F.E.B. Corp. v. United States (818 F.3d 681, 2016)

EBEL, Circuit Judge:

Plaintiff-Appellant F.E.B. Corp. (“F.E.B,”) brought this action against Defendant-Appellee United States (“the government”) seeking to quiet title to a spoil island just off Key West, Florida. Because we find that the Quiet Title Aet’s statute of limitations has run, see 28 U.S.C. § 2409a(g), we AFFIRM the district court’s dismissal of the action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

I. BACKGROUND

The island in question, known' as Wisteria Island (or “the' island”), is situated in the Gulf of Mexico, less than a mile off the coast of Key West, Florida. It |s not a natural island, but rather was formed as a result of dredging operations performed under the auspices of the United States Navy (“Navy”) in nearby Key West Harbor during the first half of the nineteenth century. As Navy contractors deepened the channels in the harbor to improve shipping and aviation access, they deposited the dredged material on a nearby plot of submerged land. The accumulations eventually rose above sea level. A substantial dredging project in 1943 made the thirty-nine-aere (later-named) Wisteria Island what it is today.

In 1951, the state of Florida issued notice of its intention to sell Wisteria Island. The United States objected to the sale of the island on the grounds that the island belonged to the United States.. In a letter to the state, the United States traced its ownership of the island and surrounding area to an 1819 treaty with Spain, as confirmed by subsequent 1845 and 1924 Executive Orders. The United States concluded, “In view of the foregoing [Florida is] informed that the Department of the Navy considers ... the spoil area in question as being the property of the United States. It is, therefore, requested, that no farther action be taken ... to dispose of the spoil area in question by sale or otherwise.” (Doc. 1-32.).

In his own letter to the state, Florida’s attorney, general acknowledged the United States’ claim, but expressed doubt as to its validity, opining: •

I am unable to state definitively whether or not the Navy’s claim is valid. However, I do think that the claim is debatable enough and so shrouded in antiquity that I think the best course would be for [Florida] to complete the sale and explain the Navy’s claim to [the buyer] and .allow him to accept the ... deed at his own risk. In this manner we can get the question of .title settled one way or other in case the Navy decides to litigate with him.

(Doc. 1-33.) Accordingly, in 1952, Florida sold the island to a private party via a quitclaim deed that contained no warranties of title.

One year later, Congress enacted' the Submerged Lands Act (“SLA”), 43 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1315, which, broadly speaking, granted .the states ownership of submerged lands within three miles of their coastlines, subject to certain exceptions. In the years that followed, the. United States did not reassert its claim to Wisteria Island. Title passed from private owner to private owner until F.E.B. acquired the island in 1967. The federal government appeared to acquiesce to F.E.B.’s ownership, and even entered into licensing agreements with F.E.B. to use the island as a Navy training ground from 2004 to 2006.

In 2011, however, the United States once again asserted ownership, over Wisteria Island. . F.E.B, filed this suit under the Quiet Title Act (“QTA”), 28 U.S.C. § 2409a, to establish ownership of the island. F.E.B. argues that it owns the island pursuant to the SLA and Florida law. The district court, however, did not reach the merits of F.EJB.’s SLA claim in this quiet title action. On' cross-motions for summary judgment, the district court found that the QTA’s statute of limitations had run, and accordingly dismissed the suit for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. F.E.B. now appeals.

II. DISCUSSION

“We review a district court’s application of a statute of limitations and its grant of summary judgment de novo.” McCaleb v. A.O. Smith Corp., 200 F.3d 747, 750 (11th Cir.2000). “Summary judgment is appropriate whén there are no genuine issues of material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Id. In this case, the parties agree that there are no material factual issues in dispute and, consequently, that the statute of limitations question may be decided as a matter of law.

A. The QTA

This case is animated by the intersection of two federal statutes.' the Quiet Title Act and the Submerged Lands Act. We begin with the QTA.

“The QTA ... waives the United States’[ ] sovereign immunity and ‘permits plaintiffs to name it as a party defendant in civil actions to adjudicate title disputes involving real property in which the United States claims an interest.’ ” McMaster v. United States, 177 F.3d 936, 939 (11th Cir.1999) (quoting Block v. N. Dakota ex rel. Bd. of Univ. & Sch. Lands, 461 U.S. 273, 276, 103 S.Ct. 1811, 75 L.Ed.2d 840 (1983) (internal alteration omitted)); see 28 U.S.C. § 2409a(a) (“The United States may be named as a party defendant -in a civil action under this section to adjudicate a disputed title to real property in which the United States claims an interest...'.”). As such, it “provide[s] the exclusive means by which adverse claimants [can] challenge the United States’ title to real property.” Block, 461 U.S. at 286, 103 S.Ct. 1811.

The QTA has a twelve-year statute' of limitations, which is triggered when the plaintiffs QTA action first accrues. See 28 U.S.C, § 2409a(g) (“Any civil action under this section ... shall be barred unless it is commenced within twelve years of the date upon which it accrued.”). A QTA action accrues when “the plaintiff or his predecessor .in interest knew or should have known of the claim of the United States” to the real property at issue. Id.

The Supreme Court has twice concluded that, because the statute of limitations circumscribes the scope' of the QTA’s" waiver of sovereign immunity, compliance with the limitations period is jurisdictional. See United States v. Mottaz, 476 U.S. 834, 841, 106 S.Ct. 2224, 90 L.Ed.2d 841 (1986) (“When the United States consents to be sued, the terms of its waiver of sovereign immunity define the extent of the court’s jurisdiction.”); Block, 461 U.S. at 292, 103 S.Ct. 1811 (“If North Dakota’s suit is barred by [the QTA statute of limitations], the courts below had no jurisdiction to inquire into the merits.”); see also Bank One Texas v. United States, 157 F.3d 397, 403 (5th Cir.1998). For the same reason, the, limitations period “must be strictly observed,” and courts “must be careful not to interpret it in a manner that would ‘extend the waiver beyond that which Congress intended.’” Block, 461 U.S. at 287, 103 S.Ct. 1811 (quoting United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 117-18, 100 S.Ct. 352, 62 L.Ed.2d 259 (1979)).

Accordingly, courts have consistently held that the QTA’s statute of limitations standard “does not require the government to provide explicit notice of its claim” in order for the statute of limitations to begin running. Spirit Lake Tribe v. N. Dakota, 262 F.3d 732, 738 (8th Cir.2001). “The government’s claim need not be ‘clear and unambiguous,’ ” and “[knowledge of the claim’s full contours is not required.” Id. (quoting first N.D. ex rel. Bd. of Univ. & Sch. Lands v. Block, 789 F.2d 1308, 1313 (8th Cir.1986), then Knapp v. United States, 636 F.2d 279, 283 (10th Cir.1980)). Rather, “[a]ll that is necessary is a reasonable awareness that the Government claims some interest adverse to the plaintiffs,” Id. (quoting Knapp, 636 F.2d at 283); see also Kingman Reef Atoll Invs., LLC v. United States, 541 F.3d 1189, 1198 (9th Cir.2008) (same); Cheyenne Arapaho Tribes v. United States, 558 F.3d 592, 595 (D.C.Cir.2009) (same). Moreover, the merits of the government’s claim are irrelevant: “Even invalid government claims trigger the QTA limitations period.” Spirit Lake, 262 F.3d at 738; see also Richmond, Fredericksburg & Potomac R.R. Co. v. United States, 945 F.2d 765, 769 (4th Cir.1991) (“The crucial issue in the statute of limitations inquiry is whether the plaintiff had notice of the federal claim, not whether the claim itself is valid.”).

In this case, it is undisputed that the state of Florida, F.E.B.’s predecessor in interest, had actual knowledge of the United States’ claim to the island in 1951. The United States’ 1951 letter objecting to Florida’s intention to sell the island plainly set forth the Navy’s claim of ownership over the island: The letter traced the United States’ ownership of the spoil area to an 1819 treaty with Spain, and informed Florida “that the Department of the Navy considers ... the spoil area in question as being the property of the United States.” (Doc. 1-32.) Such an explicit and unambiguous assertion of a property interest more than meets the QTA’s accrual requirements. See Knapp, 636 F.2d at 283; Spirit Lake, 262 F.3d at 738.

Beyond that, Florida’s actual knowledge of the federal government’s claim is evidenced by the Florida attorney general’s letter to the state agency attempting to sell the island. The letter acknowledged the Navy’s claim, but nonetheless urged the agency to “complete this sale and explain the Navy’s claim to [the buyer], and allow him to accept the ... deed at his own risk____In this manner we can get the question of title settled one way or [the] other in case the Navy decides to litigate with him.” (Doc. 1-33.) The fact that Florida duly issued the original private buyer only a quitclaim deed, with no warranties of title, further establishes Florida’s awareness of the federal government’s claimed interest. Because F.E.B.’s predecessor in interest had actual knowledge of the United States’ cjaim to the real property at issue in 1951, F.E.B.’s QTA claim expired in 1963 — well before initiation of this, suit. See 28 U.S.C. § 2409a(g). Therefore, the district., court was correct to dismiss the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

B. The SLA

F.E.B. contends that, although the QTA’s limitations period may have been triggered in 1951, the period did not expire, because the intervening passage of the SLA countervailed the United States’ 1951 assertion of ownership.

Congress enacted the Submerged Lands Act, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1315, in 1953 in reaction to the Supreme Court’s ruling in United States v. California (California I), 332 U.S. 19, 67 S.Ct. 1658, 91 L.Ed. 1889 (1947), which held that the United States— not the states — had “paramount sovereign rights” to submerged lands seaward of the states’ coasts. See United States v. Alaska, 521 U.S. 1, 5-6, 117 S.Ct. 1888, 138 L.Ed.2d 231 (1997). The SLA counteracted that holding, and instead “grant[ed] States submerged lands beneath a 3-mile belt of the territorial sea.” Id. at 35, 117 S.Ct. 1888; see 43 U.S.C. § 1311(a), (b)(1) (“confirm[ing]” and “establish[ing]” states’ “title to and ownership of the lands beneath navigable' waters within '.[their] boundaries” and “releasing] and relinquishing]- ..-. all right, title, and interest of the United States in and to all said lands”), § 1312 (defining states’ boundaries as reaching three miles seaward from their coastlines); § 1301(a)(3) (defining “lands beneath navigable waters” to include “all filled in, made, or reclaimed lands which formerly were lands beneath navigable water”).

Not all submerged (or formerly submerged) lands within that boundary, however, fall within the SLA. The SLA contains numerous exceptions, including, for example, lands actually occupied by the United States under claim of right, lands acquired by eminent domain, and, of particular relevance here, “all lands filled in, built up, or otherwise reclaimed by the United States for its own usé.” 43 U.S.C. § 1313(a) (emphasis added).

F.E.B. argues that the generic language'in the SLA abandoned the federal government’s previously-expressed claim to the (formerly submerged) Wisteria Island, which in turn effectively reset the QTA’s statute of limitations period for that island. A few of our sister circuits, in other contexts not involving the SLA, have accepted the possibility that, the government’s express abandonment of a claim can prevent a previously-triggered QTA’s limitations period from expiring (although no case-that has come to our attention has found that abandonment in fact occurred). See Spirit Lake Tribe, 262 F.3d at 739; Kingman, 541 F.3d at 1199-1201; Cheyenne Arapaho, 558 F.3d at 597; cf. Rio Grande Silvery Minnow (Hybognathusamarus) v. Bureau of Reclam., 599 F.3d 1165, 1186 (10th Cir.2010) (assuming, “without definitively deciding,” that abandonment could reset the limitations period). The bar for showing such abandonment, however, is high.

It is well-established that “the federal government cannot abandon property absent an affirmative act authorized by Congress.” Int’l Aircraft Recovery, LLC v. Unidentified, Wrecked & Abandoned Aircraft, 218 F.3d 1255, 1258 (11th Cir.2000). Moreover, “officers who have no . authority at all to dispose of Government property cannot by their conduct cause the Government to lose its valuable rights by their acquiescence, laches, or failure to act.” California I, 332 U.S. at 40, 67 S.Ct. 1658. Accordingly, our sister circuits have consistently held that, for purposes of the QTÁ statute of limitations, the United States will be deemed to have abandoned a claim of ownership only if (1) “it’clearly and unequivocally abandons its interest,” as evidenced by (2) sufficiently formal “documentation from a government official with authority to make such decisions on behalf of the United States.” Kingman, 541 F.3d at 1201 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Rio Grande, 599 F.3d at 1186 (same); Spirit Lake, 262 F.3d at 739 (same); Cheyenne Arapaho, 558 F.3d at 597 (same).

We have no difficulty concluding that the SLA does not rise to the level of the “clear arid unequivocal” abandonment' of the government’s interest in Wistéria Island necessary to reset the QTA statute of limitations. The SLA only “release[d] and relinquished]” the United States’ interest in subinerged lands “except as otherwise reserved [t]herein.” 43 U.S.C. § 1311(b). One such reservation excepts from the SLA “all lands filled in, built up, or otherwise reclaimed by the United States for its ovm use.” Id. § 1313(a) (emphasis added). Wisteria Island’s origin is undisputed: It was built up by. Navy contractors, who used the land for the government’s purpose and benefit of storing fill accumulated from nearby dredging operations. Thus, the plain language of the SLA refutes F.E.B.’s argument that the SLA clearly and unequivocally conveyed title in Wisteria Island to the neighboring state of Florida. Consequently, the statute of limitations period to challenge the federal government’s ownership of Wisteria Island continued running in the wake of the SLA, and expired long before F.E.B filed this action. - ■ ■

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