Serody v. Chater (901 F. Supp. 925, 1995)

MEMORANDUM

BUCKWALTER, District Judge.

This is an action brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) seeking judicial review of the final decision of the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration (“Commissioner”) denying the claim of William Serody (“Serody”) for disability insurance benefits (“DIB”) provided under Title II of the Social Security Act (“Act”). The parties filed cross motions for summary judgment which were referred to the Honorable James R. Melinson, United States Magistrate Judge, who issued a Report and Recommendation (“R & R”) on July 19, 1995.

The facts, procedural history, standard of review and medical evidence set forth in Magistrate Judge Melinson’s July 19,1995 R & R are approved and adopted by reference herein. In his R & R addressing the parties’ cross motions for summary judgment, Magistrate Judge Melinson found that the ALJ correctly applied the applicable legal standards and that his decision to deny benefits to the claimant, William Serody, was supported by substantial evidence. Specifically, the Magistrate Judge found that the ALJ properly concluded that Mr. Serody suffers from a severe derangement of his left knee and chronic headaches which preclude him from engaging in his prior employment as a fire fighter or fire fighting captain. Such disability, however, does not render the claimant totally disabled within the meaning of the Act. Rather, the ALJ found that despite his inability to engage in the type of work he formerly performed, Mr. Serody’s physical condition does not prevent him from engaging in sedentary work for which he can wear a knee brace and where his absence can be accommodated when his headaches are problematic. Magistrate Judge Melinson recommended that the decision of the ALJ be upheld. Subsequently, the claimant raised numerous objections to the Magistrate Judge’s R & R, to which the Commissioner did not respond. It is these objections which are currently before this court.

Our review of a magistrate judge’s ruling is de novo. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b). We may accept, reject or modify, in whole or in part, his findings and recommendations. Id. In considering the claimant’s objections in this matter, we have independently reviewed the entire record in this case, including the Magistrate Judge’s R & R, the ALJ’s written decision, the transcripts of the hearing and the hearing exhibits.

Objecting to Magistrate Judge Melinson’s R & R, claimant Serody asserts that the court erred in finding:

(1) no medical evidence in the record supports Mr. Serody’s claim of pain so severe that it would preclude him from substantial gainful activity; (2) the ALJ properly considered Mr. Serody’s complaints of pain; (3) the ALJ decision gave proper weight to the opinion of plaintiffs treating physician Dr. Kaplan; (4) the report of Dr. Toland was contrary medical evidence which conflicted with the opinion of Dr. Kaplan; (5) the ALJ properly rejected the opinion of Mr. Serody’s treating physician; (6) the vocational expert (