Full opinion text
OPINION PER CURIAM: We are asked to delineate the statutory and constitutional limits to the President’s power to control immigration in this appeal of the district court’s order preliminarily enjoining two sections of Executive Order 13780 (“E02” or “the Order”), “Protecting the Nation From Foreign Terrorist Entry Into the United States.” The Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”) gives the President broad powers to control the entry of aliens, and to take actions to protect the American public. But immigration, even for the President, is not a one-person show. The President’s authority is subject to certain statutory and constitutional restraints. We conclude that the President, in issuing the Executive Order, exceeded the scope of the authority delegated to him by Congress. In suspending the entry of more than 180 million nationals from six countries, suspending the entry of all refugees, and reducing the cap on the admission of refugees from 110,000 to 50,000 for the 2017 fiscal year, the President did not meet the essential precondition to exercising his delegated authority: The President must make a sufficient finding that the entry of these classes of people would be “detrimental to the interests of the United States.” Further, the Order runs afoul of other provisions of the INA that prohibit nationality-based discrimination and require the President to follow a specific process when setting the annual cap on the admission of refugees. On these statutory bases, we affirm in large part the district court’s order preliminarily enjoining Sections 2 and 6 of the Executive Order. I A One week after inauguration and without interagency review, President Donald J. Trump issued Executive Order 13769 (“EOl”). Exec. Order No. 13769, 82 Fed. Reg. 8977 (Jan. 27, 2017). Entitled “Protecting the Nation From Foreign Terrorist Entry Into the United States,” EOl’s stated purpose was to “protect the American people from terrorist attacks by foreign nationals admitted to the United States.” Id. EOl recited that “[njumerous foreign-born individuals have been convicted or implicated in terrorism-related crimes since September 11, 2001, including foreign nationals who entered the United States after receiving visitor, student, or employment visas, or who entered through the United States refugee resettlement program.” Id. EOl mandated two main courses of action to assure that the United States remain “vigilant during the visa-issuance process to ensure that those approved for admission do not intend to harm Americans and that they have no ties to terrorism.” Id. In Section 3, the President invoked his authority under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(f) to suspend for 90 days immigrant and nonimmigrant entry into the United States of nationals from seven majority-Muslim countries: Iraq, Iran, Libya, Sudan, Somalia, Syria, and Yemen. See id. at 8978. In Section 5, the President immediately suspended the U.S. Refugee Admissions Program (“USRAP”) for 120 days, imposed a ban of indefinite duration on the entry of refugees from Syria, and limited the entry of refugees to 50,000 in fiscal year 2017. Id. at 8979. EOl also ordered that changes be made to the refugee screening process “to prioritize refugee claims made by individuals on the basis of religious-based persecution, provided that the religion of the individual is a minority religion in the individual’s country of nationality.” Id. EOl permitted the Secretaries of State and Homeland Security to make case-by-case exceptions to these restrictions “when in the national interest,” and explained that it would be in the national interest “when the person is a religious minority in his country of nationality facing religious persecution.” Id. EOl took immediate effect, causing great uncertainty as to the scope of the order, particularly in its application to lawful permanent residents. Notably, federal officials themselves were unsure as to the scope of EOl, which caused mass confusion at airports and other ports of entry. See Brief of the Foundation of Children of Iran and Iranian Alliance Across Borders as Amici Curiae, Dkt. No. 77 at 11-12 (describing how an Iranian visa holder was turned away while en route to the United States because of the confusion regarding the contours of EOl’s scope); Brief of Former National Security Officials as Amici Curiae, Dkt. No. 108 at 25 n.53 & 54 (noting confusion at airports because officials were neither consulted nor informed of EOl in advance). Shortly after EOl issued, the States of Washington and Minnesota filed suit in the Western District of Washington to enjoin EOl. On February 3, 2017, the district court granted a temporary restraining order (“TRO”). Washington v. Trump, No. C17-0141JLR, 2017 WL 462040 (W.D. Wash. Feb. 3, 2017). On February 4, 2017, the Government filed an emergency motion in our court, seeking a stay of the TRO pending appeal. On February 9, 2017, this court denied the Government’s emergency motion for a stay of the injunction. Washington v. Trump, 847 F.3d 1151 (9th Cir. 2017) (per curiam), reconsideration en banc denied, 853 F.3d 933 (9th Cir. 2017). In so doing, the panel rejected the Government’s arguments that EOl was wholly unreviewable. See id. at 1161-64. After determining that the states had standing based on the alleged harms to their proprietary interests, id. at 1159-61, this court concluded that the states demonstrated a likelihood of success on their procedural due process claim, at least as to lawful permanent residents and nonimmigrant visa holders, id. at 1164-66. The panel did not review the states’ other claims, including the statutory-based claims. Id. at 1164. Rather than continue with the litigation, the Government filed an unopposed motion to voluntarily dismiss the underlying appeal after the President signed E02. On March 8, 2017, this court granted that motion, which substantially ended the story of EOl. The curtain opens next to the present controversy regarding E02. B On March 6, 2017, the President issued E02, also entitled “Protecting the Nation From Foreign Terrorist Entry Into the United States.” Exec. Order No. 13780, 82 Fed. Reg. 13209 (Mar. 6, 2017). The revised Order was to take effect on March 16, 2017, at which point EOl would be revoked. Id. at 13218. The Order expressly stated that EOl “did not provide a basis for discriminating for or against members of any particular religion” and was “not motivated by animus toward any religion.” Id. at 13210. Section 2 — “Temporary Suspension of Entry for Nationals of Countries of Particular Concern During Review Period” — reinstates the 90-day ban on travel for nationals of six of the seven majority-Muslim countries identified in EOl: Iran, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, and Yemen. Id. at 13213. Section 2 also directs the Secretary of Homeland Security, the Secretary of State, and the Director of National Intelligence to “conduct a worldwide review to identify whether, and if so what, additional information will be needed from each foreign country to adjudicate an application by a national of that country for a visa, admission, or other benefit under the INA (adjudications) in order to determine that the individual is not a security or public-safety threat.” Id. at 13212. Section 2(c) states in full: To temporarily reduce investigative burdens on relevant agencies during the review period described in subsection (a) of this section, to ensure the proper review and maximum utilization of available resources for the screening and vetting of foreign nationals, to ensure that adequate standards are established to prevent infiltration by foreign terrorists, and in light of the national security concerns referenced in section 1 of this order, I hereby proclaim, pursuant to sections 212(f) and 215(a) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. [§§ ] 1182(f) and 1185(a), that the unrestricted entry into the United States of nationals of Iran, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, and Yemen would be detrimental to the interests of the United States. I therefore direct that the entry into the United States of nationals of those six countries be suspended for 90 days from the effective date of this order, subject to the limitations, waivers, and exceptions set forth in sections 3 and 12 of this order. Id. at 13213. Regarding the six identified countries, E02 explains: Each of these countries is a state sponsor of terrorism, has been significantly compromised by terrorist organizations, or contains active conflict zones. Any of these circumstances diminishes the foreign government’s willingness or ability to share or validate important information about individuals seeking to travel to the United States. Moreover, the significant presence in each of these countries of terrorist organizations, their members, and others exposed to those organizations increases the chance that conditions will be exploited to enable terrorist operatives or sympathizers to travel to the United States. Finally, once foreign nationals from these countries are admitted to the United States, it is often difficult to remove them, because many of these countries typically delay issuing, or refuse to issue, travel documents. Id. at 13210. Based on the conditions of these six countries, “the risk of erroneously permitting entry of a national of one of these countries who intends to commit terrorist acts or otherwise harm the national security of the United States is unacceptably high.” Id. at 13211. The Order states that it no longer includes Iraq on the list of designated countries because of Iraq’s “close cooperative relationship” with the United States and its recent efforts to enhance its travel documentation procedures. Id. at 13212. The Order also states that its scope has been narrowed from EOl in response to “judicial concerns” about the suspension of entry with respect to certain categories of aliens. Id. E02 applies only to individuals outside of the United States who do not have a valid visa as of the issuance of EOl or E02. E02, unlike EOl, expressly exempts lawful permanent residents, dual citizens traveling under a passport issued by a country not on the banned list, asy-lees, and refugees already admitted to the United States. See id. at 13213-14. The Order also provides that consular officers or Customs and Border Protection officials can exercise discretion in authorizing case-by-case waivers to issue visas and grant entry during the suspension period, and offers examples of when waivers “could be appropriate.” See id. at 13214-15. Section 6 — “Realignment of the U.S. Refugee Admissions Program for Fiscal Year 2017” — suspends USRAP for 120 days. Id. at 13215. During this period, the heads of certain executive agencies are directed to review the current USRAP application and adjudication processes, and to determine the additional procedures that “should” be required for individuals seeking admission as refugees. See id. at 13215-16. Invoking 8 U.S.C. § 1182(f), Section 6(b) reduces the number of refugees to be admitted from 110,000 to 50,000 in fiscal year 2017. Id. at 13216. The Order also removes EOl’s preference for refugees facing persecution as a member of a minority religion, and no longer imposes a complete ban on Syrian refugees. Section 6 further provides for discretionary case-by-case waivers. Id. E02 supplies additional information relevant to national security concerns. The Order includes excerpts from the State Department’s 2015 Country Reports on Terrorism, that it asserts demonstrate “why ... nationals [from the designated countries] continue to present heightened risk to the security of the United States.” Id. at 13210; see id. at 13210-11 (providing a brief description of country conditions for each of the designated countries). The Order states that foreign nationals and refugees have committed acts of terrorism: Recent history shows that some of those who have entered the United States through our immigration system have proved to be threats to our national security. Since 2001, hundreds of persons born abroad have been convicted of terrorism-related crimes in the United States. They have included not just persons who came here legally on visas but also individuals who first entered the country as refugees. For example, in January 2013, two Iraqi nationals admitted to the United States as refugees in 2009 were sentenced to 40 years and to life in prison, respectively, for multiple terrorism-related offenses. And in October 2014, a native of Somalia who had been brought to the United States as a child refugee and later became a naturalized United States citizen was sentenced to 30 years in prison for attempting to use a weapon of mass destruction as part of a plot to detonate a bomb at a crowded Christmas-tree-lighting ceremony in Portland, Oregon. The Attorney General has reported to me that more than 300 persons who entered the United States as refugees are currently the subjects of counterterrorism investigations by the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Id. at 13212. E02 does not discuss any instances of domestic terrorism involving nationals from Iran, Libya, Sudan, Syria, or Yemen. C Two versions of a report from the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) surfaced after EOl issued. First, a draft report from DHS, prepared about one month after EOl issued and two weeks prior to E02’s issuance, concluded that citizenship “is unlikely to be a reliable indicator of potential terrorist activity” and that citizens of countries affected by EOl are “[rjarely [i]mplicated in U.S.-[b]ased [tjerrorism.” Specifically, the DHS report determined that since the spring of 2011, at least eighty-two individuals were inspired by a foreign terrorist group to carry out or attempt to carry out an attack in the United States. Slightly more than half were U.S. citizens born in the United States, and the remaining persons were from twenty-six different countries — with the most individuals originating from Pakistan, followed by Somalia, Bangladesh, Cuba, Ethiopia, Iraq, and Uzbekistan. Id. Of the six countries included in E02, only Somalia was identified as being among the “top” countries-of-origin for the terrorists analyzed in the report. During the time period covered in the report, three offenders were from Somalia; one was from Iran, Sudan, and Yemen each; and none was from Syria or Libya. The final version of the report, issued five days prior to E02, concluded “that most foreign-born, [U.S.]based violent extremists likely radicalized several years after their entry to the United States, [thus] limiting the ability of screening and vetting officials to prevent their entry because of national security concerns” (emphasis added). The same day E02 issued, Attorney General Jefferson B. Sessions III and Secretary of Homeland Security John F. Kelly submitted a letter to the President recommending that .he “direct[] a temporary pause in entry” from countries that are “unable or unwilling to provide the United States with adequate information about their nationals” or are designated as “state sponsors of terrorism.” D The State of Hawai'i (“the State”) filed a motion for a TRO seeking to enjoin EOl, which the District of Hawai'i did not rule on because of the nationwide TRO entered in the Western District of Washington. After E02 issued, the State filed an amended complaint challenging E02 in order “to protect its residents, its employers, its educational institutions, and its sovereignty.” Dr. Elshikh, the Imam of the Muslim Association of Hawai'i, joined the State’s challenge because the Order “inflicts a grave injury on Muslims in Hawai'i, including Dr. Elshikh, his family, and members of his Mosque.” In 2015, Dr. Elshikh’s wife filed an 1-180 Petition for Alien Relative on behalf of her mother— Dr. Elshikh’s mother-in-law — a Syrian national living in Syria. Dr. Elshikh fears that his mother-in-law will not be able to enter the United States if E 02 is implemented. Plaintiffs named as Defendants Donald J. Trump, in his official capacity as President of the United States; the U.S. Department of Homeland Security; John F. Kelly, in his official capacity as Secretary of Homeland Security; the U.S. Department of State; Rex W. Tillerson, in his official capacity as Secretary of State; and the United States of America (collectively referred to as “the Government”). Plaintiffs allege that E02 suffers similar constitutional and statutory defects as EOl and claim that the Order violates: the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment; the equal protection guarantees of the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause on the basis of religion and/or national origin, nationality, or alienage; the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment based on substantive due process rights; the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment based on procedural due process rights; the Immigration and Nationality Act; the Religious Freedom Restoration Act; and the Administrative Procedure Act. For their INA claim, Plaintiffs specifically contend that E02 violates the INA by discriminating on the basis of nationality, ignoring and modifying the statutory criteria for determining terrorism-related inadmissibility, and exceeding the President’s delegated authority under the INA. Plaintiffs also filed a motion for a TRO along with their amended complaint. On March 15, 2017, the district court granted the TRO, holding that Plaintiffs had shown a likelihood of success on the merits of their Establishment Clause claim, and entered a nationwide injunction prohibiting enforcement of Sections 2 and 6 of E02. See Hawai'i v. Trump, — F.Supp.3d -, No. CV 17-00050 DKW-KSC, 2017 WL 1011673 (D. Haw. Mar. 15, 2017) (“Hawai'i TRO”). On March 29, 2017, the district court granted Plaintiffs’ motion to convert the TRO to a preliminary injunction. See Hawai'i v. Trump, — F.Supp.3d -, No. CV 17-00050 DKW-KSC, 2017 WL 1167383 (D. Haw. Mar. 29, 2017) (“Hawai'i PI"). The district court declined to narrow the scope of the injunction, concluding that the entirety of Sections 2 and 6 of the Order ran afoul of the Establishment Clause and that the Government did not provide a workable framework for narrowing the scope of the enjoined conduct. See id. at -, at *8. The court entered the following injunction: Defendants and all their respective officers, agents, servants, employees, and attorneys, and persons in active concert or participation with them, are hereby enjoined from enforcing or implementing Sections 2 and 6 of the Executive Order across the Nation. Enforcement of these provisions in all places, including the United States, at all United States borders and ports of entry, and in the issuance of visas is prohibited, pending further orders from this Court. Id. at -, at *9. On March 30, 2017, the Government filed a notice of appeal. This court granted the Government’s unopposed motion to expedite the case. The Government requests that this court vacate the preliminary injunction, or at least narrow the injunction, and also stay the injunction pending appeal. II The district court held that Plaintiffs were entitled to preliminary relief because they had made a strong showing of success on the merits of their Establishment Clause claim. Applying the secular purpose test from Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971), and relying on the historical record that contained “significant and unrebutted evidence of religious animus driving the promulgation of the Executive Order,” the district court concluded that E02 was issued with an intent to disfavor people of Islamic faith. See Hawaii TRO, — F.Supp.3d at -, 2017 WL 1011673, at *12-16. In so doing, the district court decided an important and controversial constitutional claim without first expressing its views on Plaintiffs’ statutory claims, including their INA-based claim. See id. at -n. 11, at *11 n.11. The INA claim was squarely before the district court and briefed and argued before this court. Mindful of the Supreme Court’s admonition that “courts should be extremely careful not to issue unnecessary constitutional rulings,” “[particularly where, as here, a case implicates the fundamental relationship between the Branches,” we think it appropriate to turn first to the INA claim. Am. Foreign Serv. Ass’n v. Garfinkel, 490 U.S. 153, 161, 109 S.Ct. 1693, 104 L.Ed.2d 139 (1989) (per curiam); accord Lyng v. Nw. Indian Cemetery Protective Ass’n, 485 U.S. 439, 445, 108 S.Ct. 1319, 99 L.Ed.2d 534 (1988) (“A fundamental and longstanding principle of judicial restraint requires that courts avoid reaching constitutional questions in advance of the necessity of deciding them.”). After first determining that Plaintiffs have standing to assert their INA-based statutory claim, we conclude that Plaintiffs have shown a likelihood of success on the merits of that claim and that the district court’s preliminary injunction order can be affirmed in large part based on statutory grounds. For reasons further explained below, we need not, and do not, reach the Establishment Clause claim to resolve this appeal. See Ashwander v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 347, 56 S.Ct. 466, 80 L.Ed. 688 (1936) (Brandéis, J., concurring) (“[I]f a case can be decided on either of two grounds, one involving a constitutional question, the other a question of statutory construction or general law, the Court will decide only the latter.”). Ill Before turning to our review of Plaintiffs’ statutory claim, we first address the Government’s challenge to the preliminary injunction order on justiciability grounds. The Government contends both that Plaintiffs lack standing to pursue this case and that the case is not yet ripe. The Government further contends that the consular nonreviewability doctrine bars this court from reviewing E02. We address each contention in turn. A “Article III of the Constitution limits federal-court jurisdiction to ‘Cases’ and ‘Controversies.’ ” Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 516, 127 S.Ct. 1438, 167 L.Ed.2d 248 (2007). “Standing to sue is a doctrine rooted in the traditional understanding of a case or controversy” and limits who may “maintain a lawsuit in federal court to seek redress for a legal wrong.” Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, — U.S. -, 136 S.Ct. 1540, 1547, 194 L.Ed.2d 635 (2016). “[T]o satisfy Article Ill’s standing requirements, a plaintiff must show (1) it has suffered an ‘injury in fact’ that is (a) concrete and particularized and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical; (2) the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action of the defendant; and (3) it is likely, as opposed to merely speculative, that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision.” Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 180-81, 120 S.Ct. 693, 145 L.Ed.2d 610 (2000) (citing Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992)). “At this very preliminary stage of the litigation, [Plaintiffs] may rely on the allegations in their [amended complaint] and whatever other evidence they submitted in support of their [preliminary injunction] motion to meet their burden.” Washington, 847 F.3d at 1159; see Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561, 112 S.Ct. 2130. The district court determined that both the State of Hawai'i and Dr. Elshikh have standing to pursue their Establishment Clause claim. See Hawai‘i TRO, — F.Supp.3d at ---, 2017 WL 1011673, at *7-10. The Government argues that Plaintiffs fail to satisfy the requirements of Article III standing to bring their Establishment Clause claim. Plaintiffs must establish standing for each of their claims. DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 352, 126 S.Ct. 1854, 164 L.Ed.2d 589 (2006). As we do not reach Plaintiffs’ Establishment Clause claim, we address only whether Plaintiffs have standing to challenge E02 based on their INA-based statutory claim and conclude that they do. 1 Dr. Elshikh is an American citizen of Egyptian descent. He alleges that E02 will prevent his mother-in-law from obtaining a visa to reunite with her family. His mother-in-law is a Syrian national currently living in Syria; she last visited her family in Hawai'i in 2005 and has not yet met two of her five grandchildren. Dr. Elshikh’s wife filed an 1-130 Petition for Alien Relative on behalf of her mother in September 2015, and the petition was approved in February 2016. After EOl issued, Dr. Elshikh was told that his mother-in-law’s visa application for an immigrant visa had been put on hold. After EOl was enjoined, he was notified that the application had progressed to the next stage of the process, and that her interview would be scheduled at an embassy overseas. Dr. Elshikh understandably and reasonably fears that E02 will prevent his mother-in-law from entering the country. Dr. Elshikh asserts that he has standing based on the barriers E02 imposes in preventing him from reuniting his mother-in-law with his family. This court and the Supreme Court have reviewed the merits of cases brought by U.S. residents with a specific interest in the entry of a foreigner. See, e.g., Kerry v. Din, — U.S. -, 135 S.Ct. 2128, 2131, 192 L.Ed.2d 183 (2015) (involving a challenge by a U.S. citizen to the denial of her husband’s visa); Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 756-60, 92 S.Ct. 2576, 33 L.Ed.2d 683 (1972) (addressing a challenge by American professors to the denial of a visa to a journalist they had invited to speak at several academic events); Cardenas v. United States, 826 F.3d 1164, 1167 (9th Cir. 2016) (determining that a U.S. citizen could challenge the denial of her husband’s visa). Most similar to this case, in Legal Assistance for Vietnamese Asylum Seekers v. Department of State, Bureau of Consular Affairs, the D.C. Circuit determined that visa sponsors had standing to assert that the State Department’s refusal to process visa applications of Vietnamese citizens living in Hong Kong violated 8 U.S.C. § 1152. 45 F.3d 469, 471-73 (D.C. Cir. 1995), vacated on other grounds, 519 U.S. 1, 117 S.Ct. 378, 136 L.Ed.2d 1 (1996). The court explained that the State Department’s actions prolonged the separation of immediate family members, which resulted in injury to the sponsors. Id. Dr. Elshikh seeks to reunite his mother-in-law with his family and similarly experiences prolonged separation from her. By suspending the entry of nationals from the six designated countries, including Syria, E02 operates to delay or prevent the issuance of visas to nationals from those countries, including Dr. Elshikh’s mother-in-law. Dr. Elshikh has alleged a concrete harm because E02, specifically the operation of Section 2, is a barrier to reunification with his mother-in-law in light of her stalled visa process. See id. (holding that U.S. resident sponsors had standing to challenge the State Department’s refusal to process visa applications); Int’l Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, 857 F.3d 554, 583-84, No. 17-1351, 2017 WL 2273306, at *10 (4th Cir. May 25, 2017) (en banc), as amended (May 31, 2017) (identifying prolonged separation between plaintiff and his wife as a concrete harm). That his mother-in-law’s visa application process was placed on hold when EOl took effect, but moved forward when EOl was enjoined, further shows that Dr. Elshikh’s injury is concrete, real, and immediate if E02 takes effect. Dr. Elshikh has thus alleged a sufficient injury-in-fact. While not challenged by the Government, it is also clear that Dr. Elshikh has established causation and re-dressability. His injuries are fairly traceable to the Order, satisfying causation, and enjoining E02 will remove a barrier to reunification and redress that injury, satisfying redressability. Dr. Elshikh has met the requirements for constitutional standing with respect to the INA-based statutory claim. 2 The State of Hawaii alleges two primary theories of harm in asserting its standing: harm to its proprietary interests and impairment of its sovereign interests. “[L]ike other associations and private parties, a State is bound to have a variety of proprietary interests. A State may, for example, own land or participate in a business venture.” Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico ex rel. Barez, 458 U.S. 592, 601, 102 S.Ct. 3260, 73 L.Ed.2d 995 (1982). “And like other such proprietors [the State] may at times need to pursue those interests in court.” Id. at 601-02, 102 S.Ct. 3260. The State asserts that it has standing because of the injuries inflicted on its university. The University of Hawai'i (“the University”), which the State operates, has twenty-three graduate students, at least twenty-nine visiting faculty members, and other permanent faculty members from the six countries designated in E02. The State asserts that E02 constrains the University’s ability to recruit and enroll undergraduate and graduate students, and recruit and hire visiting faculty from the affected countries. The State also contends that E02 threatens the University’s ability to fulfill its educational mission by hampering recruitment of diverse students, preventing scholars from considering employment at the University, dissuading current professors and scholars from continuing their scholarship at the University, hindering the free flow of ideas, and harming its values of inclusiveness and tolerance. Given the timing of the admissions cycle and this litigation, the State concedes that it is too soon to determine the full impact on recruitment, but asserts that individuals who are not current visa.holders or lawful permanent residents would be precluded from considering the University. In its opposition brief, the State gave updated information, explaining that eleven graduate students from the countries affected by the Order have been admitted, and the University was still considering applications from twenty-one other affected applicants. After the case was submitted, Plaintiffs supplemented the record with further updates on the University’s admissions cycle. At least three graduate students, each from one of the six designated countries, have accepted their offers of admission and have committed to attending the University. There are eleven graduate student applicants, each from one of the six designated countries, with pending offers of admission for the 2017-18 school year. University classes begin on August 21, 2017, but at least two of the students who have accepted their offers of admission must be present on campus by August 1, 2017 and August 10, 2017, respectively, for their graduate programs. The State further explains that if E02 takes effect now, these students’ ability to obtain visas will be impeded. Before Plaintiffs supplemented the record, the Government argued that the State had not identified any prospective student or faculty member who wished to enter the country during Section 2(c)’s 90-day period. However, the State’s alleged harm is that E02 presently constrains their recruitment efforts for students and faculty, and that E02 deters prospective students and faculty members. Given the short admissions cycle — from when the University offers admissions to when international students must decide whether to attend — and the uncertainty of whether E02 will inhibit their ability to secure a visa before the fall semester begins, E02’s deterrent effect is an injury that is “concrete” and “imminent,” as opposed to merely “speculative.” See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560-61, 112 S.Ct. 2130 (internal quotation marks omitted). Of course, a student who is not permitted to obtain a visa and enter our country would not accept an offer of admission. The Government next contends that Plaintiffs cannot rely on events that unfolded after the filing of the complaint to establish standing. This argument is not persuasive. The State had previously contended that its recruitment was constrained by E02 and its supplemental declaration merely provides greater detail regarding the students who may be unable to join the academic community this fall if E02 takes effect. We consider the supplemental information as further evidence that E02 -will harm the State because students affected by Section 2(c) may not attend the University, and the University will lose tuition and educational benefits. The State’s standing can thus be grounded in its proprietary interests as an operator of the University. E02 harms the State’s interests because (1) students and faculty suspended from entry are deterred from studying or teaching at the University; and (2) students who are unable to attend the University will not pay tuition or contribute to a diverse student body. See Washington, 847 F.3d at 1161 (holding that states, as operators of universities, had Article III standing to challenge EOl based on harms to their proprietary interests); Texas v. United States, 809 F.3d 134, 155-63 (5th Cir. 2015), as revised (Nov. 25, 2015), aff'd by an equally divided Court, — U.S. -, 136 S.Ct. 2271, 195 L.Ed.2d 638 (2016) (holding that the state of Texas had standing to challenge the Deferred Action for Parents of Americans and Lawful Permanent Residents (“DAPA”) program based on its alleged injury of subsidizing driver’s licenses to DAPA beneficiaries). We further conclude that the State has shown that its injury is fairly traceable to E02 and that enjoining E02 would redress its harm. The State also presents an alternative standing theory: that the Order impairs its sovereign interests in carrying out its refugee policies, among other things. A state has an interest in its “exercise of sovereign power over individuals and entities within the relevant jurisdiction,” which “involves the power to create and enforce a legal code.” Alfred L. Snapp & Son, 458 U.S. at 601, 102 S.Ct. 3260. The State contends that E02 hinders the exercise of its sovereign power to enforce its laws and policies and this inflicts an injury sufficient to provide the State standing to challenge the Order. The State has laws protecting equal rights, barring discrimination, and fostering diversity. See, e.g., Haw. Const, art. 1, §§ 2, 5; Haw. Rev. Stat. §§ 489-3, 515-3. Specific to refugees, the State created the Office of Community Services (“OCS”), which is directed to “[a]ssist and coordinate the efforts of all public and private agencies providing services which affect the disadvantaged, refugees, and immigrants.” Haw. Rev. Stat. § 371K-4. OCS operates multiple programs for refugees. The State has resettled three refugees this fiscal year, and at least twenty since 2010. E02 would prevent the State from assisting with refugee resettlement and thus prevent it from effectuating its policies aimed at assisting refugee and immigrant populations. See id. The State’s requested injunctive relief would permit it to assist in the resettlement of refugees, at least through fiscal year 2017. As the State exercises “sovereign power over individuals and entities within the relevant jurisdiction” in administering OCS, we conclude, at this preliminary stage, that the State has made sufficient allegations to support standing to challenge the refugee-related provisions of E02. See Alfred L. Snapp & Son, 458 U.S. at 601, 102 S.Ct. 3260; see also Virginia ex rel. Cuccinelli v. Sebelius, 656 F.3d 253, 269 (4th Cir. 2011) (collecting cases where state was found to possess sovereign standing based on state statutes that regulated behavior or provided'for the administration of a state program). Concluding that Dr. Elshikh and the State have satisfied Article Ill’s standing requirements, we turn to whether Plaintiffs are within the “zone of interests” protected by the INA. 3 Because Plaintiffs allege a statutory claim, we must determine whether they meet the requirement of having interests that “fall within the zone of interests protected by the law invoked.” Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., - U.S. -, 134 S.Ct. 1377, 1388, 188 L.Ed.2d 392 (2014) (internal quotation marks omitted). We have little trouble determining that Dr. Elshikh is within the zone of interests of the INA to challenge E02 based on this statutory claim. He asserts that the travel ban prevents his mother-in-law from reuniting with his family. See Legal Assistance for Vietnamese Asylum Seekers, 45 F.3d at 471-72 (“The INA authorizes the immigration of family members of United States citizens and permanent resident aliens. In originally enacting the INA, Congress implemented the underlying intention of our immigration laws regarding the preservation of the family unit. Given the nature and purpose of the statute, the resident appellants fall well within the zone of interest Congress intended to protect.” (internal quotation marks, citations, and alterations omitted)). Likewise, the State’s efforts to enroll students and hire faculty members who are nationals from the six designated countries fall within the zone of interests of the INA. The INA makes clear that a nonimmigrant student may be admitted into the United States. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(F) (identifying students qualified to pursue a full course of study); 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(f) (providing the requirements for nonimmigrant students, including those in colleges and universities). The INA also provides that nonimmigrant scholars and teachers may be admitted into the United States. See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(J) (identifying students, scholars, trainees, teachers, professors, research assistants, specialists, or leaders in fields of specialized knowledge or skill); id. § 1101(a)(15)(H) (identifying aliens coming to perform services in a specialty occupation); id. § 1101(a)(15)(O) (identifying aliens with extraordinary abilities in the sciences, arts, education, business, or athletics). International students and visiting faculty may qualify for F-l visas, J-l visas, H-1B visas, or 0-1 visas. See Directory of Visa Categories, U.S. Dep’t of State, https://travel.state.gov/content/visas/en/ general/all-visa-categories.html (last visited June 6, 2017). The INA leaves no doubt that the State’s interests in student- and employment-based visa petitions for its students and faculty are related to the basic purposes of the INA. The State’s interest in effectuating its refugee resettlement policies and programs also falls within the zone of interests protected by the INA. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) (defining “refugees”); id. § 1157 (providing the procedure for determining the number of refugee admissions). These provisions of the INA were amended to provide a “systematic procedure” for the admission of refugees into the United States, as well as “-uniform provisions for the effective resettlement and absorption of those refugees who are admitted.” Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, § 101, 94 Stat. 102 (1980). The State argues that E02 upsets this finely-tuned system devised by Congress. We conclude that Plaintiffs’ claims of injury as a result of the alleged statutory violations are, at the least, “arguably within the zone of interests” that the INA protects. Bank of Am. Corp. v. City of Miami, Fla., — U.S. -, 137 S.Ct. 1296, 1303, 197 L.Ed.2d 678 (2017) (quoting Ass’n of Data Processing Serv. Orgs., Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 153, 90 S.Ct. 827, 25 L.Ed.2d 184 (1970)). Plaintiffs have standing to assert their INA-based statutory claim that E02 exceeds the scope of the President’s authority under the INA and conflicts with various INA provisions. B The Government next argues that Plaintiffs’ claims are speculative and not ripe. “Ripeness is peculiarly a question of timing, designed to prevent the courts, through avoidance of premature adjudication, from entangling themselves in abstract disagreements.” Stormans, Inc. v. Selecky, 586 F.3d 1109, 1122 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal quotations marks and alteration omitted). “Our role is neither to issue advisory opinions nor to declare rights in hypothetical cases, but to adjudicate live cases or controversies consistent with the powers granted the judiciary in Article III of the Constitution.” Thomas v. Anchorage Equal Rights Comm’n, 220 F.3d 1134, 1138 (9th Cir. 2000). We.are unpersuaded by the Government’s arguments that until a student or faculty member requests a waiver and it is denied, or until Dr. Elshikh’s mother-in-law requests a waiver and she is denied, Plaintiffs injuries are not ripe because they assume “contingent future events that may not occur.” Texas v. United States, 523 U.S. 296, 300, 118 S.Ct. 1257, 140 L.Ed.2d 406 (1998) (internal quotation marks omitted). Although the waiver may, in theory, provide students, visiting faculty members, or Dr. Elshikh’s mother-in-law an opportunity to obtain visas, the waiver is discretionary. Indeed, no one can count on it. The Order poses hardships to nationals from the six designated countries by barring throughout the suspension period their ability to obtain visas. The waiver provision neither guarantees that waivers will be granted nor provides a process for applying for a waiver; moreover, the ultimate decision is clearly committed to a consular officer’s discretion. See 82 Fed. Reg. at 13214 (“Case-by-case waivers could be appropriate in circumstances such as the following....”) (emphasis added); id. at 13219 (stating that nothing in the Order provides any “enforceable” rights). The discretionary waiver is not “a sufficient safety valve,” Washington, 847 F.3d at 1169, and is a far cry from the “contingent future” argued by the Government. Here, nationals from the six designated countries, including Dr. Elshikh’s mother-in-law and students who have accepted, or been offered, admission to the University of Hawaii, are burdened by E02 because they are not permitted entry, and whether they might obtain a waiver is speculative and at the discretion of a consular officer or a Customs and Border Protection official. See 82 Fed. Reg. at 13214. We decline the Government’s invitation to wait until Plaintiffs identify a visa applicant who was denied a discretionary waiver to assess whether Plaintiffs have shown a likelihood of success on the merits of their claims. Regardless of whether Dr. Elshikh’s mother-in-law or the University’s prospective students and faculty members might conceivably obtain such a waiver, they will face substantial hardship if we were to first require that they try to obtain a waiver before we will consider their case. Cf. Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 149, 87 S.Ct. 1507, 18 L.Ed.2d 681 (1967). We conclude that the claim is ripe for review. C Finally, the Government renews the argument it made before this court in Washington v. Trump that we may not review E02 because the consular nonre-viewability doctrine counsels that the decision to issue or withhold a visa is not subject to judicial review. See Li Hing of Hong Kong, Inc. v. Levin, 800 F.2d 970, 971 (9th Cir. 1986) (“[I]t has been consistently held that the consular official’s decision to issue or withhold a visa is not subject either to administrative or judicial review.”). We reject this argument. Plaintiffs do not seek review of an individual consular officer’s decision to grant or to deny a visa pursuant to valid regulations, which could implicate the consular nonreviewability doctrine. Plaintiffs instead challenge “the President’s promulgation of sweeping immigration policy.” Washington, 847 F.3d at 1162. Courts can and do review both constitutional and statutory “challenges to the substance and implementation of immigration policy.” Id. at 1163; see, e.g., Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc., 509 U.S. 155, 187-88, 113 S.Ct. 2549, 125 L.Ed.2d 128 (1993) (addressing the merits of a challenge that an executive order violated the INA and the United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees); INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 940-41, 103 S.Ct. 2764, 77 L.Ed.2d 317 (1983) (addressing whether a section of the INA that authorized one House of Congress to invalidate a decision of the Executive to allow a deportable alien to remain in the United States was unconstitutional). This case is justiciable because Plaintiffs seek judicial review of E02, contending that E02 exceeds the statutory authority delegated by Congress and constitutional boundaries. “This is a familiar judicial exercise.” Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Clinton, 566 U.S. 189, 196, 132 S.Ct. 1421, 182 L.Ed.2d 423 (2012). We reject the Government’s argument that the Order is not subject to judicial review. Although “[t]he Executive has broad discretion over the admission and exclusion of aliens, [ ] that discretion is not boundless. It extends only as far as the statutory authority conferred by Congress and may not transgress constitutional limitations. It is the duty of the courts, in cases properly before them, to say where those statutory and constitutional boundaries lie.” Abourezk v. Reagan, 785 F.2d 1043, 1061 (D.C. Cir. 1986), aff'd, 484 U.S. 1, 108 S.Ct. 252, 98 L.Ed.2d 1 (1987). Whatever deference we accord to the President’s immigration and national security policy judgments does not preclude us from reviewing the policy at all. See Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 70, 101 S.Ct. 2646, 69 L.Ed.2d 478 (1981) (“[D]eference does not mean abdication.”); Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1, 34, 130 S.Ct. 2705, 177 L.Ed.2d 355 (2010) (“Our precedents, old and new, make clear that concerns of national security and foreign relations do not warrant abdication of the judicial role.”). We do not abdicate the judicial role, and we affirm our obligation “to say what the law is” in this case. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177, 2 L.Ed. 60 (1803). We turn to the merits of the appeal of the preliminary injunction order. IV A A preliminary injunction is “an extraordinary remedy that may only be awarded upon a clear showing that the plaintiff is entitled to such relief.” Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 22, 129 S.Ct. 365, 172 L.Ed.2d 249 (2008). “A plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction must establish [1] that he is likely to succeed on the merits, [2] that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, [3] that the balance of equities tips in his favor, and [4] that an injunction is in the public interest.” Id. at 20, 129 S.Ct. 365. We may affirm the district court’s entry of the preliminary injunction “on any ground supported by the record.” Enyart v. Nat'l Conference of Bar Exam’rs, Inc., 630 F.3d 1153, 1159 (9th Cir. 2011). B We consider whether Plaintiffs are entitled to preliminary relief based on the likelihood that E02 violates the INA. First, we address whether the President complied with the conditions set forth in § 1182(f), which are necessary for invoking his authority. We next address the conflicts between E02 and other provisions of the INA. 1 Under Article I of the Constitution, the power to make immigration laws “is entrusted exclusively to Congress.” Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522, 531, 74 S.Ct. 737, 98 L.Ed. 911 (1954); see U.S. Const, art. I, § 8, cl. 4 (“The Congress shall have Power ... [t]o establish an uniform Rule of Naturalization....”); Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 792, 97 S.Ct. 1473, 52 L.Ed.2d 50 (1977) (“[0]ver no conceivable subject is the legislative power pf Congress more complete than it is over the admission of aliens.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); id. at 796, 97 S.Ct. 1473 (“The conditions of entry for every alien, the particular classes of aliens that shall be denied entry altogether, the basis for determining such classification ... have been recognized as matters solely for the responsibility of the Congress.... ” (internal quotation marks omitted)). In the INA of 1952, Congress delegated some of its power to the President through Section 212(f), which provides: Whenever the President finds that the entry of any aliens or of any class of aliens into the United States would be detrimental to the interests of the United States, he may by proclamation, and for such period as he shall deem necessary, suspend the entry of all aliens or any class of aliens as immigrants or nonimmigrants, or impose on the entry of aliens any restrictions he may deem to be appropriate. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(f). In Section 2(c) of the Order, the President invokes this power along with § 1185(a) to suspend for 90 days the entry of nationals from the six designated countries. See 82 Fed. Reg. at 13213. In Section 6(a) of the Order, the President invokes neither section to suspend travel of refugees and to suspend decisions on applications for refugee status for 120 days, but, in Section 6(b), the President invokes § 1182(f) to cap refugee admissions at 50,000 for the 2017 fiscal year. Id. at 13215-16. The parties dispute whether E02 falls clearly within the President’s congres-sionally delegated authority. To be sure, § 1182(f) gives the President broad authority to suspend the entry of aliens or classes of aliens. However, this authority is not unlimited. Cf. Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 129, 78 S.Ct. 1113, 2 L.Ed.2d 1204 (1958) (“[I]f that power is delegated, the standards must be adequate to pass scrutiny by the accepted tests.”); J.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409, 48 S.Ct. 348, 72 L.Ed. 624 (1928) (“[Legislative action is not a forbidden delegation of legislative power” if Congress provides an “intelligible principle to which the person or body authorized ... is directed to conform.”). Section 1182(f) requires that the President find that the entry of a class of aliens into the United States would be detrimental to the interests of the United States. This section requires that the President’s findings support the conclusion that entry of all nationals from the six designated countries, all refugees, and refugees in excess of 50,000 would be harmful to the national interest. There is no sufficient finding in E02 that the entry of the excluded classes would be detrimental to the interests of the United States. i Section 2(c) declares that “the unrestricted entry into the United States of nationals of Iran, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, and Yemen would be detrimental to the interests of the United States” and directs that the entry of nationals from those designated countries be barred for 90 days. 82 Fed. Reg. at 18213. The provision bans more than 180 million people from entry based on their national origin, including nationals who may have never been physically present in those countries. See Brief of Former National Security Officials as Amici Curiae, Dkt. No. 108 at 17. Section 2(c) states: To temporarily reduce investigative burdens on relevant agencies during the review period [of the United States’ vetting procedures], [2] to ensure the proper review and maximum utilization, of available resources for the screening and vetting of foreign nationals, [3] to ensure that adequate standards are established to prevent infiltration by foreign terrorists, and [4] in light of the national security concerns referenced in section 1 of this order, I hereby proclaim, pursuant to sections 212(f) and 215(a) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. [§§ ] 1182(f) and 1185(a), that the unrestricted entry into the United States of nationals of Iran, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, and Yemen would be detrimental to the interests of the United States. I therefore direct that the entry into the United States of nationals of those six countries be suspended. 82 Fed. Reg. at 13213. The Government explains that the Order’s objective “is to address the risk that potential terrorists might exploit possible weaknesses in the Nation’s screening and vetting procedures while the review of those procedures is underway.” We reject the first three reasons provided in Section 2(c) because they relate to preservation of government resources to review existing procedures and ensure adequate vetting procedures. There is no finding that present vetting standards are inadequate, and no finding that absent the improved vetting procedures there likely will be harm to our national interests. These identified reasons do not support the conclusion that the entry of nationals from the six designated countries would be harmful to our national interests. We turn to the fourth reason— national security concerns — and examine whether it confers a legally sufficient basis for the President’s conclusion that the nationality-based entry restriction is warranted. Section 1(d) of the Order explains that nationals from Iran, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, and Yemen warrant additional scrutiny because: Each of these countries is a state sponsor of terrorism, has been significantly compromised by terrorist organizations, or contains active conflict zones. Any of these circumstances diminishes the foreign government’s willingness or ability to share or validate important information about individuals seeking to travel to the United States. Moreover, the significant presence in each of these countries of terrorist organizations, their members, and others exposed to those organizations increases the chance that conditions will be exploited to enable terrorist operatives or sympathizers to travel to the United States. Finally, once foreign nationals from these countries are admitted to the United States, it is often difficult to remove them, because many of these countries typically delay issuing, or refuse to issue, travel documents. Id. at 13210 (emphasis added). Because of these country conditions, the Order concludes that “the risk of erroneously permitting entry of a national of one of these countries who intends to commit terrorist acts or otherwise harm the national security of the United States is unacceptably high.” Id. at 13211. The Order further indicates that “hundreds of persons born abroad have been convicted of terrorism-related crimes in the United States[,]” but does not identify the number of nationals from the six designated countries who have been so convicted. See id. at 13212. The Order makes no finding that nationality alone renders entry of this broad class of individuals a heightened security risk to the United States. See Int’l Refugee Assistance Project, 857 F.3d at 610, 2017 WL 2273306, at *31 (Keenan, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (“[T]he Second Executive Order does not state that any nationals of the six identified countries, by virtue of their nationality, intend to commit terrorist acts in the United States or otherwise pose a detriment to the interests of the United States.”). The Order does not tie these nationals in any way to terrorist organizations within the six designated countries. It does not identify these nationals as contributors to active conflict or as those responsible for insecure country conditions. It does not provide any link between an individual’s nationality and their propensity to commit terrorism or their inherent dangerousness. In short, the Order does not provide a rationale explaining why permitting entry of nationals from the six designated countries under current protocols would be detrimental to the interests of the United States. The Order’s discussion of country conditions fails to bridge the gap. Indeed, its use of nationality as the sole basis for suspending entry means that nationals without significant ties to the six designated countries, such as those who left as children or those whose nationality is based on parentage alone, should be suspended from entry. Yet, nationals of other countries who do have meaningful ties to the six designated countries — and may be contributing to the very country conditions discussed — fall outside the scope of Section 2(c). Consequently, E02’s focus on nationality “could have the paradoxical effect of barring entry by a Syrian national who has lived in Switzerland for decades, but not a Swiss national who has immigrated to Syria during its civil war.” Hawai‘i TRO, — F.Supp.3d at -, 2017 WL 1011673, at *15 (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted); see also Brief of the Cato Institute as Amicus Curiae, Dkt. No. 170 at 14-15 (providing statistics on nationals of the designated countries living in other countries as migrants, refugees, or asylum seekers and explaining that Syrian and Iranian nationals do not gain nationality by virtue of their place of birth). Although the Order explains that country conditions in the six designated countries lessen their governments’ ability to share information about nationals seeking to travel to our country, the Order specifically avoids making any finding that the current screening processes are inadequate. As the law stands, a visa applicant bears the burden of showing that the applicant is eligible to receive a visa or other document for entry and is not inadmissible. See 8 U.S.C. § 1361. The Government already can exclude individuals who do not meet that burden. See id. The Order offers no further reason explaining how this individualized adjudication process is flawed such that permitting entry of an entire class of nationals is injurious to the interests of the United States. Finally, the Order relies on 8 U.S.C. § 1187(a)(12) to explain why the six countries have been designated. 82 Fed. Reg. at 13210. In § 1187(a)(12), Congress prevented use of the Visa Waiver Program by dual nationals of, or those who have visited in the last six years, (1) Iraq and Syria, (2) any country designated by the Secretary of State as a state sponsor of terrorism, and (3) any other country designated as a country of concern by the Secretary of Homeland Security, in consultation with the Secretary of State and the Director of National Intelligence. Rather than setting an outright ban on entry of nationals from these countries, Congress restricted access to the tourist Visa Waiver Program and instead required that persons who are nationals of or have recently traveled to these countries enter the United States with a visa. This provision reflects Congress’s considered view on similar security concerns that the Order seeks to address. See Chadha, 462 U.S. at 951, 959, 103 S.Ct. 2764 (explaining that our founders “consciously” chose to place the legislative process in the hands of a “deliberate and deliberative” body). The Order identifies no new information to justify Section 2(e)’s blanket ban as contrasted with § 1187(a)(12)’s restriction from the Visa Waiver Program. ■ Moreover, relying on § 1187(a)(12) alone, which requires that aliens from these countries undergo vetting through visa procedures, does not explain why their entry would be detrimental to the interests of the United States. To the contrary, it effectively negates the Order’s statement of detriment — that the “unrestricted entry into the United States of nationals [of the six designated countries] would be detrimental to the interests of the United States.” 82 Fed. Reg. at 13213 (emphasis added). Section 1187(a)(12) dictates that the entry of individuals covered by the Order is never “unrestricted.” In conclusion, the Order does not offer a sufficient justification to suspend the entry of more than 180 million people on the basis of nationality. National security is not a “talismanic incantation” that, once invoked, can support any and all exercise of executive power under § 1182(f). United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258, 263-64, 88 S.Ct. 419, 19 L.Ed.2d 508 (1967); see also Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 235, 65 S.Ct. 193, 89 L.Ed. 194 (1944) (Murphy, J., dissenting) (“[T]he exclusion order necessarily must rely for its reasonableness upon the assumption that all persons of Japanese ancestry may have a dangerous tendency to commit sabotage and espionage and to aid our Japanese enemy in other ways. It is difficult to believe that reason, logic or experience could be marshalled in support of such an assumption.”). Section 1182(f) requires that the President exercise his authority only after meeting the precondition of finding that entry of an alien or class of aliens would be detrimental