Full opinion text
HENRY, Chief Judge. Colin Gonzales pleaded guilty in New Mexico state court to committing second-degree murder, aggravated burglary, aggravated battery, and aggravated assault when he was fourteen years old. In determining an appropriate sentence, the state trial court applied N.M. Stat. Ann. § 32A-2-20 (1978, as amended through 1996), which allowed a juvenile who has committed certain serious crimes to be sentenced as an adult if “(1) the child is not amenable to treatment or rehabilitation as a child in available facilities” and (2) “the child is not eligible for commitment to an institution for the developmentally disordered or mentally disabled.” The court found that Mr. Gonzales was amenable to neither treatment nor rehabilitation and was not eligible for the statutory commitment. It subsequently sentenced him to a total of twenty-two years’ incarceration in an adult prison. After the New Mexico Court of Appeals affirmed his convictions and sentences, see State v. Gonzales, 130 N.M. 341, 24 P.3d 776 (N.M.App.2001), and the state trial and appellate courts summarily denied Mr. Gonzales’s requests for post-conviction relief, Mr. Gonzales timely filed a 28 U.S.C. § 2254 habeas corpus petition in the district court. As in the state court proceedings, he alleged that (1) the state trial court violated his rights under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by finding that he was neither amenable to treatment nor eligible for commitment without submitting those questions to a jury pursuant to Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000); (2) his guilty plea was not knowing and voluntary; (3) he received ineffective assistance of counsel, and (4) the evidence was insufficient to support the state trial court’s findings regarding amenability to treatment and eligibility for commitment. The district court assigned the ease to a magistrate judge, who issued proposed findings and a recommended disposition in a thorough and well-reasoned 107-page decision. The district court adopted the magistrate judge’s decision and denied all of Mr. Gonzales’s claims. For the reasons set forth below, we agree with the district court’s decision. Although Apprendi holds that “[ojther than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt,” 530 U.S. at 490, 120 S.Ct. 2348, the Supreme Court’s decision did not involve a proceeding to determine whether a juvenile should be sentenced as an adult. As to those proceedings, Supreme Court precedent not addressed in Apprendi supports the view that neither Mr. Gonzales’s amenability to treatment nor eligibility for commitment need be determined by a jury. See Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 561-62, 86 S.Ct. 1045, 16 L.Ed.2d 84 (1966). Accordingly, applying the deferential standard of review required by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA), see 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), we conclude that the district court did not unreasonably apply federal law in rejecting Mr. Gonzales’s Apprendi claim. We also agree with the district court’s rejection of Mr. Gonzales’s claims challenging his guilty plea, his counsel’s performance, and the sufficiency of the evidence. I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND Most of the relevant facts are not disputed. We begin by describing the offenses committed by Mr. Gonzales, his mental health history, and the New Mexico juvenile justice system. We then summarize the state and federal proceedings below. A. The murder and the accompanying crimes On March 13, 1997, Mr. Gonzales and another youth broke into the Trujillo, New Mexico home of Arsenio Lucero and his wife while they were away. The two juveniles shot the Luceros’ dog with a rifle that they had stolen from another house. While Mr. Gonzales and his accomplice were still there, Mr. Lucero and his wife returned home. After Mr. Lucero entered the house, Mr. Gonzales shot him in the chest. The accomplice then shot him in the head “to put him out of his misery,” 24 P.3d at 779, and Mr. Lucero died at the scene. When Mrs. Lucero entered the house, she saw her husband’s body and begged the two youths not to kill her. One of them told her to give them money and the keys to the family’s truck or they would kill her too. Mrs. Lucero responded that she had neither money nor the keys. Mr. Gonzales and his accomplice then searched Mr. Lucero’s body and found the keys, and Mrs. Lucero fled. The youths fired eighteen to twenty-two shots toward Mrs. Lucero and several neighbors, injuring one of them. The two then drove away in the Luceros’ truck, and New Mexico state police arrested them the next day. B. Mr. Gonzales’s Mental Health History Mr. Gonzales’s mental health history soon became a central issue in the court proceedings. His family had a history of mental illness, including attention deficit disorder, bipolar illness, and depression. From a very early age, by some accounts as young as two, Mr. Gonzales had taken medication for impulsivity, distractibility, and learning difficulties. His parents reported that he had fallen and hit his head twice as a young infant. In elementary school, Mr. Gonzales had difficulty with math and spelling, as well as with tasks involving motor coordination and dexterity. However, he learned to read and had no difficulties in doing so. According to his mother, when the medication was properly adjusted, Mr. Gonzales made A’s and B’s, but his grades would drop when he either did not take medication or developed a tolerance for the dosage. When Mr. Gonzales reached adolescence, he began abusing drugs — drinking alcohol, “huffing paint[,]” smoking marijuana, and experimenting with cocaine and LSD. See State Ct. Rec. vol. I, at 59 (Forensic Evaluation Rpt. by Susan Cave, Ph.D.). He also exhibited many other behavioral problems: fighting, running away, vandalizing, and stealing. During sixth grade, school officials placed Mr. Gonzales in special education classes for “difficulties related to attention and behavioral control.” Fed. Dist. Ct. Rec. vol. Ill, doc. 65, at 29 (Proposed Findings and Recommended Disposition, filed Nov. 8, 2005) (citation omitted). In July 1996, a treating physician diagnosed Mr. Gonzales with attention deficit/hyperactivity disorder and referred him to the Las Vegas Medical Center for psychiatric treatment. A psychiatrist there added diagnoses of dysthymia, a non-specific learning disorder, and a writing disorder. Within a few months, one of Mr. Gonzales’s therapists, Ms. Sande Harley-Grano, became concerned that Mr. Gonzales’s behavior was becoming increasingly dangerous to himself and his family. In an October 1996 letter, written to justify a residential placement for Mr. Gonzales, Ms. Harley-Grano discussed his substance abuse and his self-destructive behavior (stabbing himself with pencils and being highly provocative with dangerous peers). Ms. Harley-Grano also reported that, in March 1996, Mr. Gonzales had ransacked a house and stolen several items of property, including a gun, and that, in August of that year, he had been arrested by the police for breaking into a neighbor’s home. Despite this assessment, Mr. Gonzales’s family declined the recommended residential placement. However, in January 1997, the family followed the recommendation of a juvenile probation officer and placed Mr. Gonzales in another psychiatric facility. Unfortunately, Mr. Gonzales stayed at that facility for only thirteen days. At his mother’s request, but against medical advice, he was discharged on February 2, 1997 with a diagnosis of “inhalant abuse, marijuana abuse, major depression, rule out Bipolar Disorder, ADHD, and history of head injury.” State Ct. Rec. vol., I, at 59. (Forensic Evaluation Rpt. by Susan Cave, Ph.D.). Less than six weeks later, Mr. Gonzales shot Mr. Lucero. C. New Mexico’s Youthful Offender Disposition Statute Under New Mexico law, the district court for each county includes a division known as “the Children’s Court.” N.M. Stat. Ann. § 82A-1-5 (1978, as amended through 1993). Each district must designate one or more of its judges to serve on that court. Unlike the majority of jurisdictions, which authorize juvenile courts to transfer certain cases to an adult court, New Mexico does not have a transfer system. See Gonzales, 24 P.3d at 781-82 (discussing legislative reforms); Daniel M. Vannella, Note, Let the Jury do the Waive: How Apprendi v. New Jersey Applies to Juvenile Transfer Proceedings, 48 Wm. & Mary L.Rev. 723, 753 (2006) (observing that the “New Mexico legislature had created a unique juvenile transfer system”). Instead, with limited exceptions, juveniles are tried in the Children’s Court, and that court is vested with authority to impose both juvenile and adult sentences in various circumstances. See Gonzales, 24 P.3d at 781-82. New Mexico law creates three classes of juvenile offenders: serious youthful offenders, youthful offenders, and delinquent offenders. See N.M. Stat. Ann. § 32A-2-3(C), (H), (I) (1978, as amended through 1996) (provisions in effect when Mr. Gonzales was prosecuted and sentenced). “These classifications reflect the rehabilitative purpose of the Delinquency Act [N.M. Stat. § 32A-2-1, et seq.], coupled with the realization that some juvenile offenders cannot be rehabilitated given the limited resources and jurisdiction of the juvenile justice system.” Gonzales, 24 P.3d at 781-82. “Serious youthful offenders” are children fifteen years or older charged with committing first-degree murder. See N.M. Stat. Ann. § 32A-2-3(H) (1978, as amended through 1996). They are excluded from the jurisdiction of the children’s court unless found guilty of a lesser offense. • “Youthful offenders” are children fourteen years or older who are adjudicated guilty of any one of twelve enumerated violent felonies or who have had three prior felony adjudications in the previous three years in addition to their current felony offense, as well as children fourteen years of age who are adjudicated guilty of first-degree murder. See Gonzales, 24 P.3d at 782. “For these offenders, the determination of amenability to rehabilitation within the juvenile system is a more complicated question.” Id. “Youthful offenders” are entitled to be sentenced within the juvenile system unless the prosecution has filed a notice of intent to seek an adult sentence, see § 32A-2-3(I), and the court makes certain findings regarding their amenability to treatment and eligibility for commitment. See § 32A-2-20(B). As we discuss-below, this is the category to which Mr. Gonzales belongs. Finally, there are juvenile offenders who do not fit into these first two categories. They include all children under the age of fourteen, and children over the age of fourteen years who have not committed certain offenses. See Gonzales, 24 P.3d at 782 (discussing N.M. Stat. § 32A-2-3(C)). “Given a delinquent child’s young age or lack of a serious criminal history, the Legislature has determined that existing services.and facilities most likely can rehabilitate these children within the time available.” Id. With regard to Mr. Gonzales’s class—youthful offenders — the Children’s Court may impose an adult sentence if the judge finds both that “(1) the child is not amenable to treatment or rehabilitation as a child in available facilities, and (b) the child is not eligible for commitment to an institution for the developmentally disabled or mentally disordered.” N.M. Stat. Ann. § 32A-2-20(B) (1978, as amended through 1996) (emphasis added) (provision in effect when Mr. Gonzales was prosecuted and sentenced). In making these findings, the court is required to consider the following factors: (1) the seriousness of the alleged offense; (2) whether the alleged offense was committed in an aggressive, violent, premeditated or willful manner; (3) whether a firearm was used to commit the alleged offense; (4) whether the alleged offense was against persons or against property, greater weight being given to offenses against persons, especially if personal injury resulted; (5) the sophistication and maturity of the child as determined by consideration of the child’s home, environmental situation, emotional attitude and pattern of living; (6) the record and previous history of the child; (7) the prospects for adequate protection of the public and the likelihood of reasonable rehabilitation of the child by the use of procedures, services and facilities currently available; and (8) any other relevant factor, provided that factor is stated on the record. N.M. Stat. § 32A-2-20(C). D. Initial state court proceedings Mr. Gonzales was fourteen at the time of the murder and accompanying crimes. Three days after his arrest, the state filed a delinquency petition, charging him with eleven delinquent acts (including murder, aggravated burglary, armed robbery, and conspiracy). See Fed. Dist. Ct. Rec., vol. Ill, doe. 65, at 32 n. 32 (listing delinquent acts). The state also filed a notice of intent to request an adult sentence. The day of the preliminary hearing, Mr. Gonzales’s counsel, a contract attorney with the state public defender, requested a confidential forensic evaluation by New Mexico’s Children, Youth, and Families Department because “[[Information exists that leads defense counsel to question [his] mental condition and competency to stand trial in that the child has a prolonged history of mental health treatment for a presently existing mental illness.” State Ct. Rec. vol. I, at 26-27. The court entered a stipulated order permitting the evaluation and suspending further proceedings until the competency issue was resolved. In April 1997, the parties reported to the court that Mr. Gonzales was in need of assessment and treatment. As a result, the court entered an order transferring him to the Sequoyah Adolescent Treatment Center, where he remained for nineteen months. On August 1, 1997, Mr. Gonzales reported that, about a month after being admitted, an older boy forced him to engage in sexual acts. In September 1997, Mr. Gonzales retained an attorney named Dan Cron, and the public defender’s office withdrew from the case. Mr. Cron began plea negotiations with the prosecutor. According to Mr. Cron’s affidavit, he discussed with Mr. Gonzales the legal rights waived by a plea, the elements of the charged offenses, and the possible juvenile and adult sentences. Mr. Gonzales would generally respond that he understood. However, based on subsequent conversations, Mr. Cron concluded that his client had actually understood little of what was discussed, and so he repeated the same explanations to him. In July 1998, Mr. Cron and the prosecutor stipulated to an amended order directing Dr. Susan Cave, a psychologist, to perform a competency evaluation. Dr. Cave interviewed Mr. Gonzales, administered a series of psychological tests, and reviewed clinical records from the Sequo-yah Adolescent Treatment Unit. In an August 1998 report, Dr. Cave acknowledged that “[t]here is no adequate competency examination instrument for use with adolescents.” State Ct. Rec. vol. I, at 61. In her view, Mr. Gonzales was “still incredibly emotionally immature for a boy of 15 and very self-centered[,]” nevertheless “[he] indicated sufficient information to be competent to stand trial.” Id. at 62-63. Dr. Cave explained: [Mr. Gonzales] can correctly identify where all the principals in a court room sit. He fully understands the function of the judge, [and he] even voluntarily explained the difference between a court trial and a jury trial. He understands that the job of the jury is to decide if you are “guilty” or “not guilty.” He understands that the purpose of his lawyer is to “get me out of this with the least amount of trouble as possible.” He understands that the District Attorney wants to put, him in prison. He understands that the witnesses “testify against you, say what they saw.” He can recite the somewhat lengthy list of charges against him. He can discuss the various levels of murder [,] and [he] comprehends them. He is able to work with his lawyer in a rational and factual manner in his own defense. He indicates that there are some things about the crime spree that week that he does not remember, but there are other things he says that “are carved into my memory.” He says that when he first came to treatment, he would sit in a room and dwell on what happened. He understands the difference between juvenile sanctions and adult sanctions. Id. at 62. In 1998, the trial court appointed another attorney, Gerald Baca, to assist with Mr. Gonzales’s defense. Mr. Baca continued the plea negotiations and recommended to his client that he not go to trial. In Mr. Baca’s view, the prosecution’s evidence was strong: several witnesses (Mrs. Lucero and her neighbors) had seen Mr. Gonzales leave the Luceros’ house and fire a rifle at them. Moreover, Mr. Cron’s investigation had ruled out the possibility that the accomplice was the only trigger man. Mr. Baca also concluded that, no matter who fired the shots, Mr. Gonzales could be convicted of the charged offenses as an accessory. Mr. Baca concluded that Mr. Gonzales understood the legal proceedings. In Mr. Baca’s view, Mr. Gonzales “appeared -to be a fairly normal guy. Sure, he had troubles, he had problems he had to work on. But he was talking with me normally. He appeared to be comprehending our conversations.” Fed. Dist. Ct. Rec. vol. Ill, doc. 65, at 42 (quoting Baca deposition). Mr. Gonzales asked him “some fairly sophisticated questions about his defense.” Id. On October 23, 1998, the state trial judge entered a stipulated order finding Mr. Gonzales competent to stand trial. E. Mr. Gonzales’s guilty plea On the same day, Mr. Gonzales and the government entered into a written agreement under which he would plead guilty to the following offenses: (1) second-degree murder (including a one-year firearm enhancement), in violation of N.M. Stat. §§ 30-2-1B and 31-18-16; (2) aggravated residential burglary, in violation of N.M. Stat. § 30-16-4; (3) aggravated battery with a firearm, in violation of N.M. Stat. §§ 30-3-5(0 and 31-18-16(A); and (4) two counts of aggravated assault, in violation of N.M. Stat. §§ 30-3-2(A) and 31-16-16(A). The parties further agreed that, upon the court’s acceptance of the plea, Mr. Gonzales would be adjudicated a youthful offender under New Mexico law. The court would then conduct an amenability hearing within a reasonable amount of time and “[a]ll sentencing/disposition [would] be left in the [c]ourt’s discretion.” State Ct. Rec. vol. I, at 75. The prosecutor, Mr. Baca, and Mr. Gonzales all signed the agreement. As to each count, the agreement informed Mr. Gonzales of the maximum sentence that he could receive if he were sentenced as an adult (fifteen years for second-degree murder, nine years for aggravated residential burglary, three years for aggravated battery with a firearm, and eighteen months for each of the aggravated assault with a firearm charges, in addition to fines and mandatory periods of parole). The agreement further explained that if he were sentenced as a juvenile, Mr. Gonzales could receive sentences ranging from probation to a maximum of two years at the New Mexico Boy’s School or an extended commitment until he turned twenty-one. Finally, the agreement informed Mr. Gonzales of his state law right to a jury or bench trial; his right to compel the attendance of witnesses, and his right to confront the witnesses against him. The agreement included a certification from Mr. Baca that he had conferred with Mr. Gonzales and had explained its contents in detail. On October 23, 1998, the court also conducted a plea hearing. The judge asked Mr. Gonzales if he understood the charges, the possible sentences he could receive (as a juvenile or as an adult), his right to a jury or bench trial, the government’s burden to prove the charges beyond a reasonable doubt, his right to remain silent, and his right to an attorney. After Mr. Gonzales responded that he understood those rights, the judge asked him if he admitted committing the offenses listed in the plea agreement, and Mr. Gonzales responded affirmatively. He reported that no one had threatened him or promised him anything not set forth in the plea agreement and that he was sure that he wanted to plead guilty. The judge then accepted Mr. Gonzales’s plea. F. Amenability and Commitment Findings Following the entry of the guilty plea, the state court held an amenability hearing pursuant to N.M. Stat. § 32A-2-20. The prosecution argued that Mr. Gonzales should be sentenced as an adult. It presented testimony from Mr. Lucero’s family, police officers who were at the crime scene, officers involved in the investigation, and from Mr. Gonzales himself (through statements that he had made to police officers about the crimes). Additionally, the prosecution entered into the record a copy of a report prepared by Mr. Ray Garley, a probation officer with the Juvenile Justice Division of the New Mexico Children, Youth and Families Department. In that report, Mr. Garley recommended that the court find that Mr. Gonzales was neither amenable to treatment nor eligible for commitment. In response, Mr. Gonzales argued that he should be sentenced as a juvenile. Mr. Gonzales focused on factors (5) (sophistication and maturity) and (7) (“the prospects for adequate protection of the public and the likelihood of reasonable rehabilitation of the child by the use of procedures, services and facilities currently available”). See id. § 32A-2-20(C)(5) & (7). He called four experts to testify regarding his mental health, developmental status, and prior and ongoing treatment. Although they differed with regard to a specific diagnoses, each of the experts concluded that Mr. Gonzales was amenable to treatment as a juvenile in certain facilities. The trial court announced its ruling at a May 3, 1999 hearing. Although acknowledging that “this is a tough case ... and I’ve waivered back and forth some ... throughout,” Fed. Dist. Ct. Rec. vol. Ill doc. 65, at 77 (quoting May 3, 1999 Hr’g, tape 3), it disagreed with Mr. Gonzales’s experts. The court concluded that Mr. Gonzales was neither amenable to treatment as a juvenile in available facilities nor eligible for commitment in an institution for the developmentally disabled or the mentally disordered. The court explained that the first five factors listed in § 32A-2-20(C) supported the government’s argument for an adult sentence: Mr. Gonzales had committed a serious offense against a person with a firearm and in an aggressive, violent, premeditated, or willful manner. See § 32A-2 — 20(C)(1) — (4). Although he was not “totally mature[,]” “[Mr. Gonzales was not] a baby either”; “[h]e knew what was going on[;][h]e knew what his problems were.” Fed. Dist. Ct. Rec. vol. Ill, doc. 65, at 75 (quoting May 3,1999 Hr’g, tape 3). Finally, the court explained, Mr Gonzales had a record of misconduct as a juvenile. As to that factor, the court referred specifically to Probation Officer Garley’s report. At a subsequent hearing, the trial court imposed adult sentences totaling twenty-two years. G. New Mexico Court of Appeals Decision on Direct Appeal On direct appeal, Mr. Gonzales argued that New Mexico had violated his due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment by allowing a judge rather than a jury to make findings regarding amenability to treatment and eligibility for commitment that justified the imposition of an adult sentence. Mr. Gonzales contended that these amenability and eligibility findings constituted “fact[s] that increase[ ] the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum.” Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490, 120 S.Ct. 2348. As a result, he maintained that pursuant to the Supreme Court’s decision in Apprendi, those “facts” must be “submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. Mr. Gonzales also argued that the evidence was insufficient to support the state trial court’s findings regarding his amenability to treatment and eligibility for commitment, as well as a state law issue that is not before us. The Court of Appeals rejected both arguments. As to the Apprendi claim, the court reasoned that the findings addressed in the Supreme Court’s landmark case concerned the elements of a crime, a matter fundamentally different than findings regarding amenability to treatment and eligibility for treatment. See 24 P.3d at 783-85. The Court of Appeals further concluded that substantial evidence supported the trial court’s findings as to both Mr. Gonzales’s amenability to treatment and his eligibility for commitment. H. Federal Habeas Proceedings In his federal habeas corpus petition, Mr. Gonzales raised the Apprendi and sufficiency of the evidence claims. He also asserted that his guilty plea was not knowing and voluntary and that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. The federal district court noted that Mr. Gonzales had not exhausted the latter two claims, and it allowed him to do so. Accordingly, Mr. Gonzales filed post-conviction actions in New Mexico state court raising the guilty plea and ineffective assistance claims. The state court denied those claims in a summary ruling. Following the state court’s ruling, the magistrate judge issued proposed findings and a recommended disposition applying AEDPA’s deferential standard of review and rejecting all of Mr. Gonzales’s claims. The magistrate judge also denied Mr. Gonzales’s request for an evidentiary hearing, reasoning that the issues could be fully and fairly resolved on the state court record. The district court adopted the magistrate judge’s recommendation. II. DISCUSSION On appeal, Mr. Gonzales challenged the district court’s decision as to each of his claims and requested a certificate of ap-pealability. See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c). In a prior order, this court granted that request. Here, we first summarize the standard of review under AEDPA and then proceed to the analysis of each claim. A. Standard of Review Because Mr. Gonzales challenges the New Mexico state courts’ legal conclusions as to the merits of the four claims now at issue, we apply AEDPA’s deferential standard of review. Johnson v. Mullin, 505 F.3d 1128, 1134 (10th Cir.2007). Under that standard, he is entitled to habeas corpus relief only if the state court’s decision is “ “contrary to” or “an unreasonable application of’ clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). A decision is “contrary to” clearly established federal law for purposes of § 2254 if “the state court applies a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth in [Supreme Court] cases” or if “the state court confronts a set of facts that are materially indistinguishable from a decision of [the Supreme Court] and nevertheless arrives at a result different from [the Court’s] precedent.” Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 862, 405-06, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000). It is not enough that the state court decided an issue contrary to a lower federal court’s conception of how the rule should be applied; the state court decision must be “diametrically different” and “mutually opposed” to the Supreme Court decision itself. Id. at 406, 120 S.Ct. 1495 (internal quotation marks omitted). A state court decision involves an “unreasonable application” of federal law if “the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle from [Supreme Court] decisions but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner’s case.” Id. at 413, 120 S.Ct. 1495. In light of AEDPA, a petitioner is not entitled to relief merely because a federal court concluded in its independent judgment that the state court has applied federal law erroneously or incorrectly. See McLuckie v. Abbott, 337 F.3d 1193, 1197 (10th Cir.2003). Instead, the state court’s application of federal law must be objectively unreasonable. Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 75, 123 S.Ct. 1166, 155 L.Ed.2d 144 (2003). “This standard does not require our abject deference, ... but nonetheless prohibits us from substituting our own judgment for that of the state court.” Snow v. Sirmons, 474 F.3d 693, 696 (10th Cir.2007) (internal quotation marks omitted). B. Apprendi Claims Mr. Gonzales contends that the state courts violated his due process rights by (1) allowing a judge rather than a jury to find that he was neither amenable to treatment nor eligible for commitment; and (2) failing to determine a generally applicable standard of proof. 1. Judicial findings a. Apprendi’s holding Mr. Gonzales’s arguments are based on the Supreme Court’s decision in Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 474-497, 120 S.Ct. 2348. There, after the defendant pleaded guilty to state weapons charges, a New Jersey state court judge conducted an evidentiary hearing and found by a preponderance of evidence that the crimes were motivated by racial bias. In light of those findings, the judge applied the state’s hate crimes statute to enhance the defendant’s sentence above the maximum term that could have otherwise been imposed. In the Supreme Court’s view, that judge-imposed enhancement constituted “an unacceptable departure from the jury tradition that is an indispensable part of our criminal justice system” and therefore violated the defendant’s due process rights. Id. The Court explained, “Other than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. at 490, 120 S.Ct. 2348. In applying that standard, “the relevant inquiry is one not of form, but of effect—does the required finding expose the defendant to a greater punishment than that authorized by the jury’s guilty verdict?” Id. at 494, 120 S.Ct. 2348. Mr. Gonzales maintains that the amenability and commitment findings are analogous to the New Jersey hate crimes statute applied to enhance the defendant’s sentence in Apprendi: absent those findings, the maximum sentence that Mr. Gonzales could have received was commitment to a juvenile facility until he turned twenty-one. See Gonzales, 24 P.3d at 782 (discussing N.M. Stat. § 32A-2-20CB) & (E) and stating that “[ujnder the Delinquency Act, youthful offenders are entitled to be sentenced within the juvenile system unless the court makes the findings required by Section 32A-2-20-B”). However, if the state trial judge found that Mr. Gonzales was neither amenable to treatment or eligible for commitment, then the court was authorized to sentence him as an adult and to therefore impose a maximum sentence of thirty-four years’ imprisonment. Thus, Mr. Gonzales concludes, the effect of the judge’s nonamenability-to-treatment and ineligibility-for-eommitment findings was far more profound than findings held to violate the Due Process Clause in Apprendi. In considering Mr. Gonzales’s arguments, we are mindful that, when the New Mexico Court of Appeals issued its decision on direct appeal, the United States Supreme Court had not yet issued its post-Apprendi sentencing decisions in United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 125 S.Ct. 738, 160 L.Ed.2d 621 (2005); Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 124 S.Ct. 2531, 159 L.Ed.2d 403 (2004); and Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 122 S.Ct. 2428, 153 L.Ed.2d 556 (2002). As Mr. Gonzales acknowledges, those post-Apprendi decisions may not be retroactively applied on habeas review. See Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348, 358, 124 S.Ct. 2519, 159 L.Ed.2d 442 (2004) (holding that Ring is not retroactive); United States v. Bellamy, 411 F.3d 1182, 1184 (10th Cir.2005) (holding that Booker is not retroactive); United States v. Price, 400 F.3d 844, 849 (10th Cir.2005) (holding that Blakely is not retroactive). Thus, in analyzing the New Mexico Court of Appeals’s decision, we must focus on the state of federal law as of the date that the Supreme Court announce its decision in Apprendi. In our view, Mr. Gonzales’s arguments have support in some of the language in Apprendi itself: there is no dispute that the amenability and commitment findings authorized the judge to impose a maximum adult sentence considerably longer than if he had sentenced Mr. Gonzales as a juvenile. Cf. State v. Kalmakoff, 122 P.3d 224, 226 (Alaska Ct.App.2005) (observing that “[a state judge’s] finding that [the defendant] was not amenable to treatment as a juvenile ... greatly increased the maximum sentence which [the defendant] faced”), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 127 S.Ct. 404, — L.Ed.2d — (2006). Indeed, in describing similar decisions in a variety of states, one scholar has written that the “[wjaiver of juveniles to criminal court for adult prosecution represents the single most important sentencing decision that juvenile court judges make.” Barry C. Feld, The Constitutional Tension Between Apprendi and McKeiver: Sentence Enhancements Based On Delinquency Convictions and the Quality of Justice in Juvenile Courts, 38 Wake Forest L.Rev. 1111, 1214 (2003); see also id. at 1216 (“Because juvenile waiver is a form of sentencing decision that represents a choice between the punitive sentences in criminal courts and the shorter, nominally rehabilitative dispositions available to juvenile courts, it increases the maximum penalties that juveniles face.”) However, Apprendi did not involve judicial findings that a juvenile should be prosecuted as an adult. Therefore the key question is whether its language regarding “fact[s] that increase!] the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum,” 530 U.S. at 490, 120 S.Ct. 2348, applies to such findings. b. Contrasting views of Apprendi’s application On that issue, reasonable minds have differed. In Commonwealth v. Quincy Q., 434 Mass. 859, 753 N.E.2d 781, 789 (2001), overruled on other grounds by Commonwealth v. King, 445 Mass. 217, 834 N.E.2d 1175, 1201 n. 28 (2005), the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court applied Apprendi to a statute that “authorize^] judges to increase the punishment for juveniles convicted of certain offenses beyond the statutory maximum otherwise permitted for juveniles” if certain findings were made. The court concluded that the findings necessary to impose the higher sentence were analogous to the findings in Apprendi. Even though “a juvenile court system, in which juveniles are given preferential treatment, is not constitutionally required!,]” “once the Legislature enacted a law providing that the maximum punishment for delinquent juveniles is commitment to the Department of Youth Services ... for a defined time period, ... any facts, including the requirements for youthful offender status, that would increase the penalty for such juveniles must be proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. at 789. However, the majority of courts have not followed this reasoning. See generally, Vannella, 48 Wm. & Mary L.Rev. at 751 (observing that “[o]f the courts that have considered th[e] possibility [that Apprendi applies to decisions transferring juveniles to the adult system] ... most have said that Apprendi does not apply”); Kalmakoff, 122 P.3d at 227 (stating that “the overwhelming weight of authority at this time concludes that Apprendi does not apply to juvenile waiver proceeding”). These courts distinguish Apprendi on the following grounds. First, according to some of these courts, a judge’s decision that a juvenile should be prosecuted as an adult concerns the court’s jurisdiction, and, as a result, Apprendi does not apply. See, e.g., United States v. Miguel, 338 F.3d 995, 1004 (9th Cir.2003) (“Apprendi does not require that a jury find the facts that allow the transfer to district court. The transfer proceeding establishes the district court’s jurisdiction over a defendant.”); United States v. Juvenile, 228 F.3d 987, 990 (9th Cir.2000) (rejecting the claim that the transfer of a juvenile to an adult court increases punishment and holding that it “merely establishes a basis for district court jurisdiction”) (internal quotation marks omitted); People v. Beltran, 327 Ill.App.3d 685, 262 Ill.Dec. 463, 765 N.E.2d 1071, 1075-76 (2002) (concluding that Apprendi does not apply to a decision to prosecute the defendant as an adult because a transfer hearing “is dispositional, not adjudicatory”); Caldwell v. Commonwealth, 133 S.W.3d 445, 452-53 (Ky.2004) (adopting the “jurisdiction” argument); State v. Rodriguez, 205 Ariz. 392, 71 P.3d 919, 927-28 (Ariz.Ct.App.2003) (holding that a juvenile transfer statute “is not a sentence enhancement scheme and, therefore, does not implicate Apprendi ... [because it] does not subject [a] juvenile to enhanced punishment; it subjects the juvenile to the adult criminal justice system”). It is only after a juvenile is transferred to the adult system, the reasoning goes, that Apprendi requires the jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt any facts increasing the maximum sentence. Second, some courts have relied upon the differences between the juvenile and adult criminal justice systems. They reason that the Due Process Clause requires “fundamental fairness” in juvenile proceedings but that “fundamental fairness” “does not guarantee juveniles every right criminal defendants enjoy, such as the right to a jury trial.” See In re Welfare of J.C.P., Jr., 716 N.W.2d 664, 668 (Minn.Ct.App. 2006) (citing McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 543, 545, 91 S.Ct. 1976, 29 L.Ed.2d 647 (1971) (plurality opinion)); see also Beltran, 262 Ill.Dec. 463, 765 N.E.2d at 1076 (reasoning that “although the juvenile court made findings that exposed [the defendant] to a greater sanction, [the] defendant had no due process right to have a jury make those findings beyond a reasonable doubt” because “[i]t is well established that, in a juvenile proceeding, due process does not require a jury”). Third, some courts have distinguished judicial findings supporting the adult prosecution of a juvenile from the findings traditionally made by juries. For example, in this case, the New Mexico Court of Appeals reasoned that the amenability and commitment findings at issue were not measures of the juvenile’s criminal culpability, were not findings of historical fact, and required expertise that juries lacked (i.e., the “foreknowledge of available facilities and the programs in them”). Gonzales, 24 P.3d at 784. c. Applying Apprendi to the New Mexico juvenile system Some of this reasoning may be inapplicable to the New Mexico juvenile system. As the magistrate judge thoroughly explained, in juvenile prosecutions, New Mexico does not provide for an initial transfer proceeding at which a court decides whether the defendant will be prosecuted as an adult. Instead, in order to trigger the possible imposition of an adult sentence, the prosecution must file a notice of intent within ten days of the delinquency petition. See N.M. Stat. Ann. § 32A-2-20(A) (1978, as amended through 1996) (the provision in effect when Mr. Gonzales was prosecuted and sentenced). Then, as we have noted, the juvenile has a state law right to a jury trial in the guilt phase (although Mr. Gonzales did not exercise that right here). However, the determination regarding an adult sentence is not made until after the guilt phase of the proceeding, when the judge holds a hearing. Thus, with regard to the New Mexico procedures, one cannot say that the decision regarding an adult sentence “merely establishes a basis for district court jurisdiction.” See Juvenile, 228 F.3d at 990. Here, when a New Mexico court determined to sentence Mr. Gonzales as an adult, the court already had jurisdiction, and it had already adjudicated him guilty of the charged offenses. The amenability and commitment findings “greatly increased the maximum sentence which [Mr. Gonzales] faced.” Kalmakoff, 122 P.3d at 226. Similarly, the mere fact that juveniles may not have a federal constitutional right to a jury trial in delinquency proceedings, see McKeiver, 403 U.S. at 543, 91 S.Ct. 1976, does not seem sufficient to distinguish Apprendi when the findings at issue authorize an adult sentence. Mr. Gonzales observes that this distinction appears to sanction “a constitutional no man’s land,” Reply. Br. at 7, in which a youth could be denied both the benefits of the juvenile system (i.e., limited sentences and an emphasis on rehabilitation) and the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial afforded to adult offenders. Nevertheless, in our view, the distinction between the kinds of findings made at the amenabilty hearing and findings traditionally made by juries is a plausible one. Under the New Mexico statute at issue, the judge must make a series of judgments, weighing a variety of factors rather than merely determining particular facts— for example, the seriousness of the offense, the sophistication and maturity of the juvenile offender, his or her record and previous history, the prospects for adequate protection of the public, and the likelihood of reasonable rehabilitation. See N.M. Stat. § 32A-2-20(C). We agree with the New Mexico Court of Appeals that many of these judgments may benefit from special skills and experience and involve “a predictive, more than historical, analysis.” Gonzales, 24 P.3d at 784. Moreover, the judge is required to evaluate contrasting testimony from mental health professionals, and in that way his task resembles that of the judge in adult civil commitment proceedings. See id. The fact that the Supreme Court has held that the beyond-a-reasonable doubt standard is inapplicable to those adult proceedings suggests that the Apprendi requirements are not clearly applicable here. See id. at 784-85 (“ ‘Given the lack of certainty and the fallibility of psychiatric diagnosis, there is a serious question as to whether a state could ever prove beyond a reasonable doubt that an individual is both mentally ill and likely to be dangerous.’ ”) (quoting Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 429, 99 S.Ct. 1804, 60 L.Ed.2d 323 (1979)). The distinction between amenability findings and the findings addressed in Ap-prendi is also supported by scholarly opinion. In Professor Berman’s view, Ap-prendi, Blakely, and Booker implicitly recognize an important constitutional distinction between “(1) finding those facts that mandate particular sentencing outcomes based on the predetermined judgments of legislatures or sentencing commission[s] (a task juries must perform), and (2) exercising reasoned judgment at sentencing based on the consideration of relevant sentencing facts (a task judges may perform).” Douglas A. Berman, Conceptualizing Booker, 38 Ariz. St. L.J. 387, 417 (2006). The latter determinations do not involve findings of historical fact (as did Apprendi) but instead “are akin to value judgments that judges have traditionally made when exercising reasoned judgment in the course of selecting an appropriate sentence.” Id. at 420. As a result, he concludes, the defendant’s constitutional right to a jury trial is not implicated. Under the New Mexico statute, the amenability findings require similar value judgments, and Professor Berman’s analysis thus supports the New Mexico Court of Appeals’s reading of Apprendi. Cf. Feld, 38 Wake Forest L.Rev. at 1221-22 (concluding that “[wjaiver [of juvenile court jurisdiction] is a quintessential sentencing decision that considers myriad individualized facts bearing on ‘amenability’ ” and that therefore is appropriately decided by a judge rather than a jury). To be sure, other parts of the New Mexico statute do direct the judge to consider historical facts: whether the alleged offense was committed in an aggressive, violent, premeditated or willful manner; whether a firearm was used; and whether the offense was against persons or against property. See N.M. Stat. Ann. § 32A-2-20(C)(2) — ((4)) (1978, as amended through 1996) (provision in effect when Mr. Gonzales was prosecuted and sentenced). Those facts resemble those at issue in Apprendi Nevertheless, Mr. Gonzales does not here contend that, in deciding to impose an adult sentence, the state court judge exceeded the scope of the guilty plea in finding those particular historical facts. As we see it, Mr. Gonzales’s complaint is not that the judge found that he committed the offenses in an aggressive, violent, premeditated or willful manner, that he possessed a firearm, or that the offenses involved injuries to persons rather than property. In light of the guilty plea, there was no longer a dispute about those matters. See Blakely, 542 U.S. at 310, 124 S.Ct. 2531 (“When a defendant pleads guilty, the State is free to seek judicial sentence enhancements so long as the defendant either stipulates to the relevant facts or consents to judicial factfinding.”) (citing Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 488, 120 S.Ct. 2348). Instead, Mr. Gonzales’s contention is that the Constitution bars the judge from making the kind of judgments implicit in assessing factors like his maturity, his potential for dangerousness, and the prospects for rehabilitation. Apprendi simply does not address those kinds of findings. In light of our deferential standard of review under AEDPA, that distinction forecloses Mr. Gonzales’s claim for habeas relief. d. Pre-Apprendi decisions involving juvenile proceedings We find additional support for that conclusion in the Supreme Court’s pre-Ap-prendi decisions involving the juvenile justice system. Those cases hold that delinquency proceedings “must measure up to the essentials of due process and fair treatment.” See Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 562, 86 S.Ct. 1045, 16 L.Ed.2d 84 (1966). In the Court’s view, that means that the juvenile is entitled to pre-hearing notice of the charges, the right to representation by counsel at the adjudicatory hearing, the privilege against self-incrimination, the requirement that testimony be given under oath, the opportunity for cross-examination, and the requirement that the prosecution prove the charges beyond a reasonable doubt. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 368, 90 S.Ct. 1068, 25 L.Ed.2d 368 (1970); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 31-57, 87 S.Ct. 1428, 18 L.Ed.2d 527 (1967). However, the federal Constitution does not require a jury trial. McKeiver, 403 U.S. at 545-51, 91 S.Ct. 1976. In Kent, 383 U.S. at 554-565, 86 S.Ct. 1045, the Court set forth the constitutional requirements for the kind of decision at issue in Mr. Gonzales’s case. A District of Columbia juvenile judge had waived jurisdiction and transferred a rape case to the federal district court. Despite the “tremendous consequences” of the juvenile judge’s decision (a possible death sentence for rape under the District of Columbia Criminal Code, as opposed to being kept in custody until the juvenile’s twenty-first birthday), the judge had neither held a hearing nor made any findings setting forth the reasons for his decision. 383 U.S. at 554, 86 S.Ct. 1045. The Supreme Court held that the juvenile had a due process and Sixth Amendment right to a hearing, a statement of the reasons for the juvenile judge’s decision to transfer the case, and assistance of counsel. 383 U.S. at 557, 86 S.Ct. 1045. Importantly, the Court added, “[w]e do not mean by this to indicate that the hearing to be held must conform with all of the requirements of a criminal trial or even of the usual administrative hearing.” Id. at 562, 86 S.Ct. 1045; see also Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519, 537, 95 S.Ct. 1779, 44 L.Ed.2d 346 (1975) (discussing Kent and stating that “the Court has never attempted to prescribe criteria for, or the nature or quantum of evidence that must support, a decision to transfer a juvenile for trial in adult court”). Thus, Mr. Gonzales’s argument that the amenability findings resemble those at issue in Apprendi and must be made by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt seeks to expand the constitutional requirements for transfer hearings beyond those set forth in Kent. Because Apprendi neither cites Kent nor discusses juvenile transfer hearings at all, the New Mexico Court of Appeals plausibly declined to read Apprendi so broadly and reasonably concluded that the earlier case was controlling. e. Contrasting traditions Additionally, Apprendi’s holding is based upon a “historical foundation,” 530 U.S. at 477, 120 S.Ct. 2348, centuries of common law tradition regarding the role of the jury and the burden imposed upon the government of proving its charges beyond a reasonable doubt. In light of that tradition, the Supreme Court characterized the judicial fact finding allowed by the New Jersey hate crimes statute as a “novelty.” Id. at 482, 120 S.Ct. 2348. The same cannot be said for juvenile transfer hearings. At common law, children seven years or older “were subjected to arrest, trial, and in theory to punishment like adult offenders.” In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 16, 87 S.Ct. 1428. Thus, a youth like Mr. Gonzales was not entitled to argue (before judge or jury) that he should receive the benefit of an alternative, more rehabilitative sentencing scheme because of his age. Of course, the common law approach changed dramatically with the development of juvenile courts in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries and the Supreme Court’s landmark decisions extending certain constitutional protections to proceedings in those courts. See, e.g., In re Winship, 397 U.S. at 368, 90 S.Ct. 1068; In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 31-57, 87 S.Ct. 1428; Kent, 383 U.S. at 557, 86 S.Ct. 1045. Even so, the Supreme Court has continued to distinguish between the liberty interests of adults and juveniles. For example, in Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 265, 104 S.Ct. 2403, 81 L.Ed.2d 207 (1984), the Court reasoned that a juvenile’s interest in freedom from institutional restraints “must be qualified by the recognition that juveniles, unlike adults, are always in some form of custody.” In the Court’s view, “[cjhildren, by definition, are not assumed to have the capacity to take care of themselves. They are assumed to be subject to the control of their parents, and if parental control falters, the State must play its part as parens patrie.” Id. Under that analysis, when questions of Mr. Gonzales’s amenability to treatment and eligibility to commitment were submitted to a judge rather than a jury, his young age distinguished him from an adult defendant entitled to a jury trial under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments. Unlike Apprendi, no “historical foundation ... extending] down the centuries into the common law” required submission of the amenability and commitment questions to “ ‘twelve of [Mr. Gonzales’s] equals and neighbours.’ ” Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 477, 120 S.Ct. 2348 (quoting W. Blackstone, 4 COMMENTARIES 343). The judge’s exercise of the state’s parens patrie power did not contravene that tradition. In our view, it is also significant that forty-five states and the District of Columbia have enacted statutes allowing judges to transfer juveniles to adult court after making specified findings. Vannella, 48 WM & Mary L.Rev. at 739; see also Feld, 38 Wake Forest L.Rev. at 1215 (“Traditionally, most states allowed [juvenile] judges to waive jurisdiction based on a discretionary assessment of a youth’s ‘amenability to treatment’ or ‘dangerousness.’ ”). Although these statutes set forth varying standards of proof (or none at all), “[n]o state has required a [beyond a] reasonable doubt standard before a judge may waive juvenile court jurisdiction.” Vannella, 48 Wm. & Mary L. Rev at 740. Of course, the mere existence of these statutes does not resolve the constitutional question before us. See Schall, 467 U.S. at 268, 104 S.Ct. 2403. However, these statutes do indicate that the decision whether to transfer a juvenile to the adult system has not traditionally been made by a jury. The established practice of “legislative waiver” is also relevant. By one scholar’s reckoning, twenty-nine states have enacted statutes under which juveniles of a certain age who have committed certain acts will automatically be tried in adult courts. See Vannella, 48 Wm. & Mary L.Rev. at 741-42. New Mexico law provides an example. Children fifteen years or older who are convicted of first-degree murder may not be sentenced as juveniles. See N.M. Stat. § 32A-2-3(H). In these instances of legislative waiver, the transfer to the adult courts is accomplished by statute, unaccompanied by factual findings by either a jury or a judge. See Kalmakoff, 122 P.3d at 227 (noting that a juvenile subject to legislative waiver “would have far fewer procedural protections, such as the right to have a lawyer represent him and the right to present evidence at a hearing in front of a judge”); Feld, 38 Wake Forest L. Rev, at 1222 (noting the state legislatures’ authority to “exclude more categories of offenses from juvenile court jurisdiction”). The prevalence of legislative waiver further demonstrates that, in contrast to the factual findings in criminal trials, which Apprendi addressed, amenability and commitment findings have not traditionally been made by juries. 2. Burden of Proof Mr. Gonzales also argues that the state court proceedings failed to comport with constitutional due process requirements in another respect. He observes that N.M. Stat. § 32A-2-20 does not specify a burden of proof for amenability hearings. He invokes the Supreme Court’s decision in Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 102 S.Ct. 1388, 71 L.Ed.2d 599 (1982). There, the Court held that before it may terminate parental rights, the state must support its allegations by at least clear and convincing evidence. The Court offered the following observations about specifying the burden of proof in advance: In [a prior case] ... the Court held that fundamental fairness may be maintained in parental rights termination proceedings even when some procedures are mandated only on a case-by-case basis, rather than through rules of general application. But this Court never has approved case-by-case determination of the proper standard of proof for a given proceeding. Standards of proof, like other procedural due process . rules, are shaped by the risk of error inherent in the truth-finding process as applied to the generality of cases, not the rare exceptions. Since the litigants and the factfinder must know at the outset of a given proceeding how the risk of error will be allocated, the standard of proof necessarily must be calibrated in advance. Retrospective case-by-case review cannot preserve fundamental fairness when a class of proceedings is governed by a constitutionally defective evidentiary standard. 455 U.S. at 757, 102 S.Ct. 1388 (internal quotation marks, alterations, and citations omitted) (final emphasis added). According to Mr. Gonzales, this same kind of improper case-by-case determination occurred here. Our review of the state court proceedings establishes that Mr. Gonzales’s argument lacks merit: As the New Mexico Court of Appeals explained, Mr. Gonzales filed a prehearing motion requesting that the trial judge apply the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard to the amenability hearing. The trial court’s initial ruling did not specify a burden of proof. However, at Mr. Gonzales’s request, the court subsequently clarified that it had used the clear- and-convincing standard. See Gonzales, 24 P.3d at 780 (quoting the trial court’s explanation that “I made my [amenability and commitment] ruling based on the clear and convincing evidence argument that you ... made to me[, and] I still think that’s the appropriate standard.”). On direct appeal, the parties argued over the correct standard of proof. Although the Court of Appeals concluded that the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard was not required, it declined to decide whether the proper standard was the clear-and-convincing standard adopted by the trial, court or preponderance of the evidence, as argued by the prosecution. The Court of Appeals did hold that substantial evidence supported the trial court’s findings by clear and convincing evidence. 24 P.3d at 787-89. This procedural history demonstrates that the New Mexico courts did not engage in the kind of case-by-case approach condemned by the Supreme Court in Santosky. Unlike the circumstances to which Santosky refers, the state trial court did not use “a constitutionally defective evidentiary standard.” 455 U.S. at 757, 102 S.Ct. 1388. As we have reasoned above, federal law did not clearly require the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard at the amenability hearing, and the trial court and New Mexico Court of Appeals applied the less exacting (but still substantial) clear-and-convincing standard in assessing the evidence in this case. In our view, Santosky’s observations about case-by-case review do not mean that the burden of proof must be specified in a statute, particularly when the factfinder and the appellate court both apply a constitutionally permissible standard, as they did here. 3. Conclusion as to Apprendi claims We therefore conclude that the New Mexico Court of Appeals’s refusal to apply Apprendi’s holding to juvenile transfer proceedings is neither contrary to nor an unreasonable application of federal law. Thus, Mr. Gonzales is not entitled to relief on his claim that the state court judge violated his Due Process and Sixth Amendment rights by making findings in support of an adult sentence and by applying the clear-and-convincing burden of proof. C. Challenge to Guilty Plea Next, Mr. Gonzales challenges the state courts’ finding that his guilty plea was knowing and voluntary. He invokes (a) affidavits from himself and his mother regarding his motivation for entering the guilty plea and his mental status at the time; (b) expert testimony; (c) the diminished capacity of juveniles in general; and (d) the complexity of these particular proceedings. Mr. Gonzales further argues that the federal district court erred in refusing to grant him an evidentiary hearing on the claim. Although the state trial court found that Mr. Gonzales’s plea was knowing and voluntary, it did not make specific factual findings supporting that conclusion. Similarly, in the post-conviction proceedings, the state court issued a summary ruling and did not make factual findings regarding this claim. Accordingly, we must determine whether the state court’s legal conclusion that Mr. Gonzales’s plea was knowing and voluntary was contrary to or an unreasonable application of federal law. See Johnson v. Atherton, 296 F.3d 991, 993 (10th Cir.2002) (applying the contrary to or unreasonable application of standard to a challenge to a guilty plea). As to the district court’s denial of the request for an evidentiary hearing, our review is for an abuse of discretion. See Anderson v. Attorney Gen. of Kan., 425 F.3d 853, 858 (10th Cir.2005). 1. Applicable law A criminal defendant’s state court guilty plea must comport with due process. Miles v. Dorsey, 61 F.3d 1459, 1465-66 (10th Cir.1995). Thus, the defendant must be competent to enter the plea and the plea must be knowing and voluntary. Allen v. Mullin, 368 F.3d 1220, 1238-39 (10th Cir.2004) (discussing competency); Cunningham v. Diesslin, 92 F.3d 1054, 1060 (10th Cir.1996) (discussing the knowing and voluntary requirement). In order to be competent to enter a guilty plea, a defendant must be able to consult with his attorney with a reasonable degree of rational understanding and must have “a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him.” Allen, 368 F.3d at 1239 (internal quotation marks omitted). A plea is “knowing” if the defendant has “a full understanding of what the plea connotes and of its consequence.” Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 244, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 23 L.Ed.2d 274 (1969). In order to be “voluntary,” a plea must be “the product of a deliberate, intelligent choice.” Cunningham, 92 F.3d at 1060. In evaluating challenges to