Hill v. Mitchell (842 F.3d 910, 2016)

McKEAGUE, J., delivered the lead opinion in which BATCHELDER, J., joined in all but § III.D. BATCHELDER, J. (pp. 948-50), delivered a separate concurring opinion. COLE, C.J. (pp. OSO-SO), delivered a separate dissenting opinion.

OPINION

McKEAGUE, Circuit Judge.

An Ohio jury convicted Genesis Hill of kidnapping and murdering his infant daughter and sentenced him to death. The district court held that the prosecution violated the rule of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963), by suppressing favorable evidence—a police report and the baby’s mother’s grand jury testimony—and granted a conditional writ of habeas corpus. However, Hill violated a congressionally mandated procedural requisite to ha-beas relief by bringing his Brady claim well beyond AEDPÁ’s one-year statute of limitations period. Because Hill’s Brddy claim is procedurally barred and is otherwise without merit, and because his other grounds for relief are also without merit, we reverse the grant of habeas relief.

I

Factual Background, The Ohio Supreme Court provided a detailed background of the events leading to Hill’s conviction and sentence:

On May 31, 1991, defendant-appellant, Genesis Hill, crept into his girlfriend’s apartment in Cincinnati and surreptitiously removed their six-month-old daughter, Domika Dudley. On June 2, police found Domika’s body, wrapped in trash bags, in a vacant lot behind Hill’s house.-

Hill, age nineteen, and Teresa Dudley, age eighteen, lived near each other and had an on-going relationship. Their daughter, Domika Dudley, was born in November 1990. Around May 29, 1991, Barbara Janson, a neighbor, heard Teresa “making silly little comments” to Hill that she was going to take him to court for child support. Hill replied that “he’d kill that little bitch before he paid anything.” Teresa recalled Hill saying, “I bet I don’t pay,” when she asked him about child support.

On May 31, in the late afternoon, Hill and Teresa were together in Hill’s yard. Teresa became upset, they argued, and Teresa went home. That evening, Teresa went to sleep in her mother’s second-floor apartment in the same room as Domika. Between 11:00 p.m. and midnight, Janson and another neighbor saw Hill enter the front yard of Teresa’s apartment building, but they did not see Hill leave. That front entrance was the only entry way to her apartment except for the back yard, which was enclosed by a high wall. Ten to fifteen minutes after the neighbors saw Hill, Teresa came out and said Domika was missing.

Teresa went to Hill’s home, but was told that Hill was not there and did not have the baby. Hill lived in the same .building as did his uncle and two aunts. Just then, Hill appeared, but he denied knowing where his daughter was. A neighborhood search for Domika by police proved unsuccessful. Hill appeared unconcerned, did not participate in the search, and was “snickering” and “grinning” as Teresa talked to police about their missing baby.

Around 5:45 a.m., June 1, Teresa and one of Hill’s aunts found a distinctive blue and pink barrette on the floor of Hill’s garage. That barrette was identical to one used in Domika’s hair before she went to sleep.

On the afternoon of June 2, police found a suspicious SMA® baby formula carton in an overgrown vacant lot behind Hill’s garage. That box was not there on the day before when police searched the lot. Domika’s body was inside the carton. A plastic shopping bag and three plastic trash bags had been successively wrapped around her body. Black electrical tape was wrapped around the outer trash bag.

A man’s blue shirt, with white and red stripes, was tied around Domika’s head. Teresa and Jansón identified this shirt as one that “looks like” a shirt Hill owned.

Domika died as a result of three skull fractures, and she had been dead for more than twelve hours. Either a strong, blunt force had struck her head, or her head had been crushed. She might have been injured in a fall, but it seems only if another force had hit her during or after the fall. She was wearing only a diaper and two barrettes.

The baby formula box, in which Domika was found, was similar to one that Hill’s aunt had placed in the trash pile next to Hill’s garage. The box was in the trash on June 1, but not on June 2. Batch numbers on an SMA® can from the aunt’s pantry matched batch numbers on the box in which Domika was found. Hill’s uncle was unable to find the black electrical tape that he kept in a tool box. A forensic expert testified that the last trash bag wrapped around Domika had once been directly attached to a trash bag found’ in Hill’s kitchen. Microscopic grain, crease, and other distinctive marks made in the manufacturing process matched exactly on the two trash bags.

At Teresa’s apartment, police found Hill’s right thumb print on a hallway light bulb near where Teresa and Domi-ka had slept. When Teresa went to sleep that night, the hallway door had been partly open and the light had been on. When she awoke and discovered Domika missing, the light bulb was unscrewed. On the evening of June 2, the day Domi-ka’s body was found, a Cincinnati bus driver overheard a conversation on his bus. One young man, crying and upset, told another, “he could not believe what he had done to a little baby.” The man further stated, “he thought he might get the chair for it.” After the bus driver heard the news about a dead baby, police were called. The bus driver picked Hill out of a photo array as the young man crying on the bus. ¡.

A grand jury indicted Hill on two felony-murder counts in violation of [Ohio Revised Code] 2903.01: murder during an aggravated burglary (Count I) and during a kidnapping (Count II). Each aggravated murder count contained two death-penalty specifications under R.C. 2929.04(A)(7) (murder during an aggravated burglary and murder during a kidnapping). Count III charged aggravated burglary in violation of R.C. 2911,11, and Count IV charged kidnapping in violation of R.C. 2905.01. Hill pled not guilty. At trial, numerous friends and relatives testified for Hill and described his activities on the evening of May 31. Defense witnesses suggested that only two trash bags had been in the kitchen; that Teresa was not a good mother; that she had been aggressive towards Hill on May 31; that she had access to the trash bags in Hill’s kitchen; and that she may have “planted” the barrette on the garage floor.

Hill testified as to his activities on May 31. He admitted he had been in the hallway,, outside Teresa’s door, around 11:00 p.m., and had unscrewed the light bulb. He claimed he only “whistled” to Teresa. When she did not answer, he left and went out the front, the same way he came in. He said he then “[w]ent on about [his] business” (drinking with friends). In his narrative testimony, Hill implicitly denied taking Domika, but he did not explicitly do so. Cross-examination revealed discrepancies between his testimony and his statements to police and two mental health professionals.

The jury found Hill guilty as charged.

State v. Hill, 75 Ohio St.3d 195, 661 N.E.2d 1068, 1072-74 (1996).

During the penalty phase, numerous relatives and friends testified regarding Hill’s character and upbringing and Dr. Nancy Schmidtgoessling testified regarding Hill’s mental health and background. Hill also submitted an unsworn statement, where he said, “I feel hurt. .Growing up was hard. A lot of things wasn’t right for me,” and he “struggled to survive.” Id. at 1074. He was “sorry that you all have to be here,” “sorry that the baby [was] gone,” and “sorry for the family.” Id. He did not admit or deny killing Domika. After hearing the evidence, the jury recommended the death penalty.

Procedural Background. The Ohio Court of Appeals and the Ohio Supreme Court affirmed Hill’s convictions and sentence. State v. Hill, Nos. C-910916, C-940487, 1994 WL 721580, at *15 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 21, 1994), aff'd, 75 Ohio St.3d 195, 661 N.E.2d 1068, 1085 (1996), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 895, 117 S.Ct. 241, 136 L.Ed.2d 170 (1996). Hill sought post-conviction relief in state court on various grounds, including alleged unrelated Brady violations, but was unsuccessful. State v. Hill, No. C-100554, 2011 WL 3477183, at *7-8 (Ohio Ct. App. Aug. 10, 2011), perm. app. denied, 132 Ohio St.3d 1513, 974 N.E.2d 112 (2012) (table decision) (third petition); R. 263, Ohio Ct. App. Decision, Page ID 6849, perm. app. denied, 102 Ohio St.3d 1447, 808 N.E.2d 398 (Ohio 2004) (table decision) (second petition); State v. Hill, 90 Ohio St.3d 571, 740 N.E.2d 282, 283 (2001) (denying motion to reopen petition for post-conviction relief); State v. Hill, No. C-961052, 1997 WL 727587, at *2 (Ohio Ct. App. Nov. 21, 1997), perm. app. denied, 81 Ohio St.3d 1468, 690 N.E.2d 1288 (Ohio 1998) (table decision) (first petition).

Hill filed a habeas petition in the district court in June 1998 raising numerous grounds for relief, including a Brady claim alleging that the State suppressed favorable evidence. He filed an amended petition in April 1999, raising a Brady claim alleging that the prosecution “failed to disclose ... exculpatory evidence in its possession which, if disclosed, would have been material to the outcome of [Hill’s] trial.” App. R. 42, Am. Habeas Petition at ¶ 87, J.A. Vol. 2 at 396. Hill then filed a second amended petition in December 2005. R. 137-1, Second Am. Habeas Petition, Page ID 85-103. In that petition, Hill asserted a three-part Brady claim as his fourth ground for relief. Id. at 27-32, ¶¶ 77-97, Page ID 111-16. The district court dismissed -the first two parts of Hill’s Brady claim on the merits. In sub-part (c) (referred to as (Claim 4(c))), Hill made only the sweeping assertion that “[t]he State likely has still more Brady material that it is refusing or unable to produce.” R. 137-1, Second Am. Habeas Petition at 31, Page ID 115. Hill did not identify any Brady evidence to support Claim 4(c), leading the district court to dismiss .it because “the utter lack of substance to the claim makes any procedural default analysis not only impossible, but also unnecessary.” Hill v. Mitchell, No. 1:98-CV-452, 2006 WL 2807017, at *63 (S.D. Ohio Sept. 27, 2006).

In December 2007, Hill discovered a suppressed police report from the night Domika went missing. R. 219-3, Jim Silva-nia Deck, Page ID 2296-97 (averring that Silvania obtained report on December 17, 2007 and sent it to Hill’s counsel via overnight mail on December 18, 2007). In March 2011, he moved the district court to reconsider its finding that Claim 4(c) was procedurally defaulted and to find that the report established cause and prejudice to excuse the procedural bar. The district court agreed and granted the motion for reconsideration. Hill v. Mitchell, No. 1:98-cv-452, 2012 WL 995280, at *14 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 23, 2012).

In September 2012, Hill moved the district court to expand the record to include a transcript of Teresa Dudley’s grand jury testimony, also in support of Claim 4(c). R. 237, Motion to Expand at 7-8, Page ID 2573-74. It appears that the State disclosed the testimony in October 2010. Id. at 4, Page ID 2570.

In March 2013, the district court granted habeas relief on Claim 4(c) based on suppression of the police report. Hill v. Mitchell, No. 1:98-cv-452, 2013 WL 1345831 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 29, 2013). The court also granted Hill’s motion to expand the record to include Dudley’s grand jury testimony as further Brady evidence in support of Claim 4(c). The district court denied Hill’s remaining grounds for relief and issued a conditional writ of habeas corpus directing the State to either release Hill or grant him a new trial. The State timely appealed on the Brady claim, and Hill cross-appealed on five issues: sufficiency of the .evidence, ineffective assistance of trial counsel at the penalty phase, ineffective assistance of counsel on direct appeal, the constitutionality of Ohio’s system of proportionality review, and cumulative error.

II

We review the district court’s decision to grant a petition for a writ of habeas corpus de novo. Harris v. Stovall, 212 F.3d 940, 942 (6th Cir. 2000). Our review of state court decisions is normally governed by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA), 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Under AEDPA, we review a state-court merits adjudication only to determine whether it “resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law( as determined by the Supreme Court.” Id. To prevail, a ha-beas petitioner must “ ‘show that the state court’s ruling on the claim being presented in federal court was so lacking in justification that there was an error well understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement.’” Woods v. Donald, — U.S. —, 135 S.Ct. 1372, 1376, 191 L.Ed.2d 464 (2015) (per curiam) (quoting Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 103, 131 S.Ct. 770, 178 L.Ed.2d 624 (2011)).

AEDPA’s deferential standard applies only to claims that have been “adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings.” Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 186, 131 S.Ct. 1388, 179 L.Ed.2d 557 (2011). If the state courts have not addressed a claim on its merits, “federal habeas review is not subject to the deferential standard that applies under AED-PA” Cone v. Bell, 556 U.S. 449, 472, 129 S.Ct. 1769, 173 L.Ed.2d 701 (2009). “Instead, the claim is reviewed de novo.” Id. (citing Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374, 390, 125 S.Ct. 2456, 162 L.Ed.2d 360 (2005); Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 534, 123 S.Ct. 2527, 156 L.Ed.2d 471 (2003)); Regardless of the standard of review, however, we may not review claims at all unless the petitioner satisfies AED-PA’s procedural requirements—including the requirement that a petitioner bring his claims within AEDPA’s one-year statute of limitations period.

III

The district court granted habeas relief on Claim 4(c) for violations of Brady, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194. The State argues that the distinct court erred because (1) Hill did not bring his Brady claim within AEDPA’s one-year statute of limitations period; (2) the claim was procedurally defaulted; and (3) the claim fails on the merits. For the reasons that follow, we' agree that Hill’s claim is barred by AEDPA’s statute of limitations.

A. Background

Hill first raised Claim 4(c) in his second amended habeas petition in October 2005. R. 137-1, Second’Am. Habeas Petition at 31, Page ID 115. Claim 4(c), in its original form, did not cite any specific Brady material, making only the sweeping assertion that “[t]he State likely has still more Brady material that it is refusing or unable to produce.” Id. Hill based this vague allegation on other cases in which the Hamilton County Prosecutor’s Office was found to have violated Brady. Id. Hill also asserted that he asked to review the prosecutor’s and investigating officers’ files, but was not allowed to do so. Id. at 32, Page ID 116. On September 27, 2006, the district court dismissed the original Claim 4(c) as procedurally defaulted because “the utter lack of substance ... makes any procedural default analysis not only impossible, but also unnecessary.” Hill v. Mitchell, 2006 WL 2807017, at *63. Hill ultimately discovered Brady evidence, but did not assert his amended Brady claim in a timely fashion.

Police Report. In December 2007, Hill obtained Officer James Givens’ police report through a private investigator’s public record request. R. 219^, Police Rep., Page ID 2298-99. Givens was the first officer on the scene after Teresa Dudley called to report Domika missing. In the report, Givens wrote, “Investigate why the mother ran from police and asked for the police to check the alley behind the house (several times).” R. 219-4, Police Rep. at 1, Page ID 2298. Despite his current argument that this report is a smoking gun entitling him to relief, Hill waited over three years to bring the report to the district court’s attention. In March 2011, Hill moved the court to reconsider its finding that Claim 4(c) was procedurally defaulted, citing the police report as the Brady evidence that was missing from the original catch-all version of Claim 4(c). R. 219, Am. Motion for Reconsideration at 21-28, Page ID 2280-87. The district court was “displeased by[Hill]’s waiting three years to file the instant motion” and found “his reasons explaining the delay wholly wanting.” Hill v. Mitchell, 2012 WL 995280, at *14. The court -explained that, “[u]nder most circumstances, that delay would present an insurmountable . (and self-imposed) hurdle to a request for reconsideration.” Id.

Nevertheless, the district court found “that equitable principles [do not] -require or justify a refusal to consider [Hill]’s-request because the new evidence at issue strikes at the heart of a case that landed [Hill] on death row.” Id. To avoid AED-PA’s one-year limitation period, the court treated Hill’s motion as one to reconsider under Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(2) and granted it. Id. at *3. The court found that even if it alternatively ■ considered Hill’s motion as one to amend -his habeas petition under Fed. R. Civ. P. 15, Hill could still avoid AEDPA’s statute of limitations because his motion related back to the original Claim 4(c). Id. at *10. The district court then granted habeas relief on the basis of the police report. Hill v. Mitchell, 2013 WL 1345831, at *11.

Grand Jury Testimony. In October 2010—before moving the district court to reconsider its ruling that Claim 4(c) was procedurally defaulted—Hill obtained a transcript of Teresa Dudley’s grand jury testimony. R. 237, Motion to Expand at 4, Page ID 2570. For unexplained reasons, Hill did not includé the grand jury testimony in his motion to reconsider Claim 4(c). Instead, he waited another eighteen months, until September 2012, to move the district court to expand the record to include the grand jury testimony. Id. The State did not object, and the district' court granted the motion. Hill v. Mitchell, 2013 WL 1345831, at *13. While the court granted habeas relief on the basis of the police report, it noted that the grand jury testimony-“bolster[ed]” its conclusion that Hill was entitled to relief. Id. at *13.

B. Motion for Reconsideration—Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(2)

The district court granted Hill’s motion as one for reconsideration under Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(2). We review that decision for abuse of discretion. Landrum v. Anderson, 813 F.3d 330, 334 (6th Cir. 2016) (citing Tyler v. Anderson, 749 F.3d 499, 509 (6th Cir. 2014); Frontier Ins. Co. v. Blaty, 454 F.3d 590, 596 (6th Cir. 2006)). The district court ‘“necessarily abuse[s] its discretion if it based its ruling on .an erroneous view of the law.’ ” Highmark Inc. v. Allcare Health Mgmt. Sys., Inc., — U.S. —, 134 S.Ct. 1744, 1748 n.2, 188 L.Ed.2d 829 (2014) (quoting Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384; 405, 110 S.Ct. 2447, 110 L.Ed.2d 359 (1990)); see Schenck v. City of Hudson, 114 F.3d 590, 593 (6th Cir. 1997).

Rule 60(b) allows a habeas petitioner to mové the district court to reconsider a'judgment or order “under a limited set of circumstances.” Gonzalez v. Crosby, 545 U.S. 524, 528, 125 S.Ct. 2641, 162 L.Ed.2d 480 (2005). These limited circumstances include “newly discovered evidence,” such as the police report or the grand jury testimony, under Rule 60(b)(2). Id. But the Supreme Court has consistently explained that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure apply in habeas cases only “to the extent that they are not inconsistent with any statutory provisions or [the habeas] rules.” Mayle v. Felix, 545 U.S. 644, 654, 125 S.Ct. 2562, 162 L.Ed.2d 582 (2005) (quoting Habeas Rule 12); see also Gonzalez, 545 U.S. at 531-32, 125 S.Ct. 2641. Because using Rule 60(b)(2) here would directly contravene AEDPA’s one-year statute of limitations, the district court’s decision is “inconsistent with [a] statutory provision” and the court abused its discretion in granting the motion. Mayle, 545 U.S. at 654, 125 S.Ct. 2562.

The district court’s approach is also inconsistent Rule 60(b)’s own internal restrictions that “limit the friction” with AEDPA. Specifically, Rule 60(b) includes a “1-year deadline for asserting three of the most open-ended grounds of relief (excusable neglect, newly discovered evidence, and fraud).” Gonzalez, 545 U.S. at 534-35, 125 S.Ct. 2641 (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(1)-(3)) (emphasis added). If Hill’s motion was indeed a Rule 60(b)(2) motion based on “newly .discovered evidence,” then regardless of AEDPA, Hill was required to make the motion “no more than a year after the entry of the judgment or order or the date of the proceeding.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(c)(1) (emphasis added). But Hill made his motion more than three years after he discovered the police report, and more than four years after the district court’s order dismissing Claim 4(c). By characterizing Hill’s motion as one for reconsideration, the district court not only improperly circumvented AEDPA’s time-bar, but also misapplied the very rule used to evade it. Because the district court’s decision was a misapplication of the law, we hold that the court abused its discretion in granting Hill’s motion as a motion to reconsider under Rule 60(b)(2).

C. Motion to Amend—Fed. R. Civ. P. 15

Because Hill cannot use Rule 60(b) to avoid AEDPA’s statute of limitations, he can only prevail if we characterize his motion as one to amend his initial habeas petition under Fed. R. Civ. P. 15. The district court alluded to this alternative, holding that Hill’s motion, even if viewed as a motion to amend, was not time-barred because it relates back to the first catch-all iteration of Claim 4(c). Hill v. Mitchell, 2012 WL 995280, at *10-14. We again review for abuse of discretion. Coe v. Bell, 161 F.3d 320, 341 (6th Cir. 1998).

AEDPA imposes a one-year limitation period on habeas applications under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d). Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c)(1) creates an exception: “when a prisoner files an original petition within the one-year deadline, and later presents new claims in an amended petition filed after the deadline passes, the new claims relate back to the date of the original petition if the new claims share a ‘common core of operative facts’ with the original petition.” Cowan v. Stovall, 645 F.3d 815, 818 (6th Cir. 2011) (quoting Mayle, 545 U.S. at 650, 125 S.Ct. 2562); see 28 U.S.C. § 2242 (providing that habeas applications “may be amended ... as provided in the rules of procedure applicable to civil actions”). Rule 15(c)(1) provides that an amendment relates back when it “asserts a claim ... that arose out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set out—or attempted to be set out—in the original pleading[.]” If a petition raises a new claim that does not relate back, however, AEDPA’s statute of limitations bars consideration of the new claim. Mayle, 545 U.S. at 656-57, 125 S.Ct. 2562.

The contours of the relation-back doctrine have not been fully developed. In Mayle, the Supreme Court rejected the proposition that an amended petition asserting new habeas claims relates back simply because the new claims arise from the same “trial, conviction, or sentence” as the original petition. Id. at 663-64, 125 S.Ct. 2562. The Court noted that “the key words [in Rule 15(c)(1) ] are ‘conduct, transaction, or occurrence,’ ” and that the rule “relaxes, but does not obliterate, the statute of limitations.” Id. at 656, 659, 125 S.Ct. 2562 (citing Rule 15(c)). It then explained that “relation back depends on the existence of a common ‘core of operative facts’ uniting the original and newly asserted claims.” Id. at 659, 125 S.Ct. 2562. The Court concluded that applying relation back for any trial, conviction, or sentence was too broad a rule, as it would allow “virtually any new claim introduced in an amended petition [to] relate back[] for federal habeas claims.” Id. at 657, 125 S.Ct. 2562. Instead, the court held that “[a]n amended habeas petition does not relate back (and thereby escape AEDPA’s one-year time limit) when it asserts a new ground for relief supported by facts that differ in both time and type from those in the original pleading.” Id. at 650, 663, 125 S.Ct. 2562 (rejecting an “unconstrained reading” of Rule 15(c)(1)).

The Court also explained that an overly broad relation-back doctrine would contravene Congress’s intent in enacting AEDPA “to advance the finality of criminal convictions.” Id. at 661, 125 S.Ct. 2562 (citing Rhines v. Weber, 544 U.S. 269, 276, 125 S.Ct. 1528, 161 L.Ed.2d 440 (2005)). That is, Congress intentionally “adopted a tight time line, a .one-year limitation period,” and “[i]f claims asserted, after the one-year period could be revived simply because they relate to the same trial, conviction, or sentence as a timely filed claim, AEDPA’s limitation period would have slim significance.” Id. at 662, 125 S.Ct. 2562. From Mayle, then, we know that relation back in those circumstances is not appropriate.

Mayle provided additional guideposts for applying the relation-back doctrine, citing two decisions from our sister circuits as examples of proper applications of the relation-back doctrine. Id. at 664 n.7, 125 S.Ct. 2562 (citing Mandacina v. United States, 328 F.3d 995, 1000-01 (8th Cir. 2003); Woodward v. Williams, 263 F.3d 1135, 1142 (10th Cir. 2001)). In Mandacina, the original habeas petition raised a Brady claim alleging that the government failed to disclose exculpatory evidence that would have supported the theory that someone other than the petitioner murdered the victim. 328 F.3d at 1001. Specifically, the original claim alleged:

[T]he Government failed to properly disclose ... any and all information related by Mr. Strada prior ’ to his death in which Mr. Strada implicated any other person in any criminal activity, including any organized crime-related activity. Such information constitutes favorable and exculpatory information in that it established a motive for others besides Movant Mandacina to have killed or conspired to kill Mr. Strada ... [T]here is a strong factual basis to support a defense theory ... that Mr. Strada was killed not because of any statements he may have made regarding Movant Mandaci-na, but instead was killed by others who had a much stronger motive to retaliate against Mr. Strada.

Id. at 1000. Mandacina’s original Brady claim was thus quite specific, in terms of the information alleged to have been suppressed and its materiality to the defense. The original claim did not mention the “Borland Report” by name, but the Eighth Circuit recognized the report of detectives’ interview of Donna Borland, which had been disclosed to defense counsel, as the “strong factual basis” for the defense theory alluded to in the claim. Id. at 998. And while the original Brady claim was based on suppression of “any and all information” relating to criminal activity and persons implicated by Strada who may have had a motive to kill him, the amended Brady claim alleged that the prosecution had failed “to disclose the names of all suspects with strong motives to murder Strada, as well as all facts developed in the investigation of these suspects.” Id. at 1001. In other words, the amended Brady claim was a slightly more specific iteration of the original Brady claim, premised more specifically on the suppression of names of suspects identified. by Borland. And because the amended claim was deemed to “have arisen out of the same set of facts as the original claim[ ],” it was properly deemed to relate back. Id. at 1000 (citing United States v. Craycraft, 167 F.3d 451, 457 (8th Cir. 1999)).

Similarly, in Woodward, the Tenth Circuit “upheld relation back where the original petition challenged the trial court’s admission of recanted statements” and “the amended petition challenged the court’s refusal to allow the defendant to show that the statements had been recanted.” Mayle, 545 U.S. at 664 n.7, 125 S.Ct. 2562 (citing Woodward, 263 F.3d at 1142). The amended claim was thus deemed to relate back because, in the language of Rule 15(c), it clarified or amplified a claim alleged in the original petition. That is, the amended claim, pertaining to and amplifying the trial court’s error in admitting the same recanted statements, arose out of the same set of operative facts as the original claim.

Since Mayle, we have allowed relation back in similar circumstances, such as when a motion to amend under Rule 15(c) expands on the facts supporting a claim in the original petition. See Cowan, 645 F.3d at 819. In Cowan, the original petition alleged a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel because counsel failed to interview witnesses to support the petitioner’s defense that she was not present during the drug transaction that led to her conviction. Id. The motion to amend expanded on that claim, “describing] the witnesses whom [trial counsel] could have interviewed, and how [they] could have shown” that the petitioner was not present. Id. We held that the amendment related back because “[t]he facts recited in the two documents differed not in kind, but in specificity.” Id.

Hill’s case, however, is markedly different from Cowan, Mandacina, and Woodward. Hill’s motion to amend deals with a Brady claim, just like the original Claim 4(c), but the original Claim 4(c) was completely bereft- of specific fact allegations or evidentiary support and was not tied-to any particular theory of relief. Although Hill asserted grounds for suspicion that a Brady violation may have occurred—the Hamilton County Prosecutor’s Office’s, history, of Brady violations—his original Claim 4(c) merely speculated that the State had Brady material, nothing more. The original claim did not identify, even in general terms, the nature of any suppressed information believed to be exculpatory or impeaching or how such suppressed information was material to the defense. A claim that the State was suppressing an unspecified something is much different- from- a claim regarding what, specifically, the State was suppressing and how it would have benefitted Hill at trial had it been disclosed.

The “utter lack of substance” in Hill’s original Brady claim, as the district court put it,, separates this case from Cowan and the examples cited in Mayle. Hill v. Mitchell, 2006 WL 2807017, at *63. In each of those cases, the original claim presented an-actual theory for relief, and the amendments only “set forth certain particulars of that claim.” Cowan, 645 F.3d at 819; see also Mandacina, 328 F.3d at 1001; Woodward, 263 F.3d at 1142 (“This amendment simply ‘clarifies or amplifies a claim or theory in the original’ petition[.]”). Hill’s original Claim 4(c), by contrast, did not even raise a potential claim for relief. Even though Hill asserted that the prosecution was suppressing evidence, the basis for a Brady claim is the evidence that %oas being suppressed—not a - suspicion that something was being suppressed. Hill did not refer to a single piece of Brady evidence in the original, catch-all version of Claim 4(c). His amended Brady claim cannot be deemed to share a “common core of operative facts”. with the original Claim 4(c), as required for relation back, because the original Claim 4(c) alleged no operative facts out of which the amended claim could also be deemed to have arisen. Mayle, 545 U.S. at 650, 125 S.Ct. 2562.

Applying the relation-back doctrine to such a broad, unsupported claim would also create a greater problem: if a catch-all Brady claim, devoid of Brady material or specific factual allegations, were sufficient to justify relation back under Rule 15(c), then habeas petitioners could routinely circumvent AEDPA’s statute of limitations on Brady claims. All a petitioner would need to do is include a catch-all Brady claim in his original petition (with no Brady evidence) and hope that evidence eventually turns up. If evidence did turn up, the petitioner could then file an amended petition at any time, because any subsequent amendment would relate back and skirt AEDPA’s statute of limitations. It would not matter if Hill, or a future petitioner, waited five, ten, or even twenty years to present Brady evidence, even after its discovery. Such a result would eviscerate AEDPA’s statute of limitations for Brady claims and would run directly contrary to Congress’s intent.

We understand the rationale behind the district court’s decision, which was largely based on equitable principles and the fact that the State did suppress evidence. Hill v. Mitchell, 2012 WL 995280, at *13-14. The district court concluded that Claim 4(c) was not a “new” claim because Hill based the original Claim 4(c) on the prosecution’s history of suppressing evidence. Id: at *13'. The district court’s point is well taken; we agree that Hill had a colorable basis to suspect the State had suppressed evidence, and we agree that the State “is hardly in a position to invoke equitable principles.” Id. at *14. We also recognize that Hill could not have included a Brady claim based on the undiscovered police report or grand jury testimony in his original habeas petition.

But that is exactly why Hill had one year from the discovery of the new evidence (under AEDPA or Rule 60(b)) to bring it to the district court’s attention. Our disapproval of the State’s actions does not excuse Hill’s unexplained failure to present the police report for over three years after he discovered it. We do not have the authority to simply ignore AED-PA’s congressionally mandated requirements based on notions of equity. Again, we may apply the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure only “to the extent that they are not inconsistent with any statutory provisions or [the habeas] rules.” Mayle, 545 U.S. at 654, 125 S.Ct. 2562. Hill asks us to do the opposite and use Rule 60(b) or Rule 15(c) to circumvent AEDPA’s one-year limitations period, a request we cannot grant. See Moreland v. Robinson, 813 F.3d 315, 323 (6th Cir. 2016) (“Rule 60(b) motions and [Rule 15(c) ] motions to amend may not be used as vehicles to circumvent the limitations that Congress has placed upon the presentation of claims in a second or successive application for habeas relief.”). We therefore hold that the district court abused its discretion in bypassing AEDPA’s statute of limitations to grant Hill’s motion to amend (or reconsider) his Brady claim. Because the claim is time-barred, the district court’s award of conditional relief on Claim 4(c) must be reversed.

D. Merits of the Brady Claim

Yet, even if we were to hold the Brady claim properly before the court, it should be found wanting on the merits, even on de novo review. See Jalowiec v. Bradshaw, 657 F.3d 293, 305 (6th Cir. 2011) (where the state courts did not address the merits of the claim, the habeas court may review de novo).

To succeed on a Brady claim, a petitioner must establish: (1) the existence of favorable evidence, either exculpatory or impeaching; (2) that the evidence was suppressed; and (3) that the suppression resulted in prejudice. Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 281-82, 119 S.Ct. 1936, 144 L.Ed.2d 286 (1999). There is no question that the State suppressed Officer Givens’ police report and Teresa Dudley’s grand jury testimony, and all agree that these materials could potentially have been favorable to the defense. However, we remain unpersuaded that the nondisclosure of these materials resulted in cognizable prejudice.

To show cognizable prejudice, Hill must establish that the suppressed evidence is material—that “there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Kyles, 514 U.S. at 433, 115 S.Ct. 1555 (emphasis added). The question is whether “ ‘the favorable evidence could reasonably be taken to put the whole ease in such a different light as to undermine confidence in the verdict.’ ” Strickler, 527 U.S. at 290, 119 S.Ct. 1936 (quoting Kyles, 514 U.S. at 435, 115 S.Ct. 1555). Speculation about a different outcome is not enough; “ ‘[t]he likelihood of a different result must be substantial, not just conceivable.’ ” LaMar v. Houk, 798 F.3d 405, 416 (6th Cir. 2015) (quoting Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 112, 131 S.Ct. 770, 178 L.Ed.2d 624 (2011)). That is, the likelihood of-a different result must be great enough to undermine confidence in the verdict. Wearry v. Cain, — U.S. —, 136 S.Ct. 1002, 1006, 194 L.Ed.2d 78 (2016) (citing Smith v. Cain, 565 U.S. 73, 132 S.Ct. 627, 630, 181 L.Ed.2d 571 (2012)).

Hill’s Brady claim rests on two items of marginal, speculative significance: (a) ambiguous comments in a preliminary police report; and (b) grand jury testimony given by Teresa Dudley that was not precisely consistent with her trial testimony.

1. Preliminary Police Report

Officer Givens was the first officer to arrive after Dudley called the police to report that Domika was missing, and he prepared the police report the next morning. R. 219-4, Police Rep. at 1, Page ID 2298. One of the questions in the report asked, “Do you believe that this case could be solved with some additional investigative time?” Id. Givens circled “YES” and wrote “[ijnvestigate why the mother ran from police and asked for the police to check the alley behind the house (several times).” Id. The report then asked for additional comments, and Givens wrote:

Received radio call regarding family trouble. When we arrived Mother and Grandmother were lying on ground crying. The mother then told us she thinks the father took the baby. We searched the house and surrounding area. Notified Lieutenant, we then went to father’s house. Gave consent to search. During search found nothing. Notified CIS they responded and had the Mother,. Grandmother, and father come down for Question!.] CIS interviewed the above.

■Id. at 2, Page ID 2299.

At trial, Givens testified that he arrived at Dudley’s house around 12:15 a.m. on the night Domika disappeared and “saw a Teresa Dudley and her mother. They were laying on the ground crying. It was dispatched as family trouble. I got there and asked them what the problem was. And they said—Teresa said her baby was missing.” Trial Tr. Vol. VIII, Givens Testimony at 1038. Givens then testified that -he and another police officer searched the area, including the alley behind Dudley’s house, and found nothing. Id. at 1038-39.

Two items in the police report are said to have potential impeaching value: (1) Givens’ reference to an otherwise unsupported notion that Dudley ran from police; and (2) Givens’ statement that Dudley asked the police to check “the alley behind the house” “several times.” R. 219-4, Police Rep. at 1, Page ID 2298. The district court held that the report was material Brady evidence because it “easts far more suspicion on Teresa Dudley than any evidence at trial did.” R. 226, Dist. Ct. Op. at 9, Page ID 2393. A closer look, however, reveals that the report has much less probative value than the district court surmised.

Dudley Running from Police. The district court inferred from the report that “Dudley fled from police when they first approached her.... [I]nformation that a young mother who frantically called police when her baby went missing actually fled from police when they first approached her constitutes vital, powerful evidence as' to her credibility.” Id. at 10, Page ID 2394 (emphasis added). But this comment in the police report is hardly “evidence” at all; it reflects a question in Givens’ mind. And the inference drawn by the district court is directly contradicted both by the contents of the report itself and by Givens’ trial testimony. The district court’s assumption that Dudley ran when police first approached her is otherwise unsupported in the record. The comment suggests someone told Givens that Dudley “ran from police;” it does not indicate when she may •have run, or who reported her running. Givens, the first officer on the scene, wrote that “[w]hen we arrived [Dudley] and Grandmother were lying on [the] ground crying.” R. 219-4, Police Rep. at 2, Page ID 2299. Givens confirmed this account at .trial, testifying that Dudley and her mother were lying on the ground crying when police first arrived. Trial Tr. Vol. VIII, Givens. Testimony at 1038. If Dudley ran, there is no evidence she did so when the police first approached.

Certainly, Hill’s counsel could have asked Givens about the “ran from police” comment, its source, and whether he did investigate the matter. Counsel also could have asked Dudley whether she actually ran and, if so, why. But the notion that those questions would have yielded answers tending to exculpate Hill or impeach either Givens or Dudley is a matter of sheer speculation. Several witnesses and police officers were with Dudley that night, and not a single one of them testified that she ran from police. The report, at most, suggested only a potential line of questioning that might have led to something impeaching. Standing alone, the “ran from police” comment is not nearly as incriminating of Dudley as the district court suggested and its impeachment value is wholly speculative. That is, the likelihood that inquiry would have led to any evidence favorable to the defense at all is speculative. Even more remote is the likelihood that inquiry would have led to evidence so exculpatory or impeaching as to undermine confidence in the outcome.

Dudley Asking Police to Check the Alley. The second item in the report is the reference to Dudley’s asking police to “check the alley behind the house.” Id. at 1, Page ID 2298. The district court.used this comment to conclude that the report “gives rise to a reasonable suspicion that Dudley had knowledge not only that her baby was dead but also about where the baby’s body was—before the body was found and at a. time when Dudley was purporting to search for her missing daughter”—“givfing] rise to at least 'an inference that Dudley was responsible for the baby’s death.” R. 226, Dist. Ct. Op. at 10, Page ID 2394.

Again, the district court’s sweeping conclusion rests on inferences and assumptions that simply are not reasonably supported in the record. The court pointed out that Domika’s body was found in a formula box in a vacant lot behind Hill’s house, and that the formula box had previously been located in an alley behind Hill’s house. Id. From these facts, the court inferred that Dudley’s reference to the alley behind the house indicates she knew exactly where Domika was, that she knew Domika was dead, and that she was giving the police the location of her body. But the record provides a simple, more likely explanation for Givens’ statement: Dudley was asking the police to search the alley behind her own house, and for good reason.

When Dudley realized Domika was missing, she ran out of her house screaming that Domika was gone. Trial Tr. Vol. VHI, Janson Testimony at 980; Dudley Testimony at 1009. Her friends Barbara Sue Jan-son and Pamela Lewis told her that they had just seen Hill enter her house through the front, but did not see him leave. Trial Tr. Vol VIII, Janson Testimony at 980, Lewis Testimony at 994-95, Dudley Testimony at 1003. The only exit aside from the front door is through an alley behind Dudley’s house. See Trial Tr, Vol. VIII, Janson Testimony at 980, Lewis testimony at 991, Dudley Testimony at 1014-15; see also R. 237-1, Officer Hennekes Grand Jury Testimony at 3-4, 6, Page ID 2583-84, 2586 (“There is an alley that runs in the rear of [Dudley’s house] that is accessible from that address.... You can walk back the side [of the house] and get to the alley without ever coming back out front.”). Dudley thus likely asked the police to check the alley behind her own house because (1) her baby was missing, (2) her friends told her that Hill had just been in her house, and (8) the only way he could have left without being seen was through the alley behind her house.

The actual events of the evening support this explanation, because the police did check the alley behind Dudley’s house. The report itself notes that police “searched the whole [of Dudley’s] house which includes the attic[,] the alley behind' the house[,] and the father’s house.” R. 219-4, Police Rep. at 1, Page ID 2298 (emphasis added). Officer Givens then testified at trial, consistent with the report, that the police searched the alley behind Dudley’s house the night Domika disappeared. Trial Tr. Vol. VIII, Givens Testimony at 1038-39. He added that the police did not search outside Hill’s house that night. Id. at 1044. If, as the district court assumed, Dudley repeatedly asked police to check the alley behind Hill’s house, why didn’t they look there? Because, to use Occam’s razor, Dudley did not ask police to check the alley behind Hill’s house; she asked them to check the alley behind her own. It follows that the potential impeaching value of this comment in the police report is practically nil.- If Hill’s counsel had asked Dudley what she meant, her explanation would likely have been totally innocuous. There is no reason in the record to assume as the district court did.

What we are left with, after excising the district court’s assumptions, is a police report that alludes to two items of ambiguous significance: first, that Dudley might have run from police at some point; and second, that Dudley asked the police to check the alley behind someone’s house for evidence relating to Domika’s disappearance—most likely her own house, because she thought Hill took her baby and left through that alley. Yet, despite the obvious ambiguity of the two items, the district court granted habeas relief without even conducting an evidentiary hearing on the materiality of the police report. In fact, Hill did not even request one. From this, it is hard to avoid the conclusion that Hill’s counsel realized the police report was more significant for its speculative value. That is, counsel likely realized that an evidentiary hearing posed the risk that entirely innocent explanations for both •comments would be exposed; better to let the police report speak for itself and hope that its nondisclosure by the police is deemed to justify an adverse inference. The strategy apparently worked in the district court, but careful scrutiny reveals that Hill has failed to meet his burden of showing materiality. The police report comments simply do not carry the weight the district court assigned to them.

2. Grand Jury Testimony

Dudley’s grand jury testimony is even less helpful to Hill’s case. Before the grand jury, Dudley was asked whether Domika had barrettes in her hair the night she disappeared. She testified:

A. She had three in her hair. She had a pink one on one side with some teddy bears, then she had a pink one with a blue teddy bear, and she had a yellow one at the top.

When we went down there that morning, me, Denise and Ranisha, we went looking up towards my house. And we came back down. They started looking in the garage and I was standing outside the garage. And I looked down. There was a barrette right there ... I was like, there, that is her barrette right there. Ranisha looked up, picked it up and gave it to me.

R. 237-1, Dudley Grand Jury Testimony at 18, Page ID 2598. At trial, Dudley testified:

A. Me, Barbie, and Pam, we went down there, and Ruby was standing outside, and Denise. Then Denise give me a shirt and I set down there. And they say “We help her look for her, if you want me to.” Denise and Ronessa, they had helped me look for her that night.

We had went up in our park, where I live, and we came back down, we started looking in the garages. And I went down and her barrette was right there and I found it. They say “You sure this is your baby barrette?” And I was like, ‘Yeah.”

Q. How many barrettes? How many barrettes was your baby wearing—

A. Three.

Q. —when she went to bed that night?

A. Three.

Q. Do you remember what color they were?

A. Yeah, yellow, and there was a blue one with a pink teddy bear. I forgot the other color, I know it was three barrettes.

Q. Okay. I will show you, you said you found a barrette in the garage at [Hillj’s house that morning?

A. Yeah.

Q. I will show you what’s been marked as State’s Exhibit Number 13, and ask you if you have ever seen this little blue barrette with the pink teddy b[e]ar on it before?

A. Yeah, it was in her hair.

Q. Was it in her hair when she was asleep with you that night?

A. Yeah, because I had did her hair earlier.

Q. And you saw, found that in [Hillj’s garage?

A. Just sitting there.

Trial Tr. Vol. VIII, Dudley Testimony at 1012-14.

Hill points to two inconsistencies between Dudley’s grand jury testimony and her trial testimony: (1) the identity of Dudley’s companions when she searched the garage and found the barrette; and (2) the barrette’s location when Dudley found it. These inconsistencies—to the extent they even exist—are inconsequential and disclosure of the grand jury testimony would have had no impact at Hill’s trial.

Who Searched the Garage? At trial, Dudley testified that Denise (Hill’s aunt) and Ronessa—Denise’s daughter and Hill’s cousin—helped her look for Domika that night. Id. at 1012. Denise and Ronessa confirmed this account at trial, testifying that they were helping Dudley search in the garage when Dudley found the barrette. Trial Tr. Vol. X, Denise Hill Testimony at 1247-49; Ronessa Hill Testimony at 1366-67. Before the grand jury, Dudley testified that Denise and “Ranisha,” rather than “Ronessa,” helped her search the garage. Dudley explained that “Ranisha” is Hill’s cousin, and her last name is Hill. R. 237-1, Dudley Grand Jury Testimony at 19, Page ID 2599.

This “inconsistency”—calling Hill’s cousin “Ranisha” instead of “Ronessa”—again has a simple explanation: Dudley incorrectly called Ronessa by the name “Rani-sha” before the grand jury. There is no person named “Ranisha” involved in this case, and Dudley, Denise, and Ronessa all testified at trial that they were searching the garage when Dudley found the barrette. Trial Tr. Vol. VIII, Dudley Testimony at 1012; Trial Tr. Vol. X, Denise Hill Testimony at 1247-48; Ronessa Hill Testimony at 1373-74. While there may be a nominal discrepancy in the grand jury testimony, there is no substantial reason to believe Dudley identified two different persons.

Whether the Barrette was Inside or Outside the Garage. The second alleged inconsistency is similarly overblown. Before the grand jury, Dudley testified that she was “standing outside the garage” and saw the barrette when she “looked down.” R. 237-1, Dudley Grand Jury Testimony at 18, Page ID 2598. At trial, she testified that she “started looking in the garage[,] [a]nd I went down and her barrette was right there and I found it.” Trial Tr. Vol. VIII, Dudley Testimony at 1012-13. The district court inferred that Dudley’s grand jury testimony indicated she found the barrette outside the garage, while her trial testimony indicated she found it inside the garage. R, 240, Dist. Ct. Op. at 19, Page ID 2685. Hill makes the same argument on appeal.

But Dudley did not testify that she found the barrette outside the garage before the grand jury. She only said that she was standing outside the garage when she saw it. That is not inconsistent with her trial testimony, as she testified that the barrette was “[rjight in the opening” of the garage. Trial Tr. Vol. VIII, Dudley Testimony at 1027. Dudley also'testified before the grand jury that Ronessa (“Ranisha”) was the one who picked up the barrette, and Ronessa was inside the garage. As all of the record evidence indicates the barrette was inside the garage, there is no inconsistency between Dudley’s grand jury testimony and her trial testimony. To the extent the district court imagined or inferred a material discrepancy, again, the appropriate recourse was to conduct an evidentiary hearing. That none was conducted or even requested is telling.

After we again eliminate the unsupported assumptions in the district court’s analysis, the only “inconsistency” in the grand jury testimony is the mix-up with Rones-sa’s .name. This is a minor discrepancy. If it had been disclosed to Hill prior to trial, it would almost certainly have been easily explained .away. There is no reason to believe that Hill would have been able to use it to so effectively impeach Dudley’s credibility as to undermine confidence in the outcome of the trial.

3. Collective Impact

Still, despite the limited probative value of the police report comments and the grand jury testimony, we must “consider the effect of the suppressed evidence collectively, rather than item by item.” Ja-lowiec, 657 F.3d at 305 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Collectively, then, we have a police report suggesting Dudley may have run from police at some point and that she told police to check an alley behind someone’s house, and we have grand jury testimony suggesting Dudley was heard to pronounce Hill’s cousin Ronessa’s name differently than she did during Hill’s trial. Hill contends the nondisclosure of these items was prejudicial because he could have used them to undermine the credibility of the prosecution’s most powerful witness, the only person tying Hill to Domika’s murder.

Hill’s argument fails, to account-for. the substantial evidence against Hill from witnesses other than Teresa Dudley. Barbara Janson and Pamela Lewis both testified that they saw Hill enter Dudley’s house, but did not see him leave. Trial Tr. Vol VHÍ, Janson Testimony at 980, Lewis Testimony at 994-95. Hill admitted at trial that he entered Dudley’s home the night Domika disappeared. Trial Tr. Vol. X, Genesis Hill Testimony at 1405-06. Officer Givens testified that Hill lied initially about being in Dudley’s house, denying that he had been there at all the night Domika disappeared. Trial Tr. Vol. VIII, Givens Testimony at 1051. Officers Robert Stein-her and Charles Beaver testified that they found Domika’s body in a vacant lot behind Hill’s house. Id. Steinher Testimony at 1084, Beaver Testimony at 1097-98. Officer Robert Hennekes testified that police found her body in a formula box that was traced back to Hill’s house. Id. Hennekes Testimony at 1065-67. A forensic expert testified that the trash bags wrapped around Domika’s body matched trashed bags from Hill’s home. Trial Tr. Vol. IX, William Dean Testimony at 1170-71. Officer Steinher testified that those trash bags were secured with electrical tape, and that Hill’s uncle was unable to find the electrical tape he normally kept in his tool box. Trial Tr. Vol. VIII, Steinher Testimony at 1088. Finally, a bus driver picked Hill out of a photo array and testified that he saw a passenger matching Hill’s description who said he “could not believe what he had done to a little baby” and feared he would “get the chair for it.” Trial Tr. Vol. IX, Patrick Ormond Testimony at 1138-40.

Now consider the evidence Dudley provided. Yes, she testified that she found the barrette in Hill’s garage, but that is the only evidence for which Dudley is the sole link. Trial Tr. Vol. VIII, Dudley Testimony at 1012-14. Other witnesses independently tied everything else to Hill. Dudley testified that Hill told her “I bet I don’t pay” child support—but Barbara Sue Janson also testified that she overheard a conversation between Hill and Dudley about child support where Hill said he’d “kill that little bitch before, he paid anything.” Id. Janson Testimony at 981-82. Dudley testified that Hill once threw a brick through her window—but Hill also admitted doing so at trial. Compare Trial Tr, Vol. VIII, Dudley Testimony at 1005, with Trial Tr. Vol. X, Hill Testimony at 1415-16. Dudley testified that the lightbulb outside her bedroom was unscrewed right after Domika disappeared—but Hill also admitted unscrewing it. Compare Trial Tr. Vol. VIII, Dudley Testimony at 1008, with Trial Tr. Vol. X, Hill Testimony at 1411. Dudley testified that Hill did not look worried when she told him Domika was missing—but Officer Givens independently testified that Hill was “snickering” and “grinning” at Dudley when the police asked him if-he took the baby. Trial Tr. Vol. VIH, Givens Testimony at 1050-51. Finally, Barbara Sue Jan-son, the State’s first witness, testified that she was “positive” she had seen Hill wear the shirt in which .Domika’s body was found wrapped, or one that “look[ed] just like it.” Trial Tr. Vol. VIII, Janson Testimony at 980-81, 987-88.

Hill also fails to explain how the availability of the police report and the grand jury testimony would have changed anything at Hill’s trial when set against this substantial evidence. Even if we give some limited weight to the suppressed evidence, it would; at most, have been used to marginally impeach the credibility of Teresa Dudley. It would have had no impact on nearly all of the evidence—evidence from witnesses other than Dudley. Speculation about whether Dudley told police to check in an alley does not give rise to such a substantial likelihood of a different result as to “undermine confidence in the jury’s verdict.” Weary, 136 S.Ct. at 1006. Such speculation certainly does not rise to the level of a “reasonable probability that ... the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Kyles, 514 U.S. at 433, 115 S.Ct. 1555, The late-disclosed items are simply not'material.

In summation, Hill brought the suppressed evidence to the district court’s attention well outside AEDPA’s one-year statute of limitations period, and we cannot cast aside AEDPA’s procedural bars using our own considerations of equity. And even if Hill’s Brady claim were properly before the court, it would fail on the merits. On the present record'—absent unsupported assumptions and unfounded speculation— Hill has fallen far short of carrying his burden of showing a reasonable probability that disclosure of the police report or Dudley’s grand jury testimony would have altered the jury’s verdict. Because Brady evidence must be material to warrant relief, and because this evidence is not material, the district court’s award of relief on this claim must be reversed.

IV

Having determined that habeas relief was improperly granted on Hill’s Brady claim, we must now address the five claims of error Hill presents on cross-appeal, challenging the district court’s denial of his other habeas claims. Hill brings claims based on (a) sufficiency of the evidence; (b) ineffective assistance of counsel at the penalty phase; (c) ineffective assistance of counsel on direct appeal; (d) an argument that Ohio’s proportionality review is unconstitutional; and (e) a claim for cumulative error. We find each unpersuasive.

A. Ninth Ground: Sufficiency of the Evidence

Hill first challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction. “[T]he relevant question is whethr er, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any. rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979). This standard is even more exacting on habeas, as we are reviewing the Ohio Supreme Court’s decision denying Hill’s claim on the merits and must do so through AEDPA’s deferential lens. Under this standard, even if we were to “conclude that a rational trier of fact could not have found the petitioner guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, on habeas review, we must still defer to the state appel late court’s sufficiency determination as long as it is not unreasonable.” Brown v. Konteh, 567 F.3d 191, 205 (6th Cir. 2009) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2)).

Hill’s appeal focuses on the lack of direct evidence implicating him and asserts that the circumstantial evidence was insufficient to support a conviction. However, “[c]ircumstantial evidence may support a conviction, and such evidence need not remove every reasonable hypothesis except that of guilt.” Apanovitch v. Houk, 466 F.3d 460