Full opinion text
MAHONEY, Circuit Judge: Kevin Granato (“Granato”), Cosmo Ca-tanzano (“Catanzano”), Mario Parlagreeo (“M. Parlagreeo”), William Meli (“Meli”), Joseph Savarese (“Savarese”), Nunzio De-Carlo ("DeCarlo”) and John Parlagreeo (“J. Parlagreeo”) appeal from judgments of conviction for violations of 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) (1988), a provision of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”), and various other federal laws entered after a jury trial in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York, I. Leo Glasser, Judge. An eleven-count superseding indictment, No. 87 Cr. 760(S-2)(ILG), was filed in the Eastern District of New York on January 27, 1988, naming the appellants and others as defendants. Count one charged that in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) (1988), Granato, Catanzano, M. Parlagreeo, Meli and DeCarlo conducted, and participated in the conduct of, the affairs of a criminal enterprise led by Scarpa (the “Scarpa Crew” or “Crew”), which “reported to the Colombo Organized Crime Family.” The “goal” of the Crew was allegedly “to raise money through the trafficking of narcotics and other controlled substances, and extortion.” The Indictment charged that the Scarpa Crew “exerted control over certain areas in the Bensonhurst section of Brooklyn, New York,” and “ran several marijuana concessions on Staten Island” from July, 1985 until January 27, 1988. Count one of the Indictment alleged that, through various combinations of its membership, the Scarpa Crew engaged in the following eight acts of racketeering as predicates to a violation of section 1962(c): (1) conspiracy among Granato, Catanzano, M. Parlagreeo, Meli and DeCarlo to distribute marijuana in or about and between July, 1985 and February, 1986 in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846 (1988); (2) conspiracy between Granato and M. Parlagreeo to distribute cocaine hydrochloride in or about and between September, 1985 and February, 1986 in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846 (1988); (3) conspiracy between Granato and Catanzano to distribute heroin hydrochloride and cocaine hydrochloride on or about and between January 6,1987 and March 20, 1987 in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846 (1988); (4) murder in the second degree of one Albert Ñocha committed by Granato, Ca-tanzano, M. Parlagreeo and DeCarlo on or about and between December 8, 1985 and December 10, 1985 in violation of N.Y.Penal Law §§ 125.25 and 20.00 (McKinney 1987); (5) conspiracy among Granato, M. Parlagreeo and Meli to affect commerce by extortion in or about and between September, 1985 and April, 1986 in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (1988); (6) conspiracy among Granato, Catanzano, M. Parlagreeo, Meli and DeCarlo to affect commerce by extortion on or about and between February 20, 1986 and April 23, 1986 in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (1988), specifying as overt acts the beating of one Eric Leon (“Leon”) for failure to pay a debt owed to Scarpa, and related events; (7) intimidation by De-Carlo of a witness, Leon, on or about February 24, 1986 in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1512(a)(3) (1982); and (8) bribery in the third degree of New York City police officers by DeCarlo on ten occasions from on or about November 9, 1985 to February 15, 1986 in violation of N.Y.Penal Law § 200.00 (McKinney 1988). Count two charged Granato and M. Par-legreco with engaging in a continuing criminal enterprise in or about and between July, 1985 and January 27, 1988 in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 848(a) (1988). Count three charged Granato, Catanzano, M. Parlagre-co, Meli and DeCarlo with conspiracy to distribute marijuana in or about and between July, 1985 and February, 1986 in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 846 and 841(b)(1)(D) (1988). Count four charged Granato, Catanzano, M. Parlagreco, Meli and DeCarlo with distributing marijuana in or about and between July, 1985 and February, 1986 in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 841(b)(1)(D) (1988) and 18 U.S.C. § 2 (1988). Count five charged Gra-nato, M. Parlagreco and Meli with conspiracy to commit extortion in or about and between September, 1985 and April, 1986 in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (1988). Count six charged Granato with carrying a firearm in relation to a crime of violence in September, 1985 in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (1988). Count seven charged Granato, Catanza-no, M. Parlagreco, Meli, Savarese, DeCarlo and J. Parlagreco with conspiracy to extort Leon in or about and between February 20, 1986 and April 23, 1986 in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (1988). Count eight charged Granato, Catanzano, M. Parlagreco, Meli, DeCarlo, Savarese and J. Parlagreco with committing extortion by physical violence and threats of physical violence upon Leon on or about February 20, 1986 in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1951 and 2 (1988). Count nine charged Granato, Meli and DeCarlo with assault resulting in serious bodily injury upon Leon for the purpose of maintaining or increasing their position in a criminal enterprise engaged in racketeering activity on or about February 20, 1986 in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1959 and 2 (1988). Count ten charged Granato and M. Parla-greco with intimidating a witness, Leon, on or about February 20, 1986 in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1512(b)(3) and 2 (1988). Count eleven charged DeCarlo with intimidating a witness, Leon, on or about February 24, 1986 in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1512(b)(3) (1988). Before he could be brought to trial, Scar-pa fled the jurisdiction, became a fugitive, and was thereafter apprehended and arrested by agents of the Drug Enforcement Administration (“DEA”) in a motel in Lakewood, New Jersey on August 29, 1988. He was tried separately before a jury in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York, I. Leo Glasser, Judge, and convicted of conducting a racketeering enterprise in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) (1988); engaging in a continuing criminal enterprise in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 848(a) (1988); conspiring to distribute marijuana in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846 (1988); distributing marijuana in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (1988); and two counts of conspiring to commit extortion, and one count of extortion, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (1988). See United States v. Scarpa, 897 F.2d 63, 64 (2d Cir.1990), petition for cert. filed, No. 89-1856 (U.S. May 24, 1990). His appeal was heard in tandem with the instant appeal, and his conviction was affirmed by this court on February 23, 1990. Id. The trial of the appellants herein, which took place while Scarpa was a fugitive, began on May 23, 1988 and ended on July 15, 1988, when the jury returned a verdict. Granato, Catanzano, M. Parlagreco, Meli and DeCarlo were all convicted on count one, the RICO count. The jury determined that all predicate acts were proved, as charged, against all defendants, except that predicate act four, the murder of Albert Ñocha, was proven only against De-Carlo, and not against Granato, Catanzano and M. Parlagreco. All defendants were found guilty of all other counts as charged in the Indictment, except that Granato was acquitted on count six, carrying a firearm in relation to a crime of violence. All appellants except J. Parlagreco were sentenced to concurrent prison terms on each count of conviction, with the maximum term for each appellant as follows: Granato, fifteen years plus a special parole term of ten years and a $10,000 fine; Ca-tanzano, seven years plus a special parole term of five years; M. Parlagreco, twenty years plus a special parole term of five years; Meli, fifteen years plus a special parole term of ten years; Savarese, five years plus five years probation; and De-Carlo, twenty years plus a special parole term of ten years. J. Parlagreco’s sentence was suspended, and he was placed on probation for five years. The district court also imposed, as required by 18 U.S.C. § 3013 (1988), a special assessment of fifty dollars upon each defendant for each count of conviction. We affirm. Background In view of the jury verdicts, we consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the government. The evidence presented at trial included surveillance photographs, soundless videotapes, tape recordings and the testimony of numerous witnesses. The Scarpa Crew, under the leadership of Scar-pa, an alleged “capo” in the Colombo organized crime family, operated several lucrative marijuana sales locations (known as “spots”) in parts of Brooklyn and Staten Island from approximately July, 1985 until the termination of that activity as a result of this criminal proceeding. Other illegal activity that stemmed from the operation of the spots included bribing New York City police officers in an effort to protect the spots from police interference, extorting money from competing drug dealers who also distributed marijuana in the area, murdering a competing dealer, and brutally assaulting an associate in an effort to extort money which he owed to the Crew. It was also established that members of the Scarpa Crew, on occasion, engaged in the distribution of heroin and cocaine. A. Distribution of Marijuana. According to testimony at trial, the Scar-pa Crew first became involved in marijuana distribution in the summer of 1985 when they ousted two dealers, Scotty Brennan and Peter Crupi, from a location adjacent to Staten Island College (the “college spot”). The operation at the college spot proved highly lucrative, so the Scarpa Crew also established spots at Wolfs Pond Park on Staten Island, and at 13th Avenue and 73rd Street, and 20th Avenue and 81st Street, both in Brooklyn. The college spot, however, remained the primary location. It was operated for the Scarpa Crew by Leon, who had been employed by the Crew for $100 per night. Other lower-level workers, earning approximately $30-$70 per night, were employed by the Crew to function as “chickeys” or look-outs, “dealers,” who distributed marijuana to buyers, and “runners,” who collected the money from the dealers and brought it back to Leon. In a typical day of operation, Letterio DeCarlo would prepare the marijuana for sale by bagging it in individual packets and then placing the packets in duffle bags. Leon and the workers would gather at Mike’s Candy Store on 69th Street in Brooklyn at approximately 4:30 — 5:00 p.m. and either wait for Letterio DeCarlo, Gra-nato or M. Parlagreco to bring the marijuana in duffle bags to the candy store, or go to Letterio DeCarlo’s house to pick it up. The group would then assemble in several cars and drive to the college spot at about 6:00 p.m. Upon arrival, Leon would distribute the marijuana to the dealers, who in turn sold it to customers who walked or drove by. Leon, Granato, M. Parlagreco, Meli or Ca-tanzano, and sometimes DeCarlo would wait close by and observe as the marijuana was sold. At about 9:00 p.m., the spot would close down and Granato, M. Parlagreco, Meli and an individual who had been hired to count the money would depart and do the counting at that individual’s apartment. An evening’s proceeds usually exceeded $10,000, and the amount sometimes reached as high as $17,000 or $18,000. Finally, after the money had been counted, the workers would be paid by Leon, and the assemblage would return to Brooklyn in cars. B. Bribery. Police interference proved costly to the operation. The Crew originally conducted sales in a college parking lot near a highway, but following regular police raids, they were forced to move the operation to a secluded area at a nearby underpass beneath a highway. On several occasions, workers were arrested, and a lawyer was hired for their arraignment. Initially, the Crew paid the lawyer’s fee and any required bail, but this practice was eventually terminated. In order to eliminate police interference, DeCarlo attempted to bribe police officers from the local precinct. The bribery began on November 1, 1985, after police officer Thomas Tobin (“Tobin”) arrested DeCarlo at the college spot for driving with a suspended license. After his booking, DeCar-lo told Tobin that he did not wish to continue paying lawyers’ fees and city fines, but would prefer to pay police officers in exchange for lightened enforcement activity at the college spot. DeCarlo offered to pay as much as $400-$600 to each police officer involved, and told Tobin to return to the college spot the following night if he was interested in such an arrangement. Tobin notified the Internal Affairs Division (“IAD”) of the New York City Police Department of the situation, and the IAD assigned Sergeant Gino Modesti (“Modes-ti”) to accompany Tobin to the meeting with DeCarlo the next night. The police officers pretended to place DeCarlo under arrest. After driving a few blocks, they parked their radio car and conducted a meeting with DeCarlo. Granato and Meli were surveilled parked nearby, observing the meeting. The officers discussed with DeCarlo the bribery arrangement he had suggested, and recorded their conversation. Over the course of the following five months, Tobin, Modesti and Vincent Mura-no (“Murano”), an IAD undercover detective, met or spoke by phone with DeCarlo on approximately thirty occasions. In addition to receiving protection for the marijuana spots, DeCarlo requested assistance in fixing a cocaine charge pending against him, and in arranging for the recovery of drug money that had been seized in an arrest of Leon. In return, DeCarlo paid bribes to the officers totalling in excess of $10,000. C. The Murder of Albert Ñocha. In addition to police interference, the Scarpa Crew had to reckon with competing drug dealers. In December, 1985, another marijuana dealer, Albert Ñocha (“Ñocha”), began selling marijuana at a location in Clove Lake Park, not far from the Scarpa Crew’s college spot. Leon warned Ñocha not to sell there, but Ñocha refused to relocate. Leon reported the encounter to DeCarlo, and DeCarlo reported Nocha’s marijuana sales to Scarpa. On a subsequent evening, Leon, DeCarlo and several associates again encountered Ñocha. DeCarlo warned Ñocha to leave the location in Clove Lake Park, but Ñocha again refused to do so. On December 10, 1985, Albert Ñocha was found shot to death in Clove Lake Park. He had approximately $400 in small bills in his pocket and a paper bag containing marijuana in his hand. An autopsy revealed that he had been shot once in the chest and three times in the head at pointblank range. Evidence at trial, including Leon’s testimony that DeCarlo told Leon that DeCarlo had killed Ñocha, tied DeCar-lo to the shooting. D. Extortion of Other Drug Dealers. The Scarpa Crew also extorted money from marijuana dealers who worked in adjoining neighborhoods. One of these dealers, Vincent LaFaro (“LaFaro”), operated from a park at 66th Street and Fort Hamilton Parkway in Brooklyn. In the summer of 1985, he was approached there by Gra-nato and M. Parlagreco, who identified themselves as members of the Scarpa Crew and demanded that LaFaro pay them $1,000 per week for protection. They directed LaFaro to appear with the money every Thursday at the Parkway Luncheonette at 75th Street and 13th Avenue in Brooklyn. LaFaro, however, did not make the $1,000 payment the following week, whereupon Granato and M. Parlagreco returned and threatened him with a gun, stating that if he did not pay, they would compel him to discontinue his operation. LaFaro, believing that Granato and M. Parlagreco would injure him if he did not pay in the future, began making payments. Over the course of the next seven months, LaFaro delivered $1,000 every Thursday or Friday at the Parkway Luncheonette, usually to Granato and M. Parlagreco, but on one occasion to Scarpa and another to Meli. E. Cocaine and Heroin Distribution. The Scarpa Crew also engaged in sales of cocaine and heroin. At least some of the bulk purchases were made through a New Jersey “connection” and an individual named “Eddie” on Staten Island who provided the Scarpa Crew with kilograms of cocaine. In the first series of sales, Granato and M. Parlagreco sold cocaine to Leon and to other customers. Leon was typically provided with cocaine at a cost of $900 per ounce, but was not required to make payment until he resold it to his own customers, including individuals known to him as “Sal from Virginia,” "Sal from New Jersey” and “Big Nick.” When an order for cocaine was provided by one of these customers, Leon would call M. Parlagreco and meet him or Granato at Granato’s home on Staten Island to pick up the cocaine. In a second series of transactions occurring at various times from January through March, 1987, Granato and Catan-zano sold cocaine and heroin to a dealer named Anthony DeBiase. DeBiase would generally meet Granato or Catanzano at one of several restaurants in Brooklyn to pick up the narcotics, deliver it to a buyer at a different restaurant, and return to pay Granato and Catanzano. On six occasions, Granato and Catanzano sold quantities of up to one quarter of a kilogram of cocaine and an eighth of a kilogram of heroin to DeBiase, which he later unwittingly resold to undercover officers. After the last narcotics sale on March 20, 1987, DeBiase, Granato and Catanzano were arrested as they drove away from the scene of the transaction. Granato and Ca-tanzano were subsequently convicted on October 8, 1987, after a jury trial in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York, of a conspiracy to distribute heroin and cocaine between January and March, 1987, as well as of related distributions of cocaine and heroin. A corresponding conspiracy was charged as predicate act three of count one of the Indictment. F. The Extortion of Eric Leon. Leon, the manager of the college spot, eventually fell into disfavor with the Scar-pa Crew after he ran up a considerable debt. Leon’s trouble began on New Year’s Eve, December 31, 1985, when he was left alone to manage the college spot. Leon collected approximately $8,000 that night from marijuana sales, the sale of cocaine to Sal from New Jersey, and the collection of money from Sal from Virginia. After hiding the money in a box in the trunk of the car he was using, he began driving to Brooklyn. His car broke down while en-route, and Leon was taken into custody by police who observed him selling brass knuckles from the trunk of the disabled car. The officers later searched the vehicle and found marijuana in its trunk, but did not find the hidden money. Leon was placed under arrest for marijuana possession and other charges, and was released on bail two days later. In the interim, however, he arranged for a friend to retrieve the cash from the car trunk. Leon and his friend divided the money. Upon his release, Leon reported the event to the Scarpa Crew, but did not tell them that his friend had retrieved the money from his car trunk. Granato and M. Parlagreco, believing Leon at first, advised him not to worry about the missing money, because DeCarlo believed he could use his influence with the police officers whom he was bribing to recover it. When DeCarlo’s efforts proved unavailing and it became clear that the money was missing from the car trunk, Leon was told that he would have to repay the missing money. In addition, Leon owed the Scarpa Crew money for cocaine he had purchased and for marijuana proceeds that were missing from the college spot. The total amount owed was approximately $21,000. Leon eventually stopped going to the college spot because he feared that the Scarpa Crew would harm him as a result of the large debt. However, after a meeting with Scarpa, Granato and M. Parlagreco at which Leon stated his intention to pay his debt to the Crew over time, Leon resumed his activities at the college spot. In addition to working at the college spot without pay, Leon tried to raise money by selling marijuana independently and borrowing money from his friends. He also stole $5,000 from Sal from Virginia. In addition, he turned over his television set and video recorder to Granato. Apparently, the Scarpa Crew was dissatisfied with the rate at which Leon was repaying the debt, and was further dissatisfied that Leon had stolen money from Sal from Virginia, who was a good friend of J. Parlagreco. On February 20, 1986 Leon was summoned to meet with Crew members at Mike’s Candy Store. When Leon arrived at the store at about 4:30 p.m., all of the appellants were there, as well as Scarpa and Letterio DeCarlo. After greeting Leon, however, Scarpa promptly departed. J. Parlagreco and M. Parlagreco questioned Leon about the $5,000 transaction with Sal from Virginia. Granato then handed Leon a quarter and told him that he had ten minutes to raise $17,000, and that he could not leave the store to get the money. While Leon was talking to a friend on the telephone, Meli hit Leon in the head. Leon then hung up the phone, and was savagely beaten by Meli, DeCarlo and Sa-varese with fists, brass knuckles and a baseball bat, while Granato and Catanzano stood by in the front doorway. The beating ended when Granato shouted: “That’s enough.” G. The Intimidation of Leon. After Leon sustained the beating in the candy store, Granato and M. Parlagreco dragged him outside to the sidewalk and told him that he still had to repay the money. Meli came out of the candy store and warned Leon that if he told the police about the beating, the Crew would kill Leon’s daughter. Granato also warned Leon not to try to run away to Puerto Rico, because the Crew would kill someone in his family. Leon then escaped over a fence and ran into a nearby house, and a woman in the house called the police. When police officers first arrived, Leon told them that several men whom he did not know had jumped out of a car, struck him with baseball bats, and sped off. He was then taken to the emergency room of Maimonides Hospital, where he was treated. X-rays showed that his arm had been broken in two places and the base of his thumb had been snapped. Shortly after Leon arrived at the hospital, DeCarlo walked into the emergency room. Leon’s sister, who had arrived earlier, began screaming, and DeCarlo left. Immediately after DeCarlo departed, Leon asked the police for protection, and told them that he had been beaten by associates of Scarpa, naming (according to New York City Police Detective Robert Rodenburg (“Rodenburg”)) Mario and John “Pellegri-no,” Granato, DeCarlo, “Meli or Miley” and Scarpa. Leon was later transferred to Coney Island Hospital. DeCarlo visited Leon there and warned him that if he did not pay the debt owed to the Scarpa Crew, he and his family would be killed. DeCarlo also warned Leon not to speak to the police, and threatened that if Leon testified against the Crew, they would kill his family and his daughter, and would eventually kill him. H. Leon’s Cooperation. New York City Police Detective Richard Puntillo (“Puntillo”) visited Leon at Coney Island Hospital. During their first meeting, Leon asked the detective for protection from the Scarpa Crew. Puntillo promised Leon that the government would pay his debt to the Scarpa Crew and provide him with protection if Leon would cooperate in an investigation of the Scarpa Crew by possibly “wearing] a wire,” providing introductions to Crew members, and “possibly testifying] in court somewhere down the road.” Leon agreed. On the day Leon was released from the hospital, he met with Puntillo and arranged to record a conversation with Crew members. A wire recorder was concealed in Leon’s arm cast, and Puntillo gave Leon $5,000 to pay part of his outstanding debt. Leon was then driven by a detective to a bar where he met with Granato and Catan-zano. Leon gave the $5,000 to Granato. During the attendant conversation, Leon described the injuries he had sustained as a result of the beating in the candy store. Granato interjected: “You got off easy.” Leon then asked Granato to tell Scarpa that Leon would repay the remainder of the debt, and that he hoped to return to work at the college spot. Granato responded: “we’ll work it out.” One week later Leon called M. Parlagre-co, who agreed to meet Leon at the candy store. On March 8, 1986, Leon was wired and provided with an additional $6,000. J. Parlagreco showed up for the meeting at the candy store, and Leon gave him the $6,000 to pass on to M. Parlagreco and Granato. J. Parlagreco warned Leon not to talk on the telephone about Leon’s debt to the Crew. Leon later made three additional payments on his debt to the Scarpa Crew. Each payment was made at the candy store, after a telephone conversation with M. Parlagreco — the first to Savarese on April 1, 1986 in the amount of $2,000; the second to an individual named Charlie Manse, nicknamed “Charlie Springs,” on April 17, 1986 in the amount of $1,000; and the third to Mike, the owner of the store, on April 23, 1986 in the amount of $3,000. Further factual matters will be set forth in the discussion of the issues to which they relate. Discussion Appellants urge numerous grounds for reversal, and most join in each other’s arguments, to the extent generally applicable, pursuant to Fed.R.App.P. 28(i). We consider their claims that: (a) the evidence was insufficient to establish that (1) J. Par-lagreco committed extortion and conspired to do so, (2) M. Parlagreco was an organizer, supervisor or manager of the Scarpa Crew’s narcotics activity within the meaning of 21 U.S.C. § 848(a) (1988), (3) the requisite link existed between the narcotics conspiracy charged against Catanzano in predicate act three of count one and the enterprise charged in the indictment, and (4) DeCarlo committed the murder of Albert Ñocha charged as predicate act four of count one; (b) the district court improperly denied defense motions to obtain copies of government surveillance tapes; (c) the district court improperly refused to strike a reference in the indictment to “the Colombo Organized Crime Family”; (d) the government engaged in an improper “stepladder” prosecution of Catanzano; (e) the trial of Savarese should have been severed; (f) certain of the district court’s evidentiary rulings were improper; (g) various jury instructions were improper; and (h) DeCar-lo should have been granted a psychiatric examination prior to sentencing. A. Sufficiency of the Evidence. Several appellants claim that the evidence presented against them was insufficient to support their convictions on a variety of counts. Before considering specific claims as to the sufficiency of the evidence, we review the general standards by which these contentions are to be assessed. An appellant challenging the sufficiency of the evidence bears “ ‘a very heavy burden.’ ” United States v. Nusraty, 867 F.2d 759, 762 (2d Cir.1989) (quoting United States v. Young, 745 F.2d 733, 762 (2d Cir.1984) (quoting United States v. Carson, 702 F.2d 351, 361 (2d Cir.), cert. de nied, 462 U.S. 1108, 103 S.Ct. 2456 & 2457, 77 L.Ed.2d 1335 (1983))), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1084, 105 S.Ct. 1842, 85 L.Ed.2d 142 (1985); see also United States v. Buck, 804 F.2d 239, 242 (2d Cir.1986); United States v. Grubczak, 793 F.2d 458, 462 (2d Cir.1986). In reviewing such claims, we “view the evidence in the light most favorable to the government and construe all possible inferences in its favor.” United States v. Badalamenti, 794 F.2d 821, 828 (2d Cir.1986) (citing United States v. Martino, 759 F.2d 998, 1002 (2d Cir.1985)). “The test is ‘whether the jury, drawing reasonable inferences from the evidence, may fairly and logically have concluded that the defendant was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.’ ” United States v. Chang An-Lo, 851 F.2d 547, 554 (2d Cir.) (quoting Grubczak, 793 F.2d at 463 (citations omitted)), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 966, 109 S.Ct. 493, 102 L.Ed.2d 530 (1988). The government is not “required to preclude every reasonable hypothesis which is consistent with innocence.” Chang An-Lo, 851 F.2d at 554 (citing United States v. Fiore, 821 F.2d 127, 128 (2d Cir.1987)). In sum, a jury’s verdict will be sustained if there is substantial evidence, taking the view most favorable to the government, to support it. United States v. Nersesian, 824 F.2d 1294, 1324 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 957, 108 S.Ct. 355, 98 L.Ed.2d 380 (1987). We now turn to appellants’ specific claims of insufficiency. 1. John Parlagreco. 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a) (1988) prescribes criminal penalties for any person who “in any way or degree obstructs, delays, or affects commerce or the movement of any article or commodity in commerce, by ... extortion or attempts or conspires so to do, or commits or threatens physical violence to any person or property in furtherance of a plan or purpose” to violate the section. The term “extortion” is defined in pertinent part as “the obtaining of property from another, with his consent, induced by wrongful use of actual or threatened force, violence, or fear.” 18 U.S.C. § 1951(b)(2) (1988). J. Parlegreco was convicted on two separate counts under section 1951(a) — count seven for conspiring to extort money from Leon during the period February 20, 1986 through April 23, 1986, and count eight for wilfully committing and threatening to commit physical violence against Leon on February 20, 1986, the day Leon was assaulted in Mike’s Candy Store. On appeal, J. Parlagreco challenges the sufficiency of the evidence on both counts, claiming that “there was simply no evidence that [he] calculatingly used threatening words or gestures to induce Mr. Leon to make the payments,” but rather that he was merely present on the occasion of Leon’s beating; and that his later receipt of a $6,000 payment from Leon on March 8, 1986 was inadequate proof of his membership in a conspiracy to extort money from Leon. The government, on the other hand, contends that, although J. Parlagreco never physically assaulted Leon, “the jury was entitled to find that [J.] Parlagreco knew of the conspiracy to extort Leon and actively participated in it by appearing at the candy store in order to intimidate Leon, threatening Leon with ... [a] comment about Sal [from Virginia], and accepting the March 8 payment.” Since J. Parlagreco calls into question the adequacy of the evidence supporting his conspiracy conviction, it is appropriate at this juncture to review the general principles governing the sufficiency of evidence to sustain a conspiracy conviction. Because “conspiracy by its very nature is a secretive operation,” United States v. Provenzano, 615 F.2d 37, 45 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 953, 100 S.Ct. 2921, 64 L.Ed.2d 810 (1980), “the ‘[existence of and participation in a conspiracy ... may be established ... through circumstantial evidence.’ ” United States v. Soto, 716 F.2d 989, 991 (2d Cir.1983) (quoting United States v. Sanzo, 673 F.2d 64, 69 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 858, 103 S.Ct. 128, 74 L.Ed.2d 111 (1982)). However, “knowledge of the existence and goals of a conspiracy does not of itself make one a coconspirator.” United States v. Cianchetti, 315 F.2d 584, 588 (2d Cir.1963). Similarly, “[association with a conspirator, without more, is insufficient to establish the requisite degree of participation in a conspiratorial venture.” United States v. Steinberg, 525 F.2d 1126, 1134 (2d Cir.1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 971, 96 S.Ct. 2167, 48 L.Ed.2d 794 (1976); see also United States v. Johnson, 513 F.2d 819, 824 (2d Cir.1975) (“Guilt may not be inferred from mere association with a guilty party.”). Moreover, “ ‘absent evidence of purposeful behavior, mere presence at the scene of a crime, even when coupled with knowledge that a crime is being committed, is insufficient to establish membership in a conspir-acy_’ ” Chang An-Lo, 851 F.2d at 554 (quoting Martino, 759 F.2d at 1002 (citations omitted)). Thus, evidence of purposeful behavior designed to further a conspiracy must be shown to prove membership in that conspiracy. See United States v. Torres, 519 F.2d 723, 726 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1019, 96 S.Ct. 457, 46 L.Ed.2d 392 (1975). However, “once a conspiracy is shown to exist, the evidence sufficient to link another defendant to it need not be overwhelming.” United States v. Casamento, 887 F.2d 1141, 1156 (2d Cir.1989) (citing United States v. Ciambrone, 787 F.2d 799, 806 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1017, 107 S.Ct. 668, 93 L.Ed.2d 720 (1986)), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 110 S.Ct. 1138, 107 L.Ed.2d 1043 (1990). We turn now to the evidence presented by the government regarding J. Parlagreco. It was established at trial that J. Parlagreco was present in Mike’s Candy Store on the day Leon was beaten. Leon testified as follows regarding his entry into the store on the day of the assault: Q When you walked in what happened? A As I walked in there were two guys in the front door. There was some kid named Casper and some kid named Angelo. As I walked in Angelo looked at me, look who it is, the man of the hour. This statement tends to establish that those present in the store beforehand, including J. Parlagreco, were discussing Leon and planning the assault which ensued. Leon also testified as follows regarding a conversation he had with J. Parlagreco just moments before he was beaten: Q Did you have a conversation with anyone when you got into the candy store? A Yes. John Parlagreco looked at me and said, what happened. Q Was John Parlagreco in the candy store when you first arrived? A Yes, he was. Q What happened in your conversation with John Parlagreco? A He said what happened with you and Sal. So what do you mean what happened with me and Sal. He goes, you beat him for money. I said I didn’t beat him for money. You don’t know what you are talking about. And then Mario Parlagreco— Q Excuse me, Mr. Leon. When he said, what did you do to Sal what did you understand he was talking about? A What I did to him with the cops, I pretended they were cops. Q Which Sal was this? A This Sal from Virginia. Q Do you know whether John Parlagre-co knew Sal from Virginia? A Yes, they were good friends. Q Go ahead with the conversation you had with John Parlagreco. He said what did you do to Sal. What did you say? A I said you don’t know what I did to Sal, meaning it doesn’t concern him. So Mario turned around and said what did you do, what did you do about my house. Right there and then I knew, more or less, what was going to happen to me. So then Kevin pulled out a quarter. He said I’ll give you ten minutes to come up with $17,000. This conversation indicates participation by J. Parlagreco in the planning and implementation of the assault upon Leon. In addition, it was established that on March 8, 1986, J. Parlagreco accepted a $6,000 payment from Leon for application to Leon’s debt to the Scarpa Crew. The recorded conversation between the two at Mike’s Candy Store on that occasion follows: Leon: Hey John. Is Mario there? PARLAGRECO: What? Leon: Is Mario there? Parlagreco: I don’t know where he is. Leon: You know where he is? What’s up, dude? Can I leave you something? Parlagreoo: Yeah. What is it? (Unintelligible.) Leon: Who do I leave it with? Parlagreco: Dough? Leon: Who do I leave it with? Parlagreco: Gimme it, I’ll— Leon: Leave it with Mike? Parlagreco: Leave it with me. Leon: Okay, I’ll do that. * * * * * * Leon: What’s up, dude? Tell him I’ll give him a call tonight. Parlagreco: What? Leon: Tell him I’ll give him a beep tonight. Alright? Parlagreco: Don’t talk over the phone. (Unintelligible.) Leon: No, no, I didn’t know. Six thousand dollars. Tell him the eleven thousand is squashed from that. Tell him I’ll give him a beep tonight and we’ll straighten it out tommorrow. Parlagreco: How much is there? Leon: Six thousand. Parlagreco: I ain’t gotta count it, right? Leon: No, uh, tell him I’ll give him a call tonight. * * * * * * Leon: Alright. Tell, uh, tell Mario I’ll beep him later. Parlagreco: Alright. Leon: I’ll give him a call later. I want to straighten out a couple of things with him. Parlagreco: Alright. Leon: Alright? Parlagreco: Alright. Leon: I want to see if I can come back to work and all that shit. Alright, dude? I’ll talk to you later. Parlagreco: Alright. See you later, man. Leon: Alright, John. While J. Parlagreco contends that acceptance of the payment was only an innocent favor to his brother, the jury was entitled to conclude otherwise and view the acceptance of the payment as a further indication of J. Parlagreco’s involvement in the conspiracy. In sum, we believe that this evidence sufficed to establish J. Parlagreco’s “demonstrated awareness of [the] conspiracy’s existence coupled with his active participation,” Torres, 519 F.2d at 726, and was accordingly sufficient to sustain J. Parlagreco’s conviction on count seven. We further conclude that his presence in the candy store on the day Leon was beaten, when viewed in the context of the verbal exchanges which took place immediately before Leon was beaten and the subsequent payment of a portion of Leon’s debt to J. Parlagreco, was sufficient to sustain J. Parlagreco’s conviction on count eight. 2. Mario Parlagreco. M. Parlagreco challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain his conviction on count two for violation of 21 U.S.C. § 848(a) (1988) by “engaging] in a continuing criminal enterprise,” id. The pertinent provision is 21 U.S.C. § 848(c) (1988), which provides: For purposes of subsection (a) of this section, a person is engaged in a continuing criminal enterprise if— (1) he violates any provision of this subchapter or subchapter II of this chapter the punishment for which is a felony, and (2) such violation is a part of a continuing series of violations of this sub-chapter or subchapter II of this chapter— (A) which are undertaken by such person in concert with five or more other persons with respect to whom such person occupies a position of organizer, a supervisory position, or any other position of management, and (B) from which such person obtains substantial income or resources. Specifically, M. Parlagreco contends that he “was not shown to have had a managerial or supervisory role over anyone, except perhaps his brother, [J. Parlagreco], whom he supposedly asked to do a favor and collect some money from Leon.” The government, on the other hand, contends that there was ample evidence concerning the distribution of marijuana at the college spot to establish that M. Parlagreco was a supervisor, and that the operation employed at least five people. The government points to the following testimony offered by Leon regarding the operation of the college spot: Q Mr. Leon, when the spot was at its biggest about how many workers would be out there? A Six or seven. Q Did they have various job titles? A Yes. Q What were the various job titles? A There was a chickey. A chickey is a lookout. They stand up on the hill and they just look for cops, and if they saw a cop they would either at the beginning we would have the blowhorns, and we would have whistles, then they would scream, and then we had walkie-talkie. Q Besides the chickeys, what other type of workers were there? A We had the runner and the dealers. The runners, they would take the money from the dealer, and bring it to me, and the dealers would just deal the dime bags. And sometimes it was really busy. We had — -we had two dealers. One would take the money and the other one would deal the bags. * * * * * * Q Who would hire the workers who worked out at the College of Staten Island? A Any of us. Q When you say “any of us” who do you mean? A Kevin Granato, Cosmo Catanzano, Billy Meli, Mario Parlagreco, Nicky DeCarlo, Lenny DeCarlo.... jfc if: s): * sfc sfc Q Mr. Leon, who did you answer to at the college, who was your boss? A My boss was Kevin Granato, Cosmo Catanzano, Mario Parlagreco, and Billy Meli. Q What would they do, what was their job at the college, what was Mr. Gra-nato’s, Mr. Parlagreco’s, Mr. Meli’s and Mr. Catanzano’s job at the college? A To make sure that — they made sure that the business went right and if there was any kind of trouble that they would handle it. “The operative concepts used in section 848 — ‘organize,’ ‘supervise,’ and ‘manage’ —are not technical, and we see no reason to give them other than their everyday meanings.” United States v. Mannino, 635 F.2d 110, 117 (2d Cir.1980). Further, a defendant “need not have been the dominant organizer or manager as long as [he] was in some managerial position.” United States v. Losada, 674 F.2d 167, 174 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1125, 102 S.Ct. 2945, 73 L.Ed.2d 1341 (1982). Viewing the cited evidence in light of these principles, we conclude that the jury was entitled to determine that M. Parlagre-co occupied a managerial role in the charged narcotics enterprise within the meaning of section 848. 3. Cosmo Catanzano. The Indictment specifies as the third predicate act of racketeering under count one that between January 6, 1987 and March 20, 1987, Granato and Catanzano conspired to distribute cocaine hydrochloride and heroin hydrochloride in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846 (1988). As hereinabove stated, Granato and Catanzano were convicted of this conspiracy, as well as of related distributions of cocaine and heroin, in a prior trial, and their judgments of conviction were received in evidence in the trial leading to the convictions which are the subject of the instant appeal. The activity in question was six separate sales of heroin and cocaine to one Anthony DeBi-ase, who unwittingly resold the narcotics to undercover officers. Catanzano now contends that this predicate act “was blatantly lacking a nexus to the charged enterprise and thus it was insufficient to serve as a ‘predicate’ act for his conviction on the RICO charge herein.” The government responds that while “Catanzano seeks to divorce his participation in the 1987 DeBiase narcotics sales from his other criminal activities in 1986 by emphasizing their separation in time,” the jury “could reasonably have concluded ... that the DeBiase sales were in fact related to Catanzano’s continued membership in the Scarpa Crew.” Catanzano wisely does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to establish the existence of the conspiracy charged as predicate act three. This evidence consisted, in addition to the prior judgments of conviction, of testimony by DeBiase and the undercover agents involved in the De-Biase transactions. Rather, Catanzano stresses DeBiase’s inability to identify the source of the cocaine and heroin provided to DeBiase by Granato and Catanzano, and claims that this compels the “unescapable [sic] conclusion ... that there was no connection to the enterprise established.” We reach a different conclusion. Leon testified as follows regarding the Scarpa Crew’s initial involvement in cocaine sales: Q Did there come a time, Mr. Leon when you had a conversation with one or more of the defendants about cocaine? A Yes, I did. Q When was this conversation? Were you working at the college at this point? A Yes. Q Who did you have this conversation with? A Kevin Granato and Mario Parlagreco. Q Anyone else present? A No. Q What was said during the course of the conversation? A Business was really down and I asked Kevin anything we could do to make more money, and he said “What do you have in mind.” I said “Why don’t we sell cocaine.” So he said “Are you sure you can get rid of it?” I said “Yes.” He said “Well, I got this connection in New Jersey and this guy will front me,” front is trust me, “two or three kilos at a shot.” Q So after that conversation, what happened? A Well, the next day Kevin Granato said “I’ll pick you up at your house”; me, Kevin Granato and Mario Parla-greco jumped in the car; shot out to Staten Island; Kevin said “This guy is going to bring down a kilo of cocaine” and we met in Staten Island behind a restaurant. I don’t remember the name of the restaurant, but we went to this guy Eddie’s house, I don’t know his last name, but it was like three houses away from the restaurant and we went up to the house, then me and Kevin came down, Mario stood up there, and we met the guy behind the restaurant. The guy pulled up in a station wagon, don’t remember the guy’s name, and he told Kevin — got out of the car, he told Kevin Granato “I only have a half kilo.” Kevin said “That’s fine.” And he said “I’ll bring the other half tomorrow.” Okay, we’ll talk later, jumped back in the car. He jumped in the car, left and we went to Eddie’s house. In addition, LaFaro testified that when he went to the Parkway Luncheonette to make the first weekly $1,000 protection payment to the Scarpa Crew, he was told by Granato and M. Parlagreco (to whom he made the payment) that “we got cocaine if you need cocaine.” In sum, substantial evidence was provided that the Scarpa Crew engaged in the distribution of cocaine and heroin, as well as marijuana. Granato and Catanzano were indisputably part of the Scarpa Crew at the time of the DeBiase transactions. Accordingly, we place little weight on De-Biase’s inability to specify the source of the narcotics that he purchased from Granato and Catanzano, and conclude that the evidence linking these sales to the Scarpa Crew sufficed to justify the jury’s verdict that the third predicate act of racketeering was part of the “conduct of the affairs of the [Scarpa Crew,]” as charged in count one of the Indictment. See United States v. Salerno, 868 F.2d 524, 533-34 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 109 S.Ct. 3192, 105 L.Ed.2d 700 (1989), - U.S. -, 110 S.Ct. 56, 107 L.Ed.2d 24 (1989). 4. Nunzio DeCarlo. DeCarlo claims that the evidence was insufficient to establish that the fourth racketeering act of count one, the murder of Albert Ñocha in violation of N.Y.Penal Law §§ 125.25 and 20.00 (McKinney 1988), was proven as to him. He points to recorded telephone conversations between him and undercover detective Murano in which DeCarlo raised the subject of the Ñocha murder and consistently denied any role in the killing, and generally assails the government’s evidence as too weak to warrant the submission of this issue to the jury. The government points out that on the afternoon of the murder, DeCarlo unavailingly requested Murano to direct narcotics enforcement activity away from the college spot to a different part of Staten Island that evening. Further, the government stresses the extensive testimony by Leon connecting DeCarlo to Nocha’s murder. Leon testified that Ñocha was selling marijuana at Clove Lake Park, in the vicinity of the college spot and therefore in competition with the Scarpa Crew. Leon stated that he had confronted Ñocha concerning the matter, and DeCarlo subsequently did so, but Ñocha refused to terminate his activities. Leon further testified that he assisted DeCarlo in arranging for a car to be stolen for use in connection with the Ñocha murder, and that, in a departure from normal practice, none of his superiors in the Scarpa Crew accompanied Leon to the college spot the evening that Ñocha was slain. Most importantly, Leon provided the following testimony concerning the events of that evening: A Just went on, 9 o’clock I stood there for awhile, counted the money. And Nicky DeCarlo pulls up. Q What happened? A He tells me — he goes — what are you still doing here? I am going to pay the workers, going to Brooklyn in a little while. He asked me for money. I said no. Did you guy do it? Q What did you mean. A Kill Ñocha. He said yes. How did you do it? A I shot him twice in the stomach and once in the face. I said you are crazy. Everybody is going to be in Pastels, a night club. That is where everybody is going to be. Q Is that what Nicky DeCarlo said to you? A Yes. * * * * * * Q Did you have another conversation? A The same night and he asked me to give him all the issues and the money that Kevin Granato wanted it. Kevin Granato told me don’t ever give nothing to Nicky. I told Nicky no. We went on the conversation about the Ñocha murder. I said what are you doing out here, ain’t you scared? He said no, once you kill your first you get scared for two days, now you get used to it. DeCarlo points to various assorted inconsistencies in Leon’s testimony, and weaknesses therein allegedly exposed in cross-examination. His burden, however, is to establish that Leon’s testimony concerning two explicit admissions of the Ñocha murder by DeCarlo was so incredible that the jury should not have been permitted to consider it or to reach a verdict consistent with it. He has not done so. We conclude that the evidence was sufficient to support the jury’s verdict on this issue. B. Surveillance Tapes. Prior to trial, the government disclosed that in March, 1986, in connection with a separate investigation, the office of the Kings County district attorney had obtained authorization to install an eavesdropping device in the Wimpy Boys Social Club (the “Club”), which was adjacent to the Parkway Luncheonette at 75th Street and 13th Avenue in Brooklyn. The Scarpa Crew congregated frequently at the Club, and the government introduced at trial both still photographs and silent videotapes of members of the Scarpa Crew in the vicinity of the Club, as well as of the Club and its environs. The warrant obtained by the Kings County district attorney was extended several times, and electronic surveillance tape recordings were created over a period of months as a result. In January, 1988, the Government informed the district court and defense counsel that it had been offered copies of these tape recordings by the Kings County district attorney, and that the tapes might contain evidence relevant to the charges in the indictment. On January 19, 1988, the government obtained the tapes, and government representatives began to review them to determine their relevance to the ease. Granate, Catanzano and M. Parlagreco subsequently moved for production of the tape recordings pursuant to Fed.R.Crim.P. 16(a)(1)(A) and (C) and Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963). The government responded that it had completed its review of the tapes, and they were not discoverable under either rule 16 or Brady. In opposition to the motion, the government submitted, in camera, a sealed affidavit by the assistant United States attorney who had supervised the review of the tape recordings which included detailed summaries and excerpts from transcripts of the tape recordings. The sealed affidavit also appended the warrants authorizing the surveillance, and an affidavit by a government agent who had reviewed the tapes. The government represented that the only statements on the tapes relating to the crimes charged in the Indictment were made by individuals other than the defendants. It also stated that while the tape recordings did contain statements by the defendants, those statements were either innocuous or relevant only to crimes not charged in the Indictment. The government also represented that the tapes did not contain any exculpatory material subject to production under Brady. By memorandum and order dated May 16, 1988, the district court denied the motion for production of the tape recordings. Relying upon its in camera review of the sealed affidavit, the court concluded that the Government had made an adequate showing that the tapes were neither “relevant” within the meaning of rule 16(a)(1)(A) nor “material to the preparation of the defendant’s defense” within the meaning of rule 16(a)(1)(C), and did not contain Brady material. The court stated: [T]he movants contend that the very innocuousness of the statements renders them relevant as they are probative of the defendants’ innocence. As the government points out, however, the movants are effectively arguing that the very irrelevance of these statements makes them relevant. The defendants cannot hope to use a process of elimination to defend themselves by presenting evidence of their noncriminal activities. Such evidence would only be relevant if the indictment charged them with ceaseless criminal conduct. Furthermore, the government convincingly explains the lack of inculpatory evidence on the tapes as the result of minimization efforts by the Kings County District Attorney, and the technical limitations of the eavesdropping device. At trial, after the government had rested its case, the defense sought to present evidence, by way of testimony or stipulation, of the existence of the bug and the absence of relevant intercepted conversations by the defendants. The district court denied the application. On appeal, Granate, Meli and Savarese renew the contention that the tapes were discoverable and that the district court erred in not ordering their discovery or permitting testimony concerning them. The identical argument was presented, and rejected, on Scarpa’s appeal, which was heard by the panel to which the instant appeal was argued. See United States v. Scarpa, 897 F.2d 63, 70 (2d Cir.1990), petition for cert. filed, No. 89-1856 (U.S. May 24, 1990). We there said: Rule 16 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure requires disclosure by the government of “any relevant written or recorded statements made by the defendant ... within the possession, custody or control of the government.” Fed.R. Crim.P. 16(a)(1)(A). “ ‘[Determinations of relevance are entrusted to the sound discretion of the trial judge, and his decision will not be overturned unless he has acted arbitrarily or irrationally.’ ” United States v. Diaz, 878 F.2d 608, 614 (2d Cir.1989) (quoting United States v. Cruz, 797 F.2d 90, 95 (2d Cir.1986)), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 110 S.Ct. 543, 107 L.Ed.2d 540 (1989). Scarpa contends that the absence of incriminating statements on the tapes is relevant in the sense that it tends to disprove the government’s theory that the defendants congregated at the Wimpy Boys Club to discuss the marijuana business. Scarpa contends also that the tapes would support his contention that his illicit income came from gambling, rather than from drugs. A defendant may not seek to establish his innocence, however, through proof of the absence of criminal acts on specific occasions. See United States v. O’Connor, 580 F.2d 38, 43 (2d Cir.1978); United States v. Shapiro, 159 F.2d 890, 891 (2d Cir.1947), aff'd, 335 U.S. 1, 68 S.Ct. 1375, 92 L.Ed. 1787 (1948); see also 1A Wigmore on Evidence § 56.1 (Tillers rev. 1983). The district court found that the tapes contained conversations which were “either wholly innocuous or involve[d] criminality that has nothing to do with the crimes charged in this case.” The absence of drug conversations is consistent with testimony by the cooperating witnesses that drugs were never discussed inside the Club. Thus, the district court appropriately refused to order disclosure of the tapes. See United States v. McElroy, 697 F.2d 459, 464 (2d Cir.1982) (“Rule 16 thus does not cover oral statements unrelated to the crime charged or completely separate from the Government’s trial evidence.”). Id. We find no occasion to add to this analysis, and conclude that the district court did not err in its rulings concerning these tape recordings. C. Reference to “the Colombo Organized Crime Family” in the Indictment. The first paragraph of count one of the Indictment reads as follows: From in or about July 1985 and continuing until the date of filing this indictment, the defendant GREGORY Scarpa, Jr., headed an enterprise, the goal of which was to raise money through the trafficking of narcotics and other controlled substances, and extortion. The Soarpa enterprise, commonly referred to as his “Crew” and hereinafter referred to as the “Scarpa Crew”, reported to the Colombo Organized Crime Family. Emphasis added. Prior to trial, Granato moved to strike the reference to the Colombo Organized Crime Family from the indictment pursuant to Fed.R.Crim.P. 7(d), which provides that “[t]he court on motion of the defendant may strike surplusage from the indictment,” on the basis that the Scarpa Crew, and not the Colombo Organized Crime Family, was the enterprise alleged in the Indictment. The government opposed the motion, claiming that “this allegation is necessary to its case because the Scarpa Crew derived its existence and organization from its association with the Colombo Family.” At the hearing on the motion, the government assured the court that the Colombo Organized Crime Family “serves to identify the crew, the crew is a branch of the family and there will be testimony to that effect from some of our witnesses.” The district court denied the motion in its memorandum and order dated May 16, 1988, stating: Since the government asserts that the Scarpa Crew’s alleged connection to the Colombo Family is relevant to the identity and character of the RICO enterprise charged in the indictment, the reference to the Colombo Family should not be stricken even though the Colombo Family itself is not the alleged enterprise. At the government’s suggestion, however, the court adopts the procedure discussed in United States v. Castellano, 610 F.Supp. 1359, 1428-29 (S.D.N.Y.1985) and United States v. Persico, 621 F.Supp. 842, 861 (S.D.N.Y.1985). The defendant may renew his motion after the presentation of the government’s case if it fails to offer proof of the alleged connection between the Scarpa Crew and the Colombo Family. If the motion is granted, the court will give appropriate instructions to the jury. Evidence relating to the Scarpa Crew’s connection to the Colombo Organized Crime Family was presented by two witnesses at trial. The first reference came in testimony by Christopher Gaeta (“Gaeta”), an imprisoned felon who conversed with several of the defendants at the Metropolitan Correctional Center in Manhattan at the time of their arrest in November, 1987. Gaeta testified: Q Did Bill Meli have any conversation with you in the presence of someone named Sally Crash (ph)? A At one point when they first got there, they he — there was a gentleman Sally Crash an old timer that owned a bar on 86th. I believe it was Mario who said do I — he asked me if I knew salary cash [sic] was a wiseguy. I said I’m not sure, I think he is. Billy says that he past — Billy Meli said the comment that he said— Mr. Bronson: Objection. The Court: Overruled. The Witness: He said the way he said that, the comment he past [sic] must mean he’s a wiseguy, he got to be made but if— Q Go on? A But if he got a place on 86th he got to be with us, he must be with the Columbo’s [sic]. Q What did you understand the term wiseguy to mean? A A wiseguy, a good fellow, a made member of the Mafia. Q What does “made” mean? A You are strained out, you are a wiseguy. Subsequently, Leon testified as follows: Q Did you ever have any conversations with any of the defendants about the Scarpa crew? A Yes. Q With Nicky De Carlo? A Yes. Q What did — do you recall when the conversation was? A I was working in the college at the time. Q Sometime during that time period while working in the college? A Yes. Q Do you recall where the conversation was? A Took place in his car, we were driving around. Q What did Nicky DeCarlo tell but [sic] the Scarpas [sic] Crew is? A He was telling me that, you know— me and Patrick Brennan weren’t too good pals, Nicky said don’t worry you are with Greg now and Greg is a Capo of the Colombo Crime Family and you are with him and he is going to talk to Greg about it. Following the government’s case, appellants renewed the rule 7(d) motion and moved in the alternative for a mistrial. The district court denied the motion. On appeal, Meli and Savarese contend that (1) the rule 7(d) motion should have been granted, (2) cited testimony concerning the Colombo connection should have been excluded as prejudicial pursuant to Fed.R. Evid. 403, or (3) a mistrial should have been declared. We disagree. Motions to strike surplus-age from an indictment will be granted only where the challenged allegations are “not relevant to the crime charged and are inflammatory and prejudicial.” United States v. Napolitano, 552 F.Supp. 465, 480 (S.D.N.Y.1982) (citing