United States v. Stanfield (109 F.3d 976, 1997)

Affirmed by published opinion. Judge LUTTIG wrote the opinion, in which Judges HAMILTON and WILLIAMS joined.

OPINION

LUTTIG, Circuit Judge:

Law enforcement officials literally risk their lives each time they approach occupied vehicles during the course of investigative traffic stops. As the Supreme Court has repeatedly observed, “a significant percentage of murders of police officers occurs when officers are making traffic stops.” United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 234 n. 5, 94 S.Ct. 467, 476 n. 5, 38 L.Ed.2d 427 (1973). In recognition of the extraordinary dangers to which officers are exposed during such encounters, the Court has consistently accorded officers wide latitude to protect their safety, authorizing them, inter alia, to routinely order both drivers and passengers to exit their vehicles during such stops and to conduct the equivalent of “frisks” of automobile interiors whenever they reasonably believe their safety might be in jeopardy.

The advent of tinted automobile windows, however, has threatened to bring to naught these essential law enforcement protections. Confronted with the grave risk that tinted windows pose to the safety of law enforcement personnel, we address herein whether the government’s substantial interest in officer safety during a lawful traffic stop outweighs the intrusion on the privacy interests of the vehicle’s occupants which results when, because of heavily tinted windows that prevent the interior compartment from being viewed, an officer opens a door of the vehicle in order to ensure that the vehicle’s driver is unarmed and that there are no other occupants who might threaten his safety during the investigatory stop. We conclude that, perhaps generally, but at least under the circumstances of this case, the substantial government interest in officer safety which exists when law enforcement officers must approach vehicles with heavily tinted windows far outweighs any minimal privacy interest the suspect retains in the otherwise visible interior compartment of his vehicle.

I.

At approximately 9:00 a.m. on the morning of April 29, 1996, three officers from the Baltimore City Police Department — Officers Mackel, Buie and Hamel — were patrolling a high crime area in West Baltimore known for its open narcotics trafficking when they saw a late model, black Nissan Pathfinder with heavily tinted windows illegally parked in the middle of the street, effectively blocking traffic. See Md. Transportation Code Ann. §§ 21-1003(r), 27-101(a) & (b) (Michie 1996). The officers, who were armed and wearing bullet-proof vests over their uniforms because of the dangerousness of their assignment, see United States v. Stanfield, 906 F.Supp. 300, 301 (D.Md.1995), circled the block and, when the driver of the Pathfinder made no effort to move his vehicle to allow a free flow of traffic, parked their unmarked vehicle in front of the Pathfinder. Upon exiting their cruiser, the officers noticed that the Pathfinder’s driver, appellant Billy Howard Stanfield, was talking to a man leaning from a second story window, whom the officers recognized as William Staten, a known drug dealer. See id.-, J.A. at 151-52 (testimony of Officer Mackel); see also J.A. at 19 (Government’s Memorandum of Law in Response to Defendant’s Motion to Suppress Evidence).

The officers approached Stanfield’s Pathfinder from both the driver and passenger sides, and, as they did so, they noticed that the front driver’s side window was down, but that the front passenger side window was raised. See Stanfield, 906 F.Supp. at 301, 303. The tinting on the Pathfinder’s windows was so dark that Officer Mackel, who was approaching on the passenger’s side, could not see into the vehicle. See id. at 302, 303. Nor could Officers Buie and Hamel see much of the vehicle’s interior during their approach from the driver’s side. As a consequence of the officers’ inability to see inside the vehicle as they approached, Officer Mackel opened the front passenger side door of Stanfield’s vehicle in order to determine whether Stanfield was armed or had access to weapons and whether he was alone in the Pathfinder. When Officer Maekel opened the passenger door, he saw in plain view, from his vantage point entirely outside the vehicle, see id., a clear plastic bag of cocaine protruding from the mouth of a brown paper bag which was overturned on the back seat of the Pathfinder. See id. & n. 6. The officers arrested Stanfield, searched the Pathfinder, and discovered a nine-millimeter semi-automatic handgun, numerous empty vials, two contact pagers, and over 200 grams of cocaine. See id. at 302. Stanfield was subsequently charged with possession with intent to distribute cocaine and possession with intent to distribute cocaine base in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1).

Prior to trial, Stanfield moved to suppress the cocaine seized from the back seat of his Pathfinder, contending that the search affected by Officer Mackel’s opening of the front passenger door was unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment and, therefore, that the cocaine discovered as a consequence of that search must be suppressed. Following an evidentiary hearing, the district court denied the motion, upholding the search on two independent grounds. First, citing Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 740, 103 S.Ct. 1535, 1542, 75 L.Ed.2d 502 (1983), the district court held that Officer Mackel’s opening of the passenger side door was permissible because Stanfield did not have a legitimate expectation of privacy in the interior of his car. See Stanfield, 906 F.Supp. at 304 n. 9. Second, the district court held that, under Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 103 S.Ct. 3469, 77 L.Ed.2d 1201 (1983), “Officer Maekel was Constitutionally permitted to open the door to determine whether there were other[ ] [occupants in the vehicle] and if any weapons were within Stanfield’s immediate reach,” determinations which the district court found were otherwise virtually impossible because of the heavy window tinting. Stanfield, 906 F.Supp. at 304; see also id. at 303-04 & n. 11 (“[B]ecause Officer Maekel was unable to see through the heavily tinted windows of the Pathfinder, he had an objectively reasonable belief that Stanfiéld (or a hidden passenger) was potentially dangerous.”).

Following the district court’s denial of Stanfield’s suppression motion, Stanfield pled guilty to one count of possession, reserving the right to appeal the district court’s suppression ruling that is now before us. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.

II.

“[T]he ‘touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is reasonableness.’ ” Ohio v. Robinette, — U.S. -, -, 117 S.Ct. 417, 421, 136 L.Ed.2d 347 (1996) (quoting Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 250, 111 S.Ct. 1801, 1803, 114 L.Ed.2d 297 (1991)). And, as the Court explained in Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 98 S.Ct. 330, 54 L.Ed.2d 331 (1977), reasonableness “depends ‘on a balance between the public interest and the individual’s right to personal security free from arbitrary interference by law officers.’ ” Id. at 109, 98 S.Ct. at 332 (quoting United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 878, 95 S.Ct. 2574, 2579, 45 L.Ed.2d 607 (1975)). Under this balancing test, the Supreme Court has consistently approved of protective searches of persons, vehicles, and even homes, during routine and other lawful investigatory detentions, in recognition of the paramount interest in officer safety and the extraordinary risks to which law enforcement officials are exposed during such detentions.

Thus, for example, in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968), the Court sanctioned the now-familiar “pat-down” search, or “frisk,” because of the “immediacy” of the government’s interest in officer safety, notwithstanding its conclusion that “[e]ven a limited search of the outer clothing for weapons constitutes a severe ... intrusion upon cherished personal security,” id. at 24-25, 88 S.Ct. at 1881-82. If an officer possesses a reasonable belief based on “specific and articulable facts” that the suspect is potentially dangerous, id. at 21, 88 S.Ct. at 1880, reasoned the Court, then the officer is justified in undertaking the “limited steps” necessary to “protect himself and others from possible danger.” Id. at 28, 88 S.Ct. at 1883.

Fifteen years later, in Long, the Court authorized what are essentially “frisks” of automobile interiors during traffic stops, see Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325, 332, 110 S.Ct. 1093, 1097, 108 L.Ed.2d 276 (1990), holding that such protective searches are “justified by the principles ... established in Terry.” Long, 463 U.S. at 1046, 103 S.Ct. at 3479. Recognizing that all “investigative detentions involving suspects in vehicles are especially fraught with danger to police officers,” id. at 1047, 103 S.Ct. at 3480, and accepting without discussion that an area search of a vehicle is less intrusive than the frisk of the person, the Court concluded that “the balancing required by Terry clearly weighs in favor of allowing the police to conduct an area search of the passenger compartment to uncover weapons, as long as they possess [a] reasonable belief that the suspect is potentially dangerous.” Id. at 1051, 103 S.Ct. at 3482.

In Mimms and Maryland v. Wilson, — U.S. -, 117 S.Ct. 882, 137 L.Ed.2d 41 (1997); the Court even adopted bright-line rules that officers may, as a matter of course, order both drivers and passengers from vehicles during routine traffic stops in order to ensure that such stops are completed without incident.

The Court in Mimms held that the “inordinate risk” that exists every time “an officer ... approaches a person seated in an automobile,” 434 U.S. at 110, 98 S.Ct. at 333, justifies a per se rule that drivers may be ordered out of their vehicles during lawful traffic stops, whether or not there exists any particular reason under the circumstances to believe that officer safety might be in jeopardy. In contrast to the substantial state interest in safety at stake when officers must approach a stopped vehicle, the Court characterized the additional intrusion on personal liberty occasioned by requiring drivers to exit their vehicles and to move off onto the shoulder of the road as “de minimis,” “at most a mere inconvenience,” id. at 111, 98 S.Ct. at 333, and “hardly ris[ing] to the level of a ‘petty indignity,’ ” id. (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 17, 88 S.Ct. at 1877), reasoning that “[t]he driver is being asked to expose to view very little more ... than is already exposed” when the driver is seated in his automobile. Id.

Finally, repeating its oft-repeated observation that the government has a “legitimate” and “weighty” interest in officer safety, the Court in Wilson recently expanded the Mimms per se rule to allow officers to order not only drivers, but all occupants, to exit vehicles and move off onto the shoulder of the road during routine traffic stops. See — U.S. at -, 117 S.Ct. at 885. WMle acknowledging that the passengers’ liberty interests implicated by orders to exit vehicles might be stronger than those of the drivers, the Court nonetheless readily concluded that these interests likewise are “minimal” and necessarily must yield to the state’s interest in officer safety, finding persuasive Maryland’s common-sense argument that every occupant in a vehicle “increases the possible sources of harm to the officer.” Id.

A.

1.

Notwithstanding that the Court “generally eschew[s] bright-line rules in the Fourth Amendment context,” id. at-n. 1, 117 S.Ct. at 885 n. 1; see also Robinette, — U.S. at -, 117 S.Ct. at 421, we believe that the Court’s decisions in Mimms and Wilson in particular would support a holding that whenever, during a lawful traffic stop, officers are required to approach a vehicle with windows so heavily tinted that they are unable to view the interior of the stopped vehicle, they may, when it appears in their experienced judgment prudent to do so, open at least one of the vehicle’s doors and, without crossing the plane of the vehicle, visually inspect its interior in order to ascertain whether the driver is armed, whether he has access to weapons, or whether there are other occupants of the vehicle who might pose a danger to the officers. Indeed, it seems to us that a contrary holding would not only be irreconcilable with, but arguably undermine altogether, the easelaw from the Supreme Court that was developed specifically for the purpose of protecting officer safety during what are, in today’s society, frighteningly perilous encounters.

Even where the interiors of vehicles are fully visible, “roadside encounters between police and suspects are especially hazardous,” Long, 463 U.S. at 1049, 103 S.Ct. at 3481, with as many as “30% of police shootings occur[ing] when a police officer approached] a suspect seated in an automobile,” Mimms, 434 U.S. at 110, 98 S.Ct. at 333; see also Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 148 n. 3, 92 S.Ct. 1921, 1924 n. 3, 32 L.Ed.2d 612 (1972). In fact, as the Court noted recently in Wilson, in 1994 alone, 5,762 assaults on police officers occurred during the course of traffic pursuits or stops. See Wilson, — U.S. at -, 117 S.Ct. at 885 (citation omitted). Thus, “it [is]’too plain for argument’ ” that the governmental interest in officer safety during traffic stops is substantial. Id. at -, 117 S.Ct. at 885 (quoting Mimms, 434 U.S at 110, 98 S.Ct. at 333).

When, during already dangerous traffic stops, officers must approach vehicles whose occupants and interiors are blocked from view by tinted windows, the potential harm to which the officers are exposed increases exponentially, to the point, we believe, of unconscionability. Indeed, we can conceive of almost nothing more dangerous to a law enforcement officer in the context of a traffic stop than approaching an automobile whose passenger compartment is entirely hidden from the officer’s view by darkly tinted windows. As the officer exits his cruiser and proceeds toward the tinted-windowed vehicle, he has no way of knowing whether the vehicle’s driver is fumbling for his driver’s license or reaching for a gun; he does not know whether he is about to encounter a single law-abiding citizen or to be ambushed by a car-full of armed assailants. He literally does not even know whether a weapon has been trained on him from the moment the stop was initiated. As one officer put the obvious; “If the suspect has a weapon, I might not see it until he rolls down the window. He may just shoot me through the window.” If, as the Court has noted, officers face an “inordinate risk” every time they approach even a vehicle whose interior and passengers are fully visible to the officers, Mimms, 434 U.S. at 110, 98 S.Ct. at 333, the risk these officers face when they approach a vehicle with heavily tinted windows is, quite simply, intolerable. In fact, it is out of recognition of just such danger that at least twenty-eight states, including Maryland, have now enacted laws either regulating or altogether prohibiting the use of tinted windows on vehicles in their states.

In contrast to the indisputably substantial government interest in protecting its law enforcement officials from the danger that inheres in the lawful stop of a vehicle with heavily tinted windows, the privacy and liberty interests implicated by the opening of such a vehicle’s door for the limited purpose of determining whether the vehicle is occupied by one or several persons and whether the vehicle’s occupants are armed or have access to weapons, are, although not unimportant, comparatively minor, and will always be so.

It is axiomatic, of course, that “[o]ne has a lesser expectation of privacy in a motor vehicle,” in part because “its function is transportation and it seldom serves as one’s residence or as the repository of personal effects.” United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 12, 97 S.Ct. 2476, 2484, 53 L.Ed.2d 538 (1977) (quoting Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583, 590, 94 S.Ct. 2464, 2469, 41 L.Ed.2d 325 (1974) (plurality opinion)). Because of this, and the fact that vehicular travel is, of necessity, highly regulated, individuals traveling in vehicles “must expect that the State, in enforcing its regulations, will intrude to some extent” on their privacy. New York v. Class, 475 U.S. 106, 113, 106 S.Ct. 960, 965, 89 L.Ed.2d 81 (1986).

But, apart from the fact that there is a considerably reduced privacy interest in a vehicle’s interior passenger compartment as a matter of law, the driver and other occupants of a lawfully stopped vehicle have already had their liberty curtailed. Moreover, because the driver must comply with routine requests for identification and registration, he will be required at some point during the brief detention to expose the interior compartment of his vehicle to view through at least one window, if for no other reason than to interact with the officer. Of course, when the driver lowers the window, then much if not all of the car’s interior will be visible to the officer. The additional interference with the occupants’ privacy interests affected by the opening of one of the vehicle’s doors would seem minimal when measured against the enormous danger law enforcement officers face when they approach a vehicle with heavily tinted windows. Such an intrusion would seem considerably less than the intrusions affected by ordering the driver and passengers to exit the vehicle and to proceed to the shoulder of the road, which were held in Mimms and Wilson, respectively, to be “de minimis” in comparison to the states’ interests in protecting their law enforcement personnel under circumstances far less inherently dangerous than those existing when the stopped vehicle has heavily tinted -windows. Not only does the person subjected to the limited search entailed in the opening of the vehicle door not have his entire body exposed to the view of the officers and public, he also retains his liberty interest in remaining seated in his automobile during the duration of the detention. Indeed, the actual invasion of privacy entailed in an officer’s opening of the vehicle door is indistinguishable from, if not precisely the same as, that which occurs when an occupant is required to open a door to exit a vehicle pursuant to an order given under the authority of Mimms or Wilson.

2.

Even if there were reasonable alternatives to allowing officers to open the door of a vehicle with heavily tinted windows in order to ascertain whether the driver is armed and whether there are other occupants in the vehicle, we would hesitate to impose them on the law enforcement community as a matter of constitutional law. As the Supreme Court has been at pains to observe, during Terry-type stops, officers “must make ... ‘quick decisions] as to how to protect [themselves] and others from possible danger’ ” at times when they are “particularly vulnerable,” and thus it has “not required that officers adopt alternate means to ensure their safety in order to avoid the intrusion involved in [such an] encounter.” Long, 463 U.S. at 1052, 103 S.Ct. at 3482 (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 28, 88 S.Ct. at 1883); see also id. at 1052 n. 16, 103 S.Ct. at 3482 n. 16. That is, the Court has scrupulously avoided substituting its judgment for that of law enforcement as to how best to ensure officer safety.

With that said, however, we are at a loss to identify an acceptable alternative to a rule such as that we suggest would be justified. Upon a moment’s reflection, it becomes apparent that neither requiring officers (while in their cruisers or as they proceed toward the stopped vehicle) instead to order occupants to exit the vehicle nor requiring that they order that all of the vehicle’s doors be opened, represents an acceptable, or even a reasonable, alternative. To require officers to order the vehicle’s occupants to exit as the officers approach the stopped vehicle exposes the officers to the very danger to which we believe it is unconscionable to subject them, namely, that they might be fired upon as they approach the vehicle. As the Court observed in Terry, it is by definition “unreasonable to require that police officers take unnecessary risks in the performance of their duties.” 392 U.S. at 23, 88 S.Ct. at 1881. On the other hand, to insist that officers remain in their vehicles and order the occupants out ignores the fact that, with heavily tinted windows, the officers could never know whether all of the vehicle’s occupants had exited; and, eventually, the officers would still be required under this alternative to approach a vehicle which, insofar as the officers could know, still held passengers who might be armed and dangerous. Ordering that the vehicle’s doors be opened, of course, allows the vehicle’s occupants legitimately to move about the vehicle in ways that would enable them to access available weapons, which represents a separate danger unto itself.

Therefore, in the end, we believe, it will be impractical, if not impossible, for law enforcement officers to neutralize the dangers to which they are exposed by virtue of heavily tinted windows. There simply do not appear to be any alternatives to the bright-line rule we suggest, which would infringe less on the residual privacy interests that drivers and passengers retain in the interior compartment of a lawfully stopped vehicle, yet still allow law enforcement officers to take that control of the situation that enables them to minimize the risk of harm to themselves and to the vehicle’s occupants. Cf. Wilson, — U.S. at -, 117 S.Ct. at 886 (“The risk of harm to both the police and the occupants is minimized if the officers routinely exercise unquestioned command of the situation.”) (quoting Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 703, 101 S.Ct. 2587, 2594, 69 L.Ed.2d 340 (1981)). A bright-line rule that officers could always pursue the course of opening the door of a tinted-windowed vehicle when, in their informed judgment, such an act appears necessary to protect their safety, would not render the stops of such vehicles risk-free, but it would at least reduce to an extent the enormous danger to which law enforcement authorities are exposed as a consequence of the advent of tinted windows.

B.

Even absent a Mimms Wilson-type per se rule that officers may, in the circum- ' stances we have described, open a vehicle’s door to deter mine the number of occupants within and whether any of those occupants are armed or have access to weapons, however, Officer Mackel’s opening of Stanfield’s passenger door was fully authorized under the principles, if not by the direct holdings, of Terry, Long and Buie. Officer Mackel’s belief that he was potentially in danger as he approached Stanfield’s Pathfinder was imminently reasonable; it would be folly to suggest otherwise. Under Terry, Long and Buie, therefore, it is clear that Officer Mackel could have conducted a protective search of the entire interior compartment of Stan-field’s vehicle to ensure his safety and that of his partners. It follows a fortiori that Officer Maekel’s much more limited search of merely opening the Pathfinder’s door was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.

As our previous discussion suggests, we are convinced that the presence of windows so tinted that the vehicle’s interior compartment is not .visible is, in itself, a circumstance that would cause an officer reasonably to believe that his safety might be in danger— as the district court held. When the fact of the tinted windows on Stanfield’s Pathfinder is considered together with the other circumstances informing Officer Mackel’s judgment as he approached Stanfield’s vehicle on the morning of April 29, 1996, we are satisfied that no reasonable officer would have failed to appreciate the potential danger confronting Officer Mackel and his partners.

First, Stanfield was, at the time of the stop, in violation of the state’s traffic laws, having parked his Pathfinder in the middle of a two-way street, which was not passable by two ears simultaneously. See Stanfield, 906 F.Supp. at 301. Second, Stanfield’s vehicle was stopped in the early morning in a relatively deserted area of town. See id.; J.A. at 128. Third, Stanfield’s vehicle was stopped in an area of Baltimore known for its open narcotics trafficking and high crime rate. See Stanfield, 906 F.Supp. at 301; J.A. at 53. As we have often noted, where there are drugs, there are almost always guns. And, as the Supreme Court has recognized, in a high crime area, “the possibility that any given individual is armed is significant.” Buie, 494 U.S. at 334 n. 2, 110 S.Ct. at 1098 n. 2. Fourth, Stanfield was driving a vehicle which, according to the officers’ testimony and the district court’s factual finding, “is of the class of four wheel drive vehicles favored by drug dealers,” and is also “the preferred target of car thieves.” Stanfield, 906 F.Supp. at 301 & n. 3; J.A. at 163-64. Fifth, as the district court found, the officers did not know and could not determine, because of the tinting on the windows, “whether Stan-field was alone or whether any weapon was within arms reach of the defendant.” See Stanfield, 906 F.Supp. at 303. And, sixth, as the district court found, Stanfield had been seen by the officers conversing with William Staten, a known drug dealer, immediately prior to his encounter with Officers Mackel, Buie and Hamel. Id. at 301, 304 n. 10; J.A. at 151-52, 237 (testimony of Officer Mackel); J.A. at 19 (Government’s Memorandum of Law in Response to Defendant’s Motion to Suppress Evidence). Only the most foolhardy would not have believed that his safety was “potentially” in danger, see Long, 463 U.S. at 1051, 103 S.Ct. at 3481-82, as he approached Stanfield’s Pathfinder.

There was more reason for Officer Mackel to believe that his safety might be in danger than there was in Long for Deputies Howell and Lewis to believe that their safety might be in danger. The Supreme Court there held that Howell and Lewis were “clearly justified” in their conclusion that Long might pose a danger to them were he allowed to reenter his vehicle because (1) “[t]he hour was late and the area rural,” (2) Long had been speeding and had swerved into a ditch, (3) Long had appeared to be under the influence of an intoxicant, and (4) the officers had seen a hunting knife on the floorboard of Long’s car. 463 U.S. at 1050, 103 S.Ct. at 3481. The Court readily reached this conclusion notwithstanding that the officers had already completed their detention of the suspect without incident; they knew that there were no other occupants in Long’s vehicle; they also knew that there was no one else in the vicinity who could pose an immediate threat to their safety; they knew that Long did not have a weapon on his person; they had determined that, although Long was not impaired sufficiently that he could not drive, he was unlikely to initiate an assault on the officers; and they had reason to believe that Long wished to leave the scene without further involvement with the authorities.

In contrast, here, Officers Mackel, Buie and Hamel had just initiated their encounter with Stanfield, who was driving a vehicle not uncommonly associated with drug activity; they were in a high crime area known for its open drug trafficking; they had, only moments earlier, seen Stanfield talking with a known drug dealer; they did not know whether Stanfield was alone or accompanied by others; they were unable, because of the tinting of the windows, to determine whether Stanfield, or any other occupants of the vehicle, were presently armed or had ready access to weapons; and they had no reason to think Stanfield might be incapacitated in such a way as actually to reduce any threat he might pose to them.

If there was less reason for Officer Mackel to believe that he might be in danger than there was in Terry for Officer McFadden to believe he might be in danger, we are satisfied that the difference is not significant enough to warrant a different conclusion as to the reasonableness of Officer Mackel’s perception of possible danger, especially given the greater vulnerability of the officers here because of the heavy tinting of the Pathfinder’s windows. Officer McFadden had observed conduct by Matthew Terry and his companions that was entirely innocent in itself, although suspicious to McFadden, a trained officer, who recognized the conduct as “consistent with [an] hypothesis that the[ ] men were contemplating a daylight robbery.” Terry, 392 U.S at 28, 88 S.Ct. at 1888. Under these circumstances, observed the Court, it was reasonable for Officer McFadden to assume that one or more of the men might be armed. Here, of course, Stanfield was not engaged in entirely innocent behavior; he was actually committing an offense, albeit a relatively minor traffic offense, when he was stopped. And, it bears repeating, he was stopped in an area of the city known for its open drug trafficking, in a vehicle frequently associated with drug activity, and he was talking with a known drug dealer. A trained officer certainly would be as warranted in believing that his safety might be in danger in these circumstances as in those present in Terry. Of course, in neither instance need the officer have been “absolutely certain that the individual [was] armed; the[only question] is whether a reasonably prudent man in the circumstances would[have been] warranted in the belief that his safety or that of others was in danger.” Terry, 392 U.S. at 27, 88 S.Ct. at 1883. As to this question, in this case, we have no doubt whatsoever.

Although the Court in Buie did not itself resolve the ultimate issue of whether the protective sweep undertaken by the officers was justified under the Terry and Long standard, which the Court there held was applicable to the officers’ sweep of Buie’s home, the Court specifically analogized law enforcement’s interest “in taking steps to assure themselves that the house in which a suspect is being, or has just been, arrested is not harboring, other persons who are dangerous and who could unexpectedly launch an attack,” to the “immediate interest of the police officers [in Terry and Long ] in taking steps to assure themselves that the persons with whom they were dealing were not armed with, or able to gain immediate control of, a weapon that could unexpectedly and fatally be used against them.” Buie, 494 U.S. at 333, 110 S.Ct. at 1097. The Court noted that an in-home arrest, unlike the typical encounter on the street, “puts the officer at the disadvantage of being on his adversary’s