Full opinion text
OPINION COWEN, Circuit Judge. After a wide-ranging investigation into corruption in Philadelphia city government, the federal government obtained convictions against Corey Kemp, the former treasurer of Philadelphia; Glenn G. Hoick and Stephen M. Umbrell, former executives of Commerce Bank; La-Van Hawkins, a businessman from Detroit; and Janice Renee Knight, the nominal owner of a printing company named RPC Unlimited. The appellants challenge their judgments of conviction on a variety of fronts. For the reasons discussed below, we will affirm. I. A. The Charges On November 2, 2004, a grand jury in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania returned a 63-count indictment against Kemp, Hoick, Umbrell, Hawkins, Knight, Ronald White, a Philadelphia-based lawyer with close ties to city government, and four others whose cases proceeded separately. The centerpiece of the indictment charged Kemp, White, Hoick, Umbrell, Knight, and Hawkins with conspiracy to commit honest services fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371. According to the indictment, White acquired control over Kemp’s decision-making by making corrupt payments and gifts to Kemp, and then used that control to direct city contracts to companies that he favored. The indictment alleged that Hawkins aided this arrangement by funneling bribe money from White to Kemp, and that Knight, White’s girlfriend, took advantage of White’s control over Kemp by accepting a steady stream of city business through RPC Unlimited. Moreover, the indictment charged Hoick and Umbrell with participating in the conspiracy by extending, through Commerce Bank, otherwise-unavailable loans to Kemp in exchange for preferential treatment from Kemp on official matters. In addition to the conspiracy charge, the indictment also charged the defendants with numerous counts of honest services mail fraud, honest services wire fraud, extortion, and perjury. Of these charges, four groups are relevant to this appeal. First, Kemp was charged with two counts of honest services mail fraud for his role in an asset-locator business that he created and operated with his friend, Rhonda Anderson. Second, Hoick and Umbrell were charged with eight counts of honest services wire fraud concerning their role in corrupting Kemp. Third, Hawkins was charged with two counts of aiding and abetting wire fraud, concerning his transfer of money to Kemp. Fourth, Hawkins was charged with four counts of perjury stemming from false statements that Hawkins allegedly made while testifying before a grand jury investigating this case. B. The Government’s Evidence Kemp, Hawkins, Knight, Hoick, and Umbrell proceeded together to trial. Opening statements began on February 22, 2005, and the government presented its case over the next six weeks. Central to the government’s case were tape recordings of scores of conversations between the defendants. 1. Evidence Concerning Kemp The government overwhelmingly proved that White showered Kemp with gifts and that Kemp permitted White to wield an untoward influence in selecting which companies would be selected for or excluded from bond teams. Kemp and White’s relationship was accurately encapsulated by Kemp’s statement, after informing White that White would be paid $35,000 to $40,000 for a city contract, “[Y]ou got your boy sitting in the Treasurer’s seat, man!” (App. at 12473.) The government also presented evidence concerning the asset-locator business that Kemp operated with his friend Anderson. Anderson testified that in November 2002, Kemp told Anderson that the treasurer’s office had received a request from a company for a list of bondholders whose bonds had matured but who had not collected their money. Kemp told Anderson that the two of them should create a business offering the same service. Kemp and Anderson hoped tp get paid by the bondholders for facilitating their recovery; Kemp and Anderson agreed that Kemp would receive 40% of the proceeds. Kemp “said that he would have to be paid in cash and that no one could really know about his interest in it because he was treasurer.” (App. at 9006.) According to Anderson, Kemp would receive his share for providing the list of bondholders and generating the forms that had to be filed to permit the banks to pay on the bonds. Anderson ultimately initiated this business, using a company that she co-owned with another Mend. She collected fees of $3,700 and $1,000, and paid Kemp, in cash, a total of $1,300 for his services. 2. Evidence Concerning Hoick and Umbrell The government showed that Hoick and Umbrell, as executives of Commerce Bank, worked mightily to earn contracts and increase cash deposits from Philadelphia. At the same time that they were soliciting this business, Hoick and Umbrell extended five different loans to Kemp. The government contrasted Commerce’s amenability to Kemp once he became treasurer to the fact that just before Kemp took that position, in September 2001, Commerce rejected Kemp’s application for a $2,000 line of credit with a form letter. It was the government’s position that Hoick and Umbrell extended these loans to Kemp for the purpose of influencing his decision-making, while Hoick and Umbrell claimed that the loans were made in the ordinary course of business. The government’s evidence concerning these loans may be summarized as follows: First, the government presented testimony demonstrating that Kemp introduced Paul Schnapp, a member of his family, to Umbrell, and requested a $10,000 loan for Schnapp. Schnapp had filed for bankruptcy two years earlier, and his application for a similar loan had recently been rejected by Wachovia. Commerce required Schnapp’s wife, Teresita, a recent immigrant to the United States with almost no credit history, to co-sign the loan. Schnapp’s loan application indicated that his income was $10,000 a month, but the only supporting documentation demonstrated income in the past month of $1,800. The branch manager wrote to a colleague that “this comes from the top” and was an “easy one,” and Schnapp was approved for an unsecured $10,000 loan days after applying. (App. at 16548.) Second, Commerce provided Kemp with mortgages that allowed him to purchase a $225,000 house with no money down. On November 4, 2002, Umbrell reported to the chairman of Commerce that Kemp had requested a mortgage and that Umbrell and a Commerce mortgage representative would meet with Kemp the following day. Umbrell did meet with Kemp; however, instead of a mortgage representative, the third member of the group was White. The next day, Umbrell approved Kemp’s request to be pre-qualified for a $227,000 mortgage. However, Commerce Bank’s policy was only to provide letters of pre-qualification to those individuals with credit scores of at least 680, and Kemp’s scores ranged from 456 to 526. The government presented evidence that this was not an official Commerce pre-qualification form, but was a singular letter created by Um-brell to benefit Kemp. The initial mortgage was formally approved on November 18, 2002 — before Kemp had even completed an application. Commerce submitted Kemp’s application to its underwriting process, and the application was rejected by the program that Commerce used to rate loans. The report indicated that Kemp’s and his wife’s credit scores ranged from 440 to 528, that Kemp had a past-due liability to Wachovia of over $13,000, and that Kemp owed other creditors an additional $20,000. Thomas Conte, who was the operations manager of Commerce’s mortgage department at the time Kemp’s loan was processed, reviewed the underwriting results and also rejected the application. However, on December 3, 2002, Hoick and Umbrell reversed Conte’s decision and approved the loan. While the loan was initially contingent upon Kemp’s repaying the $33,000 that he owed to creditors, a week later, Hoick and Umbrell waived that condition. Conte testified that this process deviated from Commerce Bank’s standard underwriting procedures. On December 18, 2002, Commerce’s consumer loan department began processing Kemp’s second mortgage loan, for the additional 20% of the purchase price. Commerce’s usual policy was to advance 100% financing only to individuals with a credit score of at least 650 and no charge-offs in the past seven years. Kemp clearly did not meet those requirements — his credit score, as calculated by this underwriting program, was 433, and his charge-off with Wachovia originated within the previous year — and the underwriting program rejected the application. Nevertheless, Um-brell authorized the loan on the basis of Kemp’s “strong bank relationship,” his position as treasurer, and his income. (App. at 16347-48.) Contrary to Umbrell’s claim that Kemp had a strong relationship with Commerce, the government presented evidence that Kemp’s account with Commerce usually contained less that $1,000. Third, in March 2003, Commerce made a $21,300 automobile loan to Kemp. The applicable credit report showed that Kemp’s credit score was 520, which was still below Commerce’s standard requirement of 650, and that Kemp had a prior bad debt to Wachovia (as described above) and an additional prior bad debt to Summit Bank for a 1990 Pontiac Grand Am. Again, the underwriting program did not approve the loan, and again, Umbrell overrode the declination, based on Kemp’s “strong bank relationship” and “positive previous experience.” (App. at 16361.) Fourth, in June 2003, Commerce approved Kemp’s request for a $480,000 construction loan for his church, which had been damaged by lightning. On June 23, 2003, Miriam D’Elia, an attorney at White’s law office, who was handling the closing for Commerce, informed Kemp that the church would not receive any money until it provided all of its specifications and plans. Kemp then called Um-brell, and Umbrell agreed to disburse money to the church for previous expenses as long as Kemp provided invoices — even without providing proof that the church had paid those invoices. Kemp and the church’s pastor then created false invoices so that the church could procure money for invented expenses. The day after Kemp spoke to Umbrell, D’Elia informed Kemp that Commerce’s closing agent, Valerie Coates, was “very concerned” that the church understood it would not receive any money at the closing. (App. at 12449.) Kemp told D’Elia that Umbrell had approved the church’s obtaining money for costs, and D’Elia responded that Coates was “real upset about that.” (App. at 12450.) Coates then joined the conversation, and stated to Kemp, “[YJou’re not expecting any funding [at closing], correct.” (App. at 12452.) Kemp responded that Umbrell had approved the church’s being reimbursed for previous expenses, and Coates said, “Okay, he’s gonna be a bad boy then.” (App. at 12453.) Coates testified that this statement did not mean that Umbrell had acted inappropriately, only that this decision would complicate her work. Kemp and Umbrell spoke again later that day. Kemp asked Umbrell if he would waive any of the closing fees, and Umbrell agreed to waive the $3,500 appraisal fee. The two then discussed the renewal of some of Philadelphia’s certificates of deposit with Commerce. Kemp told Umbrell that Umbrell did not have to work with any of Kemp’s subordinates on the deal, but should talk to Kemp himself, because “I want them to know that you are my f — -king guy- So you get special treatment.” (App. at 12459.) Coates then sent an email to Hoick, asking him to approve the advance of 80% of the church’s as-is value of $150,000; immediately thereafter, Hoick approved. In the file notes for the loan, Coates wrote, “I did what I was told to do.” (App. at 16409.) She testified that this did not denote that she was unhappy with what had occurred, only that her actions had been authorized. Fifth and finally, on July 1, 2003, Um-brell called Kemp, and the two briefly discussed Philadelphia’s deposits with Commerce, and then Kemp stated, “[M]y brother-in-law’s looking to do a small personal loan.... What’s the maximum he can do unsecured?” (App. at 12549-50.) Umbrell responded, “[H]ow much does he need, tell me what he needs, ‘cause then I’ll know what pocket to put it in.” (App. at 12550.) Kemp informed Umbrell that his brother-in-law had “shaky credit,” Um-brell asked if it was “bankruptcy bad,” and Kemp responded in the negative. (App. at 12550.) Umbrell responded, “What do you want to go back and promise him? ... Is [$6,000] enough for you to go back with? ... I’m trying to make you look good ... how much do you want to ... if you want to tell him seventy five hundred, tell him seventy five hundred.” (App. at 12551.) The two ultimately agreed on $7,500, which, as the telephone call made clear, Umbrell approved without so much as seeing an application or speaking to the borrower. The government presented evidence demonstrating that Hoick, Umbrell, and Kemp all understood that in return for these loans, Commerce Bank would receive preferential treatment. Most significant were the circumstances surrounding the city’s selection of Commerce to offer a $30 million line of credit in support of the Neighborhood Transformation Initiative (NTI). In order to select the bank that would offer this line of credit, the city instituted a bidding process, in which interested banks would submit competing financial plans to the city. Soon after Commerce’s submission, Kemp told White to tell Commerce, in the future, not to submit its bid first, because then Kemp could tell White about the other bids so that Commerce could then bid accordingly. Later that day, White called Umbrell, and said, “Listen, uh, somebody told me to tell you that when you guys do these things, don’t ever send your stuff in first.” (App. at 12192.) Umbrell responded, “[Y]ou know I love you, right? ... I know who told you that, ... and I understand why.” (App. at 12192.) White then called Hoick and gave him the same advice. Hoick replied, “I know, I know. Corey said to him not to.” (App. at 12198.) Initially, the two best bids came from Commerce and KBC Bank. KBC offered the lowest interest rate, but Commerce offered to defer interest for an initial period. Kemp told White that he planned to call Commerce and convince them to lower their interest rate, which he did, in a subsequent conversation with Hoick. Thus, Commerce was given the opportunity to submit a second bid. Around this time Kemp met with Donald DiLoreto, a representative of Wachovia Bank, and they discussed the bidding. After then1 conversation, DiLoreto emailed Kemp asking if he could submit an improved bid. Kemp never responded. After Commerce submitted its improved offer, Kemp asked his boss, Janice Davis, if they could award the line of credit to Commerce. Davis told Kemp that if one bank was permitted to rebid, every bank must receive the same opportunity. Neither Davis nor the representatives of the five banks who submitted bids expected that any bank would have a chance to enter a second bid. Nevertheless, on Davis’s orders, Kemp opened another round of bidding. After the second round of bidding began, Hoick and Umbrell discussed the situation in a telephone call with White. Hoick appeared confused by the process, stating “you know we made ... the revised proposal to Corey? ... And something’s not smelling right.” (App. at 12256.) White assured Hoick and Umbrell that they did not have to worry. This was good advice: Commerce’s new bid, which conformed to Kemp’s demand, was the best one -and Commerce won the line of credit. The government presented evidence demonstrating that none of the other banks received any inside information about what to bid. The corruptness of the process was starkly described in a telephone call between Kemp and Reverend Frank McCracken, where Kemp stated: Listen [Commerce Bank] better take care of me man, I’m hooking ‘em up. Did my thing. ‘Cause, I got a conference call at four, three thirty and that’s on ah a line of credit. I got a thirty million dollar line of credit from Commerce Bank for the city.... Ah, it was a bid though, it was a bid. And they, um, they bid, they were they were like in second place right, so I called Steve and I said Steve, look, this is what you all got to beat. See, you didn’t hear it from me, but then they came back. (App. at 12557-58.) 3. Evidence Concerning Hawkins The government’s evidence against Hawkins primarily concerned three events: Hawkins’s providing Kemp with a check for $5,000 dated March 10, 2002; Hawkins’s providing Kemp with a check for $5,000 dated September 25, 2002; and a meeting that Hawkins attended with Kemp, White, and businessman Aslam Khan. The government focused on these events in an attempt to prove both that Hawkins had joined the conspiracy and that he had committed perjury when he subsequently testified about these events before a grand jury. The first check was dated March 10, 2002, was written on the account of one of Hawkins’s companies, was made out to Kemp, and was signed by Hawkins. The government presented evidence that White, but not Kemp, was present in Detroit on March 10, that Kemp had been married 20 months prior to that time, and that Kemp successfully cashed the check. When Hawkins testified before a grand jury about circumstances surrounding this $5,000 check, however, he claimed that White and Kemp were in Detroit because White was throwing a bachelor party for Kemp. According to Hawkins, Kemp and White went to Hawkins’s office, and White asked Hawkins to write a $5,000 check for Kemp as a wedding present. Hawkins stated that the check was never cashed. The second check was dated September 25, 2002, and was written on Hawkins’s personal account. Hawkins filled out the entire cheek except for the payee information. The government showed that on September 25, Kemp, but not White, was present in Detroit. This check bounced twice, and was ultimately replaced by a wire transfer sent from Hawkins’s account to Kemp’s account. The government showed that White had written a check to Hawkins for $5,000 dated September 23, 2002. During his grand jury testimony, Hawkins testified that on September 25, 2002, he and White were together in Detroit. He explained that he gave the check to White to give to an association of African-American newspapers, who had been helping him in ongoing litigation against Burger King. Hawkins stated that the $5,000 was supposed to be part of a $15,000 donation that he had promised to the association. When asked why White had so recently written Hawkins a check for $5,000, Hawkins answered that the check could either have been to reimburse him for the first check he wrote to Kemp or to repay part of the $40,000 that Hawkins had loaned to White. Hawkins testified that the loan had been made from cash that he kept in his drawer. The third salient event concerned a business meeting between Hawkins, Khan, Kemp, and White. As background, the government showed that in 2002, Hawkins joined a venture that was seeking to purchase AFCE, which owned and operated restaurants such as Popeye’s, Church’s, and Cinnabon. The cost of this venture was estimated to be between $600 million and $1 billion. To raise this capital, Hawkins sought investments from pension funds, including Philadelphia’s fund. To that end, on January 22, 2003, Hawkins and other members of his group met in White’s office with White, Kemp, and Tony Johnson, Philadelphia’s chief investment officer, and attempted to convince Philadelphia officials to invest. Two days after that meeting, Hawkins rented a private jet to transport Kemp and White to the Super Bowl, at a cost of approximately $58,000. In the spring of 2003, the AFCE deal stalled, and Hawkins redirected his focus to acquiring almost 100 Church’s Fried Chicken franchises from Aslam Khan. On April 21, 2003, Hawkins discussed this deal with White. Hawkins explained that he needed to raise some money, and hoped to acquire an investment from Philadelphia’s pension fund, which was controlled by Anthony Johnson. In a May 2, 2003 phone call, Hawkins told White that he was going to “need you to have Tony [Johnson] to come to New York.” (App. at 12011.) White responded that if he could not get Johnson, he would bring Kemp; Hawkins was amenable to that alternative arrangement. On May 6, 2003, Hawkins called White and reminded him of the meeting “that I needed you to have Corey at.” (App. at 12033.) Hawkins explained that he just needed Kemp “to keep this guy in the hole,” so that he would think that Hawkins was “gettin’ 20 million.” (App. at 12034.) On May 8, 2003, Hawkins, Khan, White, and Kemp met in New York. Kemp, who apparently believed that the purpose of the meeting was to discuss the possibility of Church’s expanding into Philadelphia, said that he was “speaking on behalf of the administration,” and that “we will do whatever we can that’s in our power in the City’s Administration to help this along.” (App. at 12057-58.) Hawkins then prompted Kemp that first, Hawkins needed to raise $40 million to purchase the existing franchises. Kemp replied that he liked what he had heard and promised to take the proposal back to the administration. Kemp’s boss, Davis, testified that Kemp did not have the authority to talk about the city’s pension funds and that she would have fired him if she knew about this meeting. Hawkins also testified before the grand jury about this meeting. He explained that the meeting was held because Khan was interested in bringing Church’s Chicken into Philadelphia, and he believed that White would be useful in accomplishing that goal. He testified that he did not know why Kemp was present, did not know in advance that Kemp would be there, and had only asked White to bring someone to the meeting who was familiar with the lay of the city and could describe potential franchise locations to Khan. Hawkins explained that Kemp had been present at the previous meeting in Philadelphia concerning Hawkins’s attempted purchase of AFCE, and had, after completing a market survey, reported on the opportunities that were available for fast-food restaurants in Philadelphia. 4. Evidence Concerning Knight Janice Knight, White’s girlfriend, was the nominal owner of RPC Enterprises, a printing company. The government presented evidence that White worked tirelessly to ensure that RPC was chosen as the printer for bond deals, and acted as the de facto president of the company. Moreover, the government adduced testimony that RPC lacked the equipment to perform printing jobs itself, and instead, farmed the jobs out to a separate company in New Jersey. Instead of negotiating fees with RPC, Kemp simply informed RPC what the city’s budget was, and paid RPC the maximum allotted. Thus, during the time that Kemp was treasurer, RPC charged the city for $308,000 of work, despite the fact that the New Jersey company had charged RPC only $89,000. C, Allegations of Juror Misconduct and the Discharge of Juror 11 On April 13, 2005, the case was presented to the jury. On April 27, 2005, the District Court discharged a juror, concluding that she was biased against the government. The' District Court had received its first indication that something was amiss with the jury on April 18, 2005. That afternoon, the court received two notes from jurors. The first note stated: Your honor, the following note was handed to me in confidence and asked that you see it. I have read it and can confirm the statements were made. The person mentioned is making the rest of the group retry the case in the jury room. We are at a stalemate in the deliberation process. Evidence is being produced at the juror’s request and when it is produced, it is being disregarded. I feel that several jurors are removing themselves from the deliberation process because they feel this effort is futile. We are slowly losing jurors as the days go by, not for lack of interest or commitment to their civic duty but for the fact that nothing they can do or say will matter. (App. at 10680.) The note also requested simple definitions of the terms “intent,” “reasonable doubt,” and “conspiracy.” The second note stated: Dear Foreperson: I have concerns regarding our deliberations. I feel I must keep an open mind, evaluate the evidence and make an effort to remain neutral. When the following comments are made by a fellow juror, I have concerns about that person’s motivation and honesty. 1. “The government lies. They always lie.” 2. “English is his second language — he didn’t understand what he was saying.” 3. “How would you be! She was having chemotherapy!” 4. “I’ve interviewed many people and I know when they are on drugs.” I have tried to pass RPC book from RW’s office to the person, they refuse to look at what I was referring to, sat back in chair, closed eyes and folding their arms across their chest. I also resent the statement you are all benefitting from Ron White — two months of my civic duty should be ended with conversations with fellow jurors that have open minds. Perhaps I am trying to be too open minded. Any suggestions? (App. at 10691-92.) In response to these notes, the judge called the jury into the courtroom. Then, before re-instructing the jurors on intent, reasonable doubt, and conspiracy, he stated: You have been terrific citizens. You have given up your daily lives to come in here and perform your civic duty. That is very, very important. That is appreciated by everyone. When you became jurors, you took an oath and your oath was to follow the law and part of that oath is to deliberate, and you must, as part of that oath, deliberate with each other and discuss the evidence and discuss the law and try to reach a verdict. Now, in trying to reach a verdict, you should not give up any beliefs which you have that you believe are true and sincere and that you hold to be warranted as a result of sitting as jurors and listening to this case for the last eight weeks. At the same time though, it is your duty and obligation as jurors to listen to what the other jurors say and to consider their arguments, to consider what they recall about the evidence, to consider what they recall about the law, to consider their evaluation of the witnesses and you should listen to each other and they should listen to you. So it’s important that, in the deliberative process, that all of you engage in this process of deliberating but if you have a sincere belief that the others are wrong and you are right, you are entitled to hold on to that and maintain that but you still have the duty to deliberate and discuss with each other what you believe the evidence is and why you believe it. That is part of the duty of each juror to deliberate and if you still, after doing that, you still have your own sincere belief and you believe you are right, you are entitled to maintain it but please remember, the duty to deliberate is part of your oath as being jurors. (App. at 10699-700.) The following day, the judge received two more notes. The first note stated: I am finding it very difficult to deliberate with a juror who will not acknowledge any of the evidence. The juror has made comments when presented with the evidence, “show it to someone who cares.” The juror has continually referred to notes and used them as the evidence, also crosses arms over chest, leans back into chair and closes eyes and will not look over the evidence. Has made comments about “government lying.” “FBI is biased.” And “one defendant has been on chemotherapy” and 11 of us are benefitting from Ron White, (i.e. the payment we are receiving from jury duty), using analogies that does not pertain to anything. (App. at 10739.) The second note stated: I’m concerned with one of my fellow jurors’ comments during deliberations. I know every juror has their right to state feelings and opinions. Some of the remarks that I’ve hear from one individual makes me feel as though there is more bias than normal deliberations, comments such as, 1. Prosecutors and FBI agents are liars. 2. Using sympathy and feelings as factors in deliberations. 3. Saying all the jurors are receiving benefits, courtesy of Ron White. I don’t know if I should be doing this but if I didn’t, I don’t think justice was served. (App. at 10739-40.) After receiving this note, the court heard argument from all counsel, and resolved to question each juror individually. The court asked three questions of each juror, in camera: (1) “Are you personally experiencing any problems with how the deliberations are proceeding without telling us anything about the votes as to guilt or innocence? If yes, describe the problem.” (2) “Are all the jurors discussing the evidence or lack of evidence?” (3) “Are all the jurors following the court’s instructions on the law?” (App. at 10758.) The jurors’ responses may be summarized as follows: Juror 1: There was a problem at one point, but at the moment all jurors were acting appropriately. Juror 2: Juror 11 was very prejudiced against individuals based on their occupation. Juror 3: While deliberations were stressful, all jurors were acting appropriately. Juror 4: All jurors were properly discussing the evidence or lack of evidence, but sometimes certain jurors refused to look at evidence that other jurors found pertinent. Juror 5: All jurors were acting appropriately. Juror 6: All jurors were acting appropriately. Juror 7: All jurors were acting appropriately. Juror 8: Juror 11 was refusing to consider evidence. Juror 9: Juror 11 sometimes refused to look at evidence presented by other jurors, and was reasoning illogically. However, the jurors had made a break that day and it seemed that the deliberations were progressing. Juror 10: All jurors were acting appropriately. Juror 11: The jurors were making progress. Juror 12: AJI jurors were considering the evidence, but one juror said that the prosecutors were lying and that all jurors were receiving benefits from Ron White. The District Court decided, on the basis of these responses, that no further instructions were necessary. The next day the judge received a note stating “the hearing in your chambers has helped facilitate the deliberations.” (App. at 10791.) Despite these glad tidings, on April 25, the jurors passed a note to the judge stating: Your Honor, deliberations have stopped! One of the jurors has changed their mind over the weekend on several counts that were decided last Thursday. The reasons stated by the juror are illogical. The following jurors do not believe further deliberations will be at all beneficial. It is unfair to the defendants, the lawyers, and the people of Philadelphia to continue deliberations in this manner. (App. at 10862.7.) The note was signed by nine jurors. Based on this note, the court decided to question the jurors individually a second time. The judge asked each juror: (1) “Is there any juror or jurors who are refusing to deliberate?” (2) “Is there any juror who is refusing to discuss the evidence or lack of evidence?” (3) “Is there any juror who is refusing to follow the Court’s instructions?” (App. at 10862.20.) The jurors’ responses are as follows: Juror 1: Juror 11 did not seem to be deliberating, but was discussing the evidence and following the instructions. Juror 2: Juror 11 was not cooperating and was refusing to discuss the evidence. Juror 3: Three jurors were refusing to listen to the others, with Juror 11 particularly culpable. Juror 4: Juror 11 was refusing to deliberate and discuss the evidence. Juror 5: One juror was refusing to deliberate. Juror 6: All jurors were acting appropriately. Juror 7: Juror 11 was refusing to follow the court’s instructions. Juror 8: Juror 11 was refusing to deliberate and discuss the evidence. Juror 9: Juror 11 was refusing to discuss the evidence. Juror 10: All jurors were acting appropriately. Juror 11: One or two jurors seemed to feel that they were done talking about certain topics. Juror 12: Juror 11 was refusing to deliberate and discuss the evidence. Immediately after completing this voir dire, the judge received a note stating that “the jury did not feel the right questions were asked.” (App. at 10862.43.) The jurors suggested the following questions: 1. Why have the jurors stopped deliberating? 2. Are jurors looking at the evidence logically and forming a reasonable opinion about each individual count? 3. Have jurors entered into deliberations with preconceived notions or prejudices? 4. Can you summarize the deliberations and how you feel they are progressing? 5. Are jurors using emotions rather than evidence to rule on certain counts? Most counts? 6. Your Honor, is it possible to allow the jurors to expand on their answers? (App. 10862.43-44.) Upon receiving this note, the judge dismissed the jury for the day to allow himself time to consider how to proceed. The next day, the judge provided additional instructions to the jurors. The judge first told the jurors that the questions he had asked the day before were “the only questions which [he felt he was] entitled to ask at that time,” so as to avoid intruding into the jury deliberations. (App. at 10874.) He stated, however, that he could “ask questions to [ensure] that all of you are following your oaths as jurors, that you are reviewing the evidence, that you are deliberating with each other and that you are following my instructions.” (App. at 10876.) The judge then reminded the jurors that they were under oath, and that they had promised to decide the case fairly and impartially without being swayed by either the race or the occupation of the defendants and witnesses. The judge reiterated that the jurors were prohibited from using prejudice or bias in making decisions, and explained that if any juror did so, that juror was not following his instructions. The court also re-instructed the jurors about their duty to deliberate, but emphasized that “if you come to different views of the facts, you are entitled to maintain those views as long as you consider the views of others.” (App. at 10882.) The next day (April 27), the judge received three notes. The first asked legal questions. The second was from Juror 11, and stated: Is it permissible to discuss the fact that we have heard only selected portions of selected phone calls and to try to evaluate what this might mean in determining what was going on and what people intended to do? Can you consider omitted evidence— for example, the prosecution only showed us what they wanted to show? Is it permissible to try to illustrate how two people might understand a conversation differently? (App. at 10896.) The third note asked two preliminary questions, and then stated, “How do we inform the court a juror has violated his or her oath (i.e., biased against the government. States prosecution makes up stories).” (App. at 10896.) The court then instructed the jury about the legal questions contained in the notes, and concluded: “Ladies and gentlemen, as I said yesterday, bias is a violation of a juror’s oath. If one of you or more of you believe that a juror is biased against the government, I instruct you to send me another note, saying that you believe that, and then the remedy is that I will have the jury come into the conference room again, one by one.” (App. 10922.) After hearing argument from counsel, the court clarified a few points with the jurors, including the bias instruction. The court stated: I want to make it clear that when we talk about bias ... we are talking about bias against a specific type of person or against a specific occupation or bias against the prosecution and that the juror is unwilling to put aside that bias. If the juror or jurors say, they don’t believe someone or a particular piece of evidence, that is not bias. That is just a discussion on the evidence presented in the case. But as I said before, if there are jurors who believe that a juror is unwilling to put aside bias, is using bias, that is something you should send me a note about.... (App. at 10935-36.) Soon afterward, the court received two more notes. The first stated: I believe the following statements reflect bias by a juror: The government lies. The prosecution made it up. They couldn’t get Ron White so they made this up about Corey Kemp. They didn’t play all of the calls. They omitted evidence. You didn’t hear what they didn’t want you to hear. The FBI lies. The government didn’t present the evidence to prove anything. (App. at 10949.) The second note, signed by the foreman, stated simply, “[A]sk the three questions again in your chambers.” (App. at 10949.) Based on these notes, the court conducted another individual voir dire, which yielded the following information: Juror 1: Juror 11 refused to deliberate and discuss the evidence, and would not put aside her bias. Juror 2: Juror 11 refused to deliberate and discuss the evidence, and was very prejudiced against the government. Juror 2 also stated: “You just can’t talk to [Juror No. 11]. She goes nuts. She starts banging on the table. She won’t listen to us. Won’t let anybody get a word in edge-wise.... If we present her with evidence, she flips through her notes and does not want to hear any evidence.” Juror 2 went on to emphasize that “[Juror No. 11] is totally against the government. We have heard her say, the FBI are nothing but a bunch of liars.” Juror 3: Three jurors had a difficult time listening to each other, but Juror 11 just shut down and refused to look at evidence that was shown to her. Juror 11 was also off task and biased against the FBI and the government. Juror 3 also stated: “People disagree on a lot of things. But when the arguments are with 11, it’s just like slamming your head into a wall.” Juror 4: Juror 11 refused to deliberate or discuss the evidence, and was biased. Juror 5: All jurors were deliberating and discussing evidence, but Juror 11 was “a bit biased, not tending enough to the evidence and instructions.” Juror 6: All jurors were deliberating, and Juror 11 was not biased, but did refuse to look at the evidence. Juror 7: All jurors were deliberating, but Juror 11 was refusing to discuss the evidence. Further, Juror 11 was biased to a point concerning witnesses’s occupations and was allowing that to cloud her judgment. However, she was not letting it affect her “that much.” Juror 8: Juror 11 was refusing to deliberate and would not look at any evidence. She also was biased and unable to put that bias aside. Juror 9: Juror 11 was refusing to deliberate and would not look at evidence that was presented to her. Juror 11 also held prejudices against the government or the FBI, and was unwilling to put those prejudices aside. Juror 10: Juror 11 refused to deliberate, ignored evidence, carried a personal agenda, and was biased. Juror 11: No jurors were refusing to deliberate or discuss the evidence. However, some people had difficulty focusing on the specific elements of a crime instead of just concluding that a defendant was guilty because the juror disapproved of the defendant’s behavior. The jurors had been attempting to rule on guilt or innocence count by count, which was difficult for her, because so many of the issues were interrelated. Once the jury began to evaluate evidence on a different issue, Juror 11 said, “[WJait a minute here, this contradicts what we agreed to back here.... I agreed with you about here now I’m looking at this evidence and I don’t think that is there anymore.” All the jurors were working to put aside their biases. When asked whether she was biased against the FBI, Juror 11 responded that she didn’t think so, and that her comments concerning the FBI were made only to refute another juror’s statement that they only had to consider the FBI’s evidence. She had not claimed that FBI agents always lie; instead, she had said that they are “probably accomplished liars” from doing undercover work, and that they are therefore probably skilled at detecting when someone is lying to them. Juror 12: Juror 11 was refusing to deliberate or discuss evidence, and was biased against law enforcement. Speaking of Juror ll’s bias, Juror 12 stated that “it’s not the witnesses in the trial. It’s the preconceived notion that law enforcement lies, they are telling lies.” Juror 11 then asked to return to clarify her previous statements. She stated that she had actually said that she “thought FBI agents were among the most credible witnesses because they were careful to say what they believed to be the truth and to distinguish fact from opinion.” (App. at 11062.) She also claimed to have said that one agent may have been biased going into his interview with Janice Knight because he had previously heard so much incriminatory information about her. To recap, eight jurors (1-4, 8-10, 12) stated in clear terms that Juror No. 11 violated her duty to deliberate in good faith and to be free of preconceived biases that informed her decision-making. Juror No. 11 denied any allegations of bias or a refusal to deliberate. Juror No. 5 stated that no juror was refusing to deliberate or discuss the evidenee/lack of evidence, and that all the jurors were following the District Court’s instructions. This juror also stated that Juror No. 11 was “a bit biased, not tending enough to the evidence and instructions, but we are working on that.” Juror No. 6 stated that Juror No. 11 was not refusing to follow the instructions, and that she was not biased either. However, Juror No. 6 did note that Juror No. ll’s answers were “pretty much set in stone,” making it “hard to show her the evidence.” Juror No. 7 stated that no juror was refusing to deliberate, although he believed that Juror No. 11 refused to consider the evidence or lack of evidence. Juror No. 7 also noted that Juror No. 11 expressed bias against certain occupations. Based on these responses, the court granted the government’s motion to discharge Juror 11. The court stated: We have 11 out of the 12 jurors have made affirmative responses to at least one of the questions that I posited to them concerning juror number 11.... I find that the other 11 jurors are more credible than juror number 11. And to put it bluntly, I find that juror number 11 is in denial. She is articulate but she is not credible. You cannot balance her testimony that she made here against 11 of her fellow jurors. I find that they are more credible than she is, and I find that she is biased against the government. ... I find that she has come in here and tried to articulate using an educated background. She is articulate but she is in total denial of what I find to be the facts as expressed by the other 11 jurors.... (App. at 11079-80.) The District Court then seated an alternate juror who had been sequestered during the first round of deliberations. D. The Verdict On May 10, 2005, the reconstituted jury returned its verdict. Kemp was convicted of conspiracy, seven counts of wire fraud, 11 counts of mail fraud, one count of attempted extortion, one count of extortion, two counts of making false statements to a bank, and four counts of filing a false income tax return; Hawkins was convicted of one count of wire fraud and three counts of perjury; Hoick and Umbrell were convicted of conspiracy and two counts of wire fraud; and Knight was convicted of two counts of making false statements to the FBI. The jury also acquitted the defendants or was unable to reach a verdict on a number of charges. Ultimately, the District Court sentenced Kemp to 120 months’ imprisonment, Hoick to 28 months’ imprisonment, Umbrell to 27 months’ imprisonment, Hawkins to 33 months’ imprisonment, and Knight to 5.5 months’ imprisonment. All five defendants then filed timely appeals. II. We have jurisdiction of an appeal from a judgment of conviction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. III. The appellants challenge their convictions on many grounds. Kemp argues that the government failed to present sufficient evidence to support his convictions for mail fraud relating to his asset-locator business. Hoick and Umbrell challenge them wire fraud convictions by arguing that the indictment failed to state an offense, the District Court erroneously instructed the jury, and the government presented insufficient evidence to sustain the convictions. Hoick and Umbrell also argue that their conspiracy convictions must be vacated because there was a prejudicial variance between the crime charged in the indictment and the evidence adduced at trial. Hawkins claims that the government presented insufficient evidence to support his convictions for wire fraud and perjury, that the District Court’s jury instructions on wire fraud omitted an essential element, and that the Court wrongly admitted several forms of unfairly prejudicial evidence. Finally, all appellants contend that the District Court erred by individually questioning the jurors upon receiving complaints of juror misconduct and then discharging Juror 11. We consider each of these sundry claims in turn. A. Kemp’s Mail Fraud Convictions Kemp claims that the government presented insufficient evidence to support his convictions for honest services mail fraud concerning his role in the asset-locator business for which he received $1,300. We review sufficiency-of-the-evidence challenges with particular deference to the jury’s verdict. United States v. Dent, 149 F.3d 180, 187 (3d Cir.1998). Because Kemp did not raise this argument to the District Court in his motion for acquittal, we review for plain error. United States v. Vampire Nation, 451 F.3d 189, 203 (3d Cir.2006). Plain error requires: “(1) an error; (2) that is plain; and (3) that affected substantial rights.” Id. As we will explain, the jury’s conclusion on this count was supported by the evidence and not plain error. To prove mail fraud, the government must establish “(1) the defendant’s knowing and willful participation in a scheme or artifice to defraud, (2) with the specific intent to defraud, and (3) the use of the mails ... in furtherance of the scheme.” United States v. Antico, 275 F.3d 245, 261 (3d Cir.2001). Congress has clarified that “the term ‘scheme or artifice to defraud’ includes a scheme or artifice to deprive another of the intangible right of honest services.” 18 U.S.C. § 1346. Honest services fraud, in turn, typically occurs in either of two situations: “(1) bribery, where a [public official] was paid for a particular decision or action; or (2) failure to disclose a conflict of interest resulting in personal gain.” Antico, 275 F.3d at 262-63. The government pursued both of these discrete theories in prosecuting the mail fraud counts at issue. Kemp maintains that his convictions must be vacated because the government presented insufficient evidence to prove honest services fraud under either the bribery theory or the failure-to-disclose theory. Because Kemp challenges the sufficiency of the evidence of these two theories, and has not argued that either was legally invalid or unconstitutional, we will affirm if the evidence is sufficient to support a judgment on either theory. See United States v. Syme, 276 F.3d 131, 144 (3d Cir.2002) (explaining that “if the evidence is insufficient to support a conviction on one alternative theory in a count but sufficient to convict on another alternative theory that was charged to the jury in the same count, then a reviewing court should assume that the jury convicted on the factually sufficient theory and should let the jury verdict stand”). Here, a reasonable jury could conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that Kemp “was paid for a particular decision or action,” Antico, 275 F.3d at 263, and thus convict him of honest services fraud under a bribery theory. The government presented evidence that Kemp and Anderson had an arrangement where Anderson would locate owners of unredeemed city bonds and attempt to help them cash their bonds. This project required Kemp to exercise his authority as treasurer: he provided Anderson with a list of holders of outstanding bonds and a form letter for her to use; also, the treasurer’s office was responsible for contacting the banks to facilitate the ultimate repayment. When Anderson was asked at trial what Kemp would contribute to the business to earn his share of its proceeds, she identified only these first two official actions. A reasonable jury certainly could have concluded that Kemp was paid for the reasons that Anderson pinpointed — taking official action that aided the business. Kemp argues that he was paid not for taking particular actions but because he held a stake in the business. However, Anderson testified that the company was formally owned by her and a friend, and not Kemp. While Kemp did suggest the idea of the asset-locator business to Anderson, a reasonable jury could have found it more likely that Kemp was paid $1,300 for taking actions in favor of the business than for providing an inchoate idea. We have repeatedly recognized that accepting money in exchange for an official action is a form of honest services fraud. See United States v. Panarella, 277 F.3d 678, 690 (3d Cir.2002); Antico, 275 F.3d at 262-63. As Pennsylvania law provides, “public office is a public trust and ... any effort to realize personal financial gain through public office other than compensation provided by law is a violation of that trust.” 65 Pa. Cons.Stat. § 1101.1. Here, the government presented sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that Kemp violated that trust by soliciting and accepting payment in exchange for taking official action. Accordingly, we find no plain error and reject Kemp’s challenge to his mail fraud convictions. B. Hoick’s and Umbrell’s Wire Fraud Convictions 1. Challenge to the Indictment Hoick and Umbrell lead off their attack on their wire fraud convictions by arguing that their convictions under the bribery theory of honest services fraud must be vacated because that theory was not charged in the indictment. We deem an indictment sufficient so long as it “(1) contains the elements of the offense intended to be charged, (2) sufficiently apprises the defendant of what he must be prepared to meet, and (3) allows the defendant to show with accuracy to what extent he may plead a former acquittal or conviction in the event of a subsequent prosecution.” United States v. Vitillo, 490 F.3d 314 (3d Cir.2007) (internal quotation marks omitted). Moreover, “no greater specificity than the statutory language is required so long as there is sufficient factual orientation to permit the defendant to prepare his defense and to invoke double jeopardy in the event of a subsequent prosecution.” United States v. Rankin, 870 F.2d 109, 112 (3d Cir.1989). We exercise plenary review over this challenge. United States v. Hedaithy, 392 F.3d 580, 590 n. 10 (3d Cir.2004). We conclude that the indictment here adequately charged Hoick and Um-brell with the bribery theory of honest services wire fraud. The wire fraud counts of the indictment (counts 15-22) plainly alleged honest services fraud, charging Hoick and Umbrell with engaging in “a scheme to defraud the City of Philadelphia and its citizens of the right to defendant COREY KEMP’S honest services in the affairs of the City of Philadelphia.” (App. at 587.) Then, the specific factual allegations' — some of which were incorporated by reference to the allegations of the conspiracy charge, see Fed. R.Crim.P. 7(c)(1) (“A count may incorporate by reference an allegation made in another count.”); see also United States v. Markus, 721 F.2d 442, 444 (3d Cir.1983)— were sufficient to alert Hoick and Umbrell that the government planned to pursue both theories. The indictment refers to “the benefits that HOLCK and UM-BRELL extended to Kemp with the intent to influence KEMP’s official actions” (App. at 491), and charges that “defendants GLENN K. HOLCK and STEPHEN M. UMBRELL, on behalf of their employer, Commerce Bank, provided benefits to Kemp in the form of otherwise unavailable loans in exchange for favorable decisions by KEMP as Treasurer of Philadelphia” (App. at 554). These allegations were sufficient to charge Hoick and Umbrell with honest services fraud under a bribery theory, and accordingly, we reject Hoick and Umbrell’s argument that the indictment should have been dismissed. 2. The “Stream of Benefits” Instruction Hoick and Umbrell next claim that the District Court misstated the law when instructing the jury on the bribery theory of honest services fraud, such that the jury was invited to convict if it concluded that Hoick and Umbrell had provided benefits to Kemp in a “general attempt to curry favor.” We exercise plenary review over whether the District Court correctly stated the law, and consider “whether the charge, taken as a whole, properly apprise^] the jury of the issues and the applicable law.” Armstrong v. Burdette Tomlin Mem’l Hosp., 438 F.3d 240, 245 (3d Cir.2006) (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). While we agree with Hoick and Umbrell that bribery may not be founded on a mere intent to curry favor, we nevertheless reject their challenge to the District Court’s instructions. As Hoick and Umbrell recognize, there is a critical difference between bribery and generalized gifts provided in an attempt to build goodwill. The Supreme Court has explained, in interpreting the federal bribery and gratuity statute, 18 U.S.C. § 201, that bribery requires a quid pro quo, which includes an “intent ‘to influence’ an official act or ‘to be influenced’ in an official act.” United States v. Sun-Diamond Growers of Cal., 526 U.S. 398, 404, 119 S.Ct. 1402, 143 L.Ed.2d 576 (1999) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 201(b)). This may be contrasted to both a gratuity, which “may constitute merely a reward for some future act that the public official will take (and may already have determined to take), or for a past act that he has already taken,” and to a noncriminal gift extended to a public official merely “to build a reservoir of goodwill that might ultimately affect one or more of a multitude of unspecified acts, now and in the future.” Id. at 405, 119 S.Ct. 1402. This discussion is equally applicable to bribery in the honest services fraud context, and we thus conclude that bribery requires “a specific intent to give or receive something of value in exchange for an official act.” Id. at 404-05, 119 S.Ct. 1402. Hoick and Umbrell arrive at their conclusion that this requirement was elided by the instructions only by reading certain sections of the jury charge out of context, which “is not the way we review jury instructions, because a single instruction to a jury may not be judged in artificial isolation, but must be viewed in the context of the overall charge.” United States v. Park, 421 U.S. 658, 674, 95 S.Ct. 1903, 44 L.Ed.2d 489 (1975). Read fairly, the instructions proffered by the District Court repeatedly emphasized the critical quid pro quo, explaining that “[t]o establish such bribery the government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that there was a quid pro quo, ... that the benefit was offered in exchange for the official act.” (App. at 9642.) The Court continued, “where there is a stream of benefits given by a person to favor a public official, ... it need not be shown that any specific benefit was given in exchange for a specific official act. If you find beyond a reasonable doubt that a person gave an official a stream of benefits in implicit exchange for one or more official acts, you may conclude that a bribery has occurred.” (App. at 9643.) Finally, the Court explained, “[t]o find the giver of a benefit guilty, you must find that the giver had a specific intent to give ... something of value in exchange for an official act, that is, that the accused had the specific intent to engage in such a quid pro quo exchange.” (App. at 9643-44.) This instruction correctly described the law of bribery, and left no danger that the jury would convict upon merely finding that Hoick and Umbrell provided benefits to Kemp in a general attempt to curry favor or build goodwill. Moreover, we agree with the government that the District Court’s instruction to the jury that it could convict upon finding a “stream of benefits” was legally correct. The key to whether a gift constitutes a bribe is whether the parties intended for the benefit to be made in exchange for some official action; the government need not prove that each gift was provided with the intent to prompt a specific official act. See United States v. Jennings, 160 F.3d 1006, 1014 (4th Cir.1998). Rather, “[t]he quid pro quo requirement is satisfied so long as the evidence shows a ‘course of conduct of favors and gifts flowing to a public official in exchange for a pattern of official actions favorable to the donor.’ ” Id. Thus, “payments may be made with the intent to retain the official’s services on an ‘as needed’ basis, so that whenever the opportunity presents itself the official will take specific action on the payor’s behalf.” Id.; see also United States v. Sawyer, 85 F.3d 713, 730 (1st Cir.1996) (stating that “a person with continuing and long-term interests before an official might engage in a pattern of repeated, intentional gratuity offenses in order to coax ongoing favorable official action in derogation of the public’s right to impartial official services”). While the form and number of gifts may vary, the gifts still constitute a bribe as long as the essential intent — a specific intent to give or receive something of value in exchange for an official act — exists. This theory was accurately and entirely presented to the jury in the jury instructions, and accordingly, we reject Hoick and Umbrell’s argument that the instructions as proffered were inadequate.' 3. Legal Validity of Failure to Disclose Theory Hoick and Umbrell next present three arguments that the District Court’s jury instructions concerning the failure-to-disclose theory of honest services fraud were legally erroneous. If, as Hoick and Umbrell argue, the alternative theory is legally invalid, we must vacate their convictions. See Syme, 276 F.3d at 144. Our review over whether the District Court correctly stated the law is plenary. Armstrong, 438 F.3d at 245. For the reasons discussed below, we conclude that the District Court correctly charged the jury. Hoick and Umbrell first argue that the jury instructions were inconsistent with our decision in Panarella. According to Hoick and Umbrell, when we held in Pa-narella that a “public official who conceals a financial interest in violation of state criminal law while taking discretionary action that the official knows will directly benefit that interest commits honest services fraud,” 277 F.3d at 694, we ruled that the discretionary action must benefit the public official himself, and not the person or organization that provided the benefit. They thus argue that the District Court’s instructions, which permitted the jury to convict upon finding that Kemp took “a discretionary official action benefitting the giver of the benefit” (App. at 9644), wrongly stated the law. A complete analysis of Panarella plainly demonstrates the defectiveness of Hoick and Umbrell’s position. In Panarella, Loeper, while Majority Leader of the Pennsylvania Senate, worked as a business consultant for a tax collection business. Id. at 681. Loeper failed to disclose his income from the business as required by state law, and spoke and voted against bills that would have harmed that business. Id. We held that this conduct constituted honest services fraud, and emphasized the importance of disclosing conflicts of interest. Id. at 696-97. We explained: Were it easy to detect and prosecute public officials for bribery, the need for public officials to disclose conflicts of interest would be greatly reduced.... One reason why federal and state law mandates disclosure of conflicts of interest, however, is that it is often difficult or impossible to know for