Full opinion text
GRABER, Circuit Judge. Plaintiffs are California card clubs and charities that are prohibited under California state law from offering casino-style gaming. They challenge the validity of compacts entered into under the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (“IGRA”), 25 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2721, between the State of California and certain Indian tribes. Pursuant to an amendment to the California Constitution that permits casino-style gaming only on Indian lands (“Proposition 1A”), California has entered into 62 compacts (“Tribal-State Compacts”) with Indian tribes allowing such gaming. Plaintiffs brought this action, in federal district court, against various state defendants and the Secretary and Assistant Secretary of the United States Department of the Interior, alleging that Proposition 1A and the Tribal-State Compacts violate IGRA and their rights to equal protection guaranteed by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. The district court granted summary judgment to both the state defendants and the federal defendants. Because we hold that Proposition 1A and the Tribal-State Compacts are consistent with IGRA and do not violate the guarantees of equal protection, we affirm. BACKGROUND A. The Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (“IGRA”) In California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202, 107 S.Ct. 1083, 94 L.Ed.2d 244 (1987), the Supreme Court invalidated an attempt by California to enforce California Penal Code § 326.5 (the “bingo statute”) against tribes that operated bingo halls. The Supreme Court characterized the bingo statute as regulatory, rather than criminal, and held that Public Law No. 280 prohibited the enforcement of state regulatory statutes against Indian tribes: [I]f the intent of a state law is generally to prohibit certain conduct, it falls within Pub. L. 280’s grant of criminal jurisdiction, but if the state law generally permits the conduct at issue, subject to regulation, it must be classified as civil/regulatory and Pub. L. 280 does not authorize its enforcement on an Indian reservation. Cabazon, 480 U.S. at 209, 107 S.Ct. 1083. Because California permitted a substantial amount of gaming activity, including bingo, the bingo statute could not be characterized as criminal or prohibitory and therefore could not be enforced on Indian lands. As a response to the Cabazon decision, Congress enacted IGRA as a means of granting states some role in the regulation of Indian gaming. As noted in the opinion below, IGRA was Congress’ compromise solution to the difficult questions involving Indian gaming. The Act was passed in order to provide “a statutory basis for the operation of gaming by Indian tribes as a means of promoting tribal economic development, self-sufficiency, and strong tribal governments” and “to shield [tribal gaming] from organized crime and other corrupting influences to ensure that the Indian tribe is the primary beneficiary of the gaming operation.” 25 U.S.C. § 2702(1), (2). IGRA is an example of “cooperative federalism” in that it seeks to balance the competing sovereign interests of the federal government, state governments, and Indian tribes, by giving each a role in the regulatory scheme. Artichoke Joe’s v. Norton, 216 F.Supp.2d 1084, 1092 (E.D.Cal.2002) (alteration in original). IGRA creates three classes of gaming, each of which is subject to a different level of regulation. Class I gaming covers “social games solely for prizes of minimal value or traditional forms of Indian gaming engaged in by individuals as part of, or in connection with, tribal ceremonies or celebrations.” 25 U.S.C. § 2703(6). Class II gaming includes bingo and card games that are explicitly authorized by a state or “not explicitly prohibited by the laws of the State and are [legally] played at any location in the State.” Id. § 2703(7)(A)(ii). Class II gaming specifically excludes banked card games and slot machines. At issue in this case is class III gaming, the most heavily regulated and most controversial form of gambling under IGRA. Class III gaming includes “all forms of gaming that are not class I gaming or class II gaming.” Id. § 2703(8). It includes the types of high-stakes games usually associated with casino-style gambling, as well as slot machines and parimutuel horse-wagering. Class III gaming is lawful on Indian lands only if three conditions are satisfied: (1) authorization by an ordinance or resolution of the governing body of the Indian tribe and the Chair of the National Indian Gaming Commission (“NIGC”); (2) location in a state that permits such gaming for any purpose by any person, organization, or entity; and (3) the existence of a Tribal-State compact approved by the Secretary of the Interior. Id. § 2710(d)(1). IGRA’s compacting requirement allows states to negotiate with tribes that are located within their borders regarding aspects of class III Indian gaming that might affect legitimate state interests. Id. § 2710(d)(3)(C). The compacting process gives to states civil regulatory authority that they otherwise would lack under Ca-lazón, while granting to tribes the ability to offer legal class III gaming. Keweenaw Bay Indian Cmty. v. United States, 136 F.3d 469, 472 (6th Cir.1998). IGRA also imposes on states an obligation to conduct compact negotiations in good faith, 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(3)(A), and allows tribes to enforce that obligation in federal court, id. § 2710(d)(7)(A). B. California’s Regulation of Indian Gaming Under IGRA After the enactment of IGRA, certain Indian tribes in California sought to negotiate compacts with the State to permit the operation of class III gaming on their reservations. The class III games over which the tribes sought to negotiate — live banked or percentage card games and stand-alone electronic gaming machines (similar to slot machines) — were not permitted under California law. See Cal.Penal Code §§ 330, 330a, 330b. However, California did allow other forms of class III gaming, such as nonelectronic keno and lotto. Rumsey Indian Rancheria of Wintun Indians v. Wilson, 64 F.3d 1250, 1255 n. 1 (9th Cir.1994). During the administration of Governor Pete Wilson, California refused to negotiate with tribes with respect to the forms of gaming that they sought to conduct. Because the State did not permit live banked or percentage card games or slot machine-like devices, it took the view that it had no obligation to negotiate with respect to those games or devices. The tribes argued that, because the State permitted other types of class III games, it could not refuse to negotiate over a particular subset of class III games. See Mashantucket Pequot Tribe v. Connecticut, 913 F.2d 1024, 1030 (2d Cir.1990) (agreeing with the tribe’s position). In Rumsey, this court rejected the tribes’ view, holding that IGRA does not require a state to negotiate over one form of Class III gaming activity simply because it has legalized another, albeit similar form of gaming. Instead, the statute says only that, if a state allows a gaming activity “for any purpose by any person, organization, or entity,” then it also must allow Indian tribes to engage in that same activity. 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(1)(B). In other words, a state need only allow Indian tribes to operate games that others can operate, but need not give tribes what others cannot have. 64 F.3d at 1258. The Rumsey decision meant that the State of California had no obligation under federal law to negotiate with the tribes over the class III gaming that the tribes wanted to operate. The tribes thus resorted to California’s initiative process to impose a state-law obligation on California to negotiate class III gaming compacts. A coalition of California tribes drafted Proposition 5, which required the State to enter into a model class III gaming compact covering banked card games and slot machines. The Proposition required the Governor to execute compacts within 30 days after any federally recognized Indian tribe requested such an arrangement. If the Governor took no action within 30 days, the compacts were deemed approved. Flynt v. Cal. Gambling Control Comm’n, 104 Cal.App.4th 1125, 129 Cal.Rptr.2d 167, 176 (2002), cert. denied, — U.S.-, 124 S.Ct. 398, 157 L.Ed.2d 278 (2003); Cal. Gov’t Code §§ 98000-98012. Proposition 5 also contained a provision waiving California’s sovereign immunity to suits brought under IGRA. See id. § 98005. After the passage of Proposition 5 on the November 1998 ballot, the Hotel Employees and Restaurant Employees International Union filed a petition for a writ of mandate in the California Supreme Court, seeking to prevent the Governor from implementing the Proposition. The union alleged that Proposition 5 violated Article VI, Section 19(e) of the California Constitution, which states that the “Legislature has no power to authorize, and shall prohibit casinos of the type currently operating in Nevada and New Jersey.” The California Supreme Court agreed with the union and issued a peremptory writ of mandate, preventing the Governor from implementing Proposition 5. Hotel Employees & Rest. Employees Int’l Union v. Davis, 21 Cal.4th 585, 88 Cal.Rptr.2d 56, 981 P.2d 990, 1011 (1999). Before the California Supreme Court ruled in Hotel Employees, Governor Gray Davis took office and sought to negotiate class III gaming compacts with several Indian tribes in California. However, once the California Supreme Court issued its ruling, the State no longer had authority to execute the compacts. To address this problem, the Davis administration proposed an amendment to the California Constitution that would exempt Indian tribes from the State’s constitutional prohibition on class III gaming. The Davis administration and various Indian tribes continued to negotiate Tribal-State Compacts, adding a provision that conditioned execution of the compacts on ratification of the proposed state constitutional amendment. In September of 1999, the Governor concluded 57 compacts with Indian tribes. The California legislature quickly ratified all 57 compacts. Artichoke Joe’s, 216 F.Supp.2d at 1096. In March of 2000, California voters ratified Proposition 1A, amending the California Constitution to provide: Notwithstanding subdivisions (a) and (e), and any other provision of state law, the Governor is authorized to negotiate and conclude compacts, subject to ratification by the Legislature, for the operation of slot machines and for the conduct of lottery games and banking and percentage card games by federally recognized Indian tribes on Indian lands in California in accordance with federal law. Accordingly, slot machines, lottery games, and banking and percentage card games are hereby permitted to be conducted and operated on tribal lands subject to those compacts. Cal. Const, art. IV, § 19(f). Shortly after the ratification of Proposition 1A, the Assistant Secretary of Indian Affairs approved the compacts on behalf of the Secretary of the Interior (“Secretary”). He concluded that “[t]he Governor can, consistent with the State’s amended Constitution, conclude a compact giving an Indian tribe, along with other California Indian tribes, the exclusive right to conduct certain types of Class III gaming.” Upon this approval, the Tribal-State Compacts went into effect. The compacts “create a unique opportunity for[each] Tribe to operate its Gaming Facility in an economic environment free of competition from the Class III gaming ... on non-Indian lands in California.” Tribal-State Compact Between the State of California and the Augustine Band of Mission Indians (Mar. 15, 2000), pmbl. E. The compacts condition the operation of class III gaming facilities on tribes’ agreeing to certain revenue-sharing arrangements and paying into a “Special Distribution Fund,” which is used by certain state agencies to cover expenses related to Indian gaming. Since the original 57 compacts took effect, 5 additional compacts have been entered into by the Governor and approved by the Secretary. Artichoke Joe’s, 216 F.Supp.2d at 1096. At present, 39 of the 62 tribes with compacts operate casinos with slot machines. Casinos have become the main source of revenue for Indian tribes in California. Some 44 California tribes are still without compacts, however. Id. C. District Court Proceedings Under Proposition 1A, Indian tribes are the only entities that are permitted to conduct class III gaming in California. California law does not bar non-Indian gaming altogether, however. Player-banked games, such as poker, are permitted in card rooms that generally charge membership fees or hourly rates. Also, California allows charities to engage in bingo for fundraising. Plaintiffs — non-Indians who are currently conducting gaming operations within those regulations— brought this action to challenge the Indians’ exclusive right to conduct class III gaming. Plaintiffs’ gaming operations are not nearly as lucrative as the gaming allowed to tribes. Plaintiffs allege that allowing only Indians to conduct casino gaming violates IGRA and Plaintiffs’ right to equal protection under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. Plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunc-tive relief on four counts of their complaint. Count One charged the federal defendants, namely, the Secretary and Assistant Secretary of the Interior, with violating IGRA and the Fifth Amendment’s guarantee of equal protection by approving California’s Tribal-State Compacts. Count Two sought similar relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Governor Gray Davis, the Director of the California Division of Gambling Control, and the Chair and Members of the California Gambling Control Commission. Plaintiffs alleged that Proposition 1A and the Tribal-State Compacts violate both IGRA and the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause. Plaintiffs sought to invalidate the current Tribal-State Compacts and to bar the Governor from entering into any future Tribal-State compacts (“Prospective Compacts”). Count Three also targeted Prospective Compacts; Plaintiffs sought to enjoin the state defendants from passing legislation thought to precede a compact with the Lytton Band, a tribe that Plaintiffs expected would build a casino near San Francisco. Finally, in Count Four, Plaintiffs sought to enjoin California’s Attorney General, the Director of the California Division of Gambling Control, and the Chair and Members of the California Gambling Control Commission from prosecuting Plaintiffs under the relevant sections of the penal code that proscribe casino-style gaming, so long as the Tribal-State Compacts remain in effect. The district court held that it had “jurisdiction to resolve the claims against the federal defendants, the claims against the Governor related to existing compacts, and the claims against the State Attorney General and the Director of the California Division of Gambling Control as to the enforcement of state gaming laws against plaintiffs.” Artichoke Joe’s, 216 F.Supp.2d at 1090. However, the court dismissed Count Three and Plaintiffs’ other claims as to the Prospective Compacts on the ground that Plaintiffs had failed to demonstrate that they faced an “immediate and imminent” threat of harm from the Prospective Compacts. Id. at 1103. The court also dismissed the California Gambling Control Commission from Counts Two and Four, finding that Plaintiffs had not demonstrated that the threat of enforcement was fairly traceable to the Commission. On the merits, the district court determined that Proposition 1A satisfies IGRA’s requirement that a state “permit” class III gaming “for any purpose, by any person, organization, or entity.” Id. at 1128. The court went on to decide that granting Indian tribes a monopoly on class III gaming does not violate the Fifth or the Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantee of equal protection. Id. at 1132-33. The district court therefore granted Defendants’ motion for summary judgment. Id. at 1133. This timely appeal followed. STANDARD OF REVIEW We review de novo a grant of summary judgment. Robi v. Reed, 173 F.3d 736, 739 (9th Cir.1999). We also review de novo questions of statutory interpretation, Lopez v. Wash. Mut. Bank, 302 F.3d 900, 903 (9th Cir.2002), and questions of the constitutionality of a federal statute, Mayweathers v. Newland, 314 F.3d 1062, 1066 (9th Cir.2002), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 124 S.Ct. 66, 157 L.Ed.2d 20 (2003). ANALYSIS A. Validity of Proposition 1A and the Tribal-State Compacts Under IGRA and the Johnson Act Assessing whether Proposition 1A and the Tribal-State Compacts violate IGRA requires us to interpret 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(1)(B), IGRA’s provision regulating class III gaming on Indian lands. “We interpret a federal statute by ascertaining the intent of Congress and by giving effect to its legislative will.” Ariz. Appetito’s Stores, Inc. v. Paradise Vill. Inv. Co. (In re Ariz. Appetito’s Stores, Inc.), 893 F.2d 216, 219 (9th Cir.1990). “We begin, as always, with the language of the statute.’ ” Navajo Nation v. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 325 F.3d 1133, 1136 (9th Cir.2003) (en banc) (quoting Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 172, 121 S.Ct. 2120, 150 L.Ed.2d 251 (2001)). “When the words of a statute are unambiguous, ... judicial inquiry is complete.” Conn. Nat’l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 254, 112 S.Ct. 1146, 117 L.Ed.2d 391 (1992) (internal quotation marks omitted). ‘Where the language is not dispositive, we look to the congressional intent revealed in the history and purposes of the statutory scheme.” United States v. Buckland, 289 F.3d 558, 565 (9th Cir.2002) (en banc) (internal quotation marks omitted). 1. Statutory Text The parties dispute the proper construction of 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(1)(B), which provides that “[cjlass III gaming activities shall be lawful on Indian lands only if such activities are ... (B) located in a State that permits such gaming for any purpose by any person, organization, or entity.” Construing this provision involves two separate but related questions of interpretation. First, we must decide whether Proposition 1A, which permits class III gaming only on Indian lands, is consistent with § 2710(d)(l)(B)’s requirement that a State be one that “permits such gaming” before a class III gaming compact may take effect. Then we must decide whether “any person, organization, or entity” should be read to exclude Indian tribes. To resolve these questions, we examine the text both in isolation and in the context of the statute as a whole. (a) “permits such gaming” In construing the phrase “permits such gaming” in § 2710(d)(1)(B), we are mindful of cases that characterize as “patent bootstrapping” the notion that a Tribal-State compact can satisfy both the “permits such gaming” requirement under § 2710(d)(1)(B) and the compact requirement under § 2710(d)(1)(C). See Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe of Okla. v. Green, 995 F.2d 179, 181 (10th Cir.1993) (holding that a Tribal-State compact allowing the importation of gambling devices onto a tribe’s lands violated the Johnson Act because, standing alone, the compact could not satisfy § 2710(d)(l)(B)’s “permits such gaming” requirement); United States v. Santa Ynez Band of Chumash Mission Indians of Santa Ynez Reservation, 33 F.Supp.2d 862 (C.D.Cal.1998) (describing games that are illegal under state law as “uncompactable”). However, Proposition 1A distinguishes the present controversy from the “bootstrapping” cases. Proposition 1A does more than authorize the Governor to enter into Tribal-State compacts. It explicitly states that “slot machines, lottery games, and banking and percentage card games are hereby permitted to be conducted and operated on tribal lands” subject to the regulations embodied in the Tribal-State compact. Proposition 1A (emphasis added). Thus, there is law— separate from the compact itself — that “permits such gaming” in certain circumstances. 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(1)(B). Plaintiffs argue that, because California has no authority to “permit” gaming on Indian lands under Cabazon, “permits such gaming” can refer only to the State’s ability to regulate gaming operations conducted on non-Indian lands. When enacting IGRA, Plaintiffs contend, Congress would have known that the State, acting alone, could not “permit” class III gaming on Indian lands and, thus, that a state law providing for class III gaming conducted only by Indian tribes on Indian lands could not satisfy the requirement of § 2710(d)(1)(B). This argument is plausible but does not foreclose an alternative understanding of the verb “permit,” for three reasons: (1) Under Cabazon, California did not lack jurisdiction to apply its prohibition on class III gaming on Indian lands before IGRA was enacted; (2) at the same time Congress passed IGRA, it gave California the regulatory authority that Cabazon took away, 18 U.S.C. § 1166; and (3) we have not construed IGRA’s use of the word “permit” to require a legally binding affirmative act, see Rumsey, 64 F.3d at 1257. Under Cabazon, the Supreme Court applied the long-standing general rule that a state has jurisdiction over Indian lands only if Congress has explicitly ceded that jurisdiction. 480 U.S. at 207, 107 S.Ct. 1083. But see id. at 214-15,107 S.Ct. 1083 (explaining exceptions in which a state may exercise jurisdiction without an express congressional mandate). California claimed that it had jurisdiction over gaming activities on Indian lands pursuant to authority ceded by Public Law No. 280, which conferred “broad criminal jurisdiction over offenses committed by or against Indians within all Indian country within the State.” Id. at 207, 107 S.Ct. 1083. Because California permitted some of the gaming at issue, however, with violations of the law deemed to be mere misdemeanors, the Supreme Court concluded that the statutes actually were regulatory rather than prohibitory (or criminal) in nature. Public Law No. 280 did not confer jurisdiction on the State to regulate gaming and, thus, California could not base its jurisdiction on that statute. Nonetheless, the general criminal jurisdiction that California exercises under Public Law No. 280 allowed California to prohibit gaming for Indian tribes, if the scheme was prohibitory rather than regulatory. Id. at 208, 107 S.Ct. 1083. Therefore, pre-IGRA and post-Cabazon, California still had some jurisdiction over Indian lands pertaining to gaming. IGRA changed the landscape but did not divest California of its general criminal jurisdiction over Indian lands. Rather, it devised a method to give back some of the regulatory authority that the Supreme Court had held inapplicable to Indian lands in Cabazon. One of the bases of the holding in Cabazon was that Congress had not explicitly ceded regulatory authority for gaming to the states in Public Law No. 280 or otherwise. IGRA responded by creating a statutory basis for gaming regulation that introduced the compacting process as a means of sharing with the states the federal government’s regulatory authority over class III gaming. Cabazon, 480 U.S. at 207-14, 107 S.Ct. 1083; 25 U.S.C. §§ 2702(1), 2710(d)(1). Simultaneously, IGRA put into effect 18 U.S.C. § 1166, which provides that “all State laws pertaining to the licensing, regulation, or prohibition of gambling, including but not limited to criminal sanctions applicable thereto, shall apply in Indian country in the same manner and to the same extent as such laws apply elsewhere in the State.” 18 U.S.C. § 1166(a). The federal government retained the power to prosecute violations of state gambling laws in Indian country, so as to preserve the delicate balance of power between the States and the tribes. See Sycuan Band of Mission Indians v. Roache, 54 F.3d 535, 538 (9th Cir.1994) (explaining the limit on a state’s “jurisdiction” to enforce the gambling laws that extend into Indian lands). However, the fact that the federal government retained that power does not change the fact that California may enact laws and regulations concerning gambling that have an effect on Indian lands via § 1166. See United States v. E.C. Invs., Inc., 77 F.3d 327, 330-31 (9th Cir.1996) (discussing the relationship between state law and exclusive federal enforcement power in § 1166(d)). Further, our decision in Rumsey supports a construction of the phrase “permits such gaming” under which California could “permit” gaming on Indian lands both before and after the ratification of Proposition 1A. Rumsey held that, in the statute at issue, “permit” had a clear and unambiguous meaning. 64 F.3d at 1257. “In United States v. Launder, 743 F.2d 686[, 689] (9th Cir.1984), we adopted a [Black’s Law Dictionary definition of the term ‘permit’ as meaning ‘ “[t]o suffer, allow, consent, let; to give leave or license; to acquiesce, by failure to prevent, or to expressly assent or agree to the doing of an act.” ’ ” Rumsey, 64 F.3d at 1257. In other words, under Rumsey, the word “permit” in this statute does not necessarily require an affirmative act of legal authority in order to “permit” conduct. California may “permit” class III gaming within the meaning of IGRA even if it “acquiesces, by failure to prevent” class III gaming. Under Rumsey, mere tolerance of class III gaming might be enough to satisfy § 2710(d)(l)(B)’s requirement that a state “permit[] such gaming for any purpose by any person, organization, or entity.” § 2710(d)(1)(B). Plaintiffs are quick to point out that Rumsey dealt with a state’s obligation to negotiate under IGRA, rather than the limits of a state’s negotiating authority in the compacting process. Indeed, most cases interpreting § 2710(d)(1)(B) have done so in the context of addressing a state’s duty to negotiate with a tribe concerning class III gaming. See, e.g, Rumsey, 64 F.3d at 1258; Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe v. South Dakota, 3 F.3d 273, 279 (8th Cir.1993) (construing the phrase “such gaming” in § 2710(d)(1)(B) in deciding whether the state had to negotiate with the tribes about traditional keno); Mashantucket Pequot Tribe, 913 F.2d at 1029-31 (construing the same provision in deciding which games were subject to negotiation). However material, this distinction does not compel a reading of “permits such gaming” that requires California to legalize non-Indian class III gaming before executing valid compacts under IGRA. We are still left, then, with a statutory provision that is susceptible to more than one interpretation. Neither the statutory text read in isolation nor judicial constructions of it resolve the ambiguity. (b) “any person, organization, or entity” We reach a similar conclusion with respect to the requirement of § 2710(d)(1)(B) that a state permit class III gaming by “any person, organization, or entity.” There is nothing in the text itself that definitively resolves whether Congress intended Indian tribes to fall within the scope of “any person, organization, or entity” under this provision. Plaintiffs interpret this phrase in § 2710(d)(1)(B) to exclude Indian tribes from “any person, organization, or entity,” because they read the subsection simply as a “most-favored nations” clause. If no other class III gaming is permitted in a state, they contend, then federal law bars Indians from conducting such gaming. Under this construction, § 2710(d)(1)(B) merely places Indians on an equal footing with other gambling businesses in the state. As Rumsey put it, after citing § 2710(d)(1)(B), “a state need only allow Indian tribes to operate games that others can operate, but need not give tribes what others cannot have.” 64 F.3d at 1258; see also 18 U.S.C. § 1166(a) (providing that state laws on gambling “shall apply in Indian country in the same manner and to the same extent as such laws apply elsewhere in the State”). There is no statutory provision expressly allowing States to enter into exclusive arrangements with Indian tribes. Plaintiffs reasonably interpret IGRA as a statute that is intended to maintain a competitive balance between Indian and non-Indian gaming interests under California and federal law. Defendants, on the other hand, construe “any person, organization, or entity” to include Indian tribes. Looking only to the text itself, the breadth of the provision does suggest that it is meant to be read inclusively; “permits such gaming for any purpose by any person, organization, or entity” does not lend itself to easy circumscription. 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(1)(B) (emphasis added). The statute does not explicitly exclude Indians from its scope. And Rumsey did not hold that a state may not give tribes what others do not have, but only that a state need not do so. 64 F.3d at 1258. As the district court noted, Congress employed “capacious language” to define those situations in which it would be legal for Indian tribes to conduct class III gaming operations on Indian lands. Artichoke Joe’s, 216 F.Supp.2d at 1121. Nonetheless, the parties’ textual dispute ultimately reduces to what the statute does not say. Because the statute does not explicitly exclude Indians from the phrase “any person, organization, or entity,” Defendants read IGRA to allow state-law provisions legalizing class III gaming monopolies on Indian lands to satisfy the requirements of § 2710(d)(1)(B). Because the statute does not expressly permit Indian tribes to run class III gaming enterprises as a monopoly, Plaintiffs read § 2710(d)(1)(B) to require states to permit class III gaming for any purpose by any non-Indian person, entity, or organization. Looking to past judicial constructions of the text, Defendants have somewhat the better of the argument. In the context of deciding whether California could condition approval of a Tribal-State compact on a tribe’s agreement to certain revenue-sharing and employment provisions, we said that the core of the compact between Indian tribes and the State is the exchange of “the exclusive right to conduct lucrative Las Vegas-style class III gaming, free from non-tribal competition” for the tribes’ agreement “to a number of restrictions and obligations concerning their gaming enterprises.” In re Indian Gaming Related Cases, 331 F.3d at 1104. An Arizona district court reached a similar result in a case deciding that a Tribal-State compact, standing alone, cannot legalize Indian gaming under IGRA. The court read § 2710(d)(1)(B) to require a state to “first legalize a game, even if only for tribes, before it can become a compact term.” Am. Greyhound Racing, Inc. v. Hull, 146 F.Supp.2d 1012, 1067 (D.Ariz.2001), vacated on other grounds, 305 F.3d 1015 (9th Cir.2002) (emphasis added). Similarly, the California Supreme Court, adopting the reasoning of the district court in the present case, has construed § 2710(d)(1)(B) to allow tribal monopolies of class III gaming activities. See Flynt, 129 Cal.Rptr.2d at 178. Although the trend of judicial construction- of § 2710(d)(1)(B) slightly favors Defendants’ view, none of the cases controls the issue before us. (c) The subsection and the statute as a whole Reading 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(1)(B) in the light of IGRA as a whole also fails to resolve the ambiguity conclusively. Looking both to similar text used elsewhere in the statute and to other operational text addressing the application of state law on tribal lands, we find potentially relevant provisions supporting each party’s interpretation of § 2710(d)(1)(B). IGRA uses identical text to govern whether tribes may engage in class II gaming under § 2710(b)(1)(A). A tribe may conduct class II gaming operations only if that tribe is “located within a State that permits such gaming for any purpose by any person, organization or entity.” Plaintiffs argue that the absence of a compacting process for class II gaming shows that the verb “permits” must refer to what states allow on non-Indian lands. They then cite the familiar canon of construction that identical text appearing more than once in the same statute is presumed to have the same meaning. See Batjac Prods., Inc. v. GoodTimes Home Video Corp., 160 F.3d 1223, 1228-29 (9th Cir.1998). However, this argument begs the question whether a state could permit class II gaming only on Indian lands, even without a compacting process. Other sections of the statute that employ text similar to the phrase “any person, organization, or entity” in § 2710(d)(1)(B) lend support both to Plaintiffs’ and Defendants’ interpretations of that text. Section 2710(d)(2)(A) provides that, “[i]f any Indian tribe proposes to engage in, or to authorize any person or entity to engage in, a class III gaming activity on Indian lands of the Indian tribe, the governing body of the Indian tribe shall adopt and submit to the Chairman an ordinance or resolution that meets the requirements of’ § 2710(b). (Emphasis added.) In this provision, the term “any person or entity” implicitly excludes Indian tribes. Other subsections, however, qualify the phrase “any person or entity” when it is meant to exclude Indian tribes. Thus, for example, § 2710(d)(4) restricts a state’s ability to tax gaming activities. It states that IGRA should not be read to authorize the imposition of “any tax, fee, charge, or other assessment upon an Indian tribe or upon any other person or entity authorized by an Indian tribe to engage in class III activity.” (Emphasis added.) Section 2710(b)(4)(A) also qualifies “any person or entity” with the phrase “other than the Indian tribe” when distinguishing between Indian and non-Indian entities. These qualifiers suggest that the unadorned phrase “any person or entity” includes Indian tribes. Looking to other operative text in the statute that addresses the applicability of state law on tribal lands, we again find support for both of the proposed interpretations. Section 2710(b)(4)(A) states that tribal licensing requirements for class II gaming operations must be “at least as restrictive as those established under State law governing similar gaming within the jurisdiction of the State within which such Indian lands are located.” (Emphasis added.) Read narrowly, this text supports the notion that Congress was legislating with the assumption in mind that existing state law would apply to tribal gaming operations — at least insofar as class II gaming is concerned. Read broadly, the text supports Plaintiffs’ interpretation that IGRA confers “most favored nation” status on Indian tribes. Section 2710(d)(5) seems to carry the same assumption to the context of class III gaming, stating that [n]othing in this subsection shall impair the right of an Indian tribe to regulate class III gaming on its Indian lands concurrently with the State, except to the extent that such regulation is inconsistent with, or less stringent than, the State laws and regulations made applicable by any Tribal-State compact.... In establishing consistency between state and tribal gaming regulations, Congress apparently assumed the existence of state regulation of class III gaming. Finally, 18 U.S.C. § 1166 establishes federal jurisdiction over violations of state gaming laws on Indian lands. Section 1166(a) states that, “for purposes of Federal law, all State laws pertaining to the licensing, regulation, or prohibition of gambling, including but not limited to criminal sanctions applicable thereto, shall apply in Indian country in the same manner and to the same extent as such laws apply elsewhere in the State.” This provision suggests that existing state law is expected to apply to both Indian and non-Indian gaming activities. However, § 1166(c)(2), by excluding class III gaming operations conducted under Tribal-State compacts from the term “gambling” in § 1166(a), expressly carves out such operations from this jurisdictional scheme. In summary, an examination of IGRA as a whole fails to resolve the ambiguities inherent in 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(1)(B). We thus turn to sources outside the operative statutory text. 2. Congressional Findings, Purpose, and Legislative History As is true of the operative text, Congress’ statements of intent in enacting IGRA, and IGRA’s legislative history, leave us in equipoise between the parties’ competing interpretations of the statute. Both Plaintiffs and Defendants find support for their respective positions, but no party has directed our attention to, nor can we find, any statement of intent or legislative history that clearly demonstrates that Congress even considered the question before us. The official legislative history of IGRA — the formal record of the Select Committee Report and the subsequent floor debates — is silent on the specific issue of tribal monopolies on class III gaming. This silence does not definitively favor either interpretation of IGRA although, as the district court noted, silence does suggest that tribal gaming monopolies were not at “the forefront of what Congress had in mind.” Artichoke Joe’s, 216 F.Supp.2d at 1121. “Drawing inferences as to congressional intent from silence in legislative history is always a precarious business.” Symons v. Chrysler Corp. Loan Guarantee Bd., 670 F.2d 238, 242 (D.C.Cir.1981). The legislative history conveys quite clearly that Congress devised the Tribal-State compacting process as a means to resolve the most contentiously debated issue in the legislation: which authority— Tribal, State, or Federal — would regulate class III gaming. S.Rep. No. 100-446, at 5-6 (1988), repnnted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3071, 3075-76. Indian tribes resisted ceding any authority over gaming to the states. Id. at 13, reprinted at 3083. The states, on the other hand, resisted tribally or federally regulated class III gaming, especially because many states already had in place regulatory systems for such gaming. Id. IGRA’s drafters conceived of the Tribal-State compact as “the best mechanism to assure that the interests of both sovereign entities are met with respect to the regulation of complex gaming enterprises.” Id. The legislative history thus shows that Congress looked to the compacting process primarily as a means of balancing state and tribal interests. The Select Committee’s articulation of these interests refers only obliquely to the economic concerns of third parties: In the Committee’s view, both State and tribal governments have significant governmental interests in the conduct of class III gaming.... A tribe’s governmental interests include raising revenues to provide governmental services for the benefit of the tribal community and reservation residents, promoting public safety as well as law and order on tribal lands, realizing the objectives of economic self-sufficiency and Indian self-determination, and regulating activities of persons within its jurisdictional borders. A State’s governmental interests with respect to class III gaming on Indian lands include the interplay of such gaming with the State’s public policy, safety, law and other interests, as well as impacts on the State’s regulatory system, including its economic interest in raising revenue for its citizens. Id. (emphasis added). Recognition of the interests of non-Indians is implied, but only as a consideration for the state, not for Congress directly. Plaintiffs direct our attention to parts of the legislative history showing that Congress intended to preserve an environment of free-market competition among entities engaged in class III gaming. Although the notion of free-market competition does appear in the legislative history, it figures most prominently in the context of warning states not to abuse the compacting process to protect non-Indian gaming interests: “It is the Committee’s intent that the compact requirement for class III not be used as a justification by a State for excluding Indian tribes from such gaming or for the protection of other State-licensed gaming enterprises from free market competition with Indian tribes.” Id. This is not to say that the statute’s effect on existing gaming interests was entirely absent from Congress’ deliberations. The Select Committee on Indian Affairs stated that IGRA “allows States to consider negative impacts on existing gaming activities.” Id. at 14, repnnted at 3084. However, the legislative history seems simply to assume (rather than affirmatively to require) existing, competitive gaming activities. Congress intended that IGRA not “allow States to reject Indian gaming on the mere showing that Indian gaming will compete with non Indian games. Rather, States must show that economic consequences will be severe and that they will clearly outweigh positive economic consequences.” Id. Other portions of the legislative history suggest that Congress enacted IGRA with the assumption that States would use laws and regulatory systems that police extant class III gaming operations to regulate similar operations on tribal lands. One goal of IGRA is to “foster a consistency and uniformity in the manner in which laws regulating the conduct of gaming activities are applied.” Id. at 6, re-printed at 3076. The Justice Department opposed the creation of a federal agency to regulate class II and class III gaming activity because, in the Department’s view, “the expertise to regulate gaming activities and to enforce laws related to gaming could be found in state agencies.” Id. at 5, reprinted at 3075. Congress shared the Justice Department’s concern about the effect of tribal class III gaming operations on existing state regulatory systems. The Select Committee noted “the strong concerns of states that state laws and regulations relating to sophisticated forms of class III gaming be respected on Indian lands.” Id. at 13, reprinted at 3083. Its admonition to the states not to use compact negotiations to protect “other State-licensed gaming enterprises,” id., from competition with Indian tribes also reveals the assumption that the class III gaming compacts would be concluded in states with laws and agencies that regulate existing non-Indian class III gaming operations. Other portions of the legislative history support Defendants’ interpretation. We first note that any express congressional consideration of non-Indian gaming interests in the text of IGRA seems to have fallen out as Congress worked through competing drafts of the legislation. As introduced, Senate Bill 555 contained text that provided explicitly for the interpretation that Plaintiffs urge here. Section 11(d)(1) and (2) provided: (1) Except as provided in paragraph (2) of this subsection, class III gaming shall be unlawful on any Indian lands under section 1166 of title 18, United States Code. (2)(A) A gaming activity on Indian lands that is otherwise legal tuithin the State where such lands are located may be exempt from the operation of paragraph (1) of this subsection where the Indian tribe requests the Secretary to consent to the transfer of all civil and criminal jurisdiction, except for taxing authority, pertaining to the licensing and regulation of gaming over the proposed gaming enterprise to the State within which such gaming enterprise is to be located and the Secretary so consents. 133 Cong. Rec. 3740 (1987) (emphasis added). The final version of S.B. 555, however, uses the current, broader text. The current text originated in S.B. 1303, a bill that ultimately failed in committee. Id. at 14332, § 10(b). The fact that the “permits such gaming” text was taken from another bill suggests that the substitution was deliberate, and the particular substitution that the drafters chose implies that Congress intended a broader meaning than the one proposed by Plaintiffs. Further, at least one individual legislator did recognize a preference for Indian gaming. In his separate statement following the Select Committee Report, Senator Evans observed that Indian tribes may have a competitive economic advantage because, rightly or wrongly, many states have chosen not to allow the same types of gaming in which tribes are empowered to engage. Ironically, the strongest opponents of tribal authority over gaming on Indian lands are from States whose liberal gaming policies would allow them to compete on an equal basis with the tribes. S.Rep. No. 100-446, at 36, reprinted at 3105. Although not dispositive as to Congress’ view of class III gaming monopolies, Senator Evans’ comments do show that at least one legislator, and perhaps other interested parties as well, viewed Indian monopolies as a possibility under IGRA. IGRA’s stated purposes also tend slightly to favor Defendants’ interpretation. Section 2702 provides that IGRA’s purpose is (1) to provide a statutory basis for the operation of gaming by Indian tribes as a means of promoting tribal economic development, self-sufficiency, and strong tribal governments; (2) to provide a statutory basis for the regulation of gaming by an Indian tribe adequate to shield it from organized crime and other corrupting influences, to ensure that the Indian tribe is the primary beneficiary of the gaming operation, and to assure that gaming is conducted fairly and honestly by both the operator and players[.] 25 U.S.C. § 2702. Those stated purposes address the Indian tribes’ interests in matters related to their autonomy and the State’s interest in the prevention of crime. Nowhere is there any reference to the idea that IGRA serves as a means of policing equality between Indian and non-Indian gaming operations in the context of class III gaming. At the same time, Congress’ interests in tribal self-sufficiency and self-government do not necessarily translate into approval of state-wide gaming monopolies. The statement of congressional findings in § 2701 is similarly ambiguous: Indian tribes have the exclusive right to regulate gaming activity on Indian lands if the gaming activity is not specifically prohibited by Federal law and is conducted within a State which does not, as a matter of criminal law and public policy, prohibit such gaming activity. Id. § 2701(5). One way to interpret this section is to note that Congress wanted to grant to Indian tribes an “exclusive right,” a right unavailable to non-Indian gaming interests, and to read “such gaming activity” to refer back to the entire phrase “gaming activity on Indian lands.” This reading favors Defendants. It is equally possible, however, to read this section to say that the only “exclusive right” granted is the right “to regulate gaming activity on Indian lands” and thus to read “such gaming activity” to refer back only to the remaining phrase “the gaming activity” which, in general, must be a type of gaming activity that a state does not prohibit. This reading favors Plaintiffs. In sum, an examination of the legislative history and IGRA’s stated purposes does not resolve the ambiguities in the operative text. Both Plaintiffs’ interpretation and Defendants’ interpretation remain plausible. We therefore turn to other interpretive aids. 3. The Blackfeet Tribe Presumption Ambiguity in a statute that is enacted for the benefit of Indians implicates a well-known canon of construction. In Montana v. Blackfeet Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 759, 105 S.Ct. 2399, 85 L.Ed.2d 753 (1985), the Supreme Court held that “the standard principles of statutory construction do not have their usual force in cases involving Indian law. As we said earlier this Term, ‘[t]he canons of construction applicable in Indian law are rooted in the unique trust relationship between the United States and the Indians.’” Id. at 766, 105 S.Ct. 2399 (quoting Oneida County v. Oneida Indian Nation, 470 U.S. 226, 247, 105 S.Ct. 1245, 84 L.Ed.2d 169 (1985)). The Court then described the two canons of construction that apply specially in Indian law, one of which is that “statutes are to be construed liberally in favor of the Indians, with ambiguous provisions interpreted to their benefit.” Id. This presumption, also known as the trust doctrine, grew out of the trust obligation that Congress owes to Indian tribes. Initially, the presumption was applied in the context of Indian treaties as a counterbalance to Congress’ ability to abrogate a treaty obligation unilaterally without a tribe’s consent. See Felix S. Cohen’s Handbook of Federal Indian Law 221-23 (2d ed. 1982) (collecting cases). Later decisions extended this presumption beyond the context of Indian treaties to land disputes, United States v. Santa Fe Pac. R.R., 314 U.S. 339, 62 S.Ct. 248, 86 L.Ed. 260 (1941); state jurisdiction to tax, Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 U.S. 373, 96 S.Ct. 2102, 48 L.Ed.2d 710 (1976); and the application of the Bill of Rights to tribes in matters of self-government, Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 98 S.Ct. 1670, 56 L.Ed.2d 106 (1978). The Blackfeet presumption simply requires that, when there is doubt as to the proper interpretation of an ambiguous provision in a federal statute enacted for the benefit of an Indian tribe, “the doubt [will] benefit the Tribe, for ‘[a]mbiguities in federal law have been construed generously in order to comport with ... traditional notions of sovereignty and with the federal policy of encouraging tribal independence.’ ” Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130, 152, 102 S.Ct. 894, 71 L.Ed.2d 21 (1982) (quoting White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 143-44, 100 S.Ct. 2578, 65 L.Ed.2d 665 (1980)); see also Native Vill. of Venetie I.R.A. Council v. Alaska, 944 F.2d 548, 553 (9th Cir.1991) (applying the Blackfeet presumption when choosing between two interpretations of the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978). This presumption is subject to two implicit limitations. First, the presumption applies only to federal statutes that are “passed for the benefit of dependent Indian tribes.” Hoonah Indian Ass’n v. Morrison, 170 F.3d 1223, 1228-29 (9th Cir.1999) (internal quotation marks omitted). Second, ambiguity is a prerequisite for any application of the Blackfeet presumption. Thus, in Rumsey, we refused to apply the presumption favoring tribes where doing so would contradict the plain words of the statute. 64 F.3d at 1257. Neither of those limitations prevents us from turning to the Blackfeet presumption in this case. As discussed above, the relevant text of the statute is ambiguous. Further, IGRA is undoubtedly a statute passed for the benefit of Indian tribes. IGRA’s declaration of policy, providing that the statute is intended “as a means of promoting tribal economic development, self-sufficiency, and strong tribal governments,” 25 U.S.C. § 2702(1), firmly places the statute in the category of legislation to which the Blackfeet presumption applies. Application of the Blackfeet presumption is straightforward. We are confronted by an ambiguous provision in a federal statute that was intended to benefit Indian tribes. One construction of the provision favors Indian tribes, while the other does not. We faced a similar situation in the context of Indian taxation in Quinault Indian Nation v. Grays Harbor County, 310 F.3d 645 (9th Cir.2002). In choosing between two characterizations of a tax law “plagued with ambiguity,” we adopted the construction that favored the Indian Nation over the one that favored Grays Harbor County, noting that “it is not enough to be persuaded that the County’s is a permissible or even the better reading.” Id. at 647. Here, we must follow a similar approach. We adopt Defendants’ construction, not because it is necessarily the better reading, but because it favors Indian tribes and the statute at issue is both ambiguous and intended to benefit those tribes. Neither of the two exceptions to the application of the Blackfeet presumption causes us pause. The first exception is that deference to an agency’s interpretation can overcome the presumption in favor of Indian tribes. Haynes v. United States, 891 F.2d 235, 239 (9th Cir.1989). But see Navajo Nation, 325 F.3d at 1136 n. 4 (noting a circuit split as to whether deference to an agency’s interpretation takes priority over the Blackfeet presumption). Assuming, without deciding, that the Secretary’s interpretation of § 2710(d)(1)(B) is entitled to deference under Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 104 S.Ct. 2778, 81 L.Ed.2d 694 (1984), and United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 121 S.Ct. 2164, 150 L.Ed.2d 292 (2001), that interpretation likewise adopts Defendants’ construction of the statute and favors Indian tribes. In other words, the Blackfeet presumption and the doctrine of agency deference point to the same result. The second exception involves the avoidance of constitutionally doubtful interpretations of a statute. In Williams v. Babbitt, 115 F.3d 657 (9th Cir.1997), we declined to adopt the Department of the Interior’s interpretation of the Reindeer Industry Act of 1937, 25 U.S.C. §§ 500-500n. Although the agency’s interpretation was “not unreasonable” and was owed Chevron deference, we ruled that the agency’s interpretation raised severe constitutional concerns that prevailed over any deference owed to the agency. Williams, 115 F.3d at 661-62. We reasoned that, because Chevron deference trumps the Blackfeet presumption, and the Supreme Court held in Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Florida Gulf Coast Building & Constr. Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568, 108 S.Ct. 1392, 99 L.Ed.2d 645 (1988), that the doctrine of constitutional avoidance trumps Chevron deference,' it follows that constitutional avoidance also trumps statutory constructions favoring Indians. Williams, 115 F.3d at 663 n. 5. The doctrine of constitutional avoidance requires that “ ‘every reasonable construction must be resorted to, in order to save a statute from unconstitutionality.’ ” Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 190, 111 S.Ct. 1759, 114 L.Ed.2d 233 (1991) (quoting DeBartolo Corp., 485 U.S. at 575, 108 S.Ct. 1392 (emphasis omitted)). Here, we need not invalidate California’s grant to Indian tribes of exclusive class III gambling privileges in order to save the statute from unconstitutionality because, as we are about to explain, Plaintiffs’ constitutional arguments “do not carry the day.” Id. at 191, 111 S.Ct. 1759. Moreover, the privileges granted to Indian tribes do not raise constitutional concerns that are sufficiently “grave” to trigger the application of the doctrine. Id. Rather, the award of exclusive class III gaming franchises simply furthers the federal government’s longstanding trust obligations to Indian tribes and helps promote their economic self-development. As the Supreme Court has cautioned elsewhere, “[statutes should be interpreted to avoid serious constitutional doubts, not to eliminate all possible contentions that the statute might be unconstitutional.” Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 314 n. 9, 113 S.Ct. 1439, 123 L.Ed.2d 1 (1993) (citation omitted). Thus, the doctrine of constitutional avoidance does not apply here. See Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 239, 118 S.Ct. 1219, 140 L.Ed.2d 350 (1998) (stating that “the ‘constitutional doubt’ doctrine does not apply mechanically whenever there arises a significant constitutional question the answer to which is not obvious”). 4. Conclusion IGRA is a statute that Congress enacted for the benefit of Indian tribes. Section 2710(d)(1)(B) remains ambiguous after consulting its text, context, purpose, and legislative history. We therefore apply the Blackfeet presumption and hold that California’s Proposition 1A “permits” class III gaming within the meaning of IGRA by legalizing such gaming operations only when conducted by the “entity” of an Indian tribe. B. Equal Protection Having held that IGRA allows the State of California to grant to the Indian tribes a monopoly on class III gaming, we must decide the second question that Plaintiffs pose: whether that monopoly violates Plaintiffs’ right to equal protection under the laws. The equal protection claim requires us to answer two questions. First, we must decide whether the distinction between Indian and non-Indian gaming interests is a political or a racial classification, so we can determine the proper level of deference that is owed to the classification. Second, we must decide whether, under the applicable standard of review, legitimate state interests justify the grant to Indian tribes of a monopoly on class III gaming. 1. Nature of the Classification in IGRA and in Proposition 1A “In areas of social and economic policy, a statutory classification that neither proceeds along suspect fines nor infringes fundamental constitutional rights must be upheld against equal protection challenge if there is any reasonably conceivable state of facts that could provide a rational basis for the classification.” FCC v. Beach Communications, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 313, 113 S.Ct. 2096, 124 L.Ed.2d 211 (1993). Plaintiffs seek to avoid this deferential standard of review by arguing that the tribal monopoly on class III gaming amounts to a racial preference for Native Americans, which would be subject to strict scrutiny. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227, 115 S.Ct. 2097, 132 L.Ed.2d 158 (1995). A racial preference violates equal protection guarantees unless it is “narrowly tailored” to “further compelling governmental interests.” Id.; see also Rice v. Cayetano, 528 U.S. 495, 120 S.Ct. 1044, 145 L.Ed.2d 1007 (2000) (striking down a race-based voting limitation). In the context of a challenge to legislative classifications relating to Indians or Indian tribes, the starting point for our analysis is Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 94 S.Ct. 2474, 41 L.Ed.2d 290 (1974). In Mancari, the Supreme Court upheld an employment preference for Native Americans seeking positions in the Bureau of Indian Affairs (“BIA”). The class action plaintiffs, who were non-Indian applicants for BIA employment, argued that the preference amounted to invidious racial discrimination that violated their right to equal protection.. The Supreme Court noted that, if credited, the plaintiffs’ argument would call into question the entirety of Congress’ regulation of Indian affairs under Article I, Section 8 of the U.S. Constitution: Literally every piece of legislation dealing with Indian tribes and reservations, and certainly all legislation dealing with the BIA, single out for special treatment a constituency of tribal Indians living on or near reservations. If these laws, derived from historical relationships and explicitly designed to help only Indians, were deemed invidious racial discrimination, an entire Title of the United States Code (25 U.S.C.) would be effectively erased and the solemn commitment of the Government toward the Indians would be jeopardized. Mancari, 417 U.S. at 552-53, 94 S.Ct. 2474. The Court concluded that strict scrutiny did not apply because the preference for Indians relied on a political, rather than a racial, classification. The hiring preference was not directed toward “a ‘racial’ group consisting of ‘Indians’; instead, it applie[d] only to members of ‘federally recognized’ tribes.” Id. at 554 n. 24, 94 S.Ct. 2474. Thus, even if an applicant demonstrated the required quantum of Indian blood, he or she still would have to show membership in a federally recognized tribe in order to qualify for the hiring preference. The Court tied its deferential standard of review to Congress’ interest in furthering tribal sovereignty. The Indians who qualified for the preference were not racially defined, but rather were “members of quasi-sovereign tribal entities whose lives and activities are governed by the BIA in a unique fashion.” Id. at 554, 94 S.Ct. 2474. The preference was also an important part of the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934. “The overriding purpose of that particular Act was to establish machinery whereby Indian tribes would be able to assume a greater degree of self-government, both politically and economically.” Id. at 542, 94 S.Ct. 2474. The Court held that legislative classifications furthering that same purpose were political and, thus, did not warrant strict scrutiny instead of ordinary, rational-basis scrutiny: “As long as the special treatment can be tied rationa