Full opinion text
HOLMES, Circuit Judge. This case involves one battle in a prolonged war over a finite and elemental resource — Rio Grande water. The needs of the plants and animals that depend upon this water for survival are in tension with the needs of the human inhabitants of the Middle Rio Grande Valley (the “Valley”) who depend upon the water for daily living and commercial and agricultural activities. Alleging that the Bureau of Reclamation (“Reclamation”) failed to properly maintain the delicate balance between these counterpoised needs to the detriment of several endangered species, Defenders of Wildlife, Forest Guardians, National Audubon Society, New Mexico Audubon Council, Sierra Club, and the Southwest Environmental Center (the “Environmental Groups”) sought relief in federal court pursuant to the Endangered Species Act (“ESA”). Directly at issue is whether Reclamation has discretion to reallocate water from agricultural and municipal contract users to maintain stream flows for the benefit of the Rio Grande Silvery Minnow (“Minnow”). The Environmental Groups claim that Reclamation does and that its failure to weigh that discretion in its consultations with the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (the “FWS”) violated § 7 of the ESA. At the outset, we commend the district court. When confronted with an extended and sometimes acrimonious dispute between bitterly opposed and firmly entrenched interests, it acted impartially, thoughtfully, and thoroughly. We are constrained, however, to disagree with the district court and conclude that intervening events have mooted the Environmental Groups’ scope-of-consultation claim under the ESA. We also conclude that the district court erred in denying the appellants’ motions for vacatur. For the reasons stated below, we dismiss the appeal and remand to the district court to vacate its memorandum opinions and orders of April 19, 2002, September 23, 2002, and November 22, 2005, and to dismiss the Environmental Groups’ complaint with regard to their scope-of-consultation claim under the ESA. I. BACKGROUND A. Federal Involvement in the Valley The human inhabitants of the Valley have, for centuries, used the Rio Grande for irrigation. In 1925, the Middle Rio Grande Conservancy District (the “MRGCD”) was formed to consolidate water rights and irrigation systems, and to rehabilitate the existing irrigation systems in the Valley. The MRGCD’s subsequent financial difficulties coupled with aggradation of the river channel led to development of the Middle Rio Grande Project (the “Project”), one of two major federal water projects impacting the Valley. Approved by the Flood Control Acts of 1948 and 1950, the Project consists of federally rehabilitated and/or constructed water-storage facilities, diversion dams, canals, drains, and levees. The other major water project in the Valley, the San Juan-Chama Project (the “San Juan-Chama”), imports water from the Colorado River Basin to the Rio Grande Basin. See Rio Grande Silvery Minnow v. Keys (Minnow II), 333 F.3d 1109, 1122-23 (10th Cir.2003), vacated as moot, 355 F.3d 1215 (10th Cir.2004). B. The Endangered Species Act and the Minnow Primarily at issue in this case is § 7(a)(2) of the ESA, codified at 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2). Listing a species as endangered or threatened under 16 U.S.C. § 1533 triggers the ESA’s provisions. Wyo. Farm Bureau Fed’n v. Babbitt, 199 F.3d 1224, 1231 (10th Cir.2000). Thus, the ESA’s protections extended to the Minnow beginning in 1994 when the FWS listed it as endangered. The Minnow now occupies a small portion of its historic range, primarily existing in the San Acacia Reach — a sixty-mile stretch of river south of Albuquerque, New Mexico, and north of Elephant Butte Reservoir. Spring run-off triggers Minnow spawning. During drought years, the Minnow is allegedly jeopardized both by low spring run-off, which limits spawning, and, as the summer progresses and irrigation increases, by river drying in the San Acacia Reach, which increases adult Minnow mortality. Section 7(a)(2) of the ESA provides, “[ejach Federal agency shall, in consultation with and with the assistance of the Secretary, insure that any action authorized, funded, or carried out by such agency ... is not likely to jeopardize the continued existence of any endangered species or threatened species.” 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2). Section 7 applies to “actions in which there is discretionary Federal involvement or control.” 50 C.F.R. § 402.03 (emphasis added); see also Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders v. Defenders of Wildlife, 551 U.S. 644, 665-66, 669, 127 S.Ct. 2518, 168 L.Ed.2d 467 (2007) (determining that the FWS’s and the National Marine Fisheries Service’s interpretation — that “ § 7(a)(2)’s no-jeopardy duty covers only discretionary agency actions and does not attach to actions ... that an agency is required by statute to undertake once certain specified triggering events have occurred” — was reasonable). 50 C.F.R. § 402.02, in turn, defines agency “action” as “all activities or programs of any kind authorized, funded, or carried out, in whole or in part, by Federal agencies.” Section 7(a)(2) imposes both a procedural and a substantive obligation on federal agencies. Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders, 551 U.S. at 667, 127 S.Ct. 2518; New Mexico ex rel. Richardson v. Bureau of Land Mgmt., 565 F.3d 683, 700 (10th Cir.2009). “An agency’s decision whether to take a discretionary action that may jeopardize endangered or threatened species is strictly governed by ESA-mandated inter-agency consultation procedures.” Forest Guardians v. Johanns, 450 F.3d 455, 457 (9th Cir.2006). The procedural obligation ensures that the agency proposing the action (the “action agency”) con-suits with the FWS to determine the effects of its action on endangered species and their critical habitat. Fla. Key Deer v. Paulison, 522 F.3d 1133, 1138 (11th Cir.2008). To meet its procedural obligation, the action agency must first determine whether its proposed discretionary action may affect a listed species or a critical habitat. 50 C.F.R. § 402.14(a). If so, the agency must consult with the FWS. Id. § 402.14(a), (c). During consultation, the FWS “evaluates the effects of the proposed action on the survival of [the] species and any potential destruction or adverse modification of critical habitat” and, “based on ‘the best scientific and commercial data available,’ ” formulates a biological opinion (also referred to here as “B.O.”). Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n v. Nat’l Marine Fisheries Serv., 524 F.3d 917, 924 (9th Cir.2008) (quoting 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2)). The B.O. is prepared by the FWS at the conclusion of consultation. It is a written statement determining whether the proposed action “is likely to jeopardize the continued existence of listed species.” 50 C.F.R. § 402.14(g)(4). “If the biological opinion concludes that jeopardy is not likely and that there will not be adverse modification of critical habitat, or that there is a ‘reasonable and prudent alternative[ ]’ to the agency action that avoids jeopardy and adverse modification and that the incidental taking of endangered or threatened species will not violate section 7(a)(2), the consulting agency can issue an ‘Incidental Take Statement’. Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n, 524 F.3d at 924. An Incidental Take Statement (“ITS”) “constitutes a permit authorizing the action agency to take the endangered or threatened species so long as it respects the [FWS’s] terms and conditions.” Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 170, 117 S.Ct. 1154, 137 L.Ed.2d 281 (1997) (internal quotation marks omitted). If an action agency receives a jeopardy opinion, the action agency can comply with its substantive obligation under § 7(a)(2) only if it “ ‘terminate[s] the action, implement[s] the proposed alternative, or seek[s] an exemption from the Cabinet-level Endangered Species Committee pursuant to 16 U.S.C. § 1536(e).’” Fla. Key Deer, 522 F.3d at 1139 (quoting Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders, 127 S.Ct. at 2526). C. Procedural History On November 15,1999, the Environmental Groups filed an ESA citizen suit seeking both injunctive and declaratory relief, in part, for Reclamation’s and the Army Corps of Engineers’ (the “Corps”) failure to fully consult with the FWS pursuant to § 7(a)(2) of the ESA prior to issuing an October 1999 biological assessment. The Environmental Groups contended that Reclamation and the Corps possessed “significant discretion over virtually all aspects of their funding and operation of the ... Project, and therefore they must consult with the FWS on all of these actions.” J.A. at 277. The suit prompted several contract water users, including the MRGCD and the State of New Mexico, to intervene. On June 29, 2001, the FWS issued a biological opinion (“2001 B.O.”). As a result, the Environmental Groups filed a second amended complaint contesting the validity of the 2001 B.O. and again raising Reclamation’s and the Corps’ alleged failure to consult with the FWS to the fullest extent of their discretionary authority. On April 19, 2002, the district court affirmed the 2001 B.O. on substantive grounds, leaving the remainder of the Environmental Group’s claims for later resolution. On the procedural front, however, the district court concluded that “[Reclamation] retains sufficient discretion over its river management and operations in the middle Rio Grande, specifically water deliveries under the ... Project and under the San Juan-Chama ..., to require [Reclamation] to consult over those actions under Section 7(a)(2) of the ESA.” Id. at 173. We subsequently dismissed the intervenors’ appeal of the April 19 order for lack of standing and dismissed the federal agencies’ appeal because the order was not subject to interlocutory review. Rio Grande Silvery Minnow v. Keys (Minnow I), 46 Fed.Appx. 929, 933-34, 935 (10th Cir.2002) (per curiam). On September 4, 2002, the Environmental Groups sought emergency injunctive relief, alleging that a drought year was endangering the Minnow and asking the court to order the federal defendants to meet the flow requirements of the 2001 B.O. On September 12, 2002, the FWS issued a biological opinion (“2002 B.O.”) in which it determined that, although Reclamation’s operations in the Valley were likely to jeopardize the Minnow, there existed no reasonable and prudent alternative (“RPA”) to alleviate the jeopardy. Consequently, on September 19, 2002, the Environmental Groups filed a third amended complaint challenging the 2002 B.O. They continued to press their allegation that Reclamation “failed to consult fully ... over all aspects of their Middle Rio Grande water operations and related decision-making activities,” the key elements of which included their decisions not to reduce water to the MRGCD and not to use San Juan-Chama water for the benefit of the Minnow. J.A. at 516-17. The Environmental Groups sought a declaration that both the 2001 B.O. and the 2002 B.O. were arbitrary and capricious, an order requiring the federal agencies to complete full consultation through issuance of a legally adequate biological opinion, and an order requiring the federal agencies to “take all steps within their discretionary authority necessary to conserve” the Minnow. Id. at 527. In a September 23, 2002 Memorandum Opinion addressing the Environmental Groups’ motion for an injunction, the district court chided Reclamation for having failed to. timely reinitiate consultation despite the persistent historic drought and “clear guidance that it had discretion to consult with the FWS about limiting or reducing contract deliveries under the [San Juan-Chama] and the [Project].” Id. at 208. Because the FWS could formulate no RPA that avoided jeopardy to the Minnow, the district court determined that the 2002 B.O. was arbitrary and capricious. Moreover, it concluded that Reclamation was empowered to release San Juan-Chama water, to restrict future contract deliveries of both San Juan-Chama and Project water, and to restrict diversions by the MRGCD. An appeal ensued. While the appeal was pending, the FWS issued a March 16, 2003 biological opinion (“2003 B.O.”). The FWS used a “depletion-based approach” for purposes of determining the scope of the proposed federal action. Id. at 923. That is, the FWS, Reclamation, the Corps, and other interested parties consulted “on the effects of total river depletions on listed species, without identifying particular aspects of the overall action as ‘discretionary or non-discretionary.’” Id. The FWS concluded that the proposed actions would likely jeopardize the continued existence of the Minnow. Similarly, the FWS analyzed the threat to the Minnow and developed RPAs “based on biological needs of the species, independent of sources of water and discretionary authority.” Id. at 921. In recognition of the district court’s pri- or orders and the pending appeal, however, Reclamation proposed different measures it could use to avoid jeopardy to the Minnow, depending on the ultimate determination of the scope of its discretion. Under the first proposal, Reclamation assumed that it had no discretion to limit contract deliveries to benefit the Minnow and proposed a supplemental water program by which it would lease water from willing lessors to enhance river flows when necessary. Under the second proposal, Reclamation assumed that it had discretion to limit diversions, curtail water storage, and release stored water belonging to both contract users and the Native American tribes and vowed to strive to allot shortages between all users. Meanwhile, in December 2003, Congress enacted a rider to the Energy and Water Development Appropriations Act, 2004, Pub.L. No. 108-137, § 208, 117 Stat. 1827, 1849-50 (2003) (the “2003 minnow rider”). The 2003 minnow rider placed San JuanChama water beyond Reclamation’s discretionary reach. § 208, 117 Stat. at 1849. Additionally, Congress deemed conformity with the 2003 B.O.’s RPAs and ITS as full compliance with the ESA’s requirements for a two-year period. Id. at 1849-50. Congress enacted a second rider in 2004, which extended the ESA adequacy of the 2003 B.O.’s RPAs and ITS through March 2013. See Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2005, Pub.L. No. 108-447, § 205, 118 Stat. 2809, 2949 (2004) (the “2004 minnow rider”). Finally, on November 19, 2005, Congress amended the 2004 minnow rider and extended its ESA-satisfaction coverage to include “any amendments” to the 2003 B.O. Energy and Water Development Appropriations Act, 2006, Pub.L. No. 109-103, § 121(b), 119 Stat. 2247, 2256 (2005). Following the issuance of the 2003 B.O., the passage of the 2003 minnow rider, and our dismissal of the preliminary injunction appeal as moot, the Environmental Groups acknowledged that “there is no further relief that can be issued at this time upon the existing claims in Plaintiffs’ lawsuit.” J.A. at 1630. They sought dismissal but requested that the district court not vacate its prior orders. Agreeing that the case was moot, the appellants urged vacatur. The Environmental Groups then sought to withdraw their motion to dismiss, claiming that their scope-of-consultation claim was not mooted by intervening events because the violation was likely to recur. On November 22, 2005, although recognizing that congressional action mooted the Environmental Groups’ claims as to San Juan-Chama water, the district court rejected the contention that the Environmental Groups’ scope-of-consultation claim as to Project water was moot. Rather, the court determined that the FWS’s issuance of the 2003 B.O., and Reclamation’s adoption of it, constituted a voluntary cessation with respect to Reclamation’s failure to consider the alleged full scope of its discretionary authority. Absent Reclamation’s and the FWS’s assurances that they would continue to operate under the discretionary option in the 2003 B.O., the district court determined that they failed to meet their burden of establishing mootness. Additionally, the district court entered a declaratory judgment requiring Reclamation and the FWS to consider, in future consultations, Reclamation’s discretion to reallocate Project contract water. Finally, assuming arguendo that the case was moot, the court concluded that vacating its 2002 memorandum opinions and orders would not be appropriate and in the public interest. This appeal followed. II. DISCUSSION A. Intervening Events have Mooted the Environmental Groups’ Scope-of-Consultation Claim 1. Standard of Review [12,13] We have no subject-matter jurisdiction if a case is moot. Unified Sch. Dist. No. 259 v. Disability Rights Ctr. of Kan., 491 F.3d 1143, 1146-47 (10th Cir.2007). We review questions of mootness de novo. R.M. Inv. Co. v. U.S. Forest Serv., 511 F.3d 1103, 1107 (10th Cir.2007). “ ‘Mootness is a threshold issue because the existence of a live case or controversy is a constitutional prerequisite to federal court jurisdiction.’” Disability Law Ctr. v. Millcreek Health Ctr., 428 F.3d 992, 996 (10th Cir.2005) (quoting McClendon v. City of Albuquerque, 100 F.3d 863, 867 (10th Cir.1996)). “ ‘Without a live, concrete controversy, we lack jurisdiction to consider claims no matter how meritorious.’ ” Habecker v. Town of Estes Park, 518 F.3d 1217, 1223 (10th Cir.2008) (quoting Mink v. Suthers, 482 F.3d 1244, 1253 (10th Cir.2007)). Declaratory judgment actions must be sustainable under the same mootness criteria that apply to any other lawsuit. See Unified Sch. Dist. No. 259, 491 F.3d at 1147 (“Actions seeking a declaratory judgment must comport with the same mootness principles as any other suit.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). As we noted in Cox v. Phelps Dodge Corp., “[i]t is well established that what makes a declaratory judgment action a proper judicial resolution of a case or controversy rather than an advisory opinion is the settling of some dispute which affects the behavior of the defendant toward the plaintiff.” 43 F.3d 1345, 1348 (10th Cir.1994) (brackets, en dash, and internal quotation marks omitted), superseded by statute on other grounds, Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub.L. No. 102-166, § 102, 105 Stat. 1071, 1072 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1981a), as recognized in Walker v. UPS Inc., 240 F.3d 1268, 1278 (10th Cir.2001). “ ‘The crucial question is whether granting a present determination of the issues offered will have some effect in the real world.’ ” Wyoming v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 414 F.3d 1207, 1212 (10th Cir.2005) (emphasis added) (quoting Citizens for Responsible Gov’t State Political Action Comm. v. Davidson, 236 F.3d 1174, 1182 (10th Cir.2000)). 2. Challenges to the 2001 and 2002 Biological Opinions are Moot The appellants challenge the district court’s determination that the FWS’s issuance of the 2003 B.O. did not moot the Environmental Groups’ claims. To determine whether any claim remains for review, we must ascertain what type of relief the Environmental Groups seek, and whether we can, at this juncture, afford them meaningful relief. See S. Utah Wilderness Alliance v. Smith, 110 F.3d 724, 727 (10th Cir.1997). The Environmental Groups essentially contend that, since the Minnow’s listing as endangered, and continuing to the date of the filing of the third amended complaint, Reclamation has failed to fully consult. They prayed for a declaration that the federal agencies are violating § 7(a)(2) by failing to consult on all discretionary aspects of the federal action, and for an injunction ordering full consultation. Because only the 2001 B.O. and 2002 B.O. had been issued when the Environmental Groups filed their third amended complaint, we must therefore interpret then pleadings as directed at the 2001 B.O. and 2002 B.O. The Environmental Groups’ allegations of legal wrongdoing must be grounded in a concrete and particularized factual context; they are not subject to review as free-floating, ethereal grievances. See Nat’l Mining Ass’n v. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, 251 F.3d 1007, 1010 (D.C.Cir.2001) (“To determine whether anything remains of NMA’s case, we need to identify which regulations NMA challenged and whether the new rules altered those regulations.”). And only the 2001 B.O. and 2002 B.O. were extant targets for their allegations. The problem for the Environmental Groups, however, is that neither the 2001 B.O. nor 2002 B.O. still exists. After the Environmental Groups filed their third amended complaint, the FWS issued the 2003 B.O., which superseded both of them. The 2003 B.O. establishes a new regulatory framework under which the propriety of Reclamation’s actions must be judged. The Environmental Groups have not argued that the 2003 B.O. is a mirror image of the two biological opinions that it supplanted, nor could they. Nor have they asserted that the changes are “only superficial ].” Conservation Law Found, v. Evans, 360 F.3d 21, 26 (1st Cir.2004). We must conclude that the FWS’s issuance of the 2003 B.O. mooted the Environmental Groups’ prayer for both injunctive and declaratory relief. If we issued an injunction directing Reclamation to consult concerning the biological opinions at issue in this litigation, it would have no effect in the real world because those biological opinions have been superseded. Indeed, even as to the 2003 B.O., a consultation injunction would be meaningless because the federal agencies already have consulted. “An injunction ordering consultation [using an expanded scope] is no longer warranted. There is no point in ordering an action that has already taken place.” S. Utah Wilderness Alliance, 110 F.3d at 728. Furthermore, any declaration that the 2001 B.O. and 2002 B.O. were insufficient due to Reclamation’s failure to fully consult would be wholly without effect in the real world. The Environmental Groups insist that we are situated to provide some relief, especially declaratory relief regarding the scope of Reclamation’s discretion in consultation. However, the Environmental Groups have not been able to point to some concrete ongoing injury. See Cox, 43 F.3d at 1348 (“[T]his court has explained that a plaintiff cannot maintain a declaratory or injunctive action unless he or she can demonstrate a good chance of being likewise injured [by the defendant] in the future.” (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted)). As the regulations governing formal consultation, 50 C.F.R. § 402.14, and reinitiation of formal consultation, 50 C.F.R. § 402.16, demonstrate, the duty to consult is not itself an ongoing agency action subject to challenge. See Sierra Club v. Yeutter, 926 F.2d 429, 439-40 (5th Cir.1991) (“Once an agency submits a plan that has been agreed to through the section 7 consultation process, the court then, applying the arbitrary and capricious standard of review, must approve or disapprove it.”). In other words, the Environmental Groups cannot challenge the scope of consultation untethered from the federal agencies’ efforts to develop a biological opinion. The consultation process culminates in the issuance of a biological opinion. Water Keeper Alliance, 271 F.3d at 26. And, in this case, that biological opinion has now been issued (i.e., the 2003 B.O.). The Environmental Groups’ concerns about whether Reclamation will appropriately consult with the FWS in response to changing water-demand conditions are far too speculative to support a claim for declaratory relief. Any such relief would amount to an advisory opinion regarding the scope of Reclamation’s discretion and such an opinion would clearly be improper. See S. Utah Wilderness Alliance, 110 F.3d at 730 (“SUWA has not shown that the defendants are likely to violate section 7(a)(2) in the near future.”); see also Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Lohn, 511 F.3d 960, 964 (9th Cir.2007) (concluding that a claim for declaratory relief regarding allegedly improper regulatory policy was mooted by governmental agency’s listing of killer whale species as endangered, which was “ultimate objective” of environmental advocacy appellants; the fact that agency employed the allegedly improper policy in effecting the listing did not alter the mootness calculus because it was “too speculative” that this policy in the future “might adversely affect” listed species or affect “other” killer whale species); Or. Natural Desert Ass’n v. U.S. Forest Serv., No. 04-3096-PA, 2007 WL 1072112, at *5 (D.Or. Apr.3, 2007) (“Plaintiffs also argue that declaratory relief would be helpful to ‘ensure that the [new] BiOp complies with the law and does so in a timely manner’ and that declaratory relief would ‘clarify and settle’ defendants’ legal obligations. I agree with defendants, however, such justifications are so vague as to make Article Ill’s ‘case or controversy’ requirement meaningless. Courts should not micromanage an agency’s procedures under the guise of judicial review.”). We addressed an analogous situation in Wyoming. There the State of Wyoming successfully brought a NEPA challenge before the district court against a rule of the U.S. Forest Service, “commonly known as the ‘Roadless Rule,’ that generally prohibited road construction in inventoried roadless areas on National Forest System lands.” 414 F.3d at 1210. During the pendency of the appeal by certain environmental group defendant-intervenors, the Forest Service issued a final rule that replaced the Roadless Rule, and we concluded that “the new rule has mooted the issues in th[e] case” and dismissed the appeal. Id. In particular, we noted that “[t]he portions of the Roadless Rule that were substantively challenged by Wyoming no longer exist.” Id. at 1212. Furthermore, we reasoned that “the alleged procedural deficiencies of the Roadless Rule are now irrelevant because the replacement rule was promulgated in a new and separate rulemaking process.” Id. As in Wyoming, to the extent that the Environmental Groups seek a declaration that the 2001 B.O. and 2002 B.O. are legally infirm due to Reclamation’s failure to consult using the full scope of its discretion, we are not situated to issue a present determination with real-world effect because those regulations no longer are operational' — -for all material purposes, they no longer exist. And, because of that fact, we likewise are not situated to cure any purported procedural irregularities in Reclamation’s consultation behavior concerning those opinions. Thus, the Environmental Groups’ claims are moot. See also Colo. Off-Highway Vehicle Coal. v. U.S. Forest Serv., 357 F.3d 1130, 1135 (10th Cir.2004) (“Plaintiffs challenge to the 1997 Decision Notice and its request for declaratory and injunctive relief is moot. The 1998 Routt Forest Plan and its accompanying [off-road vehicle] use policy now governs the Routt National Forest making Plaintiffs attack on the 1997 Decision Notice futile.” (emphasis added)); cf. Camfield v. City of Okla. City, 248 F.3d 1214, 1223 (10th Cir.2001) (“Because parties have no legally cognizable interest in the constitutional validity of an obsolete statute, a statutory amendment moots a case to the extent that it removes challenged features of the prior law[.]” (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)). On these facts, cases of our sister circuits also are instructive. For example, in American Rivers v. National Marine Fisheries Service, the Ninth Circuit summarized plaintiffs’ challenge as follows: The plaintiffs alleged that the 1994-1998 Biological Opinion [issued by the National Marine Fisheries Service] violated § 7(a)(2) of the ESA. Specifically, American Rivers contended that the federal defendants violated the ESA by relying on the transportation of Snake River smolts to conclude that the 1994-1998 operations of the River Power System are unlikely to jeopardize the continued existence of the listed salmon. 126 F.3d 1118, 1122 (9th Cir.1997) (footnote omitted). However, during the course of the litigation, the National Marine Fisheries Service “issued a new biological opinion (“1995 Biological Opinion”) which superseded the [challenged] 1994-1998 Biological Opinion.” Id. at 1123. With little difficulty, the Ninth Circuit concluded that plaintiffs’ action was moot. Id. at 1124 (“[T]he biological opinion in the present case has been superseded by the 1995 Biological Opinion. Therefore, any challenge to the 1994-1998 Biological Opinion is moot.”). The D.C. Circuit reached a similar conclusion in National Mining Ass’n. At issue there was “the validity of several federal regulatory requirements imposed on permit applicants, and the procedures for contesting the accuracy of information used to determine permit eligibility.” 251 F.3d at 1009. The permits were issued under the Surface Mining Reclamation and Control Act, 30 U.S.C. § 1201 et seq., and its implementing regulations; no one could engage in surface coal mining without such a permit. Id. After oral argument, the Interior Department revised the regulations that governed some of the challenged regulatory requirements and procedures and, consequently, the D.C. Circuit was “faced with additional questions concerning the extent to which the case is now moot.” Id. After identifying the regulations that were the subject of appellant’s challenge, the D.C. Circuit determined that the Interior Department’s revisions to those regulations rendered appellant’s attack upon them moot. Id. at 1010-11. In particular, the D.C. Circuit stressed that the revisions effected “substantial changes” to the previously existing regulatory regime, thus altering the real-world conditions and eliminating the possibility of meaningful relief. Id. at 1011. The court noted: “The old set of rules, which are the subject of this lawsuit, cannot be evaluated as if nothing has changed. A new system is now in place.” Id. Accordingly, the D.C. Circuit determined that the revisions mooted appellant’s challenge. See also Forest Guardians v. U.S. Forest Serv., 329 F.3d 1089, 1096 (9th Cir.2003) (holding ESA § 7 and § 9 claims moot when challenged permits were issued pursuant to superseded biological opinion); Ramsey v. Kantor, 96 F.3d 434, 446 (9th Cir.1996) (holding that the same rule of mootness applies where an agency “would no longer be relying on the particular biological opinion that was being challenged, but rather upon a new opinion,” and “where an agency will be basing its ruling on different criteria or factors in the future”). The relevant case law thus strongly counsels in favor of a conclusion of mootness here. Due to the FWS’s issuance of the 2003 B.O., we can provide no effective relief. The Environmental Groups did not challenge the 2003 B.O., and it currently governs Reclamation’s disposition of the water at issue. That B.O. has altered the real-world parameters within which Reclamation operates, creating a new regulatory context for assessing its compliance with its ESA obligations. The Environmental Groups’ reliance on the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Forest Guardians v. Johanns is unavailing. In that case, the Forest Service and the FWS engaged in comprehensive management and monitoring of lands used for grazing that ultimately allowed the Forest Service to presume that the FWS concurred each year in a no-jeopardy finding for parcels of land covered by its plan. Johanns, 450 F.3d at 458-59. When the Forest Service did not comply with the management and monitoring requirements, the plaintiff brought suit claiming that consultation should be reinitiated. See id. at 459-60. The Forest Service then reinitiated consultation and subsequently received the FWS’s concurrence in its no-jeopardy finding. Id. at 461. In holding that the Forest Service’s subsequent reinitiation of consultation did not moot the plaintiffs claims, the court distinguished our decision in Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance. The court observed that the monitoring requirements were ongoing action that would extend through the lease term. Id. at 462. Additionally, the court determined that the Forest Service was likely to continue its “practice of not complying with the monitoring requirements,” especially because it argued that compliance was not required. Id. The court, therefore, determined that a “[d]eclaratory judgment in favor of Forest Guardians would thus ensure that the Forest Service does not continue to fail to meet its monitoring responsibilities in the future and that it fulfills its duty under the ESA to consult with FWS when necessary.” Id. Consequently, the court concluded that, although the plaintiffs request for an injunction was mooted by reinitiation of consultation, a declaratory judgment would, nevertheless, provide relief. Id. at 462-63. The absence of an on-going ESA violation makes this case distinguishable from Johanns and more akin to Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance. See S. Utah Wilderness Alliance, 110 F.3d at 728-30 (finding plaintiffs claim, seeking declaratory judgment for the Bureau of Land Management’s alleged failure to consult with the FWS as required by § 7(a)(2), moot when agencies subsequently completed informal consultation). Unlike the Forest Service in Johanns, Reclamation is not currently engaged in the same behavior that was the subject of the Environmental Groups’ objections. Instead, the FWS issued a superseding B.O. with which Reclamation is complying. Thus, we are constrained to conclude that the issuance of the 2003 B.O. mooted the Environmental Groups’ scope-of-consultation claim under the ESA. 3. Voluntary Cessation The Environmental Groups argue, and the district court held, that the scope-of-consultation claim was not mooted by the issuance of the 2003 B.O. because Reclamation voluntarily ceased the alleged objectionable behavior. We disagree. “One exception to a claim of mootness is a defendant’s voluntary cessation of an alleged illegal practice which the defendant is free to resume at any time.” Chihuahuan Grasslands Alliance v. Kempthorne, 545 F.3d 884, 892 (10th Cir.2008). “The rule that ‘voluntary cessation of a challenged practice rarely moots a federal case ... traces to the principle that a party should not be able to evade judicial review, or to defeat a judgment, by temporarily altering questionable behavior.’” Unified Sch. Dist. No. 259, 491 F.3d at 1149 (quoting City News & Novelty, Inc. v. City of Waukesha, 531 U.S. 278, 284 n. 1, 121 S.Ct. 743, 148 L.Ed.2d 757 (2001)). “In other words, this exception exists to counteract the possibility of a defendant ceasing illegal action long enough to render a lawsuit moot and then resuming the illegal conduct.” Chihuahuan Grasslands Alliance, 545 F.3d at 892. Voluntary actions may, nevertheless, moot litigation if two conditions are satisfied: “(1) it can be said with assurance that there is no reasonable expectation that the alleged violation will recur, and (2) interim relief or events have completely and irrevocably eradicated the effects of the alleged violation.” County of Los Angeles v. Davis, 440 U.S. 625, 631, 99 S.Ct. 1379, 59 L.Ed.2d 642 (1979) (internal quotation marks, elipses, and citations omitted). “[V]oluntary cessation of offensive conduct will only moot litigation if it is clear that the defendant has not changed course simply to deprive the court of jurisdiction.” Nat’l Adver. Co. v. City of Mia mi 402 F.3d 1329, 1333 (11th Cir.2005) (per curiam). The party asserting mootness bears the “ ‘heavy burden of persuading]’ the court that the challenged conduct cannot reasonably be expected to start up again.” Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 189, 120 S.Ct. 693, 145 L.Ed.2d 610 (2000) (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Concentrated Phosphate Exp. Ass’n, 393 U.S. 199, 203, 89 S.Ct. 361, 21 L.Ed.2d 344 (1968)). In practice, however, Laidlaw's heavy burden frequently has not prevent- ed governmental officials from discontinuing challenged practices and mooting a case. Thus, even when a legislative body has the power to re-enact an ordinance or statute, ordinarily an amendment or repeal of it moots a case challenging the ordinance or statute. See Camfield, 248 F.3d at 1223; see also Native Vill. of Noatak v. Blatchford, 38 F.3d 1505, 1510 (9th Cir.1994) (“A statutory change, however, is usually enough to render a case moot, even if the legislature possesses the power to reenact the statute after the lawsuit is dismissed. As a general rule, if a challenged law is repealed or expires, the case becomes moot.”); 13C Wright, Miller & Cooper, supra note 15, § 3533.6, at 259 (“The legislative rules established by statute or administrative regulation may shift as an action progresses. Ordinarily courts respond by applying the law in force at the time of decision.... Mootness may result because the change has removed any basis for a claim, or has fully satisfied the claim.” (emphasis added)); 13C Wright, Miller & Cooper, supra note 15, § 3533.6, at 277 (“Repeal ... likewise moots attacks on a statute.”). Indeed, in this governmental context, “[m]ost cases that deny mootness rely on clear showings of reluctant submission [by governmental actors] and a desire to return to the old ways.” 13C Wright, Miller & Cooper, supra note 15, § 3533.6, at 311 (emphasis added). More specifically, when a legislature repeals or amends a statute after it is judicially challenged, we have concluded that the voluntary-cessation exception has no application “where there is no evidence in the record to indicate that the legislature intends to reenact the prior version of the disputed statute.” Camfield, 248 F.3d at 1223-24. In Camfield, we distinguished the Supreme Court’s decision in City of Mesquite v. Aladdin’s Castle, Inc., 455 U.S. 283, 102 S.Ct. 1070, 71 L.Ed.2d 152 (1982), where the Court determined that the action was not moot, by noting that Aladdin’s Castle “precludfes] a mootness determination in cases challenging a prior version of a state statute only when the legislature has openly expressed its intent to reenact the challenged law.” Id. Likewise, the “[withdrawal or alteration of administrative policies can moot an attack on those policies.” Bahnmiller v. Derwinski, 923 F.2d 1085, 1089 (4th Cir.1991); see, e.g., Coliseum Square Ass’n v. Jackson, 465 F.3d 215, 246 (5th Cir.2006) (“Corrective action by an agency can moot an issue.”). And the “mere possibility” that an agency might rescind amendments to its actions or regulations does not enliven a moot controversy. Ala. Hosp. Ass’n v. Beasley, 702 F.2d 955, 961 (11th Cir.1983). A case “cease[s] to be a live controversy if the possibility of recurrence of the challenged conduct is only a ‘speculative contingency.’” Burbank v. Twomey, 520 F.2d 744, 748 (7th Cir.1975) (quoting Hall v. Beals, 396 U.S. 45, 49, 90 S.Ct. 200, 24 L.Ed.2d 214 (1969)). Guided by these principles, we proceed to apply the two-part test of County of Los Angeles here. We conclude that the district court erred in applying the voluntary-cessation exception to the mootness doctrine in this case. Our de novo review of the record convinces us that the appellants have met their burden of establishing mootness. The first part of the test requires us to inquire whether we can say with assurance that “ ‘there is no reasonable expectation’ that the alleged violation will recur.” County of Los Angeles, 440 U.S. at 631, 99 S.Ct. 1379. Our review of the record assures us that, in light of intervening events, there is no reasonable expectation that Reclamation will revert to using the same consulting process which resulted in the 2001 B.O. and 2002 B.O. Although the district court’s September 23, 2002 order no doubt played a role in the FWS’s issuance of the 2003 B.O., the absence of evidence here that the federal agencies used the issuance of the new B.O. merely to defeat the district court’s jurisdiction weakens the implication that they manipulated the system. See Chihuahuan Grasslands Alliance, 545 F.3d at 893 (“Nothing in the record presented to us indicates the BLM’s termination of the leases at issue constitutes a ‘voluntary cessation’ of illegal conduct made in an effort to evade judicial review or avoid judgment by temporarily altering questionable behavior.”); Sossamon, 560 F.3d at 325 (‘We will not require some physical or logical impossibility that the challenged policy will be reenacted absent evidence that the voluntary cessation is a sham for continuing possibly unlawful conduct.”); see also 13C Wright, Miller & Cooper, supra note 15, § 3533.7, at 326 (noting that although governmental defendants might take action as a direct response to litigation, “[a]t any rate, self-correction again provides a secure foundation for mootness so long as it seems genuine”); cf. Save Greers Ferry Lake, Inc. v. Dep’t of Def., 255 F.3d 498, 501 (8th Cir.2001) (“[W]hile the district court’s preliminary injunction clearly had the salutary effect of prompting the Corps to reevaluate its issuance of the FONSI [Finding of No Significant Impact], withdraw the 2000 SMP [Shoreline Management Plan], and decide to prepare an EIS [Environmental Impact Statement], the injunction cannot continue in effect insofar as it purports to adjudicate the present or future legality of the withdrawn 2000 SMP and to order an EIS for the 2000 SMP.”). Moreover, “we are not here presented with a mere informal promise or assurance on the part of the [governmental] defendants that the challenged practice will cease.” Burbank, 520 F.2d at 748; see also 13C Wright, Miller & Cooper, supra note 15, § 3553.7, at 351-52 (noting that a conclusion of mootness ordinarily does not “follow announcement of an intention to change or adoption of a plan to work toward lawful behavior”). Instead, the FWS took the concrete step in 2003 of issuing a new biological opinion. This 2003 B.O. superseded and rendered obsolete the two biological opinions that provided the framework for the Environmental Groups’ challenge to Reclamation’s scope of discretion. This 2003 B.O. established a new regulatory context for assessing the propriety of Reclamation’s conduct under the ESA. Therefore, there is no reasonable expectation that Reclamation’s actions could give rise to the scope-of-discretion issue in the same (or essentially the same) manner that gave rise to the Environmental Groups’ challenge. See County of Los Angeles, 440 U.S. at 632, 99 S.Ct. 1379 (concluding that use of unvalidated civil service exam unlikely to recur because, following commencement of litigation, city instituted new method of screening job applicants and increasing minority representation in fire department). We do recognize that Reclamation has not abandoned its narrow view of the scope of its discretion. Specifically, Reclamation provided for an option to achieve the 2003 B.O.’s RPAs that was consistent with its narrow view and contrary to the district court’s rulings concerning the scope of its discretion. However, even if Reclamation’s reservation of this narrow-discretion option suggests some possibility that it would revert to its narrow scope-of-discretion view should it avoid the precedential effects of the district court’s orders — through, for example, a mootness determination and vacatur — that possibility likely would not be sufficient to warrant application of the voluntary-cessation exception. See Ala. Hosp. Ass’n, 702 F.2d at 961 (noting that the “mere possibility” that an agency might rescind amendments to its actions or regulations does not enliven a moot controversy). Moreover, even if we accorded that possibility some persuasive force on the voluntary-cessation question, we would recognize that if the seopeof-discretion issue does arise again it would be in a different regulatory context than that challenged by the Environmental Groups (i.e., the 2001 B.O. and 2002 B.O.). Consequently, the precise issue that was the subject of the Environmental Groups’ action is no longer extant, and it would not be reasonably likely to recur through Reclamation’s actions. See Unified Sch. Dist. No. 259, 491 F.3d at 1150 (“[T]he ‘allegedly wrongful behavior’ in this case is highly fact-and context-specific, rather than conduct that is likely to ‘recur’ on similar facts and in the same context. In such a case, the ‘voluntary cessation’ doctrine is inapplicable, because our review of future instances of ‘wrongful behavior’ may be quite different than the complained-of example that already has ceased.”). Moreover, significantly, the change effected by the 2003 B.O. is likely to be rather lengthy in duration. See Burbank, 520 F.2d at 748 (noting that the court was not “faced with a situation where the order is of brief duration and the plaintiff may well be again confronted with the challenged conduct when the order terminates”); see also 13C 'Wright, Miller & Cooper, supra note 15, § 3553.7, at 341 (noting that “[tjemporary compliance with a decree pending appeal, for example, clearly should not moot a case”). As noted, through Congress’s enactment of the minnow riders, the ESA adequacy of the 2003 B.O.’s RPAs and ITS has been assured until March 2013. Under these circumstances, it is unlikely that the Reclamation would give up the protective shield constructed by the minnow riders during the ten-year period and revert to substantially the same discretionary approach that it followed in the 2001 B.O. and 2002 B.O. in consulting concerning a new biological opinion. The district court expressly concluded that the minnow riders did not militate against application of the voluntary-cessation exception. Significantly, however, in reaching this conclusion, the district court apparently did not consider the amendment to the 2004 minnow rider that had been enacted only three days before its ruling. Tellingly, the district court stated: Movants [federal agencies] have failed to establish that it is absolutely clear that they would not return to their wrongful use of an impermissibly narrow and limited scope of discretion in future ESA consultations. The 2004 minnow rider is conditional: it protects the 2003 BO only if the federal agencies comply with the ITS and RPA, and only to the extent that the 2003 BO is not amended. It is virtually a certainty that there will be more ESA consultations in the near future over water operations in the middle Rio Grande.... All the considerations that affect water operation decisions on minnow survival such as climate, water availability, the understanding of minnow biology, and so forth, are subject to change, meaning the issue of the scope of discretion is likely to recur. J.A. at 240-41 (emphasis added). The district court’s application of the voluntary-cessation exception therefore appears to have been grounded on a false premise— viz., that the minnow riders would ensure that Reclamation’s actions pursuant to the 2003 B.O. comported with the ESA only so long as the 2003 B.O. was not amended. In fact, even through a series of amendments to the 2003 B.O. over the ten-year life span of the minnow riders, Reclamation’s conduct can still remain insulated from ESA attack, so long as it conforms to that B.O. In sum, County of Los Angeles’s first inquiry does not support a conclusion of voluntary cessation. The second part of the County of Los Angeles test requires little discussion here. Under that part, we examine whether interim events have “completely and irrevocably eradicated the effects of the alleged violation.” 440 U.S. at 631, 99 S.Ct. 1379. After undertaking this inquiry, we can identify no lingering effects from the federal agencies’ alleged violations of the ESA in connection with the issuance of the 2001 and 2002 biological opinions. As discussed at length supra Part 11(A)(2), any injury inflicted upon the Environmental Groups by Reclamation’s purported failure to consult to the full scope of its discretion in connection with the 2001 and 2002 biological opinions cannot be said to have survived the issuance of the 2003 B.O., which superseded and replaced those opinions. In bolstering its case against mootness, the Environmental Groups contend the scope-of-discretion issue is still significant and has a day-to-day impact on Reclamation’s ability to effectively comply with the flow requirements of the 2003 B.O. See Aplees. Br. at 35 (“The extent of the Bureau’s authority to alter operations of El Vado Dam or the MRG Project diversion dams affects the success of its efforts every day to comply with the flow requirements of the 2003 BO. If the Bureau has broad discretion to control water operations, it is also more likely to be able to purchase necessary water, because water rights holders will know that, one way or another, the Bureau will have to obtain enough water to avoid jeopardy.”). However, as the federal agencies correctly note, the Environmental Groups have not filed a claim or sought relief with respect to Reclamation’s day-to-day activities in complying with the 2003 B.O. And ordinarily it would not be appropriate for a federal court to be in the business of monitoring such day-to-day compliance activities in any event. See Norton v. S. Utah Wilderness Alliance, 542 U.S. 55, 67, 124 S.Ct. 2373, 159 L.Ed.2d 137 (2004) (“The prospect of pervasive oversight by federal courts over the manner and pace of agency compliance with such [broad] congressional directives is not contemplated by the APA.”); see also Fund for Animals, Inc. v. U.S. Bureau of Land Mgmt., 460 F.3d 13, 21 (D.C.Cir.2006). In sum, we simply are unable to conclude that the FWS’s issuance of the 2003 B.O., and Reclamation’s adoption of it, provide the appropriate foundation for application of the voluntary-cessation exception of the mootness doctrine. Accordingly, this litigation is moot with regard to the scope-of-consultation claim, and the district court erred in denying the appellants’ motions to dismiss the action for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. 4. The Dissent’s Objection to the Standard of Review The dissent contends that we have incorrectly applied a de novo standard of review to the voluntary-cessation exception to the mootness doctrine. Dissent at 1134. In particular, the dissent asserts that “we should review the district court’s determination as to the effect of the federal agencies’ voluntary cessation of allegedly illegal activities under the more deferential abuse of discretion standard.” Id. at 1135 (emphasis added). This standard leads the dissent to conclude regarding the issue of recurrence (i.e., the first part of the County of Los Angeles test) that “we must agree with the district court and assume that the federal agencies may sidestep their self-mandated practices.” Id. at 1137. Likewise, the dissent is guided by this deferential standard in resolving the question of whether interim events have comprehensively and irrevocably eliminated the effects of the alleged violation (i.e., the second part of the County of Los Angeles test). Indicative of this deference, the dissent states that it “concluded] that the district court acted quite reasonably when it determined that the federal agencies cannot show that the effects of the ESA violation have been completely and irrevocably eradicated.” Id. at 1138 (internal quotation marks omitted). However, we must disagree with our thoughtful colleague in dissent. In particular, we respectfully submit that the dissent’s objection to the standard of review is misguided. It apparently overlooks the critical distinction between constitutional mootness and prudential mootness — only the former kind of mootness is at issue here. Courts recognize two kinds of mootness: constitutional mootness and prudential mootness. See, e.g., United States v. W.T. Grant Co., 345 U.S. 629, 632-34, 73 S.Ct. 894, 97 L.Ed. 1303 (1953); Fletcher v. United States, 116 F.3d 1315, 1321 (10th Cir.1997); S. Utah Wilderness Alliance, 110 F.3d at 727-28; Bldg. & Constr. Dep’t v. Rockwell Int’l Corp., 7 F.3d 1487, 1491-92 (10th Cir.1993); New Mexico ex rel. N.M. State Highway Dep’t v. Goldschmidt, 629 F.2d 665, 668-69 (10th Cir.1980); see also Chamber of Commerce v. U.S. Dep’t of Energy, 627 F.2d 289, 291 (D.C.Cir.1980) (per curiam) (“The doctrine of mootness has two distinct branches.”); 13B Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Edward H. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure § 3533. 1, at 725 (3d ed.2008). Under the constitutional-mootness doctrine, a federal court has jurisdiction over only “cases” and “controversies.” U.S. Const, art. Ill, § 2, cl. 1. “[A]n actual controversy must be extant at all stages of review, not merely at the time the complaint is filed.” Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 67, 117 S.Ct. 1055, 137 L.Ed.2d 170 (1997) (internal quotation marks omitted). Even if a case is not constitutionally moot, a court may dismiss the case under the prudential-mootness doctrine if the case “is so attenuated that considerations of prudence and comity for coordinate branches of government counsel the court to stay its hand, and to withhold relief it has the power to grant.” Fletcher, 116 F.3d at 1321 (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted); S. Utah Wilderness Alliance, 110 F.3d at 727 (stating that “[p]rudential mootness addresses not the power to grant relief but the court’s discretion in the exercise of that power” (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted)). “[P]rudential mootness arises out of the court’s general discretion in formulating prospective equitable remedies.... ” Bldg. & Constr. Dep’t, 7 F.3d at 1492; see Chamber of Commerce, 627 F.2d at 291 (“The cousin of the mootness doctrine, in its strict Article III sense, is a melange of doctrines relating to the court’s discretion in matters of remedy and judicial administration.”). This doctrine generally applies only to requests for injunctive or declaratory relief. Bldg. & Constr. Dep’t, 7 F.3d at 1492 (“All the cases in which the prudential mootness concept has been applied have involved a request for prospective equitable relief by declaratory judgment or injunction.”); see Fletcher, 116 F.3d at 1321; S. Utah Wilderness Alliance, 110 F.3d at 727. A voluntary-cessation evaluation may be an important component of the overall analysis with respect to both constitutional and prudential mootness. “Under both Article III and prudential mootness doctrines, the central inquiry is essentially the same: have circumstances changed since the beginning of litigation that forestall any occasion for meaningful relief.” S. Utah Wilderness Alliance, 110 F.3d at 727. Under both mootness doctrines, courts must assess the likelihood that defendants will recommence the challenged, allegedly offensive conduct. Compare Chihuahuan Grasslands Alliance, 545 F.3d at 892 (noting in the constitutional context that “this [voluntary-cessation] exception exists to counteract the possibility of a defendant ceasing illegal action long enough to render a lawsuit moot and then resuming the illegal conduct”), with Fletcher, 116 F.3d at 1321 (noting as to prudential mootness that “[a] court may refuse to grant relief where it appears that a change of circumstances renders it highly unlikely that the actions in question will be repeated”), and Bldg. & Constr. Dep’t, 7 F.3d at 1492 (noting that, in cases involving prudential mootness, “a court may decline to grant declaratory or injunctive relief where it appears that a defendant, usually the government, has already changed or is in the process of changing its policies or where it appears that any repeat of the actions in question is otherwise highly unlikely”). Although we engage in similar factual inquiries to ascertain constitutional and prudential mootness, different standards of review apply to these doctrines. “The constitutional mootness question is a threshold inquiry because a live case or controversy is a constitutional prerequisite to federal jurisdiction. Our review of this question is de novo.” Fletcher, 116 F.3d at 1321 (citation omitted); see also Sample v. Johnson, 771 F.2d 1335, 1338 (9th Cir.1985) (“We apply a de novo standard for reviewing a district court’s decision on subject matter jurisdiction, and, concomitantly apply that standard in reviewing questions of mootness.” (citation omitted)). By con trast, “we review the district court’s determination of prudential mootness for an abuse of discretion ” because this doctrine “is concerned with the court’s discretion to exercise its power to provide relief.” Fletcher, 116 F.3d at 1321 (emphasis added). As a component of the mootness analysis, it naturally and ineluctably follows that the voluntary-cessation inquiry will be subject to the same standard of review as the overarching mootness question at issue — whether constitutional or prudential. Compare Unified Sch. Dist. No. 259, 491 F.3d at 1149-50 (tacitly applying de novo standard of review to contention of voluntary cessation in the constitutional-mootness context), with Comm, for the First Amendment v. Campbell, 962 F.2d 1517, 1524-25 (10th Cir.1992) (explicitly applying abuse-of-discretion standard of review to assertion of voluntary cessation in the prudential-mootness context). In this case, we apply a de novo standard of review because the case presents a question of constitutional mootness. If we had concluded that the Environmental Group’s ESA claims survived this jurisdictional-mootness inquiry, it might well have been appropriate to conduct a prudentialmootness analysis, given that the Environmental Groups seek only injunctive and declaratory relief. E.g., Bldg. & Constr. Dep’t, 7 F.3d at 1492. However, we need not reach this issue or definitively opine on it, because we have determined that the Environmental Groups’ ESA claims are constitutionally moot. The dissent mistakenly applies the abuse-of-discretion standard — that ordinarily is associated with the prudentialmootness doctrine — to the question of constitutional mootness in this case. To support the application of an abuse-of-discretion standard, the dissent primarily relies on (1) the Supreme Court’s opinion in W.T. Grant Co.; (2) the Tenth Circuit’s opinion in Committee for the First Amendment v. Campbell; and (3) opinions from other circuits. Dissent at 1134-35. The dissent’s reliance is misplaced. Despite its arguments, W.T. Grant Co. and Committee for the First Amendment actually are quite consistent with our opinion. The cases from the other circuits, moreover, are contrary to our precedent and otherwise unpersuasive. In W.T. Grant Co., the Supreme Court established the dual analysis of constitutional and prudential mootness. 345 U.S. at 632-34, 73 S.Ct. 894. Based upon our analysis below, we must respectfully conclude that the dissent has misguidedly relied upon W.T. Grant Co.’s analysis related to prudential mootness in arguing for use of an abuse-of-discretion standard in this case — where only constitutional mootness is at issue. Under the constitutional-mootness doctrine, the Court held in W.T. Grant Co. that the defendants had not carried their “heavy” burden of showing that their voluntary cessation of illegal interlocking corporate directorates rendered the case moot. Id. at 633, 73 S.Ct. 894. Although the defendants indicated that the interlocking corporate directorates “no longer existed and disclaimed any intention to revive them,” the Court reviewed the issue de novo and determined that this averment was insufficient to render the case moot. Id. (“Such a profession [as offered by defendants] does not suffice to make a case moot although it is one of the factors to be considered in determining the appropriateness of granting an injunction against the now-discontinued acts.”); id. at 638, 73 S.Ct. 894 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (suggesting that the constitutional-mootness ruling of the district court was “now conceded [by the majority] to be erroneous”). Once the Court rejected the constitutional-mootness claim, it considered prudential mootness. Id. at 633-34, 73 S.Ct. 894. It was in this context that the Court in W.T. Grant Co. used the language relied upon by the dissent, w