Full opinion text
DUBINA, Chief Judge: I. BACKGROUND A federal grand jury in the Southern District of Florida indicted Appellants Ad-ham Hassoun, Kifah Jayyousi, and Jose Padilla (referred to individually by name or collectively as “defendants”), along with Mohammed Youssef and Kassem Daher, for offenses relating to their support for Islamist violence overseas. Count 1 charged defendants with conspiring in the United States to murder, kidnap, or maim persons overseas. 18 U.S.C. § 956(a)(1). Count 2 charged defendants with conspiring, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 871, to commit the substantive 18 U.S.C. § 2339A offense of “providing] material support or resources or concealing] or disguising] the nature, [or] source ... of material support or resources, knowing or intending that they are to be used in preparation for, or in carrying out, a violation of [§ 956(a)(1), i.e., a conspiracy to murder, kidnap or maim overseas].” 18 U.S.C. § 2339A. Count 3 charged defendants with a substantive § 2339A material support offense based upon an underlying § 956(a)(1) conspiracy. The charged conduct began in October of 1993 and continued until November 1, 2001. Before trial, this court reversed the district court’s order dismissing the most serious count, Count 1, for multiplicity. United States v. Hassoun, 476 F.3d 1181 (11th Cir.2007). Trial commenced on April 16, 2007, and four months later, the jury returned a special verdict convicting defendants on all counts. The jury expressly found each of the three objects of the Count 1 conspiracy (the murder of persons outside the United States, the kidnapping of persons outside the United States, and the maiming of persons outside the United States) and found that Padilla’s and Hassoun’s offenses continued beyond October 26, 2001, but Jayyousi’s offense did not. The district court denied the defendants’ motions for judgment of acquittal and new trial. On Count 1, the district court sentenced Padilla to 208 months, Hassoun to 188 months, and Jayyousi to 152 months’ imprisonment. On Count 2, the district court sentenced each defendant to the maximum 60 months’ imprisonment. On Count 3, the district court sentenced Padilla and Hassoun to the maximum of 180 months’ imprisonment and sentenced Jayyousi to the maximum of 120 months’ imprisonment. The district court made all sentences run concurrently and imposed a 20-year period of supervised release for each defendant. The defendants appeal, and the government cross-appeals Padilla’s sentence. II. ISSUES 1. Whether the district court properly admitted the testimony of FBI Agent John Kavanaugh. 2. Whether there is sufficient evidence to support Padilla’s convictions on all counts and Jayyousi’s conviction on Count 3, the substantive material support offense. 3. Whether the district court properly admitted the expert testimony of Dr. Rohan Gunaratna. 4. Whether the district court properly admitted against Hassoun and Jayyousi portions of a television interview with Osama bin Laden. 5. Whether the district court properly denied Padilla’s motion to suppress statements he made during an interview with FBI agents. 6. Whether the district court properly denied Padilla’s motion to dismiss his indictment based on alleged outrageous government conduct. 7. Whether the district court precluded Hassoun from admitting evidence of innocent intent. 8. Whether the district court properly denied Hassoun’s motion for severance. 9. Whether the district court properly applied the terrorism enhancement to defendants’ sentences. 10. On cross-appeal, whether the district court erred procedurally or substantively in sentencing Padilla. III. TRIAL EVIDENCE The government’s theory at trial was that the defendants formed a support cell linked to radical Islamists worldwide and conspired to send money, recruits and equipment overseas to groups that the defendants knew used violence in their efforts to establish Islamic states. The government posited that the defendants’ efforts supported an international network of radical Islamists, including al-Qaeda and other terrorist groups such as Maktab al-Khidamat (“MAK”), the precursor to al-Qaeda founded by Palestinian Abdullah Azzam, and The Islamic Group of Egypt founded by an Egyptian cleric, Sheikh Omar Abdel Rahman (“the Blind Sheikh”). The government claimed that each defendant performed an important, but different, role in this support cell. To support its theory, the government presented evidence of intercepted telephone calls among defendants, faxes from, support groups to defendants, checks and receipts showing financial transactions by defendants, and an al-Qaeda “mujahideen identification form” that the government contended Padilla completed in July 2000, in order to attend a jihad training camp. The defendants’ primary defense was their lack of'intent to support a violent form of jihad. They contended that they provided only humanitarian aid to oppressed Muslims and did not knowingly participate in a conspiracy to provide material support or resources for terrorist organizations that engaged in murder, kidnapping, or maiming in their efforts to establish Islamic states. The government began its presentation of evidence with Jennifer Keenan, an FBI special agent, who was a legal attache in Yemen and Islamabad, Pakistan, in 2001. During this time, United States personnel obtained evidence such as photographs, letters, documents, passports, videotapes, and a blue binder, from Kandahar, Afghanistan. The FBI reviewed them for any imminent threat information. The FBI examined the binder for latent fingerprints, but did not translate any of the documents in the binder. [Doc. 1061, p. 9-54.] Tom Langston, a CIA officer, worked in Afghanistan collecting intelligence in support of military operations. He testified that an individual brought him the blue binder, telling Langston that he discovered it in an office that was formerly used by Arabs. This individual was affiliated with a tribal network that was cooperating with the United States against the Taliban. [Id. at 58, 67.] Peter Carlson, Assistant Special Agent in charge of the Miami, Florida field office for the United States Department of State’s Diplomatic Security Service, testified that he issued visas and passports and assisted United States citizens who traveled abroad. [Id at 85.] He identified a certified copy of Padilla’s passport application that he received from Washington, D.C., copies of Padilla’s social security card and driver’s license, and a certified copy of a passport application that Padilla made in February 2001 in Karachi, Pakistan. [Id. at 101;- Gov’t Ex. 408, 408A, 408D, 409.] Carlson also identified a photocopy of the signature page and face page of Padilla’s allegedly lost 1996 passport. [Id; Gov’t Ex. 409A.] John Morgan, a fingerprint specialist, compared the prints from the blue binder with the FBI’s print card containing Padilla’s prints. [Doc. 1098, p. 22.] He identified Padilla’s prints on the front and back of a “mujahideen identification form,” which was in the blue binder. [Id at 35.] An FBI language analyst and interpreter, Nancy Khouri, translated the documents in the blue binder, 403TR-A through 403TR-E, from Arabic to English. She testified that the identification form had “Top Secret” on the bottom of it, and the applicant noted on the form that “Abu al-Fida” recommended him. [Id. at 148-49.] The applicant also noted that he had traveled to Egypt for study, Saudi Arabia for hajj (pilgrimage), and Yemen for jihad.. [M] The applicant answered some questions in Arabic, stated that his country was the United States, and gave his date of birth as 10/18/70, which was the same as the birth date on Padilla’s passport. . [Id at 144,148.] The government then presented evidence from FBI language specialists and agents identifying numerous exhibits containing translated summaries of intercepted phone calls. One language specialist testified that he reviewed verbatim transcripts of the calls and made verbatim translations. [Doc. 1099, p. 61.] When he drafted the summaries, he listened to the calls while he read the translations to ensure a proper and accurate summary. [Id. at 80.] FBI Agent Kent Hukill testified that Hassoun was the subject of an intelligence investigation that Hukill, along with other agents, began in May 2002. [Doc. 1110, p. 77.] The agents reviewed the audio summaries and identified the other defendants as part of the investigation. [Id. at 90-91.] Agent Hukill interviewed Hassoun numerous times and identified his voice on the recordings. [Id. at 106.] He testified that the agents used verbatim transcripts of the pertinent call summaries, which numbered 700 out of 150,000 total calls. [Id. at 124.] He acknowledged that Padilla’s voice was identified in only seven of the calls. [7d at 162.] Another government witness, Yahya Abrahim Goba, testified that he attended an al-Qaeda camp for the purpose of preparing for jihad, which he defined as military fighting. [Doc. 1383, p. 52.] When he obtained a visa from the Pakistani Consulate en route to training camp, Goba told the personnel that he was going to Afghanistan for “tourism.” [Id. at 61.] Goba stated that an individual who wanted to attend camp had to have a known and trusted al-Qaeda contact recommend him. [Id. at 59.] Goba explained that the camp participants stopped at “guest houses” in Pakistan that were managed by the Taliban and used for new recruits. Guards armed with AK-47 machine guns were at the guest houses. [Id. at 72.] When a participant arrived at the guest house, he relinquished his passport and other personal belongings to a trustee and filled out paperwork using an alias. [Id. at 79-82.] Goba stated that a recruit participated in basic training at the camps, which included war tactics, topography, and instruction with firearms and explosives such as hand grenades, land mines and Molotov cocktails. [Id. at 98.] Goba emphasized that no humanitarian work occurred at the guest houses, and the recruits all practiced military jihad at the camp. [Id. at 195, 202.] Other FBI language specialists testified regarding the translations of the intercepted telephone calls. [Doc. 1111.] Fady Haydar stated that in numerous calls, individuals referred to Padilla as “Ibrahim,” “Abu Abdullah,” or the “Spanish Brother.” [Id. at 56.] Baria Dagher commented that Hassoun and Jayyousi were the primary participants in the intercepted calls he translated, and Joyce Kandalaft stated that she recognized the voices of Hassoun, Jayyousi, Kassem Daher, and Mohammad Youssef on the calls, and she noted that the individuals often used nicknames. [Id. at 160.] The government admitted the audiotapes through FBI Agent Russell Fincher, a counter-terrorism agent who listened to numerous audio tapes and read transcripts while listening to the tapes. Agent Fincher also interviewed Padilla at the Chicago O’Hare airport on May 8, 2002. [Doc. 1100, p. 44-94.] The district court admitted the tapes and transcripts over the defendants’ authentication and relevancy objections. [Id. at 154.] The government also presented the testimony of two individuals who met some of the defendants at a mosque. Herbert At-well testified that he attended a mosque in South Florida where he met Hassoun and Padilla. [Doc. 1114, p. 6-48.] Atwell stated that Hassoun would invite people in the mosque to be mujahideen fighters, but that Hassoun was not recruiting people to be terrorist fighters. [Id. at 25.] Atwell understood that the mujahideen fight in wars for the cause of Islam. [Id. at 43.] Jeremy Collins testified that he met Jayyousi at a mosque in California, and after becoming friends with Jayyousi, learned that he was publishing a newsletter, “The Islam Report.” [Id. at 49.] Collins stated that Jayyousi was particularly concerned about the Blind Sheikh, who was convicted of conspiring to blow up the World Trade Center, and solicited funds for his defense. [Id. at 64.] Collins also met Mohamed Zaky at the' California mosque and learned that Zaky was forming an organization called “Save Bosnia Now,” which he later renamed “American Worldwide Relief’ (“AWR”), and this group worked with the American Islamic Group. Collins performed several duties for AWR — he paid bills, deposited checks, purchased medicine to send to Chechnya, sent sleeping bags and shoes to Chechnya on behalf of AWR, and purchased minutes for satellite phones AWR sent to Chechnya. [Id. at 70-77.] Later, AWR learned that the satellite phones had been disconnected. AWR also sent hand-held walkie-talkies to Chechnya. Jayyousi was President of AWR and made the decisions about where the organization sent its aid. [Id. at 83, 111, 120]. Collins stated that at some point he became concerned that AWR might be involved in more than humanitarian aid to the Chechen refugees. [Id. at 88.] Collins began to distance himself from AWR because the organization’s work “seemed to be more fighting than relief work.” [Doc. 1115, p. 81.] A. FBI Agent John Kavanaugh’s testimony Over the defendants’ objections, the government presented the lay opinion testimony of FBI Agent John Kavanaugh, who began working on the present case in May 2002. [Doc. 1116, 1117, 1118, 1119, 1123, 1120, 1121, 1140, 1141, 1393.] Agent Kavanaugh reviewed the telephone intercepts, the summaries for the intercepts, financial records, interview summations, faxes, and other documents pertaining to the case. Based on the present investigation and his participation in over 20 terrorist-related cases, he remarked that the people who were involved in terrorism-related cases used code words in their communications. [Doc. 1116, p. 90-91.] In reviewing the intercepted calls in this case, Agent Kavanaugh noticed the use of code words such' as “football” and “soccer” for jihad; “tourism” for jihad; “tourist” for mujahideen; “sneakers” for support; “going on the picnic” for travel to jihad; “married” for. martyrdom; “trade” for jihad; “open up a market” for opening a group in support of jihad; open up a “branch” for starting a jihad support group; “the first area” for Afghanistan; “school over there to teach football” for a place to train in jihad; “students” for Taliban; “iron” for weapon; “joint venture” for a‘ group of mujahideen; “full sponsorship” for income for room and board (at training camp); and “open the door” for opportunity to go to jihad. [Doc. 1116, p. 91, 141, 161; Doc. 1117, p. 21-61, 100, 105; Doc. 1118, p. 20-126.] Agent Kavanaugh stated that he knew the speakers were using code words because on some occasions they said they were, and at other times he could detect the speakers were using code words by the context of the conversations. [Doc. 1116, p. 90-91.] The agent mentioned that the FBI did summarize a few of the satellite calls, but they were not produced in full transcript form. [Doc. 1121, p. 19.] He testified that the satellite phones were' purchased through the AWR organization. Agent Kavanaugh testified that the defendants were also secretive in their communications. The speakers on the intercepted calls mentioned that they were not to discuss any “relief’ matters over the phone [Id. at 99.]; that they knew the lines were always monitored [Id. at 105.]; and that they did not like to “name names or areas” during phone conversations. [Doc. 1141, p. 131-33.] Jayyousi mentioned in one of the intercepted calls, that “all these calls are recorded.” [Doc. 1141, p. 146.] Agent Kavanaugh stated that it was not unusual, for these individuals to use nicknames in their intercepted communications. . In one call, Youssef referred to Hassoun by his nickname, Abu Sayyaf. [Doc. 1118, p. 20, 28-29.] In a call between Hassoun and Youssef, Hassoun stated that they were sending the “Spanish Brother” — Padilla—to Kosovo, where Youssef was participating with Kosovar Muslims in a fight with the Serbian government. [Doc. 1118, p. 33-85.] In another call between Hassoun, Youssef, and an unidentified male, they referred to Padilla as “the Puerto Rican” because of his Puerto Rican descent. [Doc. 1118, p. 81.] Defendants also referred to Padilla by other names, such as “Ibrahim” and “Ukasha.” [Doc. 1116, p. 167; Doc. 1117, p. 33; Doc. 1118, p. 35, 37, 81-82; Doc. 1119, p. 33; Doc. 1123, p. 85.] Agent Kavanaugh testified about Hassoun, Youssef, and Padilla’s plans for Padilla to travel to Kosovo. [Doc. 1118, Gov’t Ex. 107TRJ They discussed Padilla’s visit with the Blind Sheikh. [Doc. 1116, p. 167.] In a call between Hassoun and Youssef, Youssef mentioned his “partner,” Padilla, in their discussions about travel arrangements to Afghanistan. [Doc. 1117, p. 31-33 (Youssef mentions to Hassoun that Ibrahim will be in agreement to join Youssef).] In another call between Hassoun, Padilla, and others, Padilla stated that an individual needed discipline and obedience to participate in a jihad. [Doc. 1117, p. 105; Gov’t Ex. 81TRJ The agent also mentioned several intercepted calls discussing Padilla’s travel to Egypt. While Youssef was in Egypt, Hassoun discussed with another individual who attended the South Florida mosque that he was getting together some money for Padilla to travel to Egypt. [Doc. 1118, p. 75-76.] Several months later Padilla traveled to Egypt, where he and Hassoun discussed Padilla’s finances. [Id. at 95-125.] In October 1998, Hassoun conversed with Youssef, who was in Egypt, and an unidentified male, and in response to Hassoun’s inquiry about the Puerto Rican, Youssef responded that Padilla was happy; he was next to him in the building. [Id. at 80-81; Gov’t Ex. 110TR.] During this October call, Hassoun and Youssef discussed finances, particularly Padilla’s monthly expenses. [Id. at 83.] During this same call, Hassoun referenced other people traveling from the United States to Egypt because they “have established the groundwork through Ibrahim.” [Id. at 84.] Furthermore, while Padilla was still in Egypt, he spoke with Hassoun about finances again and asked Hassoun to send him some money. Hassoun told Padilla that he would send him “one grand.” [Id. at 103.] In a later call, Padilla mentioned to Hassoun that he asked a sister (it was unclear from the record exactly who Padilla asked to assist him) to tell his mother to send him an Army jacket, book bag, and sleeping bag so he would be ready when “the door opened.” [Id. at 108-14.] Also during this time, in October 1999, Hassoun and Padilla conversed about the lack of information Padilla was receiving in Egypt- [Id. at 123; Gov’t Ex. 116TR.] Agent Kavanaugh stated that the information to which Padilla referred regarded the occurrence of jihads. [Id. at 126-130.] Hassoun told Padilla to prepare financially so he could be ready to move to “some area close by.” [7d] Later in the conversation, they discussed whether Padilla would travel to Yemen. Padilla told Hassoun that he did not know if the brothers were good or whether he needed a recommendation to connect him with the “good brothers with the right faith.” [Id. at 134.] Agent Kavanaugh opined that he understood the good brothers to be people who shared the same view of Islam as Padilla did. [Id. at 135.] In a September 2000 call between Hassoun, Youssef, and an unidentified female, Youssef mentioned that he would be over at “[0]sama’s,” and Padilla was expected to be there. [Doc. 1119, p. 33, 44; Gov’t Ex. 403TR (English translation of Arabic mujahideen data form dated July 24, 2000).] Agent Kavanaugh understood this to be a reference to Osama bin Laden. [Id] In another call, Youssef told Hassoun and another individual that he traveled to Azerbaijan, near Chechnya, and Padilla went to Al Muqbil, Yemen. [Id. at 87-88.] Padilla told Hassoun that he performed the jihad and met some brothers from Yemen. [Doc. 1121, p. 170-172.] Agent Kavanaugh testified that the defendants referenced other terrorist groups and leaders in their conversations. [Doc. 1116.] Hassoun mentioned Sheikh Abu Azzam, leader of MAK. [Id. at 145.] In one call, Youssef mentioned to Jayyousi that he and Padilla wanted to visit the Blind Sheikh (Islamic Group of Egypt). [Doc. 1116, p. 167.] Hassoun and Youssef discussed Dr. Ayman al-Zawahiri and Abu Fayez (“Mohammad Chehade”), the leader of the Global Relief Foundation. [Doc. 1118, p. 20.] Agent Kavanaugh also testified about a fax that Hassoun received that contained two documents. [Doc. 1117, p. 78; Gov’t Ex. 212FT.] One of the documents was a letter about an issue in Ogaden, Ethiopia, and the second one was a communique involving Libya. The letter mentioned the killing of 200 infidels, which referenced the number of Ethiopian soldiers who were killed by the Muslim brothers. In a call regarding the fax, Hassoun told Youssef that 56 of the brothers were “married there,” which indicated that they were martyred during the fighting. [Doc. 1117, p. 73; Gov’t Ex. 212FT.] Hassoun also stated that the Ethiopian army moved in with tanks and armored vehicles and the brothers launched a counterattack and drove them away. [Id. at 76.] Hassoun mentioned that there were heavy casualties, and that the “dogs” were helping the Ethiopian Army. [/&] Agent Kavanaugh opined that he understood the reference to the dogs as being a reference to the United States government. [Id. at 77.] Agent Kavanaugh interpreted a call between Hassoun, Kassem Daher, and another individual, in which Hassoun stated that “they [were] playing football in Somalia” and they needed to send “sneakers” over there. [Doc. 1117, p. 102-03 (stating that Hassoun meant jihad and support for jihad).] In a lengthy call in August 1998, Youssef called Hassoun from Egypt to inform Hassoun that the “joint venture” they had formed resulted in the loss of 70. [Doc. 1118, p. 58.] Hassoun responded that “70 got married completely.” [7d] Youssef then talked about the various groups he encountered in Kosovo and told Hassoun that they thought of joining brothers in another town, but by the time they wanted to join the “club,” it was being shelled heavily by the enemy. [Id. at 64.] Hassoun asked Youssef if they had “balls and clothes and everything, sports equipment?” [Id. at 65.] Agent Kavanaugh opined that these words indicated weaponry. [Id.] Agent Kavanaugh identified banking records associated with Hassoun. [Doc. 1117, p. 103, Gov’t Ex. 600A-E.] One of the checks, dated 1/31/97, was addressed to Kassem Daher for the amount of $2,000 and the word “Somalia” was written on the reference line. The check was written five days after a phone call in which Hassoun discussed playing football in Somalia. [Id. at 104-05.] Agent Kavanaugh identified a cashier’s check written by Hassoun for $5,000 to Mohammad Hisham Sayefedeen, part of Youssef s full name, that appeared in wiretap intercepts and Youssefs passport. [Id. at 137-38, Gov’t Ex. 413.] The government introduced a deposit slip for $5,000 in the name of Hassoun. [Id. at 140, Gov’t Ex. 600D.] The agent identified a financial document involving a wire transfer from Hassoun to Mohammad His-ham Youssef. [Id. at 141, Gov’t Ex. 601.] The government presented Hassoun’s credit card statement for June/July 1998, and the agent identified the $5,242 transaction as the amount for the wire transfer reflected in government’s exhibit 413. [Id. at 143-44, Gov’t Ex. 602.] The agent also identified several other checks from Hassoun. [Doc. 1141, p. 36-91.] There were two checks from Hassoun to Global Relief Foundation — each in the amount of $2,500 — with one check containing the words “tourism” and “Chechen information” on the memo line, along with a quote from the Koran. Defendants elicited from Agent Kavanaugh the fact that Padilla was involved in very few phone calls; that Padilla did not use code words in his conversations [Doc. 1121, p. 58-172.]; and that Hassoun and Jayyousi used similar phrases when they discussed charitable relief work. [Doc. 1119, p. 88; Doc. 1123; Doc. 1120; Doc. 1121, Doc. 1140.] Agent Kavanaugh acknowledged that the government did not intercept any calls between Padilla and Youssef. [Doc. 1121, p. 58-172.] Defendants questioned Agent Kavanaugh about many calls involving the defendants’ relief work to show the jury that they lacked the intent necessary to commit the charged crimes. [Doc. 1140, p. 53.] B. Dr. Rohan Gunaratna’s testimony The government also presented historical background information about conflict zones and key figures in the violent Islamic movement through the testimony of Dr. Rohan Gunaratna, the head of the International Center for Political Violence and Terrorism Research in Asia. Dr. Gunaratna testified about the characteristics of the support cells upon which the violent Islamic movement relies. [Doc. 1393, p. 114-184; Doc. 1137; Doc. 1138; Doc. 1139; Doc. 1136, Doc. 1394; Doc. 1157; Doc. 1158.] Dr. Gunaratna had studied the fields of terrorism and political religious violence for about twenty-five years and had been a teaching fellow at the U.S. Military Academy and at the Fletcher School for Law and Diplomacy at the Egyptian Center for Counter Terrorism Studies. He testified that the International Center manages one of the largest terrorism databases in the world, and it creates counter-terrorism research centers in conflict zones such as Kabul, Afghanistan, and Pakistan. He explained that the International Center works with a number of governments and countries around the world to create environments that hinder terrorist support. Dr. Gunaratna testified that he had a special focus on Islamic organizations from 1993 to 1996, particularly organizations advocating jihad. He authored ten books, one entitled “Inside Al-Qaeda,” and he had been an expert witness in terrorism cases for both the prosecution and the defense. While conducting his research into al-Qaeda, he interviewed members of Islamist radical groups, spoke to academicians, and traveled to countries where radical Islamist violence occurred, such as Pakistan and Iraq. The district court admitted him as an expert in the area of al-Qaeda and its associated groups and in the area of international terrorism. [Doc. 1393, p. 134.] Dr. Gunaratna provided background information on al-Qaeda and Osama bin Laden, a Saudi who moved to Pakistan and founded al-Qaeda, an organization committed to establishing Islamic states based on Islamic law. Islamic law is historically opposed to the political process and to democratic regimes. [Doc. 1393, p. 135— 39.] Abdullah Azzam helped found the predecessor of al-Qaeda, and he was a key ideologue of the jihadist movement. [let] Abdullah Azzam consistently campaigned for the creation of Sharia-based Islamic states (states governed by strict imposition of Islamic laws), and had no problem with using force to achieve his political objectives. When he used the word “jihad,” he meant the use of violence. [Id.] Abdullah Azzam and bin Laden created MAK, an organization to recruit and assist fighters coming to Afghanistan. In November 1989, Abdullah Azzam was killed, and bin Laden took control of MAK and created al-Qaeda to work with MAK to support different jihadist groups which were fighting globally. Al-Qaeda had a military training camp on the Afghanistan/Pakistan border. [Id. at p. 144-55.] Dr. Gunaratna testified that al-Qaeda established and managed the Advice and Reformation Committee to distribute propaganda. This committee had an office in the United Kingdom, and Khalid al-Fawwaz served as the leader. Dr. Gunaratna acknowledged that Jayyousi received a fax from this committee, informing Jayyousi that al-Fawwaz had been appointed as bin Laden’s representative to operate in that region. He acknowledged that this publication, which Jayyousi received via fax, was sent to a specific group of people. [Id. at 158-63.] He stated that al-Qaeda had relationships with other radical Islamist groups outside of Afghanistan, and it provided support for these like-minded groups. [Id. at 169-70.] Dr. Gunaratna also provided information regarding the support cells that provide assistance to terrorist and militant organizations. He stated that the support cells provide funds, transportation, safe houses, communications, training, and recruitment. He explained that these cells operate through “front” organizations, such as community, religious, humanitarian, and educational charities. [Id. at 173-80.] He also testified that in his research, he learned that members of these support cells and groups use code words and double talk in their communications by substituting key words likely to draw suspicion with more common verbiage. [Id. at 181.] In reviewing the telephone intercepts in this case, Dr. Gunaratna opined that the defendants used code words in some of their communications. When they used the word “tourism,” that meant armed jihad; the word “football and/or soccer” meant fighting or combat; the phrase “to be married” referred to going to paradise or martyrdom; the phrase “first area” meant Pakistan or Afghanistan; the word “screws” meant bullets; the word “eggplant” meant a rocket propelled grenade launcher; and other words denoting fruits and vegetables were used as codes for arms. [Doc. 1137, p. 11-15.] He noted that many of these words were in other transcripts that he reviewed between radical Islamist groups and their supporters. [Id. at 12.] His interpretation of the code words’ meanings was similar to Agent Kavanaugh’s testimony, except that Dr. Gunaratna opined that when the defendants used the word jihad, they meant the violent or armed jihad, whereas the agent did not specify if the word jihad meant violent or peaceful jihad. Dr. Gunaratna testified that during a phone call, Hassoun referenced bin Laden by his nickname, “Abu Abdallah,” which was known only by his supporters. [M at 27.] In a later call, Jayyousi mentioned bin Laden’s mentor, Sheikh Salman, and mentioned a CNN interview with bin Laden that showed the radical Islamic violence in Somalia during that time period. Both Hassoun and Jayyousi discussed a statement or “fatwa” (a religious opinion usually issued by established religious leaders but also issued by radical leaders) that threatened America. Dr. Gunaratna opined that this fatwa the defendants discussed was “very likely” the same fatwa issued by bin Laden in August 1996. [Id. at 52-53.] In that same call, Jayyousi mentioned Armed Islamic Group, which was one of the most violent groups and wanted to establish an Islamic state in Algeria. [Id. at 58.] In commenting on a statement by Hassoun that MAK can deal with “these people” by “the sword,” Dr. Gunaratna testified that “these people” meant the people in the White House, and by “the sword” was a term commonly used by the MAK leader and radical Islamists. [Id. at 72.] The government presented other calls in which the defendants discussed the Chechen conflict. Dr. Gunaratna explained that the Chechens were Muslims who lived in Russia and were attempting to separate from Russia. [Id. at 94-132.] At some point, the Arab mujahideen assisted the Chechen separatists, and Ibham Omar al Khattab — together with bin Laden and Fat’hi Shishani, leader of the International Islamic Brigade — fought with the Afghans against the Soviets. Shishani’s group was violent and wanted to create Islamic states wherever Muslims lived; this group was an extension of al-Qaeda. [Id. at 104-06.] Dr. Gunaratna testified that the foreign mujahideen fighters in Chechnya engaged in a lot of violence; killings, suicide attacks, and martyrdom were common. [Id. at 108.] He stated that al-Qaeda provided financial support directly to the fighters in the Chechen conflict. [Id. at 117.] Dr. Gunaratna also commented on calls between some of the defendants in which they discussed the success of the Chechen conflict, evidenced by the fact that the Russian flag was no longer flying over the Chechen capital of Grozny. They also discussed the provision of funds to the Chechen separatists. [Id. at 111-22.] Dr. Gunaratna described the conflict in the Muslim area of Kosovo, Yugoslavia that occurred in the 1990s. [Id. at 143.] Foreign mujahideen assisted in this conflict, later establishing a presence in bordering Albania. Al-Qaeda provided financial and other support to these fighters in Kosovo. The Kosovar people opposed these fighters because the people perceived them as too violent. Dr. Gunaratna commented on a call in which Youssef informed Hassoun that he was in Albania, which was the launching pad for the Arab mujahideen to enter Kosovo. [Id. at 149.] Dr. Gunaratna testified that al-Qaeda’s most significant number of training camps was in Afghanistan, and their purpose was to train people to participate in violence. [Doc. 1139, p. 7.] “Al-Qaeda’s premier facility for providing training in the 1990’s was the al-Frooq camp” near Kandahar. [Id. at 10.] He commented on the secrecy of the training camps and the necessity of having an individual recommend you for training, especially for American Muslims. He stated that al-Qaeda kept records on the people who attended the training camps, and the attendees had to complete a mujahideen application form. He noted that a number of these forms were discovered from various Arab safe houses and training camps. [Id. at 19-30.] He testified that a new recruit could not provide his real name on the identification form. [Id. at 31.] The government questioned Dr. Gunaratna regarding other intercepted calls he reviewed. In one call, Hassoun identified himself with the Abu Muhjin group, and he discussed al-Ittihad al-Islami. Dr. Gunaratna stated that both of these groups are radical Islamic groups. [Doc. 1158, p. 145.] He also commented on several calls involving Jayyousi. In one call, Jayyousi referred to funds for preparations and referred to the “first area” — code for Afghanistan. [Id. at 146-47.] In another call, Jayyousi spoke to the Blind Sheikh and referred to Chechnya, saying that the government was an Islamic government, “but it is full of heresy.” Dr. Gunaratna noted that this statement was consistent with the view of establishing an Islamic state in Chechnya. [Id. at 168.] Jayyousi also referred to bin Laden in another call and discussed a fundraiser to collect money to send to Afghanistan. Jayyousi clarified that the brother of whom he spoke was Arab, not Afghani, which Dr. Gunaratna testified was an important distinction because the terrorist groups wanted to support primarily the Arab mujahideen. [Id. at 177-79.] On cross-examination, , defendants attacked Dr. Gunaratna’s credibility and his qualifications as an expert. [Doc. 1139, p. 71; Doc. 1136; Doc. 1394; Doc. 1157.] They did elicit from Dr. Gunaratna that he had not listed AWR and Save Bosnia Now as cover organizations for jihad terrorist groups; however, he did list the Islamic Group of Egypt as one. [Doc. 1157, p. 96.] He acknowledged that in the intercepted calls he reviewed involving Jayyousi, he discerned no code talk. [Id. at 113.] The government presented several other witnesses in its case-in-chief. A Department of Defense employee testified that he performed a personnel search on Padilla and discovered that Padilla did not serve in the military. [Doc. 1159, p. 21.] FBI Agent Russell Fincher testified that he interviewed Padilla at the Chicago O’Hare airport in 2002. [Id. at 90-101.] Fincher stated that Padilla acknowledged some of his travels, but was evasive regarding his overseas travel. Joyce Kandalaft, a contract linguist with the FBI, identified several documents: two checks .from Hassoun to the Canadian Islamic Association, one in the amount of $8,000 for “tourism” and another in the amount of $3,000 for “tourism” and ,“tourists”; a check from Hassoun to AWR in the amount of $5,000 “for the brothers”;, a check from Hassoun to Jayyousi for $600; several checks from Hassoun to Global Relief, one in the amount of $5,000 for “Kosovo,” one in the amount of $600 for “Kosovo support,” one with “Chechen tourism and media” and a Koranic verse on it, and one in the amount of $2,000 for “Afghan Relief.” [Doc. 1160, p. 7, Gov’t Ex. 600H-R.] The government also presented a portion of a CNN videotape of an interview with Osama bin Laden. [Doc. 1137, p. 32.] C. Defense case The defendants presented an expert in English/Arabie interpretation and translation to challenge the government’s evidence regarding the defendants’ use of code words. [Doc. 1200.] He testified that many of the alleged code words had other, more innocuous meanings than indicated by the government witnesses. He stated that a mujahid is someone who fights for a cause, either religious or political, or it can mean a person who provides a service for the infirm or for refugees. [Id. at 71, 97.] However, he acknowledged that most of the government’s translations were correct. [Id. at 127-28.] An Imán, a religious leader in the Muslim community, testified that he met Hassoun at a Florida mosque. [Doc. 1201.] He testified that the mosque was very involved in charity and “alms giving,” and the mosque collected money fór victimized Muslims in other countries. Hassoun asked him for permission to hold fundraisers in the mosque for projects in Bosnia, Kosovo, and Chechnya. The Iman testified that Hassoun did not recruit mujahideen fighters within the mosque. Hassoun presented the testimony of his father-in-law, who testified that he and Hassoun were joking when they spoke of belonging to Abu Muhjin. [Doc. 1203, p. 45-59.] The other defense witnesses were character witnesses, such as co-workers and people who participated in humanitarian relief efforts with some of the defendants. [Doc. 1246, 1204, 1205.] IV. DISCUSSION A. Admission of Agent Kavanaugh’s testimony Defendants challenge the district court’s admission of Agent Kavanaugh’s testimony under Federal Rule of Evidence 701, specifically arguing that the district court abused its discretion in allowing Agent Kavanaugh to testify regarding his interpretation of the meanings of alleged code words the defendants used in the telephone intercepts. They argue that the agent should not have been allowed to proffer his lay opinion because he was not present during all of the intercepted calls and he did not have a rationally based perception of what the individuals meant when they used the code words. We review the district court’s ruling regarding the admissibility of the agent’s lay testimony under Rule 701 for a clear abuse of discretion. See United States v. Myers, 972 F.2d 1566, 1576-77 (11th Cir.1992). Rule 701 allows a lay witness to offer opinions or inferences if they are “(a) rationally based on the perception of the witness, (b) helpful to a clear understanding of the witness’ testimony or the determination of a fact in issue, and (c) not based on scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge within the scope of Rule 702.” Fed.R.Evid. 701. Subsection “(a) is the familiar requirement of firsthand knowledge or observation” and the limitation in (b) is phrased in terms of requiring that the lay witness’s testimony be helpful in resolving issues. Id. advisory committee’s note. In the 2000 Amendments, Rule 701 was changed “to eliminate the risk that the reliability requirements set forth in Rule 702 will be evaded through the simple expedient of proffering an expert in lay witness clothing.” Id. advisory committee’s note. Agent Kavanaugh’s testimony was rationally based on his perception. While investigating this case for five years, Agent Kavanaugh read thousands of wiretap summaries plus hundreds of verbatim transcripts, as well as faxes, publications, and speeches. He listened to the intercepted calls in English and Arabic. At trial, defendants objected to Agent Kavanaugh’s opinion testimony because he did not personally observe or participate in the defendants’ conversations and based his testimony largely on documents admitted into evidence. We have never held that a lay witness must be a participant or observer of a conversation to provide testimony about the meaning of coded language used in the conversation. We have allowed a lay witness to base his opinion testimony on his examination of documents even when the witness was not involved in the activity about which he testified. We have held that the testimony of a financial analyst of the FBI who “simply reviewed and summarized over seven thousand financial documents,” was properly admitted under Rule 701 in United States v. Hamaker, 455 F.3d 1316, 1331-32 (11th Cir.2006). The financial analyst of the FBI in Hamaker “added and substracted numbers from a long catalogue of ... records, and then compared those numbers in a straightforward fashion.” Id. The testimony was “rationally based on the perception of the witness.” Id. at 1332 (quoting Fed.R.Evid. 701). We have also held that testimony of a lay witness in a prosecution for Medicare fraud was “based on ‘first hand knowledge or observation,’ ” United States v. Gold, 743 F.2d 800, 817 (11th Cir.1984) (quoting Fed. R.Evid. 701 advisory committee note), when it was “based on [the witness’s] own examination of ... store[ ] records,” id. Defendants rely on United States v. Cano, 289 F.3d 1354 (11th Cir.2002), to support their argument, but their reliance is misplaced. In Cano, a cocaine trafficking and money laundering case, the government proffered Case Agent Donnelly to testify regarding the “hieroglyphics” or symbols contained in a defendant’s phone book. Id. at 1360-61. ' The government did not proffer the agent as an expert. Id. at 1360. The agent “deciphered] the hieroglyphics — by correlating the ten digit telephone number of members of the conspiracy (obtained from the wiretaps) with the ten hieroglyphic symbols opposite their names in the phone book.” Id. at 1360-61. For the first time on appeal, the defendants objected, based on Rule 701(a), to Agent Donnelly’s testimony regarding his deciphering. We agreed with the defendants that the agent was prohibited from testifying about the meaning of a simple code that the jury could have deciphered easily based on evidence admitted at the trial, id. at 1363-64, but based on the overwhelming evidence of guilt, we concluded that the error did not affect the defendants’ substantial rights. Id. at 1364. In the present case, Agent Kavanaugh testified about the meanings of code words that he learned through his examination of voluminous documents during a five-year investigation. His testimony was more similar to the lay testimony held admissible in Hamaker and Gold than the testimony held inadmissible in Cano. Just as the testimony of the lay witnesses in Ha-maker and Gold was “rationally based,” Fed.R.Evid. 701(a), on their perception of business records, Agent Kavanaugh’s testimony was also based on a review of documents and “rationally based on [his] perception,” id. By contrast, Agent Donnelly “merely delivered a jury argument from the witness stand” when he drew “inferences ... based on facts already in evidence.” Cano, 289 F.3d at 1363. But Agent Kavanaugh had examined thousands of documents, many of which were not admitted into evidence. Agent Donnelly deciphered only a simple code, but Agent Kavanaugh’s familiarity with the investigation allowed him to perceive the meaning of coded language that the jury could not have readily discerned. We also reject the defendants’ argument that Agent Kavanaugh’s testimony was not “helpful to a clear understanding of the witness’ testimony or the determination of a fact in issue.” Fed.R.Evid. 701(b). We have held that a lay witness may provide interpretations of code words when the meaning of these words “[is] not ‘perfectly clear’ without [the witness’s] explanations.” United States v. Awan, 966 F.2d 1415, 1430-31 (11th Cir.1992) Agent Kavanaugh’s knowledge of the investigation enabled him to draw inferences about the meanings of code words that the jury could not have readily drawn. His testimony helped the jury understand better' the defendants’ conversations that related to their support of international terrorism because they “would likely be unfamiliar with the complexities” of terrorist activities. Id. at 1430. In his testimony he linked the defendants’ specific calls to checks, wire transfers, and other discrete acts of material support that put the code words into context. [Doc. 1120, p. 21.] The defendants also contend that the district court erred in allowing Agent Kavanaugh’s testimony under Rule 701(c). We disagree. In Hamaker, the financial analyst of the FBI testified as a lay witness even though “his expertise and the use of computer software may have made him more efficient at reviewing [the] records.” 455 F.3d at 1331-32. We permitted his testimony because he “did not testify ... based on his financial expertise, nor did he express any expert opinion.” Id. at 1331. See also United States v. Rollins, 544 F.3d 820, 832-33 (7th Cir. 2008) (holding that a law enforcement agent’s testimony was admissible under Rule 701(c), even though the agent had “years of experience as a law enforcement officer,” because “his understanding of the[ ] conversations came only as a result of the particular things he perceived from monitoring intercepted calls” and his testimony was based on his “perceptions derived from [that] particular case”), cert. denied, — U.S.-, 130 S.Ct. 3343, 176 L.Ed.2d 1236 (2010). The record confirms that Agent Kavanaugh based his testimony about the meaning of the code words on his experience from this particular investigation. He limited his testimony to what he learned during this particular investigation, and he testified that he interpreted code words based on their context [Doc. 1116,p. 90, 93.] The district court explained that “it appears as if this witness’s training and experience to opine on what certain things mean is the investigation of this case.” [Doc. 1116, p. 41.] The district court also limited the agent’s testimony to facts he learned in his investigation of the defendants. [Doc. 1119, p. 118 (“I want to make sure ... this witness’s answer ... is based upon things that he learned in the course of this investigation. That is how he was proffered to the Court as a 701 witness.”).] Therefore, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in allowing Agent Kavanaugh to testify regarding his interpretation of the defendants’ use of code words in the intercepts because the government satisfied the criteria under Rule 701. B. Sufficiency of the evidence Padilla challenges the sufficiency of the evidence on all three counts, and Jayyousi contends that the government did not present sufficient evidence to convict him on Count 3, the substantive 18 U.S.C. § 2339A material support offense based upon an underlying 18 U.S.C. § 956(a)(1) conspiracy. In reviewing challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence, we must accept all reasonable inferences that support the verdict and “affirm the conviction if a reasonable trier of fact could conclude that the evidence establishes guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” United States v. Mieres-Borges, 919 F.2d 652, 656 (11th Cir. 1990) (internal quotation marks omitted). When a reasonable trier of fact could find that the evidence established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, “[i]t is not necessary that the evidence exclude every reasonable hypothesis of innocence or be wholly inconsistent with every conclusion except that of guilt ... A jury is free to choose among the constructions of the evidence.” United States v. Calderon, 127 F.3d 1314, 1324 (11th Cir.1997) (quoting United States v. Hardy, 895 F.2d 1331, 1334 (11th Cir. 1990)). The record shows that the government presented evidence that the defendants formed a support cell linked to radical Islamists worldwide and conspired to send money, recruits, and equipment overseas to groups that the defendants knew used violence in their efforts to establish Islamic states. Agent Kavanaugh, who was in charge of the bulk of the investigation in this case, identified numerous conversations among the defendants discussing Padilla’s travels to countries where Muslims were victimized. The government presented Padilla’s mujahideen identification form that indicated his intent to attend a jihad training camp. The government’s expert testified to the secrecy of the training camps, and the requirement that a recruit, particularly an American Muslim, receive a recommendation from a reliable brother to attend the camp. He also acknowledged that al-Qaeda kept records on the recruits who attended the training camps and that the recruits did not provide their real names on the identification forms. Government witness Goba confirmed the expert’s testimony regarding the secrecy of the jihad training camps, the need for someone to recommend each recruit, and the purpose of the camp, which was to train individuals in weapons and war tactics for military jihad. The record provides sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to find that Padilla trained with al-Qaeda and shared his conspirators’ intent to support jihad violence overseas to establish Islamic states. The government presented evidence of numerous discussions between the conspirators regarding the various conflicts involving Muslims overseas. The evidence showed that Youssef, Hassoun, and Padilla began discussing attendance at al-Qaeda camps before Padilla left for Egypt in September 1998. [Doc. 1117, p. 28-35, 43-50; Gov’t Ex. 58TR.] In various calls, Youssef stated that he was ready to work with the refugees in Kosovo, and that he fought on the front lines in the Kosovar conflict. [Doc. 1117, p. 149-51; Doc. 1118, p. 35-37; Gov’t Ex. 97TR, 100TR.] Hassoun expressed his desire to send another recruit to Kosovo, and Youssef suggested Padilla. [Doc. 1117, p. 150-51.] Later, Hassoun told Youssef that he would send money with Padilla. [Doe. 1118, p. 35-37.] Further, Padilla was secretive about his plans to attend the training camp, instructing Hassoun not to tell Youssef any plans over the phone. [Doc. 1117, p.117-18; Gov’t Ex. 88TR.] The record also demonstrates that the conspirators did not intend for Padilla to remain in Egypt, but instead, they planned for him to prepare to leave Egypt for jihad at the first opportunity, [Doc. 1118, p. 105; Gov’t Ex. 113TR/114TR (Padilla telling Hassoun how to reach him in case the “door opens”).], and planned for Padilla to travel to the Chechen jihad after he received his training. While traveling to fight in Chechnya, Youssef told Hassoun that he would soon be with bin Laden and Khattab’s company, and when Hassoun asked about Padilla, Youssef stated that Padilla was traveling to the “area of [0]sa-ma [bin Laden].” [Doc. 1119, p. 44-46, 58-59; Doc. 1158, p. 153-56, Doc. 1393, p. 58-63; Gov’t Ex. 118TR, 119TR.] Another intercept further dispels Padilla’s contention regarding the sufficiency of the evidence. In October 2000, Hassoun asked Youssef if he would join “Abu Abdullah, the Puerto Rican” in Afghanistan, and Youssef responded that he had experience fighting on the front lines and did not need to hone his military skills. [Doc. 1119, p. 79-80; Gov’t Ex. 124TR.] Based on the above, we conclude that there is sufficient record evidence to support Padilla’s convictions on Counts 1 and 2. Padilla and Jayyousi both challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to convict, them on Count 3. In order to convict Padilla and Jayyousi under the substantive count, the government did not have to prove that Padilla and Jayyousi personally committed violent acts; rather, the government had to prove that these individuals knew that they were supporting mujahideen who engaged in murder, maiming, or kidnapping in order to establish Islamic states. The evidence supports the jury’s reasonable inference that Padilla and Jayyousi knew the training camps trained recruits in weaponry and war tactics and that they shared a common purpose to support violent jihad to regain the lands that were once under Islamic control [See, e.g., Gov’t Ex. 802, The Islam Report where Jayyousi wrote, “May Allah help the mujahideen topple these un-Islamic and illegal puppet regimes in our Muslim lands.”]. The record indicates Padilla provided himself as material support in the form of a recruit for jihad training; personal information on the mujahideen identification form matched Padilla’s personal information on his passport; the government expert identified Padilla’s fingerprints on the form; the government expert testified that the use of code words is a signature trait of a terrorism support cell; Jayyousi received a fax that had bin Laden’s signature on it [Gov’t. Ex. 200.]; Jayyousi oversaw the purchase of satellite phones, walkie talkies and encrypted radios to send to Chechnya to aid the Muslims in their armed conflict; Jayyousi told Mohamed Shishani that the donations for the radios (to assist in communication during fighting) did not come in time to prevent the killing of mujahideen by friendly fire; and Jayyousi acknowledged in a conversation that all their calls were recorded. We conclude that this evidence, along with other evidence presented by the government, was sufficient for a reasonable jury to conclude that Jayyousi and Padilla were guilty of providing material support or resources, knowing that these would be used in preparation for carrying out a conspiracy to murder, kidnap, or maim overseas. C. Admission of Dr. Gunaratna’s testimony Defendants argue on appeal that the district court erred in allowing Dr. Gunaratna to testify as an expert witness because his methodology was unreliable. Specifically, they claim that they were unable to verify his methods because he would not identify the interviewees upon whom he based his information due to confidentiality agreements he had signed with them. Furthermore, Dr. Gunaratna had to rely on translators during his communications with the interviewees, and defendants contend that this compromised the reliability of the information he gleaned from his interviews. They also contend that he was not qualified to testify about the use and importance of code words in communications among violent jihad supporters. “We review a trial court’s evidentiary rulings on the admission of expert witness testimony for abuse of discretion.” Toole v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 235 F.3d 1307,1312 (11th Cir.2000). Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence controls the admission of expert testimony. It provides: If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise, if (1) the testimony is based upon sufficient facts or data, (2) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods, and (3) the witness has applied the principles and methods reliably to the facts of the case. Fed.R.Evid. 702. In Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 592-95, 113 S.Ct. 2786, 2796-98, 125 L.Ed.2d 469 (1993), the Supreme Court stated that Rule 702 compels the district courts to perform the critical “gatekeeping” function concerning the admissibility of expert evidence. This function “inherently require[s] the trial court to conduct an exacting analysis” of the foundations of expert opinions to ensure they meet the standards for admissibility under Rule 702. McCorvey v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 298 F.3d 1253, 1257 (11th Cir.2002). In determining the admissibility of expert testimony under Rule 702, district courts must consider whether the expert can testify competently on the areas he intends to discuss, whether the expert’s methodology is sufficiently reliable, and whether the expert’s testimony, through the application of his scientific, technical, or specialized expertise, will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence. City of Tuscaloosa v. Harcros Chems., Inc., 158 F.3d 548, 562 (11th Cir.1998). Defendants filed a pre-trial Daubert motion, which the district court denied without holding a hearing. At trial, the district-court accepted Dr. Gunaratna as an expert in the areas of al-Qaeda and its associated groups and international terrorism. During their cross-examination, defendants objected to Dr. Gunaratna’s testimony because he based his opinion on confidential or classified information. [Doc. 1136, p. 42-50.] They also made a Sixth Amendment objection. [Id.] The government responded that the location where Dr. Gunaratna interviewed these individuals was irrelevant, and he would be breaching confidentiality agreements with governments if he revealed where he conducted the interviews and the identity of the people he interviewed. [Id. at 50-54.] The government also responded that Dr. Gunaratna based his identification of the al-Qaeda form from his viewing of similar documents, not from his interviews. [Id.] The district court noted that the defendants had been able to call into question Dr. Gunaratna’s credibility on cross. [Id. at 49.] Then, the district court sustained the objections on relevance grounds, finding that “the fact that he has maintained confidential relationships with other governments is not relevant to this, case.” [Id. at 54-55.] The defendants made no specific objection to Dr. Gunaratna’s testimony about the use of code words by violent Islamists. Therefore, because the defendants did not preserve this particular challenge to Dr. Gunaratna’s testimony regarding code words, we will address this challenge under the plain error doctrine. See United States v. Arias-Izquierdo, 449 F.3d 1168, 1185 n. 8 (11th Cir.2006) (noting that appellate court will remand on an issue not raised in the district court only if “there is (1) error, (2) that is plain, (3) that affects substantial rights, and ... (4) the error seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings”). We conclude from the record that the district court did not plainly err in allowing Dr. Gunaratna to testify regarding the use of code words by violent radical groups. Based on his specialized knowledge of Islamist radicals, Dr. Gunaratna was able to testify regarding their method of communication. Further, his testimony related to trial evidence, helped the jury understand the unique use of certain words in the intercepted calls, and countered defendants’ claim that these words did not have violent connotations. With regard to defendants’ objection to Dr. Gunaratna’s qualification as an expert, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in accepting him as an expert witness. A review of the record indicates that the defendants had broad latitude in their cross-examination, and the district court acknowledged that they had been able to call into question Dr. Gunaratna’s credibility during cross. Defendants challenged his undisclosed sources for his published works and thoroughly questioned him about his interviews with extremists. [Docs. 1139, 1136, 1394, 1157, 1158.] The district court properly determined that the defendants’ inability to obtain the location of Dr. Gunaratna’s interviews and the identities of the interviewees did not make Dr. Gunaratna’s methodology unreliable. Accordingly, we conclude that the district court’s admission of Dr. Gunaratna’s testimony was not “manifestly erroneous.” United States v. Douglas, 489 F.3d 1117, 1124 (11th, Cir. 2007) (quoting Quiet Tech. DC-8, Inc. v. Hurel-Dubois UK Ltd., 326 F.3d 1333, 1339-40 (11th Cir.2003)). D. Admissibility of televised interview of Osama bin Laden Defendants argue that the district court erred by admitting into evidence a portion of a 1997 CNN interview with Osama bin Laden. Jayyousi and Hassoun objected at trial to the video’s presentation based on Rule 401, arguing relevancy. Padilla objected based on Rule 403, arguing that it was prejudicial to him because there was no evidence he watched the interview or discussed the interv