Full opinion text
BIRCH, Circuit Judge: Petitioner-appellant John Forrest Parker appeals the district court’s judgment dismissing his petition for writ of habeas corpus filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 and denying him relief. Parker sought a vacation of his 1988 conviction for capital murder and his death sentence. After the district court denied Parker’s Fed.R.Civ.P. 59 motion for reconsideration, Parker appealed and the district court issued a certificate of appealability on five issues. We conclude that the district court correctly denied habeas relief and AFFIRM. I. BACKGROUND In March 1988, Charles Sennett contracted with one of his tenants, Billy Gray Williams, to murder his wife, Elizabeth Dorlene Sennett (“Dorlene”), for $3000. Parker v. State, 587 So.2d 1072, 1078 (Ala.Crim.App.1991) (“Parker 7”). Williams, in turn, hired John Parker and Kenneth Eugene Smith for $1000 each to commit the murder. Williams gave Parker $100 to purchase a weapon on 17 March 1988, and promised to pay him the balance when the job was completed. Instead of buying a weapon, Parker used the $100 for drugs and injected 3 cubic centimeters of Talwin, a narcotic analgesic (painkiller), while en route to the Sennetts’ residence on 18 March. Parker drove his vehicle to the Sennetts’ residence while Smith, who was in the passenger seat, sharpened Parker’s survival knife. Parker parked his car behind the Sennetts’ home, told Dorlene that her husband had given them permission to look at the property as a hunting site and, upon receiving Dorlene’s approval, walked into a wooded area with Smith. They later returned to the house and received permission from Dorlene to use her bathroom. While in the bathroom, Parker put cotton socks onto his hands. He then exited the bathroom, jumped Dorlene, and began hitting her. Parker and Smith hit Dorlene with a galvanized pipe and stabbed her while she pled with them not to hurt her. Consistent with their plan, they broke the glass in the medicine cabinet and took a stereo and video cassette recorder (VCR) to make the assault look like it was done during a burglary. Parker later burned his clothes and threw the stereo off a bridge, and he and Smith threw away the knife that they used. Parker subsequently received the additional $900 for the murder. Parker v. State, 610 So.2d 1171, App. II at 1178-79 (Ala.Crim.App.1992) (“Par ker II”); In re Parker, 610 So.2d 1181, 1184-85 (Ala.1992) (“Parker III”). When Sennett arrived home, he found his house ransacked and Dorlene close to death, and called Colbert County Sheriffs Investigator Ronnie May at 11:44 A.M. May dispatched a rescue squad and sheriffs deputies to the Sennetts’ home. May and another deputy arrived at the Sennetts’ home about 12:05 P.M., and the rescue squad arrived soon thereafter. Dorlene was transported to the hospital, and seen by Dr. David Parks McKinley. Resuscitation efforts failed and Dorlene was declared dead as a result of cardiac arrest and exsanguination. An examination of her body revealed multiple stab wounds to the right side of her chest, the right side of her neck, the base of her neck, forehead, nose, and scalp, and contusions on her nose and forehead. Hairs found at the crime scene in a cap located near Dorlene’s body were consistent with Smith’s known hair sample, and on an afghan that had been wrapped around Dorlene’s body were consistent with fibers later taken from Parker’s knife. Parker I, 587 So.2d at 1089. The VCR taken from the Sennetts’ house was found inside Smith’s residence. Parker I, 587 So.2d at 1090. In April 1988, Parker was indicted for the capital murder of Dorlene by beating and stabbing her with a knife for the pecuniary consideration of $1000 in violation Ala.Code 13A-5-40. At trial, he was found guilty by a jury; the jury recommended a sentence of life imprisonment without parole. The sentencing judge, however, overrode the jury and sentenced Parker to death on 21 June 1989. See Parker I, 587 So.2d at 1076, 1100. On appeal, the case was remanded for an evidentiary hearing on Parker’s Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986) claim and for the district court to reweigh and make new findings regarding the mitigating and aggravating circumstances. Parker I, 587 So.2d at 1100. Following an evidentiary hearing on remand, the trial judge found that the prosecution had not violated Batson by using its peremptory strikes to remove eight black venire members. Parker II, 610 So.2d at 1172, 1177. The trial judge also found that the aggravating circumstance of murder for pecuniary gain outweighed the mitigating circumstances, including Parker’s lack of a prior significant criminal history, age at the time of the offense, demonstration of remorse, and the jury’s recommendation of life without parole. Id. at 1172, 1179-81. Parker’s conviction and sentence were affirmed by the appellate court and the Alabama Supreme Court. See id. at 1173; In re Parker, 610 So.2d 1181, 1187 (1992) (“Parker III”). Parker’s petition for writ of certiorari was denied. See Parker v. Alabama, 509 U.S. 929, 113 S.Ct. 3053, 125 L.Ed.2d 737 (1993) (“Parker IV”). Parker moved for post-conviction relief under Alabama Rule of Criminal Procedure 32 in 1994, and filed an amended petition in 1996. Following an evidentiary hearing, the state trial court denied the petition. The denial was affirmed on appeal, Parker v. State, 768 So.2d 1020 (Ala.Crim.App.1999) (“Parker V”), and Parker’s petition for writ of certiorari was denied, Ex Parte Parker, 780 So.2d 811 (Ala.1999) (“Parker VI”). Parker filed a timely petition for writ of habeas corpus, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, in 2000 and amended the petition in 2001. The district court denied the petition and denied reconsideration. Following Parker’s notice of appeal, the district court granted a certificate of appealability on the following issues: (1) whether jurors were excluded by the prosecutor on the basis of race, contrary to clearly established federal law and in violation of the Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments; (2) whether the prosecutor’s improper closing arguments denied Parker due process, a fair trial, and a reliable sentencing proceeding in violation of the Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments; (3) whether the state’s failure to disclose information relevant to a witness’s testimony was a violation of Brady and the Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments; (4) whether Parker received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial in violation of his rights under the Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments; and (5) whether Parker’s statement and other evidence were obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment. II. DISCUSSION We review the denial of a petition for writ of habeas corpus de novo, but are limited in our review of every issue decided in the state courts by a “ ‘general framework of substantial deference.’ ” Crowe v. Hall, 490 F.3d 840, 844 (11th Cir.2007) (quoting Diaz v. Sec’y of the Dep't of Corr., 402 F.3d 1136, 1141 (11th Cir.2005)). We will not, therefore, disturb the decisions of the Alabama courts unless those decisions are “contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court,” or were “based on an unreasonable determination of the facts.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Under § 2254(d)(1), a state court decision is “contrary to” clearly established federal law if the state court either (1) applied a rule that contradicts the governing law as set forth by the Supreme Court or (2) arrived at a different result from the Supreme Court when presented with “materially indistinguishable facts.” Putman v. Head, 268 F.3d 1223, 1241 (11th Cir.2001). A state court decision involves an “unreasonable application” of clearly established Supreme Court law if the law is “applied ... to the facts ... in an objectively unreasonable manner.” Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19, 25, 123 S.Ct. 357, 360, 154 L.Ed.2d 279 (2002). A. Juror Exclusion Based on Race Parker argues that, over his objection, the prosecution struck eight of nine qualified black venire members. He contends that the trial court’s finding on remand that the prosecutor struck the jurors on facially-neutral grounds is not supported by the record because eight of the seated jurors had exactly the same characteristics that the prosecution identified as the bases for excluding four black venire members. He contends that the prosecution’s explanations for striking the venire members and for failing to strike other similarly situated white venire members are inconsistent with its failure to question the white venire members about their traffic violations and personal and family criminal histories. The prosecution exercised peremptory strikes against eight of the nine black venire members. The stricken black venire members included Juror 3, Sheila Armstead; Juror 21, Thykle L. Coman; Juror 25, Jeffrey S. Davis; Juror 67, Willie M. Mayes; Juror 77, Cynthia Montgomery; Juror 83, Annie O. Owes; Juror 120, Eugene L. Watkins; and Juror 121, Mary A. Webb. Black venire member Carter Triplett, Juror 113, was selected for the jury. During voir dire, none of the black jurors responded positively when asked whether they believed that the death penalty should be applied in the case of a murder. The prosecution then used 26 of its 28 strikes to strike individuals who did not answer favorably toward the death penalty. The reasons provided by the prosecution for exercising these strikes included (1) Coman’s general opposition to the death penalty; (2) the belief that Coman and Webb, who had taken psychology classes or training, would give “undue emphasis” to a defense psychologist’s testimony, R1-17, Exh. Vol. 3 at 402-04; (3) the belief that Armstead, Coman, Montgomery, and Owes, who each were related to someone who had been charged with a crime, might be “prejudice[d] against the State,” Exh. Evid. HR at id. at 17-18, 20-24, 32-36, 38-40; and (4) the belief that Watkins, who had a “series of traffic offenses” and “arrests,” might think “that the State ... [was] picking on him,” “not be open minded ... to the testimony of law enforcement officers,” and have an inability “to follow the law.” Id. at 24-25, 40-41. Davis indicated that, if the jury was sequestered, he would have problems staying overnight. Mayes worked with members of co-defendant Williams’ family and had overheard conversations regarding the case. [Id. at 21-22.] White venire members were stricken for some of the same reasons. Juror 92, Betty Rickard, was stricken for her general opposition to the death penalty; Jurors 9, Rebecca Barr; 58, Sharon Landers; 63, Rebecca Livingston; 82, Marshal Newman; Rickard; and 129, Marty Willing-ham, were stricken because they had prior training or course-work in psychology; and Willingham had a record of minor traffic offenses. Jurors 40, Pamela Hen-don; 53, Jenaine Johnson; and Jennifer Razor said that it would be difficult for them to stay overnight. Juror 68, Birdie McCarley was stricken because she knew members of Parker’s family. Eight of the eleven white seated jurors were, however, related .to someone who had been convicted of a felony, had taken a psychology course, knew one of the defense attorneys, or had been convicted of more than one traffic offense. Seated white juror Joni Simpson admitted that she had taken a course in psychology. The prosecutor admitted that he erred in not striking Simpson because he intended to strike all of the venire members who had taken psychology classes and his note indicated that he had. Simpson and seated juror Gary Highfield knew defense attorney, Gene Hamby, and seated juror Teddy Roe Mansell knew defense attorney H. Thomas Heflin, Jr.’s law partner, who had represented Mansell’s ex-wife during child support contempt proceedings. Seated jurors Highfield, Mansell, Mike Quillen, Williams Glenn Pettus, Simpson, and alternate juror Johnny O. Miller, all had traffic offense records. Many of the seated jurors’ traffic offenses occurred outside of Colbert County, and Quillen’s traffic offenses occurred in Tennessee. High-field, Mansell, Pettus and Simpson had only one traffic ticket each from Colbert County. Mansell had been prosecuted for child support contempt proceedings. Seated jurors James Ayers, Highfield, LaDecca Holt, Lucy Lowry, Noel Gene Morris, and Quillen were related to someone who had a felony conviction. The convictions of the family members of Ayers, Lowry, and Morris were outside of the five year scope of the prosecutor’s investigation. The convictions of the family members of High-field, Lowry, Morris, and Quillen occurred outside of Colbert County, Alabama. Le-Decca Holt’s “uncle by marriage,” Curtis Sheffield, had a felony conviction in Colbert County. Exh. Evid. HR at 64. The prosecution used 28 percent of its total strikes to strike black venire members, who composed about seven percent of the total venire and eight percent of the seated jury. Acknowledging that black jurors were struck, the prosecution argued that “race had nothing to do” with the strikes because they were not “paying attention to race.” Id. at 27. During its first twelve strikes, the prosecution used eight strikes against blacks. In making the strikes, the prosecution relied on information regarding repeat traffic violations and criminal prosecutions of the jurors or their families that its investigator had obtained and did not question the jurors if that information indicated a potential problem that might lead to bias. The investigator’s search spanned five years, which was the amount of time that the prosecuting district attorney had been in office and that the records were retained in the county clerk’s office. Traffic investigations were performed on any venire members who were “thought” to have a history of traffic offenses based on the prosecution’s investigator’s interviews with law enforcement officers. Id. at 41. The prosecutor explained that he did not question the venire members regarding information that he had obtained from their individual voir dire questionnaires or his investigator because he did not want to embarrass them in front of the other venire members. He acknowledged that, although individual voir dires were available, he did not use them. He said that he had no knowledge of Holt’s family member’s crime and “missed” it during the investigation. Id. at 90. On direct appeal, the state appellate court affirmed the trial judge’s “commendable thoroughness and ... conscientiousness” in making findings and concluding that Batson was not violated. Parker II, 610 So.2d at 1172. The state trial court compared each of the reasons for the prosecutor’s strikes, noted the prosecution’s practice regarding its investigatory methods, and commented that, even if the prosecution had done a state-wide investigation of the venire members’ traffic records, it would only have been able to get records for five years. Id. at 1173-76. Based on the analysis of the strikes and investigatory methods, the trial court “d[id] not find that there was a significant disparate treatment of [the venire-members] with the same characteristics.” Id. at 1176. The district court found that the prosecution’s failure to strike the white jurors with traffic convictions or family member convictions that occurred outside of Colbert County or more than five years earlier was not inconsistent with its striking of black jurors who had traffic convictions and family member convictions that occurred within Colbert County within the last five years. It found that the trial court’s conclusion satisfied Batson and that its decision was neither contrary to nor involved an unreasonable application of the law. Because it is constitutionally permissible for the prosecutor to retain jurors who are “death qualified” and to strike jurors who state that they could not impose the death penalty under any circumstance, Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 165-67, 175-77, 106 S.Ct. 1758, 1760-62, 1766-67, 90 L.Ed.2d 137 (1986), the prosecution legitimately struck Coman. In Batson, the Supreme Court held it unconstitutional for the prosecution to challenge potential jurors based solely on their race or on the assumption that because of their race they will be unable to consider the case impartially. 476 U.S. at 89, 106 S.Ct. at 1719. A defendant may raise the necessary inference of “purposeful discrimination in selection of the petit jury” based “solely on evidence concerning the prosecutor’s exercise of peremptory challenges” during the trial. Id. at 96, 106 S.Ct. at 1723. [T]he defendant first must show that he is a member of a cognizable racial group, and that the prosecutor has exercised peremptory challenges to remove from the venire members of the defendant’s race. Second, the defendant is entitled to rely on the [undisputed] fact ... that peremptory challenges constitute a jury selection practice that permits those to discriminate who are of a mind to discriminate. Finally, the defendant must show that these facts and any other relevant circumstances raise an inference that the prosecutor used that practice to exclude the veniremen from the petit jury on account of their race. Id., 106 S.Ct. at 1723 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). It is not necessary to show that all or even a majority of the prosecutor’s strikes were discriminatory; any single strike demonstrated to result from purposeful discrimination is sufficient. See McNair v. Campbell, 416 F.3d 1291, 1311 (11th Cir.2005). In Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 402, 111 S.Ct. 1364, 1366, 113 L.Ed.2d 411 (1991), Batson claims were extended to defendants regardless of whether they share the same race as the struck jurors. Once the defendant makes a prima facie showing, the burden shifts to the prosecution to explain, in clearly and reasonably specific terms, the legitimate race-neutral reasons for striking the jurors in question. Batson, 476 U.S. at 97, 98 n. 20, 106 S.Ct. at 1723, 1724 n. 20. The court must then confront the “decisive question” and evaluate the credibility of the prosecution’s explanation, Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 365, 111 S.Ct. 1859, 1869, 114 L.Ed.2d 395 (1991), “in light of all evidence with a bearing on it.” Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231, 252, 125 S.Ct. 2317, 2331, 162 L.Ed.2d 196 (2005). Finally, the court must determine whether the defendant has established purposeful discrimination. Batson, 476 U.S. at 98, 106 S.Ct. at 1724. The reasons stated by the prosecutor provide the only reasons on which the prosecutor’s credibility is to be judged. United States v. Houston, 456 F.3d 1328, 1335 (11th Cir.2006). The credibility of the prosecution’s explanation is to be evaluated considering the “totality of the relevant facts,” including whether members of a race were disproportionately excluded. Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 363, 111 S.Ct. at 1868 (quotation marks and citation omitted). Questions arise regarding the credibility of the explanation and the possibility that the explanation is pretextual (1) when the prosecutor’s explanation for a strike is equally applicable to jurors of a different race who have not been stricken, Caldwell v. Maloney, 159 F.3d 639, 651 (1st Cir.1998); (2) upon a comparative analysis of the jurors struck and those who remained, Turner v. Marshall, 121 F.3d 1248, 1251-52 (9th Cir.1997), including the attributes of the white and black venire members, Houston, 456 F.3d at 1338; (3) or when the prosecution fails to engage in a meaningful voir dire examination on a subject that it alleges it is concerned, Miller-El, 545 U.S. at 246, 125 S.Ct. at 2328. Evidence of purposeful discrimination may be shown through side-by-side comparisons confirming that the reasons for striking a black panelist also apply to similar non-black panelists who were permitted to serve. See id. at 241, 125 S.Ct. at 2325. A prosecutor’s reasonable explanation for objecting to a black panelist based on his or her opinions or comments may be undercut by the prosecution’s failure to object to other white panelists who expressed similar views, and may be evidence of pretext. Id. at 248, 125 S.Ct. at 2329-30. The prosecutor’s failure to strike similarly situated jurors is not pretextual, however, “where there are relevant differences between the struck jurors and the comparator jurors.” United States v. Novaton, 271 F.3d 968, 1004 (11th Cir.2001). The prosecutor’s explanation “does not demand an explanation that is persuasive, or even plausible; so long as the reason is not inherently discriminatory, it suffices.” Rice v. Collins, 546 U.S. 333, 338, 126 S.Ct. 969, 973-74, 163 L.Ed.2d 824 (2006) (quotation marks and citation omitted). Neither a prosecutor’s mistaken belief about a juror nor failure to ask a voir dire question provides “clear and convincing” evidence of pretext. McNair, 416 F.3d at 1311-12. If the fact-finder determines that the prosecutor’s race-neutral explanations are true, the petitioner may obtain relief only by showing that the state court’s conclusion was an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented during the state proceedings. Miller El, 545 U.S. at 240, 125 S.Ct. at 2325. Consistent with § 2254(e)(1), we presume the state court’s factual findings to be correct unless the petitioner rebuts that presumption with clear and convincing evidence. Id. “The standard is demanding but not insatiable; ... deference does not by definition preclude relief.” Id. (citation and internal punctuation omitted). We cannot, however, substitute our evaluation of the record for that of the state trial court, as we presume the state court’s factual findings to be correct, and cannot grant a habeas petition unless the state court’s credibility findings regarding the prosecutor’s race-neutral explanations for the Bat-son challenge are “unreasonable ... in light of the evidence presented in the state court.” Rice, 546 U.S. at 337-39, 126 S.Ct. at 973-74. Based on the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals’ remand for the prosecution to offer race-neutral reasons for striking the jurors, we assume that a prima facie showing under Batson was made. See Parker I, 587 So.2d at 1077; Novaton, 271 F.3d at 1003 (assuming a prima facie showing when the district court required the prosecution to offer race-neutral reasons for its strikes). Based on the state court’s application of the law, acceptance of the prosecutor’s stated reasons for his strikes, and consideration of the differences in the situations of the stricken and seated jurors, the district court did not err in finding that the state court reasonably applied Batson and that Parker failed to prove “purposeful discrimination” under Batson. B. Improper Closing Arguments Parker argues that the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals’ decision regarding the prosecutor’s vouching for witnesses during the guilt-phase closing argument and arguing that the death penalty should be applied because of uncharged criminal behavior is an unreasonable application of the law and an unreasonable application of the facts. Alabama concedes that the prosecutor’s arguments regarding two of the witnesses were improper, but maintains that the other statements were not improper and that none of the statements rise to the level of a violation of due process. During the guilt-phase closing argument, the prosecutor summarized the evidence against Parker and commented about the testimony of three of Alabama’s witnesses, Donald Buckman, Investigator May, and Dr. McKinley. Regarding Buck-man’s testimony, the prosecutor “assure[d]” the jury that Buckman “did not have anything against John Parker.” Exh. Vol. 8 at 1576. Regarding May’s testimony, the prosecutor stated: I’ve known Ronnie May for a long time and worked with him and, of course, when we put a witness on the witness stand we vouch for their credibility just as the defense does when they call a witness. But I can assure you right now that what Ronnie May testified to you about — about anything, but particularly about the statement that I’m, talking about right now that was given to him on March the 31st by Mr. Parker. I can assure you he told you the truth, what was told him by Mr. Parker. And I don’t for any one minute think that any of y’all think he would get up and make it up or fabricate it or anything like that. But I can assure you, ladies and gentlemen, what he told you is the truth with regard to that statement. Id. at 1575. Regarding McKinley, the prosecutor asked the jury to consider: Who is best qualified to make the judgment about the potential murder weapon? ... [T]he forensic pathologist who did the autopsy who made exacting measurements about the wounds and examined those wounds? Whose job it was to determine specifically what the cause of death was and to determine, if possible, what type of weapon might have been used and some possible characteristics for that weapon? ... [O]r is it the doctor who worked on the person in the emergency room and was primarily trying to save her life .... I’m not try[ing] to in anyway run down Dr. McKinley. I know Dr. McKinley. He’s a personal acquaintance of mine and I can assure he’s ... giving you his opinion, his best opinion, but again I say to you; who is best qualified to give that opinion? Id. at 1581-82. In his final closing argument, the prosecutor explained to the jury that they were “the most important part of this whole case” because their function was to listen to the evidence and decide what the truth is. You decide who that has testified to you is telling the truth, who is not telling the truth, who is being evasive with you and you ultimately decide the true facts in the case upon which your verdict is to be based .... Exh. Vol. 9 at 1608. The prosecutor, however, then continued: There is no such thing as a case that you couldn’t look at long enough and hard enough and find some kind of little inconsistency in the testimony and the reason for that is, I submit to you at least from the State’s witnesses they were trying very hard to tell you the truth and the truth as they saw it .... [W]e vouch for the credibility of those witnesses by putting them on the stand and I submit to you that they’ve told the truth .... Id. at 1611. During the jury instructions, the trial judge instructed the jury that they were: the sole judges as to the weight that should be give to all of the testimony in the case ... [t]he jury’s role is to determine the facts. You ladies and gentlemen of the jury[] take the testimony of the witnesses, together with all proper and reasonable inferences therefrom, apply your common sense, and in an impartial and honest way[,] determine what you believe to be the truth. You should weigh all of the evidence and ... give it just such weight as you think it is entitled to receive. In doing so[,] you may take into consideration any interest which any witness might have shown to have in the outcome of this case. If you believe that any material part of the evidence of any witness was willfully false, you may disregard all of the testimony of such witness. Id. at 1655-56. In determining what the true facts are in the case, you are limited to the evidence that has been presented from the witness stand as opposed to matters that have been stated by the attorneys in the course of the trial. What the attorneys have said ... is not evidence in the case. What they have argued to you ... is not evidence. Id. at 1641-42. The Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals found that the prosecutor’s statements were “improper attempts to bolster witnesses by vouching for their credibility.” Parker I, 587 So.2d at 1094. It concluded, however, that the comments, “although clearly erroneous, do not undermine the fundamental fairness of the trial and contribute to a miscarriage of justice.” Id. (citation and internal quotations omitted). In reaching that conclusion, it viewed the prosecutor’s comments in the context of the entire trial and noted that (1) during the defense closing argument, Parker’s attorney did not contend that Parker’s confession was false, but conceded that Parker admitted that he was at the crime scene and had gone there to commit a burglary, and (2) any prejudice was cured by the trial judge’s extensive cautionary instructions to the jury that they were only to consider the evidence and not the attorneys’ comments. Id. at 1094-95. During a trial, counsel have a duty to refrain from commenting on their personal views on a defendant’s guilt and the evidence. United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 7, 9, 105 S.Ct. 1038, 1042-43, 84 L.Ed.2d 1 (1985). A prosecutor’s comments during a closing argument are evaluated to determine whether the comments so unfairly affected the trial as to deny the defendant due process, Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 181, 106 S.Ct. 2464, 2474-71, 91 L.Ed.2d 144 (1986), when considered “in the context of the entire trial in light of any curative instructions.” United States v. Abraham, 386 F.3d 1033, 1036 (11th Cir.2004) (per curiam) (quotation marks and citation omitted). Due process is denied “when there is a reasonable probability,” or “a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome,” that, but for the improper remarks, “the outcome of the proceeding would have been different.” United States v. Eyster, 948 F.2d 1196, 1206-07 (11th Cir.1991) (citations and internal punctuation omitted). The prosecutor’s comments must both (1) be improper and (2) “prejudicially affect the substantial rights of the defendant.” United States v. Thompson, 422 F.3d 1285, 1297 (11th Cir.2005). A prosecutor’s comments constitute improper “vouching” if they are “based on the government’s reputation or allude to evidence not formally before the jury.” Eyster, 948 F.2d at 1206. Although improper vouching is grounds for reversal, it may be cured if the remarks are not “substantially prejudicial” and any lingering prejudice is remedied by a careful cautionary instruction. United States v. Sarmiento, 744 F.2d 755, 762-65 (11th Cir.1984). As the Supreme Court of Alabama correctly noted, Parker’s strategy was to argue that he assaulted but did not murder Dorlene. Parker III, 610 So.2d at 1184. During his closing arguments, Parker’s attorney used Parker’s statement to support that strategy. He was thus not prejudiced by any enhanced credibility given to the testimony of Buckman or May since their testimony that Parker had gone to the Sennetts’ residence was consistent with this strategy and would not have adversely affected the jury verdict. He was also not prejudiced by the prosecutor’s reference to his personal acquaintance with McKinley; the prosecutor based his comments on a comparison of McKinley’s and the forensic pathologist’s qualifications regarding their thoughts on the murder weapon and was based on facts in evidence. Further, any enhanced credibility given to McKinley’s testimony was consistent with Parker’s witness’s testimony that he did not believe that Parker’s knife was the murder weapon. Buckman testified that Parker and Smith drove to his house in Parker’s car on the morning of the murder and that Smith asked where he could find a gun. May testified that Parker admitted in his statement that, on the day of the murder, he and Smith drove to the Sennetts’ home in his car, jumped Dorlene, held her down with a chair, and hit her with a galvanized pipe; Smith did all of the stabbing; and they stole the Sennetts’ VCR and stereo and broke some glassware to provide the appearance of a robbery. May also testified that Parker did not know who covered Dorlene, did not know the number of times she was stabbed or the location of the wounds, never stated that she was dead when they left, and denied turning over a china cabinet that the police found turned over in the room where Dorlene was found. McKinley, Dorlene’s emergency room physician, did not think Parker’s knife was the instrument that caused her injuries based on his examinations of Dorlene’s knife wounds, the knife, and the autopsy photographs and report. He admitted that he had not measured the depth of the wounds but noted that he determined that the wounds extended “from the skin all the way into the chest cavity” or at least two inches or more. Exh. Vol. 6 at 1056-57. He also explained that, although the knife had a serrated edge, he did not observe any “sawing effect” on the wounds, which were described in the autopsy report as having a “sharp” and “fairly smooth rounded edge.” Id. at 1059. He conceded that the forensic pathologist who performed the autopsy had more specialized training and would have probably made more specific detailed observations about the knife wounds. During his closing argument, Parker’s attorney stipulated twice that Parker was at the Sennett home on the day of the murder and that Parker and Smith assaulted Dorlene. He argued that, consistent with May’s testimony, Parker and Smith merely assaulted, cut, stabbed, and robbed Dorlene leaving her unconscious but alive. He maintained that, when Sennett returned to his home and found Dorlene, he murdered her to prevent her from divorcing him over the affair that he was having. He explained thát, although only one knife had been admitted into evidence, there were two sets of knife wounds on Dorlene’s body. He reminded the jury that Dorlene was alive when the paramedics arrived about 20 minutes after Sennett’s emergency call and that the testimony indicated that she would not have survived long after being stabbed. He also reviewed with the jury that the exhibit knife was six inches long, one and one-quarter to one and one-half inches wide, and one-eighth inch thick, but that some of the knife wounds appeared to be two inches long, three-quarters inch wide, and one half inch thick. In arguing for the death penalty, the prosecutor noted that: certainly we have had some evidence of criminal activity on the part of [Parker]. It came out in the form of [ ] previous criminal activities, about drugs, selling and using drugs. I believe there was some mention of stealing gasoline on one occasion. So again, there is evidence of prior criminal activity. Exh. Vol. 9 at 1770. He maintained that the jury should “do the right thing” by imposing a “proper verdict” of death, and asked “how many times, how many times does a person have to do something like this before ... [being classified] basically as a bad person.” Id. at 1777, 1780. Despite the prosecutor’s argument, the jury returned a verdict recommending, by a ten to two vote, that Parker be sentenced to life without parole. The Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals found that any error caused by the prosecutor’s sentencing-phase comments was harmless “because the jury, by a vote of ten to two, recommended life without parole.” Parker I, 587 So.2d at 1095. A petitioner cannot show sentencing phase prejudice when the jury recommends a sentence of life instead of death. Routly v. Singletary, 33 F.3d 1279, 1297 (11th Cir.1994) (per curiam). Parker cannot, therefore, demonstrate that, but for the prosecutor’s death penalty argument the outcome of the sentencing phase would have been different. The district court did not err in finding that the Alabama courts’ decisions were neither contrary to nor an unreasonable application of the law, and were not based on an unreasonable determination of the facts. C. Failure to disclose information in violation of Brady v. Maryland Parker contends that, despite his motions and requests for all favorable and exculpatory evidence, the prosecution failed to reveal that one of its witnesses, Teddy Lynn "White, had more convictions than it initially disclosed. He maintains that the facts of White’s additional convictions, his eligibility for release, the withdrawal of his initial release date, and his subsequent release were discoverable and highly prejudicial. He argues that the Alabama courts incorrectly interpreted Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963) by finding that the prosecutor’s lack of knowledge of White’s convictions or early release excused the prosecution from complying with Brady. Parker moved for favorable and exculpatory discovery in May 1988 and in March and May 1989. In response to these requests, Alabama produced a statement of White dated 19 May 1989. In this statement, White explained that he was serving a sentence for burglary. White stated that, about one to two weeks before the murder, Parker had asked him to sell him a gun and had told White that he and “Kenny” planned to murder someone for money. Exh. Vol. 14 at 2672-76. At a pre-trial motions hearing, in response to Parker’s Brady claims, the prosecutor explained that he had provided Parker’s attorney with “a complete copy of [his] file.” Exh. Vol.1, R5 at 105. During the trial, the judge overruled Parker’s objection to White’s testimony. Parker argued that the statement that the prosecution had provided to him did not indicate any exculpatory evidence, including White’s criminal record. White then testified, consistent with his prior statement, about his conversation with Parker before the murder. White answered “Yes” when asked whether he had been convicted of a felony “on more than one occasion,” and stated that all of his felonies were burglaries. Exh. Vol. 8 at 1483-84. He also responded that he had not been promised anything, including that there would be no objections to his release, in exchange for his testimony. During the motion for new trial hearing, however, Parker’s counsel learned that, at the time of White’s testimony on 6 June 1989, White had been convicted of theft, receiving stolen property, burglary, and unlawful breaking and entering. White also had an earlier burglary conviction in 1985. Parker’s counsel also learned that, although White was originally scheduled to be released on 24 May 1989, his release was delayed on 19 May 1989 (the same day that he provided his statement). White had submitted a request for the Supervised Intensive Restitution Program (SIR) in March 1989. His application was approved and he was scheduled for SIR release on 24 May 1989. On 10 May 1989, however, the Lauderdale County District Attorney filed a “protest” to White’s placement in SIR. Exh. Vol. 10 at 1845-46, 1850-51. On 26 May 1989, the prison’s Director of Classification disapproved of the protest and advised that White was to be placed into SIR on 26 May 1989 “regardless of the protest.” Id. at 1851, 1863-64. On 12 June 1989 (one week after his testimony in Parker’s trial in Colbert County), White’s release into SIR was approved and, on 14 June 1999, he was released from confinement and put into the SIR program. On 18 May 1989, while White’s SIR application was being reviewed, May was advised that White might have a connection with Parker’s case. May attempted to have White interviewed immediately, but was unable to have the interview conducted until 19 May 1989. On appeal, the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals found that there was “no evidence that the prosecution suppressed, any evidence whatsoever.” Parker I, 587 So.2d at 1086. It noted that (1) the contention that White’s testimony was secured in exchange for his release was “supported only by a coincidence of facts,” (2) Parker was aware that White would testify before the trial, and (3) there was no evidence that the prosecution had obtained or had possession of White’s arrest history or knowledge of his prior convictions. Id. at 1086-87. The district court held that the Alabama court did not unreasonably apply the Brady suppression element and that the decision was not based on an unreasonable determination of the facts. It also held that Parker failed to prove prejudice with regard to either claim. Once a defendant requests the discovery of any favorable evidence material to either guilt or sentence, the prosecution’s suppression of such evidence, whether in good or bad faith, violates due process. Brady, 373 U.S. at 87, 83 S.Ct. at 1196-97. The prosecutor has a duty not only to disclose such favorable evidence but also “to learn of any favorable evidence known to others acting on the government’s behalf ....” Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 432, 437, 115 S.Ct. 1555, 1565, 1567, 131 L.Ed.2d 490 (1995). The duty exists whether or not the prosecutor knew of the existence of the evidence if the evidence was in the possession of the government arm or generally provided only to governmental entities. Martinez v. Wainwright, 621 F.2d 184, 186-87 (5th Cir.1980). The prosecution does not, however, have an obligation to seek evidence of which it has no knowledge or which is not in its possession. United States v. Luis-Gonzalez, 719 F.2d 1539, 1548 (11th Cir.1983). Further, there is no suppression if the defendant knew of the information or had equal access to obtaining it. Maharaj v. Sec’y of the Dep’t of Corr., 432 F.3d 1292, 1315 n. 4 (11th Cir.2005). In Alabama, a defendant has access to convictions records which are “mátters of public record” and “available through counsel’s own efforts.” Ex parte Perkins, 920 So.2d 599, 606 (Ala.Crim.App.2005) (per curiam). To demonstrate a Brady violation, a defendant must show that: (1) the cumulative effect of evidence was favorable because it was exculpatory or impeaching; (2) the evidence was willfully or inadvertently suppressed by the prosecution; and (3) the evidence was material; and (4) that the failure to disclose the evidence was prejudicial. Bradley v. Nagle, 212 F.3d 559, 566 (11th Cir.2000) (citation omitted). The prosecution is not required to provide its entire file to the defense, but must disclose “material” evidence. Stephens v. Hall, 407 F.3d 1195, 1203 (11th Cir.2005) (citing United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 675, 105 S.Ct. 3375, 3380, 87 L.Ed.2d 481 (1985)). Excluded evidence is material “only if there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A ‘reasonable probability’ is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682, 105 S.Ct. at 3383. The Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals reasonably applied Brady in finding that the prosecutor did not suppress evidence of White’s convictions. The prosecutor provided Parker with all of the information that he had and there was no showing that the prosecutor had knowledge of White’s other convictions. White’s conviction record was available to Parker’s attorneys and used by them in support of the motion for new trial. Further, Parker did not show prejudice. The jury heard White’s testimony that he had multiple convictions for burglary; his convictions for theft and breaking and entering were not materially different enough to provide additional bases for discrediting his testimony. Further, even if White’s testimony was discredited, same or similar testimony was presented that Parker was looking for a gun on the morning of the murder and that Parker admitted to participating in a murder for hire scheme. Parker is, therefore, also unable to show materiality for White’s arrest record. There was also no showing that the Colbert County prosecutor had any knowledge related to White’s release or of the delay of his release due to the protest filed by the Lauderdale County prosecutor. White’s application for the SIR program was filed months before May learned of his connection with Parker, and was approved before White’s interview or testimony. White testified that no one had promised him anything in exchange for his testimony, and May testified that no one had promised White a SIR release in exchange for his testimony. White’s SIR supervisor also stated that no one in the Board of Corrections’ chain of command, except possibly the Prison Commissioner or the prison’s Director of Classification, could move a prisoner to SIR in exchange for his testimony in a case and that he knew of no one who had been so moved. Parker has not shown that the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals unreasonably determined the facts regarding his Brady claim as to White’s release when it held that the claim was “supported only by a coincidence of facts” or unreasonably applied Brady in holding that he failed to prove that the prosecution suppressed knowledge of a release agreement. Parker I, 587 So.2d at 1086-87. D. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Parker argues that there were multiple deficiencies that resulted in ineffective assistance of counsel during the trial and sentencing. He explains that, although his attorneys recognized that they were not qualified or prepared to competently handie a capital trial, their motions for removal from the case were denied. In order to present a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, the defendant must show that (1) counsel’s performance was deficient and (2) the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2064, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). The defendant must make both showings in order to establish that the conviction or sentence was caused by “a breakdown in the adversary process that renders the result unreliable.” Id. at 687, 104 S.Ct. at 2064. The deficient performance inquiry focuses on “whether counsel’s assistance was reasonable considering all of the circumstances,” and is judged under an “objective standard of reasonableness.” Id. at 687-88, 104 S.Ct. at 2064-65. The petitioner bears the heavy burden of proving that “no competent counsel would have taken the action” taken by his counsel. Callahan v. Campbell, 427 F.3d 897, 933 (11th Cir.2005) (quotation marks and citation omitted). “Because of the difficulties inherent in making the evaluation [of reasonable assistance], a court must indulge a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance” and “the defendant must overcome the presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged action” could be considered trial strategy. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689, 104 S.Ct. at 2065. Although the Strickland presumption is demanding, it is not insurmountable. Chatom v. White, 858 F.2d 1479, 1485 (11th Cir.1988). It can be met when the deficient actions center on a single sufficiently egregious and prejudicial incident. Id. And it may be assessed against the seriousness of the charges filed against the defendant. Magill v. Dugger, 824 F.2d 879, 886 (11th Cir.1987). Additional, but cumulative, evidence which could have been presented does not, however, establish ineffective assistance. Van Poyck v. Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 290 F.3d 1318, 1324 n. 7 (11th Cir.2002) (per curiam). 1. Parker’s Intoxication and Impairment at the Time of Statement Parker maintains that his attorneys were ineffective because they failed to address his impairment at the time of his statement and failed to hire expert witnesses who could specifically address this impairment in testimony at the suppression hearing. During the suppression hearing, Fountain testified that she had been with Parker the entire day of the arrest and that he had begun drinking beer and smoking marijuana early in the day. Fountain said that Parker drank at least “six to eight” beers and had smoked at least “[f]ive to six joints” of marijuana that day. Exh. Vol. 2 at 238-239, 248. She commented that he had also been “shooting up” Talwin, but she did not recall seeing him do so on the day of the arrest. Id. at 238-39, 248. May testified that Parker asked to speak with him sometime after 5:45 in the afternoon on 31 March 1988. May met with Parker and, after advising Parker of his Miranda rights, Parker made his statement. May explained that he was trained to look for evidence of drug or alcohol use during interrogations but that he did not detect any signs of drug or alcohol impairment on Parker and that Parker appeared to understand what he was saying. May testified at trial that, after Parker began his initial statement, he asked Parker whether he was telling the truth and Parker changed his story. Dr. James Edward Crowder, a local clinical psychologist, testified. Based on the evidence of Parker’s alcohol and drug use at the time of his arrest, Crowder opined that Parker would “have had a reduction in his ability to withstand pressure [and] frustration and ... would have had to some extent an impairment in his judgment.” Exh. Vol. 2 at 259-60. On cross-examination, he conceded that an experienced drinker could develop a tolerance to alcohol that would permit him to function with a higher level of alcohol. Crowder explained that, if Parker’s judgment was impaired by alcohol or drugs, he might be inclined to act in a manner “not in his best interest.” Id. at 262. He conceded that evidence of Parker’s requests for visits with investigators in the days following his first interview might indicate that his judgment had not changed much between his first and subsequent visits. During the post-conviction hearing, Dr. Peter Breggin testified as an expert in psychiatry, forensic psychiatry, and drug abuse, and Dr. Emanuel Hriso as an expert of neuropsychiatry and addiction. Based on the evidence of Parker’s alcohol and drug use on the day of his arrest, Breggin opined that by the time of his statement at 5:30 P.M., Parker would have been in a mixed state of alcohol and marijuana intoxication and alcohol withdrawal. He explained that Parker would have been suffering from anguish, desperation, discomfort, and pain as a result of alcohol withdrawal compounded by his inability to inject Talwin. Breggin stated that the combination of withdrawal, brain damage, and neuropsychological deficits would have altered Parker’s judgment and made it more difficult for him to control his impulses. He explained that, “driven by a combination of intoxication!,] addiction withdrawal!,] and memory problems” “more than his will,” he may have understood the basic questions but would have felt “an extreme amount of urgency to say yes to anything that he thought would get him ... home.” Exh. PC Vol. 11 at 202-03. He noted that the sedative drugs that Parker was using, alcohol and marijuana, would have acted as a truth serum to “loosen his control over his own willful processes.” Id. at 203-06. Hriso commented that Parker’s alcohol and marijuana use could sedate and impair Parker’s judgment so that he could not control his normal defenses and would not be unable “to make correct declarations.” Exh. PC Vol. 14 at 717-18. He also noted that Parker would have been vulnerable to Talwin withdrawal, to an impaired judgment, and to an inability to understand the exact meaning of words spoken to him. Hriso explained that, because erratic behavior was expected in such a state, it was understandable that Parker would have asked to speak to May and had confessed to the crime. The determination of a confession’s voluntariness requires an examination of the totality of the circumstances and ultimately requires an inquiry into whether the statement was “the product of an essentially free and unconstrained choice.” Hubbard v. Haley, 317 F.3d 1245, 1252-53 (11th Cir.2003) (citation and quotation marks omitted). We consider a number of factors, and the presence of one alone is not determinative. Id. at 1253. A confession that was not the product of free will and rationale intellect or that was made when the individual’s will was “overborne” by physical, psychological, or drug-induced means, is inadmissible. Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 307, 83 S.Ct. 745, 754, 9 L.Ed.2d 770 (1963), overruled on other grounds by Keeney v. Tamayo-Reyes, 504 U.S. 1, 5, 112 S.Ct. 1715, 1717, 118 L.Ed.2d 318 (1992). In determining whether or not a confession is constitutionally voluntary, the truth or lack thereof of the statement is irrelevant. See Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534, 544, 81 S.Ct. 735, 741, 5 L.Ed.2d 760 (1961). In Alabama, although a confession will be deemed inadmissible if the defendant’s mind was “substantially impaired” at the time of the confession, “[i]ntoxication, short of ... impairment of the will and mind as to make the individual unconscious of the meaning of his words, will not render a statement or confession inadmissible.” Free v. State, 495 So.2d 1147, 1156 (Ala.Crim.App.1986) (citation and quotation marks omitted). The voluntariness determination is a matter of law for the trial court, and that court’s decision will not be reversed unless it is manifestly wrong or contrary to the great weight of the evidence. Id. The state courts rejected this claim because there was not a reasonable probability that the outcome of the suppression hearing would have been different with the experts’ testimony or that the exclusion of Parker’s statement would have changed the jury determination of guilt. The sthte trial judge found that “[n]othing presented at the [post-conviction] hearing is of such nature that this Court would have ruled differently on [Parker’s] suppression motion if this Court had been presented with this evidence at trial.” Exh. PC Vol. 3 at 527. The state appellate court held that Parker failed to show that he was prejudiced by his attorneys’ failure to call expert witnesses at the suppression hearing and therefore failed to show that his attorneys were ineffective. The district court correctly held that this conclusion was objectively reasonable. None of Parker’s post-conviction experts examined Parker on the day of his statement; their testimony was based on his medical history and their opinions that Parker would have been suffering withdrawal or impairment. May did not detect any signs of impairment when Parker made his 'Statement, and Crowder indicated that Parker’s subsequent contact with the officers might indicate that he was no more impaired than he had been during his first statement. Parker was cognizant of his situation when he began his statement, and drove himself, Fountain, and a law enforcement officer to the courthouse. The state court’s factual determination that Parker exercised his free choice was not objectively unreasonable or disproved by clear and convincing evidence. The district court correctly held that the state court reasonably applied Strickland in finding no prejudice. Parker also failed to prove deficient performance. His trial attorneys did present evidence regarding the effects of his drug use at the suppression hearing. Any additional evidence would have been merely cumulative. 2. Experts Regarding the Murder and Weapon Parker contends that his trial counsel failed to make proper use of the evidence which showed that Parker, who was in Florence at 11:30 A.M., could not have inflicted the fatal stab wounds, which were inflicted no earlier than 11:42 A.M. He maintains that Veasey’s testimony during the post-conviction hearing regarding the time of the fatal attacks bolstered Parker’s theory of the crime and was actually consistent with the testimony of prosecution witnesses at trial. Parker also maintains that his attorneys were ineffective for (1) failing to present available evidence that Charles Sennett killed his wife after Parker and Smith left the Sennett residence, and (2) failing to call a qualified expert to address the prosecution’s allegations that Parker’s survival knife was the murder weapon. He maintains that none of the experts who testified at the trial were qualified to meaningfully address the relationship between Dorlene’s wounds and the size and shape of the knife. At trial, all three doctors who testified regarding the pathology of Dorlene’s death indicated that the fatal stab wounds appeared to have been inflicted within minutes of the law enforcement officials’ arrival at the Sennetts’ home at 12:09 P.M. It is uncontested that Parker was not at the residence at that time. Dr. Emily Ward, the forensic pathologist who performed Dorlene’s autopsy, described the wounds as “rapidly fatal”' because they would cause death in no more than five minutes from blood loss and the accumulation of air in the chest cavity. Exh. Vol. 6 at 1012-13. Dr. McKinley believed that the primary fatal wounds were made to Dorlene’s chest within 30 minutes of the emergency medical team’s detection of a pulse. Board certified forensic pathologist Dr. James Allen Barksdale opined that the wounds were inflicted “[w]ithin a very few minutes” of the emergency medical team’s detection of a heartbeat. Exh. Vol. 8 at 1537. May testified that his investigation confirmed that Parker was in Florence at 11:30 A.M. on the morning of the murder, and that it normally took about 30 minutes to drive from the Sennetts’ home to Florence. During the trial, there was conflicting testimony presented as to whether Parker’s survival knife was the murder weapon. Dr. McKinley did not believe that Parker’s knife was the murder weapon. He did not, however, examine the length and widths of the stab wounds to determine whether or not the knife matched the wounds. Dr. Barksdale also reviewed the evidence and did not believe that Parker’s knife was the murder weapon. He admitted that he did not participate in the autopsy and that it was hard to make a judgment based solely on the pictures unless the view was “straight on.” Exh. Vol. 8 at 1540-41, 1544-45. Dr. Ward testified that the size and irregulai'ity of Dorlene’s stab wounds matched the irregular, jagged back-side of Parker’s survival knife. She testified that Dorlene sustained defensive wounds and did not likely survive more than five minutes after being stabbed. Alabama forensic supervisor John Kilborn testified that Parker’s knife contained “one colorless wool fiber at the hilt” that was “similar” to the fiber on the afghan found at the Sennetts’ home. Exh. Vol. 7 at 1348. At the post-conviction hearing, Parker presented the testimony of board certified forensic pathologist Dr. Sparks P. Veasey. Veasey explained that, in examining a stab wound, a pathologist measures the length of the wound across the skin and the approximate depth of penetration. He said that the approximation of the wound depth could be the same size as the knife that inflicted the wound or vary from shorter to longer based on tissue differences, lung deflation, abdominal and skin flexibility, abdominal or chest wall compression, and the amount of force used. He rejected for lack of medical certainty Ward’s statements regarding the correlation between the wound and the knife and the “unusual” characteristics of the wound as necessarily being caused by a jagged or serrated edge. Exh. PC Vol. 14 at 809-12, 817, 819. Veasey noted that certain characteristics of the knife should have correlated with the wounds but did not. He pointed out that the knife admitted into evidence had a hilt or guard that separated the blade from the handle and that, if thrust forcefully into a victim, it would leave patterned abrasions or contusion injuries around the wound which were not found on Dorlene’s wounds. Veasey also explained that the width, or distance between the sharp and dull sides, of the admitted knife was inconsistent with the width of the wounds. Veasey opined that Dorlene’s wounds, which consisted of both blunt trauma and cutting injuries, occurred at two separate times: the earlier blunt trauma episode in which she attempted to defend herself and was thus “cognizant” of the attack, and the later cutting episode, which showed no evidence of defensive actions and occurred within thirty minutes of the emergency medical team arrival. Id. at 835-41. On cross-examination, Veasey admitted that he had trouble seeing “certain details” from the wound pictures and that Dr. Ward would have been in a better position to see the wound details. Id. at 846-47. He conceded that Parker’s knife could have been the murder weapon. The state court noted that Veasey’s testimony would not have changed the outcome of the trial but would have supported the pro