Full opinion text
I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY Florida currently has forty Senate districts and one hundred twenty House of Representative districts. These districts were created in 1982 and are currently malapportioned. According to the 1990 census data, the total population of the state of Florida is 12,937,-926 persons. Between the census of 1980 and 1990, Florida’s population increased 3,213,602 persons. To achieve equality between Florida’s forty Senate districts, each district would ideally contain 323,448 persons. • To achieve equality between Florida’s one hundred twenty House districts, each district would ideally contain 107,816 persons. On the opening day of the 1992 Florida legislative session, Miguel De Grandy, a member of the Florida House of Representatives, and other registered voters (“De Grandy plaintiffs”) filed a complaint against the Speaker of the Florida House of Representatives, the President of the Florida Senate, the Governor of Florida, and other state officials. The De Grandy plaintiffs filed the complaint in this court challenging the constitutionality of Florida’s current congressional and state legislative districts. The De Grandy plaintiffs alleged that the current districts violate both the Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution and the Voting Rights Act of 1965, as amended, and urged this court to assert jurisdiction in order to redistrict and reapportion the state. The De Grandy plaintiffs filed a first amended complaint on January 23, 1992. The defendants moved to dismiss the complaint. After hearing arguments on the motion, the court dismissed the action without prejudice for lack of subject matter jurisdiction (document 41). On March 9, 1992, the De Grandy plaintiffs filed a second amended complaint (document 44) alleging violations of Article I, Section 2 and of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution as well as violations of Sections 2 and 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 1973 et seq. In short, Count I alleged that the present Florida House and Senate districts were unconstitutional inasmuch as they violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, Article I, Section 2 of the United States Constitution and the “one-person, one-vote” principle. Count II alleged that because these districts diluted the voting strength of minority voters, they violated the Voting Rights Act of 1965, as amended. Count III alleged that the Florida Legislature was at an impasse in adoption of state redistricting plans. Counts V and VI alleged that the time lines for redistricting set forth in Article III, Section 16 of the Florida Constitution, in conjunction with the preclearance requirements of Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, “permit the adoption and implementation of new district lines to take place so late in the year after the decennial census” that they result in a deprivation of plaintiffs’ right to participate in the 1992 elections on a fair and equal basis. Doeument 44 at ¶ 120. Count V alleged a facial challenge, while Count VI alleged an “as applied” challenge. Count VII alleged that certain defendants have “intentionally misused the time lines and procedures found in Article III ... to delay the redistricting process to the advantage of white incumbents and to the detriment of voters and would be challengers to those incumbents.” Document 44 at ¶ 130. On March 13, 1992, the Florida legislature ended its regular session without adopting a state reapportionment plan. On March 27, 1992, this three-judge court convened, denied all motions to dismiss and established an expedited schedule for adoption of congressional and state legislative plans by May 29, 1992 (document 56). That scheduling order in no way enjoined or prevented state redistricting and reapportionment agencies from attempting to enact their own plans. On April 2,1992, the Governor of Florida called a special redistricting and reapportionment session of the Florida Legislature pursuant to Article III, Section 16(a), of the Florida Constitution. On April 10, 1992, the legislature adopted Senate Joint Resolution 2-G reapportioning state House and Senate districts. Meanwhile, this case progressed and on April 6, 1992, the court appointed a special master pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 53 for both Congressional and legislative reapportionment. On April 7,1992, the court consolidated this case with a similar lawsuit filed by the Florida State Conference of the NAACP Branches and many individual African-American voters. The court also granted other persons and organizations leave to intervene or act as amicus curiae. On April 17,1992, the Attorney General of the State of Florida submitted Senate Joint Resolution 2-G concerning state legislative reapportionment to the United States Department of Justice (DOJ) for preclearance pursuant to Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act. That same day, this court issued an order bifurcating the congressional redistricting and state reapportionment hearings. The special master promptly concluded his hearings on congressional redistricting and issued his report and recommendation. This court considered the parties objections, conducted a hearing and issued its judgment on May 29, 1992 (document 439). On May 13, 1992, the Florida Supreme Court validated Senate Joint Resolution 2-G. As a result of the validation, this court stayed proceedings related to state r.eapportionment until May 27, 1992. A hearing was held on May 27,1992 at which time the court considered all pending motions. At the hearing, the court granted the government’s motion to be dismissed as a party to the litigation, but invited comments from J. Gerald Hebert of the United States DOJ. Mr. Hebert advised the court that the Justice Department would probably issue its decision by June 17, 1992 as to whether the House and Senate plans would be precleared.' All other motions were denied, and the stay of legislative reapportionment was continued. On June 16, 1992, the DOJ issued its preclearance decision, noting that its review and determination addressed the plans only insofar as the five preclearance counties were affected. Exhibit 1 to document 447. The Attorney General of the United States did not interpose any objection to the Florida House of Representatives redistricting plan. The DOJ refused to preclear the Senate plan stating: We are unable to reach the same conclusion with regard to the Senate redistricting plan. With regard to the Hillsborough County area, the state has chosen to draw its senatorial districts such that there are no districts in which minority persons constitute a majority of the voting age population. To accomplish this result, the state chose to divide the politically cohesive minority populations in the Tampa and St. Petersburg areas. Alternative plans were presented to the legislature uniting the Tampa and St. Petersburg minority populations in order to provide minority voters an effective opportunity to elect their preferred candidate to the State Senate---[T]he information before us, including the economic and other ties between Tampa and St. Petersburg, as well as the political cohesiveness of minority voters in those two cities, demonstrates that the two areas do share a commonality of interest. Finally, we have examined evidence, including evidence in the legislative record, which suggests that the state’s approach to senatorial redi'stricting in the Hillsborough area was undertaken with an intent to protect incumbents. Such a rationale, of course, cannot justify the treatment of minority voters in this area by the State Senate plan. Exhibit 1 to document 447 at 2-3. Plaintiffs immediately filed a Renewed and Expedited Motion to Lift Stay, Establish Scheduling Order, and Set Trial on Legislative Redistricting (document 444) and a Motion for Leave to File Third Amended Complaint (document 448). The latter was granted and in their third amended complaint, plaintiffs added a count alleging that the 1992 joint resolution of apportionment violated Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act. On June 18, 1992, the court issued a scheduling order and set a hearing on all pending motions for June 26, 1992 (document 449). The Florida Supreme Court set an expedited schedule to address the DOJ’s objection to the Senate plan. In its order dated June 17, 1992, the Supreme Court encouraged the legislature to adopt a proper reapportionment plan, taking into consideration the objections of the Justice Department. See Exhibit A to document 462 at 2. The order continued: “In the event the Legislature declares its inability to adopt a reapportionment plan or fails to adopt a plan by June 24, 1992, this Court will conclude that a legislative impasse has occurred, and this Court will promptly undertake to make such reapportionment.” The court also set forth an abbreviated time frame within which action must be taken. In a letter dated June 18,1992, the Speaker of the House (defendant Wetherell) and President of the Senate (defendant Margolis) advised the Supreme Court of their decision not to convene their respective Houses in an extraordinary apportionment session. See Exhibit A to document 478. The court was also advised that the Governor did not intend to convene the legislature in an extraordinary apportionment session. Exhibit A to document 478. In an order dated June 17, 1992, the Florida Supreme Court declared a legislative impasse and adopted an amended schedule. Jurisdictional questions were raised both in this court and in the Florida Supreme Court. The De Grandy plaintiffs filed their action in this court on January 14, 1992, and have continually asserted that jurisdiction to correct the Department’s Section 5 objection lies only in this court. The Florida Supreme Court, however, without discussing the propriety of concurrent federal jurisdiction, held that [T]he reapportionment of state legislative bodies is not a power delegated by the Constitution of the United States to the federal government. Under the provisions of the Tenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, this is a power reserved to states. Of course, this Court is obligated to apply any applicable federal constitutional provisions and any federal statutes implementing these provisions. The Florida Constitution places upon this Court the responsibility to review state legislative reapportionment. Art. Ill, § 16, Fla. Const. Pursuant to that authority, we approved the original legislative reapportionment and retained jurisdiction to entertain subsequent objections thereto. Consistent with the provisions of article III, section 16 of the Florida Constitution, we believe that it is our obligation to redraw the plan to satisfy the objection of the Justice Department now that the Legislature has declared that it is not going to do so. In re Constitutionality of Senate Joint Resolution 2G, Special Apportionment Session 1992, 601 So.2d 543, 545 (Fla.1992) (document 491). Defendants have consistently maintained that because Article III, Section 16 of the Florida Constitution specifically conferred jurisdiction over legislative redistricting to the Florida Supreme Court, this court should abstain in deference to the principles of comity and federalism. This court has declined the invitation to abstain. On June 25, 1992, the Florida Supreme Court adopted a Senate redistricting plan which it felt complied with the DOJ’s objection to Hillsborough County. After reviewing the six submitted plans, the Supreme Court adopted the plan submitted by Gwen Humphrey, et al., and supported by Representative Darryl Reaves, et al. [“HumphreyReaves plan”]. Constitutionality of SJR-2G, 601 So.2d at 546. Chief Justice Shaw wrote separately to indicate his opinion that the overall plan — including the present revision — does not comply with Section 2 of the Voting Rights Aet: Because this Court’s review in the present proceeding is limited in scope to DOJ’s section 5 preclearance inquiry, I concur in the majority opinion. I believe the present revision in the plan meets the objection evinced in DOJ’s admittedly restricted review. I write to note, however, that I still conclude that the overall plan, including the present revision, fails under Section 2 of the Act because it does not provide an equal opportunity for minorities to elect representatives of their choice to the Florida legislature, as noted in my earlier dissent. Constitutionality of SJR-2G, 601 So.2d at 548 (Shaw, C.J. specially concurring). The focus of this litigation has continually shifted. Plaintiffs’ first amended complaint alleged that the delay inherent in Article III, Section 16 of the Florida Constitution (and the fact that the legislature was not expected to pass a reapportionment plan in time for the scheduled 1992 elections) resulted in an unconstitutional intrusion in a citizen’s right to vote. When the legislature passed SJR 2-G, plaintiffs asserted that this plan would not be precleared by the DOJ, and then when the Senate plan was, indeed, not precleared, plaintiffs asked this court to adopt a plan which complied with Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act. On June 23, 1992, the DOJ filed in this court its own lawsuit against the State of Florida and several elected officials alleging that (1) the redistricting plans for the members of the Florida Legislature dilute the voting strength of African-American and Hispanic citizens in several areas of the state in violation of Section 2 et seq. of the Voting Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1973, et seq. and (2) the state’s proposed Senate plan in the Hills-borough County area divides the politically cohesive minority populations in the Tampa and St. Petersburg areas such that there are no senatorial districts in which minority persons constitute a majority of the voting age population. The De Grandy plaintiffs were also permitted to amend their complaint to allege Section 2 violations in both the House and Senate plans. See document 448. On June 26,1992, this court commenced its hearing on legislative reapportionment. At the outset, the court ruled on several pending motions and heard argument on the others. After argument, the court granted Alberto R. Cardenas’ and Alan K. Fertel’s Motions for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice (documents 482 and 483) and the United States’ Motion to Consolidate its lawsuit into the pending litigation (document 2). The court also denied as moot Defendant Wetherell’s and Margolis’ Motions to Quash Subpoena (documents 485 and 487), and denied Plaintiffs’ Motion to Strike Proposed State Senate Redistricting Plans Submitted by Margolis and Wetherell (document 478). The court then turned to the Florida Senate redistricting plan. The DOJ indicated its belief that the Florida Supreme Court’s modification to the Hills-borough County area Senate districts satisfied its previous objection. The Department stated that a preclearance decision would be made within days of the State’s submission of the plan to the Department. The same day, this court imposed the Florida Supreme Court plan as its own plan for section 5 purposes. See Tr. 1-37. The effect of this was to eliminate the need for preclearanee. “Plans imposed by court order are not subject to the [preclearance] requirements of § 5.” Wise v. Lipscomb, 437 U.S. 535, 542, 98 S.Ct. 2493, 2498, 57 L.Ed.2d 411 (1978); see also State of Texas v. United States of America, 785 F.Supp. 201, 205 (D.D.C.1992). At the same time, however, the court indicated its intention to entertain Section 2 challenges on both the Florida Senate and Florida House plans. In Count VIII of the De Grandy plaintiffs’ fourth amended complaint, plaintiffs allege that both the Florida House and Senate redistricting plans encompassed in joint resolution of legislative reapportionment, SJR, 2-G, violate Section 2 et seq. of the Voting Rights Act, Title 42, United States Code, Section 1973, et seq. See document 506 at 5Í-60. Specifically, plaintiffs contend that “[t]he joint resolution of apportionment ... unlawfully fragments cohesive minority communities and otherwise impermissibly submerges their right to vote and to participate in the electoral process.” Document 506 at 52 ¶ 137. Plaintiffs attack both the Dade County districts in the Senate plan and the Dade and Escambia County districts in the House plan as violative of Section 2, alleging that The African-American population in Escambia County was split into two districts, one of 30% black population and one of 14% black population. SJR 2-G deliberately fractures Escambia County’s African-American population in order to protect white, incumbent representative, Speaker-designate Bo Johnson. Alternative plans encapsulate the black population in a .relatively compact, cohesive, 40% biack community of interest. * * Jfc * * * In Dade County, black citizens were fragmented in District 118 and District 119. Many African-American seats were also packed with many Hispanic citizens which dilutes the ability of African-Americans to elect candidates of choice. * * * * * * Hispanic voters are packed in Districts 110 (82.1%), 111 (75.7%), and 114 (77.5%) and further submerges Hispanic voters in black minority districts,- specifically, District 103 (62% black, 27.8% Hispanic), District 109 (63.0% black, 34.5% Hispanic), and District 118 (34.5% black, 27.1% Hispanic). Less egregious examples of packing, but still having the same dilutionary effect, are District 104 (57.8% black, 16.1% Hispanic), Anglo District 105 (19.2% Hispanic), Anglo District 106 (32.3% Hispanic), District 108 (66.2% black, 16.0% Hispanic). SJR 2-G appears to purposefully pack, fracture and submerge Hispanic population deliberately to dilute Hispanic voting strength; Nine Hispanic-American majority districts were created in SJR 2-G; however, other plans submitted to the Legislature show that eleven majority-Hispanic-American seats can be created in the Dade County area. This dilution of Hispanic voting strength is accomplished by the aforementioned packing, fracturing, and submergence with the intent and purpose of protecting white incumbents; With respect to the plan for apportionment for the Florida State Senate, ... the redistricting plan enacted by the State of Florida creates 7 Senate districts in the Dade County area. The state’s plan fragments the Hispanic population concentrations such that Hispanics comprise a majority of the voting age population only in three districts. The racial and ethnic population concentrations existing in the Dade County area are such that, if the Dade County area of the state is divided into equally populated legislative districts which respect communities of interest and follow other non-discriminatory plan-drawing criteria, Hispanics would constitute a significant voting age majority of the population in one additional Senate district in Dade County. Document 506 at ¶¶ 141(a), (i); 142(a), (b). The complaint also alleges that the creation of these districts was both intentional and willful, and for the purpose of preserving white incumbent legislators and discriminating against African-American and Hispanic candidates and electorate. Document 506 at ¶ 145. The entire trial lasted five days — from Friday, June 26, 1992 through Wednesday, July 1, 1992, excluding Sunday, June 28, 1992. The court first heard testimony concerning the Senate Plan. At the close of plaintiffs’ case in chief, defendants orally moved for a directed verdict, which was denied by the court. Tr. III-216. The Senate defendants then presented their case. The court next turned to the attack upon the Dade County portion of the House plan. The parties advised the court that they were attempting to settle the Escambia portion of the lawsuit by redrawing the Escambia County House. districts. After hearing the testimony of one of plaintiffs’ Escambia County witnesses, the court ruled from the bench that the “plaintiffs [had] established a prima facie, case on the constitutional violation in the Escambia Coúnty area of Florida.” Tr. IV-18. Before the close of plaintiffs’ prima facie case, the court was notified that the parties, except for plaintiff-intervenor Darryl Reaves, had reached a settlement agreement as to the Escambia County House districts. Upon the granting of the House defendants’ oral motion to dismiss Reaves for lack of standing, as to Escambia County, Tr. VIII-59, the court considered and approved the proposed consent judgment (document 548). See Tr. VIII-94. On July 1,1992, at the close of all testimony and oral argument, the court ruled from the bench that the plaintiffs have shown a fourth Hispanic district can be drawn in accordance with the [Thornburg v. ] Gingles [478 U.S. 30, 106 S.Ct. 2752, 92 L.Ed.2d 25] standard, but the plaintiffs have failed to prove that a fourth Hispanic district can be drawn without creating a regressive effect upon Afro-American voters in Dade County and South Florida____ Consequently, under Supreme Court precedent, this court must give deference to the state policy as expressed in the Florida plan as validated by the Florida Supreme Court. Tr. VIII-53. The court denied plaintiffs’ oral motion for reconsideration. Tr. VIII-61. After hearing closing argument as to the Dade County portion of the Florida House plan, the court ruled from the bench that “under the totality of the circumstances, the plaintiffs have shown a violation of Section 2 in that the plaintiffs have shown that more than nine Hispanic districts may be drawn without having or creating a regressive effect upon black voters in South Florida and in Dade County.” Tr. VIII-83. The court indicated its intention to immediately proceed into the remedy phase of this case. The court later imposed the Modified De Grandy Plan as its own plan. Tr. VIII at 160. On July 2, 1992, the court entered judgment as to the 1992 Florida Senate Plan (document 553) and as to the 1992 Florida House Plan (document 554), the latter supplemented on July 6, 1992 (document 559). Following the trial, the House and Executive defendants moved for reconsideration (documents 550 and 556) These motions were denied (documents 555 and 560). The House defendants also moved for reconsideration, rehearing and for a stay (document 561) the court denied (document 571). This opinion memorializes and explains the court’s rationale for its July 2, 1992 rulings. II. FINDINGS OF FACTS AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW A. Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act As amended and in pertinent part, Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 provides as follows: (a) No voting qualification or prerequisite to voting or standard, practice, or procedure shall be imposed or applied by any State or political subdivision in a manner which results in a denial or abridgement of the right of any citizen of the United States to vote on account of race or color, or in contravention of the guarantees set forth in section 4(f)(2), as provided in subsection (b). (b) A violation of subsection (a) is established if, based on the totality of the circumstances, it is shown that the political processes leading to nomination or election in the state or political subdivision are not equally open to participation by members of a class of citizens protected by subsection (a) in that its members have less opportunity than other members of the electorate to participate in the political process and to elect representatives of their choice. The extent to which members of a protected class have been elected to office in the State or political subdivision is one “circumstance’ which may be considered, provided that nothing in this section establishes a right to have members of a protected class elected in numbers equal to their proportion in the population. 42 U.S.C. § 1973. As originally passed, Congress intended for the language of Section 2 to parallel the language of the Fifteenth Amendment. City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 60-61, 100 S.Ct. 1490, 1496, 64 L.Ed.2d 47 (1980) (plurality opinion). Because Section 2 parallelled the Fifteenth Amendment, the plurality of the Supreme Court held that a plaintiff was required to prove discriminatory intent to establish a violation of Section 2. Bolden, 446 U.S. at 62, 71, 100 S.Ct. at 1497, 1502. In response to the Supreme Court’s ruling in Bolden, Congress amended Section 2 in 1982 to include a “results” or “effects” test to determine whether racial vote dilution has occurred. See Senate Report at 27; Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 35, 106 S.Ct. 2752, 2758, 92 L.Ed.2d 25 (1986); see also Burton v. Sheheen, 793 F.Supp. 1329, 1348 (D.S.C.1992). In Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 106 S.Ct. 2752, 92 L.Ed.2d 25 (1986), the Supreme Court received its first opportunity to review the 1982 Section 2 amendments. Gingles involved a Section 2 challenge to the use of multi-member districts in North Carolina. The Court held that “[t]he essence of a Section 2 claim is that a certain electoral law, practice, or structure interacts with social and historical conditions to cause an inequality in the opportunities enjoyed by black and white voters to elect their preferred representatives.” Gingles, 478 U.S. at 47, 106 S.Ct. at 2765. Additionally, the law is clear that Section 2 extends coverage to “language minorities” including Hispanics. Chisom v. Roemer, — U.S. -, - & n. 18, 111 S.Ct. 2354, 2362 & n. 18, 115 L.Ed.2d 348 (1991); Hastert v. State Bd. of Elections, 777 F.Supp. 634, 648 (N.D.Ill.1991). In determining whether a Section 2 violation has occurred, “a court must assess the impact of the contested structure or practice on minority electoral opportunities ‘on the basis of objective factors.’” Gingles, 478 U.S. at 44, 106 S.Ct. at 2763 (quoting Senate Report at 27). The Supreme Court in Gingles reiterated the list of “typical” factors which may be relevant to, and probative of, a Section 2 claim as set forth in the Senate Report. These “Senate factors” include: 1. The extent of any history of official discrimination in the state or political subdivision that touched the right of the members of the minority group to register, to vote, or otherwise to participate in the democratic process; 2. the extent to which voting in the election of the state or political subdivision is racially polarized; 3. the extent to which the state or political subdivision has used unusually large election districts, majority vote requirements, anti-single shot provisions, or other voting practices or procedures that may enhance the opportunity for discrimination against the minority group; 4. if there is a candidate slating process, whether the members of the minority group have been denied access to that process; 5. the extent to which members of the minority group in the state or political subdivision bear the effects of discrimination in such areas as education, employment and health, which hinder their ability to participate effectively in the political process; 6. whether political campaigns have been characterized by overt or subtle racial appeals; 7. the extent to which members of the minority group have been elected to public office in the jurisdiction. Additional factors that in some cases have had probative value as part of plaintiffs’ evidence to establish a violation are: Whether there is a significant lack of responsiveness on the part of elected officials to the particularized needs of the members of the minority group. And whether the policy underlying the state or political subdivision’s use of such voting qualification, prerequisite to voting, or standard, practice or procedure is tenuous. See Senate Report at 206-07 (citing White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755, 93 S.Ct. 2332, 37 L.Ed.2d 314 (1973); Zimmer v. McKeithen, 485 F.2d 1297 (5th Cir.1973)). This list is not exhaustive — it is not required that any number of the factors be proved and other factors may be relevant. Gingles, 478 U.S. at 45, 106 S.Ct. at 2763. The Court did note, however, that “the most important Senate Report factors bearing on Section 2 challenges to multi-member districts are the ‘extent to which minority group members have been elected to public office in the jurisdiction’ and the ‘extent to which voting in the elections of the state or political subdivision is racially polarized.’” Gingles, 478 U.S. at 49 n. 15, 106 S.Ct. at 2765-66 n. 15 (quoting U.S.C.C.A.N.1982 at 206). The Court, however, set forth the following important limitations on the extent to which these factors establish liability under Section 2: [WJhile many or all of the factors listed in the Senate Report may be relevant to a claim of vote dilution through submergence in multimember districts, unless there is a conjunction of the following circumstances, the use of multimember districts generally will not impede the ability of minority voters to elect representatives of their choice. Gingles, 478 U.S. at 48, 106 S.Ct. at 2765. The Court then listed three circumstances which “are necessary preconditions for multimember districts to operate to impair minority voters’ ability to elect representatives of their choice.” Gingles, 478 U.S. at 49-50, 106 S.Ct. at 2766. These preconditions are: 1) the minority group must be able to demonstrate that it is sufficiently large and geographically compact to constitute a majority in a single member district; 2) the minority group must be able to show that it is politically cohesive 3) the minority group must be able to demonstrate that the white majority votes sufficiently as a bloc to enable it — in the absence of special circumstances, such as the minority candidate running unopposed — usually to defeat the minority’s preferred candidate. The purpose of the first requirement is to determine whether “minority voters [would] possess the potential to elect representatives in the absence of the challenged structure or practice.” Gingles, 478 U.S. at 50 n. 17, 106 S.Ct. at 2766 n. 17. As the Gingles court noted, because a minority population which is spread evenly throughout the district “cannot maintain that they would have been able to elect representatives of their choice in the absence of the multimember electoral structure,” they cannot maintain that the multimember electoral system itself dilutes the voting strength of the minority voters. Gin gles, 478 U.S. at 50 n. 17, 106 S.Ct. at 2766 n. 17. Thus far, the Supreme Court has not spoken as to whether the Gingles analysis applies when a court is faced with a challenge to single member districts. District courts are divided on this issue with the courts in Armour v. Ohio, 775 F.Supp. 1044 (N.D.Ohio 1991), Illinois Legislative Redistricting Commission v. LaPaille, 782 F.Supp. 1272 (N.D.Ill.1992), and Emison v. Growe, 782 F.Supp. 427 (D.Minn.1992), jur. noted, - U.S. -, 112 S.Ct. 1557, 118 L.Ed.2d 206, motion gr., - U.S. -, 113 S.Ct. 18, 120 L.Ed.2d 945 1992 U.S.LEXIS 3673 (1992) holding that the Gingles preconditions do not apply to a single-member district plan, and the courts in Hastert, 777 F.Supp. 634, and DeBaca v. County of San Diego, 794 F.Supp. 990 (S.D.Cal.1992) holding that they do. We find the approach taken by Hastert and DeBaca to be persuasive and accordingly turn to examining the Gingles factors. Of course, the effect of proving these three preconditions is an open question in this circuit. In Solomon v. Liberty County, Florida, 899 F.2d 1012 (11th Cir.1990) (en banc), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1023, 111 S.Ct. 670, 112 L.Ed.2d 663 (1991) this circuit divided 5-5 as to the legal effect of proving the three Gingles factors. Because we find a Section 2 violation under either Judge Kravitch’s or Judge Tjoflat’s approach, the court need not address the conflict raised in Solomon. In other words, this court concludes that the plaintiffs have satisfied each of the three elements Gingles requires and that when considered together with the Senate factors, the “totality of the circumstances” show that with respect to Florida’s Senate Plan, Hispanic and African-American vote dilution exists in Dade County in violation of § 2 of the Voting Rights Act. Additionally, under the totality of the circumstances, Hispanic vote dilution exists in Dade County under Florida’s House Plan. B. Application of the Gingles Factors 1. Sufficiently Large and Geographically Compact a. Sufficiently Large (Citizenship) The Gingles court stated that in order to state a claim under Section 2, the minority group must show that it is sufficiently large to constitute a majority in a single member district. There is some dispute as to whether the term “majority” as used in Gingles refers to a numerical majority or a voting majority, and therefore, whether a court should focus on voting age population or total population as the measure of opportunity within a given district. See Burton v. Shebeen, 793 F.Supp. at 1354 (citing McDaniel v. Mehfoud, 708 F.Supp. 754, 756 (E.D.Va.1989). Although the Burton court noted that the Ninth Circuit has held in Garza v. County of Los Angeles, 918 F.2d 763, 774-76 (9th Cir.1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1028, 111 S.Ct. 681, 112 L.Ed.2d 673 (1991) that total population may be an adequate measure of minority opportunity; it followed the holdings of both McDaniel and McNeil v. Springfield Park District, 851 F.2d 937, 944-45 (7th Cir.1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1031, 109 S.Ct. 1769, 104 L.Ed.2d 204 (1989) and concluded that “political opportunity is best measured in terms of minority voting age population.” . Burton, 793 F.Supp. at 1354. This court has previously indicated its view that the VAP is the relevant inquiry as concerns rédistrieting, and we adopt the rationale and conclusion of the Burton court that voting age population (VAP) rather than total population provides a better measure of opportunity within a given district to elect a candidate of choice. Creating districts containing a bare majority VAP of minority groups such as African-Americans and Hispanics, however, will not necessarily remedy a Voting Rights Act violation because, even if minorities constitute fifty percent of the overall population or voting age population in a district, they may not make up fifty percent of the voters. See Ketchum v. Byrne, 740 F.2d 1398 (7th Cir.1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1135, 105 S.Ct. 2673, 86 L.Ed.2d 692 (1985) The court found in Ketchum that “minorities must have something more than a mere majority even of voting age population in order to have a reasonable opportunity to elect a representative of their choice.” Ketchum, 740 F.2d at 1413. According to the experts, there are four key reasons why a supermajority of minority VAP is necessary to create effective minority districts: (a) there are typically more aliens among minority (especially Hispanic) populations; (b) the voting age population is typically a lower proportion of the total population among minorities; (c) registration rates are often lower among minorities; and (d) turnout rates are often lower among minorities. Kimball Brace, et al., Minority Voting Equality: The 65 Percent Rule in Theory and Practice, 10 Law & Policy 43, 47 (1988) (emphasis in the original). An Hispanic supermajority of the VAP is necessary to account for the fact that many Hispanics are noncitizens and have lower voter registration rates. Document 438 (Congressional Opinion) at 16. This fact is not disputed by any party and is confirmed by the testimony of Dr. Moreno: “[t]he nature of tripartite politics in Dade means that only when Hispanics have a super majority can a Latin candidate win.” Affidavit of Dr. Dario Moreno (document 471 at 27). Because the issues in this case were whether a fourth majority Hispanic Senate district and whether a tenth and eleventh majority Hispanic House district could be drawn in Dade County, much of the testimony revolved around what constituted a “supermajority” of Hispanic VAP sufficient to enable Hispanics to elect a candidate of their choice. Much of the testimony addressed the “65 percent rule” and the impact of citizenship on the voting age population. The 65 percent rule states that “barring exceptional circumstances, a district should contain a black [or Hispanic] population of at least 65 per cent (or a voting age population of at least 60 percent) to provide blacks [or Hispanics] with an opportunity to elect a candidate of their choice.” Brace, supra at 44. The origin of this rule has been traced to the United States Supreme Court case of United Jewish Organizations, Inc. v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144, 97 S.Ct. 996, 51 L.Ed.2d 229 (1977) and has been subsequently addressed in Ketchum and Neal v. Coleburn, 689 F.Supp. 1426 (E.D.Va.1988). According to Kimball Brace, the foundation of the rule is suspect: Legend has it that the rule came about because someone in the Justice Department took 50 percent and simply added 5 percent to compensate for the higher proportion of Hispanic noncitizens, 5 percent for lower Hispanic voting age population (VAP) and 5 percent for lower Hispanic registration and turnout. Brace, supra, at 44. In his testimony before the court in Ketchum, 740 F.2d at 1415, Mr. Brace stated the rule in a slightly different way: [The 65 percent rule] is derived from the 50 percent total population, adding five percent for each of the three factors that are voting age population, because minorities tend to have a lower voting age population, lower registration patterns and a lower turnout pattern. In accord Jeffers v. Clinton, 756 F.Supp. 1195, 1199 (E.D.Ark.1990) (three-judge court), aff'd 498 U.S. 1019, 111 S.Ct. 662, 112 L.Ed.2d 656 (1991) (citing Smith v. Clinton, 687 F.Supp. 1361, 1362-63 (E.D.Ark.1988) (three-judge court), aff'd 488 U.S. 988, 109 S.Ct. 548, 102 L.Ed.2d 576 (1988)). Whereas in Clinton and Ketchum, Mr. Brace would supplement the 50 percent majority figure by five percent each for low voter registration and low voter turnout (for a total of ten percent), in his law review article, he would supplement the 50 percent majority figure by five percent total for low registration and turnout. For this and other reasons, the 65 percent rule is not universally accepted by experts and has been modified or rejected by some courts. See e.g., Tr. VI-6 (Dr. Weber). The court in Rybicki v. State Board of Elections, 574 F.Supp. 1147, 1149 (N.D.Ill.1983) stated that: The 65% figure is a general guideline which has been used by the DOJ. reappor- ■ tionment experts and the courts as a measure of the minority population in a district needed for minority voters to have a meaningful opportunity to elect a candidate of their choice. The 65% guideline, which the Supreme Court characterized as “reasonable” in [Carey], takes into account the younger median population age and the lower voter registration and turnout of minority citizens. The court in Colebum noted that [T]he general 65% guideline for remedial districts is not a required minimum which, the plaintiffs must meet before they can be awarded any relief under § 2 of the Voting Rights Act. Rather, the 65% standard is a flexible and practical guideline to consider in fashioning relief for a § 2 violation. Coleburn, 689 F.Supp. at 1438. The Coleburn court noted that the 65% figure is an “approximation of the type of corrective super-majority that may be needed in any particular ease” which may have to be “reconsidered and adjusted in light of ‘new information’ and changing circumstances.” Coleburn, 689 F.Supp. at 1438 (citing Ketchum, 740 F.2d at 1416 nn. 20, 21). In his affidavit, Dr. Arrington indicates why he and other experts have modified the 65% rule insofar as it affects African-Americans: [Bjecause minority communities are now better organized and minority citizens more likely to register and vote than was true in an earlier era [,i]t is not always necessary to have a 60% [African-American VAP district] to assure blacks the opportunity to elect candidates of their choice. Although a 60% black VAP is probably still a good goal, 55% black VAP is almost always enough for black citizens to have an opportunity to participate in the political process and elect candidates of their choice. AffidavitTI of Dr. Arrington (exhibit to document 474). The court in Ketchum similarly concluded that a 65% supermajority of African-American VAP might no longer be necessary to ensure African-Americans a chance to elect a candidate of their choice and ad-, vised district courts to reconsider that figure in light of new information and statistical data: For example, we note that the Rev. Jesse Jackson’s 1984 presidential candidacy has apparently stimulated black registration and turnout nationally. More specific to Chicago, we understand‘that the November 1982 gubernatorial election in Illinois and the 1983 Chicago mayoral election indicated a marked increase in black registration and turnout. If these and other elections should demonstrate a significant and consistent change in voting behavior in Chicago applicablé to aldermanic elections, there would have to be a corresponding change in redistricting practices and legal standards[.] Ketchum, 740 F.2d at 1416 n. 21. The testimony in this case also showed that African-Americans turn out in much higher rates than Hispanics. Tr. VI-282-83 (Lisa Handley). The effectiveness of the African-American majority districts created by the Florida House and Senate plans is not in dispute. The African-American VAP in these districts ranged from 50.96% to 57.24% in the House districts and from 51.7% to 52.5% in the Senate and no party has attempted to argue that these districts would not result in an African-American candidate of choice being elected. Thus we find that a district with an African-American majority VAP is an effective district which gives African-Americans a potential for electing candidates of their choice. Accordingly, the NAACP’s proposed three African-American districts satisfy the “sufficiently large” requirement. The only question, therefore, is whether the VAP in the proposed one additional Hispanic Senate district and two additional Hispanic House districts would enable Hispanic voters in these districts to elect candidates of choice without-impairing the VAPs in the surrounding 3 Hispanic Senate and 9 Hispanic House- districts. Plaintiffs’ own witness testified that an Hispanic Senate district containing 55% Hispanic VAP would be “problematic” inasmuch as the VAP would be too low to guarantee that the district would result in the election of the Hispanic candidate of choice. Tr. 11-66. Plaintiffs submitted evidence, however, that a district containing 59 percent Hispanic VAP would enable Hispanics to elect a candidate of choice. Specifically, Dr. Lichtman testified that Once the Hispanic concentration reaches a certain point, then all those districts seem to elect Hispanics, but below that given point, none of the districts seem to elect Hispanics____ [N]o candidate of choice of the Hispanic ... has been elected in districts below a 59 percent Hispanic level, and in districts at 59 percent and above, those districts have in every instance elected Hispanic candidates Tr. III-24. Dr. Lichtman concluded that the Hispanic VAP of 62.1 percent in district 40 provided Hispanics a “realistic opportunity” to elect a candidate of choice in that district. Tr. Ill — 30, 67-8. Dr. Lichtman’s assessment included adjusting for the lower Hispanic voter turnout. Declaration of Dr. Allan J. Lichtman at 2, Although Dr. Lichtman had previously recommended to the Dade County commission that they attempt to create “rock solid” majority Hispanic districts containing 65% Hispanic VAP and “rock solid” majority African-American districts containing 55% African-American VAP, these districts were created “for an entirely different purpose” and he “erred on the side of making sure that [these] seats would be safe.” Tr. III-94, III-233. He then reaffirmed his conclusion that “a 62 percent district, while not an absolute lock ... certainly comes well within the range to provide Hispanic voters a realistic potential to elect candidates of their choice.” Tr. HI-94. Defendants, on the other hand, submitted evidence that after accounting for the lower level of citizenship for Hispanics, some of the newly created Hispanic districts would not be effective. In other words, although the Hispanic VAP might indicate that these districts would tend to elect a Hispanic candidate of choice, because the number of Hispanic citizens (as opposed to voting age residents) did not constitute a majority, Hispanics would not be able to elect a candidate of choice without relying on a certain percentage of white-crossover votes. According to defendants, the creation of these two additional Hispanic districts would do nothing more than dilute the Hispanic citizen VAP in the remaining nine districts and would result in a decrease in safe Hispanic districts. In support of their argument, defendants cite De Grove’s testimony that after adjusting for citizenship, a district containing 66% Hispanic VAP would have less than 50% Hispanic voters. Tr. VII-26, 29. Defendants further note that citizenship levels vary among Hispanic districts — older, settled Hispanic neighborhoods in the central part of the city will have higher citizenship levels than the neighborhoods which attract more recent arrivals. Tr. VII-49. Whereas according to Dr. Weber, Cubans have a higher citizenship rate than other groups, Tr. V-26, Dr. Moreno testified that due to the high number of recent Hispanic arrivals tending to settle in the South Beach area, there was a “higher level of [Hispanic] non-citizenship and a higher level of [Hispanic] non-registration” in South Beach than in other areas of the city. Tr. 11-72-73. Because of this, plaintiffs' proposed 35th Senate district would not be an effective district. Tr. 11-72. Plaintiffs responded by noting that their proposed 35th district does not consist entirely of South Beach; rather, the lack of Hispanic citizens in South Beach is balanced by the highly concentrated Hispanic areas of Little Havana. Defendants also argued that plaintiffs were changing their position. According to defendants, in the congressional redistricting hearings, plaintiffs had contended that a 65% supermajority was necessary for Hispanics to elect a candidate of choice, but now they contend that a 59% or 62% supermajority would allow them to do so. Plaintiffs explained that the reason why plaintiffs advocated such a high VAP for the Hispanic congressional districts was because only two districts were being formed. Because everyone agreed that only two Hispanic districts would be drawn, “it ma[de] sense to hedge your bet and make those districts as Hispanic as possible.” Tr. 11-115. See also Tr. II-67-8. Furthermore, according to Dr. Arrington, a higher minority VAP is necessary for congressional districts to perform than for state legislative districts to perform: One would certainly want a somewhat higher black VAP for Congressional districts than for the state legislature because of the greater organization and financing necessary to conduct a campaign at that level. Arrington Aff. at 6. Although his analysis specifically applies only to African-Americans, there is no reason to suspect it would not also apply to Hispanics. The court finds that because minority groups have a younger population than majority groups, a supermajority' of Hispanic and African-American total population is necessary in order to create an opportunity for these groups to elect candidates of their choice. Because Hispanics communities are characterized by a large number of non citizens and a lower voter registration and turnout rates, a supermajority of Hispanic VAP is necessary to create districts in which Hispanics can elect candidates of choice. Like Hispanics, African-Americans must also constitute a supermajority of the total population of the district in order to elect a candidate of choice; however, because of the recent increase in African-American turnout and registration, a supermajority of African-American VAP is not necessary in order to elect an African-American candidate of choice. Furthermore, although the court finds that both a supermajority of Hispanic and African-American total population and a supermajority of Hispanic VAP are necessary, we decline to express these requirements as exact percentages. The court further finds that both the Senate districts proposed by plaintiff-intervenors Reaves/Brown/Hargrett and the House districts proposed by the De Grandy plaintiffs would create districts containing effective Hispanic voting majorities. Each of the proposed Senate districts in the Reaves/Brown plan and House districts in the De Grandy plan contains an Hispanic VAP of at least 60%. Because the 65 percent rule already accounts for citizenship, making another adjustment for citizenship would overstate its importance and lead to double counting. Finally, the fact that the plaintiffs themselves are satisfied with ■ these percentages also tends to indicate the effectiveness of the proposed districts. Coleburn, 689 F.Supp. at 1438. b. Geographical Compactness Plaintiffs have shown that the Dade County’s Hispanic population is sufficiently large and geographically compact to constitute a majority in four Senate and eleven House districts. Hispanics constitute nearly one million persons in the Dade County area, and the county has sufficient concentrations of Hispanic population that can be easily combined to create four Senate and eleven House districts that contain effective Hispanic voting majorities. Hispanics have primarily settled in three sections of Dade: the Little Havana section of the City of Miami, the “West Dade area” comprising the communities of Sweetwater, Village Green, Westchester and West Kendall, and the Northwest section of the county consisting of the cities of Hialeah, Miami Springs, and their surrounding neighborhoods. Moreno Aff. at 5-6. There is also a sizeable Hispanic (mostly Mexican) farm-worker community in the Homestead area. Document 471 at 5-6. The Cuban migration patterns went from east to west — as Cubans improved economically, they moved out of the Little Havana area into the suburbs. Tr. III-12. With the exception of the Miami airport, which separates Little Havana from Hialeah and Miami Springs, the Hispanic. population forms a compact and contiguous line from Hialeah to Kendall. Tr. Ill — 13. The two most dramatic areas of Hispanic growth in Dade County area along Miami Beach and the Kendall/West Kendall area. Tr, 11-14. The African-American population is also sufficiently large and geographically compact to constitute a majority in two Senate and four House districts in Dade County. The concentrations of the African-American population essentially rest in the north central portion of urbanized Dade County including Opa-Locka, Liberty City and Carol City. Tr. VI-205; 11-15-16. There are also pockets of non-Hispanic African-Americans in downtown Miami (including Overtown), Coconut Grove, and Richmond Heights. Tr. II-16; VI-205. Finally, there are African-American neighborhoods in Florida City, Homestead, Goulds, and South Miami. Tr. 11-16. The Allapattah area is the border zone between African-American neighborhoods (to the east) and Hispanic areas (to the west). Tr. 11-15. The court in Hastert v. State Bd. of Elections, 777 F.Supp. 634 (N.D.Ill.1991), noted that the Gingles geographical compactness requirement is not “an aesthetic concept.” Hastert, 777 F.Supp. at 649. In that case, most of Chicago/Cook County’s Hispanic population was “clustered into two dense enclaves, one on Chicago’s near northwest side and the other on the near southwest side,” but that the two enclaves were “less than a mile from each other at their closest points.” Hastert, 777 F.Supp. at 649. Concluding that Chicago’s Hispanic community was geographically compact within the meaning of Gingles despite the fact that the clusters were separated, the court held that “[t]he separation of /clusters is not indicative of the existence of two distinct communities, but appears to have occurred as a result of exogenous physical and institutional barriers.” Hastert, 777 F.Supp. at 649. Despite the fact the Hispanic community existed in two separate enclaves, the court in Hastert concluded that the Chicago/Cook County Hispanic community was sufficiently large and geographically compact to constitute a single district majority. Hastert, 777 F.Supp. at 649. Other courts have echoed the fact that compactness is not an aesthetic concept. In Dillard v. Baldwin County Board of Education, 686 F.Supp. 1459, 1465-66 (M.D.Ala.1988), the court held that “[a]n aesthetic norm, by itself, would be not only unrelated to the legal and social issues presented under Section 2, it would be an unworkable concept, resulting in arbitrary and capricious results, because it offers no guidance as to when it is met.” The court in Wilson v. Eu, 1 Cal. 4th 707, 4 Cal.Rptr.2d 379, 823 P.2d 545 (1992), held that the compactness requirement should be used to promote the creation of functional voting districts that allow for effective representation. Specifically, the court held that Compactness' does not refer to geometric shapes but to the ability of citizens to relate to each other and their representatives and to the ability of representatives to relate effectively to their constituency. Eu, 4 Cal.Rptr.2d at 387, 823 P.2d at 553. In this case, plaintiffs testified that the primary difference between their House plan and the Florida House plan was that the De Grandy House plan attempted to draw the Hispanic districts from north to south while the state drew the districts from east to west. Tr. IY-22. The De Grandy/Reaves/Humphrey plaintiffs and the DOJ argue that Florida’s House plan fragments and dilutes the Hispanic vote. Dr. Moreno testified that House District 116 of the Florida plan has an Hispanic VAP of 48 percent. Tr. III-263. Additionally, Dr. Moreno pointed out that the line of District 116 separates heavily Hispanic neighborhoods in District 112 from the rest of the heavily hispanic Kendall Lakes area and the Kendall area. Tr. III-263-264. Dr. Moreno concluded that the Florida plan erects a barrier between “neighbors making up the same, basically what is the same housing development in Kendall Lakes.” Tr. III-264. Additionally, Dr. Moreno testified that in order to protect a white incumbent the Florida plan packs District 114 with an Hispanic VAP of over 78 percent. Tr. Ill — 265. Dr. Moreno also pointed out that in District 102 and District 109 the State repeated the process of fragmenting Hispanic communities. Tr. Ill — 265. This court does not find that the. districts drawn by the De Grandy plaintiffs are significantly less geographically compact than those drawn by the state of Florida. Nor are these districts “so unreasonably irregular, ‘bizarre,’ or ‘uncouth’ as to approach obvious gerrymandering.” Coleburn, 689 F.Supp. at 1437. Furthermore, these districts are “relatively compact and are in line with the configuration of electoral districts that have been approved in other cases.” Coleburn, 689 F.Supp. at 1437 (citing Rybicki v. State Board of Elections, 574 F.Supp. 1082, 1146, 1166-67 (N.D.Ill.1982) (three judge court)). Finally, the court finds that the districts as drawn in the De Grandy House and Senate plans would create functional voting districts that allow for effective representation. 2. Political Cohesiveness The testimony showed that the Hispanics and African-Americans were each politically cohesive among themselves but were not at all cohesive — and were often at odds — in relation to each other. See e.g. Tr. III-35-36; Meek v. Metropolitan Dade County, 908 F.2d 1540, 1545-46 (11th Cir.1990). There is a high degree of tension in Dade County between the African-American population and the Hispanic population. Tr. 11-82. Furthermore, while African Americans tend to vote Democratic, Hispanic voters tend to vote Republican. Tr. 11-28. The focus of this Gingles prong, however, is not the joint cohesiveness of two separate minority groups, but rather whether “Hispanics” as a group and/or “African-Americans” as a group are politically cohesive. a. Hispanic The total Hispanic population of Dade County is 953,407 of which 55 percent is Cuban American. Moreno Aff. at 5. It is estimated that during the 1980’s, over 300,-000 Latin Americans moved into Dade County. Moreno Aff. at 5. Of these, the Mariel boatlift in 1980 brought in 125,000 Cuban refugees, while Nicaraguans fleeing the Sandinista regime and civil war in 1986 and 1987 numbered approximately 79,000. Tr. II-17. Thousands of Colombians, Peruvians, Hondurans, Guatemalans and Puerto Ricans also melded into Dade’s flourishing Hispanic community during the 1980s. According to the 1990 census, non-Cuban hispanics account for 40.7% of the Hispanic voters in Dade County. Tr. 11-86. The testimony showed that there is a high degree of political cohesiveness among Cuban voters in Dade County although the testimony was less clear about the cohesiveness of non-Cuban Hispanics. Because Dr. Moreno focused on Hispanics as a group and not on the individual Hispanic subgroups, he was not able to form any conclusions as to voting preferences of these individual subgroups. Tr. 11-84-91. In general, “the Hispanics in Dade County are distinguished from Hispanics in the other part of the country by being more conservative and much more Republican.” Moreno Aff. at 16. The strong loyalty Cuban-Americans have to the Republican party is seen by their voting patterns in several elections. In 1986, Republican Bob Martinez carried the Hispanic precincts of Dade over his Democratic opponent, receiving 79 percent of the vote. Moreno Aff. at 17. In 1988, President George Bush carried the Hispanic precincts of Dade County with over 85 percent of the vote, while Senator Connie Mack carried the same districts with about 80 percent of the vote. Moreno Aff. at 16. Between 1980 and 1990, Democratic party registration among Hispanics in Dade County decreased from 49 to 24 percent, while Republican registration increased from 39 to 68 percent. Moreno Aff. at 18. The Cuban vote stands in stark contrast to that of other Latinos across the United States who have consistently supported the Democratic ticket by two-to-one margins. Moreno Aff. at 18. The cohesiveness of Dade’s Hispanic community has also been buttressed by the idealogical affinity of its two largest groups — Nicaraguans and Cubans. Moreno Aff. at 9. These two groups continually work together for a conservative foreign policy agenda. Moreno Aff. at 9; Tr. 11 — 18. According to Representative Miguel De Grandy, There is a union between Cuban-Americans, Nicaraguans and other Central Americans in basic philosophy, first to form policy because ... they are basically political and not economic migrations, unlike other Hispanic sectors of the United States; they generally have a very conservative, very anti-communist political philosophy on the foreign affairs. Tr. 11-145. Dade County has a significant amount of Hispanic African-Americans including immigrants from the Dominican Republic and Puerto Rico. Tr. II at 33. Although Dr. Moreno testified that Dominicans identified more with the Hispanic culture than that of the African Americans, the cohesiveness of the 70,000 Dade County Puerto Ricans is less clear. Moreno Aff. at 33. According to Dr. Moreno, Dade County Puerto Ricans seem to identify with the language minority stronger than with the racial minority. Tr. 11-33, 84-85. Furthermore, Dade County Puerto Ricans tend to be more Republican and more conservative than their Puerto Rican counterparts in New York. Tr. 11-17. Nonetheless, the statistical evidence shows that Puerto Ricans tend to register more as Democrats (50%) than Republicans (40%). Tr. 11-142, 179. According to Dr. Moreno, the fact that Puerto Ricans and