Weigle v. SPX Corp. (729 F.3d 724, 2013)

TINDER, Circuit Judge.

This suit under the diversity jurisdiction stems from an incident in which a semi-truck trailer fell off of its support stands and on top of Scott Weigle and John Moore, the two mechanics who were working on the trailer. Weigle and Moore each sued SPX Corporation, the designer of the support stands, asserting claims of inadequate warnings and defective design under the Indiana Product Liability Act (IPLA), Ind.Code § 34-20-1-1 et seq. The district court granted summary judgment for SPX on all claims, finding that the warnings were adequate as a matter of law and that, as a result, the support stands were not defective under Indiana law. We affirm the district court’s judgments on the inadequate-warnings claims, but we vacate the judgments on the defective-design claims and remand for further proceedings.

I. Background

A. Accident & Nature of Support Stands

At the time of the underlying incident, Weigle and Moore were professional me-chames employed by Truckers 24-Hour Road Service, Inc., in Indianapolis, Indiana. Both had considerable experience: Weigle had been a mechanic at Truckers since 1997, and Moore had been a mechanic at Truckers since 2001.

On July 31, 2009, Weigle and Moore undertook a job to rebuild the braking system on a semi-truck trailer. In preparation, Weigle used an airlift to raise the rear portion of the trailer and then lowered the trailer onto two support stands; the front of the trailer was supported by the trailer s built-in dolly legs. Weigle had already begun working on the trailer when Moore came over to assist. The trailer somehow moved as both mechanics were working underneath it, causing the support stands to tip over and the trailer to come crashing down.

It is undisputed that the two support stands were OTC Tools 1779A support stands designed by SPX. These support stands consist of a conical base, an extension tube, and a support pin:

(Though omitted from this diagram, the support pin is tethered to the base by a chain and “S” hook.) These are heavy-duty support stands; the conical base is approximately 16% inches tall and approximately 15% inches in diameter, the extension tube is approximately 33% inches tall and approximately 2% inches in diameter, and the stand has a capacity rating of 12 tons when used properly. There are eight holes along the extension tube, each of which is roughly % inch in diameter. To adjust the height, the user places the support pin into the appropriate hole and allows the pin to rest on top of the base. The base lacks a bottom, so if the support pin. is not used the extension tube will touch the ground. When this happens, the support stand becomes unstable because the weight of the load is not distributed to the broad conical base but instead rests almost entirely on the narrow extension tube.

The “Parts List and Operating Instructions” accompanying the support stands contains the following relevant safety precautions and operating instructions:

Safety Precautions

CAUTION: To prevent personal injury,

• Always use the support pin, which must be completely inserted through the support stand extension tube.

• The load and support stand(s) must be stable before beginning any repairs underneath the load.

Operating Instructions

4. Insert the support pin ... completely through both walls of the extension tube.

IMPORTANT: Always check the placement of the support pin before lowering a load onto a support stand.

CAUTION: To prevent personal injury, the load and support stand(s) MUST be stable before any work begins underneath the load.

(For the full set of safety precautions and operating instructions, see Appendix A, infra.) On the left side of the safety precautions are three pietograms: one shows a person reading instructions; one shows debris bouncing off of a person’s protective eyewear; and one shows a load falling on a person.

Also, affixed to the base of each support stand is a decal, which in relevant part provides:

WARNING

To prevent personal injury,

• Always use the support pin; insert support pin completely through extension tube.

• .... Load and support stand(s) must be stable before working beneath vehicle.

(For the full decal, see Appendix B, infra.) The warning decal also includes three pic-tograms, and each appears to the left of one of the first three bulleted instructions: the pictogram showing a person reading instructions appears next to the instruction that the user follow all instructions; the pictogram showing debris bouncing off of a person’s safety goggles appears next to the instruction to wear eye protection; and the pictogram showing a load falling on top of a person appears next to the instruction not to exceed the capacity rating. No pietograms appear before the remaining four bulleted instructions, including the support-pin instruction, but those instructions are positioned below the pictogram illustrating a load falling on a person.

It is undisputed that Weigle and Moore did not use the support pin on the day of the incident. Weigle took care of situating the trailer onto the support stands, and he admitted that he never read the “Parts List and Operating Instructions” or the decal affixed to each support stand. Moore, on the other hand, had previously read all the instructions and warnings, but he did not inspect the support stands to see if the support pins were in place.

B. Summary Judgment Proceedings

Weigle and Moore sued SPX in state court, asserting claims of inadequate warnings and defective design under the IPLA, and SPX removed both cases to the Southern District of Indiana, see 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332, 1441. At the close of discovery, SPX filed near-identical motions for summary judgment in both cases. See Fed. R.Civ.P. 56.

In opposition to SPX’s motions for summary judgment, Weigle and Moore designated evidence that, according to industry custom, it is safest to operate support stands in their lowest possible position. Weigle testified in his deposition that the lowest position is the safest because it minimizes the distance that the mechanics have to lift the heavy tires when removing and reinstalling them. Similarly, Moore testified that he had been taught that support stands must be operated in the lowest possible position to ensure maximum stability. Roger Tapy, the owner and president of Truckers at the time of the incident, also noted that “in standard business, the lowest part of the stand is the safest height.”

Weigle and Moore also presented evidence that the SPX support stands are unlike most (if not all) other support stands on the market. Moore testified that other support stands are designed such that the center column cannot touch the ground even when a pin is not used, and for this reason, Moore was under the impression that the pin was merely used to adjust the support stands’ height. Tapy also testified that in his 25 years with Truckers, the SPX support stands were the only ones in which the center column could touch the ground when the pin was not used; the other approximately 60 stands with which he had experience were designed so that the center column could never touch the ground.

They also designated the report and deposition testimony of William Dickenson, a professional engineer. Dickenson opined that the SPX support stands were defective and unreasonably dangerous because the column is permitted to pass through the plane of the base in the unpinned position. In his view, the support stands do not satisfy the requirements for the design of the central column set forth in Part 4 of the American Society of Mechanical Engineers’s Portable Automotive Lifting Device standards (“ASME PALD-4”). As relevant here, the section of ASME PALD-4 in both the 1993 and 2005 standards addressing columns provides: “In the fully retracted position, the lower end of the column shall not extend below the plane made where the base contacts the ground.” Dickenson interprets the term “fully retracted position” to refer to the lowest position of the column without use of the pin. He bases this interpretation on the fact that the 1993 and 2005 standards departed from the term “lowest operating position” (i.e., the lowest position with the pin) used in the 1991 standard.

Dickenson opined that utilizing the support stands without the support pin was foreseeable. In his opinion, SPX “could have designed the column of the stand with a stop that prevented the column from retracting into the stand beyond its lowest operating position. This could have been accomplished by simply permanently installing a pin in the hole that establishes the lowest operating position of the vehicle stands.” Dickenson acknowledged the warnings against not using the support pin, but he explained that “[a] warning is not an adequate solution because warnings are not as effective at removing hazards as designing the system so that the hazard would be eliminated. Warnings rely upon human actions, which are often not reliable.” He admitted that he had not conducted a statistical or financial analysis respecting his proposed alternative, but he testified that it cost him only about $10 to alter the support stands. He also noted in his report that after reviewing the descriptions of other support stands that are similar to the SPX support stands, the SPX stands appear to be the only ones on the market that fail to satisfy ASME PALD-4. Finally, Dickenson noted that based on all the materials he had reviewed it did not appear that the designers had conducted “any failure modes and effects analysis, any hierarchy of design analysis, [or] any application of safety through design in this product”; in his view, not only did the designers not exercise reasonable care, they exercised no care at all.

Weigle and Moore also designated the deposition of Michael Schoenoff, Manager of Mechanical Engineering at SPX, whom SPX had designated both as an expert witness and as its representative under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 30(b)(6). In Schoenoffs view, the support stands were not defectively designed and were misused by the plaintiffs. He explained that Dickenson’s interpretation of the ASME PALD-4 standard was in error because “fully retracted position” refers to the lowest position of the stand when the pin is used. Schoenoff also testified that SPX was aware in 1985 that the support stand was unstable without the pin. He also agreed that there is no evidence that SPX considered alternative designs. Nor is there any evidence that SPX conducted a hazard-risk or failure-mode analysis on the support stand.

Lastly, Weigle and Moore designated the deposition of Larry Betcher, Manager of Product Innovation at SPX, who designed the SPX support stand at issue. Like Schoenoff, Betcher disagreed with Dickenson’s interpretation of ASME PALD^I and interpreted “fully retracted position” to refer to the lowest pinned position. Betcher also testified that use of the support stand without the support pin is inherently dangerous because the load is likely to come crashing down. He admitted that it was foreseeable that a user might operate the support stand without the pin, which is why the instruction that the pin should always be used was included. Betcher also testified that no alternative designs had been considered, no field studies had been conducted to determine whether the support stand was being operated without the pin, and the effectiveness of the warnings never had been tested.

The district court granted summary judgment for SPX on all claims. It first concluded that the instructions and warnings were adequate as a matter of law. As to the defective-design claims, the court did not address the sufficiency of Weigle’s and Moore’s designated evidence. Instead, relying on Marshall v. Clark Equipment Co., 680 N.E.2d 1102, 1106 (Ind.Ct.App.1997), it concluded that because the warnings were adequate, the support stands were neither defective nor unreasonably dangerous. Weigle and Moore now appeal.

II. Discussion

We review a district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo, Abbott v. Sangamon County, Ill., 705 F.3d 706, 713 (7th Cir.2013), construing all facts and inferences in favor of the nonmovants, Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). Summary judgment is proper “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986).

The IPLA “imposes liability upon sellers of a product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to any user or consumer.” Ford Motor Co. v. Rushford, 868 N.E.2d 806, 809 (Ind.2007) (citation omitted); see Ind.Code § 34-20-2-1. A plaintiff bringing an action under the IPLA must establish that (1) the product was in a defective condition; (2) the product was unreasonably dangerous; (3) the plaintiff was a foreseeable user or consumer; (4) the defendant was in the business of selling the product; (5) the product was expected to and did reach the user or consumer without substantial alteration; and (6) the defect in the product caused the plaintiffs injury. See Ind.Code § 34-20-2-1; Bourne v. Marty Gilman, Inc., 452 F.3d 632, 635-36 (7th Cir.2006); Koske v. Townsend Eng’g Co., 551 N.E.2d 437, 440-41 (Ind.1990). In this case there is no dispute that Weigle and Moore were foreseeable users of the support stands, that SPX was in the business of selling the support stands, and that the support stands had not been substantially altered.

A product can be defective because of a manufacturing defect, a design defect, or a lack of adequate instructions and warnings. See Ind.Code §§ 34-20-2-1 to -3; Hoffman v. E.W. Bliss Co., 448 N.E.2d 277, 281 (Ind.1983). Inadequate-warning and defective-design claims both sound in negligence. See Ind.Code § 34-20-2-2. To prevail on a negligence claim a plaintiff must establish “(1) a duty owed by the defendant to the plaintiff; (2) a breach of that duty by the defendant; and (3) an injury to the plaintiff proximately caused by the breach.” Rushford, 868 N.E.2d at 810 (citation omitted).

A. Inadequate-Warnings Claims

A product is defective under the IPLA “if the seller fails to: (1) properly package or label the product to give reasonable warnings of danger about the product; or (2) give reasonably complete instructions on proper use of the product; when the seller, by exercising reasonable diligence, could have made such warnings or instructions to the user or consumer.” Ind.Code § 34-20-4-2; see also Rushford,, 868 N.E.2d at 810 (“This duty is twofold: (1) to provide adequate instructions for safe use and (2) to provide a warning as to dangers inherent in improper use.”). A “ ‘product label must make apparent the potential harmful consequences. The warning should be of such intensity as to cause a reasonable man to exercise for his own safety caution commensurate with the potential danger.’” Jarrell v. Monsanto Co., 528 N.E.2d 1158, 1162 (Ind.Ct.App.1988) (citation omitted). A warning’s adequacy is measured by its factual content, the manner in which it is expressed, and the method of conveying these facts. Id. at 1162-63. The adequacy of a warning (i.e., whether the defendant breached its duty to warn) is generally a question of fact, but it can be decided as a matter of law when the facts are undisputed and only one inference can be drawn from those facts. Cook v. Ford Motor Co., 913 N.E.2d 311, 327 (Ind.Ct.App.2009).

SPX argues that the district court’s judgment should be affirmed because the warnings and instructions clearly informed users that the support pins are always to be used and that failure to use them can result in personal injury. Alternatively, SPX contends that, even if the warnings are not sufficient as a matter of law, the district court’s judgment should still be affirmed because any alleged defect in the warnings could not have been the proximate cause of Weigle’s and Moore’s injuries because Weigle did not read the warnings and Moore did not inspect the stands to ensure that the pins were in place. We need not reach the issue of proximate cause because we agree with SPX and the district court that the warnings are sufficient as a matter of law, hence Weigle and Moore have failed to establish that SPX breached its duty to warn.

Weigle and Moore acknowledge that the “Parts List and Operating Instructions” and the decal affixed to the stands both provide instructions for safe use (“[a]lways use the support pin; insert support pin completely through extension tube”) and warnings about the dangers inherent in improper use (“personal injury” accompanied by a pictogram showing a load falling on top of a person), but they contend that this is not sufficient. According to them, the warnings are inadequate because they do not warn “that the jack stand is unstable when the bottom of the extension column touches the ground when the pin is not inserted,” that is, “the warnings’ content was deficient because it failed to explain the significance of the support pin in maintaining the stability of the jack stand.” They reaffirmed their position at oral argument when they unequivocally stated that the warnings must provide not only the consequences of not using the pin but also the mechanics of the pin (e.g., use the pin or the stand will not be stable).

Weigle and Moore cite only Cook, 913 N.E.2d 311, in support of their position. Cook arose from a car accident in which an eight-year-old child, who had not been wearing a seatbelt, was severely injured when the front passenger-seat airbag deployed. Id. at 315-17. The owner’s manual accompanying the vehicle indicated that the airbag (which could be deactivated) should always be on “unless there is a rear-facing infant seat installed in the front seat” and that turning off the passenger airbag “increases the likelihood of injury to forward facing occupants in the passenger seat.” Id. at 316, 326. The plaintiffs had designated expert testimony that airbags pose a risk to all children in the front passenger seat, not just children in rear-facing child seats. Id. at 326. The Indiana Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s grant of summary judgment, explaining that the warnings were not adequate as a matter of law because, based on the wording of the owner’s manual and the expert testimony, there was “a question of fact as to whether a reasonable person would have understood from Ford’s instructions that injury could occur under these circumstances.” Id. at 327. One judge dissented on grounds that the Cooks had failed to comply with Ford’s other instructions to place children in the backseat and to wear seatbelts. Id. at 334-35 (Brown, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). The majority rejected the dissent’s reasoning because “the language selected by Ford with respect to the additional warnings was permissive; that is, it equivocally instructed to place children in the backseat ‘if possible,’ ‘suggested’ that children are safer there, and that occupants ‘should’ always wear seat belts.” Id. at 328 (majority opinion). The warnings also failed to provide “that one of the risks from which children are possibly safer is injury from deployment of the front seat passenger airbag.” Id. The court concluded that there was a question of fact as to whether Ford’s warnings were “strong and specific enough to warn the Cooks that the additional instructions [on placing children in the backseat and wearing seatbelts] were linked to danger from the airbag.” Id.

Like the district court, we are unable to see how Cook supports Weigle’s and Moore’s argument that SPX’s warnings are inadequate because they fail to explain the mechanics of the support pin. Unlike the instructions in Cook, the instructions here provide that the support pin “always” must be used by placing it all the way through the column and that the risk of not using the support pin is personal injury; in other words, the warnings here cannot be construed as permissive or equivocal.

Moreover, SPX’s instruction that the support pin must always be used is linked to the risk of personal injury and is accompanied by a pictogram illustrating a load falling on top of a person. Weigle and Moore suggest that the placement of the pictogram on the decal affixed to the support stands is confusing because it is placed next to the instruction not to exceed the capacity rating and not next to the instruction regarding the support pin. See Appendix B, infra. They claim that Betcher testified in his deposition that the pictogram was intended to apply only to the warning that appears immediately following the picture. We are not persuaded that this raises an issue of triable fact. For one thing, Betcher actually testified that the pictogram applied to the capacity-warning rating and to all subsequent warnings and instructions on the decal. In addition, immediately following the instruction in the “Parts List and Operating Instructions” related to insertion of the support pin is a bolded instruction, preceded by “IMPORTANT,” that the user should “[ajlways check the placement of the support pin before lowering a load onto a support stand.” See Appendix A, infra. In short, the instructions and warnings convey to a user that failure to use the support pin may result in personal injury caused by the load falling. No additional warnings need to be furnished where such warnings would not supplement the user’s understanding of the nature and characteristics of the product. See Shanks v. A.F.E. Indus., Inc., 275 Ind. 241, 416 N.E.2d 833, 837 (1981); Birch v. Midwest Garage Door Sys., 790 N.E.2d 504, 518 (Ind.Ct.App.2003).

What Weigle and Moore really desire is a physics lesson to accompany the support stands. We have been unable to find any Indiana authority supporting their view (which invariably would lead to claims that the warnings are too technical and confusing). Indeed, we rejected a similar argument in McMahon v. Bunn-O-Matic Corp., 150 F.3d 651 (7th Cir.1998). In McMahon, the plaintiff had been badly burned by coffee purchased from a gas station and had sued the manufacturer of the coffee maker under Indiana law, claiming that it had “failed to warn consumers about the severity of burns that hot coffee can produce.” Id. at 654. The plaintiff argued that the warnings should have indicated that hot coffee can cause third-degree burns. We rejected her argument:

Bunn can’t deliver a medical education with each cup of coffee. Any person severely injured by any product could make a claim, at least as plausible as the McMahons’, that they did not recognize the risks ex ante as clearly as they do after the accident.

Insistence on more detail can make any warning, however elaborate, seem inadequate. Indiana courts have expressed considerable reluctance to require ever-more detail in warnings. See Meyers v. Furrow Building Materials, 659 N.E.2d 1147 (Ind.Ct.App.1996); Welch v. Scripto-Tokai Corp., 651 N.E.2d 810 (Ind.Ct.App.1995). For good reasons, laid out in Todd v. Societe BIG, S.A., 9 F.3d 1216, 1218-19 (7th Cir.1993) (en banc) (Illinois law): “Extended warnings present several difficulties, first among them that, the more text must be squeezed onto the product, the smaller the type, and the less likely is the consumer to read or remember any of it. Only pithy and bold warnings can be effective. Long passages in capital letters are next to illegible, and long passages in lower case letters are treated as boilerplate. Plaintiff wants a warning in such detail that a magnifying glass would be necessary to read it. Many consumers cannot follow simple instructions (including pictures) describing how to program their video cassette recorders.” Indiana has the same general understanding....

McMahon, 150 F.3d at 656-57 (citation omitted). SPX was not required to explain the physics of the support stands to satisfy its duty to provide adequate instructions and warnings. Rather, it is enough that SPX instructed users on how to use the stand properly (“[ajlways use the support pin”) and warned users of the inherent dangers of not following those instructions (“personal injury” with a pictogram of a load falling on a person). We thus agree with the district judge that Weigle and Moore have failed to demonstrate a genuine issue of material fact as to the adequacy of the warnings.

B. Defective-Design Claims

A second way that a product can be in a defective condition under the IPLA is “if, at the time it is conveyed by the seller to another party, it is in a condition: (1) not contemplated by reasonable persons among those considered expected users or consumers of the product; and (2) that will be unreasonably dangerous to the expected user or consumer when used in reasonably expectable ways of handling or consumption.” Ind.Code § 34-20-4-1. As noted earlier, defective-design claims sound in negligence, so a party alleging a design defect “must establish that the manufacturer or seller failed to exercise reasonable care under the circumstances in designing the product.” Ind.Code § 34-20-2-2; see TRW Vehicle Safety Sys., Inc. v. Moore, 936 N.E.2d 201, 209 (Ind.2010). A plaintiff alleging defective design as a result of negligence must demonstrate that the defendant failed “to take precautions that are less expensive than the net costs of accidents.” McMahon, 150 F.3d at 657; see also Bammerlin v. Navistar Int’l Transp. Corp., 30 F.3d 898, 902 (7th Cir.1994); Miller v. Todd, 551 N.E.2d 1139, 1141, 1143 (Ind.1990). In other words, to establish that the defendant was negligent the plaintiff must establish B