Full opinion text
OPINION LECHNER, District Judge. The Grand Jury (the “Grand Jury”) returned a fifty-three count indictment (the “Indictment”) on 6 December 1996 against defendants Dorothy Blackwell (“Blackwell”) and Charles McNeil (“McNeil”) (collectively, the “Defendants”), charging embezzlement, 18 U.S.C. § 656, fifty-one counts of money laundering, 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(l)(B)(i) (“Section 1956(a)(l)(B)(i)”) and conspiracy to commit money laundering, 18 U.S.C. § 1956(h) (“Section 1956(h)”). The Grand Jury filed a superseding indictment (the “Superseding Indictment”) on 22 May 1996 and a second superseding indictment (the “Second Superseding Indictment”) on 29 May 1996. The differences among these indictments are indicated below. This opinion addresses the pretrial motions filed by Blackwell on 8 July 1996 to dismiss Count Two of the Second Superseding Indictment (“Count Two”), pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 12 (“Rule 12”) (the “Motion to Dismiss”), and for disclosure of grand jury transcripts pursuant to Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 6(e)(3)(C)(ii) (“Rule 6(e) (3)(C) (ii) ”) (the “Disclosure Motion”). This opinion also addresses the pretrial motion filed by McNeil on 22 March 1996 seeking (1) disclosure of material pursuant to Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963) (“Brady”)-, (2) disclosure of material pursuant to Rule 404(b) of the Federal Rules of Evidence (“Rule 404(b)”); (3) early disclosure of information discoverable pursuant to the Jencks Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (the “Jencks Act”); and (4) an order pursuant to Rule 104(a) of the Federal Rules of Evidence barring the introduction of co-conspirators’ statements under Rule 801(d)(2)(E) of the Federal Rules of Evidence (“Rule 801(d)(2)(E)”) and an in limine hearing on admissibility of co-conspirators statement (the “Omnibus Motion”). This opinion further addresses four motions filed by the Government shortly before trial. These included: a motion to allow the use of demonstrative charts and summary witnesses at trial (the “Demonstrative Charts and Summary Witnesses Motion”); a motion to allow the introduction of an audit (the “Audit”) of the National Westminster Bank, pursuant to Rule 803(6) of the Federal Rules of Evidence (“Rule 803(6)”) (the “Rule 803(6) Motion”); a motion to allow the introduction of pre-marked exhibits (the “Pre-Marked Exhibit Motion”); and a motion concerning judicial notice (the “Judicial Notice Motion”). Finally, this opinion addresses Blackwell's sentencing hearing (the “Sentencing Hearing”), held on 5 December 1996. At the Sentencing Hearing, objections to the Department of Probation’s presentence investigation report (the “Presentence Investigation Report”) were addressed. Facts A. The Second Superseding Indictment 1. Background The following facts are taken from the Second Superseding Indictment. During all times relevant to the Second Superseding Indictment, Blackwell was employed as an operations clerk in the Asset-Based Lending Department at the branch office of the National Westminister Bank of New Jersey (“NatWest”) located in the Cherry Hill, New Jersey (the “NatWest Cherry Hill Branch”). Second Superseding Indictment, ¶2 at 1. The job responsibilities for Blackwell included accepting deposits from “asset-based lending customers” of the bank. Id., ¶ 4 at 2. At the NatWest Cherry Hill Branch, customers gave their deposits, in the form of either cash or cheeks, to Blackwell who was “required to initial the deposit ticket to acknowledge receipt of the funds, return a copy of the initialed deposit ticket to the customer, and credit the customer’s account.” Id. Between January 1989 and October 1990, Eastern Music Systems Corporation (“Eastern Music”), one. of the NatWest’s asset-based lending customers, made deposits consisting of both cash and checks with NatWest at the NatWest Cherry Hill Branch. Second Superseding Indictment, ¶¶ 5-6 at 2. During this period, Blackwell “failed to deposit at least approximately $470,000.00” in cash delivered by Eastern Music to NatWest (the “Embezzled Money”). Id. McNeil had a personal relationship with Blackwell. Second Superseding Indictment, ¶ 2 at 4. During the times relevant to the Second Superseding Indictment, McNeil maintained cheeking accounts at the Nat-West Cherry Hill Branch (the “McNeil Nat-West Checking Account”) and First Fidelity Bank, N.A., Jersey City, New Jersey (the “McNeil First Fidelity Checking Account”), and a savings account at Hudson City Savings Bank (“Hudson City”), Cherry Hill, New Jersey (the “McNeil Hudson City Savings Account”) (collectively the “McNeil Accounts”). Id,., ¶¶ 2-4. On or about 10 January 1990, Blackwell was given Power of Attorney with respect to the McNeil Hudson City Savings Account. Id., ¶ 4. On or about 18 January 1990, McNeil obtained a loan from Hudson City of approximately $24,750.00 (the “Hudson City Loan”). Second Superseding Indictment, ¶5 at 5. The Hudson City Loan was secured by the McNeil Hudson City Savings Account. Id. “Between in or about September 1989 through at least as late as August 1991,” McNeil rented a safe deposit box at Hudson City (the “Hudson City Safe Deposit Box”). Id., ¶ 6. In or about January 1990, Blackwell was appointed as McNeil’s “deputy” with respect to the Hudson City Safe Deposit Box; she was thereby authorized access to the Hudson City Safe Deposit Box. Id. 2. Charges The Second Superseding Indictment contained two counts. Count One (“Count One”) charged Blackwell, “[bjetween in or about January 1989 and continuing through in or about October 1990, ... knowingly and wilfully embezzled, purloined, and misapplied moneys and funds of [NatWest]” in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 656 (“Section 656”). Second Superseding Indictment, ¶ 7 at 3. Count one also charged Blackwell with aiding and abetting in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2. Id. The applicable statute of limitations for a violation of Section 656 requires an “indictment be returned or the information [be] filed within 10 years after the commission of the offense.” 18 U.S.C. § 3293. Count Two charged Defendants with conspiracy to commit money laundering in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371 (“Section 371”) (the “Conspiracy”). Count Two specifically charged: Between in or about January 1989 and continuing through at least as late as April 1992, [Defendants] knowingly and willfully conspired and agreed with each other to conduct and to attempt to conduct financial transactions, that is, the deposit and withdrawal of money to and from the McNeil Accounts and the payments on the [Hudson City Loan], which financial transactions involved the proceeds of specified unlawful activity, that is, the embezzlement of NatWest’s funds, knowing that the property involved in the financial transactions represented the proceeds of some form of unlawful activity, and knowing that these financial transactions were designed in whole or in part to conceal and disguise the nature, location, source, ownership, and control of the proceeds of said specified unlawful activity[.] Second Superseding Indictment, ¶ 7 at 5-6. The Second Superseding Indictment alleged the object of the Conspiracy was to use the Embezzled Money in a manner designed to conceal Blackwell’s embezzlement of the money from NatWest. Second Superseding Indictment, ¶ 8 at 6. Defendants were charged with a series of acts taken in furtherance of the Conspiracy: (1) Defendants deposited cash into and later withdrew money from the McNeil Accounts, id., ¶¶ 9-11 at 6-7; (2) McNeil paid off the Hudson City Loan, within five months of obtaining it, “by making eight cash payments totaling $24,-750.00,” id., ¶ 12 at 7; and (3) “in or about September 1989 and in or about August 1991,” Defendants entered the Hudson City Safe Deposit Box “on at least approximately forty different days.” Id., ¶ 13. The Second Superseding Indictment alleged all of the transactions described above “involved at least some of the embezzled NatWest money.” Id., ¶ 14. 3. Overt Acts The Second Superseding Indictment charged Defendants with committing five overt acts (the “Overt Acts”) in furtherance of the Conspiracy: 1. Between in or about January 1989 and in or about April 1991, [Defendants] made and caused to be made cash deposits into the McNeil NatWest Checking Account (“Overt Act One”). 2. Between in or about October 1989 and at least as late as April 1992, [Defendants] made and caused to be made cash deposits into the McNeil First Fidelity Cheeking Account (“Overt Act Two”). 3. On or about January 18, 1990, [McNeil] obtained the Hudson City Loan (“Overt Act Three”). 4. On or about August 23, 1991, [Defendants] entered the Hudson City Safe Deposit Box (“Overt Act Four”). 5. On or about August 23, 1991, [Defendants] surrendered the Hudson City Safe Deposit Box (“Overt Act Five”). Second Superseding Indictment at 8-9 (emphasis added). B. The Indictment and the Superseding Indictment As indicated, the Indictment charged Blackwell with embezzlement and Defendants with fifty-one counts of money laundering in violation of Section 1956(a)(l)(B)(i) and one count of conspiracy to commit money laundering in violation of Section 1956(h). Count Fifty-Three of the Indictment charged: Between in or about January 1989 and continuing through in or about October 1990 ... [Defendants ... knowing that the property involved in the financial transactions as described above, represents ed the proceeds of some form of unlawful activity, and knowing that each of these financial transactions was designed in whole or in part to conceal and disguise the nature, location, source, ownership, and control of the proceeds of specified unlawful, that is, the embezzlement of Nat-West’s funds, knowingly and willfully conspired and agreed with each other and others to conduct and to attempt to conduct each of these financial transactions, which in fact involved the proceeds of said specified unlawful activity, contrary to Title 18, United States Code, Section 1956(a)(l)(B)(i)____ All in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 1956(h). Indictment, ¶ 2 at 9 & p. 10 (emphasis added). The Superseding Indictment contained two counts. Count One charged Blackwell with embezzlement in violation of Section 656. Count Two charged Defendants with conspiracy to engage in money laundering in violation of Section 1956(h). Count Two charged: Between in or about January 1989 and continuing through at least as late as April 1992 ... [Defendants ... knowingly and willfully conspired and agreed with each other to conduct and to attempt to conduct financial transactions ... knowing that the money involved ... represented the proceeds of some form of unlawful activity, and knowing that these financial transactions were designed in whole and in part to conceal and disguise the nature, location, source, ownership, and control of the proceeds of said specified unlawful activity, contrary to [Section 1956(a)(l)(B)(i) ]____ All in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 1956(h). Superseding Indictment, ¶7 at 5-6 & p. 8 (emphasis added). C. Comparison of the Indictments The charge against Blackwell for embezzlement under Section 656 remained undisturbed in all three indictments. The two superseding indictments, however, eliminated the fifty-one counts of money laundering under Section 1956(a)(l)(B)(i) contained in the Indictment. The most important differences among the indictments for the purposes of the Motion to Dismiss, however, were the changes made in the Conspiracy charge. As indicated, the Indictment charged Defendants with conspiracy to commit money laundering under Section 1956(h). The Conspiracy, as charged in the Indictment, was alleged to have occurred “[b]etween in or about January 1989 ... [and] in or about October 1990” and only concerned transactions made at the McNeil NatWest Cheeking Account. The Superseding Indictment changed the time-frame of the Conspiracy; it alleged the Conspiracy existed between “in or about January 1989 and continuing through at least as late as April 1992.” Superseding Indictment, ¶ 7 at 5. The Conspiracy, as charged in the Superseding Indictment, implicated transactions at all the McNeil Accounts. Id., ¶¶ 2-4 at 4-5. The Superseding Indictment further alleged the pay-off of the McNeil Hudson City Loan and Defendants’ visits to the McNeil Hudson City Safe Deposit Box were acts in furtherance of the Conspiracy. Id., ¶ 12,13 at 7-8. The Superseding Indictment alleged the indicated transactions “involved at least some of the embezzled NatWest money” and charged Defendants with a violation of Section 1956(h). Id., ¶ 14 at 8. The Second Superseding Indictment changed the statutory basis for the Conspiracy charge; instead of charging the Conspiracy under Section 1956(h), it charged the Conspiracy under Section 371. Second Superseding Indictment at 9. As indicated, the Second Superseding Indictment also alleged five specific Overt Acts taken by Defendants in furtherance of the Conspiracy. Id. at 8-9. Discussion A. Statute of Limitations 1. Rule 12(b) Under Rule 12(b), defenses which are “capable of determination without trial of the general issue may be raised before trial by motion.” Id. The 1944 Advisory Committee Note on Rule 12(b)(1) and (2) sheds considerable light on the Rule’s interpretation. As the Advisory Committee observed, subdivisions (1) and (2) of the rule classify into two groups all objections and defenses to be interposed by motion pursuant to Rule 12(b): In one group are defenses and objections which must be raised by motion, failure to do so constituting a waiver. In the other group are defenses and objections which at the defendant’s option may be raised by motion, failure to do so, however, not constituting a waiver____ In the ... group of objections and defenses, which the defendant at his [or her] option may raise by motion before trial, are included all defenses and objections which are capable of determination without a trial of the general issue. They include such matters as former jeopardy, former conviction, former acquittal, statute of limitations, immunity, lack of jurisdiction, failure of indictment or information to state an offense, etc. Rule 12(b)(1), (2) Advisory Committee Note (citations omitted, emphasis added). As the Advisory Committee Note makes clear, the statute of limitations defense is a defense “which the defendant at his [or her] option may raise by motion before trial.” Rule 12(b)(1), (2) Advisory Committee Note. Rule 12(e) further provides “[a] motion made before trial shall be determined before trial unless the court, for good cause, orders that it be deferred for determination at the trial of the general issue or until after verdict.” Id. If the defense is “substantially founded upon and intertwined with” evidence concerning the alleged offense, the motion falls within the province of the ultimate finder of fact and should be deferred until trial. United States v. Williams, 644 F.2d 950, 952-53 (2d Cir.1981); see Fed.R.Crim.P. 12(b); United States v. Doe, 63 F.3d 121, 125 (2d Cir.1995); United States v. Wilson, 26 F.3d 142, 159 (D.C.Cir.1994), cert. denied, — U.S. ---, 115 S.Ct. 1430, 131 L.Ed.2d 311 (1995); United States v. Shortt Accountancy Corp., 785 F.2d 1448, 1452 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 478 U.S. 1007, 106 S.Ct. 3301, 92 L.Ed.2d 715 (1986); United States v. Conley, 859 F.Supp. 909, 927-28 (W.D.Pa.1994) (“ ‘A defense is ... “capable of determination” if trial of the facts surrounding the commission of the alleged offense would be of no assistance in determining the validity of the defense.’ ”) (quoting United States v. Covington, 395 U.S. 57, 60, 89 S.Ct. 1559, 1561, 23 L.Ed.2d 94 (1969)). A motion to dismiss the indictment should consider only those objections that are “capable of determination without the trial of the general issue;” evidentiary questions should not be determined at that stage. United States v. Knox, 396 U.S. 77, 83 n. 7, 90 S.Ct. 363, 367 n. 7, 24 L.Ed.2d 275 (1969). “[T]he crucial question in determining whether the statute of limitations has run is the scope of the conspiratorial agreement, for it is that which determines both the duration of the conspiracy, and whether the act relied on as an overt act may properly be regarded as in furtherance of the conspiracy.” Grunewald v. United States, 353 U.S. 391, 397, 77 S.Ct. 963, 970, 1 L.Ed.2d 931 (1957). In such cases it is often difficult to separate the limitations claim from the facts of the case and issues of guilt and innocence to be established at trial. Id.; United States v. Cannistraro, 800 F.Supp. 30, 78 (D.N.J.1992) (the ultimate question of whether acts are in furtherance of conspiracy depends on objective of conspiracy, a question of fact for the jury); see e.g., United States v. McLaughlin, 910 F.Supp. 1054, 1063 (E.D.Pa.1995). The sufficiency of an indictment may not be properly challenged by a pretrial motion on the ground that it is not supported by adequate evidence. Knox, 396 U.S. at 83 n. 7, 90 S.Ct. at 367 n. 7; United States v. Donsky, 825 F.2d 746, 751 (3d Cir.1987); United States v. Gunter, 631 F.2d 583, 586 (8th Cir.1980); United States v. Gallagher, 602 F.2d 1139, 1142 (3d Cir.1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1043, 100 S.Ct. 729, 62 L.Ed.2d 728 (1980); United States v. Galati, 853 F.Supp. 152, 154 (E.D.Pa.1994). B. Money Laundering Under Section 1956(a)(l)(B)(i) As indicated, Count Two charged Defendants with the Conspiracy, the object of which was “to conceal and disguise the proceeds of ... unlawful activity, contrary to [Section 1956(a)(l)(B)(i) ].” Second Superseding Indictment, ¶7 at 5-6. Section 1956(a)(l)(B)(i) provides: "Whoever, knowing that the property involved in a financial transaction represents the proceeds of some form of unlawful activity, conducts or attempts to conduct ... a financial transaction which in fact involves the proceeds of specified unlawful activity — knowing the transaction is designed in whole or in part — to conceal or disguise the nature, the location, the source, the ownership or the control of the proceeds of specified unlawful activity____ shall be sentenced to a fine of not more than $500,000 or twice the value of the property involved in the transaction, whichever is greater, or imprisonment for not more than twenty years, or both. Id. To establish a violation of Section 1956(a)(l)(B)(i), the Government must prove (1) a defendant took part in a financial transaction involving the proceeds of a specified unlawful activity, (2) the defendant knew the property involved was the proceeds of a specified unlawful activity, and (3) the defendant knew the transaction was designed in whole or in part to conceal or disguise the proceeds. 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(l)(B)(i); United States v. Reynolds, 64 F.3d 292, 297 (7th Cir.1995), cert. denied, — U.S. ---, 116 S.Ct. 969, 133 L.Ed.2d 890 (1996); United States v. Garza, 42 F.3d 251, 253 (5th Cir.1994), cert. denied, — U.S. ---, 115 S.Ct. 2263, 132 L.Ed.2d 268 (1995); United States v. West, 22 F.3d 586, 590-91 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1020, 115 S.Ct. 584, 130 L.Ed.2d 498 (1994); United States v. Paramo, 998 F.2d 1212, 1216-17 (3d Cir.1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1121, 114 S.Ct. 1076, 127 L.Ed.2d 393 (1994) ; see United States v. Carr, 25 F.3d 1194, 1206 (3d Cir.1994) (interpreting the analogous subsection, 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(2)(B)(i), which prohibits the transportation of the “proceeds of ... unlawful activity” from the United States in order to conceal the “source, the ownership or the control of the proceeds”), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1086, 115 S.Ct. 742, 130 L.Ed.2d 643 (1995); United States v. Campbell, 977 F.2d 854, 857 (4th Cir.1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 938, 113 S.Ct. 1331, 122 L.Ed.2d 716 (1993); United States v. Massac, 867 F.2d 174, 177-78 (3d Cir.1989). A “financial transaction” is: (A) a transaction which in any way or degree affects interstate or foreign commerce (i) involving the movement of funds by wire or other means, or (ii) involving one or more monetary instruments, or (in) involving the transfer of title to any real property, vehicle or aircraft, or (B) a transaction involving the use of a financial institution which is engaged in, or the activities of which affect interstate or foreign commerce in any way or degree[.] 18 U.S.C. § 1956(c)(4). Examples of financial transactions include a purchase, sale, loan, pledge, gift, transfer, delivery, or other disposition, and with respect to a financial institution includes a deposit, withdrawal, transfer between accounts, exchange of currency, loan, extension of credit, purchase or sale of any stock, bond, certificate of deposit, or other monetary instrument, use of safety deposit box, or any other payment, transfer, or delivery by, through, or to a financial institution, by whatever means effected[.] 18 U.S.C. § 1956(c)(3) (emphasis added). Congress added the “use of a safe deposit box” to the definition of transaction in 1992. Pub.L. 102-550, § 1527(a)(2). The effective date of the 1992 amendments was 25 October 1992. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 1956 — Historical and Statutory Notes at 70. Accordingly, at the time Defendants allegedly committed Overt Acts Four and Five, involving the Hudson City Safe Deposit Box, the use of a safe deposit box was not included in the statutory definition of a “financial transaction.” See id.; United States v. Bell, 936 F.2d 337, 341-42 (7th Cir.1991). As indicated, in order to convict a defendant of a violation of Section 1956(a)(l)(B)(i), the Government must prove the defendant knowingly conducted a financial transaction involving the proceeds of a specified unlawful activity in order to conceal or disguise the proceeds. Reynolds, 64 F.3d at 297. “Conducting” a financial transaction includes “initiating, concluding, or participating in the initiating, or concluding of a transaction.” 18 U.S.C. § 1956(c)(2) (emphasis added). There is no requirement a transaction be both initiated and concluded; accordingly, a violation of Section 1956(a)(l)(B)(i) occurs and the statute of limitations begins running when a deposit is initiated. United States v. Li, 55 F.3d 325, 330 (7th Cir.1995). Each money laundering transaction constitutes a separate violation of Section 1956(a)(l)(B)(i). United States v. Martin, 933 F.2d 609, 611 (8th Cir.1991). The Senate Report on the 1986 money laundering statute expresses the intent of Congress to make each money laundering transaction a separate offense: Section 1956(c)(3) defines the term “transaction to include various activities involving financial institutions such as a deposit, an exchange of funds, a transfer between accounts, and the purchase of stock or certificates of deposit____ It should be noted that each transaction involving “dirty money” is intended to be a separate offense. For example, a drug dealer who takes [one] million [dollars] in cash from a drug sale and divides the money into smaller lots and deposits it in 10 different banks has committed 10 distinct violations of the new statute. If he then withdraws some of the money and uses it to purchase a boat or condominium, he will have committed two more violations, one for the withdrawal and one for the purchase. S.Rep. No. 433, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1986); accord Martin, 933 F.2d at 611; United States v. Blackman, 904 F.2d 1250, 1257 (8th Cir.1990) (the deposit of money in a bank and the subsequent use of that money to purchase a house equal two separate transactions). In Martin, for example, the defendant conducted two transactions involving the payment of cash for stock. 933 F.2d at 611. The court held that each transaction constituted a separate financial transaction as that word is defined under 18 U.S.C. § 1956(c)(4). Id. The Martin court observed different evidence was necessary to prove each count; the transactions at issue “occurred on different dates and in different locations, and involved different amounts of money.” Id. at 611. In Martin, the defendant argued that counts III and IV of the indictment, both of which charged him with money laundering, were “multiplicious.” 933 F.2d at 611. He argued the transactions involved were of an ongoing nature and, therefore, “constituted a single continuous transaction which could not form the basis of two separate criminal offenses.” Id. The court characterized the defendant’s argument as an assertion that “once he had engaged in one act of money laundering, he could continue to engage in subsequent acts of money laundering with impunity.” Martin, 933 F.2d at 611. The court rejected this argument, concluding: “[I]t is the individual acts of money laundering which are prohibited under [Sjection 1956(a)(l)(B)(i), and not the course of action.which those individual acts may constitute____ [T]he activities charged in ... the indictment were not multiplicious.” Id. 2. Conspiracy under Section 371 In order to prove conspiracy to commit money laundering under Section 371, the Government must establish (1) a conspiracy to commit money laundering was formed, (2) during the life of the conspiracy, a conspirator committed an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy, and (3) during the life of the conspiracy, the defendant knowingly joined the conspiracy. United States v. Conley, 37 F.3d 970, 976 (3d Cir.1994); Carr, 25 F.3d at 1201 (citing United States v. McGlory, 968 F.2d 309, 321 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 962, 113 S.Ct. 1388, 122 L.Ed.2d 763 (1992)); United States v. Rankin, 870 F.2d 109, 113 (3d Cir.1989) (citing United States v. Shoup, 608 F.2d 950, 956 (3d Cir.1979)). A conspirator “remains a participant in the [conspiracy] unless and until he [or she] communicates or otherwise objectively manifests a decision to renounce the agreement.” United States v. Rosa, 891 F.2d 1063, 1069 (3d Cir.1989). The Government, moreover, is not required to prove every defendant had “[k]nowledge of all the particular aspects, goals, and participants of a conspiracy ... to sustain a conviction.” United States v. Adams, 759 F.2d 1099, 1114 (3d Cir.) (citing Blumenthal v. United States, 332 U.S. 539, 558, 68 S.Ct. 248, 257, 92 L.Ed. 154 (1947)), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 971, 106 S.Ct. 336, 88 L.Ed.2d 321 (1985); United States v. Giampa, 904 F.Supp. 235, 330 n. 106 (D.N.J.1995). “[A] conviction for conspiracy does not require that every element of the crime be proven with direct evidence.” Carr, 25 F.3d at 1201; McGlory, 968 F.2d at 321; United States v:Wexler, 838 F.2d 88, 90-91 (3d Cir.1988). In fact, the Government may rely entirely on circumstantial evidence to “prove that an alleged conspirator had the knowledge and intent necessary to commit the crime.” United States v. Anderskow, 88 F.3d 245, 253 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, — U.S. ---, 117 S.Ct. 613, 136 L.Ed.2d 537 (1996); United States v. Schramm, 75 F.3d 156, 159 (3d Cir.1996); Carr, 25 F.3d at 1201; United States v. Iafelice, 978 F.2d 92, 96-98 (3d Cir.1992); McGlory, 968 F.2d at 321. As the Circuit observed in Iafelice, “[i]t is not unusual that the government will not have direct evidence. Knowledge is often proven by circumstances.” 978 F.2d at 98. “When the Government relies entirely on circumstantial evidence, however, ‘the inferences drawn must have a logical and convincing connection to the facts established.’ ” Carr, 25 F.3d at 1201 (quoting United States v. Casper, 956 F.2d 416, 422 (3d Cir.1992)); see United States v. McNeill, 887 F.2d 448, 450 (3d Cir.1989) (circumstantial evidence is no less probative than direct evidence) (citing United States v. Bycer, 593 F.2d 549, 551 (3d Cir.1979)), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1087, 110 S.Ct. 1152, 107 L.Ed.2d 1055 (1990). a. Overt Acts Section 371 contains an explicit requirement that a conspirator perform an “act to effect the object of the conspiracy.” 18 U.S.C. § 371; see also United States v. Small, 472 F.2d 818, 819-20 (3d Cir.1972) (“Commission of an overt act by one of the conspirators is an essential element of the crime of conspiracy.”). An overt act is an act knowingly committed by one of the conspirators when an effort is made to effect, achieve or accomplish some object or purpose of the conspiracy. Conley, 37 F.3d at 976; Rankin, 870 F.2d at 113. The Government is not limited in its proof at trial to those overt acts alleged in the indictment. United States v. Adamo, 534 F.2d 31, 38 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 841, 97 S.Ct. 116, 50 L.Ed.2d 110 (1976). Moreover, the Government is under no obligation to prove every overt act alleged. Id. Reliance by the Government at trial on overt acts not included in the indictment is not fatal to a conspiracy charge absent a showing of prejudice to the defendant. Id. at 38-39; see United States v. Schurr, 794 F.2d 903, 907 n. 4 (3d Cir.1986) (“It is well settled that the government can prove overt acts not listed in the indictment, so long as there is no prejudice to the defendants thereby.”); see also United States v. McDade, 28 F.3d 283, 301 (3d Cir.1994) (“[T]he absence of ... overt acts from the indictment [does] not in itself preclude the prosecution from proving them or from, relying on such proof to satisfy the overt act requirement contained in [Section] 371”), cert. denied, — U.S. ---, 115 S.Ct. 1312, 131 L.Ed.2d 194 (1995); United States v. DiPasquale, 740 F.2d 1282, 1294 (3d Cir.1984) (“variance is permissible unless it deprives the defendant of fair notice or places him [or her] in danger of double jeopardy”), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1228, 105 S.Ct. 1226, 84 L.Ed.2d 364 (1985); United States v. U.S. Gypsum Company, 600 F.2d 414, 419 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 884, 100 S.Ct. 175, 62 L.Ed.2d 114 (1979). The same overt acts charged in a conspiracy count may also be charged and proved as substantive offenses, “‘for the agreement to do the act is distinct from the act itself.’ ” United States v. Felix, 503 U.S. 378, 390,112 S.Ct. 1377,1384,118 L.Ed.2d 25 (1992) (quoting United States v. Bayer, 331 U.S. 532, 542, 67 S.Ct. 1394, 1399, 91 L.Ed. 1654 (1947) and citing Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640, 643, 66 S.Ct. 1180,1182, 90 L.Ed. 1489 (1946) (“[T]he commission of the substantive offense and a conspiracy to commit it are separate and distinct offenses.”)); see also Garrett v. United States, 471 U.S. 773, 778, 105 S.Ct. 2407, 2411, 85 L.Ed.2d 764 (1985) (“[Conspiracy is a distinct offense from the completed object of the conspiracy.”); Iannelli v. United States, 420 U.S. 770, 777-79, 95 S.Ct. 1284, 1289-91, 43 L.Ed.2d 616 (1975). An overt act itself, however, need not be criminal in nature if considered apart from the conspiracy. Braverman v. United States, 317 U.S. 49, 53, 63 S.Ct. 99, 101-02, 87 L.Ed. 23 (1942) (Overt act need not be a crime and need only be that of a single conspirator.); United States v. Medina, 761 F.2d 12, 15 (1st Cir.1985) (citing Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298, 334, 77 S.Ct. 1064, 1084-85, 1 L.Ed.2d 1356 (1957)). As long as the act follows and tends toward the accomplishment of the plan or scheme and is knowingly done in furtherance of some object or purpose of the conspiracy charged in the indictment, it satisfies the overt act requirement. United States v. Palmeri, 630 F.2d 192, 200-01 (3d Cir.1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 467, 101 S.Ct. 1484, 67 L.Ed.2d 616 (1981); Adamo, 534 F.2d at 38; see United States v. Barone, 458 F.2d 1027, 1029 (3d Cir.1972) (introduction by defendant of conspirator to a prospective participant in conspiracy deemed an overt act in furtherance of conspiracy). b. Section 3282 In addition to proving the elements of the Conspiracy, the Government must also satisfy the requirements of the statute of limitations, which requires the Conspiracy charge be brought within five years of the date of the offense. 18 U.S.C. § 3282 (“Section 3282”). The Second Superseding Indictment was returned on 29 May 1996. It is therefore incumbent on the Government to prove the Conspiracy was still in existence on 29 May 1991 and that at least one Overt Act was performed on or after that date. 18 U.S.C. § 3282; Grunewald, 353 U.S. at 396, 77 S.Ct. at 969-70;. see United .States v. Roshko, 969 F.2d 1, 6-7 (2d Cir.1992). “For where substantiation of a conspiracy charge requires proof of an overt act, it must be shown both that the conspiracy still subsisted within the [five years] prior to the return of the indictment, and that at least one overt act in furtherance of the conspiratorial agreement was performed within that period.” Grunewald, 353 U.S. at 397, 77 S.Ct. at 970. As indicated, “the crucial question in determining whether the statute of limitations has run is the scope of the conspiratorial agreement____” Id. c. The Defense Arguments As indicated, Defendants argued Count Two should have been dismissed because the statute of limitations had run. Dismissal Brief at 15. Defendants specifically argued: (1) The first and second superseding indictments are beyond the statute of limitations ____ (2) With respect to computation of the limits of the statute of limitations, May 22, 1996, the date the'first superseding indictment was made public, is the operative date; (3) The overt acts/uneharged conduct numbered one (1) to five (5) are beyond the statute of limitátions and are, therefore, untimely; (4) The overt acts/uncharged conduct numbers four (4) and five (5) designated as “safe deposit box transactions” were not criminally sanctioned at the time of their occurrence and, as a result, have no probative value. As such each is subject to being stricken from the true bill; (5) The inference upon inference that the government asks the Court to embrace as circumstantial evidence of culpability premised on the overt acts enumerated have no “logical or convincing connection to the facts established” and are, accordingly, inadmissible under Rules 401-402 and 403, Federal Rules of Evidence. Dismissal Brief at 15-16. Defendants argued the Overt Acts charged in the Second Superseding Indictment “although not advanced as independent offenses, [were] object crimes of the conspiracy. In other words, they could have been set forth as such and labeled ‘transactions’ under 18 U.S.C. [§§] 1956(a)(l)(B)(i) and 1956(c)(3) and (4).” Dismissal brief at 17. “As a consequence ... the overt acts ... [fell] prey to the statute of limitations.” Id. at 18. Defendants also offered four reasons why the “bank activity” at the McNeil First Fidelity Cheeking Account was insufficient as a basis to infer an ongoing conspiracy to launder money: [F]irst, ... “concealing” the monies through bank transactions could not have taken eighteen (18) months from the last unlawful withdrawal of the monies by Ms. Blackwell____ Second, ... the money laundering act becomes final, and an instant violation at the time of the deposit. Third, assuming ... that there were subsequent withdrawals from NatWest, First Fidelity, and Hudson City, these acts ... cannot be utilized to perpetuate the conspiracy based on the United States v. Li rationale and the case law related to eoncealmenVobject of the conspiracy line of cases that follow Gnmewald, to analyzed forthwith. Fourth, the goal of the conspiracy was accomplished shortly after the embezzlements, and certainly not later than December 4,1990. Dismissal Brief at 20-21. Defendants essentially argued the “initial ‘transactions,’” completed the act of money laundering and therefore “completed the object of the conspiracy.” Dismissal Brief at 21. These “initial transactions,” Defendants argued, were made immediately following the embezzlement and any transactions thereafter could not be construed as money laundering. Id. at 22. Defendants, moreover, argued the payment of the McNeil loan from money taken from “an account that the government alleges was used to ‘launder’ ” cannot constitute an act of laundering because the “formal act of money laundering” was complete when the money was deposited into the account. Id. Defendants argued, therefore, the activity set forth in the Count Two of the Second Superseding Indictment occurred after the Conspiracy had concluded and were “acts of concealment” that could not support the Conspiracy charge. Id. at 23 (citing Grunewald, 353 U.S. at 397, 77 S.Ct. at 970). Finally, Defendants argued none of the Overt Acts charged in Count Two of the Second Superseding Indictment could support the Conspiracy charge: Overt Act One declares that between July 1989 and April 1991, Blackwell and McNeil “made or caused to be made cash deposits into the McNeil NatWest checking account,” while [Overt Act] Three maintains that McNeil obtained a loan from “Hudson City” on January 18,1990. Dismissal Brief at 26. Defendants argued, because they occurred before “the cutoff date for the statute of limitations,” Overt Acts One and Three could not support the Conspiracy charge. Dismissal Brief at 26. Defendants argued the transactions involving the Hudson City Safe Deposit Box, Overt Acts Four and Five, were without legal effect. Dismissal Brief at 27. Defendants’ argument was based upon the fact the use of a safe deposit box did not constitute a financial transaction under the money laundering statute in effect during the relevant times. Id. at 27. Defendants moved “to have these attributions stricken from the record.” Dismissal Brief at 27. Defendants argued the transactions at the McNeil First Fidelity Checking Account set forth as Overt Act Two in the Superseding Indictment could not support the Conspiracy charge. Overt Act Two relates that the accused “made or caused to be made cash deposits into the McNeil First Fidelity cheeking account” between October 1989 and “at least as late as April 1992.” Relying on a piecemeal approach, any bank transaction on or prior to May 21,1991 would be faulty on statute of limitations’ grounds. Any bank business after May 21, 1991 would have to pass the test of accepted inferences by having a “reasonable and convincing connection to the established facts.” ... Despite termination of the embezzlement in October 1990, the government erroneously posits the above transactions happening one and one-half years later were part of the money laundering. This proposition is insupportable and a product of speculation and surmise. Indeed, the [Second Superseding Indictment] candidly remarks that the “transactions discussed above involved at least some of the embezzled NatWest money.” Dismissal Brief at 27. In support of their argument that the transactions charged as Overt Act Two were too far removed from the embezzlement to be in furtherance of a money laundering conspiracy, Defendants provided a summary of activity reflected in the McNeil First Fidelity Checking Account records from 29 May 1991 through 5 May 1992. See Summary of the McNeil First Fidelity Cheeking Account Records attached to Reply Brief as Exhibit A (“Summary of Activity”). The Summary of Activity indicated “31 cash deposits in the twelve month period totaling $10,863.90 or an average of $350.00 per cash deposit.” Reply Brief at 3. This activity, according to Defendants, was indicative of normal banking activity, not money laundering. Reply Brief at 3^4. In summary, Defendants appeared to argue that none of the Overt Acts charged in Count Two of the Second Superseding Indictment could support the Conspiracy charge because (1) Overt Acts One and Three were outside the statute of limitations, (2) Overt Acts Four and Five were not included as “transactions” under Sections 1956(a)(l)(B)(i) and 1956(e)(3) at the time they were made, and (3) the transactions alleged as Overt Act Two that were within the statute of limitations did not bear a “reasonable and convincing connection” to Defendants’ money laundering. Dismissal Brief at 24-27. 3. Analysis of the Defense Arguments As indicated, to convict a defendant of conspiracy to commit money laundering in violation of Section 371, the Government must prove a conspiracy was formed, at some time during the period of the conspiracy a conspirator performed or caused to be performed an overt act or acts in order to “further or advance” the purpose of the agreement and finally, at some time during the period of the conspiracy, the defendant, knowing the purpose of the conspiracy, joined the conspiracy. Conley, 37 F.3d at 976. In addition, the Government must prove one overt act within the five-year limitations period. Grunewald, 353 U.S. at 397, 77 S.Ct. at 970; Schurr, 794 F.2d at 907; United States v. Butler, 792 F.2d 1528, 1533 (11th Cir.1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 933, 107 S.Ct. 407, 93 L.Ed.2d 359 (1986); United States v. Girard, 744 F.2d 1170, 1173 (5th Cir.1984); Adamo, 534 F.2d at 38. Count Two alleged: “The object of the conspiracy was to use the embezzled money in a manner designed to conceal the fact that [Blackwell] had embezzled the money from NatWest.” Second Superseding Indictment, ¶8 at 6. Count Two also alleges the Conspiracy began in or about January 1989 and continued through at least as late as April 1992. Id., ¶ 7 at 5. The Second Superseding Indictment, therefore, properly alleged a conspiracy falling within the five year statute of limitations. Defendants’ argument that the Conspiracy was completed “immediately” when they “hid” the embezzled money in the McNeil accounts shortly after the embezzlement and that any actions taken thereafter were merely “routine means of cover-up” was unpersuasive; Defendants’ reliance on Grünewald was misplaced. In Grünewald, the defendants were charged and convicted of conspiracy to defraud the United States by fixing tax fraud eases in order to get “no prosecution rulings” from the Internal Revenue Service. 353 U.S. at 393-94, 77 S.Ct. at 968-69. The Court was faced with the question of whether the prosecution was barred by the applicable statute of limitations. Id. at 394, 77 S.Ct. at 968-69. The Court held the “crucial question” in determining whether the statute of limitations has run in a conspiracy is the scope of the agreement, “for it is that which determines duration and whether the act relied on as an overt act may properly be regarded as in furtherance of the conspiracy.” Id. at 397, 77 S.Ct. at 970. The Court rejected the Government’s argument the cover-up should be regarded as part of the conspiracy. Applying the standards set forth in Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440, 69 S.Ct. 716, 93 L.Ed. 790 (1949) and Lutwak v. United States, 344 U.S. 604, 73 S.Ct. 481, 97 L.Ed. 593 (1953), the Grünewald Court stated: The crucial teaching of Krulewitch and Lutwak is that after the central criminal purposes of a conspiracy have been attained, a subsidiary conspiracy to conceal may not be implied from circumstantial evidence showing merely that the conspiracy was kept a secret and the conspirators took care to cover up their crime in order to escape detection and punishment. 353 U.S. at 401-02, 77 S.Ct. at 972. The Court observed: [E]very conspiracy is by its very nature secret; a case can hardly be supposed where [criminals] concert together for crime and advertise their purpose to the world. And again, every conspiracy will inevitably be followed by actions taken to cover the conspirators’ traces. Sanctioning the Government’s theory would be for all practical purposes wipe out the statute of limitations in conspiracy eases, as well as extend indefinitely the time within which hearsay declarations will bind' co-conspirators. Id. at 402, 77 S.Ct. at 972. The Court, however, cautioned: By no means does this mean that acts of concealment can never have significance in furthering a criminal conspiracy. But a vital distinction must be made between acts of concealment done in furtherance of the main criminal objectives of the conspiracy, and acts of concealment done after these central objectives have .been attained, for the purpose only of covering up after the crime. Grunewald, 358 U.S. at 405, 77 S.Ct. at 974 (emphasis in original). The Court concluded that where the conspiratorial agreement included an agreement to conceal the conspiracy, the statute of limitations does not commence until after the acts of concealment are completed. Id. The ultimate question of whether acts are in furtherance of the conspiracy, therefore, depends on the objectives of the conspiracy, “a determination which is a question of fact for the jury.” Cannistraro, 800 F.Supp. at 78. The argument by Defendants that “multiple transactions” in the McNeil Accounts could not have been “part of or in furtherance of the main conspiracy” based on the “rationale” announced by the court in United States v. Li 856 F.Supp. 421, 423 (N.D.Ill. 1994), aff'd, 55 F.3d 325 (7th Cir.1995) was also misplaced. First, the decision in Li concerned only the crime of money laundering under Section 1956(a)(l)(B)(i), not a conspiracy under Section 371. Id., passim. Second, Defendants misinterpreted the holding in Li. Defendants argued the initial deposits of the Embezzled Money into the McNeil Accounts completed the money laundering offenses and “latter or subsequent transactions/use of these identical monies cannot be conceived as further criminal acts.” Dismissal Brief at 23. Defendants wrongly read the holding in Li to mean that “latter or subsequent transactions/use of these identical monies” cannot constitute money laundering. Id. In Li a check was deposited with a bank on 15 December 1988; the bank, however, did not process the check until the next day. 856 F.Supp. at 423. The court held the act of initiating the deposit of the check completed the money laundering offense and started the running of the statute of limitations. Id. Because 15 December 1988 fell outside the statute of limitations, the court affirmed the district court’s judgment of acquittal on money laundering count. Id. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding a money laundering transaction is complete and the statute of limitations begins running upon the “initiation of the deposit.” United States v. Li 55 F.3d 325, 330 (7th Cir.1995) (quoting Li 856 F.Supp. at 423). The Li holding does not stand for the proposition that, after the initial deposits are made, “latter or subsequent transactions/use of the identical monies” cannot constitute further criminal activity. “[I]t is the individual acts of money laundering which are prohibited under Section 1956(a)(l)(B)(i), and not the course of action which those individual acts may constitute.” Martin, 933 F.2d at 611 (citing Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 302, 52 S.Ct. 180, 181, 76 L.Ed. 306 (1932)). As indicated, the expressed intent of Congress was to make each money laundering transaction a separate offense. Accordingly, later transactions may constitute money laundering under Section 1956(a)(l)(B)(i). The Government was required to prove one Overt Act was committed after 29 May 1991. Two of the Overt Acts charged in the Second Superseding Indictment, Overt Acts One and Three, were alleged to have been committed before the 29 May 1991 cut-off date. While the Government was entitled to prove overt acts occurring outside the limitations period, see e.g., Adamo, 534 F.2d at 37-39, proof of Overt Acts One and Three alone could not sustain the Conspiracy charge. Overt Acts Two, Four and Five, however, properly charged actions, taken in furtherance of the Conspiracy, occurring after the 29 May 1996 cut-off date. Defendants made the confused argument Overt Acts Four and Five could not support the Conspiracy charge because they did not constitute “financial transactions” under Section 1956(c)(3) at the times relevant to the Conspiracy but later were included in the definition. Dismissal Brief at 26-27. Defendants argued “[t]he ‘safe deposit boxes’ allegations of Overt Acts Four and Five are without operative effect, not because of their timing but because of their innocence.” Dismissal Brief at 27. The fact the use of a safe deposit box was not a proscribed “financial transaction” under Section 1956(c)(3) when Overt Acts Four and Five were performed was irrelevant. As indicated, an overt act need not be a crime and may be an innocent act if considered apart from the Conspiracy. Braverman, 317 U.S. at 53, 63 S.Ct. at 101; Adamo, 534 F.2d at 39 n. 6. Defendants’ argument that Overt Acts Four and Five should have been stricken because they did not support a money laundering charge under Section 1956(a)(l)(B)(i) when they were committed was, therefore, without merit. Defendants were charged with a conspiracy to commit money laundering under Section 371. Defendants apparently conceded this point in the Reply Brief and instead speculated Overt Acts Four and Five may have improperly been presented to the Grand Jury as financial transactions under Section 1956(a)(l)(B)(i) and, therefore, should have been struck from the Second Superseding Indictment. Reply Brief at 5. Defendants’ speculations regarding the evidence submitted to the Grand Jury were insufficient to warrant the striking of Overt Acts Four and Five. The argument that the transactions described in Overt Act Two were too far removed from Blackwell’s embezzlement to be considered money laundering likewise did not justify the Dismissal of Count Two. The Grand Jury returned the Second Superseding Indictment which charged the Conspiracy continued after 29 May 1991; the Grand Jury determination is presumed to be appropriate. DiPasquale, 740 F.2d at 1294. Defendants presented neither credible evidence nor a credible argument that the Conspiracy terminated before this date. Without support, Defendants argued the probative value of the Overt Acts was outweighed by their undue prejudicial effect: “The danger of permitting such a method of proof is self-evident. The defense views this problem as within the ambit of Rules 401-402 and 403, Federal Rules of Evidence.” Dismissal Brief at 9. Pursuant to Rule 401 of the Federal Rules of Evidence (“Rule 401”), the evidence concerning the transactions described in the Overt Acts was required to be relevant to the Conspiracy charge. Rule 403 of the Federal Rules of Evidence (“Rule 403”) permits a trial court to exclude relevant evidence if its relevance is overshadowed by the risk of unfair prejudice, confusion of issues, misleading the jury or waste of time. Id.; United States v. Eufrasio, 935 F.2d 553, 571 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 925, 112 S.Ct. 340, 116 L.Ed.2d 280 (1991). The Government argued “[i]t should go without saying that it would take some length of time for a conspirator intending to conceal his or her crime, to launder $470,000 into ‘good’ spendable money. Moreover, the cash deposits continued to be made into the accounts, including the McNeil First Fidelity Checking Account, at a time at which the only source of income to the [Djefendants was the monthly disability payment collected by ... McNeil.” Opposition Brief at 17. The McNeil First Fidelity Checking Account showed numerous cash deposits, ranging from $25.00 to $1,650.00 and totaling $10,863.90, from 29 May 1991 through 5 May 1992. Summary of Activity, passim. Despite arguing the activity at the McNeil First Fidelity Checking Account during this period was merely indicative of normal banking activity, not money laundering, Defendants failed to explain the origin of $10,863.90 in cash deposits. The cash deposits into the McNeil First Fidelity Checking Account appeared relevant to the Conspiracy charge. Aside from their conclusory assertions discussed above, Defendants failed to demonstrate how the probative value of the deposits was substantially outweighed by any undue prejudicial effect. Count Two, moreover, could not be properly challenged in a pretrial motion on the ground it was not supported by adequate evidence. Knox, 396 U.S. at 83. The argument that the transactions described above were too far removed from the embezzlement to support the Conspiracy charge was an argument for the jury during trial. At trial, counsel did not object to the introduction of evidence concerning the cash deposits into the McNeil First Fidelity Checking Account. B. Defendants’ Request for a Pretrial Evidentiary Hearing As indicated, Defendants requested a pretrial evidentiary hearing, pursuant to Rule 103(a)(1) of the Federal Rules of Evidence. Defendants argued such a hearing was necessary to determine the admissibility of evidence Defendants argued “clashe[d] with the statute of limitations on grounds of competence, relevance and prejudice.” Dismissal Brief at 28. Although Rule 12 does not by its terms specify when such a motion entitles a defendant to a pretrial evidentiary hearing, the Circuit has held that a defendant’s moving papers must demonstrate a “colorable claim” for relief. United States v. Brink, 39 F.3d 419, 424 (3d Cir.1994) (remanding for hearing where defendant alleged facts that, if true, “could violate a defendant’s rights under the Sixth Amendment”); see United States v. Soberon, 929 F.2d 935, 941 (3d Cir.) (if district court had “reasonable suspicion” of prosecutorial misconduct proper course was to hold evidentiary hearing), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 818, 112 S.Ct. 73, 116 L.Ed.2d 47 (1991). In order to be “colorable,” a defendant’s motion must consist of more than mere allegations of misconduct. United States v. Sophie, 900 F.2d 1064, 1071 (7th Cir.) (“A district court does not have to hold evidentiary hearing on a motion just because a party asks for one.”), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 843, 111 S.Ct. 124, 112 L.Ed.2d 92 (1990). There must be issues of fact material to the resolution of the defendant’s claim. See United States v. Panitz, 907 F.2d 1267,1273-74 (1st Cir.1990) (refusal to hold evidentiary' hearing proper because material facts were not in dispute); Sophie, 900 F.2d at 1071 (refusal to hold hearing proper where defendant’s own submissions refuted his claim). A pretrial evidentiary hearing was not warranted in the instant case; Defendants failed to raise a colorable claim requiring an evidentiary hearing. The Second Superseding Indictment validly charged a conspiracy in violation of Section 371 and alleged overt acts falling within the statute of limitations. The questions of whether the Conspiracy remained in existence and whether Overt Acts Two, Four and Five were in furtherancé of the Conspiracy were questions for the jury. Cannistraro, 800 F.Supp. at 78. C. Disclosure of the Grand Jury Transcripts Defendants moved for an order directing disclosure of grand jury transcripts, grand jury attendance and voting records. Disclosure Brief at 1. In support of this motion, Defendants asserted the Grand Jury material might have revealed that Overt Acts Four and Five were “improperly supplied to the grand jury as ‘acts of wrongdoing.’ ” Disclosure Brief at 4. Defendants argued that because the “use of a ‘safe deposit box,’ at the time of the offense, was not statutorily deemed an act of money laundering____[i]t’s (sic) presentation to the grand jury ... therefore, was ill-founded and unquestionably tainted the grands (sic) jury proceeding.” Id, Defendants sought the disclosure of the Grand Jury transcripts for the purpose of determining whether grounds existed “for a subsequent motion to dismiss based on a ‘tainted or contaminated grand jury review.’” Id. Disclosure of grand jury material is contrary to the “ ‘long established policy that maintains the secrecy of grand jury proceedings in the federal courts.’ ” United States v. Sells Engineering, Inc., 463 U.S. 418, 424, 103 S.Ct. 3133, 3138, 77 L.Ed.2d 743 (1983) (quoting United States v. Procter & Gamble Co., 356 U.S. 677, 681, 78 S.Ct. 983, 986, 2 L.Ed.2d 1077 (1958)); In re Grand Jury Investigation, 903 F.2d 180, 182 (3d Cir. 1990); Giampa, 904 F.Supp. at 287; United States v. Eisenberg, 773 F.Supp. 662, 707 (D.N.J.1991); see In re Grand Jury Investigation, 55 F.3d 350, 353-54 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, — U.S. ---, 116 S.Ct. 307, 133 L.Ed.2d 211 (1995). The Supreme Court has observed grand jury secrecy is “older than our Nation itself.” Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. v. United States, 360 U.S. 395, 399, 79 S.Ct. 1237, 1241, 3 L.Ed.2d 1323 (1959). “Since the 17th century, grand jury proceedings have been closed to the public, and records of such proceedings have been kept from the public eye____ The rule of grand jury secrecy was imported into our federal common law and is an integral part of our criminal justice system.” Douglas Oil Co. v. Petrol Stops Northwest, 441 U.S. 211, 218 n. 9, 99 S.Ct. 1667, 1672 n. 9, 60 L.Ed.2d 156 (1979). This general rule of grand jury secrecy is now codified in Rule 6(e) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure (“Rule 6(e)”). Id. Rule 6(e) applies “not only to information drawn from transcripts of grand jury proceedings, but also to anything which may reveal what occurred before the grand jury.” In re Grand Jury Matter, 682 F.2d 61, 63 (3d Cir.1982); see Fund for Constitutional Gov’t v. National Archives & Records Serv., 656 F.2d 856, 869 (D.C.Cir.1981) (scope of grand jury secrecy encompasses anything which would reveal “the identities of witnesses or jurors, the substance of the testimony, the strategy or direction of the investigation, the deliberations or question of the jurors, and the like”) (quoting SEC v. Dresser Indus., Inc., 628 F.2d 1368, 1382 (D.C.Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 993, 101 S.Ct. 529, 66 L.Ed.2d 289 (1980)). The secrecy of grand jury proceedings is not absolute, however. In re Grand Jury Investigation, 903 F.2d at 182; see Davies v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 68 F.3d 1129, 1130 (9th Cir.1995) (“Rule 6(e) protects only materials that ‘reveal some secret aspect of the inner workings of the grand jury.’ ”) (quoting United States v. Dynavac, Inc., 6 F.3d 1407, 1413 (9th Cir.1993)). Rule 6(e)(3)(C) authorizes disclosure by court order and states, in pertinent part: Disclosure otherwise prohibited by this rule of matters occurring before the grand jury may also be made — (i) when so directed by the court preliminarily to or in connection with a judicial proceeding; [or] (ii) when permitted by a court at the request of the defendant, upon a showing that grounds may exist for a motion to dismiss the indictment because of matters occurring before the grand jury____ Id, The party moving for court-ordered' disclosure bears a heavy burden of demonstrating (1) “the material [he or she] seek[s] is needed to avoid a possible injustice in another judicial proceeding,” (2) “the need for disclosure is greater than the need for continued secrecy” and (3) “[the] request is structured to cover only material so needed.” Douglas, 441 U.S. at 222, 99 S.Ct. at 1674 (footnote omitted); Eisenberg, 773 F.Supp. at 707. The most significant factor which a party seeking disclosure must show is a “particularized need” for the information. United States v. Mechanik, 475 U.S. 66, 75, 106 S.Ct. 938, 944, 89 L.Ed.2d 50 (1986) (Burger, C.J., concurring); Sells Engineering, 463 U.S. at 434, 103 S.Ct. at 3143; Illinois v. Abbott & Assocs., Inc., 460 U.S. 557, 567, 103 S.Ct. 1356, 1361, 75 L.Ed.2d 281 (1983); United States v. Canino, 949 F.2d 928, 943. (7th Cir.1991), cert. denied, 504 U.S. 910, 112 S.Ct. 1940, 118 L.Ed.2d 546 (1992); In re Lynde, 922 F.2d 1448, 1452 (10th Cir.1991); United States v. McDowell, 888 F.2d 285, 289 (3d Cir.1989); In re Disclosure of Grand Jury Material, 645 F.Supp. 76, 78 (N.D.W.Va.1986); see also Hemly v. United States, 832 F.2d 980, 984 (7th Cir.1987) (“secrecy is not broken ‘except where there is a compelling necessity for the material”) (quoting Procter & Gamble, 356 U.S. at 682, 78 S.Ct. at 986). There is a presumption of regularity in grand jury proceedings. United States v. R. Enterprises, Inc., 498 U.S. 292, 300-01, 111 S.Ct. 722, 727-28, 112 L.Ed.2d 795 (1991); United States v. Educational Development Network Corp., 884 F.2d 737, 740 (3d Cir.1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1078, 110 S.Ct. 1806, 108 L.Ed.2d 937 (1990); United States v. Chimurenga, 609 F.Supp. 1070, 1075 (S.D.N.Y.1985), aff'd sub nom., United States v. Pean, 800 F.2d 1129 (2d Cir.19