Full opinion text
LEVIN H. CAMPBELL, Senior Circuit Judge. These appeals are from the convictions of seven individuals charged with drug trafficking offenses following a jury trial that took place in the United States District Court for the Middie District of Florida, Tampa Division. Defendants-appellants Levine Archer, Ralph Brazel, Norman Burgess, Willie Jefferson, Charles Hubbard, Sharvonne McKinnon, and Marlon McNealy were allegedly all associated with an organization led by Ronald Mathis (a/k/a “Romeo” or “Rome”) in St. Petersburg, Florida, that engaged in the distribution of crack cocaine. On October 23, 1991, a federal grand jury handed down drug trafficking indictments against thirty-two people including these defendants. Many of those indicted pleaded guilty and cooperated with the government, some of them later testifying against one of more of the defendants. Defendants’ trial was lengthy, beginning on February 4, 1993 and consuming approximately three months. On May 7, the jury found all seven defendants-appellants guilty of conspiracy to distribute cocaine base in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846. Archer and McNealy were also found guilty of conspiracy to commit racketeering activities and participation in racketeering activities, 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d) & (c), and two arid three counts, respectively, of possession of cocaine with intent to distribute, 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). Jefferson was convicted of conspiracy to commit racketeering activities, 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d).. Brazel was convicted of two counts of possession of cocaine with intent to distribute, 21 U.S.C. § 841(a). Burgess was convicted of use of a firearm during and in relation to drug trafficking, 18 U.S.C. § 924(e). Sentencing proceedings were held in August and September 1993. All the defendants received at least one life sentence. These app.eals followed. We begin this opinion with a short overview giving a general picture of the evidence at trial. Additional evidence is summarized within the ensuing, separately labelled sections of the opinion, in conjunction with our discussion of points the defendants have raised. Hence, right after the evidentiary overview, we consider the contentions of McKinnon, Hubbard, Burgess, and McNealy that the evidence was insufficient, as a matter of law, to support their convictions on certain counts; and in doing so we set out the evidence relevant to their contentions. Thereafter, we address seriatim numerous assertions of legal error the defendants individually and collectively have made. We affirm all the convictions and sentences. I. Overview Construed in the light most favorable to the government, the evidence at trial showed the following. During 1990 and 1991 in St. Petersburg, Florida, Ronald Mathis operated a major crack cocaine distribution organization with which the defendants were connected. Defendant Levine Archer (“Jamaican Joe”) supplied crack cocaine to the organization during 1990 until early 1991, when he had a dispute with Mathis. Around late 1990, Marlon McNealy and Willie Jefferson became suppliers as well. They were soon joined by Charles Hubbard, and these three were principal suppliers from July 1 through October 1991. During 1990 the Mathis organization operated on the north side of St. Petersburg. Mathis and his nephew, defendant Ralph Brazel, were among those who brought 25- and 50-packs of crack cocaine to Mathis’s sellers on Grove Street, where a rock of crack cocaine sold for $20 ($1,000 for a 50-pack). Occasionally, a seller returned crack cocaine to Mathis because it was unfit to be sold, part having been cut and sold on the side. When Mathis was not home, the seller left a plastic bag containing the drugs, along with drug proceeds, with Mathis’s live-in girlfriend, Sharvonne McKinnon; the seller and she emptied the bag and together counted the rocks of crack cocaine to be returned to Mathis. On July 11, 1990, St. Petersburg Police Department (SPPD) Detective Gerald Niles and a confidential informant made an undercover purchase of three rocks of crack for $60 from Brazel and another person at 615 Grove Street North. Brazel thereafter pled guilty to a state charge of selling cocaine on that date, and evidence of the plea was introduced at the instant trial. In late. 1990, Mathis moved his operations to the south side of the city. On December 24,1990, at an organizational meeting attended by about twenty people, Mathis outlined his plan to be bigger and smarter than another drug organization in the city, run by “Wonderman” Lee, had been. McKinnon was present and added that workers should not be as flashy as the Lee organization. In 1991 the center of operations was Mathis’s residence at 781 16th Avenue South, though several sites on the south side were used to prepare, sell, and pay for drugs sold. These locations included 827 Preston Avenue South, 14th Avenue South and Highland by a key shop, locations around 15th and 16th Avenue South, 1222 19th Avenue South, and 2320 Fairfield Avenue. Mathis moved operations from one site to another in response to law enforcement searches, and ordered at least one site to be burned down to impede investigation efforts. Evidence of arson and attempts at burglary and murder was introduced, indicating the full extent of the Mathis organization’s activities. On the south side, the Mathis organization operated around the clock in three shifts: midnight to 8:00 a.m., 8:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m., and 5:00 p.m. to midnight. Each shift had a “boss,” who delivered 50-packs of crack cocaine to “servers.” Servers took orders from customers and made deliveries accompanied by “collectors,” who took the money from the buyer and immediately counted it. “Overseers” kept tally sheets of how much crack cocaine a worker had out, collected shift revenues, and transferred the money to Mathis. “Lookouts” warned other workers of the approach of police or members of a special drug task force (the “green team,” so named because of their green jackets) by shouting, using a walkie-talkie, or activating a remote-controlled siren or alarm. Firearms were purchased and carried by some workers for protection against robbery of drugs or money. Defendants Norman Burgess and Brazel held various positions on the shifts; Burgess also served as an armed guard to Mathis or one of his associates, carrying money. McKinnon had no formal assignment on a shift, but on various occasions accepted and counted rocks of crack cocaine and money from shift workers, alerted Mathis and his associates to the approach or arrival of the green team, and relayed messages from shift workers to Mathis. A rock of crack cocaine sold on the south side for $10 ($500 for a 50-paek). For each 50-pack sold, $50 went to workers on the shift ánd $450 was returned to Mathis, who paid the suppliers and also paid workers regularly on Fridays. SPPD officers conducted undercover buys from Mathis workers around 14th Avenue South and Highland Street on March 22, March 25, and April 9, 1991. On the first two dates, undercover officer Marilyn Brown and a confidential informant purchased 25 and 50 rocks of crack cocaine from Ralph Brazel and others. Brazel collected the money from her each time, and, in response to her question about where she could get a one-ounce “cookie” of crack cocaine (a piece not yet cut into rocks), answered that she would have to talk to Mathis. Brazel pled guilty to state charges of sale and possession of crack cocaine on these dates. A third undercover buy was begun on April 9, 1991 at 14th Avenue and Highland Street, but was not completed. Detective Niles and a confidential informant attempted to purchase crack cocaine from Burgess and another person, but the transaction was disrupted when individuals nearby shouted “green team.” Before the transaction ended, Burgess asked Niles whether he was a police officer, and, apparently believing it was all right to proceed, agreed to Niles’s suggestion to put the substance appearing to be crack cocaine on the ground, where Niles would also leave the money. (The money was not in fact left, nor the substance taken.) From June until November 1991, SPPD detectives intercepted cordless telephone conversations made to and from Mathis’s residence. Local officers carried out searches of addresses associated with the Mathis organization, and conducted additional undercover drug transactions with assistance from special agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). The latter took place on or around July 25, August 2, and August 15 at a local Chevron station and a Burger King. On October 24, 1991, Hubbard, McNealy, and Jefferson were arrested after a search of a residence they frequented revealed drugs along with some of their belongings. On October 31, at Mathis’s direction, Hubbard went with two other Mathis workers to McKinnon’s apartment, where they arrived at around 1:00 a.m. and cut up and bagged 50-packs of crack cocaine until early morning. When police arrived, seeking McKinnon’s cooperation in their investigation, the three who had been cutting crack escaped out the window with their supplies. II. Discussion A. Sufficiency of the Evidence Four defendants assert that the district court erred in denying their motions for judgment of acquittal made at the close of the government’s case and renewed thereafter. McKinnon, Hubbard, and Burgess argue that the government’s evidence was insufficient to support their convictions of conspiracy to distribute cocaine base in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846. McNealy challenges his RICO conviction for conspiracy to commit racketeering activities in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d). We review the sufficiency of the evidence de novo to determine whether a reasonable jury could have concluded that the evidence established the defendants’ guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. In so doing, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the government and make all reasonable inferences and credibility choices in the government’s favor. See United States v. Lyons, 53 F.3d 1198, 1200 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 116 S.Ct. 262, 133 L.Ed.2d 185, and — U.S. -, 116 S.Ct. 350, 133 L.Ed.2d 246 (1995). 1. Conspiracy to Distribute Cocaine Base To sustain a conviction for conspiracy, the government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that a conspiracy existed, that the defendant knew of it, and that the defendant, with knowledge, voluntarily joined the conspiracy. United States v. Lopez-Ramirez, 68 F.3d 438, 440 (11th Cir.1995) (citation omitted). Here, the government had to show that an agreement existed between two or more individuals illegally to distribute cocaine base, and that each defendant knowingly and voluntarily joined or participated in the conspiracy. See Lyons, 53 F.3d at 1201. Proof could be by direct or circumstantial evidence; if circumstantial, “reasonable inferences, and not mere speculation, must support the jury’s verdict.” Lopez-Ramirez, 68 F.3d at 440 (citation omitted). “Mere presence, guilty knowledge, even sympathetic observation” and close association with a coeonspirator are insufficient, without more, to support a conviction for conspiracy to distribute drugs. Lyons, 53 F.3d at 1201; see also Lopez-Ramirez, 68 F.3d at 441 (citing cases). Yet such factors may raise a permissible inference of participation in a conspiracy, which the jury may consider as a “material and probative factor ... in reaching its decision.” United States v. Hernandez, 896 F.2d 513, 518 (11th Cir.) (citation omitted), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 858, 111 S.Ct. 159, 112 L.Ed.2d 125 (1990). A defendant may be culpable even if he or she played a minor role in the conspiracy, since a conspirator need not know the details of each act making up the conspiracy. See United States v. Parrado, 911 F.2d 1567, 1571 (11th Cir.1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1104, 111 S.Ct. 1005, 112 L.Ed.2d 1088 (1991). a. McKinnon McKinnon, Mathis’s live-in girlfriend for much of the conspiracy period, argues that the evidence is insufficient to sustain her conspiracy conviction as it shows at best that she was merely present during illegal drug activity or else that she merely associated with coconspirators. We do not agree. The evidence presented against her was as follows. Mark Muse testified that when he worked for Mathis in 1990 distributing drugs on the north side of the city, he occasionally returned to Mathis crack cocaine that was not fit to sell. On at least five such occasions, Mathis was not home, and Muse gave McKinnon a clear plastic bag with crack cocaine and money from the drugs that had been sold out of the 50-pack. Muse and McKinnon together took the drugs out of the bag and counted the rocks. Muse further testified that on some of these occasions and at least once in the spring of 1991, McKinnon opined that some people in the organization were not doing their jobs and should be fired or docked pay. Ronald Brinson, who also had worked on the north side, testified that when his shift’s supply of crack cocaine ran out, he called Mathis for more and was sometimes told to come by Mathis’s house. Mathis was not always home; on those occasions, Brinson said he told McKinnon he was there to “get some dope,” and McKinnon told him to sit and wait until Mathis returned. Brinson testified that on. December 24, 1990, McKinnon attended and spoke at a meeting held by Mathis on Preston Avenue South to outline the future of his crack cocaine distribution organization. Dwayne Green also testified that McKinnon was present, recalling that she came in after the meeting had started. Mathis chaired the meeting, discussed worker shifts and benefits, and said his operation would be bigger and smarter than another drug organization in the city' run by “Wonderman” Lee. McKinnon then added, according to Brinson, that “we” are not “going to be as flashy as Wonderman was in buying new cars and having, you know, Mercedes and being all flashy, showing that we got lots of money.” Witnesses testified that during 1991 when Mathis’s drug distribution organization operated on the south side of the city, McKinnon played various roles, though she held no formal position on a particular shift. Green testified that McKinnon once helped to settle a dispute between Mathis and another worker about1 the number of 50-paeks that had been delivered to Mathis’s house. The worker had said there were 121 50-packs, Mathis counted 120, and McKinnon, after agreeing to a $50 bet from Mathis about who was right, counted out 121 50-packs of crack cocaine. Green further testified that on three occasions between May and September 1991 when the “morning counter” did not show up on time, he saw McKinnon count money that two workers had delivered to Mathis’s house after the midnight to 8:00 a.m. shift. Green stated that, as was the practice, McKinnon counted the money for a pack ($500), took $50 off for the workers, and put the remaining $450 in the bottom drawer of a desk for Mathis. Everol Palmer testified that when he worked as a supplier for Mathis in early 1991, Mathis was not always home to accept a delivery, so two or three times in March or April Palmer left a plastic or paper bag with McKinnon for Mathis. Palmer did not describe the contents, and McKinnon did not ask. Palmer said that he stopped this practice when a dispute arose once over how much had been delivered, and Mathis said to deliver the packs directly to him, “don’t give them to my wife.” Alvin Terry testified that when he was a boss man on 19th Avenue beginning in March or April of 1991, he was responsible for calling Mathis when law enforcement officers approached so that workers on 16th Avenue could be warned. Sometimes Terry spoke to McKinnon and asked her to relay the message that the green team was approaching, and McKinnon said “okay.” Mark Muse testified that “at times” McKin-non advised him where to stand on 16th Avenue. Willis Hill, who worked the midnight to 8:00 a.m. shift, testified that he heard McKinnon, along with a lookout, yell that the green team was coming down 16th Avenue on one occasion when Willis let his cousin, Ricky Hill, sell crack and Ricky got arrested. A taped telephone conversation on September 5, 1991 between McKinnon, Mathis, and an unidentified female shows that McKinnon at one point broke off and said, “Team ... team_ They fixin a come this way. They coming this way in a green ear_ Let me go.” Several minutes later, McKinnon told Mathis by phone, “The team got Rick.... Got him with a whole pack.” Several minutes afterward, she told Mathis that she thought Rick had been caught with money too, and that the green team was still there, and “filmed your boy and everything.” Willie Culver testified that he heard McKinnon use a walkie-talkie to warn others that police were approaching. He further testified to McKinnon’s association with an incident on July 27,1991, when all-girls crew member Bibery Ladson was selling crack and the police showed up. Arriving on the scene while the police were still there, McKinnon spoke with “boss man” Willie Abernathy and then made a call on her cellular phone. Mathis arrived twenty minutes later, and Culver heard Mathis yelling at Abernathy that Ladson was supposed to have run somewhere to hide the pack and not thrown it into the car she was using. Ladson also testified to this incident, and a recorded conversation between her and another Mathis associate the evening of July 27 indicated that McKinnon had spoken to Ladson at the scene and had told her that “they ... fixin to ... try to get you ... you better leave.” Culver also testified that on August 17, 1991, his girlfriend called Mathis for him to say he would not be in to work, and McKin-non took the message, as Mathis was not home. Culver’s girlfriend spoke with McKin-non against later that day; the taped conversation, which was introduced into evidence, revealed McKinnon saying that she “told [Mathis] what you said” and she thought “somebody ... replaced [Culver] for the whole night.” Maurice Wilson testified that sometimes when he called Mathis to say he would be late for his shift, he asked McKin-non to relay the message, which she agreed to do. He also stated that while he was an overseer, McKinnon paged him on his beeper sometimes to say that Mathis wanted him to come over to the house. McKinnon was a speaker in several additional taped telephone conversations introduced as evidence of the drug organization’s activities during the summer and fall of 1991. On August 26, the day after a 50-paek had been missing and no one had been paid, McKinnon said to her brother, the collector the previous night: “One came up missing .... But [Culver] trying, he trying make Romeo think he paid you. I told Romeo you ain’t get paid, ain’t nobody getting paid because the money was short.” On September 2, McKinnon told Mathis by phone that defendant Brazel needed him because - “they almost finished” — Brazel then got on the phone and said he was “out” of crack cocaine. On September 3, McKinnon told Mathis by phone that the green team was nearby and had taken a cellular phone, which it would not give back without the receipt; Mathis told McKinnon where to find the receipt so that she could retrieve the phone. A couple hours later, McKinnon called Ms. Johnnie-Mae, whose house was used for Mathis’s crack operations, and said, “Rome said turn your walkie talkie on_ ’Cause the team just went up 15th.” On September 25, McKinnon told Mathis by phone to “hurry up” and get home because the “Team rushed” and there was chaos. On October 4, McKinnon received a call from a person identified only as “Connie” who said, “The team kicked in the door ... [o]n Fairfield,” and they discussed who was there. The evidence also showed that around midnight on October 31,1991, McKinnon’s brother, Tucker, Tory Gamage, and defendant Hubbard went at Mathis’s request to McKin-non’s apartment to cut up crack cocaine. Tucker testified that they arrived at about 1:00 a.m., McKinnon answered the door in nightclothes, and when they came in- she went into the back bedroom with her infant and closéd the door. Tucker, Gamage, and Hubbard cut up crack cocaine with razor blades and bagged it in 50-packs. At about 6:00 a.m., there was a knock on the front door and McKinnon went to answer it. Tucker testified that she looked through the peephole, and without opening the door, said, “[0]h my god, the police are out there.” Tucker testified that he, Hubbard, and Gam-age then put the crack cocaine and razor blades into bags, climbed out the window of the second-floor apartment, and ran. Tucker further testified that McKinnon had not observed or participated in the drug activities. Police searched the apartment later that day and did not find narcotics. From the evidence as related above, we are satisfied that a reasonable jury could find that a conspiracy to distribute cocaine base existed and that McKinnon knowingly and voluntarily participated in it. The evidence shows more than McKinnon’s mere presence at the scene or her close association with Mathis without more. Her understanding of the illegal purposes of the Mathis organization could be reasonably inferred from her attendance at the meeting on December 24, 1990 at which Mathis discussed how operations would be run, and her statement, in support of his, that “we” will not be as “flashy, ... showing that we got lots of money” as another drug operation in the city had been. Her knowledge of the organization’s drug distribution objectives, and her knowing and voluntary participation in these, could reasonably be inferred from the substantial evidence showing that she performed various drug-related tasks for the organization at different times. At least two witnesses testified that she counted rocks of crack cocaine during Mathis’s drug operations on the north .and south side. A crack cocaine supplier and a shift worker both testified that McKinnon accepted plastic or paper bags of crack cocaine from them to pass on to Mathis. A taped telephone conversation revealed that she notified Mathis when a worker needed more crack to sell on his shift. At least three times when a worker had not shown up, she was seen counting drug proceeds delivered by workers whose shift ended at 8:00 a.m., and on those occasions she followed the organization’s practice of binding together $450 per 50-paek after taking out $50 for the workers. McKinnon acted, moreover, as a lookout occasionally in 1991, expressly warning others of the approach of the green team by shouting, using a walkie-talkie, or calling on a cellular phone. When police arrived on the scene — -whether it was the incident involving Bibery Ladson, Ricky Hill, or another time when a cellular phone Mathis had purchased had been taken by police — the evidence showed that she promptly contacted Mathis. Taped conversations strongly suggested that she knew the purposes of the organization, knew some of its daily activities, and willingly helped to achieve its goals of distributing cocaine base for profit while avoiding detection by law enforcement authorities. This record, from the jury’s perspective, plausibly showed more than mere presence during drug activities or close association with persons dealing in drugs. Cf. United States v. Villegas, 911 F.2d 623, 629-631 (11th Cir.1990) (reviewing mere presence/close association cases and reversing conviction where evidence only showed that defendant was coconspirator’s brother and was present near drug transactions), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 977, 111 S.Ct. 1625, 113 L.Ed.2d 722 (1991). b. Hubbard Hubbard argues that the government proved at best that he was an “errand boy” for Jefferson and McNealy and had a buyer/seller relationship with Mathis, but not that he was a knowing, voluntary participant in an overall conspiracy to distribute drugs. The evidence showed that Hubbard, along with McNealy and Jefferson, supplied crack cocaine to Mathis in 1991 and interacted with other Mathis associates several times during that period. Dwayne Green, an overseer for Mathis who was responsible for paying the suppliers, testified that in early 1991 Hubbard and McNealy came to the key shop on 14th Avenue to pick up 138 packs of $400 ($53,200). Green gave the money to McNealy, and then Hubbard and McNealy left the key shop accompanied by defendant Burgess, who was armed with a .357 and had been directed by Mathis to walk them to their car safely. Green farther testified that in the fall of 1991, Hubbard, McNealy, and Jefferson delivered 50-packs of crack cocaine to him about every three days to store in a safe in his garage for Mathis’s drug distribution operations. On three occasions, Hubbard delivered 90, 180, and 186 50-packs to Green and was unable to open the safe. Mathis contacted Green by beeper to return home to help, Qnd the first time Green entered by the garage door, Hubbard drew a gun on him before realizing who it was. The record also showed that Green purchased two guns (a 9- and a 45-milimeter) on September 1, 1991, gave them to Jefferson, and saw Jefferson give one to Hubbard and the other to McNealy. Willie Culver testified that he saw Hubbard and McNealy each carrying.a 9-millimeter Glock firearm when drugs were delivered or money was picked up. Willis Hill testified that he saw Hubbard with a gun (a “tech 9”) at Mathis’s house. Culver further testified that while he was working on 16th Avenue, he saw Hubbard bring a paper bag of crack cocaine to Mathis’s house five or six times. McNealy was with him twice, and one of those times, they delivered 15 50-paeks. Maurice Wilson similarly testified that he saw Hubbard deliver crack cocaine to Mathis’s house with either McNealy or Jefferson. Hill testified that he saw Hubbard deliver to Mathis’s house a brown bag which was about one-third full of 50-packs. Corbett Talbert testified that at Mathis’s instruction, he once met Hubbard down the street from Mathis’s house to receive a delivery from him, counted 100 50-packs, and brought it back to Mathis’s house. Culver additionally testified that he saw Hubbard pick up money from locations associated with the Mathis organization eight or nine times, and saw him do the same with McNealy and Jefferson on a few occasions. Culver was permitted to testify that Hubbard threatened him five days before he testified. Detective McConaughey, a case agent, testified that on October 17, 1991 when he was driving near Mathis’s house, he noticed and started following a white Baretta rental car which began speeding down 9th Street. He identified Hubbard as the driver when they were stopped at a traffic light and the driver turned from side to side. The detective lost the car when it drove through a construction site, but found it in someone’s yard a couple minutes later with the'driver’s door open and the keys in the ignition. The detective found a $450 money roll inside the car. An observer at the scene testified that he saw a black male with medium build and a flat top exit the driver’s side and run down 50th Avenue toward 4th or 6th Street holding a package under his arm like a football. A crime scene technician and fingerprint expert testified that one of the latent prints lifted that day off the ear, on the passenger’s side near the fender by the trunk, identified positively with known prints of Hubbard. On October 21, a receipt in Hubbard’s name for a cellular phone from Radio Shack was found in an abandoned car, registered in Gloria or Marlon McNealy’s name, on Preston Avenue South. On October 24, Hubbard, McNealy, and Jefferson were arrested following a search of 737 52nd Avenue South, where police found crack cocaine and some belongings of Hubbard. Dwayne Green testified that after the arrest, Mathis’s supply of crack cocaine was low, so Mathis paid Hubbard’s bond from drug proceeds and contacted a lawyer to represent him. Taped telephone conversations between Hubbard from jail and Mathis were introduced corroborating this testimony. Hubbard was released on October 31, and around midnight, went to cut up crack cocaine at McKinnon’s apartment with Tucker and Gamage, whom Mathis asked to assist him. Tucker testified that Hubbard took out razor blades and four or five cookies (whole pieces) of crack from a bag and showed him and Gamage how to cut it. The three cut and bagged 50-packs until about 6:00 a.m., when the police arrived and the three escaped with the drugs out the window. Detective McConaughey testified that around 6:15 a.m., he saw Hubbard walking in an area near McKinnon’s apartment. The jury heard a taped telephone conversation showing that Hubbard called Mathis at 6:48 a.m. on November 1 and said the police had come and he had hidden the drugs. The above evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the government, established much more than a simple buyer-seller relationship between Mathis and Hubbard. “Where the buyer’s purpose is merely to buy, and the seller’s purpose is merely to sell, and no prior or contemporaneous understanding exists between the two beyond the sales agreement, no conspiracy has been shown.” United States v. Beasley, 2 F.3d 1551, 1560 & n. 27 (11th Cir.1993) (citing United States v. Burroughs, 830 F.2d 1574, 1581 (11th Cir.1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 969, 108 S.Ct. 1243, 99 L.Ed.2d 442 (1988)), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 114 S.Ct. 2751, 129 L.Ed.2d 869 (1994). Here, the jury could reasonably infer from the evidence that Hubbard understood that the large amounts of crack cocaine he was supplying to Mathis were to be distributed by others in the organization, and knowingly and voluntarily participated in that venture. Several witnesses testified that Hubbard, alone or with McNealy and/or Jefferson, repeatedly delivered hundreds of 50-packs of crack cocaine to Mathis at his house, to a shift overseer at his house for storage in his safe, or to another Mathis associate to bring to Mathis. On some such occasions he was seen carrying a gun, and the evidence showed that an overseer for Mathis’s operations had purchased one that was then given to Hubbard. Hubbard picked up thousands of dollars in payment from Mathis and an overseer after the 50-packs had been sold on shifts, and on at least one occasion was accompanied to the car by one of Mathis’s armed guards. See id.; Burroughs, 830 F.2d at 1581 (evidence showed “continuing course of conduct ... designed to result in the distribution of heroin,” including fronting drugs to buyers and receiving payment after their distribution). Moreover, following Hubbard’s arrest on October 24, the evidence showed that Mathis was concerned that his organization’s drug supplies were running low and told Hubbard he would pay his bail and arrange for a lawyer to represent him. Hubbard was released from jail in the early evening of October 31, and several hours later left from Mathis’s house with two Mathis associates recruited by Mathis to help Hubbard cut up crack cocaine and bag 50-packs. The evidence plainly sustains the jury’s conviction of Hubbard for conspiracy. See Ivy, 83 F.3d at 1285-1286 (rejecting defendant’s buyer-seller defense and finding his activities interdependent with the larger conspiracy where they “facilitated the endeavors of other alleged conspirators or facilitated the venture as a whole[ ]”) (citation omitted). c. Burgess Burgess argues that the evidence was insufficient to show that he was part of the single conspiracy charged against him in the indictment, and that therefore, his convictions for conspiracy and for carrying a firearm during and in relation to the conspiracy must be reversed. The evidence presented against Burgess showed that he worked as a boss man and as an overseer on different shifts during the conspiracy period and also served as an armed guard to Mathis and others who worked with him. Mark Sheffield testified that beginning in late 1990, he and Burgess were among those who started selling crack cocaine for Mathis on 827 Preston Avenue South at 9th Street. Sheffield and Alvin Terry testified that in early 1991 Burgess worked at that location on the 5:00 p.m. shift. Terry testified that in March and April of 1991, Burgess worked with him on the 8:00 a.m. shift at 14th Avenue and Highland Street, and Culver and Pedro Reed testified that for a period Burgess worked the 5:00 p.m. shift at the same location. When Mathis set up a new drug distribution site at 1222 19th Avenue South in the late spring of 1991, Burgess worked the midnight shift there, according to Reed, Terry, and Culver, who worked the next shift and received any remaining 50-packs from Burgess. Verlenseia Dukes testified that Burgess worked as a boss man on the 5:00 p.m. shift at 15th and 16th Avenues. Taped telephone conversations were introduced to supplement witnesses’ testimony that Burgess sometimes was removed temporarily from a shift because he drank before it, in violation of Mathis’s rules. On July 10, 1991, Mathis told Maurice Wilson by phone to have Verlenseia Dukes work Burgess’s 5:00 p.m. shift and to tell Burgess when he came in “to come back and fill in at 12.” On July 15, Burgess asked Mathis by phone when he could come back to work,' and Mathis told him that people were complaining that he was acting crazy and he should get some help for his drinking problem. In two telephone conversations on July 25, one shift worker complained to two others that Mathis was probably going to give Burgess’s job on the shift to Dukes instead of to her. Several witnesses testified that Burgess carried a gun to protect Mathis or others supplying or working for him. Everol Palmer, who was a supplier for Mathis for a period, testified that one time when he picked up a money sack from the key shop, Burgess and Green escorted him out to his car. Green and Terry both testified that Burgess had a .357 gun on that occasion. Green testified that Burgess accompanied Hubbard and MeNealy to their car after they had picked up at the key shop more than $50,000 in payment for crack cocaine they had supplied. Green and Sheffield testified that the day after overseer Maurice Wilson was robbed by Mathis’s , brother, Mathis offered Burgess and another person $1,000 apiece to “take [his brother] all the way out” and handed Burgess a .357 gun. Burgess took the gun and left with the other person on a motorcycle, but later retoned to say that they had been unable to find Mathis’s brother. At times Burgess also was seen carrying a .357 gun in front of Mathis’s house late at night, according to Reed. Burgess asserts, without development, that the above evidence showed multiple conspiracies but that it did not show that he was a part of the single conspiracy charged in the indictment. We disagree. In determining whether the jury could have found a single conspiracy, we consider “(1) whether a common goal existed, (2) the nature of the scheme underlying the crimes charged, and (3) the overlap of participants.” United States v. Coy, 19 F.3d 629, 633 (11th Cir.) (citations omitted), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 115 S.Ct. 356, 130 L.Ed.2d 310, and — U.S. -, 115 S.Ct. 525, 130 L.Ed.2d 429 and — U.S. -, 115 S.Ct. 602, 130 L.Ed.2d 513 (1994). Clearly, a common or similar goal existed: distributing crack cocaine for profit while avoiding authorities. See United States v. Jones, 913 F.2d 1552, 1561 (11th Cir.1990). The nature of the distribution scheme was similar, in that three shifts of workers with assigned or functionally equivalent positions distributed crack cocaine delivered by suppliers to Mathis, and weapons were purchased and carried to protect Mathis and others in the operation. Lastly, there was an overlap of participants in the drug selling and supplying transactions. The evidence was sufficient for a reasonable jury to believe that a single conspiracy existed and Burgess knowingly and voluntarily participated in it. Burgess’s challenge to his firearm conviction rests solely on his claim that there was no single conspiracy. As that claim fails, and as a reasonable jury could find that he carried a firearm during and in relation to the conspiracy, we uphold that conviction as well. 2. RICO Conspiracy — MeNealy MeNealy was convicted of one count of conspiracy to distribute cocaine base, and three counts of distribution of more than 50 grams of cocaine base at undercover transactions on July 25, August 2, and August 15, 1991. The conduct charged in these four counts constituted predicate crimes for separate RICO substantive and conspiracy counts of which MeNealy was also convicted. Respecting thé RICO conspiracy, the indictment alleged that MeNealy agreed to participate in the Mathis enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activity in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d). McNealy now contends that the government’s failure to prove a relation between the Mathis enterprise and at least two of the four above-listed predicate racketeering acts was fatal to his RICO conspiracy conviction. He argues that none of the three acts of distribution on July 26, August 2, and August 15, 1991, respectively, were shown to have been more than isolated sales, unrelated to McNealy’s role as a major supplier to the Mathis organization. The district court instructed the jury that the focus of RICO conspiracy was an unlawful agreement. The jury was told that it must find first, that two or more persons in some way or manner came to a mutual understanding to try to accomplish a common and unlawful plan, namely, to engage in a pattern of racketeering activity as charged in the Indictment. And second, that the Defendant knowingly and willfully became a member of such conspiracy. And third, that at the time the Defendant knowingly and willfully agreed to join in such conspiracy, he did so with the specific intent either to personally participate in the commission of two predicate offenses as elsewhere defined in these instructions, or that he specifically intended to otherwise participate in the affairs of the enterprise with the knowledge and intent that other members of the conspiracy would commit two or more predicate offenses as a part of a pattern of racketeering activity. The' court’s instruction correctly permitted the jury to convict McNealy of RICO conspiracy if it found that he agreed to conduct or to participate in the affairs of the Mathis enterprise either by agreeing personally to commit at least two predicate acts for the required pattern of racketeering activity, or by agreeing to the overall objective and knowing that others were conspiring to participate in the same enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activity. See Starrett, 55 F.3d at 1544 (citations omitted); United States v. Valera, 845 F.2d 923, 929 (11th Cir.1988). MeNealy’s RICO conspiracy conviction must, therefore, be upheld if sufficient direct or circumstantial evidence showed that he agreed on the overall objective and “must necessarily have known that others were also conspiring to participate in the same enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activity.” Valera, 845 F.2d at 929 (citation omitted). Apart from McNealy’s three independent drug sales, the indictment charged the following predicate offenses as part of the RICO conspiracy: act 1: McNealy, Archer, and Jefferson conspired to distribute cocaine base from November 1988 through October 1991; act 7: Mathis knowingly possessed cocaine base with intent to distribute between July 1990 and March 1991; act 8: Archer knowingly possessed cocaine base with intent to distribute between July and December 1990; act 10: Archer knowingly possessed cocaine base with intent to distribute between August and November 1990; act 18: Mathis knowingly used a communication facility, a telephone, in facilitating a drug crime on or about July 2,1991; act 25: Mathis and others knowingly possessed cocaine base with intent to distribute on or about August 19,1991. “[T]he predicate crimes of other conspirators can also serve as predicate acts for [a defendant’s] RICO conviction.” United States v. Gonzalez, 921 F.2d 1580, 1546 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 860, 112 S.Ct. 178, 116 L.Ed.2d 140 and 502 U.S. 827, 112 S.Ct. 96, 116 L.Ed.2d 68 (1991). Accordingly, MeNea-l/s RICO conspiracy conviction “can properly rest on any predicate acts the evidence to which sufficiently indicates that [he] agreed.” Id. at 1546 n. 24. The evidence at trial clearly established that McNealy knew of act one, the conspiracy to distribute drugs, participated personally in it, and knew of other members of the enterprise (e.g., Jefferson) participating in the same. The evidence also gave rise to a reasonable inference that McNealy necessarily must have known of and agreed to the commission of act seven, Mathis’s knowing possession of cocaine base with intent to distribute between July 1990 and March 1991. Numerous witnesses testified that McNealy began supplying the Mathis organization around late 1990 or early 1991 on Preston Avenue South, and continued to supply large quantities of cocaine frequently to Mathis through October 1991. The evidence also showed that McNealy was paid by Mathis after the crack cocaine had been sold by shift workers, a fact that gives rise to a reasonable inference that McNealy knew Mathis intended to distribute the large quantities of crack cocaine that McNealy supplied. There is also evidence to suggest that McNealy may have been aware of other predicate offenses listed in the indictment, but it need not be evaluated, see Starrett, 55 F.3d at 1548, since we find ample evidence to support a jury finding that he agreed to the overall objective of the Mathis enterprise— profiting from the distribution of cocaine base while minimizing the risk of detection— and agreed to the commission of at least two predicate acts listed in the indictment. Accordingly, rejecting McNealy’s claim of insufficient proof of his involvement, we affirm McNealy’s conviction of RICO conspiracy- B. Jury Instructions McKinnon and McNealy challenge the district court’s refusal to give their requested instructions on the count charging a conspiracy to distribute cocaine base. For the denial of a requested jury instruction to be reversible error, a defendant must show that the instruction “(1) was a correct statement of the law; (2) was not adequately covered in the instructions given to the jury; (3) concerned an issue so substantive that its omission impaired the accused’s ability to present a defense; and (4) dealt with an issue properly before the jury.” Lyons, 53 F.3d at 1200. McKinnon argues that the district court erred in refusing to give the following instruction which she requested: “One may know of and assist (even intentionally) a substantive crime without joining a conspiracy to commit the crime.” McKinnon says she wanted the instruction because there was no direct evidence linking her to any agreement, and the instruction would have forced the jury to consider this issue carefully. However, the court’s instructions adequately covered McKinnon’s rights on this score. The existence of a conspiratorial agreement may be (and most often is) proven by circumstantial evidence; a jury could reasonably infer from the evidence here that an unlawful agreement existed and that McKinnon knowingly and willingly joined the unlawful scheme. To be sure, it was the jury’s responsibility to determine, on all the evidence, whether to draw that inference. The court emphasized that the elements of a conspiracy, which it correctly described, must be proven for each individual defendant beyond a reasonable doubt before she or he could be found guilty. The instructions given by the court cautioned that mere presence or association did not necessarily prove a conspiracy, and that “a person who has no knowledge of a conspiracy, but who happens to act in a way which advances some purpose of one, does not thereby become a conspirator.” The given instructions, therefore, would have required the jury to acquit McKinnon of the conspiracy charge if it found that an unlawful agreement was not proven or that she merely advanced a purpose of the conspiracy without knowledge of it. McNealy argues that the district court erred in refusing to give his requested instruction on the buyer-seller theory of defense to a drug conspiracy charge. However, in United States v. Lively, 803 F.2d 1124 (11th Cir.1986), we held that an instruction like the one given here was sufficient, stating that it “addressed the substance of the requested [buyer-seller] instruction: without a showing of knowledge, a single, isolated act by a defendant does not by itself constitute participation in a conspiracy.” Id. at 1129. We add that the evidence against McNealy on the count charging a conspiracy to distribute cocaine base plainly showed much more than a buyer-seller relationship. Cf. Beasley, 2 F.3d at 1561 (failure to instruct jury on buyer-seller relationship theory was not plain error where evidence established a continuing course of conduct designed to result in the distribution of cocaine). Hubbard argues for the first time on appeal that the district court erred in not instructing the jury on a lesser-included offense to conspiracy to distribute cocaine base. In light of his failure to request such an instruction below or to object timely to the jury charge given, we review his claim for plain error only. As Hubbard still does not identify what lesser-included offense instruction would have been appropriate or desirable, we find no error, let alone plain error, in the instructions given. C. Statements of Nontestifying Codefend-ant McNealy argues pursuant to Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 88 S.Ct. 1620, 20 L.Ed.2d 476 (1968), that his Sixth Amendment right to confrontation was violated when Larry Thomas, who was being held in custody in the same prison wing as defendant Jefferson, was allowed to testify about statements Jefferson made to him that also inculpated McNealy. In Bruton,' the Supreme Court held that the admission of statements by a nontestifying codefendant that inculpated another defendant in a joint trial violated the defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to confrontation. Even where the jury was instructed to consider the statements only against the nontestifying eode-fendant, a substantial risk remained that the jury looked to the extrajudicial incriminating statements to determine the other defendant’s guilt. See id. at 126, 88 S.Ct. at 1622-23. No Bruton problem exists, however, where the statement “was not incriminating on its face, and became so only when linked with evidence introduced later at trial.” Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200, 208, 107 S.Ct. 1702, 1707, 95 L.Ed.2d 176 (1987); United States v. Arias, 984 F.2d 1139, 1142 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 508 U.S. 979, 113 S.Ct. 2979, 125 L.Ed.2d 676 and 509 U.S. 932, 113 S.Ct. 3062, 125 L.Ed.2d 744 (1993). Thus, “[f]or Bruton to apply, a eodefendant’s statement must be clearly inculpatory standing alone.” Arias, 984 F.2d at 1142 (citation omitted). McNealy challenges two aspects of Thomas’s testimony. First, Thomas testified that Jefferson told him “he [Jefferson] was getting rid of five birds a week with Romeo Mathis.” Thomas understood from experience that “birds” meant “[k]ilos of cocaine.” Contrary to McNealy’s contention, nothing in this statement or the few statements that followed on the same subject, standing alone, directly inculpated him. See Arias, 984 F.2d at 1142-1143. The statement referred solely to Jefferson in connection with the Mathis operation. Moreover, the district court instructed the jury that this part of Thomas’s testimony was to be considered solely against Jefferson. See Marsh, 481 U.S. at 210, 107 S.Ct. at 1708-09 (no Bruton problem where codefendant’s confession was redacted to omit any reference to defendant and limiting instruction was given). We hold that the admission of this statement did not violate McNealy’s Sixth Amendment right to confrontation. The second statement presents a more troublesome question. Thomas testified that Jefferson said that “he [Jefferson] met a couple guys at a Burger King and made a deal with them for some drugs and the guys turned out to be police detectives,” and that Jefferson said McNealy was with him at the deal. The event referenced was an undercover drug transaction on August 15, 1991, in which a confidential informant and FBI special agent arranged to meet McNealy at a local Burger King to purchase crack cocaine for $1,950. Jefferson did not testify at trial, and his alleged statement testified to by Thomas directly linked McNealy to the drug deal on August 15. MeNeafys name was not redacted from the statement, nor was an instruction given directing the jury to consider the statement solely against Jefferson. The government concedes that this inculpatory statement creates a Bruton problem, violating MeNeafys rights under the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment. See United States v. Perez-Garcia, 904 F.2d 1534, 1542-43 (11th Cir.1990) (holding that “the potentially incul-patory inference combined with the lack of a cautionary instruction constituted a violation of appellants’ rights under Bruton and the confrontation clause,” though the violation did not rise to the level of plain error). McNealy did not, however, object at trial to the admission of Thomas’s testimony nor did he ask the court to give a cautionary instruction. We, therefore, review the Confrontation Clause violation for plain error only. Plain error exists “when an error is so obvious that failure to notice it would result in a miscarriage of justice.” Id. McNealy argues that the admission of Jefferson’s statement directly linking him to the August 15th drug transaction substantially influenced the outcome of the trial. Viewing this statement in light of all the evidence presented at trial, however, id. at 1543, we think it added little if anything more to the government’s case. The jury heard testimony about the August 15th transaction from the confidential informant and FBI special agent who conducted it undercover, and both iden-tilled McNealy as the one through whom all arrangements were made and carried out. The jury saw a videotape of this and other similarly conducted undercover drug transactions with McNealy. Because there was abundant properly admitted evidence linking McNealy to the drug transaction on August 15, we do not find plain error in the- court’s admission of the testimony about Jefferson’s statement nor in the court’s failure, unrequested, to instruct the jury to consider the statement only against Jefferson. See id. at 1543; cf. United States v. Veltmann, 6 F.3d 1483, 1501 (11th Cir.1993) (Bruton violation was harmful error where, after the admission of certain evidence was reversed, “the properly admitted evidence of guilt is less than overwhelming, and the prejudicial effect of the codefendant’s statements is so significant in comparison”); United States v. Hemelryck, 945 F.2d 1493, 1502-03 (11th Cir.1991) (where admission of nontestifying defendant’s statement was error, and government directly linked statement to defendant in its rebuttal closing, error was harmless in light of substantial independent evidence establishing defendant’s role in cocaine transaction). D. Dismissal of Two Counts Without Jefferson’s Consent Jefferson contends that he was deprived of his right to a fair trial when the prosecution successfully moved, two days before the end of its ease-in-chief, to dismiss counts two (RICO) and thirty-one (distribution of cocaine base) against him without his consent. The prosecution made the motion after it says it acquired a reasonable doubt about the validity of its charges against Jefferson that he took part in a drug deal at a Burger King on August 15, 1991. Jefferson argues, as he did in the district court, that the dismissal of the two counts without his consent violated Fed.R.Crim.P. 48(a) and caused prejudice to him by impairing his ability to impeach the credibility of one witness, Thomas, who testified to his participation in that incident and the remaining crimes — RICO conspiracy and conspiracy to distribute cocaine base — of which he was found guilty. Moreover, since that witness cooperated with the government, Jefferson wished to use a more forceful impeachment of him to cast doubt on the veracity of all cooperating witnesses who testified against him on the remaining charges. This prejudice was compounded, he says, by the district court’s refusal adequately to explain to the jury the reason for the sudden dismissal of counts two and thirty-one. 1. Dismissal of Counts Two and Thirty-One Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 48(a) requires the United States Attorney to obtain leave of court and the defendant’s consent before filing a dismissal of an indictment during a trial. It is undisputed that the court, on motion of the prosecution, ordered the dismissal of the two counts during trial and without Jefferson’s consent. Jefferson contends that the court’s action violated Rule 48(a) and severely prejudiced him, warranting a reversal of his convictions under the remaining counts. We find, however, insufficient prejudice to warrant reversing or vacating Jefferson’s convictions. Conversations between the district court and counsel appearing in the record show that the court viewed its dismissal of these two counts as likely to be covered by Fed.R.Crim.P. 29(a), despite the requirements of Rule 48(a). Rule 29(a) authorizes a district court to grant a judgment of acquittal on its own motion or upon a defendant’s request “after the evidence on either side is closed if the evidence is insufficient to sustain a conviction of such offense or offenses.” Before approving the dismissal, the court asked Jefferson’s counsel whether he intended to move for a judgment of acquittal on all counts pursuant to Rule 29 at the conclusion of the government’s case if the asked-for dismissal of the two counts were to be denied. Jefferson’s counsel replied, “I’m sure I will,” but pointed out that the court would have the problem “of having to, as a matter of law, judge the credibility of three eyewitnesses to the incident.” In other words, Jefferson’s counsel questioned whether the court could allow his motion for judgment of acquittal on the two counts, since, no matter how untrustworthy the government’s witnesses, they had testified to Jefferson’s involvement in the matters charged in those counts, raising jury issues of fact and credibility beyond the court’s power to resolve as a matter of law on a Rule 29 motion for judgment of acquittal. See United States v. Brown, 587 F.2d 187, 190 (5th Cir.1979) (citations omitted). At this point, government counsel spoke up, insisting that in fact the court would be able to allow the Rule 29 motion since, as the prosecution now entertained a reasonable doubt as to the charges relating to the Burger King incident, it would move to strike its evidence against Jefferson under counts two and thirty-one. Once the government did this, with the court’s approval, there would exist no evidence to support the two counts, and the court would be obliged to allow Jefferson’s Rule 29 motion and to dismiss both counts. Indeed, the court might do this upon its own motion sua sponte if Jefferson, contrary to counsel’s representations, failed to make a Rule 29 motion. Following this colloquy and an opportunity for defense counsel to confer with each other and to voice their concerns, the district court allowed the dismissal of the two counts against Jefferson. It explained: The Court believes that, based upon the good-faith representation of the Government and in the interest of justice, they have, in essence, said that the Government believes that there exists a reasonable doubt regarding the charges contained in count thirty-one of the superseding Indictment, and count two of the superseding Indictment, as well as racketeering act twenty-four involving the Defendant Willie Jefferson. If a Rule 29 motion were to be made by the Defendant or, ... if the Government were to move to dismiss at the conclusion of the Government’s case in chief, or in view of this motion to strike having been made by the Government, the Court on its own motion determined that the interest of justice required the dismissal of counts two and thirty-four [sic] and racketeering act twenty-four as it relates to Willie Jefferson, it would be the Court’s obligation to do so and to take those matters away from the Jury’s consideration. I believe the Court has an obligation to do that. The timing of it should be at the first moment, I believe, that the Court becomes aware of it or that the Court is asked to make a determination relative to it. That moment has arisen with the Government’s motion to strike, which this Court grants_ Further, this Court believes that an appropriate instruction should be given to the Jury relative to the matters that flow therefrom. We need not decide whether, strictly speaking, the district court’s reliance on Rule 29(a) was appropriate in dismissing the two charges when it did. Certainly, its action at the time was not in accordance with the plain language of either Rule 48(a) or Rule 29(a). It should better have waited until the close of the government’s evidence to let events develop. Nevertheless, the effect of its prematurity upon Jefferson’s defense strategy was nil, since the government’s motion to strike the evidence of its witnesses against Jefferson could and certainly would have been allowed and dismissal under Rule 29(a) at the end of the prosecution’s case two days later, then properly allowed by the court, either upon Jefferson’s motion or sua sponte. This is not a case where the court entered a Rule 29 judgment of acquittal based on some improper ground such as the “interests of justice.” See United States v. Varkonyi, 611 F.2d 84, 86 (5th Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 945, 100 S.Ct. 2173, 64 L.Ed.2d 801 (1980); Brown, 587 F.2d at 190-91 (trial judge lacks authority to enter a judgment of acquittal “simply because he thinks that course would be most consonant with the interests of justice[]”) (citation omitted). Rather, the court correctly determined that, upon its allowance of the government’s striking of all evidence against Jefferson on the two counts, there would be no evidence left in support of them. We are unwilling in these circumstances to construe Rule 48(a) as broadly preventing the government from paving the way for a Rule 29(a) dismissal by withdrawing in good faith unreliable evidence against a defendant with the court’s consent. The situation might be different were a defendant unequivocally to insist on his right to secure the jury’s verdict on the questionable charges, see Fed.R.Crim.P. 48(a), advisory committee note 4. Here, however, Jefferson inconsistently indicated his own intention to move under Rule 29 at the close of the government’s case-in-chief. Looking, moreover, at the probable effect of Jefferson’s strategy, we see little likelihood that it would have resulted in Jefferson’s acquittal of the remaining RICO conspiracy and drug conspiracy counts. Jefferson was able, after dismissal of the two counts in question, to argue— as he did in counsel’s closing argument— that the only reasonable inference from dismissal of the two counts was that “Mr. Jefferson clearly and undeniably was misidentified” as being involved in those two dismissed crimes. Counsel developed support for this argument from a codefend-ant’s cross-examination of Detective MeCo-naughey, the SPPD case agent, who flatly admitted that he had misidentified Jefferson on August 15th in relation to the drug deal at a Burger King, and that Charles Scott, Detective Tapia, FBI Special Agent Bryant, and Larry Thomas had testified to the same incident (i.e., by inference, had also misidentified Jefferson). Furthermore, Jefferson’s guilt of the RICO conspir