Full opinion text
I.BACKGROUND..........................................................739 A. Texas’ Method of Electing District Court Judges.....................739 B. Procedural History.................................................. 740 II. THE ACCEPTED FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYZING SECTION 2 VOTE DILUTION CLAIMS ................................................... 741 A. The Threshold Inquiry: The Gingles Factors......................... 742 1. Size and Geographical Compactness of the Minority Group.........743 2. Political Cohesiveness of the Minority Group.......................743 3. Legally Significant White Bloc Voting............................. 744 B. The Broader Inquiry: The Totality of the Circumstances............747 1. The Senate Report Factors........................................747 a. History of discrimination touching the rights of minorities to participate in the political process......................747 b. Extent of racially polarized voting........................... 747 c. Use of voting practices that enhance the opportunity for discrimination____1........................................749 d. Minority access to the slating process...................'.....750 e. Lingering socioeconomic effects of discrimination............750 f. Use of racial appeals in campaigns..........................750 g. Extent to which minority candidates have been elected to public office ...............................................750 h. Responsiveness of elected officials to particular needs of the minority group............................................752 i. Tenuousness of the policy underlying the challenged practice ........................................................752 2. Other Relevant Factors, Including Racial Animus in the Electorate----753 C. The Ultimate Inquiry: Unequal Opportunity to Participate on Account of Race or Color ...........................................754 III. THE PROPOSED BALANCING FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYZING SECTION 2 VOTE DILUTION CLAIMS....................................755 A. The Accepted Role of State Interests in Section 2 Analysis..........756 B. The Proposed Role for State Interests in Section 2 Analysis.........756 C. Problems with the Proposed Balancing Framework..................757 1. The Legal Problem...............................................757 a. Congressional intent......................................... 757 b. Federalism principles........................................758 c. The: Supreme Court’s decision in Houston Lawyers’ Association........................................................760 2. The Practical Problem............................................ 763 3. Summation....................................................... 764 D. Applying the Proposed Balancing Framework in this Case: Evaluating Texas’ Asserted Interests......................................764 1. Identifying the Threatened State Interests.........................764 2. Scrutinizing the Threatened State Interests........................ 765 a. Texas’ interest in preserving the administrative advantages of the current at-large system..............................' 766 b. Texas’ interest in allowing judges to specialize...............766 c. Texas’ linkage interest.......................................767 d. Texas’ interest in preserving the function of district court judges as sole decision-makers.....'.........................769 3. Assigning a Weight to the Threatened State Interests.............772 IV. REVIEW OF THE DISTRICT COURT’S SECTION 2 LIABILITY FINDINGS................................... 772 A. Standard of Appellate Review....................................... 773 B. Review of the District Court’s Vote Dilution Findings Under the Accepted Section 2 Framework....................................774 1. Statistical Methodology....................................... 774 2. Review of District Court's Vote Dilution Findings ............. 776 a. Bexar County............................................ 777 (i) Gingles factors....................................... 777 (ii) Totality of circumstances factors..................... 778 (iii) Ultimate vote dilution finding....................... 780 b. Dallas County............................................ 780 (i) Gingles factors....................................... 780 (ii) Totality of circumstances factors..................... 781 (iii) Ultimate vote dilution finding ....................... 785 c. Ector County............................................. 785 (i) Gingles factors....................................... 786 (ii) Totality of circumstances factors..................... 786 (iii) Ultimate vote dilution finding....................... 788 d. Harris County............................................ 788 (i) Gingles factors....................................... 788 (ii) Totality of circumstances factors..................... 789 (iii) Ultimate vote dilution finding ....................... 791 e. Jefferson County......................................... 792 (i) Gingles factors....................................... 792 (ii) Totality of circumstances factors..................... 793 (iii) Ultimate vote dilution finding....................... 794 f. Lubbock County.......................................... 794 (i) Gingles factors....................................... 794 (ii) Totality of circumstances factors..................... 795 (iii) Ultimate vote dilution finding....................... 796 g. Midland County.......................................... 797 (i) Gingles factors....................................... 797 (ii) Totality of circumstances factors..................... 798 (iii) Ultimate vote dilution finding....................... 799 h. Tarrant County........................................... 799 (i) Gingles factors....................................... 799 (ii) Totality of circumstances factors..................... 800 (iii) Ultimate vote dilution finding....................... 801 i. Travis County............................................ 801 3. Effect of District Court’s Refusal to Consider Partisan Voting Evidence................................................... 803 a. The Partisanship Evidence................................ 803 (i) History of partisan politics in Texas................. 803 (ii) How partisan politics operate in Texas district court elections ............................................. 803 (iii) The limitations of the partisanship evidence.......... 805 (iv) Summation of partisanship evidence................. 805 b. The District Court’s Treatment of the Evidence............ 806 c. The District Court’s Error................................ 807 d. The Effect of the Error; Whitcomb Considered............ 807 4. Summation................................................... 813 C. Review of the District Court’s Vote Dilution Findings Under the Proposed Balancing Framework............................... 813 V. REMEDY............................................................ 814 VI. CONCLUSION....................................................... 815 DISSENT OF PATRICK E. HIGGINBOTHAM, Circuit Judge 819 APPENDIX A TO JUDGE HIGGINBOTHAM’S DISSENT ... 842 Before KING, JOHNSON and HIGGINBOTHAM, Circuit Judges. KING, Circuit Judge: This case is before us on remand from the Supreme Court's decision in Houston Lawyers' Association v. Attorney General of Texas, — U.S. —, 111 S.Ct. 2376, 115 L.Ed.2d 379 (1991), in which the Court held that Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1973, applies to all Texas judicial elections. We must now address a question that is undoubtedly easier to frame than to answer. In particular, we must decide whether the district court erred in concluding that the method by which Texas elects district court judges — as that method operates in nine counties — violates Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act. After a careful review of the record, we hold (1) that the district court correctly concluded, in eight of the counties at issue, that Texas' method of electing district court judges violates Section 2, but (2) that the district court erred in finding a Section 2 violation in Travis County. We therefore affirm the district court's decision in part, reverse the decision in part, and remand the case to the district court for consideration and imposition of an appropriate remedy. In view of the length of this opinion, a summary of the pertinent facts and major legal conclusions may be helpful to the reader: As with all cases under the Voting Rights Act, this one is driven by the facts. In this case, certain key facts are best summarized by the following table which sets forth, with respect to each of the nine Texas counties at issue, the population of the relevant minority group, the total number of district court judges elected in the county, the number of judges who are members of the relevant minority group and the percentage of the total number of district judges who are members of the relevant minority group. The table portrays graphically what is inescapable from the record in this case— that in Texas district court elections, minority voters have less opportunity than white voters to participate in the political process and to elect representatives of their choice. The powerlessness of Texas minority voters in state district court elections stands in marked contrast to the increasing ability of those voters to participate in the political process and to elect representatives of their choice in the context of federal and state legislative elections and in local city council and school board elections. The strides that minority voters have made in the latter elections are due in no small part to the Voting Rights Act. In the years following the passage of the Act, minority plaintiffs throughout the state mounted successful challenges under Section 2 to at-large election schemes for the federal and state legislative branches and for local city councils and school boards. Thus, the face of this state’s legislative branch and of local government more and more reflects the face of this state’s people. By contrast, the face of the judicial branch in Texas continues to be—as it has always been—overwhelmingly white. The state of Texas and the other defendants argue that the Voting Rights Act, so helpful to minorities in these other contexts, affords minorities no relief in the context of the election of state district judges. This is so, we are told, because the state has a compelling interest in the maintenance of the present electoral system— an interest which outweighs the interest of minorities in having an opportunity equal to that of the state’s white citizens to elect district judges of their choice. Specifically, we are told by the state that electing district judges from an area no smaller than a county is necessary to ensure that district judges are independent or accountable to all litigants equally and that no particular group will have undue influence over the decisions that must be made alone by the district judge. We are told further that the mechanism by which that interest is implemented is the state’s venue rules which operate to ensure the accountability of a state district judge to all the citizens of the county in which he is elected. Upon close inspection, we find, not surprisingly, that the venue rules in Texas, like the venue rules in the federal courts and in the courts of other states, are predicated on considerations of convenience for the litigants and the witnesses; in general, they afford a defendant some protection from being forced to defend an action in a district court remote from his residence in this vast state, or remote from the place where the events underlying the controversy occurred and the place where evidence is most likely available. In short, here as elsewhere, the venue rules were not designed to ensure judicial accountability. What does ensure that state district judges are independent and accountable to all litigants equally and that no particular group will have undue influence over the decisions that must be made are—first, the Texas Code of Judicial Conduct and second, the integrity of the individual judges. The Texas Code of Judicial Conduct charges judges with applying the law and states that an honorable judiciary separated from the influence of others is “indispensable to justice in our society.” The Code also stresses that “[a] judge should be unswayed by partisan interest, public clamor, or fear of criticism.” There is no evidence in this record that judges elected with the support of minorities will be any less obedient to the commands of the Texas Code of Judicial Conduct than are state district judges who are currently elected with the support of many other interest groups, such as the personal injury bar and the defense bar. Nor is there any support in this record for the proposition that persons elected with the support of minorities would somehow be lacking in the same high level of integrity that has in the past characterized the Texas bench. In summary, the compelling interest proffered by the state and the other defendants for the maintenance of the current system is, at best, little more than tenuous. Arrayed against it is the Texas Constitution, which was amended by the Texas legislature and by the voters of this state in 1985 to permit the election of state district judges from areas smaller than a county. The voters of this state have made provision for one of the remedies available to the district court in this case—namely, the remedy of subdistricting. Surely, the legitimate state interests in this case can permissibly be defined, in part, by this provision of its Constitution. We turn finally to a brief summary of certain other important legal issues involved in the decision of this case. In particular, we have been asked by the state of Texas and several state district judges to decide what Congress meant in the Voting Rights Act when it prohibited voting practices that result in a denial or abridgement of the right to vote “on account of race or color.” With respect to the significance of Congress' use of the phrase "on account of race" in Section 2, our holdings may be summarized as follows: First, we hold that, under the plain language of Section 2, minority plaintiffs must demonstrate that the challenged election practice, under the totality of the circumstances, results in the denial or abridgement of the right to vote "on account of," or based on, race or color. See Chisom v. Roemer, — U.S. —, —, 111 S.Ct. 2354, 2363, 115 L.Ed.2d 348 (1991). The phrase "on account of race or color" has been broadly defined by the Supreme Court and by Congress. Specifically, the totality of circumstances factors listed by Congress as relevant to a determination of Section 2 liability, as well as the threshold factors for proving vote dilution set forth in Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 106 S.Ct. 2752, 92 L.Ed.2d 25 (1986), point to minority voters' unequal opportunity to participate in the political process on the basis of race or color. Thus, minority plaintiffs seeking to satisfy the "on account of race or color" requirement — which is indisputably their burden — may present evidence of the existence of racially polarized voting, racial campaign appeals, a history of official discrimination, the lingering socioeconomic effects of discrimination, and other features of the current or past racial climate of the community in question. Proof of some or all of these factors raises an inference that racial discrimination is responsible for minority plaintiffs' unequal opportunity to participate in the political process. Therefore, we reject the argument that “on account of race or color” is a narrowly-defined phrase. In particular, we reject the contention that Congress has defined the phrase “on account of race or color” to require minority plaintiffs to present proof that their unequal opportunity to participate in the electoral process and elect representatives of their choice is “caused by racial animus in the electorate.” We also reject the related argument that, to prove legally significant white bloc voting in the context of partisan elections, as well as racially polarized voting in such elections, minority plaintiffs must prove that such voting patterns are caused by racial animus in the electorate. While proof of the presence of racial animus in the electorate would be a significant factor indicating that race or color is in some way responsible for minority plaintiffs’ unequal opportunity to participate in the electoral process, the absence of proof of racial animus in the electorate simply will not, by itself, preclude a finding that minority plaintiffs have an unequal opportunity to participate in the electoral process on account of race or color. We have also been asked to decide whether evidence of a strong statistical correlation between the electoral success and the party affiliation of a candidate can override or negate other factors which Congress has indicated point towards vote dilution. With respect to the evidence in several of the counties at issue showing a strong statistical correlation between a candidate’s electoral success and his or her party affiliation, we hold that the district court erred in refusing to consider the evidence. The evidence is unquestionably relevant as an important feature of the political landscape. And, to the extent the evidence purported to demonstrate the absence of current racial animus in the electorate, it was also relevant to the question of whether race or color is responsible for the minority plaintiffs’ unequal opportunity to participate in the political process. We further hold, however, that the district court’s failure to consider the particular evidence adduced in this case amounts to harmless error. The so-called “partisanship evidence” in this case was offered to demonstrate only that voters in elections in large Texas counties, not knowing the race or names of district court candidates, vote without specific racial animus toward those candidates. The evidence did not purport to explain why voters voted the way they did, but simply purported to rule out specific racial animus towards candidates. Moreover, to the extent that minority candidates find it harder, because of their lack of financial resources, to mount a county-wide campaign on a scale necessary to gain name recognition, the partisanship evidence of straight-ticket voting reinforces rather than negates minorities’ unequal opportunity to participate in the political process. Accordingly, we hold that, although it should not have been excluded from consideration as legally irrelevant, the partisanship evidence adduced here does not undercut the district court’s ultimate conclusion that minorities have an unequal opportunity to participate in the political process, an unequal opportunity that is tied to race or color. I. BACKGROUND This lawsuit, which is before this panel for a second time, encompasses nine different voting rights cases. It concerns the method by which Texas elects its district court judges in Bexar, Dallas, Ector, Harris, Jefferson, Lubbock, Midland, Tarrant, and Travis counties (“target counties”). Before we recount the procedural history of this lawsuit, it will be helpful to outline Texas’ method of electing district court judges and to describe how this method operates in the larger counties of the state. A. Texas’ Method of Electing District Court Judges Texas elects its 386 state district judges in partisan elections, which are conducted at the same time and in a substantially similar fashion as other state partisan races. Political parties nominate judicial candidates in general primaries and runoffs, and a candidate must receive a majority of the vote to qualify as the party’s nominee. See Tex.Elec.Code Ann. § 172.-003 (Vernon 1986). At the general election, judicial candidates must run for a specifically numbered district court, and their party affiliation is indicated on the ballot. To win the general election, a judicial candidate needs only a plurality of votes. Id. § 2.001. One feature of Texas’ method of electing state district judges is unique—the size of the various judicial districts from which such judges are elected. Since 1985, the Texas Constitution has provided that judicial districts may not be smaller than a county unless a majority of the voters of the county authorizes smaller districts, see Tex. Const. art. V, § 7a(i), and to date, no district smaller than one county has been authorized by voters from any Texas county. In addition, although the Texas Constitution permits the creation of more than one judgeship per judicial district, see Tex. Const. art. V, § 7, the legislature has seldom invoked this provision. Consequently, as a general rule only one district judge is elected per judicial district, and the judicial districts, although no smaller than a county, vary in size from one county to six counties and in population from approximately 13,000 to 2.5 million. See generally The American Bench 2138-54 (6th ed. 1991) (breaking down judicial districts in Texas according to the counties they cover). Thus, Texas’ method of electing district court judges operates as an at-large system in the larger counties—including the nine target counties—but not in the smaller counties. For example, in Harris County, which according to the 1980 Census has a population of some 2,409,544, there are fifty-nine (59) overlapping, single-judge, county-wide judicial districts. The persons running for those 59 positions may be voted on by all 1,685,024 registered voters in Harris County. By contrast, in Milam County, which according to the 1980 Census has a population of 22,732, there is only one judicial district. The registered voters in that county cast their ballots for only one district judge. See id. B. Procedural History On July 11, 1988, ten individuals, along with local and state chapters of the League of United Latin American Citizens (collectively, “Plaintiffs”), filed suit in federal district court, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. Plaintiffs asserted that Texas’ method of electing district court judges, as that method operates in larger counties, (1) dilutes minority voting strength in violation of Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, and (2) violates the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution. The named defendants in the original lawsuit were: William P. Clements, the Governor of Texas; Jim Mattox, the Attorney General of Texas, who is charged with enforcing the laws of the state; George Bayoud, the Secretary of State of Texas, who is charged with administering the elections laws of the state; and members of the Judicial Districts Board of Texas, which is charged with reapportioning the districts from which Texas district court judges are elected (collectively, “State Defendants”). Several months later, in March 1989, the district court permitted several parties to intervene in the lawsuit. The Houston Lawyers Association and the Texas Black Legislative Caucus intervened on behalf of Plaintiffs, as did certain individuals residing in Dallas County. Two Texas district court judges—Sharolyn Wood, 127th District Court in Harris County, and Harold Entz, 194th District Court in Dallas County—intervened in their personal capacities on behalf of the State Defendants. Plaintiffs originally challenged Texas’ election method in forty-four counties. By the time of trial, however, they had narrowed their challenged to the nine target counties. Plaintiffs proceeded on behalf of Black voters in Harris, Dallas, Tarrant, and Jefferson counties, on behalf of Hispanic voters in Bexar and Travis counties, and on behalf of Black and Hispanic voters combined in Lubbock, Ector, and Midland counties. The lawsuit was tried to the district court the week of September 18, 1989. After considering all the evidence, including much expert testimony, the district court rendered its liability decision and made findings of fact and conclusions of law. In its 94-page memorandum opinion of November 8, 1989, the district court rejected the Plaintiffs’ constitutional claims but found their statutory claim meritorious. The district court concluded that the Plaintiffs, on behalf of specified minority voters in each of the nine target counties, demonstrated a violation of Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act. The district court based its conclusion on its finding that Texas’ current method of electing district court judges in the nine target counties “interacts with social and historical conditions” to cause the minority voters in each of the nine counties to have less opportunity than white voters “to elect their preferred candidates.” On appeal, a divided panel of this court held that the district court erred in concluding that Texas' method of electing district court judges violates Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act in the nine target counties. See League of United Latin American Citizens v. Clements, 902 F.2d 293 (5th Cir.), opinion on rehearing en banc, 914 F.2d 620 (1990), rev'd and remanded, — U.S. —, 111 S.Ct. 2376, 115 L.Ed.2d 379 (1991). We reasoned that, although Section 2 applies to some state judicial elections, it does not apply to elections of state district judges. Id. at 308. In reaching this decision, we focused specifically on the legislative history of the Voting Rights Act, as amended in 1982, and the nature of Texas district court judgeships. We noted that, unlike a judge of a multi-member body, "the district judge in Texas does his judging alone." Id. Because we concluded that "there can be no share of such a single member office," we held that county-wide elections of district judges "[do] not violate the Voting Rights Act." Id. Accordingly, we reversed the judgment of the district court. On its own initiative, the members of this court decided to rehear the case en banc. Over Judge Johnson's dissent, a majority of this court concluded that Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act does not apply to any judicial elections. See League of United Latin American Citizens, 914 F.2d 620, 631 (5th Cir.1990) (en banc), rev'd and remanded, — U.S. —, 111 S.Ct. 2376, 115 L.Ed.2d 379 (1991). In reaching this conclusion, the majority relied primarily on Congress' use of the word "representative" in Section 2. It reasoned that Congress did not intend the term "representative" to include state judges. The majority stated: "Should Congress seek to install [the results] test for judicial elections, it must say so plainly. Instead, it has thus far plainly said the contrary." Id. The Supreme Court granted certiorari for the limited purpose of considering the scope of Section 2's coverage. See Houston Lawyers' Ass'n v. Attorney General of Texas, — U.S. —, —, 111 S.Ct. 2376, 2380, 115 L.Ed.2d 379 (1991). Relying on its decision in Chisom v. Roemer, — U.S. —, 111 S.Ct. 2354, 115 L.Ed.2d 348 (1991), which was issued the same day, the Court concluded that Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act applies to Texas' method of electing district court judges. Id. — U.S. at —, 111 S.Ct. at 2381. The Court specifically held that "[i]f a State decides to elect its trial judges, as Texas did in 1861, those elections must be conducted in compliance with the Voting Rights Act." Id. at —, 111 S.Ct. at 2380. Accordingly, the Court reversed this circuit's en banc decision and remanded the case for further proceedings. II. THE ACCEPTED FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYZING SECTION 2 VOTE DILUTION CLAIMS When Congress amended Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act in 1982, it sought “to clearly establish the standards ... for proving a violation of that section.” S.Rep. No. 417, 97th Cong., 2d Sess., at 2 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 177, 178 [hereinafter S.Rep.]. Congress specifically intended to “make clear that proof of discriminatory intent is not required to establish a violation of Section 2.” S.Rep. at 2, 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 178. Congress also intended to restore “the legal standards under the results test by codifying” the vote dilution framework embraced in White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755, 93 S.Ct. 2332, 37 L.Ed.2d 314 (1973). Id. at 2, 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 179. As amended, Section 2 establishes the basic framework for analyzing vote dilution claims. It provides: (a) No voting qualification or prerequisite to voting or standard, practice, or procedure shall be imposed or applied by any State or political subdivision in a manner which results in a denial or abridgement of the right of any citizen of the United States to vote on account of race or color, or in contravention of the guarantees set forth in section 1973b(f)(2) of this title, as provided in subsection (b) of this section. (b) A violation of subsection (a) of this section is established if, based on the totality of the circumstances, it is shown that the political processes leading to nomination or election in the State or political subdivision are not equally open to participation by members of a class of citizens protected by subsection (a) of this section in that its members have less opportunity than other members of the electorate to participate in the political process and to elect representatives of their choice. The extent to which members of a protected class have been elected to office in the State or political subdivision is one circumstance which may be considered: Provided, That nothing in this section establishes a right to have members of a protected class elected in numbers equal to their proportion in the population. 42 U.S.C. § 1973. Subsection (a) makes clear that Congress intended to codify a results test, and subsection (b) provides guidance about how the results test is to be applied. See Chisom, — U.S. at —, 111 S.Ct. at 2364. Under this framework, then, a plaintiff can prevail “by showing that a challenged election law or procedure, in the context of the total circumstances of the local electoral process, ha[s] the result of denying a racial or language minority an equal chance to participate in the electoral process.” S.Rep. at 16, 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 193. The basic framework set forth in the language of Section 2, although it appears straightforward, has become increasingly complex. Both the Supreme Court and Congress have elaborated on this basic structure, and the product of their elaborations is a two-part framework for analyzing vote dilution claims brought by minority voters. Under the first part of this accepted Section 2 framework, a court must determine whether the minority voters have satisfied a threshold test enunciated by the Supreme Court. If minority voters satisfy the threshold test and demonstrate that their ability to elect representatives of their choice is being hindered by the challenged practice, a court must then ask whether the minority voters have demonstrated certain factors that Congress deemed relevant to the Section 2 inquiry—factors that raise an inference of vote dilution. Ultimately, a court must inquire whether minority voters have demonstrated an unequal opportunity to participate in the political process on account of race or color. A. The Threshold Inquiry: The Gingles Factors The Supreme Court first elaborated on the basic analytical framework established by Section 2 in Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 106 S.Ct. 2752, 92 L.Ed.2d 25 (1986), a case in which Black voters successfully challenged North Carolina's multimember legislative redistricting plan. Although the case produced a "complicated web of dissents, concurrences, and plurality opinions," a majority of the Court agreed that at-large election procedures do not automatically violate Section 2. Id. at 46, 106 S.Ct. at 2764. A majority of the Court also agreed with the formulation of a three-part, threshold test for analyzing claims that an at-large election scheme dilutes minority voting strength. Under this threshold test, the minority group challenging an at-large election scheme must demonstrate that (1) it is sufficiently large and geographically compact to constitute a majority in a single member district, (2) it is politically cohesive, and (3) the white majority votes sufficiently as a bloc to enable it — in the absence of special circumstances — usually to defeat the minority's preferred candidate. Id. at 48-51, 106 S.Ct. at 2765-2767. Failure to establish any one of the Gingles factors precludes a finding of vote dilution, because "[t]hese circumstances are necessary preconditions for multimember districts to operate to impair minority voters' ability to elect representatives of their choice...." Id. at 50, 106 S.Ct. at 2766; see also Overton v. City of Austin, 871 F.2d 529, 538 (5th Cir.1989) (failure to establish any one of the Gingles factors is fatal to plaintiffs' vote dilution claim). 1. Size and Geographical Compactness of the Minority Group As stated above, to pass the Gingles threshold inquiry, the minority group challenging an at-large election scheme must first demonstrate that it is sufficiently large and geographically compact to constitute a majority in a single-member district. To satisfy this first Gingles factor, the minority group must ordinarily be able to draw a single member district in which a majority of the voting age population is minority. See Westwego Citizens for Better Government v. City of Westwego, 946 F.2d 1109, 1117 n. 7 (5th Cir.1991) (Westwego III); Overton, 871 F.2d at 536; see also Westwego Citizens for Better Gov't v. Westwego, 872 F.2d 1201, 1205 n. 4 (5th Cir.1989) (Westwego I) (noting that evidence of size of "voting age" population is critical to a vote dilution claim); Romero v. City of Pomona, 883 F.2d 1418, 1426 (9th Cir.1989) ("eligible minority voter population, rather than total minority population, is the appropriate measure of geographical compactness"). This requirement, according to the majority in Gingles, ensures that, in the absence of the multimember district and at-large voting scheme, "minority voters possess the potential to elect representatives...." Gingles, 478 U.S. at 50 n. 17, 106 S.Ct. at 2767 n. 17 (emphasis in original). In other words, if the minority group is not sufficiently large and geographically compact, "the multimember form of the district cannot be responsible for [minority] voters' inability to elect [their] candidates." Id. at 50, 106 S.Ct. at 2766 (emphasis in original) (footnote omitted). 2. Political Cohesiveness of the Minority Group The minority group must also demonstrate that it is "politically cohesive" to pass the Gingles threshold inquiry. Id. at 51, 106 S.Ct. at 2766. One way of proving political cohesiveness, according to the Gingles majority, is to show "that a significant number of minority group members usually vote for the same candidates...." Id. at 56, 106 S.Ct. at 2769; see also Citizens for a Better Gretna v. City of Gretna, 834 F.2d 496, 501-02 (5th Cir.1987), cert. denied, 492 U.S. 905, 109 S.Ct. 3213, 106 L.Ed.2d 564 (1989). If the minority group is not politically cohesive, or does not engage in significant bloc voting, "it cannot be said that the selection of a multimember structure thwarts distinctive minority group interests." Gingles, 478 U.S. at 51, 106 S.Ct. at 2766 (citation omitted). Although statistical evidence of racially polarized voting, see infra Part II.B.l.b., is frequently employed to demonstrate a minority group’s political cohesiveness, other evidence may also establish this second Gingles factor. We have on several occasions indicated that Gingles allows minority voters to prove their political cohesiveness even in the absence of statistical evidence of racial polarization. See Westwego III, 946 F.2d at 1118 n. 12; Brewer v. Ham, 876 F.2d 448, 453 (5th Cir.1989). In particular, political cohesiveness also may be demonstrated by testimony from persons familiar with the community in question, provided that such testimony is reinforced with other evidence or is not otherwise rebutted. See Brewer, 876 F.2d at 453-54; see also Overton, 871 F.2d at 536. Political cohesiveness is related to, but distinct from, the concept of racially polarized voting. The notion of political cohesiveness contemplates that a specified group of voters shares common beliefs, ideals, principles, agendas, concerns, and the like such that they generally unite behind or coalesce around particular candidates and issues. See Monroe v. City of Woodville, 881 F.2d 1327, 1331 (5th Cir. 1989), modified, 897 F.2d 763, cert. denied, 498 U.S. 822, 111 S.Ct. 71, 112 L.Ed.2d 45 (1990). The term racially polarized voting, on the other hand, describes an electorate in which white voters favor and vote for certain candidates or propositions, and minority voters vote for other candidates or propositions. See Gingles, 478 U.S. at 53 n. 21, 106 S.Ct. at 2768 n. 21. (racial polarization exists where there is a consistent relationship between the race of the voter and the way in which the voter votes or where minority voters and white voters vote differently). Thus, while a showing of racially polarized voting will frequently demonstrate that minority voters are politically cohesive, a showing that minority voters are politically cohesive will not, by itself, establish racially polarized voting. Finally, according to a majority of the Justices in Gingles, to satisfy the second threshold factor minority voters need not prove that the reason they vote for the same candidates is linked to race or color. Justice Brennan, writing for three other Justices, would have held that “the reasons [minority] and white voters vote differently have no relevance to the central inquiry of § 2.” Gingles, 478 U.S. at 63, 106 S.Ct. at 2773 (Brennan, J., joined by Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens, JJ.). Although not entirely agreeing with Justice Brennan, Justice O’Connor, writing on behalf of three other Justices, agreed that defendants cannot rebut statistical evidence of a minority group’s political cohesiveness by “offering evidence that the divergent racial voting patterns may be explained in part by causes other than race.” Gingles, 478 U.S. at 100, 106 S.Ct. at 2792 (O’Connor, J., joined by Burger, C.J., Powell and Rehnquist, JJ., concurring in the judgment). Justice O’Connor specifically stated that statistical evidence of divergent racial voting offered solely to establish the minority group’s political cohesiveness may not be rebutted by evidence indicating that there is “an underlying divergence in the interests of minority and white voters.” Id. 3. Legally Significant White Bloc Voting Under the third Gingles factor, the minority group “must be able to demonstrate that the white majority votes sufficiently as a bloc to enable it—in the absence of special circumstances, such as the minority candidate running unopposed—usually to defeat the minority’s preferred candidate.” Gingles, 478 U.S. at 51, 106 S.Ct. at 2766-2767 (internal references omitted). “In establishing this last circumstance, the minority group demonstrates that submergence in a white multimember district impedes its ability to elect its chosen representatives.” Id. As with demonstrating political cohesiveness, a minority group can demonstrate white bloc voting by introducing statistical evidence of racially polarized voting. See Westwego III, 946 F.2d at 1118. Moreover, where statistical evidence of racially polarized voting is used to establish white bloc voting, the elections that will usually be most probative are those in which the minority-preferred candidate is a member of the minority group. See Westwego I, 872 F.2d at 1208 n. 7. The determinative question for this third Gingles factor “is not whether whites generally vote as a bloc, but rather, whether such bloc voting is legally significant.” Monroe, 881 F.2d at 1332. Legally significant white bloc voting means white bloc voting that usually defeats the minority group’s preferred candidate. Id. at 1333. As the Court recognized in Gingles, “a white bloc vote that normally will defeat the combined strength of minority support plus white ‘crossover’ votes rises to the level of legally significant white bloc voting.” Gingles, 478 U.S. at 56, 106 S.Ct. at 2769. It is “the usual predictability of the majority’s success,” the Court continued, that “distinguishes structural dilution from the mere loss of an occasional election.” Id. at 51, 106 S.Ct. at 2767. The amount of white bloc voting that rises to the level of legal significance will vary from location to location. That is, in determining whether white voting strength can generally “minimize or cancel” minority voters’ ability to elect representatives of their choice, courts must look at a number of factors. Id. at 56,106 S.Ct. at 2769 (quoting S.Rep. at 28). Among the factors affecting the level of legally significant white bloc voting are: (1) the nature of the allegedly dilutive electoral mechanism; (2) the presence or absence of other potentially dilutive electoral devices, such as majority vote requirements, designated posts, and prohibitions against bullet voting; (3) the percentage of registered voters in the district who are members of the minority group; (4) the size of the district; and (5) in multimember districts, the number of seats open and the number of candidates in the field. Gingles, 478 U.S. at 56, 106 S.Ct. at 2769. Contrary to the arguments advanced by the State Defendants, Judge Wood, and Judge Entz, a minority group is not required to demonstrate that racial animus is responsible for a white bloc voting pattern. A requirement of demonstrating racial animus would, in the words of the Senate Report, be “unnecessarily divisive because it [would] involve charges of racism on the part of ... entire communities.” S.Rep. at 36, 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 214. And, one of the reasons Congress decided to amend Section 2 was to obviate the need for such charges of racism. Id. In sum, a minority group can satisfy the third Gingles factor by showing that a substantial majority of white voters consistently vote against the candidates preferred by minority voters, such that the candidates preferred by the minority group usually lose. It has never been the case, however, that for white bloc voting to be legally significant, it must be shown to be motivated by racial animus. See e.g., Westwego III, 946 F.2d at 1118-20 (concluding, without inquiring as to the cause of voting patterns, that the record “unmistakably” demonstrated legally significant white bloc voting). We decline to hold so now. B. The Broader Inquiry: The Totality of the Circumstances Satisfaction of the Gingles factors, at least in this circuit, does not by itself establish a violation of Section 2. See Westwego III, 946 F.2d at 1116. The minority group must further demonstrate that, under the totality of the circumstances, “its members have less opportunity than other members of the electorate to participate in the political process and to elect representatives of their choice.” 42 U.S.C. § 1973(b). Unlike the Gingles threshold inquiry, the totality of circumstances inquiry is broad. It requires courts to make a “searching practical evaluation of the ‘past and present reality’ ” of the community and to take a “ ‘functional’ view of the political process.” Gingles, 478 U.S. at 45, 106 S.Ct. at 2764. Although courts typically should be guided by the factors mentioned in the Senate Report accompanying the 1982 amendments to Section 2, other factors may also be relevant. See Westwego III, 946 F.2d at 1120. 1. The Senate Report Factors The Senate Report accompanying the 1982 amendments to Section 2 identifies seven "typical" factors and two "additional" factors that may be relevant to an analysis of the totality of the circumstances. These factors, which were derived from the analytical framework used by the Supreme Court in White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755, 93 S.Ct. 2332, 37 L.Ed.2d 314 (1973), as articulated by this court in Zimmer v. McKeithen, 485 F.2d 1297, 1305 (5th Cir.1973), aff'd sub nom. East Carroll Parish School Bd. v. Marshall, 424 U.S. 636, 96 S.Ct. 1083, 47 L.Ed.2d 296 (1976), are meant to aid a court in assessing whether "the challenged system or practice, in the context of all the circumstances in the jurisdiction in question, results in minorities being denied equal access to the political process." S.REP. at 27, 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 205. According to the Senate Report, a court must "assess the impact of the challenged structure or practice on the basis of objective factors, rather than making a determination about the motivations which lay behind its adoption or maintenance." Id. at 27, 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 205 (emphasis added). a. History of discrimination touching the rights of minorities to participate in the political process. The first factor mentioned in the Senate Report is “the extent of any history of official discrimination in the state or political subdivision that touched the right of the members of the minority group to register, to vote, or otherwise to participate in the democratic process.” S.Rep. at 28, 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 206. In listing this factor, Congress made clear that it “was concerned not only with present discrimination, but with the vestiges of discrimination which may interact with present political structures to perpetuate a historical lack of access to the political system.” Westwego I, 872 F.2d at 1211-12. Evidence that is relevant under this factor includes the use of poll taxes and literacy tests, as well as the existence of racially segregated schools and public facilities. See White, 412 U.S. at 768, 93 S.Ct. at 2340; Zimmer, 485 F.2d at 1306; see also Andrew P. Miller and Mark A. Packman, Amended Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act: What is the Intent of the Results Test?, 36 Emory L.J. 1, 28 (1987). b. Extent of racially polarized voting. The second factor that Congress deemed relevant to an analysis of the totality of the circumstances is “the extent to which voting in the elections of the state or political subdivision is racially polarized.” S.Rep. at 29, 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 206. This factor is one of the two most important in the inquiry into the past and present reality of the challenged electoral structure. Westwego III, 946 F.2d at 1120. It is, we have stated, “the linchpin -of a § 2 vote dilution claim____” Gretna, 834 F.2d at 499; see also Samuel Issacharoff, Polarized Voting and the Political Process: The Transformation of Voting Rights Jurisprudence, 90 Mich.L.Rev. 1833, 1848-49 (1990) (opining that the inclusion of the racially polarized voting inquiry in the Senate Report marked “a major shift in voting rights law” and pointed to an “emerging doctrinal coherence for claims of minority vote dilution”). As previously discussed, see supra Part II.A.2, racially polarized voting “exists where there is a ‘consistent relationship between [the] race of the voter and the way in which the voter votes,’ ... or to put it differently, where ‘[minority] voters and white voters vote differently.’ ” Gingles, 478 U.S. at 53 n. 21, 106 S.Ct. at 2768 n. 21. Racially polarized voting is not, as Judge Wood, Judge Entz, and the State Defendants suggest, racially motivated voting, or voting caused by racial animus. See Collins v. City of Norfolk, 816 F.2d 932, 935 (4th Cir.1987) (“The legal standard for the existence of racially polarized voting looks only to the difference between how majority votes and minority votes were cast; it does not ask why those votes were cast the way they were____”). Nor is racially polarized voting simply “the tendency of citizens to vote for candidates of their own race.” Miller & Packman, supra, at 16. Rather, racially polarized voting is an objective factor, which is established by evidence demonstrating that “voters vote along racial lines.” Westwego III, 946 F.2d at 1122. To say that racial polarization does not simply measure the tendency of citizens to vote for candidates of their own race, however, does not mean that evidence of such tendencies are unimportant to the racial polarization inquiry. We recognized in Gretna that, in determining the existence of racial bloc voting, “the race of the candidate is in general of less significance than the race of the voter—but only within the context of an election that offers voters the choice of supporting a viable minority candidate.” 834 F.2d at 503. Furthermore, we have noted that “the evidence most probative of racially polarized voting must be drawn from elections including both [minority] and white candidates.” Westwego I, 872 F.2d at 1208 n. 7. Accordingly, in ascertaining whether a community’s elections are characterized by racially polarized voting, a court may properly give more weight to elections in which the minority-preferred candidate is a member of the minority group. The Senate Report recognizes that racially polarized voting is a relative concept by instructing courts to assess not only the existence of racially polarized voting, but the extent of such voting. Indeed, the existence of racially polarized voting will frequently, if not always, be established by satisfying of the second and third Gingles factors. See supra Parts H.A.2., II.A.3; see also Romero v. City of Pomona, 883 F.2d 1418, 1423 (9th Cir.1989) (suggesting that the second and third Gingles factors, political cohesiveness and white bloc voting, are the “component parts” of racially polarized voting). Under the totality of circumstances inquiry, the focus is on the degree of racially polarized voting. When the pattern of racially polarized voting is severe—that is, when minority and white voters rarely engage in cross-over voting—an at-large election scheme is more likely to dilute minority voting strength in violation of Section 2. Conversely, when the pattern of racially polarized voting is slight, and there is substantial cross-over voting between minority and with voters, an at-large election scheme is less likely to dilute minority voting strength in violation of Section 2. c. Use of voting practices that enhance the opportunity for discrimination. The Senate Report also directs courts to consider other voting practices that may interact with the challenged election scheme to dilute minority voting strength. In particular, courts are to consider “the extent to which the state or political subdivision has used unusually large election districts, majority vote requirements, anti-single shot provisions, or other voting practices or procedures that may enhance the opportunity for discrimination against the minority group.” S.Rep. at 29, 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 206. Courts may also consider, at least in the context of at-large elections, whether the state or political subdivision employs what amounts to a numbered-post system and whether the system lacks a district residency requirement. See White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755, 766, 93 S.Ct. 2332, 2339, 37 L.Ed.2d 314 (1973) (discussing Texas’ “place” rule). The potential of such features to dilute minority voting strength is well-documented. See generally Chandler Davidson, Overview, in Minority Vote Dilution 5-8 (Chandler Davidson ed. 1984). Unusually large election districts may enhance vote dilution in a least two ways: First, such districts may make it more difficult for minorities to successfully campaign for office. See Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613, 627, 102 S.Ct. 3272, 3280, 73 L.Ed.2d 1012 (1982); see also Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124, 143, 91 S.Ct. 1858, 1869, 29 L.Ed.2d 363 (1971) (recognizing that, when large, multimember districts have an enhanced tendency to minimize or cancel out minority voting strength). Such districts may also create the problem of overly long ballots, making “an intelligent choice among candidates ... quite difficult.” Lucas v. Colorado Gen. Assembly, 377 U.S. 713, 731, 84 S.Ct. 1459, 1471, 12 L.Ed.2d 632 (1964). The other features discussed above similarly enhance the possibility of vote dilution. Majority vote requirements can obstruct the election of minority candidates by giving white voting majorities a "second shot" at minority candidates who have only mustered a plurality of the votes in the first election. See Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Constitutional Rights of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 491 (1975) (testimony of Dr. Charles Cotrell); see also Jones v. City of Lubbock, 727 F.2d 364, 383 (5th Cir. 1984); Major v. Treen, 574 F.Supp. 325, 351 n. 32 (E.D.La.1983) (three-judge court). Anti-single shot provisions prohibit voters from casting fewer than all of their votes and effectively force minority voters to cast votes for white candidates who may not be favored by minority voters. Westwego III, 946 F.2d at 1113 n. 3. Under a numbered post system, candidates are required to run for a designated seat. See White, 412 U.S. at 766, 93 S.Ct. at 2339. This requirement, the Supreme Court has recognized, "enhances [the minority group's] lack of access because it prevents a cohesive political group from concentrating on a single candidate." Rogers, 458 U.S. at 627, 102 S.Ct. at 3280. Finally, where there is no requirement that candidates reside in subdistricts of a multimember district, "all candidates may be selected from outside [a minority group's] residential area." White, 412 U.S. at 766 n. 10, 93 S.Ct. at 2340 n. 10. d. Minority access to the slating process. The fourth totality factor listed in the Senate Report is “whether members of the minority group have been denied- access” to any candidate slating process. S.Rep. at 29, 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 206. Slating has been defined as “the creation of a package or slate of candidates, before filing for office, by an organization with sufficient strength to make the election merely a stamp of approval of the preordained candidate group.” Overton, 871 F.2d at 534. The core inquiry as to slating, we have stated, “is the ability of [minorities] to get on the ballot.” Hendrix v. Joseph, 559 F.2d 1265, 1268 (5th Cir.1977). Where a slating organization exists, "the ability of minorities to participate in that slating organization and to receive its endorsement may be of paramount importance." United States v. Marengo County Comm'n, 731 F.2d 1546, 1569 (11th Cir.) (Wisdom, J., sitting by designation), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 976, 105 S.Ct. 375, 83 L.Ed.2d 311 (1984). We have indicated, however, that a slating organization's endorsement of a few minority candidates will not preclude a finding that the minority group lacks access to the slating process, at least where those candidates are not preferred by the minority group. See Velasquez v. City of Abilene, 725 F.2d 1017, 1022 & n. 1 (5th Cir.1984) (referring to the Senate Report). Moreover, we have recognized that the absence of a slating organization will not mitigate evidence of an unequal opportunity to participate in the political process. See McMillan v. Escambia County, 638 F.2d 1239, 1245 (5th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 453 U.S. 946, 102 S.Ct. 17, 69 L.Ed.2d 1033 (1981). e. Lingering socioeconomic effects of discrimination. Congress also has directed courts to consider “the extent to which members of the minority group in the state or political subdivision bear the effects of discrimination in such areas as education, employment and health____” S.Rep. at 29, 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 206. In doing so, Congress recognized that the lingering socioeconomic effects of discrimination may hinder a minority group’s “ability to participate effectively in the political process.” Id. Where the minority group presents evidence that its members are socioeconomically disadvantaged and that their level of participation in politics is depressed, the group “need not prove any further causal nexus between [its members’] disparate socioeconomic status and the depressed level of political participation.” Id. at 29 n. 114, 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 207 n. 114. f.Use of racial appeals in campaigns. The Senate Report further directs courts, when looking at the present reality of the community’s political process, to consider “whether political campaigns have been characterized by overt or subtle racial appeals.” S.Rep. at 29, 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 206. The presence of this factor, Congress undoubtedly recognized, could provide evidence that racial politics dominate the political process. See id. at 33, 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 210-211. The absence of racial appeals, however, is not fatal to a minority group’s vote dilution claim under Section 2. As Judge Wisdom recognized in Marengo County, overt political racism has decreased over time. 731 F.2d at 1571. Therefore, while “[e]vidence of racism can be very significant if it is present[,]____its absence should not weigh heavily against a plaintiff proceeding under the results test of [S]ection 2.” Id. g. Extent to which minority candidates have been elected to public office. The “extent to which members of the minority group have been elected to public office in the jurisdiction,” S.Rep. at 29, 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 207, along with the extent of racially polarized voting, are the two most important factors that the district court must consider its analysis of the totality of the circumstances. See Gingles, 478 U.S. at 48 n. 15, 106 S.Ct. at 2767 n. 15; Westwego III, 946 F.2d at 1120. Indeed, minority candidate success is the only factor that is mentioned in the language of Section 2 itself. Subsection (b), which sets forth the totality of the circumstances standard, expressly provides: “The extent to which members of a protected class have been elected to office in the State or political subdivision is one circumstance which may be considered: Provided, That nothing in this section establishes a right to have members of a protected class elected in numbers equal to their proportion in the population.” 42 U.S.C. § 1973(b). In the Senate Report, Congress indicated that the analysis of minority candidate success should be a cautious, relative inquiry. On the one hand, Congress recognized that, where “no members of a minority group have been elected to office over an extended period of time,” the lack of success “is probative.” S.Rep. at 29 n. 115, 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 207 n. 115. Congress cautioned, however, against giving too much weight to the isolated instances of minority candidate success. Citing our decision in Zimmer, Congress noted that “the election of a few minority candidates does not ‘necessarily foreclose the possibility of dilution of the [minority] vote’ in violation of this section.” S.Rep. at 29 n. 115, 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 207 n. 115. If such isolated successes were allowed to foreclose a Section 2 claim, Congress continued, “the possibility exists that the majority citizens might evade the section[, for example,] by manipulating the election of a ‘safe’ minority candidate.” Id. Congress did not, however, clearly establish a reference point for measuring the success of minority candidates. One possibility is to measure the success of minority candidates by reference to the proportion of minorities in the local population. Another way in which to measure the success of minority candidates is to focus on their success rate by comparing the number of minority candidates who have won with the number of minority candidates who have lost. And finally, as a third way of gauging minority success, a court could compare the number of minorities elected with the “qualified applicant pool,” as is currently done with employment discrimination claims brought under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. In our view, both of the first two methods discussed above are relevant to the inquiry of minority candidate success. Measuring the success of minority candidates by referring to the proportion of minorities in the local population is supported by the language of Section 2. See 42 U.S.C. § 1973(