Full opinion text
KING, Circuit Judge: Following their joint trial, a jury found Defendants-Appellants Mark Snarr and Edgar Garcia guilty of murdering Gabriel Rhone, a fellow inmate at the United States Penitentiary in Beaumont, Texas. After the jury unanimously recommended capital punishment for each defendant, the district court sentenced them to death. Defendants appeal their convictions and sentences. For the reasons that follow, we AFFIRM. I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND On January 21, 2009, a federal grand jury returned a one-count indictment against Mark Snarr and Edgar Garcia (“Defendants”), charging them with murdering Gabriel Rhone in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1111 and 2. The indictment provided notice of special findings for both Snarr and Garcia, and on February 9, 2009, the government filed notice of its intent to seek the death penalty against both defendants. The evidence adduced at trial showed that, on November 28, 2007, Rhone, Snarr, and Garcia were incarcerated at the federal penitentiary in Beaumont, Texas. That day, as prison guards escorted Snarr and Garcia from outdoor recreation areas to their respective cells, Defendants escaped from their handcuffs and produced handmade weapons known as “shanks.” Unaware that Garcia had a shank, and believing that Snarr was preparing to attack Garcia, correctional officer Dewight Baloney positioned himself between the two men, with his back toward Garcia. Garcia then stabbed Baloney in the back, as Snarr attacked him from the front. Defendants continued assaulting Baloney as he struggled to reach a secure location, ultimately stabbing him twenty-three times in approximately fifteen seconds. After Baloney escaped, Defendants turned their attention to correctional officer Josh McQueen. Snarr stabbed McQueen while demanding from him keys to the inmates’ cells. When McQueen refused to surrender his keys, Garcia stabbed him, at which point Snarr was able to rip McQueen’s keys from his duty belt. Defendants then ran down a corridor to Rhone’s cell. Snarr attempted for almost a full minute to unlock the cell door, while Garcia — who, according to one witness, appeared “to be taunting the inmates” in the cell with his shank — yelled either “I’m going to kill you,” or “We going to kill you.” When Defendants finally opened the door, Rhone fled from his cell and Defendants began stabbing him. One witness to the events testified that, in the midst of the attack, Defendants “were in a frenzy ... repeatedly stabbing [Rhone] over and over.” Despite officers’ commands that they stop, Defendants continued their assault on Rhone until they saw that officers were preparing to use riot control equipment to clear the area. As Defendants retreated, one of them yelled, “That’s how you get your enemy,” and Snarr exclaimed, “Dude disrespected us, and that’s what he got.” Only then were officers able to attend to Rhone, who by that time already appeared to be dead. Prison officials attempted to resuscitate him, but shortly after the attack, Rhone was pronounced dead at a Beaumont hospital. An autopsy revealed that he had sustained fifty stab wounds: eighteen to the front of his body, and thirty-two to the back. The cause of Rhone’s death was listed as “multiple stab wounds of the heart, lung, and liver,” with the injury to his heart being the fatal wound. On May 7, 2010, jurors deliberated for just over one hour before returning guilty verdicts against both Snarr and Garcia for Rhone’s murder. During the eligibility phase of the trial, the government submitted several statutory aggravating factors to establish Defendants’ eligibility for the death penalty. These included, for both defendants, that the offense had been committed: (1) “in an especially heinous, cruel, or depraved manner in that it involved torture or serious physical abuse to the victim,” and (2) “after substantial planning and premeditation to cause the death of a person.” 18 U.S.C. § 3592(c)(6), (9). To substantiate these factors, the government introduced a number of exhibits and presented several witnesses over a two-day period. On May 12, 2010, the jury unanimously concluded that Defendants were eligible for the death penalty. That same day, the district court began the selection phase of Defendants’ trial. In support of its position that Defendants’ crime warranted the death penalty, the government alleged the existence of multiple non-statutory aggravating factors, including, as relevant here, that each defendant “poses a continuing and serious threat to the lives and safety of others because it is likely that he will commit criminal acts of violence in the future.” On May 21, 2010, the jury unanimously selected the death penalty for both Snarr and Garcia. The district court subsequently sentenced Defendants to death in accordance with the jury’s recommendation. Defendants now appeal their convictions and sentences. II. ANALYSIS On appeal, Defendants raise a host of challenges, which broadly may be characterized as follows: (1) given numerous errors committed during the jury selection process, Defendants were denied their constitutional rights to an impartial jury, due process, and equal protection; (2) the district court improperly denied Defendants’ request for a lesser-included-offense instruction; (3) the government presented insufficient evidence to support the jury’s conclusion regarding the applicability of three aggravating factors; (4) the district court abused its discretion in denying Defendants’ motion for severance; (5) the Federal Death Penalty Act (“FDPA”) is unconstitutional; (6) the district court improperly excluded character evidence related to the victim; (7) the district court abused its discretion in excluding Garcia’s “execution impact” evidence; and (8) this court’s chief judge denied Defendants due process by overruling the district court and issuing an order partially reducing and partially denying funds Garcia requested for the retention of certain investigators and experts. We consider each of these claims in turn. A. Jury Selection Challenges Defendants assign three errors to the district court in connection with the jury selection process. First, Defendants argue that the court improperly excluded for cause five prospective jurors who expressed reservations about imposing the death penalty. Second, Defendants contend that the court erred in dismissing a venire person who indicated that he had a physical infirmity that would impair his ability to render effective jury service. Finally, Defendants submit that the court improperly denied their for cause challenges to three prospective jurors. (1) Prospective Jurors Dismissed for Death Penalty Objections (a)Standard of Review A district court’s dismissal of a prospective juror for cause because of his or her views on capital punishment is reviewed for abuse of discretion. United States v. Bernard, 299 F.3d 467, 474 (5th Cir.2002). “Deference to the trial court is appropriate because it is in a position to assess the demeanor of the venire, and of the individuals who compose it, a factor of critical importance in assessing the attitude and qualifications of potential jurors.” Uttecht v. Brown, 551 U.S. 1, 9, 127 S.Ct. 2218, 167 L.Ed.2d 1014 (2007). We thus give “considerable deference” to a district court’s decision to dismiss a juror based on his or her opposition to the death penalty. United States v. Fields, 483 F.3d 313, 357 (5th Cir.2007). (b)Applicable Law In Witherspoon v. Illinois, the Supreme Court held that a capital defendant’s right to trial by an impartial jury is violated when a court universally excuses for cause all members of the venire who express conscientious objections to the death penalty. 391 U.S. 510, 521-22, 88 S.Ct. 1770, 20 L.Ed.2d 776 (1968). Nevertheless, “[a] court may excuse a prospec-five juror for cause because of his views on capital punishment if those views would prevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties as a juror in accordance with the instructions and oath.” United States v. Webster, 162 F.3d 308, 340 (5th Cir.1998) (citing Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 424, 105 S.Ct. 844, 83 L.Ed.2d 841 (1985)). A prospective juror, therefore, properly is dismissed if, regardless of the facts and circumstances of a case, he indicates that he personally could not impose the death penalty. See Fields, 483 F.3d at 357. Additionally, because “many veniremen simply cannot be asked enough questions to reach the point where their bias has been made ‘unmistakably clear,’ ” dismissal for cause is also appropriate if the court “is left with the definite impression that a prospective juror would be unable to faithfully and impartially apply the law.” Wainwright, 469 U.S. at 425-26, 105 S.Ct. 844. Accordingly, this court repeatedly has deemed proper a lower court’s dismissal for cause of a prospective juror who has wavered or given conflicting or ambiguous signals as to whether he or she could sentence a defendant to death. See, e.g., United States v. Jackson, 549 F.3d 963, 973 (5th Cir.2008); Ortiz v. Quarterman, 504 F.3d 492, 502-03 (5th Cir.2007); Bernard, 299 F.3d at 474-75; Webster, 162 F.3d at 340-41. (c)Discussion Here, each member of the venire submitted answers to a written questionnaire, after which he or she was questioned by both government and defense counsel. Defendants argue that the district court abused its discretion in dismissing for cause five prospective jurors who expressed reservations during this process about their ability to impose capital punishment. As discussed below, we disagree. The first venire person whose dismissal Defendants contest is prospective juror number three (“Lacy”). Although Defendants acknowledge that Lacy expressed conscientious scruples against the death penalty, they argue that when questioned by defense counsel, Lacy indicated that she would follow the law and would answer questions truthfully, even if that resulted in a death sentence. Defendants also emphasize that Lacy indicated that she would “follow the evidence” and was “not going to disregard it.” Even so, Lacy answered in the affirmative when asked whether her “personal feelings against the death penalty would always prevent [her] from voting for the death penalty.” Further, when asked if she thought her “feelings against the death penalty would substantially impair [her] or prevent [her] from ever voting for it regardless of what the evidence and the law instructed,” she replied that they would. The court observed Lacy’s demeanor and heard her testimony. That testimony revealed Lacy’s consistent opposition to the death penalty and her view that, because of that opposition, she was unable to affirm that she could faithfully follow her oath as a juror. Accordingly, the district court did not abuse its discretion in excusing her. See Jackson, 549 F.3d at 973. Next, Defendants submit that the court erred in dismissing prospective juror number sixty-six (“Stephenson”). In particular, Defendants contend that the sum of Stephenson’s testimony was that “she did not know how she felt” about the death penalty and that she “never said she could not impose it.” Defendants argue that Stephenson even stated that she could vote in favor of capital punishment “if the Holy Spirit was guiding her” to do so. In excusing her, however, the court emphasized that throughout her questionnaire, Stephenson had indicated that she was opposed to the death penalty, that she could not impose it, and that she “thought it was God’s job to put persons to death.” The court correctly explained that Stephenson never affirmed that she would be able to return a verdict of death if the facts and circumstances warranted it under the law. In light of Stephenson’s ambiguous responses during voir dire, and her “strange” demeanor, the district court was unable to ascertain whether—notwithstanding her opposition to the death penalty—she would be able “to faithfully and impartially apply the law.” Wainwright, 469 U.S. at 426, 105 S.Ct. 844. As such, the court did not abuse its discretion in excusing her. Defendants also allege that potential juror number 130 (“Kimball”) should not have been dismissed. Kimball previously had served on a jury that imposed the death penalty, which Defendants suggest supports their conclusion that Kimball could have fulfilled his duties impartially as a juror in this case. Defendants also note that Kimball indicated that he generally favored the death penalty, and he affirmed that he “would base a decision to impose it on the facts and the law in the case.” Nevertheless, on his questionnaire, Kim-ball expressed in response to three separate questions that he did not think he could impose the death penalty a second time. During individual voir dire, Kimball testified that he might not be able to vote for the death penalty even if it was called for “under the law and the facts.” He stated that imposing capital punishment in the first case for which he had served as a juror had bothered him “an awful lot,” and had caused him to experience nightmares wherein he would “see the defendant’s face.” When asked if he thought his “personal feelings would substantially impair [his] ability to go ahead and vote for the death penalty,” Kimball replied, “I’m not really sure.” Even under questioning by defense counsel, Kimball consistently indicated that he did not know whether he could impose the death penalty in a second case. Because Kimball was consistent as to the fact that his personal feelings about imposing the death penalty in this case prevented him from attesting that he would faithfully and impartially apply the law, the district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing Kimball for cause. See Bernard, 299 F.3d at 474-75. Defendants next maintain that the district court erred in excusing prospective juror number 140 (“Furby”). Although Defendants acknowledge that Furby expressed doubts about her ability to impose the death penalty, they stress that she also indicated that she “would follow [her] oath and follow the law.” Additionally, they note that Furby stated that she would not submit a “false answer” on verdict forms simply to avoid voting for the death penalty. Finally, Defendants emphasize that when asked whether she could follow her oath and vote for the death penalty if she “heard enough bad evidence from the government” to satisfy her that the death penalty was warranted, Furby stated that “I guess if I was put in that situation, yes.” Notwithstanding this statement, however, Furby repeatedly indicated that she did not know whether she could vote for the death penalty. Indeed, she stated that the “scariness” of capital punishment would impair her ability to vote “for the death penalty even if [she] felt like the facts justified that verdict.” When eventually asked directly whether she was “going to follow [her] oath or not” and impose the death penalty if it was warranted, she stated “I’m not going to.” In light of Furby’s vacillations as to whether she personally could impose capital punishment, and her explicit statement that her personal feelings would prevent her from following her oath, the district court did not abuse its discretion in granting the government’s motion to strike her for cause. See Wainwright, 469 U.S. at 425-26, 105 S.Ct. 844. Finally, Defendants assert that the district court erred in dismissing for cause prospective juror number two-hundred (“Blackmon”). During voir dire, Blackmon stated to defense counsel that she had a “religious problem” with imposing capital punishment unless the case involved a child or an act of domestic violence. This generally was consistent with her questionnaire, wherein Blackmon had noted that she was against capital punishment except in cases involving “killing a child, abusing a child, child molestation, [or] killing an elderly person.” Nevertheless, Defendants argue that Blackmon should not have been dismissed because she testified that she was willing to keep an open mind that there might be other cases that could warrant a death sentence. Further, Defendants also emphasize that, when questioned by defense counsel, Blackmon stated that she could vote for the death penalty if the government established the appropriateness of such a sentence. Despite this testimony, however, Black-mon stated that although she had “waffled” when answering defense counsel’s questions, she did not think she “could live with [herself] if’ she voted for the death penalty in this case. When government counsel asked if he would “ever have a chance of getting a death penalty verdict from” Blackmon in cases not involving victims she had listed on her questionnaire, she replied “[p]robably not.” Finally, Blackmon stated that she would not be able to follow her oath or the court’s instruction if it meant imposing capital punishment in this case. Given Blackmon’s position that she would not follow the oath to faithfully and impartially apply the law in this case, the district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing her. See Jackson, 549 F.3d at 973-74. (2) Prospective Juror Dismissed for a Physical Infirmity Defendants also raise a host of challenges to the district court’s dismissal of a prospective juror who indicated during voir dire that he had a physical infirmity that might have impeded his ability to render jury service. First, Defendants claim that the court’s action in excusing this venire person was contrary to the Jury Selection and Service Act. 28 U.S.C. § 1861, et seq. Second, Defendants submit that the court violated the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) by dismissing this juror. 42 U.S.C. § 12101, et seq. Finally, Defendants contend that excusing this juror violated their constitutional rights to equal protection and to have a venire drawn from a fair cross section of the community. (a) Standard of Review “Determinations as to the general qualifications of jurors are reviewed for abuse of discretion.” United States v. Whitfield, 590 F.3d 325, 360 (5th Cir.2009). As a question of law, the applicability of the ADA is reviewed de novo. See Jackson, 549 F.3d at 969. Defendants’ constitutional claims were not raised below and, as such, are reviewed only for plain error. See United States v. Goldfaden, 959 F.2d 1324, 1327-28 (5th Cir.1992). Plain error review “requires considerable deference to the district court.” United States v. Peltier, 505 F.3d 389, 391 (5th Cir.2007). (b) Prospective Juror Number 232 On his questionnaire, prospective juror number 232 (“Horton”) indicated that he took medications that caused him to use the restroom frequently. He testified that although he wished to serve as a juror, his health kept him from so doing. Horton first estimated that he needed to use the facilities roughly every sixty to ninety minutes, though he later indicated that he had done so five times during the two-and-a-half hour period he was at the courthouse. He further stated that his inability to use the restroom when needed “would be a distraction” and would impede his ability to concentrate on the proceedings. After the court informed Horton that, during trial, “it could be as much as two hours at a time without a break,” Horton was unable to assure the court that he could wait that long without using the facilities. He later stated that while he knew he might be required to sit for an hour or two and be “undisturbed about that ... that’s just not going to work for me.” The court finally asked Horton directly if he was asking to be excused, to which Horton replied in the affirmative. The court therefore dismissed him. (c) The Jury Selection and Service Act Defendants first imply that Horton’s dismissal violated the Jury Selection and Service Act, which sets forth the qualifications for jury service in federal courts. 28 U.S.C. § 1865. As relevant, a person is disqualified from service under the Act’s provisions if he is unable “by reason of mental or physical infirmity, to render satisfactory jury service.” Id. at § 1865(b)(4). “A court has broad discretion to determine whether to excuse a juror for cause” pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1865(b)(4). United States v. Solomon, 273 F.3d 1108, 2001 WL 1131955, at *3 (5th Cir.2001) (per curiam) (unpublished). In Solomon, for example, we affirmed the dismissal for cause of a prospective juror who suffered from an obsessive compulsive disorder. Id. When asked whether his condition would interfere with his ability to focus on the proceedings, the venire person in Solomon had responded that there was “no way to know,” although he believed that he would be able to focus “[m]ost of the time.” Id. In affirming the district court’s dismissal of the prospective juror, we stated that “[t]he court properly exercised its discretion in concluding that the prospective juror’s mental condition prevented him from rendering satisfactory service.” Id. Other courts agree as to the propriety of dismissing prospective jurors whose infirmities would interfere with their jury service. In United States v. Flores, for instance, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal for cause of a potential juror who suffered from attention deficit disorder (“ADD”). 572 F.3d 1254, 1261 (11th Cir.2009). The defendants there had argued “that the district court was required to inquire further into [the prospective juror’s] medical condition to determine the severity of her ADD.” Id. The court disagreed, explaining that because the trial was so lengthy, concerned multiple defendants, and involved numerous witnesses and exhibits, and because “ADD could interfere with a juror’s ability to pay attention,” “the district court acted within its sound discretion when it dismissed [the potential juror] for cause.” Id.; see also United States v. Powell, 444 Fed.Appx. 517, 519-20 (3d Cir.2011) (unpublished) (affirming a district court’s decision to grant a prospective juror’s request to be excused based on the individual’s hearing impairment). Defendants do not address this authority or attempt to distinguish it from their case. Instead, they appear to focus on 28 U.S.C. § 1865(b)(2), which states that an individual is disqualified from jury service if he “is unable to read, write, and understand the English language with a degree of proficiency sufficient to fill out satisfactorily the juror qualification form.” Defendants argue that “[i]t is apparent from [his] educational and work experience, as well as [his] interview!], that [Horton] could read, write and understand the English language with proficiency.” While this is true, Defendants’ argument neglects that in dismissing Horton for cause, the district court acted not under subsection two of 28 U.S.C. § 1865(b), but rather under subsection four. Pursuant to subsection four, it is proper for a court to dismiss prospective jurors based on their infirmities if those infirmities render them unable to perform satisfactory service. Id. at § 1865(b)(4). Here, as detailed, Horton indicated that his physical infirmity could interfere with his ability to concentrate on the proceedings. This testimony was especially troubling given that, as in Flores, the trial here was lengthy, concerned multiple defendants, and involved numerous witnesses and exhibits. Accordingly, the district court did not violate the Jury Selection and Service Act or otherwise abuse its discretion in excusing Horton. (d) The ADA Defendants also maintain that the district court violated the ADA in excusing Horton. based on his physical infirmity. Under the ADA, “no qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity.” 42 U.S.C. § 12132. The ADA, however, applies only to “public entities,” which the Act defines as “(A) any State or local government”; “(B) any department, agency, special purpose district, or other instrumentality of a State or States or local government”; and “(C) the National Railroad Passenger Corporation, and any commuter authority.” Id. at § 12131(1). As other courts have observed, “[n]oticeably absent from this definition is any mention of any agency or department of the federal government, other than the National Railroad Passenger Corporation.” Isle Royale Boaters Ass’n v. Norton, 154 F.Supp.2d 1098, 1135 (W.D.Mich.2001) (holding that plaintiffs could not sue the National Park Service, “a unit of the federal government, for discrimination under the ADA”); see also Calero-Cerezo v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 355 F.3d 6, 19 (1st Cir.2004) (“[T]he ADA applies to private employers with over 15 employees and state and local governments.”); Melton v. Freeland, Nos. 1:96CV516, 1:96CV517, 1997 WL 382054, at *1 (M.D.N.C. Feb. 6, 1997) (unpublished) (explaining that the ADA does not apply to federal courts because they are not public entities under the Act). Defendants point to no federal case in which the dismissal of a juror has been successfully challenged under the ADA, nor have we discovered such a case. We therefore reject Defendants’ claim that the district court violated the ADA in dismissing Horton due to his physical infirmity. (e) Defendants’ Constitutional Challenges Defendants next claim that by dismissing Horton, the district court abridged Defendants’ right to have a venire drawn from a fair cross section of the community—as guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment—-and violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. As noted earlier, because Defendants did not raise this claim below, they are entitled only to plain-error review. Under plain-error review, a defendant “must establish: (1) an error; (2) that is clear and obvious; and (3) that affected his substantial rights.” United States v. Hernandez-Martinez, 485 F.3d 270, 273 (5th Cir.2007). “If these conditions are met, this court can exercise its discretion to notice the forfeited error only if the error seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” Id. (citation omitted). (i) Applicable Law “The Sixth Amendment secures to criminal defendants the right to be tried by an impartial jury drawn from sources reflecting a fair cross section of the community.” Berghuis v. Smith, 559 U.S. 314, 130 S.Ct. 1382, 1388, 176 L.Ed.2d 249 (2010). To establish a prima facie violation of this right, a defendant must demonstrate: (1) that the group alleged to be excluded is a “distinctive” group in the community; (2) that the representation of this group in venires from which juries are selected is not fair and reasonable in relation to the number of such persons in the community; and (3) that this un-derrepresentation is due to systematic exclusion of the group in the jury-selection process. Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 364, 99 S.Ct. 664, 58 L.Ed.2d 579 (1979). Similarly, in Castaneda v. Partida, the Supreme Court delineated the general contours of an equal protection challenge to jury selection. 430 U.S. 482, 494, 97 S.Ct. 1272, 51 L.Ed.2d 498 (1977). There, the Court explained: The first step is to establish that the group is one that is a recognizable, distinct class.... Next, the degree of un-derrepresentation must be proved, by comparing the proportion of the group in the total population to the proportion called to serve as ... jurors, over a significant period of time.... Finally, ... a selection procedure that is susceptible of abuse ... supports the presumption of discrimination raised by the statistical showing. Id. (internal citations omitted); see also McGinnis v. Johnson, 181 F.3d 686, 691 (5th Cir.1999). Thus, to prevail under either theory, a defendant must demonstrate not only that the excluded persons are members of a distinctive class, but also that the class is disproportionally underrepresented due to procedures in the jury selection process that work to exclude class members. Duren provides a roadmap as to how a petitioner might make such a showing. There, the petitioner alleged a Sixth Amendment violation based on the lack of females in his jury pool. Duren, 439 U.S. at 360, 99 S.Ct. 664. In explaining that the petitioner had successfully demonstrated a prima facie violation, the Court first stated that prior precedent “without doubt established that women ‘are sufficiently numerous and distinct from men’ so that ‘if they are systematically eliminated from jury panels, the Sixth Amendment’s fair-cross-section requirement cannot be satisfied.’ ” Id. at 364, 99 S.Ct. 664 (quoting Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 531, 95 S.Ct. 692, 42 L.Ed.2d 690 (1975)). Next, the petitioner’s “statistical presentation” evidenced “a gross discrepancy between the percentage of women in jury venires and the percentage of women in the community.” Id. at 364, 366, 99 S.Ct. 664. Finally, to establish the systematic nature of that underrepresentation, the petitioner had pointed, inter alia, to provisions of Missouri’s law that granted women automatic exemptions from jury service. Id. at 366-67, 99 S.Ct. 664. Given the “statistics and other evidence” presented by the petitioner, the Court held that he had demonstrated a prima facie fair-cross-section violation. Id. at 366, 367, 99 S.Ct. 664. (ii) Analysis In contrast to the showing made in Duren, Defendants here have done nothing more than advance conclusory statements to the effect that “the exclusion from the venire panel of [Horton] established a prima facie violation of both the fair cross-section requirement of the Sixth Amendment and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.” Defendants provide no supporting authority for their assertion that individuals who need to urinate frequently are a “distinct” class. By extension, Defendants provide no statistical data as to the representation of this supposed class on venires, or in the community at large. They therefore fail to demonstrate any degree of underrepre-sentation of this group and, relatedly, advance no argument supporting their implicit assumption that the individuals in this group have been underrepresented due to their purposeful or systemic exclusion during the jury selection process. In sum, Defendants simply have not established error, plain or otherwise, in connection with the exclusion of Horton. (3) Denial of Defendants’ For Cause Challenges Defendants next assert that the district court erred in refusing to grant their challenges for cause to three prospective jurors, which they contend violated their right to an impartial jury. (a)Standard of Review “The appellate court reviews the district court’s ruling on jury impartiality for ‘manifest abuse of discretion.’ ” United States v. Wharton, 320 F.3d 526, 535 (5th Cir.2003) (quoting United States v. Munoz, 15 F.3d 395, 397 (5th Cir.1994)); see also Skilling v. United States, — U.S. -, 130 S.Ct. 2896, 2923, 177 L.Ed.2d 619 (2010) (“A trial court’s findings of juror impartiality may be overturned only for manifest error.”) (citation omitted). “In reviewing claims of this type, the deference due to district courts is at its pinnacle .... ” Skilling, 130 S.Ct. at 2923. (b)Applicable Law As noted above, the general “standard for determining when a venire member may be excluded for cause is whether the prospective ‘juror’s views would prevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties as a juror in accordance with his instructions and his oath.’ ” Soria v. Johnson, 207 F.3d 232, 242 (5th Cir.2000) (quoting Wainwright, 469 U.S. at 424, 105 S.Ct. 844). In addressing a claim that an empaneled jury was not impartial, however, the inquiry turns not on the district court’s alleged failure to remove for cause certain prospective jurors, but rather on whether the jurors who ultimately sat were impartial. Ross v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 81, 86, 108 S.Ct. 2273, 101 L.Ed.2d 80 (1988). In other words, “[a] district court’s erroneous refusal to grant a defendant’s challenge for cause is only grounds for reversal if the defendant establishes that the jury which actually sat to decide his guilt or innocence was not impartial.” Wharton, 320 F.3d at 535. The reasoning behind this approach is that peremptory challenges— which simply “are a means to achieve the end of an impartial jury”- — -often cure errors purportedly committed when trial courts refuse to grant challenges for cause. Ross, 487 U.S. at 88, 108 S.Ct. 2273. Because “peremptory challenges are not of constitutional dimension .... the fact that the defendant had to use a peremptory challenge to achieve [an impartial jury] does not mean the Sixth Amendment was violated.” Id. Indeed, the Supreme Court expressly has held that “a defendant’s exercise of peremptory challenges ... is not denied or impaired when the defendant chooses to use a peremptory challenge to remove a juror who should have been excused for cause.” United States v. Martinez-Salazar, 528 U.S. 304, 317, 120 S.Ct. 774, 145 L.Ed.2d 792 (2000). (c)Discussion Here, Defendants were entitled to twenty peremptory challenges. Fed. R.Crim.P. 24(b)(1). Because Defendants were scheduled to be tried jointly, the district court inquired of defense counsel prior to trial as to whether Defendants would require additional challenges. Ultimately, the court granted Defendants ten additional peremptory challenges for Defendants to divide as they wished. Following voir dire, Defendants moved for “one or more” additional peremptory challenges and urged the district court to reconsider its allegedly erroneous denial of Defendants’ challenge for cause to seven prospective jurors. Included in the group of venire members Defendants had unsuccessfully challenged for cause were prospective jurors 17, 132, and 184. Defendants argued that if they were not granted additional challenges, they would be forced to lodge peremptory challenges against these individuals, and therefore would be “unable to remove other objectionable jurors who were not necessarily disqualified as a matter of law but who were nonetheless unable to be fair and impartial jurors in the judgment of defendants.” Listed amongst the latter venire members was prospective juror number 129, who ultimately was empaneled. On appeal, Defendants essentially maintain that they were denied the right to an impartial jury because they could not exercise a peremptory challenge against prospective juror number 129, since they had partially exhausted their challenges on ve-nire persons 17, 132, and 184, whom they argue should have been dismissed for cause. (d) Defendants’ Argument Fails Under Wharton Although the parties vigorously disagree about whether prospective jurors 17, 132, and 184 should have been excused for cause, because Defendants ultimately exercised peremptory challenges to remove these venire persons, this disagreement is irrelevant under Wharton. There, a defendant appealed the lower court’s denial of his challenge for cause to a venire person the defendant claimed was biased. Wharton, 320 F.3d at 535. Although the defendant eventually had used a peremptory challenge to exclude the allegedly biased prospective juror, he argued on appeal that this precluded him from using the challenge to exclude from the jury another individual he otherwise would have challenged. Id. Relying on Martinez-Salazar, the Wharton court held that “[a] district court’s erroneous refusal to grant a defendant’s challenge for cause is only grounds for reversal if the defendant establishes that the jury which actually sat to decide his guilt or innocence was not impartial.” Id.; see also Martinez-Salazar, 528 U.S. at 307, 120 S.Ct. 774 (holding that if a defendant elects to cure the erroneous refusal to dismiss a potential juror for cause “by exercising a peremptory challenge, and is subsequently convicted by a jury on which no biased juror sat, he has not been deprived of any rule-based or constitutional right”). Because the defendant had not shown that the empaneled jury was biased, the Wharton court rejected the defendant’s argument. 320 F.3d at 536. Thus, even assuming that prospective jurors 17, 132, and 184 should have been dismissed for cause, Defendants still must establish that the seated jury was not impartial. On this score, Defendants point only to prospective juror 129 (“Godkin”), who eventually was selected for the jury. On her questionnaire, Godkin placed her feelings as to the propriety of the death penalty at seven on a ten-point scale (where one indicated that the prospective juror felt capital punishment was always improper). When probed about this, God-kin explained that she arrived at seven given her belief that “life is very precious” and that a “person who takes that life is responsible and should be punished.” She stated, however, that she could comply with the law and the judge’s instruction about imposing capital punishment, and she affirmed that she did not “have any problem with the fact that it is the government’s burden to prove the death penalty is justified.” Godkin also acknowledged that, depending on the circumstances of a case — including evidence as to any mitigating and aggravating factors — either the death penalty or a life sentence may be appropriate for “[pjlanned and deliberate murder.” Nevertheless, Defendants argue that had they not been required to exhaust their peremptory strikes on prospective jurors who purportedly should have been dismissed for cause, they would have used one on Godkin. Aside from her “leanings in favor of the death penalty,” Defendants also emphasize that Godkin had relatives in law enforcement and was acquainted with a crime victim and perpetrator. Defendants neglect, however, the incidental nature of these connections, and ignore that Godkin expressly testified that these experiences would not impact her ability to be fair and impartial. Indeed, Defendants admit that Godkin “was not subject to a challenge for cause.” Simply put, despite Defendants’ contention to the contrary, there is nothing in the record to suggest that Godkin was not impartial. Because Defendants point to no other evidence that the jury was not impartial, Wharton compels us to conclude that Defendants have not established that the district court erred in refusing to excuse for cause prospective jurors 17, 132, and 184. See 320 F.3d at 535-36. B. Lesser-Included-Offense Instruction At trial, the district court denied Defendants’ request for an instruction on second degree murder, manslaughter, and involuntary manslaughter as lesser included offenses of first degree murder. Defendants now appeal the denial of an instruction on second degree murder. (1) Standard of Review We review de novo the district court’s determination of whether a particular offense is a lesser included offense of a charged offense. United States v. Finley, 477 F.3d 250, 256 (5th Cir.2007). We review for abuse of discretion the lower court’s determination as to “whether a jury could rationally acquit on the greater offense yet convict on the lesser.” Id. (2) Applicable Law A defendant is only entitled to a lesser-included-offense instruction if “(1) the elements of the lesser offense are a subset of the elements of the charged offense and (2) the evidence at trial is such that a jury could rationally find the defendant guilty of the lesser offense yet acquit him of the greater.” Id. at 255; see also Keeble v. United States, 412 U.S. 205, 208, 93 S.Ct. 1993, 36 L.Ed.2d 844 (1973) (noting that a “defendant is entitled to an instruction on a lesser included offense if the evidence would permit a jury rationally to find him guilty of the lesser offense and acquit him of the greater”). ‘While a defendant’s request for a lesser included offense charge should be freely granted, there must be a rational basis for the lesser charge and it cannot serve merely as ‘a device for defendant to invoke the mercy-dispensing prerogative of the jury.’ ” United States v. Collins, 690 F.2d 431, 438 (5th Cir.1982) (quoting United States v. Sinclair, 444 F.2d 888, 890 (D.C.Cir.1971)), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1046, 103 S.Ct. 1447, 75 L.Ed.2d 801 (1983). As relevant, the murder statute at issue here provides: Murder is the unlawful killing of a human being with malice aforethought. Every murder perpetrated by poison, lying in wait, or any other kind of willful, deliberate, malicious, and premeditated killing ... is murder in the first degree. Any other murder is murder in the second degree. 18 U.S.C. § 1111(a). We previously have stated that “[a] killing is ‘premeditated’ when it is the result of planning or deliberation. The amount of time needed for premeditation of a killing depends on the person and the circumstances. It must be long enough for the killer, after forming the intent to kill, to be fully conscious of that intent.” United States v. Agofsky, 516 F.3d 280, 282 n. 2 (5th Cir.2008) (citation omitted). (3)Discussion The question of whether the elements of second degree murder are a subset of the elements of first degree murder is not in dispute. Rather, the parties disagree as to whether the district court erred in holding that the evidence was not such that a juror could rationally find Defendants guilty only of second degree murder and acquit them of first degree murder. Defendants advance two primary claims in arguing that the district court erred in so holding. First, they assert that the court’s ruling conflicts with Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625, 100 S.Ct. 2382, 65 L.Ed.2d 392 (1980). Second, they contend that “[t]he jury should have been instructed on second-degree murder because the evidence of premeditation was insufficient and hotly disputed.” For the reasons set forth below, we reject Defendants’ arguments. (a) Beck v. Alabama In Beck, the Supreme Court struck down an Alabama statute, “unique in American criminal law,” that prohibited capital defendants from submitting lesser-included-offense instructions. Id. at 635, 100 S.Ct. 2382. In explaining its reasoning, the Court stated that “when the evidence unquestionably establishes that the defendant is guilty of a serious, violent offense — but leaves some doubt with respect to an element that would justify conviction of a capital offense' — the failure to give the jury the ‘third option’ of convicting on a lesser included offense would seem inevitably to enhance the risk of an unwarranted conviction.” Id. at 637, 100 S.Ct. 2382. The Court thus held that Alabama was “constitutionally prohibited” from statutorily precluding a lesser-inelud-ed-offense instruction in capital cases. Id. at 638,100 S.Ct. 2382. Relying on Beck, Defendants argue that the district court violated their “rights to due process” by denying their request for an instruction on second degree murder. In pressing this argument, however, Defendants overread Beck. Nothing in the Court’s opinion suggests that district courts are constitutionally compelled to give lesser-included-offense instructions where they are not supported by the evidence. Indeed, Beck repeatedly indicates that lesser-included-offense instructions are proper only where the evidence warrants them. Id. at 635 n. 11, 636 & n. 12., 100 S.Ct. 2382 This reading of Beck is confirmed by subsequent caselaw. See Schad v. Arizona, 501 U.S. 624, 648, 111 S.Ct. 2491, 115 L.Ed.2d 555 (1991) (suggesting that Beck would not “be satisfied by instructing the jury on just any lesser included offense, even one without any support in the evidence”); Schmuck v. United States, 489 U.S. 705, 716 n. 8, 109 S.Ct. 1443, 103 L.Ed.2d 734 (1989) (stating that a lesser-included-offense instruction is appropriate only where the evidence at trial is “such that a jury could rationally find the defendant guilty of the lesser offense, yet acquit him of the greater”). Accordingly, to the extent Defendants argue that a lesser-included-offense instruction was constitutionally required under Beck — even absent evidentiary support for one — we reject their argument. (b) Evidence of Premeditation Defendants next take issue with the district court’s conclusion that the evidence that Rhone’s murder was premeditated would not have allowed the jury rationally to find them guilty of second degree murder, yet acquit them of first degree murder. The primary thrust of Defendants’ argument is that Rhone — an individual they characterize as “a troubled, disliked and mentally disturbed inmate” — -was murdered in a fit of “spontaneous violence without premeditation.” They emphasize that Rhone allegedly had threatened to kill Defendants the night before the murder, and that they would not have had the opportunity to commit their crime if prison officials had followed proper procedures. Defendants neglect, however, the extensive evidence the government presented regarding premeditation. This evidence established that both Snarr and Garcia were classified as “single-cell” inmates who were housed in the prison’s special housing unit (“SHU”) while awaiting transfer to the federal administrative maximum security prison (“ADX”) in Florence, Colorado. As such, neither defendant had a cellmate, and each spent his allotted recreation period — one hour per day — alone in an outdoor “recreation cage.” Defendants also were classified as “three-man hold” inmates, meaning that they were required to be escorted by three correctional officers when out of their cells, and could not be moved while other inmates were in the same hallway. On the day of Rhone’s murder, the situation in the SHU was not normal. The unit was short-staffed, there had been an altercation in one of the cells, fire alarms were sounding, and one area of the prison was flooding. In the midst of this chaos, four officers began escorting prisoners from recreation cages back to their cells. However, two inmates — both of whom were incarcerated in cells near Defendants — refused to leave their recreation cages. Accordingly, the officers decided to remove compliant inmates, including Defendants, first. As officers handcuffed Garcia to escort him back to his cell, Snarr began shouting that he needed to use the restroom. In the interest of clearing the recreation cages of all compliant inmates, and to accommodate Snarr’s need to use the restroom, officers decided to remove him too. Officer Baloney, who was unaware that Garcia was on three-man hold status, began moving Garcia without assistance, while two other officers began moving Snarr. This confluence of events, which the government argued had been orchestrated to create chaos and divert the staffs attention, set the stage for Rhone’s murder. Beyond introducing testimony supporting the theory that these events were “inmate manipulated” and designed to exploit the guards’ weaknesses, the government presented other evidence of premeditation. In particular, one inmate testified that, on the day of the murder, he had supplied Snarr with at least one shank, and perhaps two. This same inmate testified to circumstances suggesting that Garcia may have been trying to obtain a mechanical pencil, the parts of which can be used to open handcuffs. Other witnesses similarly testified as to the planning required merely to obtain weapons in prison. Witnesses also explained that Defendants were angry at Rhone for what they deemed to be Rhone’s “disrespectful” behavior. Corrections officer Dawn Gallagher testified, for example, that prior to the murder Rhone had exposed his penis to her and ejaculated on her shoe. Defendants expressed to her that they were “very upset” and offended by Rhone’s behavior. Another witness testified that before the murder, he had heard Rhone yell, “Whoever ain’t Muslim on this tier can suck my dick,” and another witness testified to hearing one of the defendants say to Rhone during the murder, “You want us to suck your dick.” After the murder, Snarr told another inmate that he killed Rhone because Rhone had cursed at him and made too much noise in his cell. Similarly, after describing Rhone’s “disrespectful” behavior, Garcia told a different inmate that, while Rhone “would just talk and talk and talk,” Garcia was “sharpening [his] knife” in preparation for the murder. Finally, the government introduced other statements Defendants made that suggested the crime had been planned. While Snarr struggled to open Rhone’s cell door, for example, Garcia shouted either “I’m going to kill you,” or “We going to kill you.” Shortly after the murder, either Snarr or Garcia yelled, “That’s how you get your enemy,” and Snarr exclaimed, “Dude disrespected us, and that’s what he got.” Finally, an agent who investigated the murder testified that Defendants implicitly admitted to planning the murder by stating to him that they did not “intend to get the staff,” and that “[i]t wasn’t supposed to happen that way with the staff.” (4) Conclusion Simply put, the evidence overwhelmingly demonstrates premeditation. In view of this evidence, a jury could not rationally have found Defendants guilty of second degree murder, while acquitting them of first degree murder. Accordingly, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Defendants’ request for a lesser-included-offense instruction. C. Sufficiency of the Evidence At the conclusion of the eligibility phase of the trial, the district court instructed the jury on several aggravating factors. Defendants allege that the evidence was insufficient to support the jury’s findings as to two: (1) that the murder involved “substantial premeditation and planning,” and (2) that it was committed in an “especially heinous, cruel, and depraved manner.” Defendants likewise allege that the evidence was insufficient to support the jury’s finding as to the non-statutory aggravating factor that Snarr and Garcia pose a threat of future dangerousness. (1) Standard of Review This court reviews “jury findings of aggravating factors by asking whether, after viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the government, any rational trier of fact could have found the existence of the aggravating circumstance, beyond a reasonable doubt.” Bernard, 299 F.3d at 481. (2) Substantial Premeditation and Planning (a) Applicable Law As noted, the government alleged that Defendants murdered Rhone “after substantial planning and premeditation” — an aggravating factor under 18 U.S.C. § 3592(c)(9). In United States v. Flores, we observed that the term “substantial,” as used in 18 U.S.C. § 3592(c)(9), “de-notéis] a thing of high magnitude.” 63 F.3d 1342, 1373-74 (5th Cir.1995). Elsewhere, we have held that “substantial planning” thus may properly be “defined as requiring a considerable amount of planning preceding the killing.” Davis, 609 F.3d at 690 (internal quotation marks omitted). And, as previously explained, “[a] killing is ‘premeditated’ when it is the result of planning or deliberation. The amount of time needed for premeditation of a killing depends on the person and the circumstances. It must be long enough for the killer, after forming the intent to kill, to be fully conscious of that intent.” Agofsky, 516 F.3d at 282 n. 2 (citation omitted). (b) Discussion We already have discussed above the evidence the government presented in connection with this aggravating factor. Defendants advance no new arguments in the context of this challenge, but instead continue to maintain that the murder was a crime of coincidence, precipitated by events over which they had no control. Given the overwhelming nature of the government’s evidence, however, a rational juror easily could have concluded that Defendants murdered Rhone after substantial planning and premeditation. We therefore reject Defendants’ contention to the contrary. (3) Especially Heinous, Cruel, or Depraved Murder (a) Applicable Law Under 18 U.S.C. § 3592(c)(6), the government also alleged that Defendants murdered Rhone “in an especially heinous, cruel, or depraved manner in that it involved torture or serious physical abuse.” “As indicated by the statute, a murder may be especially heinous, cruel, or depraved if it involves either torture or serious physical abuse.” United States v. Agofsky, 458 F.3d 369, 374 (5th Cir.2006). Because the government does not assert that Rhone was tortured, the question here is reduced to whether there was sufficient evidence to support the jury’s conclusion that the murder involved “serious physical abuse.” In Agofsky, we held that “[f]or serious physical abuse to be aggravating in a murder case, a defendant must inflict suffering or mutilation above and beyond that necessary to cause death. Furthermore, a defendant must intend such gratuitous violence for the murder to involve serious physical abuse.” Id. (emphasis added) (internal citation omitted). The Agofsky court held that these conditions had been satisfied in that case, as the defendant there repeatedly had stomped on the victim’s face and neck even after the victim lost consciousness. Id. Beyond presenting eyewitness accounts of the attack, the government also had introduced evidence that the “assault was so violent that it splattered [the victim’s] blood and other bodily fluids on the floor and wall.” Id. at 375. Additionally, the medical evidence adduced at trial revealed the extensive nature of the victim’s injuries. Id. The court found the totality of this evidence supported the conclusion that “a rational jury could find beyond a reasonable doubt that [the defendant] intended to inflict (and in fact inflicted) more abuse than necessary to cause [the victim’s] death.” Id. at 374. Similarly, in United States v. Ebron, we held that the evidence in that case supported the determination that “a rational trier of fact could have concluded, beyond a reasonable doubt, that serious physical abuse was involved in [the victim’s] murder.” 683 F.3d 105, 151 (5th Cir.2012). As here, Ebron involved the murder of an inmate who had been stabbed to death in prison. Id. At trial, the government had established that the victim “was stabbed 106 times by a sharp, round instrument in an eight-inch by four-inch area over his heart, left lung, and liver.” Id. The court explained that, based on this evidence, a rational “trier of fact could have determined that the mutilation of [the victim’s] body went above and beyond what [was] necessary to cause death.” Id. Additionally, the court concluded that, given “the number of stab wounds,” as well as the testimony indicating “that the assault appeared to have been a message to the rest of the inmate population,” “a rational trier of fact could have also concluded that [the defendant] specifically intended that [the victim] be subjected to serious physical abuse.” Id. (b) Discussion Here, the government introduced extensive evidence to establish that Rhone’s murder involved serious physical abuse that Defendants intended to inflict. First, jurors saw a video of the crime, which shows Defendants savagely killing Rhone. Jurors also heard from a prison official who stated that, during the attack, he tried to persuade Defendants “to stop the assault” on Rhone by telling them, “Look, he’s dead. He’s dead. The guy is dead. Get off of him.” Defendants responded by smirking and continuing their attack, which the witness described as “frenzied.” A rational trier of fact could have concluded from this that Defendants intended to subject Rhone to serious physical abuse. The jury also viewed photographs taken shortly after the attack that showed Rhone’s blood pooled on the prison’s floor and running down its walls. Moreover, they heard evidence about the state of Rhone’s body after the attack. For example, one inmate who saw Rhone’s corpse described it as “a human being that was no longer a human” because Rhone’s whole “body was a stab wound” and “[h]e was pulp.” Further, the forensic pathologist who performed Rhone’s autopsy testified that Defendants had inflicted fifty stab wounds to Rhone’s head and upper body: eighteen to his front side, and thirty-two to his back. The pathologist also stated that Rhone sustained numerous other lacerations, abrasions, and trail wounds that were not sufficiently deep to constitute stab wounds. Although the pathologist testified that the stab wound to Rhone’s heart was the ultimate cause of death, he explained that several of his wounds could have been fatal, suggesting that the assault had been gratuitous. We thus observe that many of the facts here are analogous to those presented in Agofsky and Ebron: the attack was so violent that it splattered Rhone’s blood on the floor and walls, Rhone suffered extensive injuries, and Rhone was stabbed multiple times beyond that necessary to precipitate death. Defendants do not appear to contest these facts, but instead argue that the rapidity with which the murder was carried out demonstrates a lack of intent to inflict physical abuse separate and apart from the murder itself. Nevertheless, we already have rejected elsewhere the notion that the alleged brevity of an attack precludes a finding that it was committed in an especially heinous, cruel, or depraved manner. Agofsky, 458 F.3d at 375 (“[Vjiolenee need not be protracted to be gratuitous.”). In sum, based on the evidence presented at trial, a rational juror could have concluded that Defendants intended to inflict, and in fact did inflict, greater abuse than that necessary to cause Rhone’s death. (4) Future Dangerousness (a) Applicable Law Although 18 U.S.C. § 3592(c) sets forth several statutory aggravating factors that a jury may consider when contemplating the propriety of the death penalty, the statute also permits the jury to “consider whether any other aggravating factor for which notice has been given exists.” Here, the government provided notice as to the non-statutory aggravating factor of future dangerousness. In particular, the government alleged that Defendants pose “a continuing and serious threat to the lives of others because it is likely that [they] will commit criminal acts of violence in the future.” Where the alternative to the death penalty is life imprisonment, the government “is free to argue that the defendant will pose a danger to others in prison and that executing him is the only means of eliminating the threat to the safety of other inmates or prison staff.” Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 U.S. 154, 165 n. 5, 114 S.Ct. 2187, 129 L.Ed.2d 133 (1994). Under 18 U.S.C. § 3593(c), the presentation of evidence is not limited by “the rules governing admission of evidence at criminal trials.” Evidence of future dangerousness necessarily touches upon a variety of topics, including a defendant’s juvenile record, prior murders and other crimes, and prison records. See Fields, 483 F.3d at 324-25; United States v. Bourgeois, 423 F.3d 501, 511-12 (5th Cir.2005). “What is essential is that the jury have before it all possible relevant information about the individual defendant whose fate it must determine.” Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 276, 96 S.Ct. 2950, 49 L.Ed.2d 929 (1976). (b) Discussion At trial, the government argued that Snarr would be a future threat to the safety of others based on his continuing pattern of violence and institutional misconduct, lack of remorse, low likelihood of rehabilitation, and membership in a racist gang. The government’s evidence on this front included that: two of Snarr’s fifteen juvenile felonies were “life endangering”; on numerous occasions, Snarr had stabbed or beaten fellow inmates — crimes often motivated by Snarr’s membership in a racist prison gang; Snarr twice had been caught with weapons in the Beaumont prison; immediately after Rhone’s murder, Snarr and Garcia had acted in a celebratory manner, “almost like ... a bunch of guys that just won a softball game”; and Snarr had indicated to a fellow inmate that he “had no intention of getting out [of prison], that this was his life, this is what he did, this is what he lives for.” As to Garcia, the government argued that he woul