Full opinion text
JON O. NEWMAN, Circuit Judge. Table of Contents Background.....................................................................199 The Charged Offenses....................................................199 Facts of the Offenses.....................................................199 Defense Evidence........................................................204 Verdicts and Sentencing ..................................................204 Discussion......................................................................204 I. Entrapment.............................................................204 (A) Elements of Entrapment..............................................204 (1) Design ..........................................................206 (2) Time of Predisposition.............................................208 (3) Type of Evidence Relevant to Predisposition .........................208 (B) Entrapment as a Matter of Law........................................209 (1) Cromitie.........................................................210 (a) Inducement...................................................210 (b) Predisposition ................................................212 (2) David Williams, Onta Williams, and Payen ...........................215 (a) Inducement...................................................215 (b) Predisposition ................................................215 (C) Jury Charge on Entrapment...........................................216 II. Outrageous Government Conduct...........................................217 (A) Government’s Role in Planning the Crimes..............................219 (B) Exploiting Religious Views............................................219 (C) Exploiting Professed Love.............................................220 (D) Monetary and Other Benefits..........................................220 (E) Aggregation of Persuasion Techniques..................................221 III. Prosecution’s Knowing Use of Perjured Testimony...........................221 (A) False Statements Unrelated to the $250,000 Offer........................222 (B) False Statements Concerning the $250,000 ..............................223 (1) Falsity of the $250,000 Testimony...................................223 (2) The Prosecution’s Knowledge of the Falsity..........................223 (3) The Prosecution’s Imputed Knowledge ..............................224 (4) Likelihood of Affecting the Jury....................................224 IV. Other Claims............................................................225 (A) Admission of Video Evidence ..........................................225 (B) Vouching for Witness’s Credibility......................................225 (C) Jury’s Exposure to Extra-Record Evidence .............................225 (D) Sentencing..........................................................226 Conclusion......................................................................227 This is an appeal by four defendants convicted of planning and attempting to carry out domestic terrorism offenses involving a plot to launch missiles at an Air National Guard base at Stewart Airport in Newburgh, NY, and bomb two synagogues in the Bronx. The appeal primarily presents issues concerning the extent to which a government informant may lawfully urge the commission of crimes, issues framed as claims of entrapment as a matter of law and outrageous government conduct in violation of the Due Process Clause. The appeal also presents an issue concerning the falsity of portions of the informant’s trial testimony. These issues arise on an appeal by defendants-appellants James Cromitie, David Williams, Onta Williams, and Laguerre Payen from the July 8, 2011, judgments of the District Court for the Southern District of New York (Colleen McMahon, District Judge). We reject the defendants’ claims of entrapment as a matter of law, outrageous government conduct in the instigation of the offenses, and knowing use of perjured testimony, as well as all other claims raised on appeal. We therefore affirm. Background The charged offenses. All the charged offenses resulted from an elaborate sting operation conducted by the FBI using an undercover informant. An indictment filed in June 2009, charged the four defendants with eight offenses: Count One— conspiracy to use weapons of mass destruction within the United States (18 U.S.C. § 2332a); Counts Two, Three, and Four — attempt to use weapons of mass destruction near or at the Riverdale Temple, in the Bronx, the Riverdale Jewish Center (a synagogue) in the Bronx, and the New York Air National Guard Base at Newburgh, respectively (18 U.S.C. § 2332a); Count Five — conspiracy to acquire and use anti-aircraft missiles (18 U.S.C. § 2332(g)); Count Six — attempt to acquire and use anti-aircraft missiles (18 U.S.C. § 2332(g)); Count Seven — conspiracy to kill officers and employees of the United States (18 U.S.C. §§ 1114, 1117); Count Eight — attempt to kill officers and employees of the United States (18 U.S.C. §§ 1114, 2). Facts of the offenses. The facts are detailed in two comprehensive opinions of the District Court, denying the defendants’ post-trial motions. See United States v. Cromitie, 781 F.Supp.2d 211 (S.D.N.Y.2011) (“Cromitie I”), and United States v. Cromitie, No. 09 Cr. 558(CM), 2011 WL 1842219 (S.D.N.Y. May 10, 2011) (“Cromitie II”). We assume familiarity with those opinions and recount at this point only the salient facts that the jury was entitled to find with respect to the defendants’ criminal conduct. We set forth facts concerning the claims of entrapment as a matter of law, outrageous government conduct, and knowing use of perjured testimony in the discussion of those claims. A government confidential informant, Shahed Hussain, conducted an undercover investigation for several months in 2008 and 2009. Hussain is a Pakistani national who was granted asylum by the United States in the mid-1990s based on his claim of political persecution in Pakistan. In 2003, Hussain was convicted of fraud based on his misconduct as a translator working at the Motor Vehicles Bureau in Albany. To avoid being deported, Hussain agreed to cooperate with the Government’s investigation of another individual. In the spring of 2007, Hussain became a paid informant of the FBI and. started working in the lower Hudson Valley. As the District Court stated, Hussain’s goal was to “locate disaffected Muslims who might be harboring terrorist designs on the United States.” Cromitie II, 2011 WL 1842219, at *2. By June 2008, Hussain had been attending services at a mosque in Newburgh at the direction of the FBI. During that time, the FBI provided a house for Hussain that contained concealed video and audio recording equipment. In addition, the FBI provided Hussain with recording devices for his person and his car. Hussain presented himself at the mosque as a wealthy Pakistani businessman with knowledge of Islamic teachings. During a period of several months, Hussain cultivated a friendship with Cromitie, who subsequently recruited the other three defendants. Cromitie, 42 years old, was, in Judge McMahon’s words, “an impoverished man,” Cromitie I, 781 F.Supp.2d at 226, who sustained himself by committing petty drug offenses for which he had repeatedly been caught and convicted. In addition, he worked a night shift at a local Walmart store, earning less than $14,000 per year. On June 13, 2008, Cromitie walked up to Hussain in the parking lot of the mosque. Hussain testified that Cromitie,' in an Arabic accent, introduced himself as Abdul Rahman, and claimed that his father was from Afghanistan. After a short conversation, Hussain drove Cromitie home from the mosque. On the way, Cromitie asked Hussain about violence in Afghanistan that had been reported recently on television. When Hussain asked Cromitie if he would like to travel to Afghanistan, Cromitie responded by saying he would love to. He then said, in the first indication of his proclivity to terrorism, that he wanted “to die like a shahid, a martyr” and “go to paradise,” Trial Transcript (“Trial Tr.”) 681, and immediately thereafter said, “I want to do something to America.” Id. at 682. As he said these words, he pointed his right index finger in the air in a gesture Hussain testified is used by “somebody[] in radical Islam” to mean “taking an oath in front of Allah to do take part of [sic] crime or Jihad act they want to do.” Id. at 682. During that first encounter, Hussain told Cromitie that a lot of military planes flew from what was later identified as Stewart Airport to take arms and ammunition to Afghanistan and Iraq. Hussain met with Cromitie three more times in the summer of 2Ó08. Hussain testified that during these meetings Cromitie said that he hated Jews and Americans and that he would kill the President of the United States “700 times because he’s an antichrist.” I'd. at 686. After learning of these remarks, the FBI instructed Hussain to tell Cromitie that he, Hussain, was a representative of a terrorist group in Pakistan, ' Jaish-e-Mohammed (“JeM”). On July 3, 2008, Hussain, following these instructions, Hussain told Cromitie he was flying to Pakistan to meet with JeM and asked Cromitie if he wanted to attend. Cromitie said he did and then volunteered that he wanted to join JeM. Hussain recorded four conversations with Cromitie in the fall of 2008. In a conversation recorded on October 19, Cromitie said that American - Muslims could do something similar to the attacks of September 11, 2001, stating: “If, if the Muslims was to want the United States down, believe me, we can do it. With the regular Muslims here, all somebody has to do is give a good fatwa to the brothers and let, make sure they understand. You, they taking down our Islamic countries. What do we do to make that stop? So, we start taking something down here. You understand what I’m saying?” Joint Appendix (“JA”) 2824. In a conversation recorded later that day, Cromitie said, “I have zero tolerance for people who disrespect Muslims.” Id. at 2836. In a conversation recorded on October 29, Cromitie said, “When the call come[s], I’m gonna go, ‘Allahu ákbar,’ and I’m gone. There’s nothing no one can do. I’m gonna go all the way. There’s no, no turn back.” Id. at 2903. On November 14, Hussain told Cromitie that he could obtain guns and rockets. In late November, Hussain drove Cromitie to a conference of the Muslim Alliance of North America in Philadelphia. On November 28, during the ride to the conference, Cromitie, in a recorded conversation, boasted that he had stolen three guns from Walmart, two .25 automatics and a snub nose, and had “stashed” them. Also during the ride, Cromitie indicated that he could put “a team together,” id. at 3229, and said he was “gonna try to put a plan together,” id. at 3240. Earlier that day, Cromitie for the first time expressed interest in buying “stuff’ from Hussain. . Hussain had previously told Cromitie that he could get “[a]ny stuff that you need,” specifically guns and missiles. Id. at 3146. On the second day of the conference, November 29, Cromitie’s talk became more specific after Hussain asked Cromitie if his “team” had ever “thought about doing something here [in the United States].” Id. at 3285. Cromitie responded by saying that his team never considered doing that, but that he had and that he had “been wanting to do that since I was 7.” Id. at 3286. Cromitie claimed that he had bombed a police station in the Bronx in 1994, id. at 3296, but wanted to do something “a little bigger,” id. at 3304, because he had “to make some type of noise to let them know,” id. at 3302. Hussain asked Cromitie what targets he wanted to hit in the New York area, and Cromitie said that he wanted to “hit” the George Washington Bridge. Id. at 3294. When Hussain said that bridges aré too hard to hit, Cromitie replied, “Hit some small spots.... This had to be a terrorist act.” Id. Later, while Hussain and Cromitie were watching television coverage of a terrorist attack in Mumbai and the funeral of a Jew who had been killed in that attack, Cromitie said: “Look at the Jewish guy. You’re not smiling no more, you fucker. I hate those bastards.... I hate those motherfuckers. Those fucking Jewish bastards .... I’d. like to get one of those. I’d like to get a synagogue. Me. Yeah, personally.” Id. at 3316. Hussain recorded conversations with Cromitie on three occasions in December 2008. On December 5, Cromitie, after quoting a “brother” saying, “ T think it’s time we make jihad right here in America,’ ” id. at 3449, said, “I agree with the brother.... [I]t makes sense to me,” id. at 3450. On- December 17, when Hussain said, “Let’s pick a target,” Cromitie suggested “Stewart Airport.” Id. at 3536. Oh December 18, Hussain traveled to Pakistan and returned eight and one-half weeks later.' In a meeting with Cromitie on February 23, 2009, Hussain asked, “The synagogue, where is it in Bronx or in Brooklyn?” Id. at 3623. Cromitie replied, “[T]here’s one in [t]he Bronx, I mean you got like, uh two or three of them in Brooklyn.” Id. The next day, Hussain bought Cromitie a camera and drove him to Stewart Airport where they conducted surveillance. While there, Cromitie took photos. Cromitie was recorded stating, “Imagine if we hit all the planes in one spot.” Id. at 3845. He also told Hussain he was going to speak to another man about being a lookout and would “talk to some of the guys” and tell them they would receive $25,000 to “just look out.” Id. at 3655. Six weeks passed without any contact between Cromitie and Hussain. On April 5, 2009, Cromitie reached out to Hussain. In a recorded conversation, he told Hussain of his financial problems and said, “I have to try to make some money brother.” Id. at 4486. Hussain responded, “I told you, I can make you 250,000 dollars, but you don’t want it brother. What can I tell you?” Id. At this, Cromitie answered, “Okay, come see me brother. Come ,see me.” Id. We discuss this conversation in detail below. See Part 1(B)(1)(a). On April 7, Hussain told Cromitie that JeM had already taken significant steps to support the operation, stating, “The missile was ready.” Id. at 3698. Later in that conversation Cromitie said he would “take ... down” “a whole synagogue of men.” Id. at 3717. Cromitie and Hussain then discussed the need for lookouts. On April 10, Hussain picked Cromitie up at Cromitie’s house and was introduced to a man standing in front of the house. This man, known as “Daoud,” was defendant David Williams. All three men drove to the Riverdale section of the Bronx, where Cromitie photographed the Riverdale Jewish Center and the Riverdale Temple. Later that day Cromitie took photographs of airplanes at Stewart Airport. On April 23, the three met again. Cromitie asked at what distance could an IED (improvised explosive device) be detonated. When Hussain said 100 miles and explained, ‘You can sit down here, and it blows up there,” id. at 3846, Cromitie and David Williams celebrated by bumping fists. When Hussain said he would train Cromitie. how to use a rocket launcher, David Williams said that he wanted to participate. The next day, the three drove to Stewart Airport. David Williams asked Cromitie for the camera and took surveillance pictures. Later, they discussed taking rooms at a nearby Marriott Hotel to hide out after the planned attacks. After Hussain outlined the attack plans, David Williams said the airport attack would be the “tricky one,” compared to the synagogue attack, which would be “smooth” because the bombs would be detonated remotely from a hotel. Id. at 3914. In less than a week, Cromitie and David Williams' recruited defendants Onta Williams and Laguerre Payen. On April 25, in a recorded telephone call David Williams told Cromitie to call Hussain and “[t] ell him I got the other brother.” Govt. Supp. Appx. 512. By April 28, when all four defendants met with Hussain, Pay-en had been recruited. At this meeting, when Cromitie explained that “Yahudi” means “Jews,” Payen said, ‘Yeah you told me that,” JA 4079, which permitted the jury to infer that Cromitie had recruited Payen. Bombing two synagogues and launching Stinger surface-to-air missiles at Stewart Airport was specifically discussed at this meeting. Payen asked how long every job would take; Hussain told him ten minutes. Cromitie suggested that all four defendants and Hussain identify themselves in phone calls by code names: “Charles” for Cromitie, “Manny” for David Williams, “Brooks” for Onta Williams, “Bond” for Payen, and “Tony” for Hussain. They also agreed on other code words: “eggs” for phones, “the pilón” for the Bronx, “beans” for rockets, “birds” for planes, and “[t]he trains are coming” for “the police are coming.” Id. at 4090-91. Payen confirmed that all he had to say was that the trains are coming. Cromitie ended the meeting by saying, “This is going down in history.” Id. at 4104. Previously David Williams told Cromitie that he (David) wanted to be armed. On April 30, David Williams purchased a semiautomatic pistol. Two days before, Onta Williams had tried to purchase two guns. On May 1, Payen took Hussain to the apartment of a person Payen - said was willing to sell guns, but there wás no response to a knock at the door. Later on May 1, Hussain and all four defendants drove to Stewart Airport to conduct more surveillance. All agreed on the best spot from which to launch Stinger missiles. They also discussed the locations where Onta Williams and Payen would be stationed as lookouts. The whole group then drove to Hussain’s house and discussed plans for the attack. On May 6, Hussain drove Cromitie, David Williams, and Payen to a warehouse in Stamford, CT, where the FBI had stored three fake bombs and two fake Stinger missiles. Hussain instructed them how to launch the missiles and how to wire the detonating devices for the bombs. After one missile and the bombs were loaded into Hussain’s car, the four drove to a storage facility in New Windsor, NY, where Hussain had rented storage lockers. Cromitie, David Williams, and Hussain unloaded the weapons and placed them in the lockers while Payen acted as a lookout. Id. at 927. The group then hugged each other and shouted, “Allahu akbar, God is great.” Id. Later that night, Payen explained to Onta Williams how the missile operated. At a meeting on May 8, Cromitie told the other defendants that .there were 25 thousand balls (ball bearings) in a bomb and that “once them balls go off, they go anywhere.” Id. at 4281. At the end of this meeting, the defendants agreed to carry out the attacks on May 20. On May 13, all four defendants drove with Hussain to the Riverdale section of the Bronx to conduct surveillance, specifically of the Riverdale Jewish Center. The defendants got out of the car and walked around looking for security cameras on top of nearby buildings. On May 19, Hussain and the four defendants conducted a final surveillance of Stewart Airport, during which Onta Williams changed the locations of the lookouts for the Airport. The group returned to Hussain’s house to review the plans, which were to pick up the bombs at the storage facility, drive to Riverdale to wire them, leave them in cars that the FBI had placed in front of the synagogues, drive back to Newburgh, retrieve the missiles, fire them at the military planes, and detonate the bombs using their cell phones. On May 20, the four defendants drove with Hussain to the New Windsor storage facility, where they picked up the three bombs and drove to Riverdale. Acting according to their plan, they stopped near where the two cars had been parked by the FBI for the operation, a Pontiac directly in front of the Riverdale Temple and a Mazda directly in front of the Riverdale Jewish Center. Hussain let Onta Williams, David Williams, and Payen out to take up their positions as lookouts. Cromitie then placed one of the fake bombs in the trunk of the Pontiac and two others on the back seat of the Mazda. Moments later, FBI agents arrested all four defendants. Defense evidence. Cromitie presented two witnesses. The personnel manager of the Walmart store where Cromitie had worked testified that the store had stopped selling long guns before the time when Cromitie had told Hussain he had stolen guns for resale and that Cromitie stopped showing up for work in February 2009 and was subsequently fired. A neighbor of Cromitie’s testified that Cromitie had sold him the camera that Hussain had purchased and had given to Cromitie for surveillance. The other defendants presented no evidence. Verdicts and sentencing. After eight days of deliberation, the jury found Cromitie and David Williams guilty on all counts and found Onta Williams and Payen guilty on all counts except Count Eight, which charged attempt to kill officers and employees of the United States. The District Court sentenced each defendant to a 25-year mandatory minimum sentence. Discussion The defendants make three principal claims on appeal: (1) the evidence established entrapment as a matter of law; (2) the Government’s conduct in persuading Cromitie and, through him, the other defendants to participate in the plan was outrageous conduct in violation of "the Due Process Clause; and (3) the prosecution knowingly presented false testimony of its undercover informant Hussain in violation of the Due Process Clause. I. Entrapment (A) Elements of Entrapment “[A] valid entrapment defense has two related elements: government inducement of the crime, and a lack of predisposition on the part of the defendant to engage in criminal conduct.” Mathews v. United States, 485 U.S. 58, 63, 108 S.Ct. 883, 99 L.Ed.2d 54 (1988); see Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 376-78, 78 S.Ct. 819, 2 L.Ed.2d 848 (1958). “Predisposition, the principal element in the defense of entrapment, focuses upon whether the defendant was an unwary innocent or, instead, an unwary criminal who readily availed himself of the opportunity to perpetrate the crime.” Mathews, 485 U.S. at 63, 108 S.Ct. 883 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). “[T]he fact that officers or employees of the Government merely afford opportunities or facilities for the commission of the offense does not defeat the prosecution.” Jacobson v. United States, 503 U.S. 540, 548, 112 S.Ct. 1535, 118 L.Ed.2d 174 (1992) (internal quotation marks omitted). The defendant has the burden of showing inducement, see United States v. Bala, 236 F.3d 87, 94 (2d Cir.2000); United States v. Williams, 23 F.3d 629, 635 (2d Cir.1994), and, if inducement is shown, the prosecution has the burden of proving predisposition beyond a reasonable doubt, see United States v. Al-Moayad, 545 F.3d 139, 153 (2d Cir.2008); Bala, 236 F.3d at 94. Before • 1932, government inducement sufficed to preclude a valid conviction on the ground of entrapment. In that year, the Supreme Court’s first decision on the entrapment defense, Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 53 S.Ct. 210, 77 L.Ed. 413 (1932), began the process of defining the circumstances under which government inducement alone would no longer establish the defense of entrapment. Sor veils focused the entrapment inquiry on a defendant’s state of mind, rather than on only the government’s inducement: “ “When the criminal design originates, not with the accused, but is conceived in the mind of the government officers, and the accused is by persuasion, deceitful representation, or inducement lured into the commission of a criminal act, the government is estopped by sound public policy from prosecution therefor.’ ” Id. at 445, 53 S.Ct. 210 (emphasis added) (quoting Newman v. United States, 299 F. 128, 131 (4th Cir.1924)). The next year, Judge Learned Hand observed that the Supreme Court in Sorrells had not spelled out “precise limits” as to when government inducement alone would no longer suffice to preclude a valid conviction. See United States v. Becker, 62 F.2d 1007, 1008 (2d Cir.1933). Filling the void, he postulated the three eircumstances, any one of which would become the accepted means in this Circuit of establishing a defendant’s predisposition: “an existing course of similar criminal conduct; the accused’s already formed design to commit the crime or similar crimes; his willingness to do so, as evinced by ready complaisance.” Id. (emphasis added). Twenty years later, when Judge Hand endeavored to quote verbatim the Becker formulations, he changed “complaisance” to “compliance.” See United States v. Sherman, 200 F.2d 880, 882 (2d Cir.1952). Although the wording has slightly changed since Sherman, these three circumstances have remained in this Circuit the three ways available to the Government to prove a defendant’s predisposition. See United States v. Al Kassar, 660 F.3d 108, 119 (2d Cir.2011); Al-Moayad, 545 F.3d at 154; United States v. Salerno, 66 F.3d 544, 547 (2d Cir.1995); United States v. Harvey, 991 F.2d 981, 992 (2d Cir.1993). There is normally little controversy as to what constitutes prior “similar criminal conduct.” See Paul Marcus, The Entrapment Defense § 4.051 (4th ed.2009). “Ready compliance” is usually indicated by the promptness of a defendant’s agreement to commit an offense. See Marcus, supra, § 4.05G. Indeed, the Supreme Court has stated that if the defendant “had promptly availed himself of the criminal opportunity” presented by government agents, “it is unlikely that his entrapment defense would have warranted a jury instruction.” Jacobson, 503 U.S. at 550, 112 S.Ct. 1535. What is meant by a pre-existing “design” is more problematic. Because, as far as we have been able to determine, no decision of our Court has encountered a jury’s rejection of an entrapment defense where the prosecution’s claim of predisposition rests solely on the defendant’s already formed “design,” i.e., without prior criminal conduct or prompt agreement to commit the offense, we consider the meaning of “design” in some detail. (1) Design The first federal decision to use “design” to refer to the pre-existing mental state that defeats an entrapment defense appears to be Woo Wai v. United States, 223 F. 412 (9th Cir.1915), in 1915, which quoted the following passage from 12 Cyclopedia of Law and Procedure 160 (1901): “The fact that a detective or other person suspected that the defendant was about to commit a crime, and prepared for his detection, as a result of which he was entrapped in its commission, is no excuse, if the defendant alone conceived the original criminal design.” See Woo Wai, 223 F. at 414 (emphasis added). Newman, 299 F. at 131, quoted the “design” phrasing from Woo Wai, and Sorrells, 287 U.S. at 445, 53 S.Ct. 210, quoted it from Newman. Despite the repeated use of “design” to describe the second means of proving predisposition, see Jacobson, 503 U.S. at 548, 112 S.Ct. 1535; United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 435-36, 93 S.Ct. 1637, 36 L.Ed.2d 366 (1973); Sherman, 356 U.S. at 372, 78 S.Ct. 819, no court has discussed the meaning of the word in the context of the entrapment defense. In the context of predisposition, the word “design” is ambiguous. It can comprehend a continuum of mental states from a generalized idea of committing criminal activity, to an intent to commit a particular crime or crimes, to a precise plan for committing such a crime or crimes. In ordinary discourse, saying that someone acted “by design” usually means with a far more generalized intent than the specific “design” of an architect. When Judge Hand repeated from Becker the three means of showing predisposition in our Court’s first encounter with George Sherman, he said: “As we understand the doctrine it comes to this: that it is a valid reply to the defence, if the prosecution can satisfy the jury that the accused was ready and willing to commit the offence charged, whenever the opportunity offered.” Sherman, 200 F.2d at 882 (emphasis added). When used as one of the three means of showing predisposition, we think “design” must take its meaning from the context of the type of criminal -activity comprising the specific offenses a defendant has committed. With respect to a category as varied as terrorist activity, the requisite design in the mind of a defendant may be broader than the design for other narrower forms of criminal activity. In view of the broad range of activities that can constitute terrorism, especially with respect to terrorist activities directed against the interests of the United States, the relevant prior design need be only a rather generalized idea or intent to inflict harm on such interests. A person with such an idea or intent can readily be found to be “ready and willing to commit the offence charged, whenever the opportunity offered.” Our dissenting colleague draws from Judge Hand’s opinion in the first Sherman appeal a narrower view of “design” than the one we adopt. Chief Judge Jacobs quotes Judge Hand’s statement that the proof of the defendant’s predisposition “may be by evidence of ... his preparation .... ” 727 F.3d at 228, [typescript at 3] and contends that a design must be “a course of conduct ... already so well advanced in the defendant’s mind that one can be sure ... it was not planted by an agent provocateur,” id. at 228-29 [typescript at 5] In identifying evidence that “may” show predisposition, we do not think Judge Hand was requiring evidence that the defendant had taken steps to prepare to commit the charged offenses. In the sentences immediately preceding the sentence with the word “preparation,” Judge Hand stated, as we quoted above, that a valid defense is shown when the accused is .“ready and willing to commit the offense” when the opportunity -arises, and then significantly added: - “In that event the inducement which brought about the actual offence was no more than one instance of the kind of conduct in which the accused was prepared to engage; and the prosecution has not seduced an innocent person, but has only provided the -means for the accused to realize his preexisting purpose.” Sherman, 200 F.2d at 882 (emphases added). The first emphasized words convey the thought that the second means of showing predisposition, i'.e., having the requisite “design,” does not mean “prepared” in the sense of having taken specific preparatory steps to accomplish an offense, or, in Chief Judge Jacobs’ words, a “well advanced” “course of conduct”; rather, as the éécond emphasized word makes clear, it means “prepared” in the sense of being ready to commit the offense once the opportunity is presented. If the accused has a “preexisting purpose” to commit offenses such as, or similar to, the charged offenses, then he has the requisite preparedness. That is enough to have the requisite “design.” We doubt that the potential terrorists who are available to be recruited by A1 Qaeda or similar groups have already “formed” a “design” to bomb specific targets, as Chief Judge Jacobs narrowly defines those terms. Their predisposition is to have a state of mind that inclines them to inflict harm on the United States, be willing to die like a martyr, be receptive to a recruiter’s presentation, whether over the course of a week or several months, of the specifics on an operational plan, and welcome an invitation to participate. The Air Force personnel at Stewart Airport and the congregants at two synagogues in the Bronx are fortunate that the person who first approached Cromitie and suggested an operational plan was only a Government agent. We detail in Part 1(B)(1)(b), below, the evidence that permitted the jury to find that Cromitie had the requisite “design.” Before outlining that evidence, we first consider at what point predisposition must be shown and then consider what types of evidence are available to prove a pre-existing “design.” (2) Time of Predisposition Before the Supreme Court’s decision in Jacobson, the prevailing rule had been that predisposition must be shown to have existed prior to inducement by a government agent. See United States v. Williams, 547 F.3d 1187, 1198 (9th Cir.2008); United States v. Francis, 131 F.3d 1452, 1456 (11th Cir.1997); United States v. Rodriguez-Andrade, 62 F.3d 948, 954-955 & n. 4 (7th Cir.1995); United States v. Palow, 777 F.2d 52, 55 (1st Cir.1985); see also United States v. Williams, 705 F.2d 603, 618 n. 9 (2d Cir.1983) (“Simply cultivating the friendship of a target preparatory to presenting a criminal opportunity is not inducement to commit a crime”). However, in Jacobson the Court stated that the prosecution must prove that “the defendant was disposed to commit the criminal act prior to first being approached by government agents.” 503 U.S. at 549, 112 S.Ct. 1535. The Court’s support for this new standard is curious. First, the Court cited United States v. Whoie, 925 F.2d 1481 (D.C.Cir.1991). The District of Columbia Circuit there urged its district judges to follow the model instruction in the Second Circuit, which the Court correctly reported as stating that the prosecution’s burden is to prove that the defendant was ready and willing “before the inducement to commit the crime.” Id. at 1486 (emphasis added); see L. Hand, J. Siffert, W. Loughlin & S. Reiss, Model Jury Instructions No. 807, ¶ 8.07, at 8-30 (1990). Second, the Supreme Court added a footnote that relied on the fact that the Government had “conceded” that its evidence was probative “because it indicated petitioner’s state of mind prior to the commencement of the Government’s investigation.” Jacobson, 503 U.S. at 549 n. 2, 112 S.Ct. 1535 (emphasis in original). Whether Jacobson should be understood as requiring predisposition prior to an agent’s contact, as the text states, or prior to inducement or investigation, as the Court’s cited authorities state, we feel obliged to apply the standard stated in the text, and consider Cromitie’s state of mind prior to the first contact with Hussain. (3) Type of Evidence Relevant to Predisposition Obviously any relevant evidence of what a defendant says or does before “first being approached by Government agents,” Jacobson, 503 U.S. at 549, 112 S.Ct. 1535, is admissible. Not as clearly admissible is evidence of what a defendant says or does after inducement. Although as a general matter “a defendant’s state of mind ... can be inferred from his actions and statements,” United States v. Spencer, 995 F.2d 10, 11 (2d Cir.1993), a broad application of that principle would undermine the entrapment defense by permitting any induced conduct to prove predisposition. To guard against that risk, the Supreme Court has required that conduct of a defendant, after contact by Government agents, offered to prove predisposition, must be “independent and not the product of the attention that the Government had directed at [the defendant].” Jacobson, 503 U.S. at 550, 112 S.Ct. 1535; see United States v. Squillacote, 221 F.3d 542, 565-66 (4th Cir.2000) (Predisposition may be proved by evidence of “independently motivated behavior that occurs after government solicitation begins.”). Of course, what a defendant says after contacted by agents is generally admissible to prove predisposition because, although some post-contact conduct might be the product of inducement, it will be a rare situation where a defendant can plausibly claim that the inducement caused him to say something that evidenced predisposition. This reality informs our subsequent discussion of Cromitie’s post-June 13 statements in assessing his predisposition. In considering the defendants’ entrapment defense, we first discuss their claim of entrapment as a matter of law and then their challenge to the jury charge on entrapment. (B) Entrapment as a Matter of Law The defendants presented their defense of entrapment to the jury through cross-examination and summations. By its verdiets of guilty, the jury rejected the defense. On appeal, the defendants contend that entrapment was established as a matter of law, a claim we understand to mean that on the facts of this case, no reasonable jury could find predisposition beyond a reasonable doubt. See Jacobson, 503 U.S. at 553, 112 S.Ct. 1535 (entrapment as a matter of law found where “[rjational jurors could not say beyond a reasonable doubt that petitioner possessed the requisite predisposition prior to the Government’s investigation”). We consider this claim first as to Cromitie and then as to the other defendants. (1) Cromitie (a) Inducement. Because the conduct of government agents is the focus of the inducement component of the entrapment defense and is the entirety of a claim of outrageous government conduct, the factual predicates of the entrapment and the due process claims are somewhat related, although the applicable legal principles are distinct. In assessing the inducement component of Cromitie’s entrapment claim, we will consider only the facts sufficient to show inducement, leaving the additional details of the Government’s alleged misconduct for assessment of the due process claim below.’ See Part II(A)-(E). The Government initially opposes Cromitie’s entrapment claim by contending that there was no inducement. In the Government’s view, once Cromitie indicated in his first discussion with Hussain that he wanted to “do something to America” and thereafter evinced a .willingness to act upon that desire, “[a]ny follow-up remarks by [Hussain] ... lack the specificity to constitute ‘soliciting, proposing, initiating, broaching or suggesting the commission of the offense.’ ” Br. for Government at 45 (quoting United States v. Dunn, 779 F.2d 157, 158 (2d Cir.1985)). Although Hussain’s efforts to persuade Cromitie do not lack specificity, the Government seems to be arguing that his efforts are not relevant to inducement because Cromitie had the requisite predisposition before their initial meeting on June 13, 2008. However, in this case, Cromitie’s statements on that date arguably do not make it clear whether he then had the requisite predisposition. We therefore need to consider what he said and did thereafter, but, as we discuss below, see Part 1(B)(1)(b), the only post-June 13 statements and actions that can be looked at to give meaning to Cromitie’s June 13 statements are those that are independent of any inducement. Hussain’s efforts to persuade Cromitie after June 13 are relevant to both inducement and the ultimate issue of predisposition. _ In this, case, Hussain’s efforts to persuade Cromitie constituted inducement. As the District Court — with the benefit of hearing the recorded evidence and seeing the trial witnesses — forcefully stated, “I believe beyond a shadow of a doubt that there would have been no crime here except the government instigated it, planned it, and brought it to fruition.” Sentencing Transcript 63. The record fully supports this statement. Hussain’s efforts to persuade Cromitie to commit the charged offenses persisted throughout the eleven-month period from their initial meeting until the arrest. In addition to proposing specifics of the planned attacks and supplying bombs and missiles, Hussain’s inducements included offers of $250,000, a barber shop at a cost of $70,000, a BMW, and an all-expense-paid, two-week vacation to Puerto Rico for Cromitie and his family. One portion of Hussain’s testimony, elicited on redirect examination, is revealing: Q. “[W]hat did the FBI tell you to do?” A. “The FBI ..'. told me to go a little bit harder on him [Cromitie] and put some pressure on him, see where he comes out given the opportunity.” Trial Tr. 2488. At trial, the Government disputed that Hussain had offered $250,000 to Cromitie. We set forth in detail at this point what the record reveals on this issue because whether Hussain offered Cromitie this amount of money is, or might be, pertinent to three of the defendants’ claims: sufficient inducement to require the prosecution to prove predisposition, outrageous government conduct in violation of the-Due Process Clause, see Part II, infra, and, because Hussain denied making the cash offer, the prosecution’s knowing use of perjured testimony in violation of the Due Process Clause, see Part III, below. A recorded conversation on April 5 contained the following: Cromitie: “I have to try to make some money brother.” Hussain: “I told you, I can make you 250,000 dollars, but you don’t want it brother.” JA 4486. Hussain testified that he told Cromitie that “he’ll get a lot of money.” Trial Tr. 892. In a recorded phone call to Cromitie on May 1, Hussain said, “I’m going to Florida to pick up the, the money.” JA 4497. Later that night, in a recorded phone call to Payen, Cromitie said, “The cash rolled in,” id. at 4502, and in a recorded phone call to Onta Williams still later that night, said, “The cash came through,” id. at 4504. The Government’s dispute as to whether Cromitie was offered $250,000 is based on Hussain’s testimony, elicited by the prosecution, that “$250,000” was a code word for the cost of the “equipments.” Trial Tr. 1036. On cross-examination, Hussain characterized “$250,000” as a code word for the cost of the entire operation. Id. at 1797, 1800-01. On summation, the Government argued to the jury that “evidence that you saw[] supports what [Hussain] told' you, as crazy as it may sound.” Id. at 3185-86: Undermining Hussain’s claim that “$250,000” was a code word, apart from the claim’s inherent implausibility, are the facts that (1) Hussain never told Cromitie that $250,000 was a code word, a more-than-curious omission given that the two men agreed on numerous code words for things and people, even using “sun” to mean “mission,” id. at 1880, (2) Hussain never told the FBI that he was using “$250,000” as a code word, and (3) Hussain admitted on direct examination that he told Cromitie “he’ll get a lot of money.” Id. at $92. The rule of appellate review after a conviction that the evidence is to be viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution, see United States v. Chavez, 549 F.3d 119, 124 (2d Cir.2008), does not require us to accept Hussain’s code word claim where no reasonable juror could believe the claim was true. Judge McMahon found, in assessing Cromitie’s outrageous government conduct due process claim (as to which she was the trier of fact) that Hussain “offered Cromitie as much as a quarter of a million dollars to participate in a mission.... [T]here can be absolutely no. question that such an offer was made.” Cromitie I, 781 F.Supp.2d at 219. We see absolutely no basis- for rejecting that finding. (b) Predisposition. With respect to the three means of proving predisposition, it is clear that Cromitie had not engaged in a course of similar conduct prior to the Government’s inducement, nor did he readily agree to committing the charged offenses. Thus, the issue becomes whether, prior to inducement, he had an “already formed design to commit the crime or similar crimes.” Becker, 62 F.2d at 1008 (emphasis added). On the first day that Hussain met Cromitie, Hussain quotes Cromitie as saying, “I want to do something to America.” Trial Tr. 682. The potentially ominous meaning of these words was considerably clarified by Cromitie’s immediately preceding statement that he wanted “to die like a shahid, a martyr,” id. at 681, and the fact that, as he said them, he pointed his right index finger in the air in a gesture Hussain testified is used “by somebody[ ] in radical Islam” to “mean[ ] taking an oath in front of Allah to do take part of [sic] crime or Jihad act they want to do.” Id. at 2456. The jury was entitled to think that wanting to die like a martyr, coupled with wanting to do something to America, meant a willingness to be a suicide bomber, even though Cromitie never planned to sacrifice his own life. Fully indicating that Cromitie’s initial statements to Hussain revealed a pre-exr isting design to commit terrorist acts against the interests of the United States are these later statements (all words in quotation marks were recorded): —As early as July 8, 2008, Cromitie told Hussain that he wanted to join JeM, which he believed was a terrorist organization in Pakistan. —Cromitie expressed an interest in buying “stuff’ from Hussain, who had previously told Cromitie that “stuff’ included guns and missiles. —When asked, “[H]ave you ever thought about doing something here?” Cromitie answered, “I have been wanting to do that since I was 7.” JA 3285-86. —Also on November 28, Cromitie told Hussain he wanted to do something “a little bigger” than the bombing of a police station, id. at 3304, which he claimed to have done. —“I’d rather go in and bomb some place....” Id. at 3302. —“I would actually like to put a fucking bomb in the back of a cop car while he’s sitting in the motherfucker and watch him just explode, I would be the most happiest person in the world.” Id. at 3310. —“I would like to hit the bridge [to New Jersey].” Id. at 3294. ' — When Hussain said, “Let’s pick a target,” Cromitie suggested “Stewart Airport.” ’ Id. at 3536. —“If survival for me is taking out one of these American planes or whatever, that’s my fight.” Id. at 3287. —“I’d like to get a synagogue. Me. Yeah, personally.” Id. at 3316. —“I don’t care if it’s a whole synagogue of men.” Id. at 3717. —“So it doesn’t matter to me what they do to me after I killed President Bush.” Id. at 2995. —‘When the call come, I’m gonna go, ‘Allahu akbar,’ and I’m gone. There’s nothing no one can do. I’m gonna go all the way. There’s no, no turn back.” Id. at 2903. —“I’m a soldier here, though, but not for America.” Id. at 3022. Cromitie’s recorded words explained his motives for what he wanted to do: —“[T]hey taking down our Islamic countries. What do we do to make that stop? So, we start taking something down here.” Id. at 2824. —“They [air force planes] bringing ‘em [troops] over there [Afghanistan] to do damage to us. So, if they don’t have the planes to carry ‘em over there, you can’t . do too much damage.” Id. at 3660. Indeed, Cromitie’s recorded word's admitted his predisposition: —“You [Hussain] already seen ■ I had some issues with this world over here. So, and you know I would do something to get back at them. Yeah, I would. So you already knew I was like that. It wasn’t you who was talking to me, I talked to you about it. 'When we first met in the parking lot, I talked to you about it.” Id. at 3309. —“[I]f I’m doing something, it’s because I wanted to do that for so long, myself, because I know it a [sic] be right. You understand? So, you have nothing to say about that. Before I met you, I already told you already.” Id. at 3615. —“So you have, you [Hussain] didn’t cause anything. When on the day of judgment Allah wanna say, ‘Ah, yes Maqsood/ you enticed Abdul Rahman[ ] to do that.’ No! I would be the truth on that day: No! You [Allah] gave me my own will. You [Allah] gave me my own mind setting, Allah. I did that on -my own.” Id. These recorded statements, all of which were independent of any inducement, gave indisputable meaning to Cromitie’s initial ominous, though somewhat generalized, words about wanting to “do something to America” and “die like a shahid, a martyr.” The later statements also gave the jury ample basis for believing Hussain when he testified about what Cromitie had said to him during their first unrecorded conversation. Chief Judge Jacobs discounts the significance of some of these statements, contending that they were the result of “badgering” by Hussain. See 727 F.3d at 229 [typescript at 7] We disagree. Cromitie’s statement that he wanted to join JeM was volunteered and preceded only by the question whether he wanted to attend a conference in Pakistan with JeM. His statement that he wanted to bomb the George Washington Bridge was preceded only by the question “[W]hat, I mean, in your mind, were your best targets here? In New York?” JA 3292. Cromitie’s identification of Stewart Airport was preceded only by Hussain’s saying, “Let’s pick a target.” Id. at 3536. Cromitie’s statement that he wanted to bomb a synagogue was volunteered, without any prior question, while watching a television report of a bombing in Mumbai. We see no badgering eliciting these revealing statements. Nor do we agree that these and the other statements set out above fail to reveal Cromitie’s state of mind prior to the first meeting with Hussain in June 2008. On the contrary, they make entirely clear what Cromitie had in mind when he told Hussain at that first meeting that he wanted to “do something to America.” Chief Judge Jacobs also discounts Cromitie’s statement that he wanted “to die like a martyr” as “boastful piety.” 727 F.3d at 227 [typescript at 8] We see nothing pious in wanting “to die like a martyr” when said in the same breath with wanting “to do something to America,” especially when the statement is followed in a month with a volunteered desire to join what Cromitie believed was a Pakistani terrorist organization. It is true that during the many months of Hussain’s persuasion, Cromitie’s commitment to the terrorism plot was not unwavering. For example, a recorded conversation on December 10 included the following: Cromitie: “I’m gonna try one more move, Hak[]. If the move don’t work, it doesn’t matter, I’m gonna leave it. Is that okay with you?” JA 3525. Hussain: “That’s perfectly fine, brother.” Id. But moments later, Cromitie said: “‘Cause some things just don’t work out. But let me try something else. I got something else planned. There’s always a plan ‘B.’ You understand? There’s always a plan ‘B.’ So don’t worry. Just be easy. Okay?” Id. After Hussain returned from a two-month trip to Pakistan, in a recorded conversation on February 23, 2009, this colloquy occurred: Hussain: “You talked about synagogues, remember?” Cromitie: “Yeah.” Hussain: “You still wanna do it?” Cromitie: “I’m thinking about it. I have to think about it. I got so much, you know what, it’s not that I don’t wanna do it. It’s just that, since you been gone, I been, like, okay I guess everything’s down the drain now.” Hussain: “[Tjhere’s some things that you were supposed to do while I was gone.” Cromitie: “I just dropped everything.” Id. at 3595-96. But Cromitie then continued: “I didn’t forget everything, though, everything. I remember the codes, whatever---- I think I need to, I Because everything I been watching I been everything. Ever since you been gone.” Id. at 3596. On February 24, Cromitie told Hussain that he would be going to North Carolina, a trip he apparently did not make. There was no contact between them for the next six weeks despite Hussain’s efforts to reach Cromitie by phone. Then on April 5, Cromitie resumed contact by phoning Hussain. This was the call in which Hussain offered Cromitie $250,000. Cromitie asked for a meeting. When they met on April 7, Hussain pressed Cromitie as to where he stood: “So you have to tell, you have to tell me yeah. Can we do it, or can we not do it?” Id. at 3716. Cromitie initially replied, “I’m thinking,” and then, warming to the plan, said: “I’m gonna tell you I don’t care if it’s a whole synagogue full of men.... I would take ‘em down, I don’t even care. ‘Cause I know they are the ones---[S]ee, I’m not worried about nothing. Ya know? What I’m worried about is my safety.” Id. at 3717. Continuing with their plans, they discussed lookouts. On April 10, Hussain and Cromitie picked up David Williams and conducted surveillance of the synagogues. From that point on, events moved rapidly to the May 20 finale. Despite moments of wavering, which do not preclude a finding of predisposition, see United States v. Davila-Nieves, 670 F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir.2012) (predisposition despite seven-month interval between informant’s contacts with defendant); United States v. Evans, 924 F.2d 714, 716 (7th Cir.1991) (“second thoughts following initial enthusiasm do not establish entrapment”), Cromitie revealed his willingness, indeed his eagerness, to commit acts of terrorism through his own recorded statements. Two examples stand out. Referring to the initial conversation with Hussain, Cromitie recalled in a recorded conversation, “[Y]ou already knew I was like that. It wasn’t you who was talking to me, I talked to you aboút it. When we first met in the parking lot, I talked to you about it.” JA 3309. And contemplating that “on the day of judgment” Allah would say that Hussain had enticed him, Cromitie said he would answer, “No! You [Allah] gave me my own will.... I did that on my own.” Id. at 3615. From everything that Cromitie said, the jury was entitled to find that he had a preexisting “design” and hence a predisposition to inflict serious harm on interests of the United States, even though Government officers afforded him the opportunity and the pseudo weapons for striking at specific targets. “[T]he fact that officers or employees of the Government merely afford opportunities or facilities for the commission of the uffense does not defeat the prosecution.” Jacobson, 503 U.S. at 548, 112 S.Ct. 1535 (internal quotation marks omitted). “It is sufficient if the defendant is of a frame of mind such that once his attention is called to the criminal opportunity, his decision to commit the crime is the product of his own preference and not the product of government persuasion.” Williams, 705 F.2d at 618. (2) David Williams, Onta.Williams, and Payen (a) Inducement. We will assume for the argument that the Government’s inducement of Cromitie, some of which was undoubtedly relayed by him to the other three defendants, sufficed to show that they too were induced. See United States v. Pilarinos, 864 F.2d 253, 256 (2d Cir.1988) (“derivative entrapment defense available ‘where government agents act through private citizens’ ”) (quoting United States v. Buie, 407 F.2d 905, 908 (2d Cir.1969), aff'd without consideration of this point sub nom. Minor v. United Sates, 396 U.S. 87, 90 S.Ct. 284, 24 L.Ed.2d 283 (1969)); United States v. Valencia, 645 F.2d 1158, 1168-69 (2d Cir.1980) (government inducement via third party), amended, 669 F.2d 37 (2d Cir.1981), aff'd after remand, 677 F.2d 191 (2d Cir.1982). We note that only Cromitie was offered $250,000; the other defendants were each offered $5,000. Trial Tr. 1035. (b) Predisposition. The Government does not contend that the predisposition of David Williams, Onta Williams, and Payen was shown by prior similar conduct or a pre-existing design. Instead, the Government contends that their predisposition, sufficient to defeat an entrapment defense, is shown by their “‘ready response to [any] inducement.’ ” Br. for Government at 46 (quoting Ab-Moayad, 545 F.3d at 154). See United States v. Vivi ano, 437 F.2d 295, 299 (2d Cir.1971) (Predisposition may be shown by “a willingness to commit the crime for which [the defendant] is charged as evidenced by [his] ready response to the inducement.”). The District Court acknowledged that there was “no direct evidence of when or how these [three] defendants were solicited.” Cromitie II, 2011 WL 1842219, at *15. Nevertheless, after a meticulous review of the evidence, see id. at *16-23, Judge McMahon concluded that circumstantial evidence of what the three defendants said and did shortly after they had been recruited sufficed to permit the jury to find a “ready response” that defeated their entrapment defense, see id. at *23. As she noted, “[N]o more than a few days[ ] passed” between the time that Cromitie first talked to David Williams and the time when David Williams “showed himself to be fully committed” to the plan, id. at *19, and “Onta Williams and Payen agreed to become involved ‘promptly’ after they were first approached” and “were willing to join in a terrorism plot without any hesitation or reservation,” id. at *22. We fully agree with her analysis and conclusions. Although all three defendants were recruited just to be lookouts, they not only agreed to the entire plan promptly but expressed enthusiasm for it. Among their statements, most of which were recorded, are these: —David Williams: “The ones that should be hit is the ones that’s the cargo planes.” JA 3853. “[The attacks would] be a hell of a story though. Tell your grandkids.” JA 4267. —Onta Williams: “[Blowing up the planes is] gonna be a double whammy.” Id. at 4275. “So if we kill them here, it would all be equal [to U.S. military operations abroad].” Trial Tr. 2528. —Payen: (responding to Hussain’s caution that the plot was “secret”) “Insha’ Allah. I know what time it is. There’s a lot of things IVe done in my lifetime, Hakim.” JA 4117. “I’m doing this for the sake of Allah.” Id. at 4314. Although, as Judge McMahon stated, “It is beyond question that the Government created the crime here,” Cromitie II, 2011 WL 1842219, at *23, the evidence sufficed to permit the jury to find predisposition and reject the entrapment defense. That defense was not established as a matter of law. (C) Jury Charge on Entrapment The defendants challenge the jury charge on entrapment on the ground that the charge did not instruct the jury in accordance with the Seventh Circuit’s decision in United States v. Hollingsworth, 27 F.3d 1196 (7th Cir.1994) (in banc). In that decision, a closely divided (6-5) in banc court ruled that an entrapment defense succeeds as a matter of law unless a defendant, whom government agents have induced to commit an offense, is “in a position without the government’s help to become involved in illegal activity.” Id. at 1200. As then-Chief Judge Posner contended, predisposition “has positional as well as dispositional force.” Id. He amplified this “positional” view of predisposition as follows: “The defendant must be so situated by reason of previous training or experience or occupation or acquaintances that it is likely that if the government had not induced him to commit the crime[,] some criminal would have done so... Id. He offered as examples a public official in a position to accept a bribe, .a drug addict to sell drugs, and a gun dealer to make illegal gun sales. Urging us to adopt the Seventh Circuit’s view, the defendants argue that none of them was in a position to acquire Stinger missiles or bombs to carry out the proposed attacks. We reject the Seventh Circuit’s expansion of the entrapment defense to permit an induced defendant, predisposed under existing standards to commit a crime, to establish the defense of entrapment simply because, prior to the unfolding of a government sting, he was not in a position where it was likely that he would have figured out how to commit the offense and how to acquire necessary devices. The principal dissent in Hollingsworth has forcefully set forth the shortcomings of this ill-advised expansion, see 27 F.3d at 1213 (Ripple J., with whom Bauer, Coffey, Kanne, and (in part) Easterbrook join, dissenting), and the Ninth Circuit has rejected it, see United States v. Thickstun, 110 F.3d 1394, 1398 (9th Cir.1997). A person who has a pre-existing design to commit terrorist acts against United States interests or who promptly agrees to play a part in such activity should not escape punishment just because he was not in a position to obtain Stinger missiles and launch them at United States airplanes. The Government need not leave him at large until a real terrorist suggests such action and supplies real missiles. The defendants’ challenge to the jury charge is rejected. II. Outrageous Government Conduct As a claim distinct from their claim of entrapment as a matter of law, the defendants contend that their convictions should be reversed because the Government’s conduct in persuading Cromitie, and the others through Cromitie, to commit the charged offenses was so outrageous as to violate the Due Process Clause. In Hampton v. United States, 425 U.S. 484, 96 S.Ct. 1646, 48 L.Ed.2d 113 (1976), the Supreme Court, by a vote of 5 to , 3, ruled that, even as to a defendant predisposed to commit an offense, outrageous government conduct could invalidate a con