Full opinion text
MARCUS, Circuit Judge: In this case, we consider a challenge to the University of Georgia’s freshman admissions policy, and specifically that policy’s preferential treatment of non-white applicants. The three Plaintiffs are white females who applied unsuccessfully for admission to the University’s Fall 1999 class. Plaintiffs allege, and Defendants do not dispute, that the University’s admissions policy awarded a fixed numerical bonus to non-white and male applicants that it did not give to white and female applicants. The district court found the policy unlawful and entered summary judgment in Plaintiffs’ favor. The court declined, however, to enter a prospective injunction forbidding the University from ever considering race or gender in the freshman admissions process. On appeal, Defendants do not challenge the district court’s ruling regarding the University’s preferential treatment of males, but do appeal the ruling regarding the University’s preferential treatment of non-whites. According to the Defendants, the University’s freshman admissions policy does not unlawfully discriminate on the basis of race because the policy is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling interest in ensuring a diverse student body. Plaintiffs cross-appeal on several matters, including the denial of prospective injunc-tive relief. After careful review of the record and the parties’ arguments, we affirm the entirety of the district court’s rulings, although we find the University’s 1999 freshman admissions policy unconstitutional for a reason different than that adopted by the district court. The district court found the admissions policy unlawful because, in its view, student body diversity is not a compelling interest sufficient to withstand the strict scrutiny that courts must apply to government decision-making based on race. We need not, and do not, decide that issue, because even assuming that student body diversity is a compelling interest, the University’s 1999 freshman admissions policy is not narrowly tailored to achieve this interest. A policy that mechanically awards an arbitrary “diversity” bonus to each and every non-white applicant at a decisive stage in the admissions process, and severely limits the range of other factors relevant to diversity that may be considered at that stage, fails strict scrutiny and violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. I. The three Plaintiffs filed this action in August 1999, challenging the policy employed by the University of Georgia (“UGA”) to determine which applicants would be admitted to the freshman class entering in the Fall of 1999. Plaintiff Jennifer Johnson’s complaint was filed separately, and eventually was consolidated with the complaint of Plaintiffs Aimee Bo-grow and Molly Ann Beckenhauer. All three Plaintiffs had recently been denied admission to UGA, and therefore were, at or about the time of filing their complaints, attending other colleges. Johnson was offered admission to UGA after filing this lawsuit, but she declined to enroll at that time. Plaintiffs alleged that UGA’s intentional use of race violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment as well as 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and Title VI of the CM Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d; they alleged that UGA’s use of gender violated Equal Protection and Title IX. Named as Defendants were the Board of Regents of the University System of Georgia; Stephen Portch, Chancellor of the University of Georgia System; and Michael Adams, UGA’s President. Plaintiffs sought a variety of remedies, including an injunction compelling their admission to UGA; prospective injunctive relief against the future use of race and gender in the freshman admissions process; certification of class for purposes of that relief; and damages. On December 15, 1999, various African-American individuals who either were students at UGA or who intended to apply as freshmen were permitted to intervene (the “Interve-nors”). In November 1999, the district court preliminarily granted the Plaintiffs’ motion to certify a class seeking to enjoin the use of race or gender in the freshman admissions process. The class consisted of “all those similarly situated past, present, and future applicants to UGA’s freshman class denied admission or consideration for admission because of their race and/or gender.” The district court’s certification order was entered before the Defendants were even given the opportunity to oppose the certification requests of Plaintiffs Bo-grow and Beckenhauer. The district court also ruled that the damages claims against Portch and Adams in their individual capacities were barred by qualified immunity- Both parties then moved for partial reconsideration. On February 9, 2000, the district court reaffirmed its qualified immunity decision, but vacated the class certification order, on the ground that the Plaintiffs lacked standing to obtain prospective injunctive relief and hence could not represent a class seeking that relief. In light of that ruling, the court also dismissed Plaintiffs’ individual claims for prospective injunctive relief. In February 2000, with discovery underway and the parties proceeding toward summary judgment motions, the Interve-nors moved for a “special case management scheduling order” or alternatively a three month extension of discovery. The district court denied the motion, which was opposed by the Plaintiffs and UGA primarily on the ground that the Intervenors’ proposed changes to the pre-trial schedule would unduly complicate and delay resolution of the case. Summary judgment motions were then filed by the Plaintiffs, Defendants, and Intervenors. On June 16, 2000, the district court dismissed the claims against the individual Defendants in their official capacities, leaving the Board of Regents as the only Defendant. On July 24, 2000, the district court entered its summary judgment order, denying the motions of the Defendants and the Intervenors and granting in part the Plaintiffs’ motion. 106 F.Supp.2d 1362 (S.D.Ga.2000). In pertinent part, the district court found that UGA’s consideration of race in its 1999 freshman admissions policy violated Title VI, which the court analyzed as identical to Equal Protection in this context. The district court first reasoned that Justice Powell’s opinion in Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 98 S.Ct. 2733, 57 L.Ed.2d 750 (1978), was not binding precedent, and hence the court was not required to assume that the desire to foster student body diversity — the only interest asserted by UGA — was a compelling interest. The district court then reasoned that the Supreme Court’s post -Bakke decisions have demonstrated a hostility to identifying diversity as a compelling interest. The district court next explained why, in its view, UGA’s asserted interest in diversity was too “amorphous” to support racial discrimination. According to the court, “[t]he record shows that UGA is plying a ‘diversity = proportionalism’ rationale,” 106 F.Supp.2d at 1371, presumably meaning that UGA’s real interest was not diversity, but rather obtaining a percentage of non-white students equivalent to the representation of these non-white groups in the population at large. In addition, the district court discounted the benefits of diversity attested to by former UGA President Charles Knapp, describing Knapp’s testimony as “syllogism and speculation.” Id. at 1372. Because the district court did not actually cite any evidence contradicting Knapp’s testimony on the perceived benefits of student body diversity, the district court’s order may fairly be read as rejecting diversity as a compelling interest in all cases of this kind. Having found that student body diversity is not a compelling interest, the district court did not reach the question of whether UGA’s 1999 freshman admissions policy is narrowly tailored to achieve that interest, other than to opine that UGA’s asserted diversity interest is “so inherently formless and malleable that no plan can be narrowly tailored to fit it.” Id. at 1374 (emphasis in original). With respect to remedies, the district court rejected the Intervenors’ argument that the three Plaintiffs would have been denied admission even if race and gender were not factors. The court then considered damages, and eventually awarded $7,184.93 to Beckenhauer, $2,060.18 to Johnson, and $1 to Bogrow. The court also directed “UGA, together with its officers, agents, and employees, to offer Aimee Bogrow and Molly Ann Beckenhauer admission for the Fall 2000 semester, and to keep its admission offer to Jennifer L. Johnson open for the Fall 2000 semester.” Id. at 1381. It appears that Bogrow is currently attending UGA, and Johnson expects to do so this Fall. II. The relevant facts are largely undisputed. UGA is the flagship institution of Georgia’s university system. For the first 160 years of its existence, no African-American student was admitted to UGA. The first African-American students were admitted in 1961. In 1969, the federal government, through the Office of Civil Rights (“OCR”), determined that Georgia’s university system was still “operating a dual track of higher education based on race in that past patterns of racial segregation have not been eliminated from most of the institutions within the system.” In 1970, OCR ordered the Board of Regents to submit a desegregation plan and to adopt necessary affirmative action programs to alleviate the vestiges of discrimination. Among other things, the programs eventually implemented sought to increase the number of African-American students at Georgia’s traditionally white educational institutions. Notably, by March 1989, OCR advised the State of Georgia that the university system had substantially complied with the prescribed remedial measures, and therefore “Georgia’s system of public higher education is now in compliance with Title VI, and no additional desegregation measures will be required by OCR.” OCR did advise that Georgia was required to maintain compliance with Title VI and to avoid “[discrimination on the basis of race, col- or, or national origin.” Admission to UGA is competitive, and applications far exceed the number of available freshman seats. To assemble a class, the faculty admission committee, in conjunction with the admissions office, recommends a freshman admission policy each year. This policy is formally presented to UGA’s president for approval, and thereafter is implemented by the admissions office. Between 1990 and 1995, UGA’s freshman admissions policy applied objective academic criteria differently depending upon whether an applicant characterized herself as “black” or “non-black.” To be eligible for admission, an applicant had to meet certain pre-set mínimums with respect to Scholastic Aptitude Test (“SAT”) scores, grade point average (“GPA”), and academic index (“AI”). Under the 1990-95 policy, the mínimums for black students were set lower than the mínimums for non-black students. In 1995, UGA — concerned about the constitutionality of its dual-track admissions policy — revised that policy for the 1996 freshman class. The framework of the revised policy is the same as that of the 1999 policy at issue today. The revised policy divides the admissions process into three stages. UGA selects the majority of its freshman class at an initial stage which applies objective academic criteria without regard to the applicant’s race. At this initial stage (the “First Notice” stage), UGA admits automatically applicants whose Ais and SAT scores are above a certain number. From the remaining applications, UGA selects for further evaluation a group of applicants whose Ais are above a certain number and who meet minimum SAT score requirements. Applicants who fall below the minimum AI or SAT score requirements are automatically rejected. For each applicant placed in the pool for further evaluation, UGA calculates a Total Student Index (“TSI”). The TSI is based on a combination of weighted academic, extracurricular, demographic, and other factors. It is at this stage (the “TSI stage”) that UGA, under its-current policy, expressly considers an applicant’s race. Applicants whose TSI scores meet a pre-set threshold are admitted automatically, while applicants whose scores fall below a pre-set minimum are rejected. Applicants whose TSI scores fall between those guideposts are then passed on to a third stage, where they are evaluated on an individual basis by admissions officers. At this final stage (the “edge read” or “ER” stage), all applicants still in the pool start with a score of zero, and readers look for qualities that might not have been apparent at the First Notice and TSI stages. Applicants who receive an ER rating above a certain number are admitted, while those with a rating below that number are rejected. Race is not designated as a factor at the ER stage. Notably, the ER stage is the only stage in the freshman admissions process where an applicant’s file is actually read and qualitatively evaluated by admissions officers rather than being processed mechanically based upon the data specifically requested by the application form and inputted by the applicant. The Plaintiffs in this case sought admission under the 1999 version of the revised admissions policy. To be admitted automatically to the Fall 1999 class at the First Notice stage, an applicant had to obtain (1) an AI of 2.86 or above; and (2) SAT scores of at least 450 Verbal, 450 Math, and 1000 overall. Applicants with an AI of at least 2.40 and SAT scores of at least 950 overall, 430 on Verbal, and 400 on Math were eligible for further consideration and proceeded to the TSI stage. At the TSI stage, a total of twelve factors were considered, with a maximum point total of 8.15. The applicant’s AI plus three other objective academic factors— based upon SAT score, GPA, and curriculum quality- — accounted for a maximum 5.40 points, or approximately 67% of the maximum number of points available at the TSI stage. All of these academic factors had already been considered at the earlier First Notice stage. Also taken into account at the TSI stage were five additional “leadership/activity” or “ other” factors, based upon information self-reported by the student on her application: parent or sibling ties to UGA, hours spent on extracurricular activities, hours spent on summer work, hours spent on school-year work, and first-generation college. These factors could account for a possible 1.5 points, or 18% of the available total; the most heavily weighted of these factors was “both parents: no college education,” worth 0.5 points. Finally, three demographic factors were considered, for up to 1.25 additional points, or 15% of the maximum available: race/ethnicity (i.e., non-caucasian), gender (i.e., male), and Georgia residency. Applicants voluntarily designating themselves on their application forms as non-cauca-sian — defined as Asian or Pacific Islander, African-American, Hispanic, American Indian, or “Multiracial” — received 0.5 points. Applicants who did not do so, such as the Plaintiffs, did not receive the 0.5 point credit. Overall, other than the carry-over AI score, only one factor in the TSI equation — SAT score or ACT equivalent between 1200-1660, worth 1.0 TSI point— was worth more than the race factor; three academic factors and two non-academic factors (“both parents: no college education” and Georgia residency) were worth the equivalent of the race factor. After sorting applicants at the TSI stage, UGA offered admission to all candidates with a TSI score of 4.93 or higher. Applicants with a TSI score below 4.66 were rejected, while applicants whose TSI scores were between 4.66 and 4.92 survived to the final ER stage. Because of the 0.5 point credit given to non-white applicants, white applicants were effectively held to a more rigorous standard. In practice, awarding the 0.5 point credit to non-white applicants meant that white applicants needed a TSI score of at least 4.93 to be admitted at the TSI stage, while nonwhite applicants effectively needed only a 4.43. Similarly, to avoid outright rejection at the TSI phase and to proceed on to the ER phase, a white applicant needed a TSI score of at least 4.66 TSI points, while a non-white applicant — because of the 0.5 point boost — effectively needed only a 4.16. All three Plaintiffs in this case survived the First Notice stage, but did not qualify for automatic admission. At the TSI stage, Plaintiff Johnson achieved a score of 4.10. She is a white female, so UGA did not grant her the 0.5 racial or 0.25 gender bonus accorded to non-white, male applicants. Because her TSI was below 4.66, UGA denied her admission outright. Had UGA granted her a cumulative 0.75 bonus, her TSI score would have been 4.85, which would have qualified her for ER consideration. Plaintiffs Bogrow and Beckenhauer achieved TSIs of 4.52 and 4.06, respectively. As with Johnson, UGA awarded neither Bogrow and Beckenhauer the 0.5 racial bonus or the 0.25 gender bonus. Had UGA done so, Bogrow would have been admitted, and Beckenhauer would have qualified for ER consideration. Without the bonus points, however, neither applicant made the 4.66 TSI cut-off, and both were denied admission at the TSI stage. In September 1999, after the filing of this lawsuit, but before the district court determined Defendants’ liability, UGA’s president, Michael Adams, announced that gender would no longer be a factor at the TSI stage. UGA did elect to continue considering race in the 2000 freshman admissions process. Following the district court’s summary judgment order in July 2000, however, UGA announced that it would discontinue using race as a factor in freshman admissions until resolution of this lawsuit. III. The primary issue in this appeal relates to the district court’s entry of summary judgment in Plaintiffs’ favor on the ground that UGA’s 1999 freshman admissions policy violates Title VI, and by extension Equal Protection, because it treats applicants differently based upon race. This issue turns upon whether student body diversity may be a compelling interest, and if so, whether UGA has met its burden of showing that its policy is narrowly tailored to serve that interest. The Intervenors separately contend that the policy is justifiable because it serves to ameliorate the vestiges of UGA’s past discrimination. UGA and the Intervenors argue that we should direct the entry of summary judgment in their favor, or, at the very least, vacate the summary judgment ruling in Plaintiffs’ favor and remand to the district court for a trial. We review a summary judgment ruling de novo, applying the same legal standards used by the district court. See, e.g., Hilburn v. Murata Elecs. N. Am., Inc., 181 F.3d 1220, 1225 (11th Cir.1999). Summary judgment is appropriate where “there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R.Civ.P. 56(c). We “view the evidence and all factual inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion” and “ ‘all reasonable doubts about the facts [are] resolved in favor of the non-movant.’ ” See Burton v. City of Belle Glade, 178 F.3d 1175, 1187 (11th Cir.1999) (quoting Clemons v. Dougherty County, 684 F.2d 1365, 1368-69 (11th Cir.1982)). As we have explained, “ ‘[t]he mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the position will be insufficient; there must be evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the [non-moving party].’ In determining whether this eviden-tiary threshold has been met, the trial court ‘must view the evidence presented through the prism of the substantive evi-dentiary burden applicable to the particular cause of action before it.’ ” City of Delray Beach v. Agricultural Ins. Co., 85 F.3d 1527, 1530 (11th Cir.1996) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252-55, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2512-14, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986)). Simply put, “ ‘the plain language of Rule 56(c) mandates the entry of summary judgment ... against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.’ ” Id. (quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2552-53, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986)). In their cross-appeal, Plaintiffs contend that the district court erred by dismissing their claims for prospective injunctive relief and by decertifying the class. Also appealed, although only by the Intervenors, is the district court’s denial of Inter-venors’ motion for a “special case management scheduling order” or alternatively an extension of discovery. We review these rulings solely for abuse of discretion. See, e.g., Prado-Steiman v. Bush, 221 F.3d 1266, 1278 (11th Cir.2000) (class certification); Simmons v. Conger, 86 F.3d 1080, 1085 (11th Cir.1996) (injunctive relief); United States v. McCutcheon, 86 F.3d 187, 190 (11th Cir.1996) (pre-trial scheduling). IV. We address first the summary judgment ruling, and the district court’s conclusion that UGA’s use of race in its freshman admissions process for the Fall 1999 class is unlawful. The parties agree that UGA’s policy is subject to strict constitutional scrutiny. See, e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227, 115 S.Ct. 2097, 2113, 132 L.Ed.2d 158 (1995); Bass v. Board of County Comm’s, 256 F.3d 1095, 1116 (11th Cir.2001) (“The Supreme Court has held that ‘all racial classifications, imposed by whatever federal, state, or local government actor, must be analyzed by a reviewing court under strict scrutiny.’ ”) (quoting Adarand); United States v. Allen-Brown, 243 F.3d 1293, 1298-99 (11th Cir.2001) (“Under Supreme Court jurisprudence, race-based treatment is subject to strict scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause.”). We apply strict scrutiny because “[classifications of citizens solely on the basis of race ‘are by their very nature odious to a free people whose institutions are founded upon the doctrine of equality.’ ” Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 643, 113 S.Ct. 2816, 2824, 125 L.Ed.2d 511 (1993) (“Shaw I”) (quoting Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 100, 63 S.Ct. 1375, 1385, 87 L.Ed. 1774 (1943)). Both the Supreme Court and our Court have made clear that racial classifications, whatever the motivation for enacting them, are highly suspect and rarely withstand constitutional scrutiny. “[T]he basic principle is straightforward: ‘Racial and ethnic distinctions of any sort are inherently suspect and thus call for the most exacting judicial examination.’ ” Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 904, 115 S.Ct. 2475, 2482, 132 L.Ed.2d 762 (1995) (citation omitted); see also Allen-Brown, 243 F.8d at 1299 (“The standard of review under the Equal Protection Clause ‘is not dependent on the race of those burdened or benefited by a particular classification.’ The Equal Protection Clause ... recognizes that ‘any individual suffers an injury when he or she is disadvantaged by the government because of his or her race, whatever that race may be.’ ”) (citation omitted). Under strict scrutiny, a racial classification must be held unlawful unless (1) the racial classification serves a compelling governmental interest, and (2) it is narrowly tailored to further that interest. See, e.g., Adarand, 515 U.S. at 227, 115 S.Ct. at 2113; Bass, 256 F.3d at 1116. The proponent of the classification bears the burden of proving that its consideration of race is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling governmental interest. See, e.g., Bass, 256 F.3d at 1114(citing City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 510-11, 109 S.Ct. 706, 730-31, 102 L.Ed.2d 854 (1989)). We too have stressed that, when government undertakes affirmative action, it must present a “ ‘strong basis in evidence’ ” for doing so. See Peightal v. Metropolitan Dade County, 26 F.3d 1545, 1553 (11th Cir.1994) (quoting Croson, 488 U.S. at 501, 109 S.Ct. at 725); see also Engineering Contractors Ass’n of So. Fla., Inc. v. Metropolitan Dade County, 122 F.3d 895, 906 (11th Cir.1997) (“If a race- or ethnicity-conscious affirmative action program is to be upheld, ‘the district court must make a factual determination that [there exists] a strong basis in evidence’ to support the conclusion that remedial action is necessary.”). UGA’s burden in this case is, therefore, substantial. A. UGA identifies the educational benefits of student body diversity in higher education as the compelling interest justifying the consideration of race in its freshman admissions decisions. Although UGA argues loosely that its use of race is “supported” by the university’s history of discrimination, UGA does not identify remediating past discrimination as the compelling interest justifying its policy; indeed, it has repeatedly disavowed that interest. See, e.g., Defendants’ Opp. to Intervenors Mot. to Enter a Special Case Mgmt. Order, Feb. 17, 2000, at 4 (“Defendants have never contended that [UGA’s] limited use of race is required or necessary due to any remaining vestiges of discrimination. [I]ntervenors’ attempt to resurrect an issue that was laid to rest over a decade ago should be rejected.”); Appellants’ Reply Br. at 15 (“UGA does not contend that it utilized race as a TSI factor in the 1999 freshman admissions plan to cure actual present day effects of past discrimination.”). The initial question, therefore, is when, if ever, may student body diversity be a compelling interest? UGA contends that, under binding precedent (specifically, Justice Powell’s opinion in Bakke), student body diversity is always a compelling interest that can justify a racial preference in university admissions. Plaintiffs respond that, under more recent Supreme Court precedent, student body diversity is never a compelling interest. A third view, articulated indirectly at times by both parties, is that student body diversity may be a compelling interest in some facts and circumstances depending upon the record. We need not, and do not, resolve in this opinion whether student body diversity ever may be a compelling interest supporting a university’s consideration of race in its admissions process. Even assuming that UGA’s asserted interest in student body diversity is a compelling interest, UGA’s 1999 freshman admissions policy is unconstitutional because UGA has plainly failed to show that its policy is narrowly tailored to serve that interest. Accordingly, there is no reason for us to decide whether or when student body diversity may be a compelling interest, and well-settled principles of judicial restraint caution against taking that course. See, e.g., Burton v. United States, 196 U.S. 283, 295, 25 S.Ct. 243, 245, 49 L.Ed. 482 (1905) (courts are not “to decide questions of a constitutional nature unless absolutely necessary to a decision of the case”); Florida Ass’n of Rehab. Facilities, Inc. v. State of Fla. Dept. of Health and Rehab. Servs., 225 F.3d 1208, 1227 n. 14 (11th Cir.2000) (applying “the longstanding rule that constitutional questions should not be resolved unless necessary to the decision”) (citing I.A. Durbin, Inc. v. Jefferson Nat’l Bank, 793 F.2d 1541, 1553 (11th Cir.1986)). Nevertheless, some aspects of that issue are relevant to our narrow tailoring analysis; in particular, UGA claims that its policy is modeled after the “Harvard Plan” discussed by Justice Powell in Bakke. For that reason, and given that the parties have argued the issue at length in their presentations to this Court, we would be remiss if we did not address the issue at all. In particular, we think it important to underscore that the constitutional viability of student body diversity as a compelling interest is an open question, and ultimately is one that, because of its great importance, warrants consideration by the Supreme Court. A majority of the Supreme Court has never agreed that student body diversity is, or may be, a compelling interest sufficient to justify a university’s consideration of race in making admissions decisions. Defendants argue that the viability of student body diversity as a compelling interest is not an open question, because Justice Powell’s opinion 23 years ago in Bakke — which no other Justice joined— constitutes binding precedent and requires the lower federal courts to treat that interest as compelling. We are unconvinced by this argument; although a majority of the Supreme Court may eventually adopt Justice Powell’s opinion as binding precedent, and even now the opinion has persuasive value, the opinion is not binding on the issue before us today. Reaching this conclusion requires a close and careful examination of the various opinions in Bakke. In that case, an unsuccessful white applicant to the University of California at Davis Medical School challenged the school’s admissions program, which consisted of a regular admissions system for non-minority applicants and a special admissions system strictly for minorities. 438 U.S. at 273-75, 98 S.Ct. at 2739-40. The minority admissions system was overseen by a separate admissions committee. Minority applicants were never compared against non-minority applicants; and although minority applicants were rated in a manner similar to that used for non-minority applicants, minority applicants did not have to meet the minimum GPA requirement applied to non-minority applicants. The minority admissions committee’s task was to recommend minority applicants for admission until a specific number of minority applicants were admitted; the actual goal was predetermined by faculty vote. In the relevant year, 16 out of 100 available seats were reserved for minorities. The Supreme Court of California sustained the plaintiffs challenge to this dual-track quota system, holding that the medical school’s admission program violated Equal Protection, Title VI, and the California Constitution. The court ordered the plaintiffs admission to the school, and also permanently enjoined the university from “according any consideration to race in its admission process.” Id. at 272, 98 S.Ct. at 2738. In so doing, the court rejected the university’s asserted purposes for its special admissions system, including the goal of obtaining the educational benefits that flow from an ethnically diverse student body. See id. at 306, 98 S.Ct. at 2756-57. On appeal, the Supreme Court, through a majority formed by Justices Powell, Stevens, Burger, Stewart, and Rehnquist, affirmed the California Supreme Court’s finding that the medical school’s admissions system was invalid and also affirmed the order directing the admission of Bakke to the school. In the same set of opinions, however, the Court, through a different majority formed by Justices Powell, Brennan, White, Marshall, and Blackmun, reversed the California Supreme Court’s total prohibition on the university’s consideration of race in admissions. Justice Powell, writing solely for himself, supplied the pivotal vote for both holdings. Applying strict scrutiny, Justice Powell rejected almost all of the university’s proffered justifications for its consideration of race, but found the university’s goal of “attainting] a diverse student body” to be “clearly” a “constitutionally permissible goal for an institution of higher education.” Id. at 311-12, 98 S.Ct. at 2759. According to Justice Powell, a university’s “interest in diversity is compelling in the context of a university’s admissions program,” in which “[ejthnic diversity ... is only one element in a range of factors a university properly may consider in attaining the goal of a heterogenous student body.” 438 U.S. at 314, 98 S.Ct. at 2760-61. Justice Powell therefore concluded that “[i]n enjoining petitioner from ever considering the race of any applicant, ... the courts below failed to recognize that the State has a substantial interest that legitimately may be served by a properly devised admissions program involving the competitive consideration of race and ethnic origin. For this reason, so much of the California court’s judgment as enjoins petitioner from any consideration of the race of any applicant must be reversed.” Id. at 318, 98 S.Ct. at 2763. In that discussion, Justice Powell endorsed the constitutionality of the Harvard Plan, a “flexible” admissions program which treats race as one factor among many that may be considered in making admissions decisions. See id. at 320, 98 S.Ct. at 2761-62. But Justice Powell also determined that the university’s rigid quota system was not narrowly tailored to serve any asserted interest in diversity, and hence the university’s admissions process was unlawful. See id. Justice Powell clearly identified diversity as a compelling interest that may be asserted by a university in defense of an admissions program that flexibly considers race as one of several factors in making admissions decisions. No other Justice, however, expressly endorsed that view. Justice Brennan, joined by Justices White, Marshall, and Blackmun, took an entirely different approach to the case. He found that the university’s articulated purpose of remedying the effects of past societal discrimination was itself “sufficiently important to justify the use of race-conscious admissions programs where there is a sound basis for concluding that minority underrepresentation is substantial and chronic, and that the handicap of past discrimination is impeding access of minorities.” Id. at 362, 98 S.Ct. at 2784 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice Brennan did not consider whether student body diversity constituted a compelling interest sufficient to justify the university’s discriminatory admissions policy. Indeed, Justice Brennan did not consider whether any interest was compelling because he did not analyze the university’s asserted justifications under strict scrutiny. Id. at 356-57, 98 S.Ct. at 2781-82. With regard to Justice Powell’s discussion of the Harvard Plan, Justice Brennan wrote only that he agreed that the plan would be “constitutional under our approach, at least so long as the use of race to achieve an integrated student body is necessitated by the lingering effects of past discrimination.” Id. at 326 n. 1, 98 S.Ct. at 2766 n. 1. Explaining that the litigation was not a class action, but rather a “controversy between two specific litigants,” Justice Stevens (joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justices Stewart and Rehnquist) viewed “the question of whether race can ever be used as a factor in an admissions decision” as an issue not before the Court. Id. at 408, 411, 98 S.Ct. at 2808, 2809 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice Stevens also declined to address the constitutional validity of the medical school’s admissions process, relying solely upon Title VI, which he viewed as “crystal clear” in its prohibition that “[r]ace cannot be the basis of excluding anyone from participation in a federally funded program.” Id. at 418, 98 S.Ct. at 2813. Whether Justice Powell’s discussion in Bakke constitutes binding precedent may be considered in light of the principle enunciated by the Court that “[wjhen a fragmented Court decides a case ... the holding of the Court may be viewed as that position taken by those Members who concurred in the judgments on the narrowest grounds.” Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193, 97 S.Ct. 990, 994, 51 L.Ed.2d 260 (1977). In Bakke, a majority of the Court agreed to reverse the decision below to the extent that it held that race could never be a factor in a university admissions process. Justice Brennan’s opinion reached that conclusion on the (now discredited) ground that some racial classifications were not subject to strict scrutiny. He did not, therefore, consider whether student body diversity could constitute a compelling interest, as Justice Powell indicated; indeed, Justice Brennan did not even mention diversity as a constitutionally valid interest. At best, Justice Brennan’s opinion treats diversity as the kind of “important” state interest that might survive intermediate scrutiny (the standard that Justice Brennan felt should apply to race-based decision-making), not strict scrutiny. 438 U.S. at 359, 98 S.Ct. at 2783 (Brennan, J.). In this sense, at least, the narrowest — i.e., less far-reaching — common ground of the Brennan and Powell opinions on the specific subject of student body diversity is that diversity is an “important” interest, but not the kind of compelling interest that potentially might withstand even the strictest constitutional scrutiny. Moreover, Justice Brennan’s opinion endorsed Justice Powell’s reasoning, if at all, only to the extent that student body diversity was part of the university’s much broader justification that its favorable treatment of minorities was necessary to remedy the present effects of past discrimination. This remedial purpose rationale was not a component of Justice Powell’s discussion of student body diversity; Justice Powell did not anchor his view of diversity to the existence of present effects of past discrimination — societal or otherwise. For that reason, Justice Brennan’s opinion was careful to support Justice Powell’s endorsement of the Harvard Plan only “so long as the use of race to achieve an integrated student body is necessitated by the lingering effects of past discrimination.” Id. at 326 n. 1, 98 S.Ct. at 2766 n. 1 (Brennan, J.) (emphasis added). While it may be possible to speculate that all four of the Justices who joined Justice Brennan’s opinion might have embraced treating student body diversity as a compelling interest even in the absence of a valid remedial purpose, that kind of speculation is inconsistent with Marks. Moreover, we think this speculation unsound. It requires us to ignore the language and rationale of Justice Brennan’s opinion and to draw assumptions that have no basis in the opinion, a particularly unwise course given that Justice Brennan’s opinion disagreed with Justice Powell’s not only regarding the fundamental issue of whether the university’s set-aside was valid, but also on the proper constitutional test for analyzing the use of race. In the end, the fact is inescapable that no five Justices in Bakke expressly held that student body diversity is a compelling interest under the Equal Protection Clause even in the absence of valid remedial purpose. As our predecessor court aptly put it, “[i]n over 150 pages of the U.S. Reports, the Justices [in Bakke ] have told us mainly that they have agreed to disagree.” United States v. City of Miami, 614 F.2d 1322, 1337 (5th Cir.1980), on reh’g en banc, 664 F.2d 435 (1981). Simply put, Justice Powell’s opinion does not establish student body diversity as a compelling interest for purposes of this case. In the years since Bakke, the Court has never returned to whether diversity may be a compelling interest supporting a university’s consideration of race in making admissions decisions. Language in some opinions from the Court suggest, but do not hold, that the only interest sufficient to support a racial preference is remediating the defendant’s own past discrimination. See, e.g., Adarand, 515 U.S. at 237, 115 S.Ct. at 2118 (diversity in broadcasting not a compelling interest); Croson, 488 U.S. at 493, 109 S.Ct. at 722 (plurality op.) (observing that unless racial classifications “are strictly reserved for remedial settings, they may in fact promote notions of racial inferiority and lead to a politics of racial hostility”); Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 612, 110 S.Ct. 2997, 3034, 111 L.Ed.2d 445 (1990) (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (“Modern equal protection doctrine has recognized only one [compelling state] interest: remedying the effects of past discrimination.”)- Other Supreme Court opinions have rejected asserted interests similar to student body diversity. See Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899, 909-10, 116 S.Ct. 1894, 1903, 135 L.Ed.2d 207 (1996) (“Shaw II ”) (“an effort to alleviate the effects of societal discrimination is not a compelling interest”); Miller, 515 U.S. at 920, 115 S.Ct. at 2490 (interest based on assumptions that members of a particular race “think alike, share the same political interests, and will prefer the same candidates at the polls” is “racial stereotyping at odds with equal protection mandates”); Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education, 476 U.S. 267, 275-76, 106 S.Ct. 1842, 1847-48, 90 L.Ed.2d 260 (1986) (plurality op.) (local school board’s asserted interest in providing minority role models for its minority students not a sufficient interest). But none of these opinions involves university admissions, and none specifically addresses student body diversity. We think it clear that the status of student body diversity as a compelling interest justifying a racial preference in university admissions is an open question in the Supreme Court and in our Court. Of course, a proponent of any kind of race-based decision-making always faces a substantial burden in attempting to justify its policy. See Croson, 488 U.S. at 505, 109 S.Ct. at 727-28 (“ ‘Because racial characteristics so seldom provide a relevant basis for disparate treatment, and because classifications based on race are potentially so harmful to the entire body politic, it is especially important that the reasons for any such classification be clearly identified and unquestionably legitimate.’ ”) (citation omitted). It is possible that the important purpose of public education and the expansive freedoms of speech and thought associated with university environment — recognized in other decisions by the Court— may on a powerful record justify treating student body diversity as a compelling interest. The weight of recent precedent is undeniably to the contrary, however. To reiterate, we do not decide today whether or when student body diversity may be a compelling interest for purposes of strict scrutiny review under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Supreme Court has placed as much importance on the requirement that any race-conscious program be narrowly tailored as it has on the requirement that the asserted justification for race-conscious decision-making be sufficiently compelling. Here, UGA fails to meet its burden of showing that its 1999 freshman admissions policy is narrowly tailored. In similar situations, courts elsewhere have simply assumed that student body diversity is a compelling interest, and then proceeded to explain why the policy being challenged is unlawful regardless. See Eisenberg, 197 F.3d at 130; Tuttle v. Arlington County Sch. Bd., 195 F.3d 698, 705 (4th Cir.1999) (“Since we conclude ... that the [race-based admissions policy] was not narrowly tailored, we leave the question of whether diversity is a compelling interest unanswered.”); Wessmann, 160 F.3d at 794 (“[we] assume arguendo — but we do not decide — that Bakke remains good law and that some iterations of ‘diversity’ might be sufficiently compelling, in specific circumstances, to justify race-conscious actions.”). We shall do the same, and assume for purposes of this opinion only that UGA’s asserted interest in student body diversity is a compelling interest. B. The Supreme Court has explained that, although in certain circumstances drawing racial distinctions is permissible where a governmental body is pursuing a compelling state interest, a state “is constrained in how it may pursue that end: ‘[T]he means chosen to accomplish the State’s asserted purpose must be specifically and narrowly framed to accomplish that purpose.’” Shaw II, 517 U.S. at 908, 116 S.Ct. at 1902. The important purpose of the narrow tailoring requirement is to ensure that “the chosen means ‘fit’ in th[e] compelling goal so closely that there is little or no possibility that the motive for the classification was illegitimate racial prejudice or stereotype.” Croson, 488 U.S. at 493, 109 S.Ct. at 721. By definition, this inquiry must be intrusive, and focused very closely and in a very precise way on the specific terms of the regulation or policy under review, because only with that kind of searching examination can a court ensure that the defendant’s use of race is truly as narrow as the Constitution requires. See In re Birmingham Reverse Discrimination Employment Litigation, 20 F.3d 1525, 1545 (11th Cir.1994) (“a race conscious government policy justified by a compelling purpose ... must also use race in as limited a manner as possible to accomplish that compelling purpose.”). As we have discussed, it is the burden of the party proposing a racial preference to show that its approach is narrowly tailored to achieving its asserted interest. To withstand summary judgment, therefore, UGA must show that a reasonable factfinder could conclude that there is sufficient record evidence supporting its claim that its freshman admissions process is narrowly tailored to achieve its goal of student body diversity. In our view, UGA does not even come close to making that showing. Neither this Court nor the Supreme Court has had occasion to define the contours of the narrow tailoring inquiry in a case involving a university’s race-conscious admissions policy. In the employment arena, we have identified several factors to be considered when evaluating the constitutionality of an affirmative action plan, including: “ ‘the necessity for the relief and the efficacy of alternative remedies, the flexibility and duration of the relief, ... the relationship of numerical goals to the relevant ... market, and the impact of the relief on the rights of [the plaintiffs].’ ” Birmingham, 20 F.3d at 1545 (quoting Howard v. McLucas, 871 F.2d 1000, 1008 (11th Cir.1989)). These factors are drawn from the plurality opinion in United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149, 107 S.Ct. 1053, 94 L.Ed.2d 203 (1987), an employment case where the affirmative action plan at issue was designed to remediate past discrimination. The Fourth Circuit recently adopted the Paradise factors in evaluating whether a local school district’s race-conscious admissions policy was narrowly tailored. See Tuttle, 195 F.3d at 706 (“When reviewing whether a state racial classification is narrowly tailored, we consider factors such as: (1) the efficacy of alternative race-neutral policies, (2) the planned duration of the policy, (3) the relationship between the numerical goal and the percentage of minority group members in the relevant population or work force, (4) the flexibility of the policy, including the provision of waivers if the goal cannot be met, and (5) the burden of the policy on innocent third parties.”) (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Paradise, 480 U.S. at 171, 107 S.Ct. at 1067). We have no disagreement with this general framework. We do think, however, that the Paradise factors should be adjusted slightly to take better account of the unique issues raised by the use of race to achieve diversity in university admissions. For example, if we assume that student body diversity may be a compelling interest even where the defendant is not attempting to remedy present effects of past discrimination, then the duration of the race-conscious policy may not be an important consideration; by definition, the goal of remedying past discrimination has a logical end-point, the goal of exposing students to a diverse student body may not. Likewise, inquiring into “the relationship between the numerical goal and the percentage of minority group members in the relevant population” may be unhelpful where the university does not target a specific number of minority applicants for admission. At the same time, a limited inquiry into “the flexibility of the policy” may not adequately reflect the paramount importance of the requirement that, to serve validly the end of diversity, a race-conscious admissions policy must truly assess each applicant as an individual rather than a member of a particular racial group. See, e.g., Bakke, 438 U.S. at 317, 98 S.Ct. at 2762. Similarly, while it may be constitutionally acceptable in limited circumstances for “innocent” members of a once-favored racial group to bear some burden when a defendant seeks to remediate its past discrimination, this view of competing racial groups has no meaning when a university’s professed goal is to create a diverse student body, and the burden imposed by a racial preference intended to achieve diversity cannot so readily be justified on this basis. We therefore view the Paradise factors as providing general guidance on the question before us, but tailor those factors slightly to fit these types of cases. Specifically, a court evaluating a school admissions program designed to serve a compelling interest in obtaining the educational benefits associated with a diverse student body should examine: (1) whether the policy uses race in a rigid or mechanical way that does not take sufficient account of the different contributions to diversity that individual candidates may offer; (2) whether the policy fully and fairly takes account of race-neutral factors which may contribute to a diverse student body; (3) whether the policy gives an arbitrary or disproportionate benefit to members of the favored racial groups; and (4) whether the school has genuinely considered, and rejected as inadequate, race-neutral alternatives for creating student body diversity. The foregoing factors essentially correspond to all of the factors adopted in Paradise (other than duration) for affirmative action plans generally. See 480 U.S. at 171, 107 S.Ct. at 1067. We do not view these factors as determinative in all instances, but they do provide a useful analytical structure, and we think it unlikely that a race-conscious admissions policy which fails to satisfy these criteria will truly “use race in as'limited a manner as possible,” Birmingham, 20 F.3d at 1545, to advance a compelling interest in student body diversity. We discuss each of these factors in turn. At the outset, while we can assume that racial diversity may be one component of a diverse student body, it is not the only component. If the goal in creating a diverse student body is to develop a university community where students are exposed to persons of different cultures, outlooks, and experiences, a white applicant in some circumstances may make a greater contribution than a non-white applicant. To take a few obvious examples, a white applicant from a disadvantaged rural area in Appalachia may well have more to offer a Georgia public university such as UGA — from the standpoint of diversity — than a non-white applicant from an affluent family and a suburban Atlanta high school. Similarly, a white applicant to a Georgia public university who was raised in Athens, Greece may have a much richer background and exposure to a much more unusual environment than a non-white applicant who has spent all his life in Athens, Georgia. The point is simply this: the diversity interest that we assume may constitute a compelling interest does not view racial diversity as an end in itself, but rather as a means to achieve the larger goal of providing a superior education by creating a university community that resembles the broad mix of cultures, experiences, and ideas to be found in society. Accordingly, an admissions policy that seeks to create a diverse student body by considering the race of applicants must do so in a sufficiently flexible way. It goes without saying that a university may not establish a quota system for members of certain racial groups, and may not put members of one racial group on a different and more lenient track than members of another group. See, e.g., Bakke, 438 U.S. at 319-20, 98 S.Ct. at 2763 (Powell, J.). But the mere fact that race technically does not insulate a candidate from competition with other applicants does not, by itself, mean that the policy is narrowly tailored. A race-conscious admissions policy still must ensure that, even when using race as a factor, the weight accorded that factor is not subject to rigid or mechanical application, and remains flexible enough to ensure that each applicant is evaluated as an individual and not in a way that looks to her membership in a favored or disfavored racial group as a defining feature of her candidacy. Second, the policy must ensure that race-neutral factors which contribute to a diverse student body are considered fully and fairly along with race in making admissions decisions. We assume that there is value in having a racially-diverse student body. But racial diversity alone is not necessarily the hallmark of a diverse student body, and race is not necessarily the only, or best, criterion for determining the contribution that an applicant might make to the broad mix of experiences and perspectives that creates the value UGA asserts in diversity. An admissions policy that seeks to achieve student body diversity by allowing some applicants to be treated more favorably than others based on race must ensure full and fair consideration of other, race-neutral characteristics that contribute to a truly diverse class of students. Third, the policy must use race in a way that does not give an arbitrary or disproportionate benefit to members of the favored racial groups, and thereby unduly disadvantage applicants from outside the favored groups who may well add more to the overall diversity of the student body. Even when a race-conscious policy permits broad consideration of race-neutral factors that contribute to diversity, it may undervalue those factors in a way that makes race effectively the primary criterion for diversity. Finally, a university defending a race-conscious admissions policy must show that it has genuinely considered, and rejected as inadequate, race-neutral alternatives for creating student body diversity. We have held that only as a “last resort” may race be used in awarding valuable public benefits such as government contracts. See, e.g., Engineering Contractors, 122 F.3d at 926 (“The essence of the narrowly tailored inquiry is the notion that explicitly racial preferences ... must be only a last resort option.”) (internal quotation marks omitted). That principle applies equally to the university admissions process. Race-based decision-making is at odds with the Constitution in any context, and before injecting race into the admissions process, a university should explore seriously and in good faith the wide variety of race-neutral measures that may enhance not only the overall diversity of the student body, but also racial diversity itself. Applying these factors, we hold that UGA’s 1999 freshman admissions policy is not narrowly tailored to achieve its stated goal of student body diversity. By mechanically and inexorably awarding an arbitrary “diversity” bonus to each and every non-white applicant at the TSI stage, and severely limiting the range of other factors that may be considered at that stage, the policy contemplates that non-white applicants will be admitted or advance further in the process at the expense of white applicants with greater potential to contribute to a diverse student body. This lack of flexibility is fatal to UGA’s policy. To begin with, the policy mechanically awards bonus points to each non-white applicant, regardless of that applicant’s potential overall contribution to diversity. At the TSI stage, every non-white applicant receives a 0.6 point bonus, regardless of his or her background and regardless of whether a white applicant with a far more “diverse” background receives a corresponding bonus for the attributes she may offer. There is no ability to adjust the bonus downwards for non-white applicants whose profiles are clearly well within the mainstream of white applicants and who add nothing else to the diversity of the incoming class. This rigid, mechanical approach to considering race is itself incompatible with the need for flexibility in the admissions process. What makes UGA’s approach even more deficient, however, is the policy’s exclusion of many race-neutral factors that would reflect an applicant’s potential contributions to diversity. Only twelve factors are considered at the TSI stage; of those twelve, one (gender) is concededly unlawful and has now been abandoned, and four relate entirely to academic ability and do not correspond — at least on this record — to student body diversity. That leaves just seven factors, including race, corresponding in varying degrees to student body diversity. Significantly, however, there is no flexibility whatsoever at the TSI stage to consider additional factors for any individual applicant. The TSI process mechanically rewards candidates under certain fixed criteria, including race, but permits no favorable treatment of applicants whose personal backgrounds or skills, while undeniably promoting diversity, do not fit neatly into one of the categories predetermined by UGA. Individuals who come from economically disadvantaged homes; individuals who have lived or traveled widely abroad; individuals from remote or rural areas; individuals who speak foreign languages; individuals with unique communications skills (such as an ability to read Braille or communicate with the deaf); and individuals who have overcome personal adversity or social hardship — none of the characteristics that make these kinds of individuals “diverse” are taken into account at the TSI stage. Moreover, the TSI considers an applicant’s extracurricular and work activities— which both reflect and provide insight into a student’s potential contribution to diversity — only in the most limited way, by inquiring solely into the number of hours spent on those activities, without any inquiry at all into their nature or purpose. There is simply no consideration at the TSI stage of an applicant’s extracurricular or work activities from the standpoint of how those activities might enhance the diversity of the freshman class; to take only one example, an applicant who has spent her summers performing volunteer work in a less developed “third world” country presumably would add far more diversity to the class than many of her peers who worked at more ordinary and less challenging summer jobs, yet at the TSI stage the uniqueness of her experience is wholly ignored. The number of hours that an applicant reports herself having spent on these activities is hardly a meaningful substitute for personalized evaluation of the applicant’s unique extracurricular and work experiences. The almost total inability of the TSI formula to take account of the potential contributions to diversity from applicants with characteristics less easily and mechanically tabulated than race is inconsistent with narrow tailoring. This inflexibility at the TSI stage has real consequences for white applicants. The results at the TSI stage dictate whether an applicant is admitted automatically, rejected automatically, or receives personalized consideration at the ER stage. The racial bonus may be decisive as to whether the applicant is admitted or rejected. Plaintiff Bogrow, for example, would have qualified for automatic admission had she received the 0.5 point bonus; instead, because she did not receive that bonus, she was rejected outright at the TSI stage. We acknowledge that race may “tip the balance” even under an admissions policy (such as the Harvard Plan) that does not consider race so mechanically. But the problem here is even more serious, because race not only may be decisive in whether a UGA applicant qualifies for automatic admission or rejection at the TSI stage, but also may be decisive in whether the applicant will receive (at the ER stage) any personalized, qualitative assessment of her application and potential contribution to di