Holland v. United States (245 F.2d 341, 1957)

PER CURIAM.

For the purpose of the decision it is unnecessary to set forth the facts in the case. Only two assignments of error require discussion:

First, the indictment, sufficiently alleging an offense in the language of the statute and putting the defendant on notice, Lynch v. United States, 5 Cir., 189 F.2d 476, certiorari denied 342 U. S. 831, 72 S.Ct. 50, 96 L.Ed. 629; Hermansen v. United States, 5 Cir., 228 F. 2d 495, certiorari denied 351 U.S. 924, 76 S.Ct. 781, 100 L.Ed. 1455; Kreuter v. United States, 5 Cir., 218 F.2d 532, certiorari denied, 349 U.S. 932, 75 S.Ct. 777, 99 L.Ed. 1262, that the accusation against him was that of corruptly endeavoring to influence a juror, 18 U.S. C.A. § 1503, was not, as claimed, rendered fatally defective because of the failure to allege a purpose on his part to obstruct the administration of justice.

The second assignment is the refusal of the trial judge to give a request instruction on the effect of good character evidence in behalf of the defendant. The portion of the requested and refused charge deemed particularly-important by the appellant is a paraphrase of certain language found in Edgington v. United States, 164 U.S. 361, 366, 17 S.Ct. 72, 73, 41 L.Ed. 467, 471: “Whatever may have been said in some' of the earlier cases, to the effect that, evidence of the good character of the defendant is not te be considered unless the other evidence leaves the mind in. doubt, the decided weight of authority-now is that good character, when considered tei connection with the other evidence in the case, may generate a. reasonable doubt. The circumstances, may be such that an established reputation for good character, if it is relevant, to the issue, would alone create a reasonable doubt, although without it, the-other evidence would be convincing.”'

The Court below instructed the jury,. “* * * if the evidence with regard to good character, to good reputation, is sufficient when considered with all the other evidence in the case to create in your mind a reasonable doubt of his guilt then it is your duty to acquit him upon that evidence, including that of good character.” (Emphasis added.) The problem narrows therefore to whether this instruction fairly apprised the jury that in some circumstances “* * * that such testimony alone * * * may be enough to raise a reasonable doubt of guilt * * *” (emphasis added), Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469, 69 S.Ct. 213, 219, 93 L.Ed. 168, 174, and this is so even though “ * * * without it the other evidence would be convincing,” Edgington v. United States, supra.

Attesting to the importance attached to the problem by the Courts, requested instructions based on variations in wording of the Edgington pronouncement have been the spawning ground for considerable appellate discussion as to when, how, under what circumstances, and in what detail the trial court is required to transmute the principle into a working gauge for the jury.

It is unnecessary to make an extended analysis of the cases. While the trial judge correctly instructed the jury that the good character evidence was to be considered along with all the evidence and if a reasonable doubt was created, they should acquit, this instruction “ * * * jg