Anderson v. Firestone (499 F. Supp. 1027, 1980)

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

STAFFORD, District Judge.

This cause came before the court on October 9, 1980, for a bench trial based on the parties’ statement of stipulated facts, legal memoranda (Documents 4 and 10), and oral argument thereon. Jurisdiction is founded upon 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3) and plaintiffs seek declaratory and injunctive relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2201 and 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

STATEMENT OF STIPULATED FACTS

1. On April 24, 1980, Plaintiff, John B. Anderson, announced that he would seek the office of President of the United States as an independent candidate.

2. On or about May 20,1980, representatives of Plaintiff, John B. Anderson, met with Defendant, Dorothy Glisson, to determine the steps Plaintiff Anderson needed to take in order to appear on the November 4, 1980 general election ballot.

3. At the time of the May 20, 1980 conference, Plaintiff Anderson had not selected a vice-presidential nominee.

4. During the conference, Defendant Glisson advised Plaintiff Anderson’s representative:

(a) That to appear on the ballot, Plaintiff Anderson would need to obtain and submit petitions signed by one percent of the registered voters in Florida;

(b) That to be accepted, the petition had to conform to the forms prescribed by the Secretary of State;

(c) The prescribed form (Exhibit A attached to Document 3), requires the naming of a joint ticket, i. e., the names of both Presidential and Vice-Presidential candidates.

5. When told at this conference that Plaintiff Anderson had not yet selected a vice-presidential running mate, and, therefore, did not have a name to place on the petition for Vice-President, Defendant Glisson advised that if a vice-presidential candidate’s name was not placed on the petition, the petition would not be accepted.

6. When asked what would be the effect of placing the name of a surrogate vice-presidential candidate on the petition and whether a substitution of the actual vice-presidential candidate on the ticket could later occur, Defendant Glisson told Plaintiff Anderson’s representatives that the name of the vice-presidential candidate on the petitions would be the name placed on the ballot.

7. At the time of and after the preparation, execution, and submissions of the petitions for Plaintiff Anderson his agents informed Defendant and through her, Defendant Firestone, that as Anderson had not yet selected his actual vice-presidential nominee, the name of Milton Eisenhower would be included on the petition form solely as a surrogate candidate until such time as the actual selection had been made by Plaintiff Anderson.

8. Before August 15, 1980, Plaintiff Anderson met the requirements of Section 103.021(3), Florida Statutes, and filed more than the required number of petition signatures necessary to place the Plaintiff Anderson’s ticket on the November 4, 1980 Florida general election ballot.

9. On or about September 2, 1980, the Department of State certified that Plaintiff Anderson and Milton Eisenhower had complied with the requirements of Section 103.-021(3), Florida Statutes, and would be placed on the November 4, 1980 Florida general election ballot.

10. However, on August 15,1980, Milton Eisenhower had written to Robert Graham, Governor of the State of Florida, and announced his withdrawal as Plaintiff Anderson’s vice-presidential running mate. This withdrawal was conditioned upon the State of Florida’s legal determination that Plaintiff Anderson’s actual vice-presidential nominee would appear on the general election ballot.

11. On August 25,1980, Plaintiff Anderson announced that his actual running mate for vice-president was Plaintiff, Patrick J. Lucey, and requested that Plaintiff Lucey be placed on the general election ballot to fill the vacancy created by Milton Eisenhower.

12. Defendants Glisson and Firestone have refused to apply the vacancy provisions of Section 100.111(3), Florida Statutes, to the Plaintiff Anderson’s ticket, and have refused to substitute Plaintiff Lucey for the withdrawn surrogate vice-presidential candidate, Milton Eisenhower.

The court adopts the parties’ Statement of Stipulated Facts as the court’s Findings of Fact in this case.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

The issue before the court is whether the plaintiffs are denied equal protection of the laws by the State’s failure to provide the same or similar mechanism for filling the vacancy created by the withdrawal of an independent vice-presidential nominee as is provided in Section 100.111(3), Florida Statutes, to party candidates.

Although the United States Constitution grants broad powers to the States .to regulate elections, this power is subject to limitations imposed by, among others, the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution. Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 89 S.Ct. 5, 21 L.Ed.2d 24 (1968). Laws which impact upon the exercise of the franchise may burden two constitutionally protected rights: “the right of individuals to associate for the advancement of political beliefs and the right of qualified voters ... to cast their votes effectively.” Williams v. Rhodes, supra at 30, 89 S.Ct. at 10.

The State has a legitimate interest in limiting the ballot to serious contenders who are truly independent and demonstrate substantial community support. Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 746, 94 S.Ct. 1274, 1277, 39 L.Ed.2d 714 (1974). A state has “an interest, if not a duty, to protect the integrity of its political processes from frivolous or fraudulent candidacies.” Storer v. Brown, supra at 733, 94 S.Ct. at 1280, quoting Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 145, 92 S.Ct. 849, 856, 31 L.Ed.2d 92 (1972) citing Jenness v. Fortson, 403 U.S. 431, 442, 91 S.Ct. 1970, 1976, 27 L.Ed.2d 114 (1971). It is this interest in protecting the integrity of the ballot which the defendants herein assert as the compelling interest protected by its refusal to allow Vice-Presidential nominee Patrick Lucey’s name to be substituted for that of Milton Eisenhower on the November 4, 1980, Florida general election ballot.

“In determining whether or not a State law violates the Equal Protection Clause, we must consider the facts and circumstances behind the law, the interests which the State claims to be protecting, and the interests of those who are disadvantaged by the classification.” Williams v. Rhodes, supra 393 U.S. at 30, 89 S.Ct. at 10.

The State’s representatives insist that the only way to insure the integrity of the general election ballot in Florida is through the means chosen: (1) by, in effect, requiring the independent candidate for the presidency to select and announce his or her running mate several months before the party presidential candidates have been themselves selected, much less have chosen their running mates; (2) by requiring that petitions be submitted with a specific name as vice-presidential candidate, rather than permitting an appropriate alternative designation, such as “whomsoever John B. Anderson selects” as the vice-presidential candidate; (3) by refusing to allow withdrawal of the name which petitioners recognized as only a surrogate for the independent candidate’s later announced running mate and refusing to allow substitution on the ballot