Ass'n for Accessible Medicines v. Frosh (887 F.3d 664, 2018)

Citations

887 F.3d 664

Full opinion text

THACKER, Circuit Judge:

The Association for Accessible Medicines ("AAM") appeals the district court's dismissal of its dormant commerce clause challenge to a Maryland statute prohibiting price gouging in the sale of prescription drugs. AAM also appeals the district court's refusal to enjoin enforcement of the statute on the basis that it is unconstitutionally vague. We hold that the statute violates the dormant commerce clause because it directly regulates the price of transactions that occur outside Maryland. Accordingly, we reverse the district court's dismissal of that claim and remand with instructions to enter judgment in favor of AAM.

Factual Background and Procedural History

Maryland's Anti-Price Gouging Statute

In response to reports of price gouging by pharmaceutical manufacturers in the sale of certain prescription medications, Maryland's legislature passed HB 631, "An Act concerning Public Health-Essential Off-Patent or Generic Drugs-Price Gouging-Prohibition" (the "Act"), during the 2017 legislative session. J.A. 42-48. Maryland's governor refused to sign the bill, citing constitutional and other concerns, and the bill became law without his signature. The Act went into effect on October 1, 2017.

The Act prohibits "[a] manufacturer or wholesale distributor" from "engag[ing] in price gouging in the sale of an essential off-patent or generic drug." Md. Code Ann., Health-General § 2-802(a). The Act defines "price gouging" as "an unconscionable increase in the price of a prescription drug." Id. § 2-801(c). "Unconscionable increase" is further defined as an increase that "[i]s excessive and not justified by the cost of producing the drug or the cost of appropriate expansion of access to the drug to promote public health" and "[r]esults in consumers ... having no meaningful choice about whether to purchase the drug at an excessive price" due to the drug's "importance ... to their health" and "[i]nsufficient competition in the market." Id. § 2-801(f). The "essential" medications subject to the law are those "made available for sale in [Maryland]" that either "appear[ ] on the Model List of Essential Medicines most recently adopted by the World Health Organization" or are "designated ... as an essential medicine due to [their] efficacy in treating a life-threatening health condition or a chronic health condition that substantially impairs an individual's ability to engage in activities of daily living." Id. § 2-801(b)(1).

A manufacturer or wholesale distributor determined to be in violation of the Act may face a number of legal consequences, including a civil penalty of $10,000 per violation or an action to enjoin the sale of the medication at the increased price. See Md. Code Ann., Health-General § 2-803(d). To assist the Maryland Attorney General in identifying violations, the Act provides that the Maryland Medical Assistance Program "may notify the Attorney General" in the event of a particular price increase, including when an increase "[w]ould result in an increase of 50% or more in the wholesale acquisition cost of the drug within the preceding 1-year period" or when a 30-day supply of the drug "would cost more than $80 at the drug's wholesale acquisition cost." Id. § 2-803(a).

AAM's Suit Challenging the Act

AAM is a voluntary organization with a membership that consists of prescription drug manufacturers and wholesale distributors and other entities in the pharmaceutical industry. AAM's member-manufacturers, only one of which is based in Maryland, typically sell their products to wholesale pharmaceutical distributors, none of which are based in Maryland . The vast majority of these sales occur outside Maryland's borders.

On July 6, 2017, AAM filed this action against Brian Frosh, Maryland's Attorney General, and Dennis R. Schrader, Secretary of the Maryland Department of Health (collectively, "Maryland"). Among other claims, AAM asserts that the Act violates the dormant commerce clause and is unconstitutionally vague. Maryland filed a motion to dismiss AAM's suit, which the district court granted as to the dormant commerce clause claim but denied as to the vagueness claim. The district court also denied AAM's motion for a preliminary injunction. AAM timely appealed.

II.

Dormant Commerce Clause Challenge

AAM argues that the district court improperly dismissed its claim that the Act violates the dormant commerce clause by directly regulating wholly out-of-state commerce. We review the dismissal de novo, "accepting [AAM's] well-pleaded allegations as true and drawing all reasonable inferences in [AAM's] favor." Schilling v. Schmidt Baking Co. , 876 F.3d 596, 599 (4th Cir. 2017).

The Dormant Commerce Clause and the Principle Against Extraterritoriality

Implicit in the constitutional allocation of the "Power ... To regulate Commerce ... among the several States," U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3, to the federal government is a corollary "constraint on the power of the States to enact legislation that interferes with or burdens interstate commerce." Brown v. Hovatter , 561 F.3d 357, 362 (4th Cir. 2009). This doctrine, known as the "dormant" commerce clause, "is driven by concern about economic protectionism" and seeks to prevent state "regulatory measures designed to benefit in-state economic interests by burdening out-of-state competitors." Id. at 363 (quoting Dep't of Revenue of Ky. v. Davis , 553 U.S. 328, 337-38, 128 S.Ct. 1801, 170 L.Ed.2d 685 (2008) ).

The principle against extraterritoriality as it relates to the dormant commerce clause is derived from the notion that "a State may not regulate commerce occurring wholly outside of its borders." Star Sci., Inc. v. Beales , 278 F.3d 339, 355 (4th Cir. 2002) (citing Healy v. Beer Inst. , 491 U.S. 324, 335-36, 109 S.Ct. 2491, 105 L.Ed.2d 275 (1989) ; Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. N.Y. State Liquor Auth. , 476 U.S. 573, 582-83, 106 S.Ct. 2080, 90 L.Ed.2d 552 (1986) ; Edgar v. MITE Corp. , 457 U.S. 624, 642-43, 102 S.Ct. 2629, 73 L.Ed.2d 269 (1982) (plurality opinion)). The principle "reflect[s] the Constitution's special concern both with the maintenance of a national economic union unfettered by state-imposed limitations on interstate commerce and with the autonomy of the individual States within their respective spheres." Healy , 491 U.S. at 335-36, 109 S.Ct. 2491 (footnote omitted). A state law violates the extraterritoriality principle if it either expressly applies to out-of-state commerce, see Carolina Trucks & Equip., Inc. v. Volvo Trucks of N. Am., Inc. , 492 F.3d 484, 491-92 (4th Cir. 2007), or has that "practical effect," regardless of the legislature's intent, Star Sci. , 278 F.3d at 355.

One of the earliest cases to address the extraterritoriality principle as it relates to the dormant commerce clause is Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc. , 294 U.S. 511, 55 S.Ct. 497, 79 L.Ed. 1032 (1935). The New York law at issue in Baldwin required milk dealers to pay a minimum amount to milk producers, even when the milk was purchased outside New York. See id. at 519, 55 S.Ct. 497. The parties agreed that "New York ha[d] no power to project its legislation into Vermont by regulating the price to be paid in that state for milk acquired there." Id. at 521, 55 S.Ct. 497. In holding that the law violated the dormant commerce clause, the Supreme Court observed that the law essentially operated as a duty on milk produced in other states and therefore unlawfully burdened interstate commerce. See id. at 521-22, 55 S.Ct. 497.

A plurality of the Court expounded on this concept nearly half a century later in Edgar v. MITE Corp. , 457 U.S. 624, 102 S.Ct. 2629, 73 L.Ed.2d 269 (1982) (plurality opinion). The Illinois law challenged in Edgar required "any takeover offer for the shares of a target company [to] be registered with the Secretary of State" if Illinois shareholders owned at least 10% of the company or if the company was organized under Illinois law or headquartered in the state, among other conditions. Id. at 626-27, 102 S.Ct. 2629 (internal footnote omitted). The Illinois Secretary of State had the authority "to deny registration to a tender offer" under certain circumstances. Id. at 627, 102 S.Ct. 2629. The plurality held that the Illinois law violated the dormant commerce clause by "directly regulat[ing] transactions which take place across state lines, even if wholly outside the State of Illinois" because it permitted the Illinois Secretary of State to reject a tender offer even as to those shares not owned by Illinois shareholders. Id. at 641-42, 102 S.Ct. 2629. In other words, the law granted the Illinois Secretary of State the ability to intervene in transactions between an out-of-state acquiring company and out-of-state shareholders of the target company when neither the acquiring company nor the target company's shareholders had connections to Illinois.

The Court favorably referenced both Baldwin and Edgar in Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. New York State Liquor Authority , 476 U.S. 573, 106 S.Ct. 2080, 90 L.Ed.2d 552 (1986). The New York law struck down in Brown-Forman "requir[ed] distillers to affirm that they will make no sales anywhere in the United States at a price lower than the posted price in New York," which prohibited the distillers from lowering their prices in other states. Id. at 579-80, 106 S.Ct. 2080. The Court noted that the law regulated commerce in other states by controlling liquor prices in those states, which would "effectively force [the distiller] to abandon its promotional allowance program in States in which that program is legal, or force those other States to alter their own regulatory schemes in order to permit [the distiller] to lower its New York prices without violating the affirmation laws of those States." Id. at 583-84, 106 S.Ct. 2080. As a result, the law was invalid. See id. at 584, 106 S.Ct. 2080.

Just three years later, the Supreme Court considered a similar Connecticut law in Healy v. Beer Institute , 491 U.S. 324, 109 S.Ct. 2491, 105 L.Ed.2d 275 (1989). The law, which was aimed at preventing Connecticut residents from crossing state lines to purchase cheaper beer, required beer producers to affirm that their Connecticut prices were, "at the moment of posting, no higher than the prices at which those products are sold in the bordering States." Id. at 326, 109 S.Ct. 2491. From its "cases concerning the extraterritorial effects of state economic regulation," id. at 336, 109 S.Ct. 2491 (citing Brown-Forman , 476 U.S. at 579, 581-83, 106 S.Ct. 2080 ; Edgar , 457 U.S. at 642-43, 102 S.Ct. 2629 ; Baldwin , 294 U.S. at 528, 55 S.Ct. 497 ), the Supreme Court outlined the principle against extraterritoriality:

1) A state statute may not regulate "commerce that takes place wholly outside of the State's borders, whether or not the commerce has effects within the State." Id. at 336, 109 S.Ct. 2491. Specifically, a state law may not have "the practical effect of establishing 'a scale of prices for use in other states.' " Id. (quoting Baldwin , 294 U.S. at 528, 55 S.Ct. 497 ).

2) "A statute that directly controls commerce occurring wholly outside the [legislating state's] boundaries ... is invalid regardless of whether the statute's extraterritorial reach was intended by the legislature." Id. The statute's "practical effect" is the focus of the inquiry. Id.

3) In evaluating a statute's "practical effect," the Court considers "not only ... the consequences of the statute itself, but also ... how the challenged statute may interact with the legitimate regulatory regimes of other States and what effect would arise if ... every[ ] State adopted similar legislation." Id. at 336, 109 S.Ct. 2491. This is because "the Commerce Clause protects against inconsistent legislation arising from the projection of one state regulatory regime into the jurisdiction of another State." Id. at 336-37, 109 S.Ct. 2491.

Applying these three directives, the Court invalidated the Connecticut law due to its "undeniable effect of controlling commercial activity occurring wholly outside the boundary of the State." Id. at 337, 109 S.Ct. 2491. The Court also emphasized that "the practical effect of this affirmation law, in conjunction with the many other beer-pricing and affirmation laws that have been or might be enacted throughout the country, is to create just the kind of competing and interlocking local economic regulation that the Commerce Clause was meant to preclude." Id.

Maryland asserts that in Pharmaceutical Research & Manufacturers of America v. Walsh , 538 U.S. 644, 669, 123 S.Ct. 1855, 155 L.Ed.2d 889 (2003), the Supreme Court limited the principle against extraterritoriality in the dormant commerce clause context to price affirmation statutes. The Maine law at issue in Walsh established a program through which the state would "attempt to negotiate rebates with drug manufacturers to fund the reduced price for drugs offered to [program] participants." Id. at 649, 123 S.Ct. 1855. The petitioner challenged the law on the basis "that the rebate requirement constitutes impermissible extraterritorial regulation." Id. at 669, 123 S.Ct. 1855. The Supreme Court concluded that "[t]he rule that was applied in Baldwin and Healy " did not apply to the rebate program because "unlike price control or price affirmation statutes, '[the program] does not regulate the price of any out-of-state transaction, either by its express terms or by its inevitable effect.' " Id. (quoting Pharm. Research & Mfrs. of Am. v. Concannon , 249 F.3d 66, 81-82 (1st Cir. 2001) ).

Maryland's reading of this language, while adopted by two of our sister circuits, is too narrow. The Supreme Court's statement does not suggest that "[t]he rule that was applied in Baldwin and Healy " applies exclusively to "price control or price affirmation statutes." See Walsh , 538 U.S. at 669, 123 S.Ct. 1855. Instead, the Court's statement emphasizes that the extraterritoriality principle is violated if the state law at issue "regulate[s] the price of any out-of-state transaction, either by its express terms or by its inevitable effect." Id. The Maine program challenged in Walsh directly affected only transactions in Maine and did not impact the prices drug manufacturers could charge elsewhere. Further, the Illinois statute at issue in Edgar , which permitted the Secretary of State to block the takeover of a target company with certain connections to Illinois, clearly was not a price control or price affirmation statute, but the Court nonetheless concluded that it ran afoul of the principle against extraterritoriality. See 457 U.S. at 627, 641-42, 102 S.Ct. 2629 ; see also Healy , 491 U.S. at 333 n.9, 109 S.Ct. 2491 (stating that Edgar "significantly illuminates the contours of the constitutional prohibition on extraterritorial legislation"). We therefore reject Maryland's argument that Walsh limited the extraterritoriality principle only to price affirmation statutes.

AAM's Challenge to the Act

We now turn to the merits of AAM's dormant commerce clause challenge. AAM asserts that the Act directly regulates the prices charged for prescription drugs in out-of-state transactions, even though its provisions are triggered only when one of those drugs is available for sale in Maryland. Maryland acknowledges that the Act is intended to reach the manufacturers' conduct in the series of wholesale transactions that occur "upstream" from consumer retail sales but argues that these indirect effects do not violate the dormant commerce clause's prohibition on direct regulation.

We agree with AAM that the district court erroneously upheld the Act under the dormant commerce clause. First, the Act is not triggered by any conduct that takes place within Maryland. Second, even if it were, the Act controls the prices of transactions that occur outside the state. Finally, the Act, if similarly enacted by other states, would impose a significant burden on interstate commerce involving prescription drugs. All of these factors combine to create a violation of the dormant commerce clause.

The Act is Not Limited to Sales Wholly Within Maryland

In reaching its conclusion, the district court emphasized that the Act's provisions "are triggered only when there is a drug ... made available for sale within the state." J.A. 486 (emphasis in original). The district court likened the Act to the Virginia statute at issue in Star Scientific , but this comparison is inapposite. See id. at 485-86. The Virginia statute at issue in Star Scientific did not apply to sales to distributors, retail chains, or consumers outside Virginia . Instead, it specifically required tobacco manufacturers selling cigarettes in Virginia to join a nationwide settlement agreement or place into escrow a fee of two cents per cigarette actually sold in the state. See Star Sci. , 278 F.3d at 346. The relevant conduct penalized by that statute was the sale of a cigarette in Virginia .

In contrast, here, the Act's plain language allows Maryland to enforce the Act against parties to a transaction that did not result in a single pill being shipped to Maryland. Specifically, the Act prohibits "price gouging in the sale of an essential off-patent or generic drug." Md. Code Ann., Health-General § 2-802(a). "Essential off-patent or generic drug" is defined, in part, as a drug "[t]hat is made available for sale in [Maryland]." Id. § 2-801(b)(1)(iv). This "made available for sale" language does not limit the Act's application to sales that actually occur within Maryland, nor does it restrict the Act's operation to the context of a resale transaction with a Maryland consumer. Indeed, Maryland acknowledges that the Act is intended to reach sales upstream from consumer retail sales. See Oral Argument at 20:45-55, Ass'n for Accessible Meds. v. Frosh , No. 17-2166 (4th Cir. Jan. 24, 2018), http://www.ca4.uscourts.gov/oral-argument/listen-to-oral-arguments ("[T]he conduct that violates the statute could manifest itself in a wholesale transaction that occurs out-of-state."). Such "upstream" sales would occur almost exclusively outside Maryland.

Therefore, the Act targets conduct that occurs entirely outside Maryland's borders, a conclusion supported by the Act's prohibition of a manufacturer's use of the defense that it did not directly sell to a consumer in Maryland. See Md. Code Ann., Health-General § 2-803(g) ("[A] person who is alleged to have violated a requirement of this subtitle may not assert as a defense that the person did not deal directly with a consumer residing in [Maryland]."). The district court thus erred in relying on the Act's "made available for sale" language to uphold the Act.

The Act Impacts Transactions that Occur Wholly Outside Maryland

Even if the Act did require a nexus to an actual sale in Maryland, it is nonetheless invalid because it still controls the price of transactions that occur wholly outside the state. See Brown-Forman , 476 U.S. at 580, 106 S.Ct. 2080 ("The mere fact that the effects of New York's ABC Law are triggered only by sales of liquor within the State of New York ... does not validate the law if it regulates the out-of-state transactions of distillers who sell in-state."). The Act, by its own terms, is not fixated on the price the Maryland consumer ultimately pays for the drug. Instead, the lawfulness of a price increase is measured according to the price the manufacturer or wholesaler charges in the initial sale of the drug . An "unconscionable" price increase is one that "[i]s excessive and not justified by the cost of producing the drug or the cost of appropriate expansion of access to the drug to promote public health." Md. Code Ann., Health-General § 2-801(f). Significantly, the retailers that sell the drug directly to the consumer cannot be held liable under the Act; only "[a] manufacturer or wholesale distributor" is prohibited from "engag[ing] in price gouging." Id. § 2-802(a) ; see id. § 2-803(g). This structure makes clear that the conduct the Act targets is the upstream pricing and sale of prescription drugs, and the parties agree that nearly all of these transactions occur outside Maryland.

Therefore, the Act effectively seeks to compel manufacturers and wholesalers to act in accordance with Maryland law outside of Maryland. This it cannot do. See Healy , 491 U.S. at 336, 109 S.Ct. 2491 ("[T]he 'Commerce Clause ... precludes the application of a state statute to commerce that takes place wholly outside of the State's borders, whether or not the commerce has effects within the State' ...." (quoting Edgar , 457 U.S. at 642-43, 102 S.Ct. 2629 )); Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Corey , 730 F.3d 1070, 1103 (9th Cir. 2013) (explaining that "[s]tates may not mandate compliance with their preferred policies in wholly out-of-state transactions" (citing Walsh , 538 U.S. at 669, 123 S.Ct. 1855 )).

More importantly, the Act is effectively a price control statute that instructs manufacturers and wholesale distributors as to the prices they are permitted to charge in transactions that do not take place in Maryland. This is precisely the conduct "[t]he rule that was applied in Baldwin and Healy " aims to prevent. Walsh , 538 U.S. at 669, 123 S.Ct. 1855 (concluding that the Maine law at issue was valid in part because "Maine does not insist that manufacturers sell their drugs to a wholesaler for a certain price"). We acknowledge that the Act does not establish a price schedule for prescription drugs, nor does it aim to tie the prices charged for prescription drugs in Maryland to the prices at which those drugs are sold in other states. See Healy , 491 U.S. at 338, 109 S.Ct. 2491 ; Brown-Forman , 476 U.S. at 582, 106 S.Ct. 2080. But like the laws struck down in Healy and Brown-Forman , the Act attempts to dictate the price that may be charged elsewhere for a good. Any legitimate effects the Act may have in Maryland are insufficient to protect the law from invalidation. See Brown-Forman , 476 U.S. at 580, 106 S.Ct. 2080.

The Act Implicates a Price Control as Opposed to an Upstream Pricing Impact

Maryland attempts to justify the Act by arguing that its out-of-state pricing implications are merely "the upstream pricing impact of a state regulation." Freedom Holdings, Inc. v. Spitzer , 357 F.3d 205, 220 (2d Cir. 2004). But the Act is unlike the statute at issue in Freedom Holdings , which banned the importation of cigarettes manufactured by companies that did not comply with an escrow law similar to the one we upheld in Star Scientific . See id. at 211-14. The importers in Freedom Holdings argued that the New York law regulated out-of-state commerce by requiring manufacturers to sell cigarettes at a higher price "to purchasers in sales transactions that occur wholly outside [New York]." Id. at 220. The Second Circuit rejected the argument, holding that "[t]he extraterritorial effect described by [the importers] amounts to no more than the upstream pricing impact of a state regulation" and observing that "a similar pricing impact might result from any state regulation of a product." Id. The price change caused by the New York law at issue in Freedom Holdings -unlike that mandated by the Act here-was the result of natural market forces and was not artificially imposed by the laws of another state. By contrast, the Act aims to override prescription drug manufacturers' reaction to the market and to regulate the prices these manufacturers charge for their products. This is more than an "upstream pricing impact"-it is a price control.

Therefore, the fundamental problem with the Act is that it "regulate[s] the price of [an] out-of-state transaction." Walsh , 538 U.S. at 669, 123 S.Ct. 1855. The Act instructs prescription drug manufacturers that they are prohibited from charging an "unconscionable" price in the initial sale of a drug, which occurs outside Maryland's borders. Maryland cannot, even in an effort to protect its consumers from skyrocketing prescription drug costs, impose its preferences in this manner. The "practical effect" of the Act, much like the effect of the statutes struck down in Brown-Forman and Healy , is to specify the price at which goods may be sold beyond Maryland's borders. See Healy , 491 U.S. at 336, 109 S.Ct. 2491 ("The critical inquiry is whether the practical effect of the regulation is to control conduct beyond the boundaries of the State." (citing Brown-Forman , 476 U.S. at 579, 106 S.Ct. 2080 )). The district court erred by failing to account for this impact.

The Act Burdens Interstate Commerce in Prescription Drugs

The Act's significant scope is further illuminated by the burden similar legislation would place on interstate commerce. See Healy , 491 U.S. at 336, 109 S.Ct. 2491 ("[T]he practical effect of the statute must be evaluated not only by considering the consequences of the statute itself, but also by considering how the challenged statute may interact with the legitimate regulatory regimes of other States and what effect would arise if not one, but many or every, State adopted similar legislation."). Because the Act targets wholesale rather than retail pricing, an analogous restriction imposed by a state other than Maryland has the potential to subject prescription drug manufacturers to conflicting state requirements. See id. at 336-37, 109 S.Ct. 2491 ("Generally speaking, the Commerce Clause protects against inconsistent legislation arising from the projection of one state regulatory regime into the jurisdiction of another State."); Brown-Forman , 476 U.S. at 583-84, 106 S.Ct. 2080. And the Act's relatively subjective definition of what constitutes an unlawful price increase only exacerbates the problem. If multiple states enacted this type of legislation, then a manufacturer may consummate a transaction in a state where the transaction is fully permissible, yet still be subject to an enforcement action in another state (such as Maryland) wholly unrelated to the transaction.

In upholding the Act, the district court referred to this conundrum as a "practical problem" and suggested that prescription drug manufacturers could simply modify their distribution systems to track the shipments of drugs bound for Maryland and isolate those drugs in order to comply with the Act. J.A. 489-90. It is indeed true that the dormant commerce clause does not "protect[ ] the particular structure or methods of operation in a retail market." Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Md. , 437 U.S. 117, 127, 98 S.Ct. 2207, 57 L.Ed.2d 91 (1978). But the Act requires manufacturers and wholesale distributors to do more than alter their distribution channels. It sets prescription drug prices in a way that "interfere[s] with the natural function of the interstate market" by superseding market forces that dictate the price of a good. McBurney v. Young , 569 U.S. 221, 235, 133 S.Ct. 1709, 185 L.Ed.2d 758 (2013) (quoting Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp. , 426 U.S. 794, 806, 96 S.Ct. 2488, 49 L.Ed.2d 220 (1976) ). If Maryland compels manufacturers to sell prescription drugs in the initial transaction at a particular price, but another state imposes a different price, then manufacturers could not comply with both laws in a single transaction. The manufacturers' compliance would require more than modification of their distribution systems; it would force them to enter into a separate transaction for each state in order to tailor their conduct so as not to violate any state's price restrictions. Even then, if a drug from a transaction addressed to another state were later made available for sale in Maryland, the Act would permit Maryland to penalize the manufacturer. The potential for "the kind of competing and interlocking local economic regulation that the Commerce Clause was meant to preclude" is therefore both real and significant. Healy , 491 U.S. at 337, 109 S.Ct. 2491. We are thus pressed to invalidate the Act.

In sum, we hold that the Act is unconstitutional under the dormant commerce clause because it directly regulates transactions that take place outside Maryland . We therefore reverse the district court's dismissal of this claim and remand this matter to the district court with instructions to enter judgment in favor of AAM.

To be clear, we in no way mean to suggest that Maryland and other states cannot enact legislation meant to secure lower prescription drug prices for their citizens. Indeed, the Supreme Court upheld a Maine law with that very aim in Walsh . See 538 U.S. at 653-54, 669-70, 123 S.Ct. 1855.

Although we sympathize with the consumers affected by the prescription drug manufacturers' conduct and with Maryland's efforts to curtail prescription drug price gouging, we are constrained to apply the dormant commerce clause to the Act. Our dissenting colleague suggests that by doing so, we imply that prescription drug manufacturers have a constitutional right to engage in price gouging. See post at 692-93. This is a sweeping and incorrect conclusion to draw from our holding that Maryland is prohibited from combating prescription drug price gouging in the manner utilized by the Act . Prescription drug manufacturers are by no means "constitutionally entitled," id. at 57, to engage in abusive prescription drug pricing practices. But Maryland must address this concern via a statute that complies with the dormant commerce clause of the U.S. Constitution.

III.

Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the district court's dismissal of AAM's dormant commerce clause challenge and remand with instructions to enter judgment in favor of AAM. AAM's request for an injunction pending this appeal is denied as moot.

REVERSED AND REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS

Because we hold that the statute is unconstitutional pursuant to the dormant commerce clause, we need not address whether it is also void for vagueness.

Citations to the "J.A." refer to the Joint Appendix filed by the parties in this appeal.

Thus, even if we applied a limiting construction to require a consumer sale in Maryland prior to enforcement of the Act, Maryland's own interpretation of the Act clarifies that it targets not a consumer retail sale but the manufacturer's initial sale of the drug.

AAM challenges the Act only as it applies to these out-of-state sales.

WYNN, Circuit Judge, dissenting:

After a series of high-profile incidents in which several generic pharmaceutical manufacturers imposed multiple-thousand-fold price increases for single-source generic drugs that treat rare and life-threatening conditions, the Maryland legislature enacted legislation prohibiting "unconscionable" price increases for certain generic drugs "made available for sale" to Maryland consumers. Md. Code Ann. Health-Gen. §§ 2-801 to - 803 (2017). But a trade association representing generic pharmaceutical manufacturers-which styles itself the "Association for Accessible Medicines" ("AAM" or "Plaintiff")-brought this action to enjoin the Maryland statute on grounds that it violates the dormant Commerce Clause and is unconstitutionally vague. The district court upheld Maryland's authority under the dormant Commerce Clause to protect its citizens from the abusive pricing practices at issue. I agree with the district court's holding, but my colleagues in the majority hold otherwise.

In particular, the majority opinion holds that the Maryland statute violates the dormant Commerce Clause's "extraterritoriality doctrine" to the extent that it applies to sales of generic drugs between manufacturers and distributors consummated outside of Maryland, even when the generic drugs involved in such out-of-state transactions are subsequently resold to Maryland consumers. Ante at 671-72. Put differently, the majority opinion concludes that the Commerce Clause bars Maryland from protecting its citizens against unconscionable pricing practices by out-of-state generic drug manufacturers who distribute their drugs to Maryland's citizens through an out-of-state intermediary. That conclusion conflicts with the approach taken by several of our sister circuits in deciding whether a state statute's extraterritorial reach violates the dormant Commerce Clause.

Contrary to the majority opinion's conclusion, Maryland is authorized under its "general police powers to regulate matters of legitimate local concern." Lewis v. BT Inv. Mgrs., Inc. , 447 U.S. 27, 36, 100 S.Ct. 2009, 64 L.Ed.2d 702 (1980) (internal quotation marks omitted). Here, Maryland legitimately targeted generic drug pricing practices specifically designed to prey on the special vulnerabilities of a defenseless group of Maryland's citizens. Simply put, the Maryland statute-which applies equally to in-state and out-of-state manufacturers and distributors-does not implicate the concerns that lie at the heart of the Supreme Court's dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence: economic protectionism, discrimination against interstate commerce, and State regulation of streams of transactions that never cross through the State's borders. See Dep't of Revenue of Ky. v. Davis , 553 U.S. 328, 337-38, 128 S.Ct. 1801, 170 L.Ed.2d 685 (2008). Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.

Two recent reports by the federal government regarding generic drug pricing gave rise to Maryland taking action to protect its citizens from abusive pricing practices by a subset of generic drug manufacturers. Both reports were prompted by media stories highlighting significant increases in the price of certain generic drugs. See, e.g. , Jonathan D. Alpern et al. , High-Cost Generic Drugs-Implications for Patients and Policy Makers, 371 N. Engl. J. Med. 1859, 1859-60 (2014); Andrew Pollack, Once a Neglected Treatment, Now an Expensive Specialty Drug , N.Y. Times, Sept. 21, 2015, at B1.

The first report, prepared by the Government Accountability Office ("GAO") in response to a request by a bipartisan group of legislators, examined pricing trends for generic drugs covered by the Medicare program's outpatient prescription drug benefit, commonly referred to as "Medicare Part D." See U.S. Gov't Accountability Off., GAO-16-706, Generic Drugs Under Medicare: Part D Generic Drug Prices Declined Overall, but Some Had Extraordinary Price Increases (2016) [hereinafter, "GAO Report"]. The GAO Report found that for a basket of 1,441 "established generic drugs"-"drugs that were continuously billed under Medicare Part D ... during [the] study period"-prices fell, on average, 0.7 percent per quarter from the first quarter of 2010 through the second quarter of 2015. See id. at 9. Although prices for established generic drugs generally declined during the 2010 to 2015 period, the GAO Report further found that "315 of the 1,441 established drugs experienced an extraordinary price increase-a price increase of at least 100 percent." Id. at 12. Notably, the number of established drugs experiencing a price increase of at least 100 percent increased during the five-year study period:

45 drugs experienced such an increase between the first quarter of 2010 and the first quarter of 2011, whereas 103 drugs experienced such an increase between the first quarter of 2014 and the first quarter of 2015. Id. at 12, 18.

A smaller subset of established generic drugs experienced even more "extraordinary" price increases-48 such drugs experienced a price increase of 500 percent or greater and 15 such drugs experienced a price increase of 1,000 percent or greater. Id. at 14. The vast majority of these extraordinary price increases persisted throughout the term of the study. Id. at 18.

Most of the established generic drugs experiencing extraordinary price increases were not among the 100 most heavily prescribed established generic drugs covered under Medicare Part D. To that end, stakeholders interviewed by GAO reported that "[i]f a generic drug serves a small [patient] population, ... it [is] more susceptible to price increases" because "there may be little financial incentive for a [competing] manufacturer to enter the market" and thus less "downward pressure on price." Id. at 24. Stakeholders also reported that supplier and buyer consolidation can drive price increases, as can difficulty manufacturing a particular generic drug. Id.

The second report, prepared by the United States Senate Special Committee on Aging, investigated and analyzed several "abrupt and dramatic" price increases for certain generic drugs. See Senate Special Comm. on Aging, Sudden Price Spikes in Off-Patent Prescription Drugs: The Monopoly Business Model that Harms Patients, Taxpayers, and the U.S. Health Care System 3 (2016) [hereinafter, "Senate Report"]. The Senate Report examined the circumstances surrounding large price increases for seven generic drugs, all of which had lacked patent protection for decades, sold by four generic pharmaceutical companies-two of which were formed and managed by since-convicted investor Martin Shkreli. Id. at 5-6. All seven price increases exceeded 300 percent, with five of the price increases at or exceeding 2,000 percent. Id. at 6.

The Senate investigation revealed that the four companies followed a common "business model" in acquiring and marketing the seven generic drugs. Id. at 4. In particular, each case involved a (1) single-source generic drug (2) distributed through a "closed distribution system" that (3) was essential to-the "gold standard" for-(4) treating a rare condition. Id. at 4, 30-31. Each of these four characteristics allowed the company to "exercise de facto monopoly pricing power, and then impose and protect astronomical price increases," the Senate committee found. Id. at 4.

For example, single-source drugs distributed through closed-distribution systems-which make it harder for potential entrants to bring to market a competitive product or attract and retain patients-are unlikely to face competition, thereby allowing sellers to charge monopoly prices, notwithstanding the generic drug's lack of patent protection. Id. at 4, 30-31. Likewise, when a generic drug is the "gold standard" for treating a particular condition, physicians continue to prescribe the drug, even in the face of substantial price increases. Id. at 30; see also , e.g. , id. at 56 (chief executive of one generic firm explaining that it had monopoly "pricing power" for a generic drug that is the standard-of-care for treating a rare and deadly disease because, absent the drug, patients would face "liver failure or a liver transplant or even death"). And because the generic drugs treat a "rare" condition "the patient population dependent upon them [is] too small to organize effective opposition to the price increase." Id. at 31.

The Senate Report found that the large price increases "devastated patients ... across the nation," many of whom were "forced to go without vital medicine[s]" or switch to alternative, potentially less effective, therapies. Id. at 7-8. The price increases also harmed providers. For example, the Johns Hopkins Health System, which is headquartered in Maryland, reported that it lost nearly $1 million in 2015 alone as a result of several-hundred-fold price increases for two of the drugs. Id. at 6-8. The price increases also led to increases in spending by governmental health care programs, including state Medicaid programs. Id. at 110. The report further concluded that existing federal competition laws were inadequate to prevent the dramatic price increases and suggested several statutory and regulatory remedies. Id. at 116-25.

After reviewing these reports, the Maryland legislature decided to enact legislation to combat what it concluded were abusive pricing practices by certain generic drug suppliers. To that end, on May 27, 2017, the Maryland General Assembly passed HB 631. That statute, which went into effect on October 1, 2017, prohibits manufacturers and distributors from engaging in "price gouging" in the sale of an "essential off-patent or generic drug." Md. Code Ann. Health-Gen. § 2-802(a). The statute exempts "wholesale distributors" from liability, however, if they impose a price increase that "is directly attributable to additional costs for the drug imposed on the wholesale distributor by the manufacturer of the drug." Id. § 2-802(b).

HB 631 defines "essential off-patent or generic drug" as a drug: (1) "[f]or which all exclusive marketing rights, if any, granted under the federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, § 351 of the federal Public Health Service Act, and federal patent law have expired"; (2) that is listed on the Model List of Essential Medicines, as adopted by the World Health Organization, or that has been has been designated, according to specified criteria, an "essential medicine" by the Maryland Secretary of Health; (3) "[t]hat is actively manufactured and marketed for sale in the United States by three or fewer manufacturers"; and (4) that is "made available for sale" in the State of Maryland. Id. § 2-801(b)(1). "Essential off-patent or generic drug" also includes any "drug-device combination product used for the delivery of a drug" for which all exclusive marketing rights have expired. Id. § 2-801(b)(2). Although HB 631 regulates only those generic drugs "made available for sale" in Maryland, "a person who is alleged to have violated [the statute] may not assert as a defense that the person did not deal directly with a consumer residing in the State." Id. §§ 2-801(b)(1), 2-803(g).

The statute defines "price gouging" as an "unconscionable increase in the price of a prescription drug." Id. § 2-801(c). Tracking many aspects of the "business model" identified in the Senate Report, the statute provides that an "unconscionable increase" means an increase in price that (1) "[i]s excessive and not justified by the cost of producing the drug or the cost of appropriate expansion of access to the drug to promote public health"; and (2) "[r]esults in consumers for whom the drug has been prescribed having no meaningful choice about whether to purchase the drug at an excessive price" due to the "importance of the drug to their health" and insufficient market competition. Id. § 2-801(f).

HB 631 authorizes the Attorney General to petition a Maryland circuit court to restrain or enjoin violations of the statute; restore money to consumers obtained as a result of violations; require manufacturers that have engaged in "price gouging" to provide the drug to participants in any state health plan or state health program at the drug's last permissible price for a period of up to one year; and order civil penalties of up to $10,000. Id. § 2-803(d).

HB 631 also confers monitoring authority on the State's Medicaid program, the Maryland Medical Assistance Program (the "Medicaid Program"). In particular, the Medicaid Program may notify the Attorney General of certain price increases to an "essential off-patent or generic drug." Specifically, the Medicaid Program may notify the Attorney General if (1) a price increase, either by itself or together with other price increases, would cause a fifty percent or more increase, as measured within a one year time period, to the wholesale acquisition cost or price paid by the Medicaid Program; and (2) it would cost $80 at the wholesale acquisition cost to obtain a thirty day supply of the maximum recommended dosage, a full course of treatment, or if the drug is not made available in such quantities, it would exceed $80 at the wholesale acquisition cost to obtain a thirty day supply or full course of treatment. Id. § 2-803(a). After receiving notification of such an increase, the Attorney General may demand that the manufacturer imposing the increase submit documentation that itemizes the cost of production; provides explanation for the price increase, including information related to any expenditures made to "expand access to the drug," as well as the associated benefits to the public health; and any other relevant information. Id. § 2-803(b).

II.

On appeal, AAM argues that HB 631, as applied to any transaction consummated outside of Maryland's borders, violates the Commerce Clause, regardless of whether the drugs involved in such transaction later are resold in Maryland. Before addressing the merits of that claim, it is first necessary to determine what the Maryland legislature intended when it limited HB 631's extraterritorial reach to generic drugs "made available for sale" in Maryland. Id. § 2-801(b)(1). The district court held, correctly in my view, that HB 631 is "triggered only when there is a drug ... made available for sale within [Maryland]." Ass'n for Accessible Meds. v. Frosh , No. 17-cv-1860, 2017 WL 4347818, at *6 (D. Md. Sept. 29, 2017). The majority opinion, however, concludes that HB 631 "is not triggered by any conduct that takes place within Maryland." Ante at 670; see also id. at 670-71 ("[ Section 2-801(b)(1)'s] plain language allows Maryland to enforce [HB 631] against parties to a transaction that did not result in a single pill being shipped to Maryland."); id. at 671 (asserting that HB 631 does not "require a nexus to an actual sale in Maryland"). For several reasons, I disagree with the views of my colleagues in the majority.

To begin, the majority opinion's conclusion that HB 631 requires no "nexus to an actual sale in Maryland," id. at 671, runs contrary to the State's representation as to its own statute's extraterritorial reach. Before the district court and this Court, the State repeatedly asserted that HB 631 "in no way prohibits any of AAM's members from selling drugs at a conscience-shocking price to distributors, to the extent that those drugs are later sold in California or in any other state." J.A. 291 (emphasis added); see also Appellee's Br. 7 (representing that HB 631 "applies only when drugs are sold in Maryland"). Put differently, the State represents that HB 631 "does not reach, or purport to reach, any stream of commerce that does not end in Maryland ." Mem. In Support of Defs.' Mot. to Dismiss, at 23, Ass'n for Accessible Meds. v. Frosh , No. 17-cv-1860 (D. Md. Aug. 14, 2017), ECF No. 29-1 (emphasis added). Because pre-enforcement constitutional challenges to state statutes-like AAM's dormant Commerce Clause challenge-are disfavored, see Wash. State Grange v. Wash. State Republican Party , 552 U.S. 442, 450-51, 128 S.Ct. 1184, 170 L.Ed.2d 151 (2008), and because the State repeatedly has represented that HB 631's reach does not extend to generic drugs that are not later sold in Maryland, principles of federalism and judicial restraint dictate that we construe the statute's reach as not extending to any stream of commerce that does not end in Maryland.

The majority opinion's conclusion that the statute extends to drugs not ultimately sold in Maryland also conflicts with AAM's understanding of the statute's extraterritorial reach. In particular, AAM asserts that HB 631 "reach[es] 'sale[s]' that take place outside of Maryland, so long as the objects of those sales are later resold in Maryland ." Appellant's Br. 28 (emphasis added). AAM, therefore, has not challenged the State's representation-and the district court's conclusion-that HB 631 is "triggered only when there is a drug ... made available for sale within [Maryland]." Frosh , 2017 WL 4347818, at *6. In such circumstances, the majority opinion errs in reaching out to reject the State's construction of its own statute, and AAM's acquiescence in that construction. Cf. United States v. Al-Hamdi , 356 F.3d 564, 571 n.8 (4th Cir. 2004) ("It is a well settled rule that contentions not raised in the argument section of the opening brief are abandoned.").

Even if the parties disagreed as to whether the statute's applicability requires an in-state sale, Maryland rules of statutory construction-which this Court must follow-support rejecting the majority opinion's broad interpretation of the statute's extraterritorial reach. See Carolina Trucks & Equip., Inc. v. Volvo Trucks of N. Am., Inc. , 492 F.3d 484, 489 (4th Cir. 2007) ("In construing a state law, we look to the rules of construction applied by the enacting state's highest court.").

In Carolina Trucks , this Court considered a dormant Commerce Clause challenge to a South Carolina statute that prohibited motor vehicle manufacturers from "sell[ing], directly or indirectly, a motor vehicle to a consumer in this State, except through a new motor vehicle dealer." Id. at 488. The plaintiff argued that the phrase "in this State" modified only the term "consumer," meaning the statute prohibited "manufacturer-to-consumer sales to South Carolina buyers without regard to the state in which the sales took place"-including sales consummated outside of South Carolina's borders. Id. Noting that "[t]he statute is ambiguous as to what 'in this State' modifies," this Court rejected the plaintiff's proposed broad construction of the statute's extraterritorial reach. Id at 488-89. In reaching that conclusion, we emphasized that broadly construing the ambiguous statutory language would run contrary to South Carolina rules of statutory construction, which "provide that statutes must not be read to operate outside the state's borders." Id.

Like the statute at issue in Carolina Trucks , Section 2-801(b)(1)'s limitation of HB 631's reach to essential generic drugs "made available for sale" in Maryland is at least ambiguous as to the statute's extraterritorial reach. In particular, this Court reasonably could interpret the statute as applying only to those specific unconscionably priced pills that are sold or resold in Maryland-as the State represents and the district court concluded-or as extending to any unconscionably priced generic drug, some pills of which are "made available for sale" in Maryland, regardless of whether the particular pills subject to an enforcement action actually are sold or resold in Maryland-as the majority concludes. And like South Carolina law, Maryland law dictates that "unless an intent to the contrary is expressly stated, acts of the legislature will be presumed not to have any extraterritorial effect." Chairman of Bd. of Trs. of Emps.' Ret. Sys. v. Waldron , 401 A.2d 172, 183-84 (Md. 1979) (emphasis added). Carolina Trucks , therefore, requires that we reject a "broader interpretation" of Section 2-801(b)(1)'s extraterritorial reach, like that adopted by the majority opinion.

Additionally, the majority opinion's broad construction of the statute's extraterritorial reach conflicts with the rule of construction, applied by Maryland courts, requiring a court "whenever reasonably possible, [to] construe and apply a statute to avoid casting serious doubt upon its constitutionality." R.A. Ponte Architects, Ltd. v. Invs.' Alert, Inc ., 857 A.2d 1, 18 (Md. 2004) (quoting Becker v. State , 363 Md. 77, 767 A.2d 816, 824 (Md. 2001) ). To be sure, a State statute that regulated sales in streams of commerce not ending in that State would raise significant concerns under the dormant Commerce Clause. But that is not a concern here because Maryland law obliges that we interpret the law narrowly-and in accordance with the State's own construction-as applying only to sales in streams of commerce ending in Maryland.

III.

Because HB 631 regulates, at most, sales of essential generic drugs in streams of commerce that end in Maryland, AAM's Commerce Clause challenge is without merit.

The Commerce Clause entrusts Congress with the authority "[t]o regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes." U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. The Supreme Court "has long recognized that this affirmative grant of authority to Congress also encompasses an implicit or 'dormant' limitation on the authority of the States to enact legislation affecting interstate commerce." Healy v. Beer Inst. , 491 U.S. 324, 326 n.1, 109 S.Ct. 2491, 105 L.Ed.2d 275 (1989). To that end, the "dormant" Commerce Clause "prohibits States from legislating in ways that impede the flow of interstate commerce." Star Sci., Inc. v. Beales , 278 F.3d 339, 355 (4th Cir. 2002). Although some earlier Supreme Court decisions broadly applied the dormant Commerce Clause to invalidate state laws, "modern" dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence "is driven by concern about economic protectionism-that is, regulatory measures designed to benefit in-state economic interests by burdening out-of-state competitors," Davis , 553 U.S. at 337-38, 128 S.Ct. 1801 (internal quotation marks omitted).

AAM does not argue that HB 631 implicates either of these concerns underlying the Supreme Court's modern dormant Commerce Cause jurisprudence: discrimination against interstate commerce or favoring in-state economic interests over out-of-state economic interests. Rather, AAM contends-and the majority opinion agrees-that HB 631 violates the "extraterritoriality doctrine."

The extraterritoriality doctrine-a judge-made doctrine which states that a State may not regulate "commerce occurring wholly outside [its] boundaries,"

Healy , 491 U.S. at 336, 109 S.Ct. 2491 ; see also Star Sci. , 278 F.3d at 355 -has been characterized by our sister circuits as the "the most dormant" of the Supreme Court's dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence, Energy & Envtl. Legal Inst. v. Epel (EELI ), 793 F.3d 1169, 1172 (10th Cir. 2015) (Gorsuch, J.); IMS Health Inc. v. Mills , 616 F.3d 7, 29 n.27 (1st Cir. 2010) ("Extraterritoriality has been the dormant branch of the dormant Commerce Clause."), vacated sub nom. on other grounds IMS Health, Inc. v. Schneider , 564 U.S. 1051, 131 S.Ct. 3091, 180 L.Ed.2d 911 (2011). Indeed, several circuits have questioned the continuing vitality of the extraterritoriality doctrine following the Supreme Court's decision in Pharmaceutical Research & Manufacturers of America v. Walsh, which "pointedly referred to [the extraterritoriality doctrine] as 'the rule that was applied in Baldwin [v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc. , 294 U.S. 511, 55 S.Ct. 497, 79 L.Ed. 1032 (1935),] and Healy .' " IMS Health , 616 F.3d at 29 n.27 ; EELI , 793 F.3d at 1174-75; see also Am. Beverage Ass'n v. Snyder , 735 F.3d 362, 381 (6th Cir. 2013) (Sutton, J., concurring) (noting that there never has been "a single Supreme Court dormant Commerce Clause holding that relied exclusively on the extraterritoriality doctrine to invalidate a state law").

Not only have courts questioned the extraterritoriality doctrine's continuing vitality, judges and commentators also have questioned the constitutional rationale underlying the doctrine, in light of new and expanded modes of interstate commerce, changes to the Supreme Court's interpretation of the Commerce Clause, and the availability of potentially more appropriate constitutional provisions, like the Due Process Clause, to ensure that States do not unduly extend their regulatory authority beyond their borders. See Am. Beverage , 735 F.3d at 377-80 (describing the extraterritoriality doctrine as "a relic of the old world with no useful role to play in the new"); Brandon P. Denning, Extraterritoriality and the Dormant Commerce Clause: ADoctrinal Post-Mortem , 73 La. L. Rev. 979, 998 (2013) ; Jack L. Goldsmith & Alan O. Sykes, The Internet and the Dormant Commerce Clause , 110 Yale L.J. 785, 788-90, 806 (2001). Nevertheless, unless and until the Supreme Court repudiates the extraterritoriality doctrine as a separate line of dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence, we are constrained to determine whether HB 631, as applied to out-of-state transactions involving essential generic drugs later sold in Maryland, amounts to a regulation of "commerce occurring wholly outside [Maryland's] borders," as the Supreme Court used that phrase in Healy .

The majority opinion concludes that HB 631 regulates "commerce occurring wholly outside the boundaries of [Maryland]," Healy , 491 U.S. at 336, 109 S.Ct. 2491 (emphasis added)-and therefore violates the dormant Commerce Clause-because it "controls the price of transactions that occur wholly outside of the state," ante at 671 (emphasis added). I, however, conclude that the Supreme Court's Commerce Clause jurisprudence-including its decisions applying the extraterritoriality doctrine, in particular-and this Court's decisions applying that jurisprudence do not support equating a single "transaction" with "commerce," as the majority opinion does in striking down HB 631.

The Supreme Court first defined "commerce," as that term is used in the Commerce Clause, in Gibbons v. Ogden , 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 6 L.Ed. 23 (1824) (Marshall, J.). There, the appellee argued that the meaning of commerce is "limit[ed] to traffic, to buying and selling, or the interchange of commodities." Id. at 189. Writing for the Court, Chief Justice Marshall rejected the appellee's narrow definition-which sought to limit the meaning of commerce to a single exchange of goods-stating that "[c]ommerce, undoubtedly, is traffic, but it is something more: it is intercourse. It describes the commercial intercourse between nations, and parts of nations, in all its branches ..." Id. at 189-90.

Notwithstanding Chief Justice Marshall's expansive definition of commerce in Gibbons , between the late Nineteenth Century and the New Deal the Supreme Court narrowly interpreted the term, treating each distinct transaction within a single stream of economic activity as a piece of "commerce." For example, in Carter v. Carter Coal Co. , 298 U.S. 238, 56 S.Ct. 855, 80 L.Ed. 1160 (1936), the Supreme Court struck down a federal law establishing boards responsible for determining the wages, hours, and working conditions of coal mine employees, id. at 280-84, 56 S.Ct. 855. The Court concluded that Congress lacked power under the Commerce Clause to regulate coal mine workers' terms of employment because "the relation of employer and employee ... in all producing occupations is purely local in character." Id. at 303, 56 S.Ct. 855. In reaching this conclusion, the Court rejected the argument that the subsequent sale of the mined coal rendered the terms of the miners' employment in "commerce," and therefore subject to congressional regulation. Id. "Mining brings the subject-matter of commerce into existence. Commerce disposes of it," the Court held. Id. at 304, 56 S.Ct. 855. Carter is one example of a series of cases excluding "production" and "manufacturing" from the definition of "commerce." See also, e.g. , Champlin Ref. Co. v. Corp. Comm'n of State of Okl. , 286 U.S. 210, 235, 52 S.Ct. 559, 76 L.Ed. 1062 (1932) ("[Oil] production is essentially a mining operation, and therefore is not a part of interstate commerce, even though the product obtained is intended to be and in fact is immediately shipped in such commerce."); United States v. E.C. Knight Co. , 156 U.S. 1, 12, 15 S.Ct. 249, 39 L.Ed. 325 (1895) ("Commerce succeeds to manufacture, and is not a part of it.").

The Supreme Court abandoned the production-commerce distinction in a series of cases beginning with NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. , 301 U.S. 1, 40, 57 S.Ct. 615, 81 L.Ed. 893 (1937) ("[T]he fact that the employees here concerned were engaged in production is not determinative."). As Justice Jackson explained in Wickard v. Filburn , 317 U.S. 111, 63 S.Ct. 82, 87 L.Ed. 122 (1942) -which held that the growing of wheat for personal consumption constituted commercial activity subject to congressional regulation, id. at 128-29, 63 S.Ct. 82 -"[w]hether the subject of the regulation in question was 'production,' 'consumption,' or 'marketing,' is ... not material for purposes of deciding the question of federal power" to regulate commerce under the Commerce Clause, id. at 124, 63 S.Ct. 82. Accordingly, in cases involving the scope of the federal government's power under the Commerce Clause, the Supreme Court now interprets the term "commerce" as encompassing a stream of transactions-including those transactions necessary to produce a good, such as labor contracts, and those by virtue of which the good is distributed and sold to end-users.

The no