Full opinion text
OPINION OF THE COURT AMBRO, Circuit Judge: Table of Contents I. Background and Procedural History.262 II. Jurisdiction and Standard of Review.263 III. Discussion .263 A. Bond’s Appeal of the Denial of his Petition to Vacate his Conviction.263 1. Batson Claim.263 a. The Batson Standard.264 b. Standard of Review for Habeas Petitions.264 (i) Relevant Background .264 (ii) Whether State Courts Reached Third Step of Batson Analysis.268 e. Analysis of Batson Claim.269 (i) Evidence Presented to the State Courts .269 (A) Disproportionate Strikes. 269 (B) Disparate Questioning.270 (C) Pretextual Strikes.270 (ii) Evidence Presented to the District Court.272 (A) Evidence Considered by the District Court.272 (B) Evidence Not Considered by the District Court.274 2. Bruton Claim.275 3. Jury-Instruction Claims.276 a. Reasonable Doubt.276 b. Accomplice Liability.278 B. The Commonwealth’s Appeal of the Vacation of Bond’s Death Sentence.278 1. Background of the Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claim.279 a. The Penalty Phase Hearing.279 (i) Mitigation Testimony.279 (ii) Penalty Phase Argument.279 b. The PCRA Hearing.280 e. The Pennsylvania Courts’ Conclusion .284 d. Proceedings in the District Court.285 2. Governing Law.285 3. Analysis of Bond’s Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claim.288 a. Deficient Performance.288 b. Prejudice.289 IV. Conclusion.292 Jai Ho Lee died in October 1991 after being shot during the robbery of the Stop and Go Deli in Philadelphia that he managed. A Philadelphia County jury convicted Jesse Bond of Lee’s first-degree murder in February 1993. It returned a verdict of death and the court imposed that sentence. Bond exhausted his state court remedies before filing a petition for habeas corpus in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. The District Court rejected Bond’s challenges to his conviction. It granted the petition as to his death sentence, however, as it concluded that Bond had received ineffective assistance of counsel at the penalty hearing. Bond and the Commonwealth cross-appealed. We affirm the judgment of the District Court in all respects. I. Background and Procedural History The Commonwealth prosecuted Bond for shooting Lee when he refused to open the cash register. It prosecuted Aaron Wheeler at the same trial for serving as Bond’s lookout. The Commonwealth presented extensive evidence of Bond’s guilt. Yang-Jin Kim, an employee at the Stop and Go Deli who witnessed the entire robbery and shooting from close range, identified Bond as the shooter. The prosecution presented confessions by both defendants that had been redacted to eliminate references to the other defendant by name (although Bond challenged his confession on the basis that it had been coerced and testified that he was not involved in the robbery). Beulah Sheppard also told police that she saw Bond shoot Lee, though she claimed at trial she had lied to the police. The jury found Bond guilty of first-degree murder, robbery, criminal conspiracy, and possession of an instrument of crime. The penalty phase began the next day. The Commonwealth presented evidence in support of the aggravating circumstance that Bond murdered Lee while committing another felony. It also presented evidence of Bond’s criminal history, and specifically his conviction for the robbery and murder of a restaurant owner ten days prior to the murder of Lee. Bond attempted to establish mitigating factors by presenting evidence of his good character and his youth. The jury found three aggravating circumstances and no mitigating circumstances. It returned a verdict of death. The trial judge denied post-verdict motions and Bond appealed to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, which affirmed. See Commonwealth v. Bond, 539 Pa. 299, 652 A.2d 308 (1995). Bond filed a petition pursuant to Pennsylvania’s Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”), 42 Pa. Con. Stat. § 9541 et seq. The trial judge (now sitting as the PCRA court) held a seven-day hearing on Bond’s PCRA claims before denying them all. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed. See Commonwealth v. Bond, 572 Pa. 588, 819 A.2d 33 (2002). Bond subsequently filed a petition for habeas corpus in the District Court. The Court held an evidentiary hearing regarding Bond’s claims, including those of jury discrimination and ineffective assistance of counsel at the penalty phase. It denied each of Bond’s guilt-phase claims but vacated the death sentence after granting Bond’s petition as to the penalty phase ineffective assistance of counsel claim. The Commonwealth appeals the grant of penalty phase habeas relief. Bond appeals the District Court’s denial of his guilt-phase claims. II. Jurisdiction and Standard of Review The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241, 2254. We have jurisdiction over this appeal under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291,2253. The Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”) limits ha-beas relief on issues that state courts have decided on the merits. AEDPA bars ha-beas relief unless the state court decision is contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly established Supreme Court law, or the state court decision involves an unreasonable determination of the facts. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(l)-(2); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412-13, 120 S.Ct. 1495,146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000). We may not “grant habeas corpus relief simply because we disagree with the state court’s decision or because we would have reached a different result if left to our own devices.” Werts v. Vaughn, 228 F.3d 178, 197 (3d Cir.2000). The state court’s application of Supreme Court precedent must have been objectively unreasonable; “[t]he federal habeas court should not grant the petition unless the state court decision, evaluated objectively and on the merits, resulted in an outcome that cannot reasonably be justified under existing Supreme Court preee-dent.” Hackett v. Price, 381 F.3d 281, 287 (3d Cir.2004) (internal quotation marks omitted). A state court’s factual findings are “presumed to be correct,” and the habeas petitioner carries the “burden of rebutting the presumption of correctness by clear and convincing evidence.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). See also Chadwick v. Janecka, 312 F.3d 597, 607 (3d Cir.2002). We review de novo issues that the state court did not decide on the merits. Everett v. Beard, 290 F.3d 500, 508 (3d Cir.2002). III. Discussion A. Bond’s Appeal of the Denial of his Petition to Vacate his Conviction Bond argues that the District Court erred in denying three of his guilt-phase claims. We conclude that each argument fails. 1. Batson Claim Bond, who is black, contends that the prosecutor used peremptory strikes in a racially discriminatory manner during jury selection. He argues that this violates the Equal Protection.Clause as interpreted in Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986). The trial court rejected each of the three Batson challenges made by defense counsel, resulting in the seating of a jury consisting of eight white and four black members. The state courts rejected Bond’s Batson claim on direct appeal and in post-conviction proceedings. The District Court deferred to the state courts under the AED-PA standard. We affirm. a. The Batson Standard Batson requires a three-step analysis, which the Supreme Court has articulated as follows: First, the trial court must determine whether the defendant has made a pri-ma facie showing that the prosecutor exercised a peremptory challenge on the basis of race. Second, if the showing is made, the burden shifts to the prosecutor to present a race-neutral explanation for striking the juror in question. Although the prosecutor must present a comprehensible reason, “[t]he second step of this process does not demand an explanation that is persuasive or even plausible”; so long as the reason is not inherently discriminatory, it suffices. Third, the court must then determine whether the defendant has carried his burden of proving purposeful discrimination. This final step involves evaluating “the persuasiveness of the justification” proffered by the prosecutor, but “the ultimate burden of persuasion rests with, and never shifts from, the opponent of the strike.” Rice v. Collins, 546 U.S. 333, 338,126 S.Ct. 969,163 L.Ed.2d 824 (2006) (citations omitted). The parties do not dispute that Bond made a prima facie showing that the prosecutor exercised a peremptory challenge on the basis of race or that the prosecutor gave a race-neutral explanation for the challenge. The dispute thus turns on whether Bond carries his burden of proving purposeful discrimination. The burden at this step three is tó show that it is more likely than not that the prosecutor struck at least one juror because of race. See Wilson v. Beard, 426 F.3d 653, 670 (3d Cir.2005). At step three, “the trial judge must make a finding regarding the [prosecutor’s] motivation.” Bronshtein v. Horn, 404 F.3d 700, 723 (3d Cir.2005). b. Standard of Review for Habeas Petitions [3] We first address the threshold question of whether to apply the deferential AEDPA standard of review. The Commonwealth would have us answer that question “yes.” Bond disagrees and asks us to apply a de novo standard of review. Their dispute centers on whether the state courts reached the third part of the Bat-son analysis and resolved it on the merits. If the state courts performed a step-three analysis and made a finding about the prosecutor’s intent, that finding is presumed correct, see 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1), and Bond is entitled to relief only if (1) the state court decision was “contrary to,” or involved an “unreasonable application” of, Supreme Court precedent, id. § 2254(d)(1); or (2) the finding was unreasonable in light of the record before the state court, id. § 2254(d)(2); or (3) Bond rebutted that finding with clear and convincing evidence in the District Court, id. § 2254(e)(1). Failure to make a step-three finding, on the other hand, would render the state court’s decision either “contrary to” or an “unreasonable application” of Batson, see, e.g., Hardcastle v. Horn, 368 F.3d 246, 259 (3d Cir.2004), and we would not apply AEDPA deference. We would review the issue de novo with the exception that we would review relevant factual findings made by the District Court for clear error. See Whitney v. Horn, 280 F.3d 240, 249 (3d Cir.2002). (i) Relevant Background The issue of race first arose at voir dire when the prosecutor complained about defense counsel’s strikes of white venireper-sons. The trial court rejected the prosecutor’s complaint, noting instead that it was concerned about his (the prosecutor’s) actions because he had stricken four of the five black venirepersons he had an opportunity to accept. Defense counsel raised their first Bat-son challenge after the prosecutor struck the next black member of the jury pool. The court noted that the prosecutor had stricken five of six black venirepersons, but only three of their 15 white counterparts, and that “there’s clearly a propensity on the Commonwealth to strike black jurors.” At defense counsel’s urging, the court asked the prosecutor to state his reasons for striking two of the black veni-repersons (Kim Clark and Geraldine McLendon). When the prosecutor asked if the court was ordering him to do so and finding a prima facie case, the court said, “I’m not sure what I’m going to do at this point.... I don’t start out discussing anybody’s motives, but I think it’s a reasonable request. Maybe you ought to tell me that, and we’ll take it from there.” The prosecutor stated, with respect to Clark, that she “did not want to be here.... She did not seem very enthusiastic about the proceedings and merely did not want to be here. I did not like the way she related to me. Two of the white jurors I struck had the same problem .... I did not like the way that they came off to me. That was the reason I struck her.” Turning to McLendon, the prosecutor claimed she “equivocated as far as the death penalty was concerned. I was not completely confident with her answer. She said, [']if necessary. [’]” Defense counsel then asked the court to seat McLendon, arguing that she was “a lot more solid a citizen than the lady that we seated a month and a half ago [during Bond’s first trial].... It just would seem to be no neutral reason for striking Miss McLendon.” The prosecutor argued that McLendon was similar to a white venire-person he had stricken. The court said: I understand that. Except you’ve struck five out of six blacks when you’ve had the opportunity to, and you have struck — you only preempted three out of 15 whites. I’m not at this point going to find that [the prosecutor] is using his peremptory challenges to exclude black jurors, and I am not going to find at this time that it is racially motivated. However, ... I’m highly conscious of my responsibility in that regard, and that’s all it is. I do want to follow the appellate court cases.... And right now, with all respect to you, [the prosecutor], I think if we’re close in any area, it’s in the circumstances of the Commonwealth’s exercise. I’m not finding at this point any prima facie case. So, we’ll proceed. The next day, after the prosecutor struck five more black venirepersons, defense counsel raised their second Batson challenge. It pertained to three members of the venire (Brian Reed, William Williams and Nicole Gilyard). The court noted that the prosecutor had accepted two black venirepersons, who were selected, and a third, who was stricken by the defense, but had stricken nine of the 13 black venirepersons whom he had an opportunity to accept. Defense counsel contended that a pattern had been established, prompting the court to want to hear from the prosecutor. The prosecutor called the choice to strike Reed “obvious” in light of Reed’s apparent concerns about imposing the death penalty. The court agreed, saying “I think that’s clear.” The prosecutor stated that he had stricken Williams because, although otherwise “ideal,” he “gave me shock” when he “equivocated” about the death penalty. Finally, with respect to Gilyard, the prosecutor noted that he was “very concerned with the nature of the close relationship she had with the person accused of a robbery.... The fact that she seemed to have a close relationship, saw a person every day who committed a robbery, that really turned me off and that’s why I didn’t want her.” The prosecutor then volunteered that he thought Gilyard different from a white juror he accepted who had testified as a character witness on behalf of a co-worker accused of manslaughter. He said: “I just thought that he was a co-worker and did not have the close relationship with this individual had with the person who was accused of robbery.” The trial court said “I presume you’re saying ... that their race played no part in your — ,” to which the prosecutor responded “[n]one whatsoever.” Bond’s counsel rejoined that the aforementioned white juror also “was questionable” about whether he could impose the death penalty, and thus “the same reasons the Commonwealth is using to strike people he seems to avoid when it’s a white potential juror.” The court then said: “I’m not going to try and get into [the prosecutor’s] mind, and I don’t think it’s appropriate really for you to. What I need from him is some objective statement that’s racially neutral.... I’m satisfied that he has given it at this juncture.” The court then heard from counsel for Bond’s co-defendant, who joined in Bond’s counsel’s argument and added that “assuming we get to the establishment of a pattern, one of the three criteria the Commonwealth must meet to overcome that presumed or assumed pattern is that the reason they give is racially neutral and that there is a basis for them and they are not just made up out of whole cloth.... ” Co-defendant’s counsel also argued that it was inconsistent for the prosecutor to strike a black venireperson because she knew an accused robber but accept a white venireperson who testified on behalf of a co-worker accused of manslaughter: “[T]hat flies in the very face of the reasons given.... And I think there you have a fabricated reason by the Commonwealth. There they have failed to give a racially neutral reason, and in so failing, I would say that the redress ... is to seat that juror.” The prosecutor replied by reiterating his argument that the white venireperson’s relationship with a criminal defendant did not seem to him as close as the black venireperson’s comparable relationship, and also that the white juror had not equivocated regarding the death penalty. The trial court ruled: Okay. I am satisfied that the explanation is racially neutral. I do find prima, fa-cie — by the exercise of its peremptory challenges as set forth, that there is some prima facie evidence of the Commonwealth striking black jurors because of race. And I’m satisfied at this point that no further action is warranted.... But in any event, I am satisfied that [the prosecutor’s strike of Gilyard] prevails and we should move on to the next juror. Voir dire proceeded. After the prosecutor struck another black venireperson, Joyce Hinton, defense counsel (prompted by the court) raised their third and final Batson challenge. The court said: “I have already found that a prima facie case does exist of a pattern used by the Commonwealth to exclude jurors because of race. And I’ll permit [the prosecutor] to explain this particular instance.” The following then transpired: THE PROSECUTOR: Judge, I was all set to accept this juror, except I asked the witness when she hesitated, clearly hesitated about the death penalty. THE COURT: She didn’t hesitate one bit, in this Court’s opinion. THE PROSECUTOR: In my opinion, she most — ■ THE COURT: Okay. I understand that. In other words, she was asked that question by [counsel for the code-fendant]. She was asked it by you. And then you asked what you always ask, [“A]re you sure?[”] The prosecutor argued in support of asking witnesses whether they are “sure” about the death penalty, but the trial court ordered him to refrain from doing so. The following then transpired: THE COURT: You’vé indicated that you think this juror has hesitated on the death penalty issue and that’s why you exercised your peremptory challenge. THE PROSECUTOR: No, that is not why I exercised it. THE COURT: Well, why did you? THE PROSECUTOR: She resented my asking, [“A]re you sure[?”] She’s the first witness of this entire two days who took offense when I asked the question. I did not mean to offend her, but that’s the ultimate question in this case. THE COURT: All right. You don’t have to say any more. I’m satisfied that the explanation is racially neutral. I’m not saying that I necessarily agree with it except to the extent that there was something that occurred at the end of that questioning that could have made counsel hesitate over this precise juror and the manner in which that question was asked and responded to. Accordingly, I continue my finding that the Commonwealth is indeed — that there is indeed a prima facie case of excluding jurors because of race, but I’m satisfied at this point that that’s'racially neutral. And I’ll permit the strike. You may call the next juror. The trial court revisited the Batson issues on post-trial motions. It held: Batson was first raised here by defendant Bond after the Commonwealth had struck nine out [of] a possible thirteen black jurors. The court then found that this pattern established a prima facie case that the Commonwealth was using its peremptory challenges to remove black jurors and asked that the Commonwealth explain its reasons for challenging black jurors. At the defendant’s request!,] the Commonwealth explained its reasons for striking three black jurors. ... The court found these reasons to be racially neutral and permitted the three strikes. After being challenged a second time[,] the prosecutor explained his tenth strike.... Here too the court found the reason to be racially neutral. The jury after completion of the selection process consisted of four black people, out of a possible fourteen, and eight white people. Reviewing the totality of the circumstances[,] there is no showing of intentional discrimination by the prosecutor in the jury selection process and defendants are not entitled to a new trial on that basis. Opinion Denying Post-Trial Motions at 6-7, Case Nos. 1783-1791, 1821-1828 (Ct. C.P., Philadelphia County, Oct. 5, 1993) (“Post-Trial Motions Opinion”). The Pennsylvania Supreme Court reviewed Bond’s Batson challenges on direct appeal. It wrote: When each of the explanations as set forth above was offered by the prosecutor, the trial judge, who was present throughout the entire voir dire, accepted the explanations as legitimate and race neutral. Appellant does not now offer any specific arguments as to why a particular explanation was not acceptable. Rather, appellant makes a generalized assertion that the reasons put forth by the Commonwealth were not racially neutral. Based upon our review of the record we find no reason to disturb the findings of the trial court as to the legitimacy of the race neutral responses offered in this case. Commonwealth v. Bond, 539 Pa. 299, 652 A.2d 308, 310-11 (1995). The PCRA court refused to consider a newly discovered videotape of a veteran prosecutor explaining how to get around Batson to younger attorneys in the office that prosecuted Bond. It summarized its previous Batson ruling as follows: “[Fallowing a Batson challenge during jury selection, this court found no racial basis for the peremptory challenges by the prosecutor, a finding which was affirmed by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court.” Opinion Denying Petition for Post-Conviction Relief at 3-4, Commonwealth v. Bond, Case No. 1783, 1/2 (Ct. C.P. Philadelphia County, Jan. 26, 1998) (“PCRA Opinion”). The Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed. It characterized its prior Batson ruling as follows: “On direct appeal, this Court held that the prosecutor had articulated race-neutral reasons for the use of peremptory challenges.” Bond, 819 A.2d at 48 n. 8. (ii) Whether State Courts Reached Third Step of Batson Analysis The state courts repeatedly failed to identify the three steps of the Batson analysis explicitly. This renders our task harder on review, as we must attempt to discern whether those courts did in fact perform each step. The record certainly gives serious cause for concern that the state courts did not reach the third step of the Batson analysis. Most troubling, the trial court stated that it was “not going to try and get into [the prosecutor’s] mind” and suggested that it only needed “some objective statement that’s racially neutral.” This seems to indicate that the trial court believed that it could stop after the prosecutor satisfied the second step of the Batson analysis by stating a race-neutral explanation for a strike. The voir dire transcript never explicitly clarifies whether, in accepting explanations to be race-neutral, the trial court or the Pennsylvania Supreme Court believed that the prosecutor truly had acted in a race-neutral fashion (satisfying step three of the Batson analysis), or merely that the stated explanations were race-neutral (at step two). Having reviewed the state court record closely, however, we conclude that the trial court and the Supreme Court both reached the third step of the Batson analysis and resolved it in favor of the Commonwealth. The trial court may have stated its resolution of the Batson analysis inartfully during voir dire, but its order denying post-trial motions shows that it reached Batson’s third step. It wrote: “Reviewing the totality of the circumstances there is no showing of intentional discrimination by the prosecutor in the jury selection process and defendants are not entitled to a new trial on that basis.” Post-Trial Motions Opinion at 7. The reference to a “showing of intentional discrimination” puts this conclusion within step three of the Batson analysis. Here, the trial court does more than conclude that the prosecutor offered a race-neutral explanation for a strike; it concludes that Bond did not meet his burden of showing that purposeful racial discrimination, not the proffered explanation, actually motivated the prosecutor’s conduct. This step-three conclusion indicates that the trial court indeed did understand the steps of a Batson analysis. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court essentially incorporated the reasoning of the trial court, although it did not make specific mention of the opinion denying the post-trial motions. It described the trial court as accepting the prosecutor’s explanations as “legitimate and race neutral,” and referred to the trial court’s findings “as to the legitimacy of the race neutral responses offered in this case.” The emphasis on legitimacy demonstrates that the Supreme Court considered the third step of the Batson analysis. Had it stopped at the second step, it merely would have inquired into the existence of “race neutral” explanations or responses. But it also described the legitimacy of those “race neutral” explanations. It considered, in other words, whether the prosecutor had told the truth when he offered race-neutral explanations. It concluded that he had done so. This amounts to a determination on the merits at the third step of the Batson analysis. We therefore apply the deferential AEDPA standard of review. Cf. Taylor v. Horn, 504 F.3d 416, 433 (3d Cir. 2007) (explaining that AEDPA deference applies to implicit as well as explicit factual findings). c. Analysis of Batson Claim (i) Evidence Presented to the State Courts Bond argues that the voir dire transcript shows that: (A) the prosecutor struck black venirepersons and accepted white venirepersons disproportionately; (B) the prosecutor asked black venireper-sons more, and different kinds of, questions than white venirepersons; and (C) the prosecutor’s stated reasons for striking certain black venirepersons were inconsistent with his acceptance of certain white venirepersons or otherwise appear pretex-tual. The Supreme Court has recognized that these factors are relevant on the issue of discriminatory intent. See Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231, 240-63, 125 S.Ct. 2317, 162 L.Ed.2d 196 (2005). (A) Disproportionate Strikes The trial court conducted two days of voir dire.. Each panel included forty venirepersons. The voir dire transcript and case record do not show conclusively the race of many of these individuals. They do reveal the following, however: (1) the jury consisted of eight white and four black members, with two black alternates; (2) the venire panel on day one included 10 black and 30 non-black venire-persons; and (3) the prosecutor used 11 of his peremptory strikes against black veni-repersons, 3 against white venirepersons, and one against an hispanic venireperson. These raw statistics do not provide a clear picture of intentional racial discrimination. The higher number of strikes against black venirepersons raises concern but, as the Commonwealth notes, black jurors ultimately formed a larger percentage (33%) of the jury than they did of the only venire panel whose racial composition we know (25%). This comparison becomes even more favorable for the Commonwealth when we add the alternates to our consideration (43% versus 25%). The parties dispute the number of black venirepersons that the prosecutor had the opportunity to strike. Bond believes this number to be 15, the Commonwealth 17. It appears that the prosecutor accepted at least seven of these venirepersons (the four black jurors, the two black alternates, and one black venireperson struck by the defense). This means that the prosecutor accepted somewhere between 41% (7 of 17) and 47% (7 of 15) black venirepersons that he had the opportunity to strike. Bond contends that this compares unfavorably to the Commonwealth’s acceptance of white venirepersons, which it characterizes as an 83% rate. Assuming this to be correct, we certainly recognize the disparity between that rate and the 41%-47% rate for black venirepersons. This raises an inference of intentional racial discrimination. That inference does not have much strength, however, in light of the ultimate number of black jurors (and alternates), and the reasonably high rate of accepting black veni-repersons. Both factors distinguish this case from Miller-El. See 545 U.S. at 240-41,125 S.Ct. 2317 (noting that the prosecutor accepted only 9% of the black venire-persons he had an opportunity to accept and that, while approximately 20% of the venirepersons were black, only one of 108 black venirepersons actually served on the jury). (B) Disparate Questioning Bond’s argument regarding the disparate questioning of venirepersons suffers from the threshold problem that we do not know the race of each of the venirepersons. Bond thus cannot provide a detailed analysis of the questions posed to the venire pool as a whole. He relies on comparisons between stricken black venirepersons and seated white jurors, both for the substance of questioning and the number of questions posed. He does not explain why other factors, such as job stability or roots in the community, could not account for these differences. That five black stricken venirepersons were asked whether they were “sure” they could impose the death penalty raises an inference of intentional discrimination. But that inference is not particularly strong, as even Bond concedes that the Commonwealth posed the question to at least two non-black venirepersons. Nothing identified by Bond provides a close comparison to Miller-El. In that case, 6% of white venirepersons, compared to 53% of black venirepersons, were given a graphic description of the death penalty during questioning, id. at 255, 125 S.Ct. 2317, and 100% of black venirepersons, compared to 27% of white venirepersons, were asked a trick question about imposing the death penalty, id. at 262, 125 S.Ct. 2317. No equivalent difference in questioning occurred in this case. (C) Pretexual Strikes Bond contends that the prosecutor gave pretextual reasons for striking four specific black venirepersons: Kim Clark, Geraldine McLendon, Nicole Gilyard, and Joyce Hinton. To repeat, the prosecutor stated that he struck Clark because she did not seem enthusiastic about the proceedings and did not want to be there. Bond argues that the record does not support this subjective reason. We agree with the Commonwealth, however, that the record is unlikely to indicate lack of enthusiasm or other such moods that the prosecutor may claim to discern. The trial court did not note any disagreement with the prosecutor’s stated reason and Bond has not identified any white jurors accepted by the prosecutor despite a similar lack of enthusiasm. The prosecutor’s strike of Clark thus provides little, if any, support for Bond’s position. Similar defects weaken Bond’s argument regarding McLendon. The prosecutor stated that he struck her because she equivocated about her ability to impose the death penalty. Bond responds that the record reveals no such hesitation. The record is unlikely to reveal such pauses, however, and the trial court did not dispute the prosecutor’s allegation of hesitation (as compared to its rejection, discussed below, of any suggestion that Hinton hesitated). Bond also argues that the prosecutor contradicted his professed preference for jurors with children and stable work histories in striking McLendon (who met both preferences). Bond fails, however, to identify an accepted white venire-person with a similar background. The prosecutor stated that he struck Gilyard because he was “very concerned with the nature of the close relationship she had with the person accused of a robbery.... The fact that she seemed to have a very close relationship, saw a person every day who committed a robbery, that really turned me off and that’s why I didn’t want her.” Bond first argues that the record does not support the existence of a close relationship between Gil-yard and the robbery defendant. We agree that the prosecutor may have exaggerated describing this relationship as “very close,” but the record does show that the prosecutor reasonably could have believed that a close relationship existed between Gilyard and the robbery defendant: Gilyard identified the accused person as someone “close to” her and a friend whom she saw “practically every day.” Bond argues that two white jurors, Thomas Dunst and Mary Wetzel, also had a close relationship with individuals accused of a crime. The trial court did not hear argument regarding Wetzel, so we do not have available for review any explanation by the prosecutor on that point. Dunst had testified that a co-worker had been accused of manslaughter and that he testified as a character witness on his behalf. The prosecutor stated that he did not strike Dunst because he was only a coworker of the manslaughter defendant. This explanation is not inherently implausible and the subtle distinction identified by the prosecutor may reflect a legitimate, reasonable, non-race-based trial strategy. Even so, the failure to strike Dunst does raise concerns that the prosecutor gave pretextual reasons for striking Gilyard. The trial court did not express concerns about that strike, however, and accepted the prosecutor’s explanation. Nothing in the record indicates that it was unreasonable to do so. Our review of the record also reveals that the trial court likely would have perceived no significant additional grounds for concern had Bond also pointed to the failure to strike Wetzel. That conclusion would have been reasonable. We thus conclude that the strike of Gilyard permits an inference of discriminatory intent, but that it is not a strong one. The trial court did express concern about the strike of Hinton. The following exchange (which we also quote in full above) occurred: THE PROSECUTOR: Judge, I was all set to accept this juror, except I asked the witness when she hesitated, clearly hesitated about the death penalty. THE COURT: She didn’t hesitate one bit, in this Court’s opinion.... You’ve indicated that you think this juror has hesitated on the death penalty issue and that’s why you exercised your peremptory challenge. THE PROSECUTOR: No, that is not why I exercised it. THE COURT: Well, why did you? THE PROSECUTOR: She resented my asking, are you sure. She’s the first witness of this entire two days who took offense when I asked the question. I did not mean to offend her, but that’s the ultimate question in this case. THE COURT: All right. You don’t have to say any more. I’m satisfied that the explanation is racially neutral. I’m not saying that I necessarily agree with it except to the extent that there was something that occurred at the end of that questioning that could have made counsel hesitate over this precise juror and the manner in which that question was asked and responded to. Accordingly, I continue my finding that the Commonwealth is indeed — that there is indeed a prima facie case of excluding jurors because of race, but I’m satisfied at this point that that’s racially neutral. And I’ll permit the strike. You may call the next juror. Bond contends that this exchange reveals a change in positions by the prosecutor in that he first stated that he struck Hinton for hesitating and then stated that he struck her for taking offense at his question. The Commonwealth contends, to the contrary, that the trial court interrupted a single explanation of the strike: that, after Hinton hesitated, the prosecutor asked a follow-up question, to which Hinton took offense. The ambiguous transcript supports both readings. It does not allow us to discern whether Hinton indeed did resent the asking of the follow-up question. Even if she did not hesitate, the trial court appears to have agreed that she resented that question. Any exaggeration about hesitation does not stop resentment of the prosecutor’s question from being a legitimate basis for a strike. Were we to doubt that the prosecutor did in fact have that motive for striking Hinton, the record still would not allow us to do more than suspect improper motives. It does not make clear any unreasonableness in the trial court’s acceptance of the prosecutor’s stated reason. ‡ ‡ ‡ Taken as a whole, the voir dire transcript raises legitimate concerns that the prosecutor struck black venirepersons disproportionately and gave pretextual reasons for doing so. We agree with the District Court’s suggestion that reasonable minds could differ on the proper result of the third step of the Batson analysis with respect to the evidence before the state courts. That is not our inquiry, however. As discussed, we apply the deferential AEDPA standard. The possibility that we might have resolved this question differently had we sat as the trial court does not provide a basis for habeas relief under that standard. The trial court record does not allow us to conclude that the state court decisions were either “contrary to,” or involved an “unreasonable application” of, Supreme Court precedent, see 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), nor that the state courts’ findings were unreasonable in light of the record before them, see id. § 2254(d)(2). We thus defer to the state courts’ conclusion that Bond failed to meet his burden at the third stage of the Batson analysis on the record before the state courts. (ii) Evidence Presented to the District Court Bond also bases his Batson claim on evidence that he did not present to the state courts. We consider that evidence in two steps: first, evidence considered by the District Court, and second, evidence not considered by the District Court on procedural grounds. (A) Evidence Considered by the District Court The District Court held a hearing on two kinds of evidence that the Philadelphia District Attorney’s Office had a policy of discrimination at the time of Bond’s trial. Specifically, the court heard evidence that Assistant District Attorney Jack McMahon gave a videotaped training session explaining how to use race as a factor in jury selection, and that another Assistant District Attorney, Bruce Sagel, also trained members of the office to use race as a factor in selecting juries. The District Court concluded that this evidence did not indicate that the prosecutor in Bond’s case struck venirepersons because of racially discriminatory intent. The Commonwealth contends that the District Court should not have held a hearing as to these two types of evidence because the state courts concluded that a hearing was unnecessary as to the McMahon evidence and did not have the opportunity to review the Sagel evidence. This argument raises questions as to the propriety of the evidentiary hearing. Rather than decide those questions, however, we assume the best possible procedural posture for Bond: that we review the District Court’s finding that the evidence was unpersuasive for clear error. See Cristin v. Brennan, 281 F.3d 404, 409 (3d Cir.2002). As discussed below, we conclude that Bond does not prevail even with the benefit of that assumption. The Commonwealth does not attempt to defend the contents of the McMahon video. Instead, it argues that the District Court did not clearly err in concluding that the McMahon video did not show that the Philadelphia District Attorney’s Office had a policy or culture of discrimination. The Commonwealth first points to the testimony of the prosecutor in Bond’s case. He stated that he never saw the McMahon video, had not heard of it before it became public, had never had any discussions with McMahon, and had not been trained by him. Bond’s prosecutor also testified that no one had taught him to strike black jurors. The Commonwealth also presented the testimony of other members of the District Attorney’s Office. They testified that: (1) the videotape represents McMahon’s personal views, not those of the office; (2) the office policy was to follow the requirements of Batson; (3) only ten to fifteen assistant district attorneys actually attended the lecture seen in the videotape; and (4) while the videotape was available to new prosecutors, it was not part of a regular training program. The District Court credited the prosecutor’s testimony and, while acknowledging it to be a “reasonable inference” that such a policy existed, it “d[id] not conclude that it was the policy of the District Attorney’s Office to discriminate on racial grounds in the process of selecting juries.” Bond v. Beard, 2006 WL 1117862, at *3 (E.D.Pa. Apr.24, 2006). Bond’s attempts to undermine that conclusion lack force. His arguments remain general and do not have significant persuasive effect regarding his specific case. Bond does not, for example, identify specific testimony that demonstrates that the prosecutor did not deserve the positive credibility finding made by the District Court. That Court, which gave the matter much attention, had the opportunity to sit and listen to the prosecutor’s testimony. We will not conclude that it committed clear error without some firmer indication of the prosecutor’s lack of veracity than the general concerns voiced by Bond. Nor do we perceive error in the District Court’s reference to a “policy of discrimination” rather than to a “culture of discrimination.” Any difference between those phrases is irrelevant here, since the District Court implicitly found insufficient evidence of pervasive influence or pressure on prosecutors that pushed them toward Batson violations. The District Court concluded that the McMahon videotape had not affected the performance of the prosecutor in Bond’s case. Even if, as Bond suggests, the District Court should have spoken in terms of the office’s culture, rather than its policy, that would not change the Court’s conclusion that Bond has not shown that the prosecutor had seen the videotape or otherwise been trained to avoid Batson. The District Court also did not commit clear error in its treatment of the Sagel evidence. Bond’s claim on that point referred to a magazine article based on handwritten notes taken by Assistant District Attorney Gavin Lentz in a training given by Sagel. Bond sought to establish the existence of a culture of discrimination through these notes. However, both Lentz and Sagel testified in the District Court that the lecture did not include instructions to strike venirepersons because of their race. Lentz also testified that he did not believe that there was a “pervasive culture of discrimination in the office[.]” Given this testimony that contradicts Bond’s depiction of the Sagel training as equivalent to the McMahon lecture and that denies the existence of a culture of discrimination, the District Court did not clearly err in deciding that this “additional evidence,” like the McMahon videotape, does not support a conclusion that the District Attorney’s Office had a culture of discrimination. (B) Evidence Not Considered by the District Court Bond also presented a statistical study to the District Court. He argues that this study, performed by Professors David Baldus and George Woodford, demonstrates that the Philadelphia District Attorney’s Office struck black venirepersons at a 33% higher rate than non-black veni-repersons. He asserts that it shows that Bond’s prosecutor had stricken 55% of black venirepersons as opposed to 22% of non-black venirepersons. The District Court refused to consider this evidence because of Bond’s failure to present it to the state courts. We do not decide the question whether the District Court could have considered this evidence. Even if introduced, this survey, considered either individually or as part of the record as a whole, would not change our evaluation of the merits of this claim. As the District Court explained, Bond bears the ultimate burden of establishing that the prosecutor in his case intentionally discriminated on the basis of race when he struck venirepersons. The Baldus study permits an inference that the District Attorney’s Office tends to strike black venirepersons more often than non-black venirepersons and that Bond’s prosecutor has demonstrated a similar tendency. But each court to consider the prosecutor’s conduct in this specific case has concluded that the prosecutor did not discriminate intentionally on the basis of race. Bond may not prevail on his Batson claim by relying on such general evidence as the survey when both state and federal courts have evaluated the prosecutor’s specific motivations and found against Bond without making unreasonable factual determinations or committing clear error. * * * * * Taken as a whole, or individually, the evidence not considered by the state courts does not cast meaningful doubt on their Batson decision. Bond has failed to rebut their conclusions by clear and convincing evidence, see 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1), and has given us no reason to revisit our decision to defer to their Batson analysis. Accordingly, Bond’s Batson claim fails. 2. Bruton Claim The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution, and specifically its Confrontation Clause, guarantees criminal defendants the right to confront the witnesses against them. The Supreme Court has explained that a defendant is denied his right to confront witnesses against him when a prosecutor presents a co-defendant’s confession implicating the defendant at a joint trial and the co-defendant does not testify. See Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 88 S.Ct. 1620, 20 L.Ed.2d 476 (1968). The prosecutor sought to introduce confessions provided by both Bond and his codefendant at their joint trial. Bond’s counsel negotiated an appropriate approach given the constraints imposed by Bruton. They and the prosecutor apparently agreed that the Commonwealth would introduce a redacted version of Bond’s co-defendant’s confession. This version replaced Bond’s name with the words “another guy” at the points where Wheeler implicated Bond in his confession. The prosecutor unfortunately failed to keep to the parties’ agreement. He used the term “the killer” instead of the words “another guy” in his opening and, at the end of that address to the jury, identified Bond by name: “He [Bond’s co-defendant] ... admits that he saw Bond shoot and kill Mr. Lee.” Bond’s counsel moved for a mistrial and severance. The trial court rejected that motion. It instead instructed the jury that opening statements do not constitute evidence and allowed the trial to proceed. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court upheld the trial court’s decision on appeal and in post-conviction proceedings. It concluded that the redactions were sufficient and that the prosecutor’s identification of Bond was harmless error in light of the trial court’s instructions to the jury and the independent evidence of Bond’s guilt. The District Court applied the AEDPA standard of review. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(l)-(2). It held that the state courts did not apply governing law unreasonably in holding harmless any Confrontation Clause violation. The Commonwealth does not contest the existence of error under the Confrontation Clause. It renews its argument, however, that any error was harmless. We thus turn to the same question posed to the District Court. But our analysis differs somewhat in light of Fry v. Pliler, 551 U.S. - — •, 127 S.Ct. 2321, 2328, 168 L.Ed.2d 16 (2007), which the Supreme Court issued after the District Court’s opinion. Fry instructs us to perform our own harmless error analysis under Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 113 S.Ct. 1710, 123 L.Ed.2d 353 (1993), rather than review the state court’s harmless error analysis under the AEDPA standard. See Fry, 127 S.Ct. at 2328. The Supreme Court explained in Brecht that an error is harmless if it did not have “substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict.” 507 U.S. at 637, 113 S.Ct. 1710 (quoting Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 776, 66 S.Ct. 1239, 90 L.Ed. 1557 (1946)). “Under this standard, habeas petitioners may obtain plenary review of their constitutional claims, but they are not entitled to habeas relief based on trial error unless they can establish that it resulted in actual prejudice.” Id. (quotation marks omitted). “When a federal judge in a habeas proceeding is in grave doubt about whether a trial error of federal law had substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict, that error is not harmless.” O’Neal v. McAninch, 513 U.S. 432, 436, 115 S.Ct. 992, 130 L.Ed.2d 947 (1995) (quotation marks omitted). We conclude here that the error was harmless under Brecht. The prosecutor’s conduct raises serious questions as to his willingness to respect Bond’s rights under the Confrontation Clause. Yet, the Commonwealth presented such extensive evidence of Bond’s guilt that the error could not have had a substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict. Kim, who had an unobstructed view of the shooter during the robbery, identified Bond. He testified at trial that he was “absolutely certain” that Bond had shot Lee. Sheppard also gave detectives a statement before trial identifying Bond as the shooter (although she did retract that statement at trial). Finally, Bond himself confessed to the crime but contended at trial that the police had coerced this confession from him. Wflieeler’s confession added little to this compelling evidence against Bond, particularly since he provided an alibi defense and his counsel suggested in closing that Wflieeler’s confession had been coerced. The jury could have acquitted both defendants by crediting Wheeler’s alibi and concluding that Bond and Sheppard told the truth on the stand. It clearly did not do so. This leaves no basis for a “grave doubt” as to the harmlessness of the error. See id. The prosecutor’s erroneous conduct, while regrettable, thus does not provide a basis for habeas relief. 3. Jury-Instruction Claims a. Reasonable Doubt Bond contends that the trial court failed to explain that the Commonwealth had to prove each and every element of murder beyond a reasonable doubt. This failure, he argues, violates Pennsylvania law and provides a basis for habeas relief in that appellate counsel’s failure to raise this point was ineffective assistance of counsel. The trial court’s opinion denying the PCRA petition does not discuss this issue and does not list it among the claims raised by Bond. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied Bond’s PCRA appeal, holding that Bond had waived the underlying jury instruction claim by failing to raise it on direct appeal. Bond, 819 A.2d at 40 & n. 3. It noted that Bond had not framed that issue as a question of counsel’s ineffectiveness except in “a one-sentence statement at the conclusion of the argument ..., baldly asserting that all prior counsel were ineffective for failing to litigate the issue.” Id. at 40. The trial court explained that “[s]uch boilerplate allegations tacked on to waived claims of trial court error do not discharge appellant’s burden of proving ineffectiveness.” Id. The resolution of this issue by the state courts led the District Court to conclude that this claim “has not been exhausted, and has been waived.” Bond, 2006 WL 1117862, at *7. Bond contends that the doctrine of “relaxed waiver,” which prevailed in Pennsylvania at the time of the state-court decisions, makes any state-law procedural ground inadequate to bar consideration of this claim in federal court. See, e.g., Jacobs v. Horn, 395 F.3d 92, 117 (3d Cir.2005) (explaining effect of relaxed waiver doctrine). We affirm even assuming that we may reach the merits of this claim. The trial court failed to instruct the jury as clearly as it could that, to convict Bond of first-degree murder, it must find the existence of each of the elements of that crime beyond a reasonable doubt. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has explained the necessity (under Pennsylvania law) of instructing the jury that the reasonable doubt standard of proof applies to each element of a crime. See Commonwealth v. Bishop, 472 Pa. 485, 372 A.2d 794 (1977). It held that a general instruction regarding reasonable doubt was not enough. See id. at 796-97. However, it did instruct future courts sitting in review of jury instructions to read the charge as a whole. See id. at 796. Here the jury instructions as a whole explained that the jurymust find the presence of each element of first-degree murder beyond a reasonable doubt. First, the trial court instructed: “[I]t is the Commonwealth that always has the burden of proving each and every element of each of the crimes charged and that the defendants are guilty of those crimes beyond a reasonable doubt.” This portion of the charge concededly could have been better. The trial court could have added the words “beyond a reasonable doubt” after the word “charged,” making it clear that the “reasonable doubt” standard applied to each of the elements. But it did not need to do so. The instruction provides the jury no basis for believing that, while a reasonable doubt standard applies to proof of the crime, some lower standard applies to proof of the individual elements. The common sense way to read this portion of the charge is that the Commonwealth has to prove each element of the crime and that it must do so beyond a reasonable doubt. This logical reading of the quoted portion of the charge is supported by the rest of the instruction. First, the trial court repeated the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard on numerous occasions, reinforcing the implication that it was the relevant standard for the jury’s deliberation. Second, the trial court stated with respect to other charged crimes that the Commonwealth had the burden of proving each element beyond a reasonable doubt, reinforcing that principle in the jurors’ minds. Finally, the trial court did refer to both the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard and the need to prove each of the elements in the homicide charge, albeit separately. Considering these factors along with the above-quoted portion of the instruction, we have no doubt that the charge, read as a whole, properly instructed the jury that it had to find each element of first-degree murder beyond a reasonable doubt. We thus conclude that any claim brought under Bishop and its progeny would have failed on appeal in state court. This defeats any ineffective assistance of counsel claim since there is no reasonable probability that the outcome of the state proceeding would have been different but for the failure of counsel to raise this jury instruction claim. See, e.g., Albrecht v. Horn, 485 F.3d 103, 128 (3d Cir.2007) (stating that, to prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, a petitioner must establish prejudice by showing a reasonable probability that, but for attorney error, the outcome of the proceeding would have been different). b. Accomplice Liability We also reject Bond’s accomplice liability argument. The trial court’s instructions were deficient on that question. It failed to instruct the jury that, to find Bond guilty of first-degree murder as Wheeler’s accomplice, it must conclude that Bond himself had the specific intent to kill. Its instructions, as a whole, suggested that Bond was guilty of first-degree murder if Wheeler had the intent to kill and Bond was Wheeler’s accomplice in the robbery. This was error because jury instructions violate a defendant’s constitutional right to due process if they allow a jury to convict him of first-degree murder without finding that he had the specific intent to kill required by statute. See, e.g., Smith v. Horn, 120 F.3d 400 (3d Cir.1997). We review this type of instructional mistake for harmless error, asking whether it had a substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict. See, e.g., O’Neal, 513 U.S. at 436, 115 S.Ct. 992. The jury in this case returned a first-degree murder verdict against Bond but only a second-degree murder verdict against Wheeler. First-degree murder is the killing of another with malice and a specific intent to kill. Commonwealth v. Tolbert, 448 Pa.Super. 189, 670 A.2d 1172, 1179 (1995). Second-degree murder is the killing of another with malice during the commission of a felony. Id. The jury could not have held Bond liable as Wheeler’s accomplice because it found Bond guilty of first-degree murder and Wheeler guilty of second-degree murder. Even under the deficient jury instructions, only if it found Wheeler guilty of first-degree murder could the jury have found Bond guilty of first-degree murder under the accomplice liability theory. Put in layperson’s terms, the jury found Bond was the killer and Wheeler the lookout. Bond thus cannot receive relief for any instructional error on accomplice liability. Nor was his counsel ineffective for failing to raise this claim upon appeal, as he could not have prevailed. See, e.g., Albrecht, 485 F.3d at 127-29. B. The Commonwealth’s Appeal of the Vacation of Bond’s Death Sentence The Commonwealth cross-appeals the District Court’s decision vacating Bond’s death sentence and remanding for another penalty hearing. The parties agree that this claim turns on the interpretation of Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). That case allows relief for constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel when counsel has provided deficient representation and that deficiency has prejudiced the defendant. The parties also do not dispute that the deferential AEDPA standard of review applies. We therefore ask whether the Pennsylvania Supreme Court interpreted Strickland unreasonably or made unreasonable factual determinations when it decided that Bond received constitutionally effective counsel at the penalty phase. 1. Background of the Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claim Bond claims that his trial counsel was ineffective because they conducted an inadequate investigation prior to the penalty phase and as a result failed to present sufficient mitigating evidence at the sentencing hearing. He argues that counsel should have presented evidence of his poor mental health and dysfunctional family in support of relevant statutory mitigating factors. We recount in detail the events at issue to provide appropriate context before turning to our analysis of this claim. a. The Penalty Phase Hearing (i) Mitigation Testimony Bond’s counsel called seven family members and friends at the penalty phase hearing. They testified generally to Bond’s good character and willingness to help others. Their testimony included the following. — Bond’s mother, Queenie Victoria Bond Connor, lived with Bond’s father for the first six years of Bond’s life, at which point the father walked out. Bond later developed a close relationship with his mother’s then-husband, Charles Connor. The death of Connor greatly saddened Bond. Bond’s oldest brother Robert helped discipline Bond and his other siblings. (Bond has five older siblings — Robert, Terry, Tony, Alphonso, and Carolyn.) — Bond dropped out of high school because he was beaten up repeatedly. A few gangs operated in their neighborhood. Gang members beat him up because he did not join a gang. — Bond was a good and fun-loving child. He used to play harmless practical jokes. He treated his elders with respect. He helped his mother after doctors diagnosed her with diabetes and ran errands for other people in the neighborhood without accepting any payment. — Bond babysat his sibling’s children. He participated in the Job Corps and had a series of jobs at restaurants and at a nursing home that he lost or left for various reasons. He could not join the military because he failed the General Educational Development test (“G.E.D.”) by one point. He had stayed out of trouble prior to the robberies and