurrence.
70. Between August 19, 2010, and August 24, 2010, the FDA conducted a regulatory inspection of Hillandale’s West Union (Layer 9) and Alden facilities and its corporate office. It was discovered that Hillandale purchased/obtained all their pullets from Quality Egg. It was also discovered that Hillandale purchased all the feed for their facility in Alden, Iowa, from Quality Egg.
71. Excessive bird activity was observed at Hillandale’s grain storage facility. In addition, grain and other ingredients were stored outside open to the environment, therefore allowing birds and rodents access to the grain . and to potentially contaminate it with SE through fecal matter.
Austin DeCoster’s PSIR at ¶ 29-33, 45-48, 66-71; Peter DeCoster’s PSIR at ¶ 29-33, 45-48, 66-71; Quality Egg’s PSIR at ¶ 53-62.
IV. ISSUES
There are three primary issues I address in this Memorandum Opinion and Order: (1) Whether, under the Sixth Amendment, it was permissible for me to find at the defendants’ sentencing hearing that they had relevant knowledge of the conduct underlying their strict liability offense; (2) Whether, absent proof of mens rea, the sanction of imprisonment for their offense would be unconstitutional in violation of the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment; and (3) Whether, absent proof of mens rea, the sanction of imprisonment for their offense would be unconstitutional in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.
V. DISCUSSION
A. Whether The Sixth Amendment Was Violated By My Factual Findiny At The Defendants’ Sentenciny Hear-iny
1. Defendants’ Aryuments
In their initial brief, the defendants claimed to have “no knowledge of the violation and no knowledge of the conduct underlying the offense” to which they pleaded guilty. Austin DeCoster’s Memorandum at 1. Rather, their plea agreements were based on their roles as “corporate officers” at Quality Egg. Id. In the absence of mens rea, the defendants argued, imprisonment would be unconstitutional, in violation of the right to due process and the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment. See id. at 3; see also Defendants’ Reply Brief (docket no. 78), 4.
Early in their reply brief, the defendants took issue with the prosecutors’ assertion that their constitutional argument could be avoided if I determined at the defendants’ sentencing hearing “that defendants in fact had culpable mental states.” Defendants’ Reply Brief at 3 (quoting Resistance Brief at 2). Such a finding of fact would, according to the defendants, be a constitutional violation under the Sixth Amendment. This is because, citing to Alleyne v. United States, — U.S. —, 133 S.Ct. 2151, 2162-63, 186 L.Ed.2d 314 (2013) and Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530. U.S. 466, 490, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000), the United States Supreme Court has “repeatedly held that where a finding of fact would increase, the range of penalties to which the defendant may be exposed, the Sixth Amendment requires that fact to be proved to a jury or admitted by the defendant.” Id. Therefore, the defendants alleged that the issue of whether they, in fact, were involved in the offense is “not open” to me. Id. Because the admitted facts prove that the defendants’ conviction is only a criminal violation of strict and vicarious liability and the defendants had no mens rea, they argued, I “should instead hold that a sentence of imprisonment or confinement would be unconstitutional in this case[.]” Id. at 3-4.
Later in their reply brief, the defendants returned and added to their argument that proving the defendants had relevant knowledge of their offenses by a preponderance of the evidence at their sentencing, rather than at a trial by jury, would be a violation of the Sixth Amendment. See id. at 9-10. The defendants, again in reliance on Alleyne, reiterated that “absent an admission by the defendant, the government must prove to a jury ‘every fact that [is] a basis for imposing or increasing punishment.’ ” Id. at 9 (quoting Alleyne, 133 S.Ct. at 2159). In this case, both defendants signed plea agreements indicating they had no “direct involvement in the sale of the contaminated eggs,” and neither of the defendants, nor any employees at Quality Egg, “had knowledge that the eggs were adulterated with SE.” Id. at 10. Because the defendants’ admissions do not prove that they had knowledge of or involvement in the offense, the defendants argued that “no judicial finding of fact could now preempt the question of whether a prison sentence is constitutionally permissible.” Id. The defendants continued:
If the DeCosters’ position is correct, and a prison sentence cannot be imposed with a determination that the defendant had personal knowledge of the offense conduct or personal involvement in the offense conduct, then that fact cannot permissibly be determined by a court because it would supply a “basis for imposing or increasing punishment.” Alleyne, 133 S.Ct. at 2159.
Id. Thus, the defendants argued that I must first decide whether the imposition of a term of imprisonment is unconstitutional, here, before I consider the prosecutors’ claims as to the defendants’ mens rea at sentencing.
2. Prosecutors ’ Arguments
Contrary to the defendants’ assertions, the prosecutors argued that the defendants “were in no ways ‘wholly innocent and unknowing’ ... about the conduct to which they pled guilty.” Resistance Brief at 2. The prosecutors referred to information in the defendants’ PSIRs, and the defendants’ objections to their PSIRs, to further the prosecutors’ point. For instance, the defendants’ PSIRs suggest that the defendants knew of SE contamination at Quality Egg between January and August 2010 because of “necropsies that found SE in the organs of laying hens and positive environmental tests for SE.” Id. at 4-5 (citing Austin DeCoster’s PSIR at ¶ 16-22; Peter DeCoster’s PSIR at ¶ 16-22).
In addition, the prosecutors argued that the defendants’ objections (and lack thereof) to their PSIRs prove that the defendants knew about the “preventative and ameliorative measures recommended to address the company’s SE and pest control problem.” Id. at 5. This is because they were aware of the recommendations by Dr. Charles Hofacre and Dr. Maxcy P. Nolan, III, which were designed to prevent SE contamination, and did not follow all of their recommendations at Quality Egg’s Iowa facilities. The defendants’ “familiarity” with the procedures employed by Austin DeCoster’s Maine egg farms is also “telling” in that “those experiences show that following and enforcing stringent preventative and remedial measures may effectively control SE.” Id. at 6. Finally, the defendants “do not contest” that “multiple SE environmental tests performed in Quality Egg barns and layer hen necropsies tested positive for SE,” yet shell eggs produced in those environments were sold to consumers and not diverted, and Quality Egg performed no testing of such eggs “until late July 2010, when an FDA egg safety rule took effect[J” Id. (citing Austin DeCoster’s Sealed Objection to PSIR (docket no. 55), ¶¶ 8, 21; Peter DeCoster’s Sealed Objection to PSIR (docket no. 56), ¶ 4). In other words, according to the prosecutors, the defendants’ claims that they had no knowledge of the SE contamination are negated by their own submissions to the Court.
Lastly, the prosecutors indicated that they were “prepared to present evidence” at the defendants’ sentencing hearing to bolster their claim that the defendants knew of the conditions, which “increased the likelihood of Salmonella contamination and proliferation.” Id. at 5. However, no additional evidence was presented because the scope of the contested issues was narrowed by the parties’ stipulations. Based on the defendants’ PSIRs and objections, the prosecutors argued in their briefs and at sentencing, it is clear that the defendants knew about the insanitary conditions at Quality Egg in Iowa and the lack of a proper response to that problem in order to minimize and prevent SE contamination. Id. Therefore, the prosecutors made the case that the defendants’ motions are based on a “fundamentally flawed premise” because they, indeed, “knew about the conditions that caused the introduction of adulterated eggs into interstate commerce[.]” Id. at 6.
3. Analysis
Relying primarily on Alleyne, 133 S.Ct. at 2159, and Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 466,120 S.Ct. 2348, the defendants argued that if I found, as’ a matter of fact, that the defendants had relevant knowledge of their strict liability crimes, the Sixth Amendment would be violated. This is because that “finding of fact would increase the range of penalties to which the defendants] may be exposed,” and “the Sixth Amendment requires that fact to be proved to a jury or admitted by the defendant.” Defendant’s Reply Brief at 3 (emphasis added). At the sentencing, I found the defendants’ reliance on Alleyne and Apprendi misplaced. My finding on this issue only requires a brief explanation before I proceed to considering the defendants’ constitutional challenges.
In Alleyne, a defendant was convicted of robbery affecting commerce and the use of a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence. Alleyne, 133 S.Ct. at 2156. At the defendant’s sentencing, the judge, instead of a jury, found brandishing, which increased the mandatory minimum sentence to which the defendant was subjected from five years to life in prison into seven years to life in prison. Id. at 2156, 2160. In finding that the defendant’s Sixth Amendment rights were violated in Alleyne, the Supreme Court held that “[f]acts that increase the mandatory minimum sentence are ... elements and must be submitted to the jury and found beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. at 2158. In reaching that holding, the Supreme Court reasoned that “[t]he touchstone for determining whether a fact must be found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt is whether the fact constitutes an ‘element’ or ‘ingredient’ of the charged offense.” Id. (quoting United States v. O’Brien, 560 U.S. 218, 130 S.Ct. 2169, 176 L.Ed.2d 979 (2010); Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 483 n. 10, 120 S.Ct. 2348) (emphasis added). Elsewhere in that opinion, the Supreme Court reiterated that “the essential Sixth Amendment inquiry is whether a fact is an element of the crime.” Id. at 2162. The Supreme Court further explained that, in Apprendi (a prior decision), the Court decided that “a fact is by definition an element of the offense and must be submitted to the jury if it increases the punishment above what is otherwise legally prescribed.” Id. at 2158 (citing Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 483, 120 S.Ct. 2348) (emphasis added). Later in the opinion for Alleyne, the Supreme Court clearly articulated what its holding did not entail — namely, Alleyne “does not mean that any fact that influences judicial discretion must be found by a jury.” Id. at 2163. Rather, the Supreme Court continued: “We have long recognized that broad sentencing discretion, informed by judicial factfinding, does not violate the Sixth Amendment.” Id.; see also United States v. Higgins, No. 2:09-cr-403-4, 2011 WL 6088576, at *1, *10 (E.D.Pa. Dec. 7, 2011) (defendant pleaded guilty, as a responsible corporate officer, to introducing adulterated and misbranded medical devices into interstate commerce, “in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 331(a) and 331(a)(1),” but that “guilty plea does not cabin or circumscribe the Court’s consideration of relevant facts at sentencing[.]”).
Unlike in Alleyne and Apprendi, my factual finding that the defendants had relevant knowledge of their strict liability crimes — that is, knowledge of the insanitary conditions at Quality Egg, and the increased risk that their processing plants were contaminated with SE, does not constitute an element of their offense, or “increase[ ] the punishment above what is otherwise legally prescribed.” Alleyne, 133 S.Ct. at 2158 (citing Apprendi 530 U.S. at 483 n. 10, 120 S.Ct. 2348). Thus, based on. the Supreme Court’s precedent, cited to by the defendants, it is unnecessary that this factual issue be submitted to the jury. Id. Rather, the defendants pleaded guilty to violating 21 U.S.C. § 331(a), which has a statutory maximum penalty of “imprisonment for not more than one year or fined not more than $1,000, or both.” See 21 U.S.C. § 331(a); see also 21 U.S.C. 333(a)(1) (“Any person who violates a provision of section 331 of this title shall be imprisoned for not more than one year or fined not more than $1,000, or both.”). Nor were the defendants unaware of the floor (or mandatory minimum sentence) and ceiling (or mandatory maximum sentence) of their sentencing ranges based on their plea agreements. Also, unlike in Alleyne and Apprendi, the floor and the ceiling, respectively, of the defendants’ statutorily authorized sentencing ranges were never impacted by my factual findings. The sentencing guideline range, based upon a total offense level of 4, and a criminal history category of I, remained at zero months to six months in prison. See Austin DeCoster’s PSIR at ¶ 127; see also Peter DeCoster’s PSIR at ¶ 127. Therefore, the defendants erred in asserting that Alleyne and Apprendi are applicable to this case.
In addition, as indicated in the defendants’ plea agreements, both defendants agreed to be “sentenced, based on facts to be found by the sentencing judge by a preponderance of the evidence and agree facts essential to the punishment need not be (1) charged in the Indictment or Information; (2) proven to a jury; or (3) proven beyond a reasonable doubt.” Austin DeCoster’s Rule 11 Plea Agreement at ¶ 8 (emphasis added); Peter DeCoster’s Rule 11 Plea Agreement at ¶ 8 (emphasis added). However, despite what is provided in their plea agreements, and, therefore, agreed to by the defendants, the defendants demanded a higher standard of persuasion on this issue in their reply brief. Inconsistent with their plea agreements, the defendants argued in their reply brief that the prosecutors’ proposal to prove their prior knowledge of their offenses to me, by a preponderance of the evidence, would violate their Sixth Amendment rights. See Reply Brief at 9-10. Thus, alternatively, I find that the defendants clearly waived in their respective plea agreements their belated assertion of an Alleyne-Apprendi issue. Based on a correct reading of Alleyne and Apprendi, the defendants’ plea agreements, and the evidence presented by the prosecutors at the defendants’ sentencing hearing, I disagree with the defendants’ claim that a Sixth Amendment violation occurred by not submitting the factual issue of whether the defendants had relevant knowledge of their strict liability offenses to a jury.
During oral arguments at the DeCost-ers’ sentencing their counsel further refined their Sixth Amendment argument. The defendants’ argument was that if it was unconstitutional to impose any incarceration for the offense of conviction, because that would violate due process and the Eighth Amendment where no actual knowledge was established, then it would also violate the Sixth Amendment. I pointed out that was a silly argument because, if they won on the due process or Eighth Amendment claims, I could not impose incarceration, rendering their Al leyne-Apprendi argument moot. If they did not win on the due process and Eighth Amendment arguments, there was no Alleyne-Apprendi issue because the sentencing range, either statutorily or by the Guidelines, was not increased by any judicial fact-finding.
For argument’s sake, even if I agree with the defendants that they had no relevant knowledge of their criminal conduct, I am still well within my discretion to impose a sentence of imprisonment for the defendants’ violations of 21 U.S.C. § 331(a) for the reasons discussed below.
B. Whether the Eighth Amendment Permits a Sentence of Imprisonment for the Defendants’ Strict Liability Offenses
1. Defendants ’ Arguments
The defendants’ reply brief asserted that when courts consider whether a defendant’s sentence is “grossly disproportionate” to the defendant’s crime, and thus, in violation of the Eighth Amendment, courts consider “ ‘the gravity of the offense and the harshness of the penalty,’ as well [sic] the sentences imposed for similar offenses by judges within the jurisdiction and across the country.’ ” Defendants* Reply Brief at 7. Applying that standard, the .defendants argued that a prison sentence or confinement “would be disproportionate” to the defendants’ crime “because this, a strict vicarious liability crime, is the most minor offense known to the law.” Id. at 8.
The defendants further contended that their crime “is a pure status offense — a criminal violation based upon the fact that someone else subordinate to the defendant broke the law.” Id. Because someone else violated the law, with no criminal intent, when a defendant is charged under a strict vicarious liability theory, courts have traditionally warned that jailing a defendant on that basis, as here, would be “unjustifiable.” Id. Although such case law is grounded on the Due Process Clause, “the basic principle” set forth in those cases also applies to the Eighth Amendment: “Imprisonment for a person who did not commit the crime would indeed be ‘grossly disproportionate,’ and would therefore violate the Eighth Amendment, just at it would violate the Due Process Clause.” Id. at 8-9 (quoting Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 60, 130 S.Ct. 2011, 176 L.Ed.2d 825 (2010)). The defendants advanced their argument by relying on a recent district court decision: “That is why a district judge ruled in a relatively recent FDCA case that ‘prison sentences are not appropriate’ where there is an ‘absence of government proof of knowledge by the individual defendants of the wrongdoing.’ ” Id. at 9 (quoting United States v. Purdue Frederick Co., 495 F.Supp.2d 569, 576 (W.D.Va.2007)).
The defendants also disagreed with the prosecutors that imprisonment is justified for deterrence purposes. The defendants argued that “it’would not serve any rational deterrence purpose to impose a prison sentence on a corporate officer who had nothing to do with the underlying offense and who is not charged with any degree of fault.” Id. This is because such a “rule of liability” would enable courts to sentence business executives to terms of imprisonment where such business executives did “everything in their power to prevent the offense from occurring.” Id. The defendants categorized the prosecutors’ deterrence theory as “irrational.” Id. The prosecutors’ theory, the defendants contended, is “wholly insufficient” to serve as justification for imprisoning the defendants as their links to the crime committed are their statuses at Quality Egg. Id.
2. Prosecutors’Arguments
The prosecutors’ resistance brief focused on refuting the defendants’ general contention that the Constitution “forbids ‘sentence[s] of incarceration ... or other restriction[s] on liberty other than probation’ for any ‘strict liability offense.’ ” Resistance Brief at 10 (citing Austin DeCoster’s Memorandum at 2). The prosecutors asserted that the defendants’ claim, that punishment of incarceration would be unconstitutional, implicates the Eighth Amendment, not the due process clause as the defendants asserted. Id. at 10-11. The prosecutors continued by quoting Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 23, 123 S.Ct. 1179, 155 L.Ed.2d 108 (2003), a Supreme Court case discussing the Eighth Amendment’s standard: “The Eighth Amendment does not require strict proportionality between crime and sentence. It forbids only extreme sentences that are ‘grossly disproportionate’ to the crime.” Id. at 11.
Citing Graham, the prosecutors added that, in “consider[ing] whether certain sentencing practices are categorically disproportionate as applied to certain classes of offenders or offenses,” Resistance Brief at 11, the Supreme Court analyzes “ ‘objective indicia of society’s standards, as expressed in legislative enactments and state practice’ to determine whether there is a national consensus against the sentencing practice at issue.” Graham, 560 U.S. at 61, 130 S.Ct. 2011 (quoting Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 572, 125 S.Ct. 1183, 161 L.Ed.2d 1 (2005)). The Supreme Court will also be guided by “ ‘the standards elaborated by controlling precedents and by the Court’s own understanding and interpretation of the Eighth Amendment’s text, history, meaning, and purpose,’ ” and the Court analyzes “whether the challenged sentencing practice serves legitimate penological goals.” Id. at 61, 67, 130 S.Ct. 2011 (citations omitted). According to the prosecutors, the maximum statutory term under 21 U.S.C. § 333(a)(1) of one-year imprisonment fits within the limits established by the Eighth Amendment. Resistance Brief at 12.
In addition, there is no case law, the prosecutors contended, that “construes the Eighth Amendment, or any other constitutional provision, to impose a per se constitutional bar to imprisonment for strict-liability offenses.” Id. Rather, the FDCA’s one-year prison sentence furthers the penological goals and congressional efforts to deter the introduction of unsafe foods and drugs into the economy. Id. at 13. To bolster their argument, the prosecutors provided a thorough overview of relevant case law “upholding sentences of imprisonment for strict-liability offenses[.]” Id. The prosecutors discussed the facts of relevant federal district court cases in which the defendants were convicted of FDCA violations and sentenced to prison, even though they lacked knowledge of the wrongdoing. Id. at 14-15. The prosecutors noted that custodial sentences have also been imposed in strict-liability offense cases outside the context of food and drug laws. See id. at 16.
3. Analysis
The defendants have failed to convince me that even a sentence of the statutory maximum of one year in prison is “grossly disproportionate” to their offense, and therefore, in violation of the Eighth Amendment. See 21 U.S.C. § 333(a)(1); see also Ewing, 538 U.S. at 23, 123 S.Ct. 1179. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals has clearly articulated the standard to apply when determining whether a sentence is “grossly disproportionate” to a defendant’s offense:
To determine whether a sentence is grossly disproportionate, we examine “ ‘the gravity of the offense compared to the harshness of the penalty.’ ” [United States v. Paton, 535 F.3d 829, 837 (8th Cir.2008) (quoting Ewing, 538 U.S. at 28, 123 S.Ct. 1179) ]. In weighing these matters, we consider the “harm caused or threatened to the victim or to society, and the culpability and degree of the defendant’s involvement.” [United States v. Wiest, 596 F.3d 906, 911-12 (8th Cir.2010) ]. We also consider a defendant’s history of felony recidivism, if there is one. Paton, 535 F.3d at 837 (citing Ewing, 538 U.S.at 29, 123 S.Ct. 1179).
United States v. Lee, 625 F.3d 1030, 1037 (8th Cir.2010). Prior to articulating the above standard, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals explained that “it is ‘exceedingly rare’ for a noncapital sentence to violate the Eighth Amendment.” Id. Also, as the prosecutors rightly asserted, in analyzing if a sentencing practice is categorically disproportionate as applied to an entire class of offenders, the Supreme Court considers several factors. See Graham, 560 U.S. at 61, 130 S.Ct. 2011. It looks to “ ‘legislative enactments and state practice’ to determine whether there is a national consensus against the sentencing practice at issue,” “controlling precedents,” “the Court’s own understanding and interpretation of the Eighth Amendment’s test, history, meaning, and purpose,” and if the challenged practice “serves legitimate penological goals.” Id. at 61, 67, 130 S.Ct. 2011.
In this case, the DeCosters’ contaminated eggs caused harm to thousands of consumers. Those consumers were sickened, and some of the consumers’ injuries were severe. Both defendants were involved in the crimes committed: Austin DeCoster was “the person ultimately responsible for the operations of Quality Egg and the various egg facilities in Iowa associated with Quality Egg” and Peter DeCoster was “one of the persons responsible for running the operations of Quality Egg and the various egg facilities in Iowa associated with Quality Egg.” See Austin DeCoster’s Rule 11 Plea Agreement at ¶ 7; see also Peter DeCoster’s Rule 11 Plea Agreement at ¶7. This was not the first time that Austin DeCoster appeared before me for sentencing. Thus, based on the harm caused, the defendants’ involvement in the crimes, and Austin DeCoster’s criminal history, the sentence, of one year in prison is not “grossly' disproportionate” to the defendants’ crimes. See Ewing, 538 U.S. at 30-31, 123 S.Ct. 1179 (“We hold that [the defendant’s] sentence of 25 years to life in prison, imposed for the offense of felony grand theft under the three strikes law, is not grossly disproportionate and therefore does not violate the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual punishments.”); United States v. Vanhorn, 740 F.3d 1166, 1170 (8th Cir.2014) (“Because nothing in the record indicates that the sentence [ (one within the statutory range of not less than 15 years nor more than 30 years) ] is grossly disproportionate to his crime, [the defendant’s] sentence does not violate the Eighth Amendment.”).
In addition, as the prosecutors pointed out in their resistance brief, the Eighth Circuit. Court of Appeals has explained that it has “never held a sentence within the statutory range to violate the Eighth Amendment.” See Resistance Brief at 12; see also Vanhorn, 740 F.3d at 1170 (citing United States v. Neadeau, 639 F.3d 453, 456 (8th Cir.2011), in turn citing United States v. Collins, 340 F.3d 672, 680 (8th Cir.2003)). Here, any prison sentence of one year or less fits within the statutory range of punishment provided by 21 U.S.C. § 333(a)(1). See 21 U.S.C. § 333(a)(1). Therefore, I remain unconvinced that the defendants’ sentences are unconstitutional under the Eighth Amendment where their sentences fall within the statutory range established by Congress under 21 U.S.C. § 333(a)(1) and the sentencing guideline range of zero to six months, and based on the sentencing factors under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) discussed at the defendants’ sentencing hearing.
Purdue Frederick Co., a case relied upon by the defendants, is inapplicable. In Purdue Frederick Co., the District Court for the Western District of Virginia accepted the pleas of three corporate officers, who pleaded guilty to the misdemeanor charge of misbranding a prescription opioid pain medication, OxyContin, in violation of the FDCA. Purdue Frederick Co., 495 F.Supp.2d at 570. The government agreed to sentences for the individual defendants without any imprisonment after the defendants “agreed to pay a total of $34.5 million to the Virginia Medicaid Fraud Unit’s Program Income Fund.” Id. at 573. The government conceded that “a sentence of incarceration under the federal sentencing guidelines would be unusual based on the facts of the case.” Id. at 576. The defendants stressed “their lack of pri- or criminal record, their strong commitment to civic and charitable endeavors, as well as their other positive personal attributes.” Id. The district court acknowledged the “potential damage by the misbrand-ing,” which, “was substantial,” and did not minimize the