City of Chicago v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp. (213 Ill. 2d 351, 2004)

JUSTICE GARMAN

delivered the opinion of the court:

The tragic personal consequences of gun violence are inestimable. The burdens imposed upon society as a whole in the costs of law enforcement and medical services are immense. In the present case, the City of Chicago and Cook County, in an effort to stem the rising tide of gun violence and to recoup some of the expenses that flow from gun crimes, have sued 18 manufacturers, 4 distributors, and 11 dealers of handguns that have been illegally possessed and used in the city. For various reasons, 13 manufacturers, 2 distributors, and 8 dealers remain as defendants in this case. The theory of liability is public nuisance. The relief sought by the City includes compensation for the costs of emergency medical services, law enforcement efforts, the prosecution of violations of gun control ordinances, and other related expenses. The County seeks compensation for the costs of treatment of victims of gun violence and the costs of prosecutions for criminal use of firearms, including the expenses associated with providing defense counsel to those accused of gun crimes. Both plaintiffs seek punitive damages and permanent injunctive relief to abate the alleged public nuisance.

In the circuit court of Cook County, defendants sought dismissal of the lawsuit under section 2 — 615 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Code) (735 ILCS 5/2 — 615 (West 2000)), on the basis that plaintiffs failed to state a cause of action for public nuisance. The circuit court granted the motion to dismiss.

The appellate court, construing the facts in a light most favorable to the plaintiffs, found that based on the specific acts alleged in the complaint, plaintiffs had sufficiently stated a cause of action for public nuisance against all three classes of defendants, reversed the trial court, and remanded for further proceedings. 337 Ill. App. 3d 1, 18.

We granted defendants’ petitions for leave to appeal pursuant to Rule 315(a) (177 Ill. 2d R. 315(a)). Pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 345 (155 Ill. 2d R. 345), we have permitted the National Association of Manufacturers and the Product Liability Advisory Council to file briefs amici curiae on behalf of the defendants. We have also permitted the Attorney General of the State of Illinois and the National League of Cities, along with the U.S. Conference of Mayors and the International Municipal Lawyers Association, to file briefs amici curiae on behalf of the plaintiffs.

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiffs filed this suit in November 1998 and their first amended complaint in April 1999. On February 10, 2000, the trial court granted defendants’ motion to dismiss with respect to count II, negligent entrustment, and reserved ruling on count I, public nuisance. In March 2000, plaintiffs were permitted to file a second amended complaint. On September 15, 2000, the trial court granted defendants’ motion to dismiss both counts, with prejudice. On appeal, plaintiffs raised only the dismissal of the public nuisance count of the second amended complaint.

All of the defendants — manufacturers, distributors, and dealers — are federally licensed to engage in their respective businesses. None of the manufacturer defendants have their principal places of business in Illinois. Several are incorporated in other states for the purpose of importing firearms manufactured abroad. Only one of the distributor defendants is based in Illinois. The dealer defendants are located in Illinois, but outside the city of Chicago.

In the second amended complaint, plaintiffs offer dramatic statistics, both for the city and the nation, regarding the number of homicides and other crimes involving handguns. Relying on these statistics, they assert that the “widespread availability and use of firearms is a national problem.” They claim, further, that “[a]b-sent effective enforcement and prosecution of gun control laws, firearms are readily available to anyone who wishes to use them.” The ready availability of guns also contributes to suicides and accidental shootings, particularly of children. These dangers, according to the plaintiffs, “were long ago, are today, and will continue to be specifically known to defendants.”

Plaintiffs also cite provisions of the city’s Municipal Code that place strict requirements and prohibitions on the possession, use, and transfer of firearms in Chicago and assert that such ordinances can be effective only if the “residents of the jurisdiction imposing the restriction cannot legally purchase those firearms elsewhere and bring them back into the jurisdiction.” The State of Illinois also regulates the possession, use, and transfer of firearms. However, according to the complaint, “data from recovered firearms and the undercover work of the Chicago Police Department reflect numerous and systematic violations” of these ordinances and statutes. Despite strict gun control laws intended to protect the citizens of Chicago, there are “thousands of illegal firearms” in the city and more are brought into the city every year. Thus, plaintiffs assert, the “existence of illegal firearms in the City of Chicago constitutes a public nuisance because it violates ordinances and laws designed to protect the public from a threat to its health, welfare and safety,” and because the existence of readily available firearms “creates an unreasonable and significant interference” with public safety.

The second amended complaint further alleges that all three categories of defendants are put on notice of the “crime-facilitating consequences of their conduct,” by virtue of the process used by the United States Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF) to trace firearms recovered by federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies. According to the complaint, defendants “know that only firearms that have been used in connection with crimes can be the subject of traces.” On the basis of trace data from March 26, 1988, to December 31, 1998, involving 858,902 guns traced nationwide, 20 of the 22 manufacturer defendants “account for approximately 48.3% of those crime guns, even though they comprise only 2.8% of the 716 manufacturers listed in the national trace database.” The data provided, however, do not reveal the market shares of these manufacturers.

With regard to gun dealers, plaintiffs offer more recent data from the ATF revealing that 1.2% of dealers nationwide account for 57% of traced firearms. Plaintiffs also rely on a congressional study of ATF data released in December 1999, which found that “an extraordinary proportion of crime guns bought from ‘high crime’ gun dealers were probably straw purchased” and that “one-third of these crime guns were recovered in connection with a crime within just one year of its purchase, and half were traced to crimes within two years of their purchase.”

Plaintiffs’ specific allegation against the named dealer defendants is that they “sell firearms even when they know or should know that the firearms will be used or possessed illegally in Chicago.” This allegation is supported by assertions that dealers know some of their customers are residents of Chicago and that it is illegal for those customers to use or possess these weapons in the city; that dealers make sales even when the words or behavior of the buyers indicate an intention to use the weapon illegally; that dealers sell handguns designed to be carried as concealed weapons, even though state law prohibits the carrying of concealed weapons; and that dealers make multiple sales to individuals whom they know or should know intend to resell the guns in the city. The second amended complaint identifies the dealer defendants as part of a “core group of irresponsible dealers” who attract the business of gunrunners and other criminals, as reflected by ATF trace data. The complaint also includes factual assertions regarding numerous undercover “sting” operations carried out by police officers at the various dealer defendants’ stores. Plaintiffs further assert that the dealers’ practices “have caused a large underground market for illegal firearms to flourish in the City of Chicago,” and that they “know that many of the firearms they sell are used or possessed illegally, and put into the underground market.” Finally, the complaint states that the dealers’ “actions and omissions in selling firearms to Chicago residents that are illegal in the City of Chicago unreasonably facilitate violations of City ordinances, and contribute to physical harm, fear and inconvenience to Chicago residents, and are injurious to the public health and safety of Chicago residents.”

With regard to the defendant manufacturers and distributors, the second amended complaint alleges that they produce and distribute firearms that are regularly recovered by the Chicago police department. For each of the manufacturer defendants, the complaint lists the total number of firearms recovered by the police department from 1992 until the date of the filing of the complaint.

The tracing data offered by plaintiffs also contain a “time to crime” measurement, which reflects the number of days between the initial sale of a traced gun and its use in a crime. According to the complaint, the median “time to crime” for guns traced to distributor defendants is 834 days, while the median “time to crime” for guns traced to nondefendant distributors is 1,386 days.

In addition, the second amended complaint alleges that the defendant manufacturers and distributors knowingly oversupply or “saturate the market” with their products in areas where gun-control laws are less restrictive, knowing that persons will illegally bring them into jurisdictions where they are illegal and then possess or illegally resell them. Further, the complaint alleges that these defendants do not discourage the dealer defendants from selling their firearms irresponsibly, even though they are on notice as a result of the ATF traces that certain dealers are “responsible for a vastly disproportionate number” of the traced weapons. The defendant manufacturers and distributors “know that there is an absence of meaningful regulations of dealers” and know that “almost anyone can become a federally licensed firearms dealer.” Despite this knowledge, these defendants “fail to supervise, regulate or set standards for dealers’ conduct, instead relying on the mere fact that the dealers are licensed by the federal government.”

Finally, plaintiffs allege that the manufacturer defendants design and market their products to appeal to those who intend to use them for criminal purposes. Specifically, features such as ease of concealment, resistance to fingerprints, and the ability to fire many rounds from a single ammunition clip make certain firearms particularly attractive to criminals. These types of weapons, according to the complaint, “serve no legitimate sport or hunting purpose and are designed to appeal to criminals who wish to be better armed than other criminals or law enforcement officers.” The complaint identifies individual models manufactured by each of the manufacturer defendants as evidence of this marketing strategy, which “intentionally and recklessly causes thousands of illegal firearms to end up in Chicago.”

Based on these allegations, the second amended complaint states in “Count I: Public Nuisance” that the residents of Chicago “have a common right to be free from conduct that creates an unreasonable jeopardy to the public’s health, welfare and safety, and to be free from conduct that creates a disturbance and unreasonable apprehension of danger to person and property.” The defendants’ conduct of “intentionally and recklessly” designing, marketing, distributing, and selling firearms that they “should know” will be taken to Chicago causes “thousands of firearms to be possessed and used in Chicago illegally” and causes “a significant and unreasonable interference” with the rights of the public. Further, the complaint alleges that the conduct is of a continuing nature and has created an ongoing nuisance.

The complaint also alleges that defendants “owe a duty of care to the City of Chicago and its residents and the County of Cook and its residents living within Chicago to exercise reasonable care to prevent their firearms from ending up in the hands of persons who use and possess them illegally” in the city. In addition to this allegation, which sounds in negligence, the complaint alleges that defendants’ conduct is “outrageous” and is “committed with a reckless and wanton indifference to the rights and safety of others.”

With regard to the remedy sought, the complaint states that the defendants’ conduct causes increased expenditures by the city and county that should be compensated by money damages. In addition, because money damages “will not adequately compensate” plaintiffs for the harm suffered, they do not have an adequate remedy at law. Injunctive relief is proper, plaintiffs claim, because they and the residents of the city will continue to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of an injunction.

In sum, plaintiffs’ theory is that the defendants’ conduct in designing, manufacturing, distributing, and selling certain models of handguns is done with the knowledge, if not the intent, that a significant number of the guns will ultimately find their way into an illegal secondary gun market and then into hands of persons who cannot legally possess those guns within the city of Chicago. Further, the plaintiffs allege that this conduct is unreasonable, even if it may be generally in compliance with applicable state and federal laws governing the sale of firearms, because the presence and use of these guns by the people who possess them illegally, with the substantial participation of the defendants, violates the right of the general public to be free from the threat of gun violence and from jeopardy to health and safety. Finally, plaintiffs allege that the defendants’ unreasonable conduct is the proximate cause of a substantial interference with the ability of Chicago residents to live in the city without fear, inconvenience, or undue risk of physical injury, and of the resulting demand on the plaintiffs’ limited resources.

II. ISSUES PRESENTED

Before this court, the manufacturer defendants argue that the trial court properly dismissed the second amended complaint because: (1) plaintiffs’ complaint alleges conclusions, not specific underlying facts, and thus does not conform to the fact-pleading standard; (2) the lawful sale of a nondefective product cannot, as a matter of law, constitute a public nuisance; (3) their conduct is so remote from the alleged injury that, as a matter of law, the plaintiffs cannot establish proximate cause; (4) they are not liable under public nuisance law for a situation over which they have no control, specifically, the criminal acts of others after the firearms have left their possession; (5) plaintiffs are barred from any recovery of damages in this case based on the economic loss doctrine and the doctrine prohibiting a municipality from recovering the expenses of local governmental services from alleged tortfeasors in the absence of statutory authority; and (6) the state and federal constitutions forbid the imposition of civil liability for the purpose of regulating extraterritorial commercial conduct.

The distributor defendants adopt these arguments and, with respect to (4) above, make the related argument that the claim against them sounds in negligent entrustment, not public nuisance, and because they provide firearms only to licensed dealers, not to individual consumers, they cannot be held liable for the actions of the ultimate purchaser based on negligent entrustment.

The dealer defendants make the additional argument, related to (2) above, that their practices cannot be deemed unreasonable if they are in compliance with all applicable state and federal regulations.

III. ANALYSIS

A motion to dismiss under section 2 — 615 of the Code (735 ILCS 5/2 — 615 (West 2000)) challenges the legal sufficiency of the complaint by alleging defects on its face. We, therefore, review de novo an order granting or denying a section 2 — 615 motion. Wakulich v. Mraz, 203 Ill. 2d 223, 228 (2003). In reviewing the sufficiency of a complaint, we accept as true all well-pleaded facts and all reasonable inferences that may be drawn from those facts. Jarvis v. South Oak Dodge, Inc., 201 Ill. 2d 81, 86 (2002). In addition, we construe the allegations in the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Wakulich, 203 Ill. 2d at 228. When the plaintiffs theory of liability is public nuisance, the pleading requirements are not exacting because the “concept of common law public nuisance *** elude[s] precise definition.” City of Chicago v. Festival Theatre Corp., 91 Ill. 2d 295, 306 (1982). The existence of a nuisance “ ‘depends on the peculiar facts presented by each case.’ ” Donaldson v. Central Illinois Public Service Co., 199 Ill. 2d 63, 101 (2002), quoting City of Chicago v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 24 Ill. App. 3d 624, 631-32 (1974).

A. The Common Law of Public Nuisance

Because the concept “elude[s] precise definition,” public nuisance has been “ ‘negatively defined’ ” by distinguishing it from other tort actions, such as trespass. Festival Theatre, 91 Ill. 2d at 306, quoting O. Reynolds, Public Nuisance: A Crime in Tort Law, 31 Okla. L. Rev. 318, 318 (1978). As one learned treatise notes:

“There is perhaps no more impenetrable jungle in the entire law than that which surrounds the word ‘nuisance.’ It has meant all things to all people, and has been applied indiscriminately to everything from an alarming advertisement to a cockroach baked in a pie. There is general agreement that it is incapable of any exact or comprehensive definition.” W Keeton, Prosser & Keeton on Torts § 86, at 616 (5th ed. 1984).

It is well settled, however, that public nuisance encompasses:

“that class of wrongs that arise from the unreasonable, unwarrantable or unlawful use by a person of his own property, real or personal, or from his own improper, indecent or unlawful personal conduct, working an obstruction of, or injury to, a right of another or of the public. *** It is a part of the great social compact to which every person is a party, a fundamental and essential principle in every civilized community, that every person yields a portion of his right of absolute dominion ***.” H. Wood, A Practical Treatise on the Law of Nuisances § 1, at 1-3 (3d ed. 1893).

The promulgation of the Restatement of Torts in 1939 was the first “significant attempt to determine some limits to the types of tort liability” associated with nuisance. W Keeton, Prosser & Keeton on Torts § 86, at 617 (5th ed. 1984). Two lines of development in the case law were noted, one “narrowly restricted to the invasion of interests in the use or enjoyment of land,” which has come to be known as private nuisance; the other “extending to virtually any form of annoyance or inconvenience interfering with common public rights,” which is known as public nuisance. W Keeton, Prosser & Keeton on Torts § 86, at 618 (5th ed. 1984). While private nuisance is “a civil wrong, based on a disturbance of rights in land,” public nuisance is “a species of catch-all criminal offense, consisting of an interference with the rights of the community at large.” W Keeton, Prosser & Keeton on Torts § 86, at 618 (5th ed. 1984).

The Restatement definitions of public and private nuisance are consistent with Illinois law. See Wheat v. Freeman Coal Mining Corp., 23 Ill. App. 3d 14, 18 (1974) (citing Illinois cases from 1901 to support conclusion that Illinois courts have adopted the Restatement definition of nuisance); Gilmore v. Stanmar, Inc., 261 Ill. App. 3d 651, 660 (1994) (summarizing cases). See also Donaldson, 199 Ill. 2d at 101 (adopting language contained in the then-draft of section 82IB of the Restatement (Second) of Torts), quoting Commonwealth Edison, 24 Ill. App. 3d at 631.

With regard to public nuisance, section 82 IB of the Restatement (Second) of Torts states: “(1) A public nuisance is an unreasonable interference with a right common to the general public.” Restatement (Second) of Torts § 821B (1979). Thus, it is generally recognized that:

“A public nuisance, unlike a private nuisance, does not necessarily involve an interference with the use and enjoyment of land, or an invasion of another’s interest in the private use and enjoyment of land, but encompasses any unreasonable interference with a right common to the general public. Thus, an action for public nuisance may lie even though neither the plaintiff nor the defendant acts in the exercise of private property rights.” 58 Am. Jur. 2d Nuisances § 31, at 592 (2002).

See also Festival Theatre, 91 Ill. 2d at 313-15 (equitable jurisdiction to abate public nuisances exists even where such is not conferred by statute, offender is amenable to criminal law, and no property right is involved).

We therefore reject plaintiffs’ argument that their claim “squarely attacks the manner in which the defendants use their property, namely, the way in which they sell firearms from their various plants, offices, and stores.” The mere fact that defendants’ conduct in their plants, offices, and stores puts guns into the stream of commerce does not state a claim for public nuisance based on their use of land. It is the presence and use of the guns within the city of Chicago that constitutes the alleged nuisance, not the activities at the defendants’ various places of business. However, because it is clear that neither the use or misuse of land nor the invasion of property rights of another is required for a public nuisance to be found, plaintiffs’ theory of liability is not absolutely foreclosed by the existing common law of public nuisance. We, therefore, proceed to consider the legal adequacy of the second amended complaint and to address the issues raised by defendants.

B. Pleading Requirements

The manufacturer defendants argue that the appellate court, relying on the proposition that the pleading requirements in an action for public nuisance are not exacting, failed to hold the plaintiffs to the fact-pleading standard that this court has repeatedly stated is applicable to civil cases in Illinois. See, e.g., Weiss v. Waterhouse Securities, Inc., 208 Ill. 2d 439, 451 (2004) (noting that this court has stated “time and again” that Illinois is a fact-pleading jurisdiction). Specifically, these defendants claim that the only factual allegation made regarding their conduct is that they lawfully sell firearms to licensed distributors. In addition, they assert that the complaint offers no facts to support its conclusory allegations regarding their knowledge and intent. They contend that the complaint fails to plead factual allegations sufficient to state a claim as to any of the individual manufacturer defendants. In their reply brief, the distributor defendants adopt these arguments.

Further, these defendants suggest that the appellate court improperly relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court of Ohio in City of Cincinnati v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 95 Ohio St. 3d 416, 768 N.E.2d 1136 (2002), when it found the Ohio court’s decision to be “an analogous and instructive case that permits this type of lawsuit to go beyond the pleading stage.” 337 Ill. App. 3d at 16. Ohio is a notice-pleading state and, under the notice-pleading standard, a plaintiff is not required to plead operative facts with particularity. City of Cincinnati, 95 Ohio St. 3d at 423-24, 768 N.E.2d at 1146. Rather, the complaint need only contain a short and plain statement of the claim which shows that the plaintiff is entitled to relief. If there is any set of facts consistent with the plaintiffs complaint that would allow recovery, the court in a notice-pleading jurisdiction may not grant a defendant’s motion to dismiss on the pleadings. City of Cincinnati, 95 Ohio St. 3d at 424, 768 N.E.2d at 1146.

When looking to cases from other jurisdictions to determine whether the complaint should be dismissed on the pleadings, a court must keep in mind that pleading standards vary. Fact pleading imposes a heavier burden on the plaintiff, so that a complaint that would survive a motion to dismiss in a notice-pleading jurisdiction might not do so in a fact-pleading jurisdiction. See, e.g., People ex rel. Madigan v. Tang, 346 Ill. App. 3d 277, 286 (2004) (noting that in action to hold corporate officer personally liable for public nuisance, the burden of pleading facts may be “heavier” than the burden on the plaintiffs in the cited cases from other jurisdictions).

Under our fact-pleading standard, the plaintiff must allege facts sufficient to bring a claim within a legally recognized cause of action. Vernon v. Schuster, 179 Ill. 2d 338, 344 (1997). “[T]he requirement that a complaint set forth facts necessary for recovery under the theory asserted is not satisfied, in the absence of the necessary allegations, by the general policy favoring the liberal construction of pleadings.” Teter v. Clemens, 112 Ill. 2d 252, 256-57 (1986). Thus, in considering a motion to dismiss, a court must disregard the conclusions that are pleaded and look only to well-pleaded facts to determine whether they are sufficient to state a cause of action against the defendant. If not, the motion must be granted, “regardless of how many conclusions the count may contain and regardless of whether or not they inform the defendant in a general way of the nature of the claim against him.” Knox College v. Celotex Corp., 88 Ill. 2d 407, 426 (1981).

However, despite the requirement that the complaint must contain allegations of fact bringing the case within the cause of action, “the plaintiff is not required to set out evidence; only the ultimate facts to be proved should be alleged, not the evidentiary facts tending to prove such ultimate facts.” Chandler v. Illinois Central R.R. Co., 207 Ill. 2d 331, 348 (2003). Plaintiffs contend that they have set out such ultimate facts and suggest that if they are permitted to conduct discovery, additional supporting facts will come to light. Plaintiffs rely heavily on the facts underlying the trace data and the “time to crime” statistics which, they claim, point to these defendants as contributing to the problem of illegal guns to a degree that is not merely a function of their sales volume.

A sufficient pleading in a public nuisance cause of action will allege a right common to the general public, the transgression of that right by the defendant, and resulting injury. Feder v. Perry Coal Co., 279 Ill. App. 314, 318 (1935). To be more precise, facts must be alleged in support of four distinct elements of a public nuisance claim: the existence of a public right, a substantial and unreasonable interference with that right by the defendant, proximate cause, and injury.

A close examination of the second amended complaint reveals that factual allegations are sparse, particularly with respect to the individual manufacturer and distributor defendants. We note, however, that factual allegations with regard to the individual dealer defendants are somewhat more detailed. Although we have reservations regarding the adequacy of the second amended complaint under our fact-pleading standard, we decline to dispose of this case on a procedural issue. The questions of law raised by this appeal are of great importance, have been fully briefed and argued, and provide a substantive basis for resolving this case.

Turning to these substantive issues, we consider each of the required elements of the public nuisance cause of action in turn, beginning with the existence of a public right. Under the heading of “Unreasonable Interference,” we consider the argument that the lawful sale of a nondefective product cannot, as a matter of law, constitute a public nuisance and the related argument that defendants’ compliance with applicable state and federal laws precludes liability for public nuisance. Under heading of “Proximate Cause,” we address the argument that defendants may not be held liable in public nuisance when they have no control over the instrumentality at the time the alleged harm results from the criminal acts of third parties, as well as the argument that their conduct is too remote from the alleged injury for liability to attach. After addressing each of the elements of the claim, we consider the remedial issues raised by the defendants.

We now turn to our examination of the elements of the public nuisance cause of action to determine whether plaintiffs have stated a cause of action in which, if they were to prevail, the remedies they seek might be available.

C. Public Right

A public nuisance has been defined as “ ‘the doing of or the failure to do something that injuriously affects the safety, health or morals of the public, or works some substantial annoyance, inconvenience or injury to the public.’ ” Village of Wilsonville v. SCA Services, Inc., 86 Ill. 2d 1, 21-22 (1981), quoting W Prosser, Torts § 88, at 583 n.29 (4th ed. 1971). Thus, the first element that must be alleged to state a claim for public nuisance is the existence of a right common to the general public. Such rights include the rights of public health, public safety, public peace, public comfort, and public convenience. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 821B(2)(a) (1979).

In the second amended complaint, plaintiffs allege that the residents of Chicago have “a common right to be free from conduct that creates an unreasonable jeopardy to the public’s health, welfare and safety, and to be free from conduct that creates a disturbance and reasonable apprehension of danger to person and property.” (Emphases added.) Because none of the defendants are alleged to have engaged in any conduct in the city of Chicago, we understand the asserted public right to be the right to be free from unreasonable jeopardy to health, welfare, and safety, and from unreasonable threats of danger to person and property, caused by the presence of illegal weapons in the city of Chicago, allegedly made possible by defendants’ action or inaction elsewhere.

Defendant manufacturers and distributors do not argue that plaintiffs have failed to identify a public right affected by the alleged nuisance. Several dealer defendants, however, argue that plaintiffs have failed to assert a recognized public right.

We note that although other courts have dismissed public nuisance suits against similar groups of defendants (see Spitzer v. Sturm, Ruger & Co., 309 A.D.2d 91, 761 N.Y.S.2d 192 (2003); Camden County Board of Chosen Freeholders v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 273 F.3d 536 (3d Cir. 2001) (applying New Jersey law); City of Philadelphia v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 277 F.3d 415 (3d Cir. 2002) (applying Pennsylvania law)), no such case has been dismissed for failure to properly plead the existence of a public right affected by the alleged nuisance.

Nevertheless, we question whether there is a public right, as opposed to an individual right, to be free from the threat of illegal conduct by others. The case law is not helpful. Cases involving the right of public safety have involved nuisances created by vicious dogs, the storage of explosives, blasting, the storage or use of fireworks, or the presence of unsafe buildings. See, e.g., Turpen v. City of St. Francisville, 145 Ill. App. 3d 891 (1986) (dilapidated building); Village of Northbrook v. Cannon, 61 Ill. App. 3d 315 (1978) (allowing dogs to run free). The right of public peace has been disrupted by disorderly houses, unruly taverns, and dance halls. See, e.g., City of Chicago v. Cecola, 75 Ill. 2d 423 (1979) (house of prostitution); City of Chicago v. Clark, 359 Ill. 374 (1935) (disorderly house); People v. Sequoia Books, Inc., 149 Ill. App. 3d 383 (1986) (lewd behavior in adult bookstore); Toushin v. City of Chicago, 23 Ill. App. 3d 797 (1974) (massage parlor). Public comfort has been affected by odors, fumes, dust, and other sources of pollution. See, e.g., Gardner v. International Shoe Co., 319 Ill. App. 416 (1944) (odors, noises, smoke); City of Chicago v. Latronica Asphalt & Grading, Inc., 346 Ill. App. 3d 264 (2004) (illegal dumping of waste); County of Cook v. Chicago Magnet Wire Corp., 152 Ill. App. 3d 726 (1987) (odor). Such nuisances have affected the public generally.

We have found no Illinois case recognizing a public right to be free from the threat that members of the public may commit crimes against individuals. Plaintiffs cite Cecola in support of their assertion that “a violation of laws that protect public health, welfare, or safety infringes a public right and hence may be remedied through a nuisance action.” Cecola, however, involved an action to abate the nuisance created by the operation of a house of prostitution. The conduct itself was illegal; a statute specifically permitted houses of prostitution to be enjoined as public nuisances; and the operation of a house of prostitution was considered a nuisance at common law. Cecola, 75 Ill. 2d at 427. Cecola does not offer support for recognition of a public right characterized in plaintiffs’ reply brief as “the public’s right to enjoy the benefits of the laws governing the unlawful possession and use of firearms.”

“The interference with a public right is the sine qua non of a cause of action for public nuisance. However, not all interferences with public rights are public nuisances. The nuisance must affect an interest common to the general public, must produce a common injury, or be dangerous or injurious to the general public, or it must be harmful to the public health, or prevent the public from a peaceful use of their land and the public streets, or there must be some direct encroachment on public property.” 58 Am. Jur. 2d Nuisances § 39 (2002).

Further,

“A public right is one common to all members of the general public. It is collective in nature and not like the individual right that everyone has not to be assaulted or defamed or defrauded or negligently injured.” Restatement (Second) of Torts § 821B, Comment g, at 92 (1979).

In Ganim v. Smith & Wesson Corp., 258 Conn. 313, 780 A.2d 98 (2001), the Supreme Court of Connecticut resolved a case similar to the present case on the threshold question of whether the plaintiff mayor and city had standing to assert a claim of public nuisance. Ganim, 258 Conn, at 343-44, 780 A.2d at 117. The Connecticut court also commented that:

“ ‘Nuisances are public where they violate public rights, and produce a common injury, and where they constitute an obstruction to public rights, that is, the rights enjoyed by citizens as part of the public. ... [I]f the annoyance is one that is common to the public generally, then it is a public nuisance. ... The test is not the number of persons annoyed, but the possibility of annoyance to the public by the invasion of its rights. A public nuisance is one that injures the citizens generally who may he so circumstanced as to come within its influence.’ ” Ganim, 258 Conn, at 369, 780 A.2d at 131-32, quoting Higgins v. Connecticut Light & Power Co., 129 Conn. 606, 611, 30 A.2d 388, 391 (1943).

The Connecticut court acknowledged that the definition of a common law public nuisance might be “capacious enough” to encompass the plaintiffs’ complaint: “One might well say that the harms alleged by the plaintiffs to have been caused by the defendants’ conduct are harms that injure the citizens of Bridgeport who may be so circumstanced as to come within the influence of that conduct.” Ganim, 258 Conn, at 370, 780 A.2d at 132. One might also say, however, that the harm alleged was harm to individual members of the public, not to the public generally.

In the second amended complaint, plaintiffs describe the harms that they allege result from the possession and use of illegal firearms in the city of Chicago: “a higher level of crime, death and injuries to Chicago citizens, a higher level of fear, discomfort and inconvenience to the residents of Chicago, and increased costs to the plaintiffs to investigate and prosecute crimes caused by the illegal possession and use of the firearms brought into Chicago.”

Leaving aside for a moment the costs incurred by plaintiffs, which we determine, below, are not recoverable as damages, we query whether the public right asserted by plaintiffs is merely an assertion, on behalf of the entire community, of the individual right not to be assaulted. See, e.g., Restatement (Second) of Torts § 821B, Comment g, at 92 (1979) (a public right is “not like the individual right that everyone has not to be assaulted”). We are also reluctant to recognize a public right so broad and undefined that the presence of any potentially dangerous instrumentality in the community could be deemed to threaten it.

By posing this question, we do not intend to minimize the very real problem of violent crime and the difficult tasks facing law enforcement and other public officials. Nor do we intend to dismiss the concerns of citizens who live in areas where gun crimes are particularly frequent. Rather, we are reluctant to state that there is a public right to be free from the threat that some individuals may use an otherwise legal product (be it a gun, liquor, a car, a cell phone, or some other instrumentality) in a manner that may create a risk of harm to another.

For example, the purchase and consumption of alcohol by adults is legal, while driving under the influence is a crime. If there is public right to be free from the threat that others may use a lawful product to break the law, that right would include the right to drive upon the highways, free from the risk of injury posed by drunk drivers. This public right to safe passage on the highways would provide the basis for public nuisance claims against brewers and distillers, distributing companies, and proprietors of bars, taverns, liquor stores, and restaurants with liquor licenses, all of whom could be said to contribute to an interference with the public right.

Similarly, cell phones, DVD players, and other lawful products may be misused by drivers, creating a risk of harm to others. In an increasing number of jurisdictions, state legislatures have acted to ban the use of these otherwise legal products while driving. A public right to be free from the threat that other drivers may defy these laws would permit nuisance liability to be imposed on an endless list of manufacturers, distributors, and retailers of manufactured products that are intended to be, or are likely to be, used by drivers, distracting them and causing injury to others.

We conclude that there is no authority for the unprecedented expansion of the concept of public rights to encompass the right asserted by plaintiffs. Further, because we conclude, below, that plaintiffs’ claim does not meet all of the required elements of a public nuisance action, we need not decide whether to break new ground by creating such precedent.

D. Unreasonable Interference

“Circumstances that may sustain a holding that an interference with a public right is unreasonable include the following:

(a) Whether the conduct involves a significant interference with the public health, the public safety, the public peace, the public comfort or the public convenience, or

(b) whether the conduct is proscribed by a statute, ordinance or administrative regulation, or

(c) whether the conduct is of a continuing nature or has produced a permanent or long-lasting effect, and, as the actor knows or has reason to know, has a significant effect upon the public right.” (Emphases added.) Restatement (Second) of Torts § 821B(2) (1979).

We understand plaintiffs’ claim of unreasonable interference to be based on section 82 IB (2) (c), because their complaint alleges that defendants’ “conduct in designing, marketing, distributing, and selling firearms to Chicago residents or to persons whom defendants know will cause those firearms to end up in Chicago is of a continuing nature.” (Emphasis added.) The second amended complaint describes the “significant effect” of defendants’ conduct as: “a higher level of crime, death and injuries to Chicago citizens, a higher level of fear, discomfort and inconvenience to the residents of Chicago, and increased costs to the plaintiffs.” The complaint also avers that illegal firearms “are used in the commission of crimes, including crimes in which residents of Chicago are killed, maimed, or terrorized.” In addition, the complaint contains data regarding the number of homicides, robberies, and other crimes involving handguns, both in the city and nationwide. Data are offered regarding the ready availability of handguns to those who are forbidden by law to possess them. The significance of the problem is further demonstrated by citations to numerous state statutes intended to curb gun violence.

Defendants assert that in more than 2,500 reported cases in the over-100-year history of public nuisance law in Illinois, a public nuisance has been found to exist only when one of two circumstances was present: either the defendant’s conduct in creating the public nuisance involved the defendant’s use of land, or the conduct at issue was in violation of a statute or ordinance. Thus, they argue, even though an action for public nuisance may lie without allegations that the nuisance emanates from the defendants’ use of land, the law of public nuisance does not encompass conditions that eventuate from the lawful manufacture, distribution, and sale of a nondefective product.

Although we have not attempted to verify defendants’ claim that the body of law on this topic in state and federal courts applying Illinois law exceeds 2,500 cases, we have found no Illinois case in which a public nuisance was found in the absence of one of these two conditions. While no case law in this jurisdiction expressly limits application of the doctrine of public nuisance to these two circumstances, no case law expressly authorizes its application in the absence of either condition. To do so would be to expand the law of nuisance to encompass a third circumstance — the effect of lawful conduct that does not involve the use of land. We are reluctant to allow such an expansion.

With this reluctance in mind, we turn to the two arguments made by defendants challenging the appellate court’s conclusion that plaintiffs have properly pleaded the element of unreasonable interference.

1. Lawful Sale of Nondefective Product

Defendants argue that, as a matter of law, the lawful production and sale of a nondefective product is per se reasonable and, thus, cannot result in liability for creation of a public nuisance. The appellate court responded to this argument by citing section 834 of the Restatement: “ ‘One is subject to liability for a nuisance caused by an activity, not only when he carries on the activity but also when he participates to a substantial extent to carrying it on.’” 337 Ill. App. 3d at 15, quoting City of Bloomington, Indiana v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 891 F.2d 611, 614 n.5 (7th Cir. 1989), citing Restatement (Second) of Torts § 834 (1979). The appellate court also noted that a federal court deciding a case of first impression under Illinois law had previously declined to impose public nuisance liability against a gun manufacturer in the absence of state decisional law. 337 Ill. App. 3d at 14, citing Bubalo v. Navegar, Inc., No. 96—C— 3664 (N.D. Ill. March 20, 1998). Then, relying on City of Cincinnati, the appellate court rejected defendants’ argument. The Supreme Court of Ohio, in City of Cincinnati, allowed a public nuisance claim against a similar group of defendants to stand, holding that, “under the Restatement’s broad definition, a public-nuisance action can be maintained for injuries caused by a product if the facts establish that the design, manufacturing, marketing, or sale of the product unreasonably interferes with a right common to the general public.” City of Cincinnati, 95 Ohio St. 3d at 520, 768 N.E.2d at 1142.

Plaintiffs’ novel application of the cause of action of public nuisance renders authorities such as the Restatement less than helpful in answering this question. Section 834, for example, focuses primarily on private nuisance and its common law basis tied to a defendant’s use of land and the resulting invasion a plaintiff’s property rights. The “Scope Note” preceding section 834 states that the defendant’s activity “may be the direct cause of the invasion or it may create a physical condition that ultimately results in the invasion.” (Emphasis added.) Restatement (Second) of Torts § 834 (1979). All of the illustrations that follow section 834 involve invasions of property rights caused by the defendant’s use of land and are clearly predicated on a view of nuisance as a physical condition brought about by the wrongful use of real property.

Similarly, the assertion in manufacturer defendants’ brief that a “ ‘product which has caused injury cannot be classified as a nuisance to hold liable the manufacturer or seller for the product’s injurious effects’ ” (quoting 63A Am. Jur. 2d Products Liability § 927, at 105 (1997)) is not entirely helpful when a public nuisance is alleged. The cited authority also states that:

“Because a seller in a commercial transaction relinquishes ownership and control of its products when they are sold, it lacks the legal right to abate whatever hazards its products may pose. Under these circumstances, the purchaser’s proper remedies are products liability actions for negligence or breach of warranty rather than a nuisance action.” 63A Am. Jur. 2d Products Liability § 927, at 106 (1997).

Clearly, this authority is considering whether the purchaser of a product may state a nuisance claim for injuries caused by the product. Neither the plaintiffs in the present case, nor the citizens injured by the firearms that have been manufactured, distributed, and sold by the defendants, are purchasers seeking to assert a public nuisance claim when an action for products liability or breach of warranty would be more appropriate.

Plaintiffs concede that their public nuisance claim, based on the alleged effects of defendants’ lawful manufacture and sale of firearms outside the city and the county, would extend public nuisance liability further than it has been applied in the past. Nevertheless, they, and the amici in support of their position, argue that extending the doctrine of public nuisance in this manner is a proper exercise of this court’s inherent authority to develop the common law. Further, they claim, the legislature has expressed no intent to foreclose common law liability for marketing, distribution, and sales practices that create a public nuisance.

The Supreme Court of Indiana has agreed with this approach, holding in City of Gary v. Smith & Wesson Corp., 801 N.E.2d 1222, 1234 (Ind. 2003), that “a nuisance claim may be predicated on a lawful activity conducted in such a manner that it imposes costs on others.” We do not find City of Gary convincing, however, because the authority cited for this statement, Yeager & Sullivan, Inc. v. O’Neill, 163 Ind. App. 466, 474-75, 324 N.E.2d 846, 852. (1975), involved a nuisance created by the keeping of hogs, a lawful enterprise, in a manner that invaded the rights of others. Again, it was the manner in which the defendant used his real property, and the effect of his conduct on plaintiffs use and enjoyment of his real property, that resulted in imposition of nuisance liability in Yeager & Sullivan.

The other authorities offered by plaintiffs do not directly address defendants’ contention that plaintiffs’ claim is, in effect, a products liability claim repackaged as public nuisance. Because a products liability claim against one who lawfully manufactures and sells a non-defective product must fail (see Riordan v. International Armament Corp., 132 Ill. App. 3d 642 (1985); Linton v. Smith & Wesson, 127 Ill. App. 3d 676 (1984)), defendants urge this court to conclude that plaintiffs have failed to state a cause of action in public nuisance and to leave to the legislature the question of whether to impose additional constraints on the marketing and sale of firearms.

Cases from other jurisdictions in which reviewing courts have rejected public nuisance claims against the gun industry offer more analysis of this question. In Spitzer v. Sturm, Ruger & Co., a New York appellate court observed:

“[G]iving a green light to a common-law public nuisance cause of action today will, in our judgment, likely open the courthouse doors to a flood of limitless, similar theories of public nuisance, not only against these defendants, but also against a wide and varied array of other commercial and manufacturing enterprises and activities.

All a creative mind would need to do is construct a scenario describing a known or perceived harm of a sort that can somehow be said to relate back to the way a company or an industry makes, markets, and/or sells its non-defective, lawful product or service, and a public nuisance claim would be conceived and a lawsuit born.” Spitzer, 309 A.D.2d at 96, 761 N.Y.S.2d at 196.

Citing an earlier case rejecting a theory of negligent marketing against a gun manufacturer, the Spitzer court observed that “ ‘judicial resistance to the expansion of duty grows out of practical concerns both about potentially limitless liability and about the unfairness of imposing liability for the acts of another.’ ” Spitzer, 309 A.D.2d at 95-96, 761 N.Y.S.2d at 196, quoting Hamilton v. Beretta USA Corp., 96 N.Y.2d 222, 233, 750 N.E.2d 1055, 1061, 727 N.Y.S.2d 7, 13 (2001). This concern, the court, noted, “is common to both negligent marketing and public nuisance claims.” Spitzer, 309 A.D.2d at 95-96, 761 N.Y.S.2d at 196.

Similarly, a federal court of appeals, applying New Jersey law, concluded that:

“Whatever the precise scope of public nuisance law in New Jersey may be, no New Jersey court has ever allowed a public nuisance claim to proceed against manufacturers for lawful products that are lawfully placed in the stream of commerce. On the contrary, the courts have enforced the boundary between the well-developed body of product liability law and public nuisance law. Otherwise, if public nuisance law were permitted to encompass product liability, nuisance law ‘would become a monster that would devour in one gulp the entire law of tort,’ [citation]. If defective products are not a public nuisance as a matter of law, then the non-defective, lawful products at issue in this case cannot be a nuisance without straining the law to absurdity.” Camden County Board, 273 F.3d at 540.

In addition, a Florida appellate court affirmed the trial court’s dismissal of Miami-Dade County’s action against firearms manufacturers, trade associations, and retailers, saying:

“The County’s request that the trial court use its injunctive powers to mandate the redesign of firearms and declare that the appellees’ business methods create a public nuisance, is an attempt to regulate firearms and ammunition through the medium of the judiciary.” Penelas v. Arms Technology, Inc., 778 So. 2d 1042, 1045 (Fla. App. 2001).

A Florida statute expressly reserves the field of regulation of firearms and ammunition to the state legislature (Fla. Stat. § 790.33 (1999)). In Illinois, cities and counties are free to impose gun regulations within certain limits (see 720 ILCS 5/47—5 (West 2002)). Nevertheless, we agree with defendants that the Florida court’s observation is worthy of consideration.

Defendants’ position is that the legislative and executive branches of state and federal government are better suited than this court to address the societal costs that flow from the illegal use of handguns, particularly given that the commercial activity at issue is already highly regulated. Further, defendants argue that plaintiffs’ “frustration” at their inability to effectively regulate gun possession in the city cannot be “alleviated through litigation as the judiciary is not empowered to ‘enact’ regulatory measures in the guise of injunctive relief. The power to legislate belongs not to the judicial branch of government, but to the legislative branch.” Penelas, 778 So. 2d at 1045.

Our own research reveals that the Criminal Code contains a nuisance provision listing 17 categories of conduct or uses of land that are public nuisances. 720 ILCS 5/47 — 5 (West 2002). In addition, the General Assembly has enacted numerous other statutes defining certain conduct as constituting a public nuisance. See, e.g., 510 ILCS 5/15(c) (West 2002) (permitting a dangerous dog or other animal from leaving the premises of the owner without a leash or other method of control); 515 ILCS 5/1 — 215 (West 2002) (use of illegal fishing device); 605 ILCS 5/9 — 108 (West 2002) (planting of willow trees or hedges on the margin of a highway); 620 ILCS 25/11 (West 2002) (creation of a hazard that obstructs the airspace required for the takeoff or landing of aircraft); 625 ILCS 45/4 — 8 (West 2002) (use of watercraft equipped with siren or flashing lights); 720 ILCS 5/28 — 2 (West 2002) (keeping a gambling place); 720 ILCS 5/37 — 1 (West 2002) (knowingly maintaining a building used in the commission of certain enumerated criminal offenses).

As these examples well illustrate, the legislature has the power to declare something to be a nuisance that was not such at common law. People v. Jones, 329 Ill. App. 503 (1946); Village of Gurnee v. Depke, 114 Ill. App. 2d 162 (1969). However, the codification of certain common law nuisances in the Criminal Code and the legislative declaration that certain other conditions constitute nuisances does not exclude common law nuisances not codified therein from being classed as public nuisances. People ex rel. Dyer v. Clark, 268 Ill. 156 (1915). See also Gilmore, 261 Ill. App. 3d at 661 (public nuisance statute does not displace common law actions; common law right to action to abate public nuisance exists independently of any statutory right). As this court observed in Festival Theatre:

“[Elquitable jurisdiction to abate public nuisances is said to be of ‘ancient origin,’ and it exists even where not conferred by statute, where the offender is amenable to the criminal law, and where no property rights are involved. [Citations.] Too, in a common law action, the extent of the concept of public nuisance is not limited to those activities the legislature has declared public nuisances.” Festival Theatre, 91 Ill. 2d at 303.

On the other hand:

“If a defendant’s conduct in interfering with a public right does not come within one of the traditional categories of the common law crime of public nuisance or is not prohibited by a legislative act, the court is acting without an established and recognized standard.” Restatement (Second) of Torts § 821B, Comment e, at 90 (1979).

In such cases, the Restatement warns, the analysis set forth in sections 826 to 831 becomes more significant. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 821B, Comment e, at 90 (1979). These sections define factors that should be considered by a court when determining whether an intentional invasion of another’s interest in the use and enjoyment of land is unreasonable. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 826 (unreasonableness of intentional invasion), § 827 (gravity of harm), § 828 (Utility of Conduct), §§ 829 through 831 (gravity versus utility) (1979).

Because these factors are intended to apply to intentional conduct affecting the use and enjoyment of land, they are not directly applicable to the novel claim made by plaintiffs. Thus, if we were to engage in the balancing of harm versus utility that the plaintiffs urge, we would be “acting without an established and recognized standard” (Restatement (Second) of Torts § 82 IB, Comment e, at 90 (1979)). In addition, although courts frequently weigh such factors in other contexts, an analysis of the harm caused by firearms versus their utility is better suited to legislative fact-finding and policy-making than to judicial assessment.

Further, despite the existence of numerous statutes declaring various practices and conditions to constitute public nuisances, we have no indication from the legislature that it would be inclined to impose public nuisance liability for the sale of a product that may be possessed legally by some persons, in some parts of the state. It seems that plaintiffs seek injunctive relief from this court because relief has not been forthcoming from the General Assembly. We are reluctant to interfere in the lawmaking process in the manner suggested by plaintiffs, especially when the product at issue is already so heavily regulated by both the state and federal governments.

We, therefore, conclude that there are strong public policy reasons to defer to the legislature in the matter of regulating the manufacture, distribution, and sale of firearms.

2. Compliance With Applicable Law

Defendants argue further that their business practices cannot be deemed unreasonable if they are in compliance with applicable state and federal regulations. In a related argument, defendants suggest that because the firearms industry is highly regulated at both the state and federal levels, judicial restraint in further regulating their activities is advisable.

As to the argument that compliance with applicable laws precludes a claim of common law public nuisance because it is, by definition, reasonable, the appellate court concluded that “compliance with the law is not dispositive of whether a public nuisance exists, but merely serves as a ‘guideline’ in determining whether an unreasonable interference has occurred.” 337 Ill. App. 3d at 13. The authority cited for this statement, however, was not persuasive. The appellate court cited its own recent decision in Young v. Bryco Arms, 327 Ill. App. 3d 948 (2001), a case virtually identical to the present case except that it was brought by private individuals, and a law review article by one of plaintiffs’ own attorneys (D. Kairys, The Governmental Handgun Cases and the Elements and Underlying Policies of Public Nuisance Law, 32 Conn. L. Rev. 1175, 1182 (2000)). The only other authority cited by the appellate court for this proposition is Commonwealth Edison, 24 Ill. App. 3d at 632-33, in which the court concluded that although the defendant demonstrated that it was in compliance with applicable standards, the court was “not bound by federal air-pollution standards in deciding whether the facility’s emissions constitute a common law nuisance.” Rather, the court stated, “those standards offer us guidelines in the determination of the reasonableness of the operation and the extent of any harm to the public.” In Commonwealth Edison, however, the appellate court affirmed the trial court’s dismissal of the city’s public nuisance claim against an alleged polluter on other grounds, specifically, lack of proof of both substantial injury and causation. Commonwealth Edison, 24 Ill. App. 3d at 633. Thus, the commentary in Commonwealth Edison on the relevance of defendant’s compliance with federal regulations was dicta and of little persuasive value to this court.

As to the argument that comprehensive regulation of the firearms industry cautions against judicial involvement, the appellate court commented that defendant’s alleged fostering of an underground handgun market is “not [a] lawful action.” 337 Ill. App. 3d at 13. The appellate court acknowledged that “comprehensive legislation of a certain activity causes courts to exercise judicial restraint in declaring an activity to be a public nuisance if it complies with the regulations.” 337 Ill. App. 3d at 13. However, the court found such restraint unjustified in the present case because “ ‘ “there is generally no regulation of the quantity, frequency, or purpose of firearm purchases or sales [,] nor is