Citations
- 780 F. Supp. 976
Full opinion text
AMENDED MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
WEINSTEIN, District Judge:
Plaintiffs, pursuant to the Equal Access to Justice Act (“EAJA”), 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A) (West Supp.1991), seek an award of attorney fees after successfully challenging a denial of disability benefits by the Secretary of Health and Human Services (“Secretary”). They also have requested a cost-of-living increase using the “Legal Services” category of the Consumer Price Index. EAJA currently provides for $75 per hour.
Because the Secretary’s position in the underlying disability actions was substantially justified within the meaning of the EAJA, plaintiffs are not entitled to attorney fees. Were an award appropriate, the Legal Services category would provide the proper measure for cases in the Eastern District of New York.
The EAJA provides for an award of attorney fees and other expenses incurred by a prevailing party in certain civil actions against the United States “unless the court finds that the position of the United States was substantially justified or that special circumstances make an award unjust.” 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A). In Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 108 S.Ct. 2541; 101 L.Ed.2d 490 (1988), the Supreme Court defined “substantially justified” as a course of legal action that would satisfy a reasonable person. The government’s position is substantially justified if a “ ‘genuine dispute’ ” existed, id. 108 S.Ct. at 2550 (quoting Advisory Committee’s Notes on 1970 Amendment to Fed.R.Civ.P. 37(a)(4)), or “ ‘if reasonable people could differ as to [the appropriateness of the contested action].’ ” Id. (quoting Reygo Pac. Corp. v. Johnston Pump Co., 680 F.2d 647, 649 (9th Cir.1982); see also Cohen v. Bowen, 887 F.2d 582, 586 (2d Cir.1988) (“essentially a standard of reasonableness”) (citing Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Watt, 722 F.2d 1081, 1085 (2d Cir.1983)); cf. Kirkland v. Railroad Retirement Bd., 706 F.2d 99, 105 (2d Cir.1983) (decision reasonable unless “devoid of legal or factual support”). A “deferential review