Full opinion text
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION BLUMENFELD, District Judge. The plaintiffs here, groups representing environmental and general public interests, seek to halt a major governmental project because the agencies involved have allegedly made both substantive and procedural mistakes in complying with applicable environmental protection laws. The origin of this suit lies in the Navy’s current project of dredging a wider and deeper channel in the Thames River above New London to allow a new class of submarine (the SSN 688) to use the Navy’s submarine facility at Groton. The dredging itself is not being challenged here; instead the challenge is directed at the disposition of the dredged spoil at the “New London dump site,” which lies approximately two nautical miles directly off the entrance to New London Harbor and about one-and-one-half nautical miles to the west of Fishers Island in Long Island Sound. The total of the Navy’s dredging is calculated as some 2.8 million cubic yards of spoil. The project is scheduled to be done in two phases. Phase I, which began August 3, involves dredging the Thames River channel from a depth of 33 feet to a depth of 36 feet between the river’s mouth and the Underwater Systems Center (about halfway to the submarine base) and deepening the entrance to the Systems Center to 38 feet from a present depth of 35 feet. After a hiatus of approximately nine months from the completion of Phase I in June 1975, Phase II will commence. This portion of the project involves dredging the channel from the submarine base to about a mile above the Systems Center from a present depth of 33 feet to a depth of 36 feet. Concededly, the dredged material will be polluted, with especially high concentrations of volatile solids, industrial wastes, and Kjeldahl nitrogen. The New London dump site is apparently much freer of pollution than the bed of the Thames River, and the plaintiffs fear that the dredge spoil from the Thames will contaminate this relatively purer area. Additionally, the plaintiffs are concerned that dispersal of the spoil from this site will lead to pollution of estuaries and nursery grounds for marine life that exist inshore to the northwest of the dump site along the Connecticut coast. Putting these concerns into the language of a complaint, the plaintiffs argue that the decision to dispose of the dredge spoil at the New London dump site was “arbitrary and capricious” — a clear abuse of discretion that this court should nullify. This claim will be referred to below as the “substantive” objection to the Navy’s project. The plaintiffs also complain that the agencies involved inadequately complied with procedural requirements for making the decision to use the New London dump site. The parties do not dispute that the spoil disposal project was subject to the requirements of the National Environmental Protection Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4347 (1970) (hereinafter “NEPA”). Principal among these requirements is one demanding that an environmental impact statement (hereinafter “EIS”) be filed before the project is undertaken. A substantial body of case law has grown up around the issue of exactly what such a statement must contain, and the thrust of many of the plaintiffs’ claims is that the Navy’s EIS for this project is deficient in omitting required data. A broader but related claim is that the Navy’s EIS for this project was not the objective inquiry required by NEPA and regulations thereunder precedent to a decision but was instead a self-serving justification for a previously made decision to use the New London dump site. Two other related claims are that (1) the Army Corps of Engineers (hereinafter “the Corps”), not the Navy, should have prepared the EIS, and (2) even if the Navy was properly in charge of preparing the statement, it violated the requirements of NEPA by contracting the preparation of the EIS to a consultant instead of doing all the work on the statement by itself. The parties do not dispute that the Navy was required by the Water Pollution Control Act to get a permit from the Corps in order to dump the dredge spoil. The Corps granted such a permit on April 29, 1974, conditioning it upon institution of a program to monitor the environmental effects of the dumping. The plaintiffs argue that this action by the Corps was improper (1) because the Navy’s underlying EIS of December 1973 was deficient; (2) because the Corps itself failed to comply with applicable guidelines developed by the Environmental Protection Agency; and (3) because the monitoring program gives no protection against harmful dispersion of the spoil — it simply records it. On the basis of all these alleged violations of law, the plaintiffs ask this court to grant permanent injunctive relief against the continued dumping of dredge spoil from the Thames River project at the New London dump site After disposing of two preliminary issues, I will turn to the merits of the remaining substantive and' procedural objections that the plaintiffs have raised. I. Jurisdiction The jurisdiction of this court to hear the challenges based on alleged violations of NEPA is indisputedly proper under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1337 (1970). However, the defendants maintain that the court does not have jurisdiction of the objections based upon alleged violations of the Water Pollution Control Act. This Act contains a section giving jurisdiction over citizen suits, 33 U. S.C. § 1365 (Supp. II, 1972). One of the requirements of this section is that: “(b) No action may be commenced— (D . . . (A) prior to sixty days after the plaintiff has given notice of the alleged violation (i) to the Administrator [of EPA], (ii) to the State in which the alleged violation occurs, and (iii) to any alleged violator of the standard, limitation, or order .... Notice under this subsection shall be given in such manner as the [EPA] Administrator shall prescribe by regulation.” The regulations prescribed are set out in the margin. The plaintiffs gave the required notice on July 15, 1974 ; the complaint was filed on September 3, 1974, less than 60 days thereafter. Therefore, the plaintiffs’ claim to jurisdiction under 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (Supp. II, 1972) must fail. Cf. Montgomery Environmental Coalition v. Fri, 366 F.Supp. 261, 265-266 (D.D.C.1973); Brown v. Ruckelshaus, 364 F.Supp. 258, 265 n.10 (C.D.Cal.1973). II. Standing The standing of the plaintiffs to assert that the Corps and the Navy have violated NEPA is unchallenged here. The plaintiffs are all groups which assertedly contain numerous members who use Long Island Sound in one way or another. In showing potential actual injury from pollution of the Sound, they have shown enough to have standing to sue under Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U. S. 727, 92 S.Ct. 1361, 31 L.Ed.2d 636 (1972). See Montgomery Environmental Coalition v. Fri, 366 F.Supp. 261, 264 (D.D.C.1973). III. Authorship of the EIS One of the plaintiffs’ objections is that the Corps and not the Navy should have prepared the EIS. NEPA provides that “the responsible official” shall prepare an impact statement, and the CEQ Guidelines (not issued in final form until August 1973) provide guidance on which federal agency should be the “lead” agency and write the EIS when there is overlapping jurisdiction. The agency selection should turn upon “the time sequence in which the agencies become involved, the magnitude of their respective involvement, and their relative expertise in regard to the project’s environmental effects.” The plaintiffs contend, somewhat eonelusorily, that application of these guidelines to the instant case should have resulted in the Corps’ being chosen to write the EIS. The court does not view the guidelines as so pellucid, however. As to the time sequence (and assuming that the guidelines favor the agency who becomes involved at the earlier date), the Navy has the stronger case for being the lead agency since it initiated the dumping project. As to the magnitude of the agencies’ respective involvement, it was the Corps that had the statutory authority to select a site. But this was not merely a site selection project; it was a dumping project, and the Navy was to carry out all the actual dumping. As to relative environmental expertise, no data has been presented as to which agency was more experienced prior to January 1972 (when the Navy prepared the first draft of the impact statement) . It is true that where defects of procedure are urged in environmental eases, the standard a reviewing court will apply is very strict: “if the decision was reached proeedurally without individualized consideration and balancing of environmental factors — conducted fully and in good faith — it is the responsibility of the court to reverse.” However even where the challenge is to the procedures followed, the court must be convinced that error has been made. In the present instance the court is unable to conclude, on an examination of the record, that the Navy should not have been designated the lead agency for the dumping project here involved. Without a stronger showing of error, the court is unwilling to upset the agencies’ decision that the Navy should draft the EIS. Although admonished by Calvert Cliffs’ not to accord too much weight to the delay that following NEPA procedures properly might entail, the court finds it noteworthy that if an error in authorship were found here, the government would have to retreat all the way back to the EIS-drafting stage. If the statement were otherwise proper, invalidating the entire EIS process because of a mistake of authorship would be an extraordinarily harsh measure. There is no need to make an abstract decision about the boundary of responsibility between these agencies on which so much would turn. The purposes and policies behind NEPA were fulfilled in this case. The plaintiffs next argue that if the Navy was properly designated as the “responsible” agency to be charged with preparation of the EIS, it improperly abdicated its duty by contracting the job out to an independent consultant, the Ecosystems Division of Jason M. Cortell & Associates in Cambridge, Massachusetts (hereinafter “Ecosystems”). The Navy itself prepared the initial draft EIS in January 1972. This eight-page document was given to Ecosystems, along with comments received on it, appropriate background information, and instructions. Ecosystems then prepared the much more extensive revised draft EIS and final EIS. Lt. Charles T. Way, the Naval officer principally responsible for the EIS, reviewed and edited these drafts. Way testified that he confined himself to a coordinator’s role and did not question the content or accuracy of the studies the consultants used or the conclusions they drew therefrom. The plaintiffs contend that the Navy’s actions here represent an impermissible delegation of its duty as the “responsible official” to prepare the EIS. See 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2) (C) (1970); CEQ Guidelines, supra note 14, § 1500.7(c). The Second Circuit has been in the forefront of those courts requiring the responsible agency itself to prepare the EIS: a number of cases in this Circuit have held impact statements to be invalid because prepared by someone other than the agency. See Greene County Planning Bd. v. Federal Power Comm’n, 455 F.2d 412, 420-422 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 849, 93 S.Ct. 56, 34 L.Ed.2d 90 (1972); I-291 Why? Ass’n v. Burns, 372 F.Supp. 223, 243-247 (D. Conn.1974); Conservation Soc’y v. Secretary of Transp., 362 F.Supp. 627, 629-632 (D.Vt.1973); Committee to Stop Route 7 v. Volpe, 346 F.Supp. 731, 741 (D.Conn.1972). In all of these cases, the concern has been that the EIS preparer, a state agency, had an interest in seeing the project accepted as proposed and would therefore write a biased EIS. Bias in the impact statement, of course, renders impossible the fair and careful evaluation of a project’s environmental effects demanded by NEPA. Cf. Calvert Cliffs’ Coordinating Comm., Inc. v. United States Atomic Energy Comm’n, 146 U.S.App.D.C. 33, 449 F.2d 1109, 1115 (1971). This case is easily distinguishable. The preparer here was a consultant hired by and fully responsible to the Navy; Ecosystems had no self-interest that would be served by biasing the EIS. The major faetor motivating the decisions in the cases cited above is simply not present here. Indeed, there are compelling reasons why federal agencies should be allowed to use outside consultants, making them in effect adjuncts of the agency’s own staff for purposes of EIS preparation. A number of federal agencies may not undertake enough projects to make it cost-efficient to hire full-time people to work on impact statements. To prohibit agencies from hiring part-time consultants to do this work might compel them to utilize employees without any special expertise in this area to compile impact statements; an expectable result would be poorly written statements. Alternatively, prohibiting consultants might force agencies to hire full-time people for whom there was only part-time work. With the economy already in a tailspin due to “stagflation,” this court will not compel such a wasteful result. I hold that the use of a consulting firm responsible solely to the federal agency charged with preparation of the EIS does not violate the requirements of NEPA. IV. Integrity of the EIS Before considering the next claim it will be helpful to briefly set out the chronology of events leading up to the issuance of a permit to dump at New London. A. Background The Navy’s short original draft impact statement, prepared in January 1972, did not name a site for dumping. It provided simply that the dredge spoil would be disposed of “at a distance of approximately 23 to 50 miles from the mouth of the Thames River.” A number of the agencies to which the draft was circulated commented upon its deficiencies, and the Navy hired Ecosystems to prepare a revised draft. The revised draft, issued in May 1973, went into the issue of site selection much more thoroughly. The draft concluded that containment sites (those in which dumped spoil would remain) were preferable to dispersal sites and that Long Island Sound was a poor disposal area. This latter conclusion was based partly on the Navy’s own studies and partly on comments received from the EPA. The revised draft EIS recommended that the spoil be dumped at a previously used dump site, known as the Brenton Reef site, that lies off Newport in Rhode Island Sound. Exactly what happened thereafter is the subject of much dispute in this case. The following facts are fairly clear, however. On May 2, 1973, (before the revised draft EIS had been circulated) the Corps of Engineers refused as “premature” a request from the Navy for a permit to dump at Brenton Reef. The Corps at that time questioned the economic desirability of dumping so far from the site of the dredging and indicated that it was awaiting the results of studies of the New London dump site. These results were issued on May 25, 1973, in a Naval Oceanographic Office study, and the Corps began, in its own thinking, to lean heavily toward use of the New London dump site. The Corps’ scientific advisory group, the Scientific Subcommittee on Ocean Dredging, met on June 19, 1973, and actively considered using the New London dump site. This group has representatives from EPA, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, the U. S. Fish and Wildlife Service, and the Corps. By the time that the Subcommittee next met, on July 13, 1973, it had moved to recognizing “the New London spoiling site as the best site to use at the present time; it saw no need to transport spoils to another- site further to the east.” The EPA commented on the revised draft EIS on July 3, 1973, noting that a recent legislative change had made consideration of dump sites within Long Island Sound possible. All this activity culminated in the Navy’s issuance of an “Addendum” to the revised draft EIS on August 9, 1973, in which the dump site was changed from Brenton Reef to New London. Public hearings were held on the revised EIS plus Addendum, and a final EIS, based in part upon the comments of the Corps, was issued in December 1973. The fact that the Corps occupied a dual role as one of the commenting agencies to which the EIS was circulated and as the final decisionmaker has tended to cause some confusion in this case. But the Corps’ function as a comment agency in no way diminished its sole responsibility to select a site, and thus the Navy reapplied to the Corps for a permit to dump at New London. After the local headquarters of the Corps got clearance from its national headquarters in Washington, and after the Corps had given the EPA an opportunity, in conformity with the Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1344(c) (Supp. II, 1972), to “restrict or deny” dumping at New London, a permit was issued to the Navy on April 29, 1974, to dump the dredge spoil there. B. Issues and Analysis An EIS for major federal projects is required to implement the congressional command that all federal agencies shall help “insure that presently unquantified environmental amenities and values may be given appropriate consideration in decisionmaking along: with economic and technical considerations . . . .” 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2) (B) (1970). The plaintiffs argue that since the EIS is supposed to be an input to decisions, it is naturally important that the decisions not be made first, with the EIS serving simply as a post hoc justification for them. The CEQ guidelines for the preparation of impact statements concur: “In particular, agencies should keep in mind that such statements are to serve as a means of assessing the environmental impact of proposed agency actions, rather than as a justification for decisions already made.” The plaintiffs argue that this basic requirement for an EIS was not followed here — that the Corps made its site selection decision by June 27, 1973, and that it was therefore made in spite of, rather than because of, data on the environmental impact of dumping at New London. The plaintiffs contend that the final EIS that the Navy issued in December 1973, containing the first detailed analysis of the New London site, was nothing more than a justification of this decision. The defendants, on the other hand, contend that the Corps’ decision to use New London was not made until March 1974, by which time all of the input required by NEPA to be part of an EIS had been provided. They argue that the decision was therefore made with due regard to its environmental impact and was entirely proper On the parties’ view of the case, the court’s finding of the date of the Corps’ decision to use New London is critical. Indeed, the defendants as much as conceded that if the court should find the facts to be as characterized by the plaintiffs they would lose this case. The court cannot agree with the parties’ view of the case, however. No matter when the Corps’ decision to use New London was made, it is undisputed that it could have been altered until the last procedural step had been taken and the permit had been issued. Assuming arguendo that all of the necessary environmental data was at hand before the permit issued, the court is unwilling to invalidate the Corps’ action as long as the Navy supplied and the Corps considered the data in good faith. If it were acting in good faith, the Corps would presumably reevaluate a decision if subsequent information showed it to be mistaken. And as long as this evaluation of all the necessary input occurs before the permit issues and the decision is finalized, it should not matter when the Corps “decides” to use a particular site. Several factors compel the conclusion reached here. First, as noted earlier this year in I-291 Why? Ass’n v. Burns, 372 F.Supp. 223, 256-258 (D. Conn.1974), it is possible to cure deficient impact statements with timely “supplementals” that include the data necessary to make the EIS sufficient and have been properly circulated among the appropriate “comment agencies.” See Citizens for Mass Transit Against Freeways v. Brinegar, 357 F.Supp. 1269, 1274 (D.Ariz.1973); cf. Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Froehlke, 368 F. Supp. 231, 236-237 (W.D.Mo.1973) (supplemental sufficient even though not circulated for comment). But see Daly v. Volpe, 350 F.Supp. 252, 259 (W.D. Wash.1972). If the Corps considered subsequent input in good faith, there would seem to be no reason to differentiate what has occurred in this case (in which supplemental data came in and was incorporated in the final EIS) from the cases cited above (in which the data was circulated in supplemental impact statements). Second, the normal remedy when an EIS is found by a court to be deficient is an injunction and an order to shore up the statement. See, e. g., Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Morton, 337 F.Supp. 165 (D.D.C.1971), aff’d, 148 U.S.App.D.C. 5, 458 F.2d 827 (1972). Even though the project may already be underway, all that is demanded is that the necessary data be collected and considered. It would seem anomalous to hold that these agencies, who at worst tried to correct whatever deficiencies may have existed when they decided in June 1973 to use New London, are to be treated more harshly than those who have to be ordered by the courts to take corrective action. The plaintiffs’ argument has substantial force in urging that the purpose of NEPA’s requirement of an EIS was to make sure that the decisionmaker consider the environmental impacts of major projects. An EIS should not be simply a post hoc justification for a decision already made. However, the way to insure that the EIS is properly used'is not to deny the use of supplemental statements after a preliminary decision is made, but to demand that these supplementals be prepared and considered in good faith. In the present case the good faith of the Corps and the Navy is admitted by the plaintiffs, and the court finds no indications of bad faith by these agencies in the record before it. I therefore conclude that there is no violation of NEPA’s EIS requirement if all of the information required by law was placed before the Corps in the form of an EIS and properly circulated supplementals in advance of the time the Corps issued the Navy a permit to dump at New London. V. Alleged Deficiencies in the EIS What is considered next is the adequacy of the information before the Corps. The plaintiffs contend that the information was inadequate under NEPA standards in the several respects considered below. A. Cumulation of Impacts One of the plaintiffs’ claims is that the EIS is deficient because it assesses the impact of this dredge spoil disposal project in isolation. The plaintiffs argue that NEPA requires that the EIS contain data on the impact that this and all other similar projects will have. They stress that this project is but a part of the dumping which has occurred or which may be expected to occur at New London, and they argue that it is quite important for the decisionmaker to be given an overview of the impacts of dumping. For example, the plaintiffs contend that if such information had been in the EIS, it is “possible that looking at the magnitude of spoils involved, as well as dredged material from projects elsewhere in Long Island [Sound], Congress, or even the Corps itself, might have concluded that it was time to develop [a] container island project.” In arguing that the Navy should have considered the impact of this and all other dumping, the plaintiffs rely upon the highway segmentation cases. In those cases impact statements have sometimes been held deficient because they considered a deceptively small portion of a much larger project. See, e. g., Indian Lookout Alliance v. Volpe, 484 F.2d 11 (8th Cir. 1973); Conservation Soc’y v. Secretary of Transp., 362 F.Supp. 627 (D.Vt. 1973); Committee to Stop Route 7 v. Volpe, 346 F.Supp. 731 (D.Conn.1972). The segmentation cases do not provide a coherent rationale for determining when the impacts of different projects must be cumulated in a nonhighway context. However, the District of Columbia Circuit has done so in a case considering whether an EIS is required for a projected wide-reaching technology development program. In Scientists’ Inst. for Public Information, Inc. v. Atomic Energy Comm’n, 156 U.S.App.D.C. 395, 481 F.2d 1079 (1973), Judge Skelly Wright warned of the bandwagon effect some projects, there the nationwide breeder reactor project, have: “To wait until a technology attains the stage of complete commercial feasibility before considering the possible adverse environmental effects attendant upon ultimate application of the technology will undoubtedly frustrate meaningful consideration and balancing of environmental costs against economic and other benefits. Modern technological advances typically stem from massive investments in research and development, as is the case here. Technological advances are therefore capital investments and, as such, once brought to a stage of commercial feasibility the investment in their development acts to compel their application. Once there has been, in the terms of NEPA, ‘an irretrievable commitment of resources’ in the technology development stage, the balance of environmental costs and economic and other benefits shifts in favor of ultimate application of the technology. ” In the instant case, however, there is no bandwagon effect. Dredging the Thames and dumping the spoil at New London involves only the slightest investment that will compel further actions; this is a single project, almost entirely self-contained. Thus the court is unable to agree with the plaintiffs that the EIS should have considered the cumulative impact of this and all or any other projects. The plaintiffs’ concern that many projects are going on, each of which is adding pollutants to the Sound, cannot be belittled. It may be true that as each incremental harm is imposed and as the Sound becomes more polluted the need to preserve the purity of the Sound will seem lessened to the next decisionmaker. Thus a comprehensible survey providing an overview of both the Sound and the projects which would pollute it is eminently desirable, and the court is informed that such a study is presently being undertaken by a special multistate commission. The duty to discuss the impact of all possible pollutants canndt be imposed on each isolated project, however. This is a single dredging operation unrelated to any other. The appropriate impact to consider in this case was the one actually considered: the impact of the dumping of the Navy’s Thames River spoil. B. Impact Area to be Discussed Another alleged deficiency in the EIS is closely intertwined with that just considered: the plaintiffs complain that it was not enough to consider the impact of the Thames spoil on the New London dump site. Instead, the EIS should have considered the impact of the spoil on the Sound as a whole, they argue. To bolster this contention they adduce distinguished opinion that the Sound is a self-contained ecosystem in which interrelationships abound and any change affects the whole. There is not much authority for the plaintiffs to draw upon, and they rely mainly upon language addressed to a somewhat different issue in Hanly v. Kleindienst, 471 F.2d 823, 830-831 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 908, 93 S.Ct. 2290, 36 L.Ed.2d 974 (1973) (citation omitted): “In the absence of any Congressional or administrative interpretation of the term, we are persuaded that in deciding whether a major federal action will ‘significantly’ affect the quality of the human- environment [and thus whether an EIS must be prepared] the agency in charge, although vested with broad discretion, should normally be required to review the proposed action in the light of at least two relevant factors: (1) the extent to which the action will cause adverse environmental effects in excess of those created by existing uses in the area affected by it, and (2) the absolute quantitative adverse environmental effects of the action itself, including the cumulative harm that results from its contribution to existing adverse conditions or uses in the affected area. Where conduct conforms to existing uses, its adverse consequences will usually be less significant than when it represents a radical change. Absent some showing that an entire neighborhood is in the process of redevelopment, its existing environment, though frequently below an ideal standard, represents a norm that cannot be ignored. For instance, one more highway in an area honeycombed with roads usually has less of an adverse impact than it if were constructed through a roadless public park. “Although the existing environment of the area which is the site of a major federal action constitutes one criterion to be considered, it must be recognized that even a slight increase in adverse conditions that form an existing environmental milieu may sometimes threaten harm that is significant. One more factory polluting air and water in an area zoned for industrial use may represent the straw that breaks the back of the environmental camel. Hence the absolute, as well as comparative, effects of a major federal action must be considered.” Even if the plaintiffs’ view of the law is correct, however, there can be no requirement that an EIS do what is scientifically impossible. At most the agency can be compelled to disclose the impossibility. See Scientists’ Inst. for Public Information, Inc. v. Atomic Energy Comm’n, 156 U.S.App.D.C. 395, 481 F.2d 1079, 1092 (1973); Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Morton, 148 U.S.App.D.C. 5, 458 F.2d 827, 837 (1972). The defendants have presented uncontroverted evidence that it would be scientifically and practically very difficult, although desirable, to ascertain what impact the dumping of dredge spoil at the New London dump site would have throughout the entire Sound. Although not specifically mentioned in the EIS itself, that uncertainty is clearly inferable from the fact that the EIS discloses scientific uncertainty as to the much narrower issue of whether this dumping project will adversely affect even the immediate environs of the dump site. It would be meaningless for the court to require that an EIS which indicates that it is already at the bounds of scientific knowledge also indicate that inquiries beyond that frontier are not possible. No fault is found with the EIS on this score. C. Consideration of Alternatives The plaintiffs make two claims of deficiency with respect to the consideration demanded by NEPA of alternatives to dumping at the New London site. The first is that the treatment afforded those alternatives which were considered was inadequate. Alternatives which the Navy considered may be broadly divided into two classes', alternative underwater disposal sites and alternative methods of disposal. The second of the plaintiffs’ claims is that other alternatives existed that should have been considered but were not. 1. Treatment of considered alternatives The requirement that alternatives be considered is one of the most stringent of all those governing impact statements; it is the “linchpin” of NEPA. The purpose of NEPA, of course, is to insure that decisionmakers will make reasoned choices that take environmental impacts into account, so the comparison of alternatives is an absolute prerequisite to provide such choices to the decisionmaker and thus guarantee successful implementation of the Act. It is not enough to consider alternatives in'a conclusory fashion in the EIS. Not only must the statement’s drafter have a basis for his assertions, but also he must present enough of this data that those who must comment on the statement are able to evaluate his recommended choice. Otherwise the comment process mandated by NEPA, 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2) (C) (1970), could not proceed intelligently, for those who comment would be forced to accept the drafter’s conclusions on faith alone. The defendants argue correctly that the requirement of discussing alternatives is subject to a rule of reason. Certainly the impact statement need not study every alternative in the same detail as it considers the recommended course of action. What is required is that “ ‘the agency shall develop information and provide descriptions of the alternatives in adequate detail for subsequent reviewers and decision makers ... to consider the alternatives along with the principle [sic] recommendations.’ ‘Sufficient analysis of such alternatives and their costs and impact on the environment should accompany the proposed action through the agency review process in order not to foreclose prematurely options which might have less detrimental effects.’” Thus, although NEPA requires an investigation of alternatives, it does not require an exhaustive study of an alternative about which so little is known that implementation would not be feasible. See, e. g., pp. 1283-1284 infra; cf. Sierra Club v. Lynn, 502 F.2d 43 (5th Cir. 1974); Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Morton, 148 U.S.App.D. C. 5, 458 F.2d 827 (1971). Other alternatives may be environmentally worse than the one recommended (even though less expensive), and court will not interfere (nor is anyone likely to ask it to interfere) when the agency itself summarily rejects an alternative as involving too much danger to the environment. See pp. 1283, 1285 infra. Even though NEPA’s requirements are flexible, however, the flexibility does not provide “an escape hatch for footdragging agencies . . . . Congress did not intend the Act to be such a paper tiger. Indeed, the requirement of environmental consideration ‘to the fullest extent possible’ sets a high standard for the agencies, a standard which must be rigorously enforced by the reviewing courts.” If an agency would summarily reject an alternative it must at least indicate the basis for the summary rejection so that the comment process may be effective. See Scientists’ Inst. for Public Information, Inc. v. Atomic Energy Comm’n, 156 U.S.App.D.C. 395, 481 F.2d 1079, 1092 (1973). It is extremely difficult to respond, for example, to a statement that an alternative is “too expensive.” Cf. I-291 Why? Ass’n v. Burns, 372 F. Supp. 223, 248 (D.Conn.1974). On the other hand, if the statement is that the alternative is “too expensive because it would cost $5 billion,” possibilities for comment abound. Many courts have agreed and required an economic-cost-benefit analysis to be included in the EIS. See Silva v. Lynn, 482 F.2d 1282, 1287 (1st Cir. 1973); Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Froehlke, 473 F.2d 346, 352 (8th Cir. 1972); Montgomery v. Ellis, 364 F.Supp. 517, 522 (N.D.Ala. 1973); Conservation Soc’y v. Secretary of Transp., 362 F.Supp. 627, 635 (D.Vt. 1973) (Oakes, Cir. J.); cf. Calvert Cliffs’ Coordinating Comm., Inc. v. United States Atomic Energy Comm’n, 146 U.S.App.D.C. 33, 449 F.2d 1109, 1123 (1971); Daly v. Volpe, 350 F.Supp. 252, 259 (W.D.Wash.1972); EPA Regulations, Preparation of Environmental Impart Statements, 40 C.F.R. § 6.32(d) (1974): “Where practicable, benefits and costs should be quantified or described qualitatively in a way which will aid in a more objective judgment of their value. Where such an analysis is prepared, it shall be appended to the statement. . . . This analysis shall evaluate alternatives in such a manner that reviewers independently can judge their relative desirability. In addition, the reasons why the proposed action is believed by the Agency to be the best course of action shall be explained. . . . ” To summarize, NEPA does not require an infinite expansion of an impact statement, but it does not require a full disclosure of the basis on which the decision is to be made. See Monroe County Conservation Council, Inc. v. Volpe, 472 F.2d 693, 697 (2d Cir. 1972). Whether or not this full disclosure has been made is naturally a determination that must be made on a case-by-case basis. Thus I now turn to the “Alternatives” section of the Navy’s EIS. Exclusive of maps, the EIS devotes only five pages to a direct discussion of alternatives to dumping spoil at the New London site. The first alternatives considered are total or partial land disposal. The statement identifies five potential land disposal sites and concludes that they do not include sufficient area to make total land disposal feasible. With respect to partial land disposal, two of the sites are summarily rejected because they have been identified by other agencies as “areas of significant ecological importance.” As indicated above, this is a proper ground for summary rejection of an alternative. The other three potential areas are rejected in varying detail. The area of each is given and asserted to “be too small to allow settlement of the suspended solids from liquid dredge spoil before discharge back into the river.” This recital probably provides enough data with respect to the failure of solids to settle that one with some knowledge in the area would be able to comment on the accuracy of the Navy’s assessment that spoil solids will return to the river. . The second alternative considered is “dredge spoil farming,” a technique in which the spoil is used to refurbish denuded areas. The Navy indicated that one type of spoil farming was being experimented with in Maryland, but that “there is insufficient information to justify large-scale use of the spoils in this manner.” Because of the reference to the Maryland experiment, the EIS has a sufficient basis for its rejection of this form of spoil farming. The Navy has revealed the source of the data on which it relied, which will give a commenting agency an opportunity to challenge the adequacy of the Navy’s interpretation by looking at this data independently. See Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Morton, 148 U.S.App.D.C. 5, 458 F.2d 827, 837 (1972). Furthermore the grounds for the Navy’s decision are prima facie proper: an agency is not required by NEPA’s rule of reason to develop new technologies as alternatives. With re-spect to two other types of spoil farming (use as fill in strip mines; use as fertilizer), however, the Navy did not claim insufficient information; its sole basis for rejecting these alternatives was stated in one short paragraph: “The drawbacks to these alternatives include great distance and transportation costs in addition to the political jurisdictional problems associated with long distance transportation of the spoils, truck or rail traffic with the resultant increases in noise and air pollution, possible leaching of toxic materials from the spoils and the subsequent contamination of land and water resources.” While this is terse, it is adequate. The EIS contains a thorough chemical analysis, sufficient to disclose to commenting agencies its possibility for use as fertilizer. There are no strip mines in this district, and it is obvious that transportation overland is much more costly than transportation by barge for two-and-one-half miles out to the New London dump site. The third alternative considered is incineration. This alternative is also under study elsewhere: “Lockheed Shipbuilding and Construction Company, Seattle, Washington, has designed a waterborne waste treatment system utilizing old ship hulls.” The Navy’s rejection of incineration is summary, but, as above, the reference to a known project suffices to avoid a deficiency in the EIS. Likewise, in considering container disposal the EIS refers to a detailed study of containerization of spoil made by the Corps in the EIS for one of its projects; finding that the results (especially in terms of cost) are less desirable than those of other alternatives, the Navy summarily rejects containerization. The court holds that the Navy EIS has given sufficient consideration to this alternative. The Navy EIS gives somewhat more detailed attention to the possibility of building islands out of the dredge spoil. Several ongoing experiments are cited that to date have received favorable reports. However the Navy rejects the idea quickly on several bases: “Against the development of such islands is the lack of information concerning the impact such construction would have on marine life in the area. An extensive environmental impact study would need to be completed before such a project could go forward. Impediment to navigation and aesthetics in the areas chosen are also negative aspects which must be considered. Not all material from dredging operations is suitable for island construction. Much of the dredged material would be unsuitable and would need to be separated and disposed of elsewhere. . . . [T]he cost of utilization of disposal islands would be exceedingly high under current practices and . . . there would be jurisdictional problems surrounding control of ultimately chosen sites.” The court finds these reasons for rejecting this alternative entirely sufficient under the rule of reason. The idea seems to involve environmental risks from erosion of the island wherever built in exactly the same way that use of the New London dump site poses dangers from erosion and dispersal of the dredge spoil. Thus, whatever the benefits to be expected from this alternative, they will not be such as to alleviate all the problems posed by the alternative the Navy has proposed. On the negative side, it is obvious that to separate the spoil would be quite expensive, and enough is revealed about the composition of this material that those who must comment should be able to knowledgeably evaluate the Navy’s claim that the cost would be “exceedingly high.” Having considered alternative methods for disposing of the spoil, the next matter to be considered is the information revealed in the statement relating to alternative sites for underwater disposal. Dumping at dispersal sites (sites which will foster dispersal of the spoil) is quickly rejected because scientists do not agree on the long-range effects on marine biota of spoil intake and because current scientific opinion # advises against the use of dispersal sites on environmental grounds. The court has already indicated that this type of summary treatment of an alternative is proper; in any event, the plaintiffs do not seem to challenge the EIS' treatment of a dispersal-site alternative. The plaintiffs emphatically challenge the Navy’s consideration of alternative containment sites. A page and a half of the EIS’ treatment of alternatives is devoted to consideration of three alternative containment sites in Long Island Sound (“Sites 1, 2, and 3”). Site 2, located in the plains area northwest of Block Island, is rejected because the environmental impact of dumping there would be disastrous; this conclusion is not attacked by the plaintiffs, and the court finds the Navy’s treatment of this site entirely proper. The Navy rejected Sites 1 and 3 because it lacked sufficient information about the environmental impacts which would occur should the spoil be dumped at these sites. A preliminary question is whether the Navy was completely excused from developing such information about these or' any other sites in Long Island Sound. In its comments on the January 1972 draft EIS the EPA indicated that Long Island Sound should not be considered as a potential dump site, a recommendation that the Navy adopted. It was not until mid-1973 that changes in thinking by EPA and the Corps led the Navy to believe that the use of a dump site in Long Island Sound was permissible. No more than six months later, the final EIS, recommending the New London site, was released. Given this chronology, it is not at all surprising that the Navy lacked data on alternative disposal sites within Long Island Sound. The real question is whether, under the circumstances, the Navy was obligated in mid-1973 to delay its EIS, its dredging project, and its deployment of the SSN 688 submarine in order to generate this data. Or, to put it in other words, does the fact that the Navy legitimately excluded the Sound from consideration until mid-1973, combined with the defense interest in deployment of the new submarine class, excuse what might otherwise be deficient treatment of alternative containment sites by the EIS ? The court must conclude that the Navy’s obligation to discuss Sites 1 and 3 is not excused. It appears that no court has ever been asked to rule on the sufficiency of the consideration of alternatives where there had arisen a situation similar to the Navy’s prior justifiable exclusion of the Sound. However, I believe there is guidance in the eases of a couple of years ago dealing with whether an EIS was required for projects begun before the effective date of NEPA. In those cases courts were also faced with “innocent” agencies, for they had laid their plans and begun their work before there was any requirement of an EIS. Most courts found that NEPA did not apply retroactively to invalidate projects that had received final approval before the Act became applicable, but that it did apply to ongoing projects, i. e., those in which decisions were yet to be made. The latter group of cases is more closely analogous to the posture of the Navy’s dredging project as of mid-1973. When EPA withdrew its objections to a Long Island Sound site the Navy had circulated a revised draft EIS, but the final site decision had not been made, and the dredging contract had not been awarded. The project was still in the planning stage and, by analogy to the cases cited above, subject to all the requirements of NEPA. Thus, even though the consideration of Long Island , Sound alternatives might properly have been summary before mid-1973, thereafter the Navy could not rely on lack of information per se as a basis for rejecting alternative sites. Neither is the Navy project excused from fully considering the Long Island Sound alternatives because of the importance of dredging the Thames in time to accommodate the first of the new submarines. As the Sixth Circuit pointed out in Environmental Defense Fund v. TVA, 468 F.2d 1164 (6th Cir. 1972), NEPA clearly requires that “ ‘each agency of the Federal Government shall comply with the directives [of NEPA] unless the existing law applicable to such agency’s operations expressly prohibits or makes full compliance with one of the directives impossible. . . . ’ . . . Accordingly, if the . . . Project is subject to the NEPA, appellants should not be permitted to rely upon ‘[considerations of administrative difficulty, delay or economic cost’ to support a claim of exemption. ” Because the Navy’s project was concededly subject to NEPA, this court must conclude that Congress’ intent was that the environmental concerns protected by NEPA would outweigh any interest of the Navy that would be harmed by full compliance with the Act. t *Thus the question arises whether, under the rule of reason, the Navy’s treatment of Sites 1 and 3 in the EIS was adequate to meet the requirements of NEPA. In answering this question, it is important to understand how the rule of reason applies in this case. Thus it is important to realize how limited is current scientific knowledge, even with the best of testing procedures, with respect to the environmental effects of dredge spoil disposal. The Corps has said: “With the existing data, it is almost impossible to differentiate between effects from one site to another, and there is a very obvious need to vigorously pursue a continued research program to fill in the many gaps that exist.” Moreover, it is important to recognize that the Navy and the Corps are actively pursuing such research, largely by means of studying what happens to the spoil dumped at New London. “Congress has recently authorized the Corps to undertake a nationwide 5-year $30 million research program to study the effects of spoil disposal.” This type of detailed research obviously cannot be done in a vacuum — what is required is some dumped dredge spoil whose fate can be studied. The cages do not permit the courts to establish a timetable for the ascertainment of standards and methods for measuring the effect of the motion of the sea upon the dispersal of the separate ingredients in the spoil. Whether to proceed without such a study or to postpone the project while such a study is being undertaken is a question for the decisionmaker. Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Corps of Eng’rs, 325 F.Supp. 749, 760 (E.D. Ark.1971), adhered to, 342 F.Supp. 1211 (E.D.Ark.), aff’d, 470 F.2d 289 (8th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 931, 93 S.Ct. 2749, 37 L.Ed.2d 160 (1973). The rule of reason is also informed by the scope of the risk that the project would create. In this instance polluted material which is attributable to sources other than the Navy project is being removed from the Thames River, which can only have a beneficial effect on the marine life located in the river, to be disposed of elsewhere, further from shore and deeper under water. The EIS has done a good job in considering what will happen in the immediate environs of the site at which it is disposed; at issue is whether or not the spoil will thereafter disperse and, to some extent, the danger that will be posed should it disperse. It is noteworthy that although other dredge spoil from Connecticut, including much from the Thames River, has previously been dumped at New London, the plaintiffs have presented no evidence that this prior disposal has dispersed and harmed the marine life along the Connecticut shore that they seek to protect by this action. Thus the scope of the risk of this dumping, while perhaps not insubstantial, by no means amounts to a certainty of significantly adverse environmental damage. The Navy contends that in light of these factors the rule of reason demands no more than has been provided. With respect to Site 3 there is almost a page of discussion about environmental impacts that might be expected should the Thames spoil be dumped there With respect to Site 1 the individualized consideration is less extensive, but the EIS does indicate that a significant danger of environmental harm is indicated by an analysis of the site’s water chemistry and bottom substrate. In addition, much generalized material about the characteristics of eastern Long Island Sound, where Site 1 is found, is contained in earlier portions of the EIS. The court concludes that these provisions of information are adequate, in light of the rule of reason, to satisfy the Navy’s duty to consider alternatives under NEPA. Cf. Fayetteville Area Chamber of Commerce v. Volpe, 6 E.R.C. 1891 (E.D.N.C. Feb. 1, 1974). The plaintiffs also challenge the impact statement’s consideration of the so-called “acid site,” which lies about ten miles southeast of Block Island. However, I must reach a conclusion with respect to this claim similar to that reached with respect to the claims considered above, even though the plaintiffs have particularly urged that the acid site deserved full consideration in the EIS because it is the primary alternative to the New London site. The Corps’ Scientific Subcommittee on Ocean Dredging recommended and the Navy agreed to this site for study concurrent with the use of the New London dump site in case adverse effects at New London should necessitate relocation of the dumping. Moreover, the Corps requested and the EPA gave the acid site provisional certification as a dump site in September and October 1973, which was after the Navy recommended use of New London but before the final EIS was issued. The treatment given the acid site in the EIS' is brief: its selection for concurrent study is disclosed as is the fact that to use this site, if technically feasible, would cost “at least $8 million more than using the New London dumping ground.” The brevity of this treatment cannot be equated with inadequacy, however. The acid site alternative is of uncertain technical feasibility, is almost twice as expensive to use as the New London alternative, and is to be studied concurrently with use of the New London dump site. Especially given the Corps’ rational policy of preferring to use established dump sites (about which more is and can be known) when possible, the court does not find summary treatment of the acid site in the EIS violative of the rule of reason. Indeed it would make little sense to exhaustively study such an expensive and' uncertain alternative when the study will be necessarily inconclusive. The consideration of this alternative is sufficient to satisfy the Navy’s obligations under NEPA. 2. Development of alternatives The duty to actively develop alternatives stems from the same authority as the duty to discuss fully those alternatives that are considered — 42 U.S. C. §§ 4332(2) (C) (iii), (D) (1970). And the duty to actively, develop alternatives is also subject to a rule of reason similar to that considered above: not every alternative that anyone could dream up must be given the full treatment that NEPA demands for those alternatives that are considered (and are not summarily rejected for proper reasons). See, e. g., Life of the Land v. Brinegar, 485 F.2d 460, 470-472 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 961, 94 S.Ct. 1979, 40 L.Ed.2d 312 (1974); Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Morton, 148 U.S.App.D.C. 5, 458 F.2d 827, 834-838 (1972); I-291 Why? Ass’n v. Burns, 372 F.Supp. 223, 251-252 (D.Conn.1974). The rule of reason seems especially important in a case like this, where the issue is consideration of alternative offshore containment sites. Unless the Navy studied in the detail required for considered alternatives all of Long Island, Block Island, and Rhode Island Sounds, plus portions of the surrounding ocean, it is obvious that someone would be able to name a site that had not been explored. Obviously the Navy’s failure to make this complete study (the magnitude of which would have been far greater than any other oceanographic effort of which this court is aware) should not preclude it from disposal of its dredge spoil. The rule of reason applied sensibly to this type of case requires only consideration of enough feasible alternatives that a reasoned choice can be made by the decisionmaker. See Friends of the Earth v. United States Environmental Protection Agency, 499 F.2d 1118, 1126 (2d Cir. 1974); Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. United States Environmental Protection Agency, 494 F.2d 519, 524-525 (2d Cir. 1974). The plaintiffs’ claims that the Navy EIS has not considered some feasible alternative containment sites must be examined in light of this rule. The plaintiffs first commend to the Navy in a general way “[d]eeper sites, further removed from shore, with parameters far more clearly evidencing containment.” Read most charitably, this formulation suggests that the Navy should have found an example of a deep site far offshore and included an analysis of it in the EIS so that the decision-maker could see the cost of achieving better containment than is possible in sites closer to the shore. In making this argument, however, the plaintiffs ignore the fact that the Navy had concluded that, although knowledge in the area is slight, current scientific opinion advised against adding pollutants to deep ocean areas. It appears, in other words, that the Navy concluded that the sites proposed by the plaintiffs were not feasible and consideration of them thus would not aid the decisionmaker in reaching a reasoned choice. This court does not find fault with this conclusion. The plaintiffs also argue that the Brenton Reef site, recommended by the Navy in the revised draft EIS (Exh. 4), was completely and improperly dropped from consideration in the final EIS. They contend that this alternative, above all, should have been considered in the impact statement. However, the defendants correctly point out that the final EIS incorporates by reference the discussion of Brenton Reef in the revised draft EIS. Thus the only question with respect to the EIS’ treatment of Brenton Reef can be whether it was deficient; this issue the plaintiffs specifically decline to raise. VI. Alleged Errors in the Impact Statement The plaintiffs make three additional claims with respect to the impact statement: (1) that the role of the Corps’ Scientific Advisory Subcommittee in the decisionmaking process was misreported by the final EIS; (2) that the change between the revised draft and final statements in the conclusion as to which site was the “best” containment site environmentally (Brenton Reef in the revised draft EIS; New London in the final EIS) was unsupported by any evidence; and (3 that the finding' of the Naval Oceanographic Office study that the New London site exhibited short term containment was unfounded. The standard of review to be applied to these sorts of challenges differs from the strict “procedural” standard used above. At issue here is not whether the agency has turned square corners in following the procedures demanded by NEPA, but whether its findings are supported. With respect to this type of issue the test is whether the agency has acted arbitrarily and capriciously or on the basis of insubstantial evidence. See Conservation Soc’y v. Secretary of Transp., 362 F.Supp. 627, 632-633, 635 (D.Vt.1973); Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Corps of Eng’rs, 342 F.Supp. 1211 (E.D.Ark.), aff’d, 470 F.2d 289 (8th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 931, 93 S.Ct. 2749, 37 L.Ed.2d 160 (1973). This standard, of course, is precisely that to which most agency findings are subjected during judicial review under the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1970). See, e. g., Wong Wing Hang v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 360 F.2d 715, 717-719 (2d Cir. 1966). A. The Role of the Scientific Advisory Subcommittee The plaintiffs’ first claim of error is based on the impact statement’s description of the role of the Corps’ Scientific Advisory Subcommittee in influencing the Navy to change from its recommendation of Brenton Reef in the revised draft EIS to its advocacy of the New London dump site in the final EIS. The Navy’s description is summarized as follows: “As a result of the recommendations of the Scientific Advisory Subcommittee, the Navy has been directed by the Army Corps of Engineers to utilize the New London Dumping Ground.” It is the emphasized language that the plaintiffs claim constitutes a distortion. Specifically, they say that the Subcommittee only concurred in the Corps’ recommendation of the New London site, an interpretation based on documents by the Corps to that effect. According to the plaintiffs, this misstatement of the Subcommittee’s • role made it appear that the switch to the New London dump site was made on the basis of scientific considerations rather than on the basis of cost and other considerations. The defendants do not deny that this characterization of the Subcommittee’s role is incorrect; in fact, the Corps itself first objected to this language. However, the defendants do argue that this mistake is not sufficiently serious to invalidate the EIS. See Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Corps of Eng’rs, 342 F.Supp. 1211 (E.D.Ark.), aff’d, 470 F.2d 289 (8th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 931, 93 S.Ct. 2749, 37 L.Ed.2d 160 (1973). The court agrees. The EIS does not, as a whole, distort the role played by the Subcommittee. In fact exactly the point contended for by the plaintiffs — that the Subcommittee’s decision was made on the basis of cost and other considerations — is explicitly made by the EIS. The Navy’s misstatement is simply harmless error. ll. The Final Impact Statement’s Conclusion The conclusion of the revised draft EIS was: “Of the several containment sites, the most environmentally suited for the material to be disposed of is the previously spoiled dump site in Rhode Island Sound [Brenton Reef] . . . .” By the time the final EIS