People v. Bounds (171 Ill. 2d 1, 1995)

JUSTICE MILLER

delivered the opinion of the court:

Following a jury trial in the circuit court of Cook County, the defendant, Frank Bounds, was convicted of murder, aggravated criminal sexual assault, and aggravated kidnapping. At a separate sentencing hearing, the same jury found the defendant eligible for the death penalty and further determined that there were no mitigating circumstances sufficient to preclude imposition of that sentence. The defendant’s execution has been stayed pending direct review by this court. (Ill. Const. 1970, art. VI, § 4(b); 134 Ill. 2d Rules 603, 609(a).) For the reasons that follow, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court.

I. Facts

The charges against the defendant arose from the sexual assault and murder of Carolyn Lewis. The victim was abducted on the morning of December 9,1986, while she was walking to catch a bus that would take her to work. The victim was then taken to a nearby building, where she was sexually assaulted and later murdered.

Carolyn’s mother, Tommie Lewis, testified at the defendant’s trial that her daughter had worked for the Internal Revenue Service in downtown Chicago for 13 years. According to Mrs. Lewis, Carolyn would leave for work between 6 and 6:30 each morning and walk to a nearby bus stop. Mrs. Lewis stated that Carolyn left for work at her usual time on December 9, 1986. Around 9 o’clock that morning, Mrs. Lewis received a call from one of Carolyn’s coworkers, who said that Carolyn had failed to arrive for work. Later that day, Mrs. Lewis called the police to report that her daughter was missing. At trial, Mrs. Lewis identified, as belonging to her daughter, several items that were found in the building where Carolyn’s body was later discovered. Mrs. Lewis stated that the shirt that Carolyn was wearing at the time her body was found did not belong to her daughter.

Delores Dennis, a resident of the neighborhood where these offenses occurred, testified that she heard a woman scream around 6 or 6:15 on the morning of Carolyn’s disappearance. Dennis looked out her window but did not see anything suspicious. Dennis lived near the intersection of 74th and Princeton Streets.

The victim’s body was discovered on December 13, 1986, in the second-floor apartment of a two-story frame house located at 7347 South Princeton Street, in Chicago. The victim was wearing only a T-shirt and was lying on a mattress on the floor in one of the rooms. The body was frozen, and an electrical extension cord was wrapped around the victim’s neck.

Investigators found in another room a bed with sheets and covers; electrical space heaters stood on both sides of the bed. The room was also furnished with a television set and a dresser. There were liquor bottles, orange juice bottles, clothing, and boots in the room. Investigators discovered a purse containing the victim’s identification. A broom stick was broken in two pieces, and one end of one piece was smeared with what appeared to be fecal matter. The toilet bowl in the bathroom was frozen, and there was no heat in the apartment. Investigators found food on the kitchen table and in the cabinets. The apartment on thé first floor of the building appeared to be vacant.

Investigators spoke with some of the members of the family that owned the building where the victim was found, and a warrant for the defendant’s arrest was issued on December 15, 1986. The defendant was placed on the police department’s "10 most wanted” list, and his photograph was provided to the news media. Investigators would occasionally receive reports that the defendant had been seen, but none of those tips led to his arrest.

Police investigators collected from the crime scene a number of objects that bore fingerprint ridges, including orange soda cans, a glass orange juice bottle, a vodka bottle, wine bottles, and a glass candy jar. The impressions on these objects were later examined, and 16 of them were found to match the defendant’s fingerprints.

Dr. Robert Stein, the chief medical examiner of Cook County, performed an autopsy on the victim on December 15, 1986. An external examination of the victim revealed an electrical cord ligature around her neck; abrasions or contusions were also present around the neck, arms, right buttock, and right and left lower extremities. Dr. Stein stated that curvilinear abrasions around the victim’s neck were probably produced by the victim as she tried to relieve the pressure of the ligature. An internal examination revealed a fracture to the victim’s neck bone and areas of hemorrhage to the victim’s neck muscles. Dr. Stein found no injuries to the victim’s anus or vagina, although he explained that the absence of injuries was not inconsistent with sexual assault. A toxilogical report showed a blood-alcohol level of 0.205. Dr. Stein said that the elevated reading could be attributed partly, but not wholly, to alcohol produced by bodily decomposition.

On cross-examination, Dr. Stein stated that he did not find any marks or other signs that would indicate that the victim’s wrists or ankles had been bound. He was not able to determine the time of death, though he said the victim could have died three or four days before her body was discovered, on December 13. Dr. Stein was not able to determine whether the victim was killed where she was found.

The defendant was arrested for these offenses on October 6,1987. Robert Easley, a private security guard, was working that day at the Daley Center at a display of old Chicago Transit Authority buses. According to Easley, around 1 o’clock in the afternoon he saw the defendant, whom he knew from the defendant’s former employment with Easley’s girlfriend. The defendant was handing out leaflets and was standing next to a sign that said, "Down with Death in the Streets.” Easley was aware that the police were looking for the defendant, so Easley flagged down a passing patrol car.

Sergeant Leo Crotty, the officer whom Easley stopped, called for the assistance of a tactical unit. Three officers in plain clothes soon arrived. The officers received a description from Easley and later saw the defendant get off one of the buses that was on display. The officers then approached the defendant and asked him for identification. The defendant said that he did not have any with him, but said that his name was Michael Jones and gave an address on the north side. In response to a question from the officers, the defendant said that he was not familiar with the name Frank Bounds. The defendant agreed to accompany the officers to a police car so that they could make a further investigation. While the officers were checking the name the defendant had provided, they asked Easley to come to the car to attempt to identify the defendant. Easley did so, said the person was Frank Bounds, and leaned into the car and said, "Hi, Frank.” According to Easley, the defendont then bolted from the vehicle. Sergeant Grotty was able to catch the defendant.

That evening, the defendant gave an oral statement to Casimir Bartnik, an assistant State’s Attorney. Bartnik prepared a written summary of the statement, which the defendant then reviewed and signed. At the defendant’s trial, Bartnik read the summary of the statement to the jury. In the statement, the defendant said that he did not previously know the victim and that he first saw her on the morning of December 9, 1986, around 6:30, as she was walking on a sidewalk on Princeton Street. At the corner of 74th Street, the defendant grabbed the victim, placing his hand on her mouth. The victim bit his hand and screamed. The defendant then dragged the victim to an abandoned house owned by his family at 7347 South Princeton Street. The defendant took the victim to the second floor, where he had been living since he had been kicked out of his mother’s house.

The defendant said that he then removed the victim’s clothing, threw her on a bed in the main bedroom, and had vaginal intercourse with her at least once. The defendant stated that he might have had sex again later in the day and explained that he had been highly intoxicated on December 9 and was unable to remember all the details of the crimes. The defendant later tied the victim’s hands and feet with an extension cord and stuffed a towel in her mouth. The defendant left the apartment at least twice that day, to buy liquor and food.

The next morning, December 10, the defendant ran out of money, and he found about thirty to forty dollars in the victim’s purse. The defendant said that he panicked when he saw the victim’s identification, which showed that she worked for the Internal Revenue Service. The defendant next went to a liquor store and then returned to the apartment, where he sat drinking for several hours. The defendant said that the victim was calm and had a piercing stare, and he knew that she would remember his appearance. The defendant believed that he could not release the victim and decided to kill her instead.

The defendant wrapped an extension cord around the victim’s neck and pulled on the ends of the cord until the victim stopped moving. The defendant said that this took about four to five minutes. The defendant then left the apartment, but he was unable to remember where he went. The defendant returned to the vicinity the next day around 4 p.m. but left when he saw police cars and police officers in the area. During this time the defendant remembered hearing and reading missing persons reports about the victim.

The defendant said that he realized that he would need help in disposing of the victim’s body, so he called one of his brothers, Willie Amos, probably on December 10. On December 12, the defendant, Willie, and another brother, Raymond, drove to the building in Raymond’s car. The defendant and Willie went upstairs, and Willie put his hand over his mouth and looked sick when he saw the victim’s body. The defendant then told Willie to leave. Ray then drove the defendant to 79th Street and Halsted.

At the conclusion of the statement, the defendant said that he had not been promised or threatened in any way. Asked why he committed the crimes, the defendant said that he was angry at his stepfather and family for throwing him out of the family house. The defendant said that he wanted to get even and that Lewis seemed to be an easy victim.

At trial, the State also presented the testimony of Renolde Cannon, who was married to the defendant’s mother at the time of the offenses involved here. Cannon stated that the defendant was living with him and the defendant’s mother, Castella Cannon, in the fall of 1986. According to Cannon, he and the defendant got into an argument the weekend after Thanksgiving about a space heater that the defendant was using in his bedroom. On Sunday, December 7, Cannon told the defendant to move out.

The defendant presented the testimony of several witnesses. Susan Mitchnick, the defendant’s girlfriend, testified that she met the defendant in December 1986 at a meeting of the Homeless Union. They developed a relationship, and in March 1987 they began living together. Mitchnick said that during the afternoon of October 6, 1987, an officer from the Homeless Union called to tell her that the defendant had been arrested. Mitchnick later learned that the defendant was being held at Area 3 headquarters. She called there and left a message for the defendant. That evening, two police officers arrived at her home and spoke with her about the defendant. They asked her if she knew about the murder in December 1986, and she told them that she did not. According to Mitchnick, one of the officers stated that the case would receive widespread coverage in the news media and that the police could portray Mitchnick unfavorably. The officers then left. The defendant did not return Mitchnick’s call until the next evening, October 7, when she told the defendant what the police had threatened to do.

On cross-examination, Mitchnick said that the officers did not ask her where she worked and that she did not tell them; Mitchnick testified that she was working for a small public relations and consulting firm. Mitch-nick also listed the different residences where she lived during the year of her relationship with the defendant. In December 1986 she lived at 3165 West Palmer. She moved to 2147 West Charleston in March 1987, with the defendant, and then in June 1987 she and the defendant moved to 3248 West Beach.

Willie Amos, Sr., who had previously been married to the defendant’s mother, also testified in the defendant’s behalf at trial. Amos stated that he owned the building located at 7347 South Princeton, where the victim’s body was discovered. According to Amos, the family lived there until 1975, when they moved out and it was rented to others. In 1985 one of his sons, Willie Jr., moved into the second-floor apartment, where he lived for about six months. When Willie moved out, he left many of his belongings behind, including clothing and furniture. No one else occupied the apartment after that, according to the witness. He also stated that the building did not have gas, electrical, or water service.

Moses Cheeks, a city building inspector, also testified in the defendant’s behalf at trial. Cheeks had inspected the building located at 7347 South Princeton on December 15, 1986, following the discovery of the victim’s body there. Cheeks said that someone had apparently been living there, for he found clothing and furniture in both units. According to Cheeks, there was no heat, and the electricity and water had been turned off.

The defendant’s final witness was Lance Lee, who lived at 7345 South Princeton, next door to the building where the victim’s body was discovered. Lee testified that Willie Amos, Jr., had moved into one of the apartments at 7347 South Princeton during 1985 and moved out several months later; the building then stood vacant. Lee also testified that he saw either Ralph or Raymond Amos, who were identical twins, at the building around 7:15 on the mornings of both December 9 and December 10. Lee stated further that he did not see the defendant in the neighborhood on either of those days.

At the conclusion of the trial, the jury returned verdicts finding the defendant guilty of murder, aggravated criminal sexual assault, and aggravated kidnapping. The case then proceeded to a capital sentencing hearing. At the first stage of the hearing, the parties stipulated that the defendant was born in April 1952 and thus was 34 years old at the time of the murder charged here. At the conclusion of the first stage of the hearing, the jury determined the defendant eligible for the death penalty, finding the statutory aggravating circumstances that the victim was killed during the course of aggravated criminal sexual assault and aggravated kidnapping.

At the second stage of the sentencing hearing, the State introduced evidence of the defendant’s extensive criminal record. Chicago police officer Johnny Robinson testified that he was driving home on August 22, 1970, when he saw the defendant grab a woman’s purse; Robinson got out of his car, fired a shot at the defendant, and eventually captured him.

Beverly Restina Robinson testified to an occurrence involving the defendant on September 23, 1971. Early that morning, as Robinson was leaving her place of employment in River Grove, the defendant forced his way into her car and drove off with her. The defendant demanded money from Robinson, and she gave him some. The defendant choked Robinson and later placed her in the trunk of her car. The defendant then resumed driving. Robinson later was able to escape from the trunk and get help.

Florence Hoffman testified that on August 6, 1975, she returned to her apartment building in Des Plaines around 2 a.m. after playing cards with friends. Upon entering the lobby of her building, she noticed a stranger, whom she identified as the defendant. After Hoffman and the defendant got into the elevator together, the defendant stopped the elevator and placed a screwdriver against Hoffman’s neck. The defendant then ordered Hoffman to return to her car, and together they drove off, with the defendant driving. The defendant forced the victim to perform an act of oral sex on him. Hoffman later jumped out of the car. Philip C. Bettiker, a police officer with the Cook County sheriff’s police, testified that he took a statement from the defendant about the offenses. The defendant admitted his responsibility for the crimes, though he said that he released the victim.

Arthur Schmelka testified that on August 1, 1981, he was an assistant manager at a Kentucky Fried Chicken restaurant in Evanston. That day the defendant and an accomplice robbed the restaurant. The defendant was armed, and threatened to kill Schmelka. Schmelka later learned that the defendant had received a 10-year sentence for the offenses.

Evidence of another armed robbery was provided by Martin Carroll. Carroll testified that on July 30, 1981, he went to a Kentucky Fried Chicken restaurant in Chicago and interrupted an armed robbery in progress. The defendant grabbed him and hit him on the back of the head. Carroll later learned that the defendant received a 10-year prison sentence for the offenses.

Rebecca Branum, an assistant warden for the Department of Corrections, testified that on March 27, 1986, she received a report that the defendant was harassing a female food supervisor at the Lincoln Correctional Center. Branum talked to the defendant about it, and he said that the woman appeared to be "easy prey.” As a result of this conduct, the defendant was placed in segregation, lost good-time credit, and was transferred to a maximum security institution.

Cameron Forbes, a records office supervisor for the Department of Corrections, provided further testimony regarding the defendant’s criminal record and his conduct while incarcerated. According to Forbes, the defendant first entered the Department of Corrections in May 1973 on a robbery conviction. He was paroled the following year, and then returned to prison in 1976 on convictions for armed robbery and deviate sexual assault. The defendant was released from prison in November 1979. He returned in May 1980 after he had been convicted of theft, and he was released in June 1981. The defendant returned to prison in October 1982, following convictions for armed robbery and other offenses. The defendant was released in July 1986 and was on parole at the time of the offenses committed here. Forbes also stated that the defendant was placed in isolation on several occasions for various infractions of prison rules. Further details concerning the defendant’s criminal record were provided by stipulation.

A number of witnesses provided favorable testimony in behalf of the defendant at the second stage of the sentencing hearing. The defendant’s mother, Castella Cannon, stated that the defendant was employed in a construction job following his release from prison in 1986. She said that the defendant took part in church and other charitable activities.

Otis Thomas, the president of the Chicago Homeless Union, also testified in the defendant’s behalf at the sentencing hearing. Thomas stated that he met the defendant in late 1986. According to Thomas, the defendant was eager to help other homeless persons. Karen Daniel, an attorney with the appellate defender’s office, testified that she met the defendant in January 1987. Daniel was a friend of Susan Mitchnick, the defendant’s girlfriend at the time. Daniel believed that the defendant could be rehabilitated and stated that the defendant would try to help other persons in the future. Bonnie Buck, a news reporter and editor, also provided favorable testimony. Like Daniel, Buck had met the defendant through her friendship with Susan Mitchnick. Buck believed that the defendant would help others in the future. Dorothy Robinson, a minister, testified that she first met the defendant in November 1987, when the defendant’s mother took her to meet the defendant in jail. Robinson stated that she had talked to the defendant perhaps 30 times since then and believed that he would help others.

At the conclusion of the second stage of the sentencing hearing, the jury found that there were no mitigating circumstances sufficient to preclude imposition of the death penalty. The judge accordingly sentenced the defendant to death for the murder of Carolyn Lewis. At a later hearing, the jury determined that the defendant was a habitual criminal and sentenced him to natural life imprisonment for the offenses of aggravated criminal sexual assault and aggravated kidnapping.

II. Suppression Motion

The defendant raises more than 30 allegations of error in the present appeal. In the discussion that follows, we will generally consider these issues in the sequence in which the alleged errors occurred in the proceedings below. The defendant first argues that the trial judge erred in denying his motion to suppress his confession. The defendant contends that the confession was not preceded by Miranda warnings and was the product of physical and psychological coercion.

We will first summarize the evidence presented at the suppression hearing. After the defendant was arrested on October 6, 1987, he was taken to the first district police station. He was picked up there around 3:30 that afternoon by Detectives William Foley and William Kelly from Area 3 violent crimes. Foley gave the defendant Miranda warnings but did not question him at that time. The defendant was booked, and the two detectives then transported him to Area 3, where they arrived around 5 o’clock. The defendant was placed in an interrogation room. Foley and Kelly returned to the room around 6 o’clock and questioned the defendant about the Carolyn Lewis murder for 15 to 20 minutes. Foley, Kelly, and a third detective, Michael Kill, questioned the defendant again around 8 or 8:15. Kill provided the defendant with Miranda warnings, and the detectives then talked to the defendant further, telling him what they had learned about the case. The .defendant then gave a statement.

Kelly reentered the interrogation room alone around 9:10 or 9:15 and asked the defendant if he needed to use the bathroom. The defendant said that he did not. At some point the defendant requested cigarettes, which Kelly provided to him.

Beginning around 9:15 p.m., the defendant was questioned by Assistant State’s Attorney Casimir Bartnik in an interview that lasted about 25 to 30 minutes. Bartnik testified that he began by introducing himself to the defendant and giving the defendant Miranda warnings. Bartnik also asked the defendant if he needed to use the restroom or wanted anything to eat or drink; the defendant requested something to eat, so food was obtained for him. The defendant then told Bartnik about the offenses committed here. Afterwards, the defendant declined to repeat his statement in the presence of a court reporter. The defendant did agree, however, to review a written summary prepared by Bartnik and to sign the summary if it was accurate.

After preparing the summary, Bartnik returned to the interrogation room around 10:30 p.m. to review the statement with the defendant. The defendant signed a provision in which he acknowledged that he was waiving his Miranda rights. After Bartnik had read aloud one page of the statement, the defendant took the papers from Bartnik and began reading them to himself. According to Bartnik, at several points the defendant seemed to become emotional or upset and shook his head from side to side. Apart from one minor correction, which was made, the defendant did not wish to make any other changes to the statement. The defendant, Bartnik, and Kelly then signed each page.

Assistant State’s Attorney Bartnik and Detectives Foley, Kelly, and Kill all denied that anyone kicked, threatened, or physically coerced the defendant, or that the defendant ever requested the assistance of counsel. In addition, Bartnik stated that the defendant did not complain to him of any mistreatment at the hands of the police, and Bartnik did not observe any marks or blood on the defendant. The defendant also told Bartnik that he had not been promised anything in exchange for the statement. Detectives Kelly and Kill specifically denied that anyone threatened to release the name of the defendant’s girlfriend to the news media.

The defendant testified in his own behalf at the suppression hearing. The defendant stated that after he arrived at Area 3 he asked to speak to an attorney, but that Foley and Kelly told him to shut up. When the defendant denied knowing anything about the crimes, Kelly hit him on the forehead and tried to kick him in the groin.

Detective Kill later told the defendant that he had talked to the defendant’s girlfriend, Susan Mitchnick, and that Mitchnick would lose her job if the defendant did not sign a statement. According to the defendant, Foley, Kelly, and Kill each told him that if he signed a statement confessing to these crimes, Mitchnick’s name would not be released to the media.

The defendant said that he finally agreed to sign a statement so that Mitchnick’s name would be kept out of the case. The defendant said that he did not actually read the statement before signing it. The defendant also denied that he ever received Miranda warnings in the period following his arrest. The defendant insisted that he would not have signed the statement if the officers had not hit him, interrogated him for so long, or threatened to reveal Mitchnick’s name to the press.

On cross-examination, the defendant said that he knew that his name had previously appeared in the newspapers in connection with this case and that the police were looking for him. The defendant said that he did not tell Bartnik about his mistreatment, and he acknowledged telling Bartnik that he was signing the statement voluntarily. The defendant also stated that he did not report the beating when he was examined at the county jail. The defendant maintained that the beating did not leave any visible marks.

The defendant’s girlfriend, Susan Mitchnick, also testified in the defendant’s behalf at the suppression hearing. She was 30 years old and had known the defendant since December 1986. She stated that during the afternoon of October 6, 1987, she received a phone call from the president of the Homeless Union telling her that the defendant had been arrested. Mitchnick then tried to find where the defendant was being held, and around 4:30 she learned that the defendant was at Area 3. She called Area 3 around 5:15 and asked to speak with the defendant. Mitchnick was told that the defendant was being interrogated and could not receive phone calls. Around 7 p.m., Detective Kill and another officer arrived at her home and questioned her about the defendant and about the December 1986 murder of Carolyn Lewis. Mitchnick told the officers that she did not know anything about the case. In response, Kill told Mitchnick that he could arrange for her name to be run "through the mud” in the media. Mitchnick was then working for a small public relations and political consulting firm, and she believed that her employment would be jeopardized if that occurred. Mitchnick told the officers once more that she knew nothing about the case. Kill then said that the case could be portrayed as involving "a nice social worker” who befriended a homeless person who happened to be a murderer. The detectives later left. Mitchnick said that a friend, Karen Daniel, subsequently arrived.

On cross-examination, Mitchnick stated that the defendant had never told her that the police were looking for him. She also said that the police did not ask her where she worked, and that she did not volunteer that information.

Karen Daniel, the friend mentioned by Mitchnick, also testified in the defendant’s behalf at the suppression hearing. Daniel, an attorney with the State Appellate Defender’s office in Chicago, stated that Mitchnick told her that the police had threatened to drag her name through the mud if she did not cooperate.

At the suppression hearing, the parties stipulated that Wayne Kinzie, a medical technician at Cermak Health Services, of the Cook County jail, would testify that he conducted an intake examination of the defendant on October 7, 1987, and observed no bruises, cuts, swellings, sores, or bandages on the defendant at that time. Moreover, the defendant did not complain to Kinzie of any injuries. The parties also stipulated that the defendant had been convicted of armed robbery, unlawful restraint, and aggravated battery in October 1982.

The trial judge denied the defendant’s suppression motion. The judge rejected the defense assertions that Miranda warnings were never given to the defendant, that the defendant requested counsel, and that police coerced the defendant, either physically or psychologically. Noting that the medical evidence contradicted the defendant’s claim that he had been physically mistreated, the judge also said that he disbelieved the defendant’s other testimony regarding coercion. Finally, the judge believed that conduct of the officers toward Mitchnick would be significant only if what was said to her was later communicated to the defendant. The judge found, however, that threats of that nature had not been made to the defendant.

The State must establish the voluntariness of a defendant’s confession by a preponderance of the evidence. (People v. R.D. (1993), 155 Ill. 2d 122, 134; People v. King (1986), 109 Ill. 2d 514, 525; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 38, par. 114 — 11(d); see Lego v. Twomey (1972), 404 U.S. 477, 489, 30 L. Ed. 2d 618, 627, 92 S. Ct. 619, 627.) Voluntariness will be determined by considering the totality of the circumstances. (People v. Smith (1992), 152 Ill. 2d 229, 253; People v. Melock (1992), 149 Ill. 2d 423, 447; People v. Clark (1986), 114 Ill. 2d 450, 457.) The trial judge’s finding will be upheld on review unless it is against the manifest weight of the evidence. People v. Jones (1993), 156 Ill. 2d 225, 242-43; People v. Evans (1988), 125 Ill. 2d 50, 77; People v. Kincaid (1981), 87 Ill. 2d 107, 120.

Applying these precepts to the case at bar, we see no reason to disturb the trial judge’s ruling in the present case. The State presented sufficient evidence to demonstrate that the defendant made his statements "freely, voluntarily, and without compulsion or inducement of any sort.” (Clark, 114 Ill. 2d at 457.) The trial judge will assess the credibility of the witnesses (People v. Ramey (1992), 152 Ill. 2d 41, 58), and here the judge found the State’s witnesses to be more credible and rejected the defendant’s explanations for his statement. Accepting Mitchnick’s testimony as true, and her allegation that the officers threatened, to release her name to the news media, as she testified, we are not persuaded that the trial judge erred in denying the defendant’s suppression motion. The defendant must still show that the police overcame his will and compelled him to provide the statement he now seeks to suppress. As we have stated, however, the trial judge in the present case found that the defendant’s testimony lacked credibility. The conduct complained of was directed at Mitchnick, and represented tactics designed to elicit information from her, not from the defendant. Finally, we do not agree with the defendant that the period of custody was so great that it vitiated the voluntariness of the ensuing statement. The period involved here, about eight hours, was not unreasonably long. See People v. House (1990), 141 Ill. 2d 323, 379-81.

III. Jury Selection

The defendant next raises a series of challenges to the selection of the jury in his case. The defendant first argues that the trial judge erred in failing to dismiss for cause Maria Balderrama, one of the jurors who served on the jury empaneled here. The defendant maintains that Balderrama stated during voir dire that she would automatically vote to impose the death penalty if the defendant were found guilty and that the trial judge therefore should have dismissed her for cause. In deciding whether a prospective juror must be removed because of his or her views toward the death penalty, the "standard is whether the juror’s views would 'prevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties as a juror in accordance with his instructions and his oath.’ ” Wainwright v. Witt (1985), 469 U.S. 412, 424, 83 L. Ed. 2d 841, 851-52, 105 S. Ct. 844, 852, quoting Adams v. Texas (1980), 448 U.S. 38, 45, 65 L. Ed. 2d 581, 589, 100 S. Ct. 2521, 2526.

In support of this contention the defendant quotes the following excerpt from the voir dire examination of Balderrama:

"Assistant State’s Attorney Meyer: You have strong feelings against the sentencing of someone to death, is that right?

Prospective Juror Balderrama: Yeah, but only until he’s proved guilty, because right now I don’t know if he’s guilty or not guilty, and it’s difficult right now to determine.

Mr. Meyer: Let’s assume that he was found guilty? Once that is out of the way, do you still have strong feelings against the death penalty?

Balderrama: It’s for guilty people.

Mr. Meyer: If he’s proved guilty?

Balderrama: Yes.”

The defendant argues that the preceding colloquy indicates that Balderrama would automatically vote to impose the death penalty if the defendant were found guilty. Although the defendant’s trial counsel did not seek Balderrama’s dismissal, the defendant now argues that the juror should have been excused for cause. We do not agree.

As the State observes, Balderrama initially expressed opposition to the death penalty, and the material quoted above shows merely that she would be able to follow the law, and the court’s instructions, at the sentencing hearing. At the beginning of voir dire, the trial judge asked the venire members whether any of them had religious or moral scruples that would prevent them from imposing the death penalty; Balderrama was one of the venire members who said that she did. When she was examined individually by the trial judge, Balderrama stated that her conscience would not allow her to put anyone to death. The judge then explained that the death penalty was one of the sentences available for the offense of murder and asked the prospective juror whether, if the defendant were found guilty, she would be able to put those feelings aside and consider the death penalty as a punishment and vote to impose it if it was the appropriate sentence. Balderrama stated that she would be able to do so. The assistant State’s Attorney then asked Balderrama the questions that appear above.

We agree with the State that the juror in question did not express a disqualifying attitude toward the death penalty or its imposition. She initially stated that her views toward capital punishment would prevent her from voting to impose the death penalty. Once the trial judge had explained the sentencing process more fully, however, the juror indicated that she would be able to consider the sentence. Taken in context, her statements indicate that she believed that only guilty persons were deserving of the sentence, not that all guilty persons should be put to death. Consistent with those views, Balderrama was silent when the trial judge earlier asked which prospective jurors "feel because of the nature of the charge that the only penalty that should be imposed would be the death penalty?” For these reasons, we conclude that juror Balderrama did not express a disqualifying state of mind. Therefore, we have no need to consider here the defendant’s further contentions that the trial judge was required to excuse the juror sua sponte, and that defense counsel was ineffective for failing to seek Balderrama’s removal from the venire.

The defendant next argues that the trial judge erred in failing to conduct a more thorough inquiry of the views of prospective juror Dunham toward the death penalty. The defendant argues that the court’s failure to make a more complete examination of the prospective juror required defense counsel to exercise a peremptory challenge when fuller inquiry might have revealed reason to remove the venire member for cause. We note that defense counsel did not object to the judge’s questions of the prospective juror or offer any of his own. Conceding that trial counsel failed to properly preserve the issue for review, the defendant argues that the matter is plain error and, alternatively, that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to seek a more complete examination of the prospective juror.

The defendant’s argument apparently is that the trial judge erred in failing to specifically ask Dunham whether he would "automatically” vote in favor of imposing the death penalty in this case if the defendant were convicted of murder and found eligible for the death sentence. We have reviewed the voir dire of the prospective juror and find that the inquiry was reasonably complete. The judge carefully reviewed with the venire member the three stages of the trial proceedings, from the determination of guilt, through eligibility for the death, penalty, and finally the aggravation and mitigation phase. Dunham indicated that he would be able to consider impartially the evidence of guilt and, at the first stage of the sentencing hearing, that he would be able to return a finding against eligibility if there were insufficient evidence of eligibility. With regard to the last stage in the proceedings, the judge stated:

"Q. We come to the third portion of the process in which you would then, assuming first a guilty verdict, and second eligibility, the third process is where you would have to determine the question of whether or not he’s going to get it. And you have already indicated you thought you have a preference for that. You would hear evidence, bad things about Mr. Bounds and you would also hear evidence concerning good things about Mr. Bounds.

In making your decision as to whether or not you thought this was the appropriate case for the death penalty or not, would you be able to consider the mitigating factors, or the good things that you hear concerning Mr. Bounds in making that decision? Would you take into consideration those things when you made that decision?

A. I believe so.”

Defense counsel did not have any questions of his own to ask the prospective juror, nor did counsel request that Dunham be removed for cause. Trial counsel’s inaction suggests that he found the preceding comments sufficient to enable him to determine whether the prospective juror possessed a disqualifying bias in favor of the death penalty. (See Morgan v. Illinois (1992), 504 U.S. 719, 119 L. Ed. 2d 492, 112 S. Ct. 2222; People v. Smith (1992), 152 Ill. 2d 229.) On this record, we are unable to find plain error or ineffective assistance of counsel.

The defendant next argues that the trial judge erred in failing to excuse three additional prospective jurors— Bone, Boyd, and Funk — because of their views toward the death penalty. The defendant contends that all three prospective jurors indicated that they would favor the death penalty and would not be able to impartially determine whether the defendant should receive that sentence.

Although there was no statement immediately after Funk’s examination to indicate that he was being removed for cause, the record shows that Funk actually was removed for cause, contrary to the defendant’s assumption. During a preliminary examination of prospective jurors’ attitudes regarding the death penalty, Funk expressed views that would appear to disqualify him from service. Later, following the preliminary examinations of a number of other prospective jurors, defense counsel listed the names of the persons who were being removed for cause. Without objection from the State, and without correction from the court, counsel included Funk on the list, together with other prospective jurors who were being excused for cause. It thus appears that Funk was in fact removed for cause. Moreover, we note that Funk was not later recalled for examination, and thus defense counsel was not required to exercise a peremptory challenge to remove him from the jury.

To somewhat similar effect was the history of prospective juror Bone. Against this venire member, defense counsel did make a motion for removal for cause. The judge denied the motion, but Bone was never recalled for examination. Thus, even if the judge erred in failing to remove the venire member for cause, the jury was eventually selected without Bone, and defense counsel was not required to exercise a peremptory challenge against him.

We turn next to prospective juror Boyd. During voir dire, defense counsel did not seek to have him removed for cause. Conceding that counsel did not properly preserve the issue for review, the defendant now argues that the failure to remove the venire member was plain error and, alternatively, that defense counsel was ineffective for having failed to seek his removal. We do not agree. While Boyd stated at several points that he "would have problems” with considering mitigating evidence, he later stated that he would probably be able to consider other forms of punishment in deciding whether the defendant should be sentenced to death. Counsel did not seek to have Boyd removed for cause, but counsel did later exercise a peremptory challenge against him. We do not believe that we can now say that counsel was ineffective for failing to seek the venire member’s removal for cause. We note that counsel did apparently retain at least one peremptory challenge at the conclusion of jury selection. Assuming that Boyd would have been removed for cause if defense counsel had requested that action, we cannot say that counsel was forced to expend a peremptory challenge that he later would have missed.

The defendant next argues that the trial judge erred in failing to excuse prospective juror Lawrence for cause. Once again, however, the defendant is mistaken in believing that the venire member was not removed for cause. In fact, the trial judge did remove Lawrence from the venire. During voir dire, Lawrence expressed the disqualifying view that a person would not be on trial if he was not guilty of the offense. Although at the conclusion of the prospective juror’s preliminary examination no one specifically said that a motion for cause was being made, later, when defense counsel listed the venire members who were being removed for cause, he included Lawrence on the list. Lawrence was never recalled for questioning, and thus defense counsel was never in the position of having to exercise a peremptory challenge against her.

In a final challenge to the selection and composition of the jury, the defendant argues that the trial judge erred in discharging an empaneled juror because of a family medical emergency. Following the selection and swearing in of the jury, but prior to the presentation of evidence, the trial judge learned that one of the jurors, Susan Machman, would not be able to continue serving as a juror because her mother was in the hospital and was terminally ill with cancer. The trial judge informed the parties of this news, and of his decision to excuse the juror from any further service in this case and to replace her with one of the alternates. Defense counsel objected to the judge’s actions.

We find no abuse of discretion in the trial judge’s handling of the situation. During jury selection Mach-man, an attorney, informed the court of her mother’s condition and of the possibility that her mother might be hospitalized later in the week. Machman stated that she would have difficulty concentrating on the case if her mother were in the hospital. Once the judge learned that Machman’s presence would be required at the hospital, the judge had grounds for excusing her from the jury, and he did not abuse his discretion in doing so. (See People v. Hudson (1993), 157 Ill. 2d 401, 448.) Alternate jurors are selected so that trials may continue when jurors are unable to continue with their duties, and the medical condition of the juror’s mother was cause for the judge to excuse the juror from further service. Contrary to the defendant’s argument, he does not have a right to be tried by a jury comprising persons whom he specifically selected. Rather, the defendant’s right is to be tried by an impartial tribunal, "chosen through a joint effort of both parties in compliance with the statutory requirements.” (People v. Ward (1992), 154 Ill. 2d 272, 305.) The replacement of Machman with an alternate juror did not deny the defendant that right.

IV. Trial Issues

The defendant raises a number of arguments concerning the guilt phase of the proceedings below, and we now turn to those issues. The defendant first complains of error in the introduction of testimony by Dr. Stein, the chief medical examiner, concerning the possible significance of the partially clothed condition of the victim’s body. The victim was found at the crime scene wearing only a pink T-shirt that, the victim’s mother testified, did not belong to her daughter. On Dr. Stein’s direct examination, the following colloquy occurred:

"Q. Going back to the crime scene, when you observed her, you mentioned she was partially clothed. What, if any, significance do you draw from the fact that she was partially clothed?

A. Well, speaking strictly from my experience, and having visited over a thousand scenes, the partial clothing of an individual, it acts more like an erotic agent than a body in the nude. So it seems not as exciting as a partially clothed body.”

The defendant argues that the preceding testimony fell outside Dr. Stein’s field of expertise — forensic pathology — and was therefore improper. The defendant concedes that the issue was not properly preserved for purposes of appeal because trial counsel did not object to the testimony or raise the matter in the post-trial motion. (See People v. Fields (1990), 135 Ill. 2d 18, 49; People v. Enoch (1988), 122 Ill. 2d 176, 185-86.) The defendant contends, however, that Dr. Stein’s testimony amounted to plain error and, alternatively, that he was denied his right to the effective assistance of counsel by his attorney’s failure to preserve the issue.

Assuming that the testimony was erroneously admitted, we do not believe that a claim of either plain error or ineffective assistance may succeed here. The plain error doctrine operates as a limited exception to the waiver rule. Supreme Court Rule 615(a) provides that on review, "Plain errors or defects affecting substantial rights may be noticed although they were not brought to the attention of the trial court.” (134 Ill. 2d R. 615(a).) The doctrine is appropriately invoked when the evidence is closely balanced, or when the alleged error is so fundamental that it denied the defendant a fair proceeding. (People v. Banks (1994), 161 Ill. 2d 119, 143; People v. Childress (1994), 158 Ill. 2d 275, 300; People v. Fields (1990), 135 Ill. 2d 18, 56.) We do not believe that either element has been satisfied here. The evidence of the defendant’s guilt was overwhelming. The defendant provided a detailed confession to these brutal crimes, and other evidence established his presence at the crime scene around the time the offenses occurred. Nor do we believe that the alleged error was substantial. The testimony was brief, and the State did not emphasize it. The claimed error was not of such magnitude that it could have deprived the defendant of a fair trial.

We also disagree with the defendant’s contention that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to this portion of Dr. Stein’s testimony. Strickland v. Washington (1984), 466 U.S. 668, 687, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674, 693, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2064, provides a two-part test for evaluating claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. A defendant alleging ineffective assistance must demonstrate that counsel’s representation was deficient and that the deficient performance was prejudicial to the defense. To establish prejudice, a defendant "must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” (Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694, 80 L. Ed. 2d at 698, 104 S. a. at 2068.) A reviewing court "need not determine whether counsel’s performance was deficient before examining the prejudice suffered by the defendant as a result of the alleged deficiencies.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697, 80 L. Ed. 2d at 699, 104 S. Ct. at 2069.

Assuming that the challenged testimony by Dr. Stein was improper and that trial counsel should have registered an objection to it, we do not believe that the defendant was prejudiced as a consequence of the claimed error. As we have stated, the evidence of the defendant’s guilt was overwhelming, and we do not believe that there is a reasonable probability that the result of the trial would have been different even if an objection had been made and sustained to the testimony. "A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” (Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694, 80 L. Ed. 2d at 698, 104 S. Ct. at 2068.) Our confidence in the outcome of the defendant’s trial has not been undermined here.

The defendant next argues that the State failed to establish the corpus delicti of the offenses of aggravated criminal sexual assault and aggravated kidnapping at trial. The defendant contends that the State did not present sufficient evidence independent of the confession to show that either of those two crimes occurred.

This court has described the corpus delicti rule in the following terms:

”[I]f the independent evidence tends to prove that an offense occurred, then such evidence, if corroborative of the facts contained in the confession, may be considered along with the confession in establishing the corpus delicti. In such event, the independent evidence need not establish beyond a reasonable doubt that an offense did occur.” (Emphasis in original.) People v. Willingham (1982), 89 Ill. 2d 352, 361.

The defendant, in his confession, stated that around 6:30 a.m. on December 9, 1986, he grabbed the victim as she was walking in the vicinity of 74th and Princeton Streets and covered her mouth with his hand. The victim struggled and was able to scream once. The defendant then dragged the victim to a nearby vacant building. The defendant took the victim to the second-floor apartment, where he had been staying, and removed the victim’s clothing and threw her down on a bed. The defendant then had vaginal intercourse with the victim, and he might have repeated the act later that day. According to the confession, the defendant later tied the victim’s hands and feet with pieces of extension cord. Fearing that the victim would be able to identify him, the defendant killed the victim the next day, strangling her with an extension cord. The defendant said that he attacked the victim, whom he did not know, because she appeared to be‘ an easy target and he was angry with his family for having evicted him from their house.

The evidence independent of the defendant’s confession was, we believe, sufficient proof of the corpus delicti of the offenses of aggravated criminal sexual assault and aggravated kidnapping. Considering first the charge of aggravated criminal sexual assault, we find that the independent evidence adequately corroborated the details of the defendant’s confession and tended to show the occurrence of the offense. This evidence included the testimony of a neighbor who heard a woman scream around the time when the abduction occurred. In addition, the victim was found wearing only a T-shirt, which did not belong to her, and was naked from the waist down. The absence of clothing is consistent with a sexual assault. The victim’s possessions were found in the room, including boots, identification, and a ring. This tended to show that the victim was undressed where her body was discovered. There was also evidence of contusions and abrasions on the victim’s body, which corroborated the defendant’s statement that the victim resisted the attack. Investigators found a broom handle smeared with what appeared to be feces, and the evidence from the autopsy showed that the victim’s anus was dilated; this testimony could provide further evidence of assault. The defendant’s reference to his eviction was corroborated by the testimony of the defendant’s stepfather, who said that he had asked the defendant to leave the family home. Testimony concerning Carolyn Lewis’ small stature mirrored the defendant’s statement that the victim seemed to be an easy target.

The defendant observes that there Was no physical evidence, such as the presence of semen or trauma to the victim’s vaginal area, introduced in this case to show that an act of intercourse occurred. Dr. Stein testified, however, that the absence of trauma to the vaginal and anal areas was not inconsistent with nonconsensual intercourse. Moreover, the victim was found lying unclothed on a mattress in an unheated apartment in Chicago in December. In addition, some of the victim’s clothing and belongings were found in the apartment, and there were injuries to her body. While not conclusive proof that an act of penetration occurred, the undressed condition of the body tended to show that the victim was sexually assaulted and corroborated the defendant’s description of the attack. The corpus delicti of the offense of aggravated criminal sexual assault may be established in the absence of physical evidence of the type suggested by the defendant. (See People v. Cloutier (1993), 156 Ill. 2d 483, 503-04.) We believe that the evidence introduced in this case was sufficient.

The defendant also contends that the State failed to introduce sufficient evidence of the corpus delicti of aggravated kidnapping. We must reject this argument as well. The evidence here, apart from the defendant’s confession, corroborated the details of the defendant’s confession and tended to show the commission of this additional offense. In the confession, the defendant stated that he grabbed the victim and dragged her to the abandoned building where he had been living. After sexually assaulting the victim, the defendant tied her hands and feet with an extension cord and left her in that condition while he made a number of trips outside the building. The defendant later strangled the victim because he believed that she would be able to identify him if he did not kill her.

Evidence independent of the defendant’s confession corroborated the matters related in the confession and tended to show the occurrence of the offense of aggravated kidnapping. The victim’s mother testified that her daughter would regularly leave for work between 6 and 6:30 a.m. and walk to a nearby bus stop. The victim followed that routine on the morning of her disappearance, December 9, 1986, a work day. According to the testimony of a coworker, however, the victim did not arrive for work that morning. Another witness, who lived in the vicinity of where the abduction might have occurred, heard a scream around the time when the victim would have been walking to meet her bus. The victim’s body was later found in the building where the defendant had been staying. According to the forensic testimony, the victim had been strangled, and her body bore signs of other injuries as well.

We believe that the preceding evidence adequately corroborated the defendant’s confession and tended to show the occurrence of the crime of aggravated kidnapping. This evidence indicated that the victim was abducted while on her way to work and was taken to a nearby building, where she was sexually assaulted and later murdered. On this record, we find adequate evidence of the corpus delicti of aggravated kidnapping.

The defendant makes the further argument that the State failed to prove his guilt for the offense of aggravated kidnapping beyond a reasonable doubt. We do not agree. The standard to be applied in considering the sufficiency of the evidence is "whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” (Emphasis in original.) (People v. Collins (1985), 106 Ill. 2d 237, 261.) In the present case, the defendant’s confession, together with the other testimony, established that the defendant abducted the victim and dragged her tó a building where he sexually assaulted her. According to the confession, the defendant subsequently tied the victim’s hands and feet before he left the victim alone in the house. The defendant killed the victim when he later believed that she would be able to identify him. This evidence was sufficient to establish the defendant’s commission of aggravated kidnapping.

The defendant next argues that the trial judge erred when, over defense objections, the judge allowed the State to publish to the jury certain photographs of the murder victim and later allowed a number of those exhibits to accompany the jury when it began its deliberations. The defendant contends that the probative value of the nine photographs at issue was far outweighed by their prejudicial effect. The defendant additionally notes that the victim’s identity and cause of death were not disputed at trial.

The State correctly points out that the prosecution is not disabled at trial from proving every element of the charged offense and every relevant fact, even though the defendant fails to contest an issue or is willing to stipulate to a fact. (People v. Speck (1968), 41 Ill. 2d 177,

202.) Photographs of a victim, though gruesome, may be admissible if relevant. (People v. Shum (1987), 117 Ill. 2d 317, 353-54; People v. Lindgren (1980), 79 Ill. 2d 129, 143.) The decision whether to admit photographs into evidence is committed to the discretion of the trial judge, whose determination will be upheld unless it is an abuse of discretion. People v. Rissley (1995), 165 Ill. 2d 364, 403; Shum, 117 Ill. 2d at 353.

We find no abuse of discretion in this case. Photographs may be admitted to show the nature and extent of the victim’s injuries, the condition or location of the body at the crime scene, the manner or cause of death, or details corroborating a defendant’s confession, among other uses. (People v. Henderson (1990), 142 Ill. 2d 258, 319-20.) The photographs challenged by the defendant provided evidence of the victim’s injuries and of the manner and cause of her death. They depicted the injuries to the victim’s neck and head as well as those to her extremities. The photographs also corroborated certain details related by the defendant in his confession. In addition, the photographs assisted the jury in understanding the medical examiner’s testimony about the autopsy performed in this case. On this record, we find no abuse of discretion in the use of these photographs at trial.

The defendant next contends that the prosecution improperly presented evidence regarding efforts by the police to apprehend him in connection with this case. Specifically, the defendant complains of testimony that a warrant was issued for his arrest shortly after the discovery of the crimes charged here, that he was included on the Chicago police department’s "10 most wanted” list, and that his name appeared in the news media. The defendant’s trial counsel made no objection to any of the testimony the defendant now challenges, however, and accordingly the issue has not been properly preserved for review. To surmount the procedural default, the defendant argues that these matters represent plain error or, alternatively, demonstrate that trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective. As we explain below, we find that the challenged testimony was admissible. Accordingly, we do n