Avery v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance (216 Ill. 2d 100, 2005)

CHIEF JUSTICE McMORROW

delivered the opinion of the court:

Michael Avery and other named plaintiffs brought a class action in the circuit court of Williamson County against defendant, State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company (State Farm). Representing a nearly nationwide class of State Farm policyholders, plaintiffs alleged claims sounding in breach of contract and statutory consumer fraud, in addition to a claim seeking declaratory and injunctive relief.

The circuit court certified the class. The breach of contract claim was tried before a jury, and the remaining claims received a simultaneous bench trial. The jury returned a verdict in favor of plaintiffs on the breach of contract claim, and the circuit court entered judgment in favor of plaintiffs on the consumer fraud claim. With regard to the third count, the circuit court granted declaratory relief but declined to grant injunctive relief. The damages awarded to plaintiffs totaled $1,186,180,000.

The appellate court affirmed the judgment, with one exception. The appellate court reversed a portion of the damages, lowering the total award to $1,056,180,000. 321 Ill. App. 3d 269. We allowed State Farm’s petition for leave to appeal. 177 Ill. 2d R. 315(a).

Plaintiffs’ suit centers on certain automobile repair part categories which have been identified in the record and to which we refer throughout our discussion. “Crash parts” refers to automobile components that are used to replace parts damaged in a crash, rather than parts that have failed mechanically. They are primarily sheet metal and plastic parts that are attached to the outer shell of the car. Crash parts consist of two categories. The first category is comprised of new parts made by or on behalf of the automobile’s original manufacturer. These parts are commonly referred to as “Original Equipment Manufacturer” parts, or “OEM” crash parts. The second class includes aftermarket parts made by companies not affiliated with original equipment manufacturers. These parts are referred to as “non-OEM” crash parts.

A succinct general overview of plaintiffs’ theory of the case may be found in “Plaintiffs Memorandum in Support of Application of Illinois Law to the Claims of Class Members Under Illinois Choice of Law Doctrine”:

“In this case, plaintiffs have placed at issue the propriety of State Farm’s uniform practice of specifying the use of non-OEM crash parts to repair its policyholders’ car[s] in every instance in which such cheaper parts are available. *** Plaintiffs contend that this policy breaches State Farm’s standard contract because it is not designed to restore policyholders’ cars to their pre-loss condition by using parts of like kind and quality. Plaintiffs further contend that this practice violates Illinois’ consumer law because the practice itself and its economic ramifications constitute a violation of Illinois consumer statutes, which prohibit[ ] misrepresentations as to the ‘standard, quality, or grade’ of the goods and services provided under State Farm’s policies. [Citation.] At trial, the Court and jury must resolve the classwide question of whether State Farm, hy requiring the uniform use of non-OEM crash parts, and through the course of conduct it designed to conceal the true import of this practice from its policyholders, breached its contractual obligations and committed consumer fraud.”

This opinion is divided into two principal sections: “Breach of Contract” and “Consumer Fraud.” In a third section, we deal with plaintiffs’ claims for declaratory and injunctive relief. These sections are further subdivided, as required by the various arguments and issues, as follows:

I. Breach of Contract

A. Propriety of the Nationwide Contract Class

B. Whether the Verdict May Be Affirmed with Respect to Subclasses

1. The Massachusetts and “Assigned Risk” Policies

2. The “You Agree” Policies

3. The “Like Kind and Quality” Policies

4. Damages

a. Specification Damages

b. Installation Damages

II. Consumer Fraud Act

A. Plaintiffs’ Consumer Fraud Claim

1. Plaintiffs’ Consumer Fraud Claim May Not Be Based on a Breach of a Promise Contained in Their Insurance Policies

2. This Case Is Not About the Specification of Defective Parts

3. The Representations Which Form the Basis of Plaintiffs’ Cause of Action for Consumer Fraud Do Not Include the Statement That Non-OEM Parts Are as Good as OEM Parts

4. Describing a'Non-OEM Part as a “Quality Replacement Part” Is Puffing and, Hence, Not Actionable

5. The Guarantee Provided by State Farm Cannot Form a Basis for Plaintiffs’ Consumer Fraud Claim

6. The Crux of Plaintiffs’ Consumer Fraud Claim Is a Failure by State Farm to Disclose the Categorical Inferiority of Non-OEM Parts During the Claims Process

B. Propriety of the Nationwide Consumer Fraud Class

1. Scope of the Consumer Fraud Act

2. Whether the Consumer Fraud Act Applies to the Transactions at Issue in This Case

C. Propriety of Judgment: Named Plaintiff

1. Burden of Proof

2. The Deceptive Act or Practice

3. Actual Damage

4. Proximate Cause — Actual Deception

D. Other Issues

III. Equitable and Declaratory Relief We begin with plaintiffs’ breach of contract count.

I. Breach of Contract

Plaintiffs’ original class action complaint, which was filed in July 1997, was amended several times. The trial, which took place in 1999, was predicated upon plaintiffs’ third amended class action complaint. Count I (breach of contract) of the third amended complaint alleged that State Farm breached its “uniform insurance contract” with its policyholders. Plaintiffs alleged that, under the terms of this contract, State Farm promised “to restore plaintiffs’ vehicles to their pre-loss condition using parts of like kind and quality.” According to plaintiffs, the term “like kind and quality,” as stated in this promise, meant “like kind and quality to OEM parts.” However, plaintiffs also alleged that the non-OEM parts at issue in this case were categorically inferior to their OEM counterparts. Under plaintiffs’ view, non-OEM parts could never satisfy State Farm’s “like kind and quality” obligation. Plaintiffs alleged: “As a practical matter, [State Farm’s] obligation could be met only by requiring the exclusive use in repairs of factory-authorized, or OEM parts.” (Emphases added.)

In urging the certification of their claim as a class action, plaintiffs alleged that State Farm’s contractual agreement with its policyholders was a uniform “Policy,” in the singular, with “the same or common general terms.” State Farm argued, to the contrary, that there was no uniform State Farm automobile insurance policy nationwide, and individual issues therefore would dominate the contract claims, rendering classwide determinations impossible. See 735 ILCS 5/2 — 801(2) (West 1998). According to State Farm, some of its policies included a promise to pay to repair the vehicle with parts of “like kind and quality,” but other policies did not contain this provision. State Farm added that, in many states, its policies explicitly provided for the specification of non-OEM parts sufficient to restore the vehicle to its “pre-loss condition.” Still other State Farm automobile insurance policies contained neither the “like kind and quality” nor the “pre-loss condition” language. State Farm pointed, for example, to its Massachusetts policies, which promised simply to pay “the actual cash value” of “parts at the time of the collision.” Another group of policies that contained neither the “like kind and quality” nor the “pre-loss condition” language were the majority of State Farm’s “assigned risk” contracts, which were written for the “residual market” of high-risk consumers whom states required insurers to cover. According to State Farm, most of these assigned risk policies promised simply to pay the “[a]mount necessary to repair or replace the property.”

State Farm also argued that there were substantive conflicts of law between Illinois and other states, and therefore it would be improper to apply Illinois law to the contract claims of class members nationwide. State Farm contended, in addition, that Illinois lacked significant contacts with the claims of class members in other states and the imposition of Illinois law with regard to their claims would violate constitutional rights. See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 86 L. Ed. 2d 628, 105 S. Ct. 2965 (1985).

Following a hearing, the circuit court certified plaintiffs’ claims as a 48-state class action. The circuit court rejected State Farm’s arguments, finding that Illinois law could be applied to the claims of the entire class and that this imposition of Illinois law presented no constitutional difficulties. The court also rejected State Farm’s argument that there was no standard form insurance policy. The court took the position that the specific form of the individual policies was immaterial so long as the operative contractual language in each policy was susceptible of uniform interpretation. The court declined to address this issue at the certification stage, maintaining instead that the question of whether the language in State Farm’s various policies could be given a uniform interpretation should be resolved at trial.

In reaching its decision to certify the class, the court concluded that there were questions of fact or law that were common to the class, and these questions predominated over any questions affecting only individual members. 735 ILCS 5/2 — 801(2) (West 1998). The court pointed to what it termed State Farm’s uniform practice “throughout the United States” of specifying non-OEM parts on policyholders’ repair estimates. According to the court, the members of the plaintiff class had a “common interest” in determining whether this practice constituted a breach of State Farm’s contractual obligation. In the court’s view, this common interest predominated over questions affecting individual class members.

In an “Order Regarding Law to be Applied to Class Members’ Claims,” the circuit court explained its reasoning for applying Illinois law to class members’ claims nationwide. The court stated:

“With respect to the breach of contract claims, the court finds that there are no true conflicts of law raised by the specific claims or facts at issue in this case which require application of the law of any state other than Illinois. Illinois possesses sufficient contacts such that the application of Illinois law to the breach of contract claims in this case is neither arbitrary nor unfair and comports with due process. Application of Illinois law to the breach of contract claims does not implicate the interests of any other jurisdiction and application of its law to these claims. Finally, the application of Illinois breach of contract standards, which are identical to those in other jurisdictions, does not interfere with any state’s legislative or legal choices.”

Based on its finding that class members had a “common interest” in determining whether State Farm’s “uniform” practice of specifying non-OEM parts breached State Farm’s contractual obligation, and that Illinois law could be applied to class members’ claims nationwide, the circuit court certified the following class:

“All persons in the United States, except those residing in Arkansas and Tennessee, who, between July 28, 1987, and February 24, 1998, (1) were insured by a vehicle casualty insurance policy issued by Defendant State Farm and (2) made a claim for vehicle repairs pursuant to their policy and had non-factory authorized and/or non-OEM (Original Equipment Manufacturer) ‘crash parts’ installed on their vehicles or else received monetary compensation determined in relation to the cost of such parts. Excluded from the class are employees of Defendant State Farm, its officers, its directors, its subsidiaries, or its affiliates.

In addition, the following persons are excluded from the class: (1) persons who resided or garaged their vehicles in Illinois and whose Illinois insurance policies were issued/ executed prior to April 16, 1994, and (2) persons who resided in California and whose policies were issued/ executed prior to September 26, 1996.”

Following entry of the circuit court’s order certifying the class, State Farm sought from this court a writ of mandamus directing the circuit court to reverse the order. State Farm suggested in the alternative that this court reverse the circuit court’s certification order pursuant to our supervisory authority. State Farm also moved for transfer, consolidation, and a stay of proceedings. This court entered an order in which we took “no action” on State Farm’s various requests because there were insufficient votes either to allow or to deny.

In the circuit court, State Farm subsequently moved for summary judgment on the class claims and for decertification of the class. The circuit court denied these motions. State Farm also moved for summary judgment against each of the named plaintiffs. This motion was denied as well.

Prior to trial, the parties tendered a number of motions in limine. One of plaintiffs’ motions sought to bar State Farm from presenting evidence to the jury that the regulation of insurance varied from state to state, and another of plaintiffs’ motions sought to prohibit any disclosure of the states where the class members’ policies were filed. Still another of plaintiffs’ motions sought to preclude the introduction of evidence regarding differences in State Farm’s contractual obligations to class members. In opposing these motions, State Farm argued, as it had in opposing class certification, that there were significant variances in its contractual obligations to the members of the class, and these variances resulted, at least in part, from differing insurance regulations in the various states. State Farm asserted:

“[N]othing is more basic in the trial of a contract claim than *** thatf ] the rights and duties of the parties to a contract are defined by that specific contract. But plaintiffs ask to exclude that very starting point[,] [t]he contract of the individual class members, a contract which varies *** depending on troublesome differences in State Farm’s obligations toward members of the class. The contractual rights of the members of the class, Your Honor, do vary, and those variances are not only relevant but fundamental.”

The circuit court granted several of plaintiffs’ motions in limine, including those barring State Farm from (1) disclosing the states where the class members’ policies were filed, (2) introducing evidence regarding variances in the states’ insurance regulations, and (3) introducing evidence regarding differences in State Farm’s contractual obligations to members of the class.

The trial began on August 16, 1999. As previously indicated, the breach of contract claim was tried before the jury, and the remaining claims were tried before the court after the jury had left for the day. At the start of the trial, and over the objection of State Farm, the circuit court gave preliminary jury instructions. In these instructions, the court told the jury that State Farm’s contractual obligation was “exactly the same, whether State Farm promised to pay for crash parts of like kind and quality or promised to pay for crash parts which restore a vehicle to its pre-loss condition.” The court added that, under State Farm’s policies, the company was allowed to specify either OEM parts or non-OEM parts, “so long as the crash parts are of like kind and quality which restore the damaged vehicle to its pre-loss condition.” According to the circuit court, crash parts were of like kind and quality “only if they restore[d] a vehicle to its pre-loss condition,” which the court defined as “the condition of the vehicle immediately prior to the time it is damaged.”

It is unnecessary to recount in detail the evidence presented at trial. We note that the trial lasted several days, and involved hundreds of exhibits and testimony by dozens of witnesses. Much of the testimony dealt with whether non-OEM parts were categorically inferior to OEM parts. Each side presented the testimony of experts and body-shop witnesses in support of their respective positions. At this point, we summarize only the testimony of the named plaintiffs, the testimony of plaintiffs’ damages expert, and that of a State Farm claims consultant. Other facts relevant to our analysis will be introduced as they become pertinent.

Five named plaintiffs testified at trial. Michael Avery, of Louisiana, testified by video deposition. The remaining four gave their testimony in person: Mark Covington, a resident of Mississippi; Sam DeFrank, who lived in Illinois; Carly Vickers, a resident of Pennsylvania; and Todd Shadle, who was living in Massachusetts when his accident occurred.

Two of the witnesses, Avery and Shadle, did not have non-OEM parts installed on their vehicles. Both testified that before their respective accidents, their cars were in very good condition, and they would not consider non-OEM parts. Accordingly, both had OEM parts installed on their vehicles, rather than the non-OEM parts specified in the estimate, and both paid the difference in cost. For Shadle, the difference was about $45, and for Avery it was about $155.

Covington, DeFrank and Vickers did have non-OEM parts installed on their vehicles. All three expressed dissatisfaction with the parts. Vickers testified that, following the collision that gave rise to her suit, her car was involved in a subsequent, more serious accident and was declared a total loss. Vickers admitted that State Farm paid her “book value” for the car. She added that, so far as she knew, State Farm did not value her car any less because of the non-OEM parts that had been used in its repair. DeFrank testified that, several months after his truck was repaired, he sold the vehicle to his brother-in-law for an amount that was slightly below “Blue Book” value. However, DeFrank asserted that, even though the truck had been repaired with non-OEM parts, he did not discount the sale price based on this fact. DeFrank characterized the sale of the truck to his brother-in-law as an “arm’s length transaction.”

Plaintiffs’ damages expert, Dr. Iqbal Mathur, testified that there were two types of damages being sought for breach, of contract. The first was what Mathur termed “direct,” or “specification,” damages. According to Mathur, these damages were incurred when State Farm specified a non-OEM part on the repair estimate. Under this theory, everyone in the class was eligible to receive specification damages.

On cross-examination, Mathur acknowledged that a plaintiff would be entitled to receive specification damages even if his car were restored to its preloss condition. Mathur also conceded that specification damages would apply even if the car were repaired with an OEM part or with a non-OEM part that was of the same quality as an OEM part.

The second type of contract damages, which Mathur described as “consequential,” or “installation,” damages, was determined by calculating the cost of replacing non-OEM parts with OEM parts on a class member’s vehicle. Only those class members who actually had non-OEM parts installed on their vehicles were eligible to receive installation damages.

On cross-examination, Mathur acknowledged that, with regard to installation damages, it was necessary to determine whether a non-OEM part was installed on a class member’s vehicle. However, Mathur conceded that he had no way of making this determination. Mathur also acknowledged that he had “no opinion” as to how many class members had non-OEM parts installed on their vehicles but later received fair market value for them. Mathur admitted that his calculations as to installation damages might be incorrect by as much as $1 billion.

Among the witnesses appearing for defendant was Don Porter, a State Farm property consultant in auto general claims. Porter’s testimony was directed primarily to State Farm’s “basic philosophy” of handling auto damage claims, rather than any specific contractual obligation. In describing this philosophy, Porter testified repeatedly that State Farm’s goal was to pay to restore a policyholder’s car to its preloss condition. According to Porter, State Farm has “always had a commitment to restoring the vehicle to its pre-loss condition.” Porter also testified that the parts specified “must be as good as the part that was on the car prior to the loss.” Porter never mentioned the Massachusetts or assigned risk policies, and never stated that all the State Farm policy forms at issue in this case were uniform.

Following the close of evidence, the circuit court, in conferring with the parties, reiterated the view that State Farm’s contractual obligation was the same for each member of the class. In describing this uniform obligation, the circuit court pointed to Porter’s testimony. According to the court, Porter testified that State Farm’s promise “always was that when the car was repaired, the parts would be of like kind and quality which restores [the vehicle] to its pre-loss condition.” The court ruled that this uniform interpretation of the contractual obligation would apply to all of State Farm’s policies, including the “assigned risk” policies and the Massachusetts policies (neither of which contained the “like kind and quality” or the “pre-loss condition” language).

During the conference on jury instructions, State Farm objected to the use of the term “contract” in the instructions. State Farm argued: “Reference to a singular contract is factually inaccurate. There were numerous contracts.” Counsel for State Farm informed the circuit court that, with regard to the court’s interpretation of the contractual obligation as uniform, State Farm wanted to preserve its “objections as to variations in contract terms based on either differing policy language or differing state regulations.” Counsel stated:

“We understand that’s not going to be a part of this trial. So we merely want to preserve that for appellate purposes.”

The circuit court noted the objection, and subsequently instructed the jury. The instructions regarding State Farm’s contractual obligation essentially repeated what the court had given in its preliminary instructions. The essence of these contractual obligation instructions was that State Farm’s contractual obligation was the same for every class member.

The verdict form given by the circuit court was general and classwide. It stated, in pertinent part: “Do you find that defendant State Farm failed to perform its obligations under the contract and breached its contract with the plaintiff class?” The circuit court denied State Farm’s request to give, in addition, individual verdict forms for each named plaintiff.

The jury found that “defendant State Farm failed to perform its obligations under the contract and breached its contract with the plaintiff class.” Contract damages awarded to the plaintiff class totaled $456,180,000, which consisted of $243,740,000 in specification damages and $212,440,000 in installation damages. The circuit court entered judgment on the jury’s verdict in favor of plaintiffs on the contract claim. The court also entered judgment in plaintiffs’ favor on the consumer fraud claim, finding that State Farm had, by its practices, violated the Consumer Fraud Act. The court awarded plaintiffs an additional $130 million in “disgorgement” damages and $600 million in punitive damages, resulting in a total award of $1,186,180,000 on all claims.

On appeal, State Farm argued that, with regard to plaintiffs’ breach of contract claim, individual questions predominated over any purported common questions, and the claim for breach of contract therefore should not have been certified as a class action. 735 ILCS 5/2— 801(2) (West 1998). In its brief to the appellate court, State Farm contended that, contrary to the conclusion of the circuit court, the operative contractual language in State Farm’s policies was not susceptible of uniform interpretation. While acknowledging that most of its auto insurance contracts contained the “like kind and quality” or the “pre-loss condition” language, State Farm insisted that “a significant number of policies did not.” State Farm pointed, for example, to its policies in Massachusetts, as well as its assigned risk policies in Alaska, Illinois, Indiana, and Minnesota, which State Farm averred “did not use either the Tike kind and quality’ or ‘pre-loss condition’ language.” In its brief to the appellate court, State Farm asserted:

“Neither of these formulations [the Massachusetts policy provision or the ‘assigned risk’ policy provision] expressly imposes any standard of part quality. In fact, the assigned risk policies deliberately delete the ‘like kind and quality’ and ‘pre-loss condition’ language that appears in other State Farm policies.” (Emphases in original.)

Focusing on the circuit court’s interpretation of its contractual obligation as uniform, State Farm told the appellate court:

“Rather than trying to deal with the variations in policy language and the governing [state] laws, the circuit court chose to ignore them completely. The court instructed the jury that there was only one policy form, even though there are a number of different forms. Then the court made up its own interpretation of that policy form, without citing any law to support it. Finally, in order to enforce the artificial uniformity it had created, the court barred State Farm from telling the jury about any different contract language or differing state laws governing the specification of non-OEM parts.

The circuit court’s decision to force this case into the mold of a class action by fabricating a single contract and a single interpretation is an error of law of constitutional dimension that requires reversal by this Court.”

The appellate court affirmed the certification of plaintiffs’ breach of contract claim as a class action. The appellate court concluded, as had the circuit court, that State Farm’s contractual promise was the same for each member of the class. The appellate court stated:

“The record demonstrates that plaintiffs presented evidence to show that State Farm made the same promise (i.e., to pay for parts ‘of like kind and quality’ to restore ‘pre-loss condition’) to its policyholders throughout the country. State Farm’s own witness, Don Porter, a claims consultant, acknowledged that State Farm had a uniform nationwide obligation to policyholders. This promise was to specify parts of like kind and quality to OEM parts so as to restore preloss condition.” (Emphasis added.) 321 Ill. App. 3d at 280.

The appellate court also affirmed the circuit court’s finding that Illinois law could be applied to the contract claims of all the class members nationwide and that this imposition of Illinois law presented no constitutional difficulties.

With regard to the merits, the appellate court upheld the circuit court’s judgment that State Farm breached its contractual obligation to the plaintiff class. The appellate court stated:

“Plaintiffs claimed that the non-OEM parts specified by State Farm were categorically inferior and failed to restore the vehicles to their ‘pre-loss condition.’ The claim was supported with expert testimony, from which it could be reasonably inferred, if accepted as true, that the lot of non-OEM parts specified by State Farm was inferior in terms of appearance, fit, quality, function, durability, and performance.” 321 Ill. App. 3d at 280.

The appellate court also upheld most of the damages awarded for breach of contract. In affirming the award of specification damages, the appellate court explicitly concluded that these damages applied even where (1) an inferior non-OEM part was specified on the estimate, but the body shop provided an OEM part at no additional cost to the class member, and (2) non-OEM parts were used in the vehicle’s repair, but the class member subsequently sold the vehicle for fair market value with no diminution in value because of the use of non-OEM parts. 321 Ill. App. 3d at 287-88. The appellate court also upheld the award of installation damages, rejecting State Farm’s criticism that these damages were speculative. 321 Ill. App. 3d at 288-90.

However, the appellate court concluded that the $130 million in disgorgement damages constituted an impermissible double recovery, and the appellate court therefore reversed this award. As a result, plaintiffs’ total award was reduced to $1,056,180,000.

State Farm appeals from those portions of the judgment of the appellate court affirming the judgment of the circuit court. We granted State Farm’s petition for leave to appeal. 177 Ill. 2d R. 315(a).

A. Propriety of the Nationwide Contract Class

Before this court, State Farm argues, as it did before the circuit and appellate courts, that the class should not have been certified. State Farm contends that individual questions predominate over any questions common to the class and that Illinois law should not have been applied to the contract claims of class members nationwide. With regard to the merits, State Farm argues that plaintiffs failed to establish a breach of State Farm’s contractual obligation and plaintiffs failed to establish that they were entitled to damages. We turn first to State Farm’s contention that the class should not have been certified.

Class certification is governed by section 2 — 801 of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2 — 801 (West 1998)), which is patterned after Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Getto v. City of Chicago, 86 Ill. 2d 39, 47 (1981); K. Forde, Illinois’s New Class Action Statute, 59 Chi. B. Rec. 120, 122-24 (1977). Given the relationship between these two provisions, federal decisions interpreting Rule 23 are persuasive authority with regard to questions of class certification in Illinois. See, e.g., Schlessinger v. Olsen, 86 Ill. 2d 314, 320 (1981) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P 23 case in analyzing class certification issue); see K. Forde, Illinois’s New Class Action Statute, 59 Chi. B. Rec. 120, 122-24 (1977); Southwestern Refining Co. v. Bernal, 22 S.W.3d 425, 433 (Tex. 2000). Under section 2 — 801, a class may be certified only if the proponent establishes the four prerequisites set forth in the statute: (1) numerosity (“[t]he class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable”); (2) commonality (“[t]here are questions of fact or law common to the class, which common questions predominate over any questions affecting only individual members”); (3) adequacy of representation (“[t]he representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interest of the class”); and (4) appropriateness (“[t]he class action is an appropriate method for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy”). 735 ILCS 5/2 — 801 (West 1998).

Decisions regarding class certification are within the sound discretion of the trial court and should be overturned only where the court clearly abused its discretion or applied impermissible legal criteria. McCabe v. Burgess, 75 Ill. 2d 457, 464 (1979); Eshaghi v. Hanley Dawson Cadillac Co., 214 Ill. App. 3d 995, 1001 (1991). However, “[a] trial court’s discretion in deciding whether to certify a class action is not unlimited and is bounded by and must be exercised within the framework of the civil procedure rule governing class actions.” 4 A. Conte & H. Newberg, Newberg on Class Actions § 13:62, at 475 (4th ed. 2002); see also Broussard v. Meineke Discount Muffler Shops, Inc., 155 F.3d 331, 344 (4th Cir. 1998) (noting that, while a trial court has broad discretion in deciding whether to certify a class, this discretion must he exercised within the framework of Fed. R. Civ. E 23).

In the case at bar, State Farm argues that it was an abuse of discretion to certify the class. State Farm’s argument focuses on the commonality and predominance requirement of section 2 — 801. According to State Farm, it was error for the lower courts to conclude that common questions predominated over questions affecting only individual class members.

With regard to the class that was certified for plaintiffs’ contract claim, the common question identified by the circuit court in its certification order was whether State Farm’s practice of specifying non-OEM parts on repair estimates constituted a breach of State Farm’s contractual obligations. According to the circuit court, this question of “contractual interpretation” predominated over other issues. In reaching this conclusion, the circuit court acknowledged State Farm’s argument that its insurance contracts took varying forms and there was thus no standard form contract to be interpreted. However, in the court’s view, the specific form of the individual insurance policies was immaterial so long as “the operative contractual language contained in each policy [was] susceptible [of] uniform interpretation.” The court concluded that this question of whether the various policies’ language could be given uniform interpretation should be decided at trial, rather than at the class certification stage.

Notwithstanding this assertion by the court, the issue of uniform contractual interpretation was never decided on the merits. As previously noted, prior to trial the circuit court granted plaintiffs’ motions in limine barring the introduction of evidence regarding differences in State Farm’s contractual obligations and prohibiting any mention of the states where the class members’ policies were filed. As a result of these rulings, the jury was prevented from hearing evidence regarding any variations in State Farm’s contractual obligations to the class members. Moreover, by the time the trial began, the circuit court itself had decided the issue of whether the contractual language in State Farm’s various policies was susceptible of uniform interpretation. In its preliminary instructions to the jury, the court stated: “The contractual obligation of State Farm under its policies or insurance contracts is exactly the same, whether State Farm promised to pay for crash parts of like kind and quality or promised to pay for crash parts which restore a vehicle to its pre-loss condition.” (Emphasis added.) Following the close of evidence in the jury trial, the circuit court expressed this uniform contractual interpretation in even broader terms, ruling that it applied to all of State Farm’s policies, including the assigned risk policies and the Massachusetts policies (neither of which contained the “like kind and quality” or the “pre-loss condition” language).

In our view, the circuit court was incorrect in concluding, in the first instance, that the question of uniform contractual interpretation should be decided at trial rather than at the class certification stage. Apparently the circuit court came to this realization as well (although belatedly), as is evinced by the court’s deciding the uniform interpretation issue prior to trial. The reason why this question should have been resolved during the certification stage is that, had the court answered the question in the negative rather than the affirmative, the class could not have been certified. In order to satisfy the second requirement of section 2 — 801 (a common question of fact or law predominates over other questions affecting only individual class members), it must be shown that “successful adjudication of the purported class representatives’ individual claims will establish a right of recovery in other class members.” Goetz v. Village of Hoffman Estates, 62 Ill. App. 3d 233, 236 (1978); accord Society of St. Francis v. Dulman, 98 Ill. App. 3d 16, 18 (1981); Hagerty v. General Motors Corp., 59 Ill. 2d 52, 59 (1974); see also Mace v. Van Ru Credit Corp., 109 F.3d 338, 341 (7th Cir. 1997) (noting that the typicality and commonality requirements of Fed. R. Civ. E 23 “ensure that only those plaintiffs or defendants who can advance the same factual and legal arguments may be grouped together as a class”). In the case at bar, if the circuit court had concluded that the operative contractual language in State Farm’s various policies was not susceptible of uniform interpretation, this would have raised the possibility that there was a breach of contract with some class members but not with others. See Broussard, 155 F.3d at 340. In such a situation, the successful adjudication of the claims of some class members would not necessarily establish a right to recovery in others. If there were significant differences in the operative contractual language of the various policies, the commonality and predominance requirement of section 2 — 801 could not be met, and the class could not be certified. Accordingly, the circuit court erred in declining to decide the question of uniform contractual interpretation at the class certification stage. As noted, the circuit court apparently realized this error and decided the uniform interpretation issue prior to trial.

The question before us is whether the circuit court decided this issue correctly. In other words, was it error for the circuit court to conclude that the operative language in State Farm’s various policies could be given a uniform interpretation such that the successful adjudication of the contract claims of some class members would establish a right to recovery in other class members? The determination of this issue requires an examination of the relevant contracts. The starting point of any contract analysis is the language of the contract itself. Church v. General Motors Corp., 74 F.3d 795, 799 (7th Cir. 1996); Dugan v. Smerwick Sewerage Co., 142 F.3d 398, 403 (7th Cir. 1998). As a general rule, the construction, interpretation, or legal effect of a contract is a matter to be determined by the court as a question of law. 12A III. L. & Prac. Contracts § 264, at 107 (1983); see Chicago Daily News, Inc. v. Kohler, 360 Ill. 351, 363 (1935); Sindelar v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co., 161 F.2d 712, 713 (7th Cir. 1947). Our review of this issue is therefore de novo. See Hessler v. Crystal Lake Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 338 Ill. App. 3d 1010, 1017 (2003).

We begin with the two main policy forms at issue in this case. The first includes the “like kind and quality” language and provides, in pertinent part:

“We have the right to settle a loss with you or the owner of the property in one of the following ways:

2. pay to repair or replace the property or part with like kind and quality. If the repair or replacement results in better than like kind and quality, you must pay for the amount of the betterment ***.” (Emphases in original.)

The second policy form contains the “pre-loss condition” provision, as well as language expressly providing that State Farm’s contractual obligation could be met by specifying non-OEM parts. This policy form states, in pertinent part:

“The cost of repair or replacement is based upon one of the following: ijt % tji

3. an estimate written based upon the prevailing competitive price. *** We will include in the estimate parts sufficient to restore the vehicle to its pre-loss condition. You agree with us that such parts may include either parts furnished by the vehicle’s manufacturer or parts from other sources including non-original equipment manufacturers.” (Emphasis in original.)

In our view, these two policy forms are not the same. As noted, the second one contains, in addition to the “pre-loss condition” promise, an explicit agreement between State Farm and the policyholder regarding the use of non-OEM parts: “You agree with us that such parts may include either parts furnished by the vehicle’s manufacturer or parts from other sources including non-original equipment manufacturers.” (Emphasis in original.) In its brief to this court, State Farm points in particular to this language, explaining that it “expressly provided that State Farm could meet [the preloss condition] obligation by specifying non-OEM parts.” In contrast, the first policy form set forth above, which contains the “like kind and quality” promise, makes no mention of OEM or non-OEM parts, nor does it expressly allow for the specification of non-OEM parts. If, as plaintiffs claim, the specification of non-OEM parts constitutes a breach of State Farm’s contractual obligation, plaintiffs who were insured under policies containing the “like kind and quality” promise would be in a different position regarding this non-OEM-parts claim than would plaintiffs with policies containing the “you agree” language. Class members with a “like kind and quality” policy would have a stronger case for breach of contract than would those whose policies expressly al lowed the practice that is alleged to constitute the breach. It follows that the successful adjudication of the claims of class members with the “like kind and quality” language would not necessarily establish a right of recovery in those with the “you agree” language. See Hagerty, 59 Ill. 2d at 59; Goetz, 62 Ill. App. 3d at 236; Dulman, 98 Ill. App. 3d at 18; Mace, 109 F.3d at 341. There is thus a material difference between the policies containing the “you agree” provision and those that do not contain this language.

This difference between the “like kind and quality” policies, on the one hand, and the “pre-loss condition” policies containing the “you agree” provision, on the other, is not the only instance in this case of material differences in policy language. The putative class also includes State Farm insureds with policies that contain neither the “like kind and quality” nor the “pre-loss condition” promise. State Farm’s Massachusetts policies, for example, simply promise to pay “the actual cash value” of “parts at the time of the collision.” The same is true of most of State Farm’s “assigned risk” policies, which are used in the “residual market” of high-risk consumers that insurers are required to cover. Just as with the Massachusetts policies, the majority of the “assigned risk” policies contain neither the “like kind and quality” nor the “pre-loss condition” language. Instead, the “assigned risk” policies promise to pay an “[a]mount necessary to repair or replace the property.”

As State Farm points out, neither of these formulations — the Massachusetts policy provision or the “assigned risk” policy provision — expressly imposes any standard of part quality. It follows that plaintiff class members who were insured under either of these policies would he in a different position than their “like kind and quality” and “pre-loss condition” counterparts regarding the claim that the specification of non-OEM parts constituted a breach of their insurance contract. The successful adjudication of the claim of a “like kind and quality” policyholder, for example, would not necessarily establish a right to recovery in a class member with either a Massachusetts or an “assigned risk” policy. See Goetz, 62 Ill. App. 3d at 236; Dulman, 98 Ill. App. 3d at 18.

Notwithstanding the foregoing, the circuit court, following the close of evidence in the jury trial, reiterated its pretrial conclusion that State Farm’s contractual obligation was the same for each member of the class. The circuit court determined that all of State Farm’s policies, including the Massachusetts policies and the “assigned risk” policies, conveyed the same contractual promise. The court stated:

“After having heard all the testimony, and I wrote down in particular when it was done, Mr. Porter’s testimony that State Farm’s agreement, promise, however you choose to characterize it, always was that when the car was repaired, the parts would be of like kind and quality which restores [it] to its pre-loss condition.”

The appellate court also referred specifically to Porter’s testimony in concluding that State Farm’s contractual obligation was uniform: “State Farm’s own witness, Don Porter, a claims consultant, acknowledged that State Farm had a uniform nationwide obligation to policyholders.” 321 Ill. App. 3d at 280. Plaintiffs take this same position, pointing to Porter’s testimony and contending that State Farm’s contractual obligations to its policyholders were uniform. We disagree.

First, Porter’s testimony about State Farm’s “commitment to restoring the vehicle to its pre-loss condition” referred to a “basic philosophy” goal of the company, rather than a contractual obligation. Porter never testified that all of the policy forms at issue in this case were uniform. Second, to the extent that his testimony could be read as referring to State Farm’s insurance contracts, the most that can be said about this testimony is that Porter was referring to individual policy terms rather than all of the relevant policy forms. Viewed in the light most favorable to plaintiffs, Porter’s testimony may be read as supporting the position that the “like kind and quality” and the “pre-loss condition” phrases mean the same thing: State Farm promised to pay to restore the policyholder’s vehicle to its preloss condition using parts as good as the parts that were on the vehicle at the time of the loss. However, there is nothing to indicate that Porter’s testimony encompasses any other policy language.

An example of a policy provision that falls outside the scope of Porter’s testimony is the “you agree” language, which expressly allows for the specification of non-OEM parts. While Porter made brief mention of the “you agree” language in his testimony, he discussed this language only as an example of the notice that State Farm provided to policyholders regarding its non-OEM-parts practices. Porter did not state in his testimony that a policy containing language that expressly allows for the specification of non-OEM parts is the contractual equivalent of a policy that omits this language. His testimony simply contains no comment with regard to this matter. Accordingly, with respect to State Farm’s allegedly uniform contractual obligation, Porter’s testimony supports only the view that the “like kind and quality” phrase and the “pre-loss condition” phrase mean the same thing: that State Farm’s obligation was to pay to restore the policyholder’s vehicle to its preloss condition. Porter’s testimony does not support the position of the lower courts, and of plaintiffs, that the presence of the “you agree” language makes no difference and that policies containing this language convey the same contractual promise as do policies that omit it.

Equally important, Porter’s testimony does not encompass State Farm’s Massachusetts policies or its “assigned risk” policies, neither of which contain the “like kind and quality” or the “pre-loss condition” language. We have carefully examined the more than 200 transcript pages of Porter’s testimony. We find no mention of either the Massachusetts policies or the “assigned risk” policies. The assertion that Porter’s “uniform obligation” testimony encompasses these policies is simply not supported by the evidence. Accordingly, Porter’s testimony does not support the position of the lower courts, and of plaintiffs, that State Farm policies which omit the “like kind and quality” and the “pre-loss condition” language state the same contractual promise as policies that include this language.

Moreover, there is no other record evidence that can sustain the conclusion that material policy differences— i.e., the “you agree” language and the “assigned risk” language — make no difference, and that all of State Farm’s various policy formulations are the same. Plaintiffs do point to evidence in addition to Porter’s testimony, but this other evidence consists essentially of statements that are equivalent to Porter’s assertions or reflect them. There is nothing to support the conclusion that the “you agree” language, for example, or the Massachusetts or “assigned risk” policies are irrelevant and that all of State Farm’s policy variations therefore are susceptible of the same contractual interpretation. Indeed, State Farm has argued from the beginning of this case that such variances are relevant and that they preclude class certification.

In sum, there is simply no evidentiary support for the lower courts’ conclusion that all of State Farm’s various policies are uniform. Where a putative class includes members who are insured under policies that are materially different, the commonality and predominance requirement of section 2 — 801 cannot be met. 735 ILCS 5/2 — 801(2) (West 1998). See Hagerty, 59 Ill. 2d at 59; Goetz, 62 Ill. App. 3d at 236; Dulman, 98 Ill. App. 3d at 18; Mace, 109 F.3d at 341. Accordingly, it was an abuse of discretion for the circuit court to certify plaintiffs’ breach of contract claim as a class action. See Broussard, 155 F.3d at 340 (“[Pjlaintiffs simply cannot advance a single collective breach of contract action on the basis of multiple different contracts”). We therefore reverse the certification of the nationwide contract class.

B. Whether the Verdict May Be Affirmed With Respect to Subclasses

Having determined that the certification of the nationwide contract class should be reversed, we note that there remains a question whether the jury’s breach of contract verdict may be affirmed with regard to any subclass comprised of policyholders who were insured under any of the relevant individual policy forms. For the reasons set forth below, we answer this question in the negative.

We note initially that there are serious questions as to whether the breach of contract verdict may be upheld for any group of class members. Under the verdict form given by the circuit court, the jury found that “defendant State Farm failed to perform its obligations under the contract and breached its contract with the plaintiff class.” (Emphases added.) This verdict form followed naturally from the jury instructions, which stated that there was a single contract at issue with a uniform contractual obligation.

However, we have concluded, as a matter of law, that this was error. There was no single contract. Rather, there were multiple policy forms which differed materially. On its face, therefore, the verdict is improper. It included no finding, for example, that State Farm breached the policy form containing the “you agree” language, which allowed the practice that plaintiffs claim constituted the breach. Indeed, there could not have been such a finding. The jury was never instructed as to the “you agree” provision. Nor was there any finding in the verdict that State Farm breached its contractual obligation in the Massachusetts policies or the “assigned risk” policies. Once again, the jury was not instructed as to these policies. The verdict simply stated, incorrectly, that State Farm breached a single contract with the plaintiff class.

Accordingly, the breach of contract verdict cannot be upheld with respect to any subclass of policyholders insured under any of the individual policy forms at issue. However, we do not decide this case on this ground alone. Instead, we also look at the individual relevant policy forms and consider whether plaintiffs established a breach of any of them. We also consider whether plaintiffs established damages. For the reasons set forth below, we answer these questions in the negative.

1. The Massachusetts and “Assigned Risk” Policies

With regard to the Massachusetts policies and the “assigned risk” policies, we conclude that there was no breach. Neither of these policy forms contained the “like kind and quality” or the “pre-loss condition” language. The Massachusetts policies promised to pay “the actual cash value” of “parts at the time of the collision,” and the “assigned risk” policies promised to pay an “[a]mount necessary to repair or replace the property.” As State Farm has noted, neither of these formulations— the Massachusetts policy provision or the “assigned risk” policy provision — expressly imposed any standard of part quality. The specification of non-OEM parts would not constitute a breach of these contracts. So long as, with regard to the Massachusetts policies, State Farm paid “the actual cash value” of “parts at the time of the collision,” and so long as, with regard to the “assigned risk” policies, State Farm paid an “[almount necessary to repair or replace the property,” the contractual obligation would be met. It would not matter whether the parts specified were non-OEM, OEM, or some other type. Thus, the jury’s breach of contract verdict may not be affirmed with respect to a subclass consisting of policyholders insured under these provisions.

2. The “You Agree” Policies

We turn next to the policies containing the “pre-loss condition” and the “you agree” language. As noted, these provisions state:

“The cost of repair or replacement is based upon one of the following: * * ❖

3. an estimate written based upon the prevailing competitive price. *** We will include in the estimate parts sufficient to restore the vehicle to its pre-loss condition. You agree with us that such parts may include either parts furnished by the vehicle’s manufacturer or parts from other sources including non-original equipment manufacturers.” (Emphasis in original.)

We cannot affirm the jury’s verdict with respect to a subclass of policyholders who were insured under these provisions. First, pursuant to the “you agree” language, the insured expressly agrees that “such parts,” i.e., parts sufficient to restore a vehicle to its preloss condition, “may include *** parts from *** non-original equipment manufacturers.” In other words, the insured agrees that the “pre-loss condition” promise may be met by specifying non-OEM parts. In their brief to this court, plaintiffs do not explain, in any way, how a contract containing the “you agree” language, which expressly permits the specification of non-OEM parts, may be breached by the specification of non-OEM parts. Plaintiffs have established, in support of their claim, that non-OEM parts were specified by State Farm in class members’ estimates. However, in view of the “you agree” language, this specification of non-OEM parts, by itself, cannot constitute a breach of the “pre-loss condition” promise.

Second, in order to establish a breach of the “pre-loss condition” promise, plaintiffs would have to show that the parts specified or used by State Farm, whether OEM or non-OEM parts, did not restore the vehicle to its preloss condition. A necessary first step in making this showing would be to examine each class member’s vehicle to determine its preloss condition. At trial, Timothy Ryles and Paul Griglio, two of plaintiffs’ expert witnesses, conceded the necessity for such a determination. The following colloquy took place between State Farm’s counsel and Ryles:

“Q. Good point, Dr. Ryles. To determine whether a particular car has been restored to its pre-loss condition, you’d have to know what the pre-loss condition of that car was; isn’t that right?

A. You need to, yes.”

Griglio made a similar concession in this exchange with State Farm’s counsel:

“Q. Similarly, sir, to know whether or not a car was restored to pre-loss condition, you would need to know what the pre-loss condition of that car was, wouldn’t you?

A. Yes, you would.”

In the case at bar, the determination of the preloss condition of each subclass member’s vehicle would require the individual examination of hundreds of thousands, if not millions, of vehicles. Undoubtedly, these examinations would overwhelm any question common to the subclass, rendering it impossible for such questions to predominate. As noted, class certification is improper unless “common questions predominate over any questions affecting only individual members.” 735 ILCS 5/2— 801(2) (West 1998). For this reason, a claim for breach of the preloss condition promise cannot be maintained as a class action. See Augustus v. Progressive Corp., 2003 Ohio 296, ¶25; Schwendeman v. USAA Casualty Insurance Co., 116 Wash. App. 9, 22-23, 65 P.3d 1, 8 (2003); Snell v. Geico Corp., No. Civ. 202160, slip op. at 6 (Md. Cir. Ct. August 14, 2001). Accordingly, the jury’s breach of contract verdict may not be affirmed for a subclass comprised of policyholders insured under the preloss condition provision.

3. The “Like Kind and Quality” Policies

The remaining policy form is the one containing the “like kind and quality” promise. Before analyzing this provision, we note that the record appears to include the policies of only two of the named plaintiffs, DeFrank and Covington. Both DeFrank’s and Covington’s policies contain the “pre-loss condition” and “you agree” language. In addition, although we were unable to find a copy of Avery’s policy in the record, testimonial evidence indicates that Avery’s policy also contained the “pre-loss condition” and “you agree” language.

With regard to the remaining two named plaintiffs— Shadle and Vickers — the record does not appear to include their policies. On this record, therefore, it is unclear that the contracts of any of the named plaintiffs contained the “like kind and quality” language. If none of the named plaintiffs’ policies contained the “like kind and quality” language, State Farm could not have breached this provision in any of the named plaintiffs’ policies. Accordingly, plaintiffs’ claim for breach of the “like kind and quality” promise fails for lack of proof. We cannot uphold a subclass based on this policy form. “It is well settled that a class cannot be certified unless the named plaintiffs have a cause of action.” Spring Mill Townhomes Ass’n v. Osla Financial Services, Inc., 124 Ill. App. 3d 774, 779 (1983), citing Landesman v. General Motors Corp., 72 Ill. 2d 44 (1978); accord, e.g., Perlman v. Time, Inc., 133 Ill. App. 3d 348, 354 (1985). Assuming, arguendo, that there were named plaintiffs with this policy form, we conclude that there was no breach of the “like kind and quality” promise.

The “like kind and quality” promise states:

“We have the right to settle a loss with you or the owner of the property in one of the following ways:

2. pay to repair or replace the property or part with like kind and quality. If the repair or replacement results in better than like kind and quality you must pay for the amount of the betterment ***.” (Emphases in original.) According to the appellate court (and plaintiffs), “like

kind and quality,” as stated in this promise, meant “like kind and quality to OEM parts.” 321 Ill. App. 3d at 280. Plaintiffs’ contention throughout this case has been that the non-OEM parts that were at issue were categorically inferior to their OEM counterparts. It follows that, under this theory, State Farm’s specification of non-OEM parts could never satisfy the obligation to pay for parts of “like kind and quality.” In their third amended complaint, plaintiffs alleged: “As a practical matter, [State Farm’s] obligation could be met only by requiring the exclusive use in repairs of factory-authorized or OEM parts.” (Emphases added.)

In our view, there are several difficulties with this theory that the “like kind and quality” promise is necessarily breached by the specification of non-OEM parts. First, the language of the promise itself contradicts the view that State Farm may meet its contractual obligation only by specifying OEM parts. If the purpose of State Farm’s promise “to repair or replace the property or part with like kind and quality” (emphasis added) were to require the specification of OEM parts, then there is no reason why the indirect phrasing “like kind and quality” would have been used. The provision could simply have promised that OEM parts would be specified. Implicit in the phrase “like kind and quality” is the likeness or similarity of one thing to another. Common sense indicates that an item that is of “like kind and quality” to another is not that very item, but rather is something of “like kind and quality” to it.

Also contradicting the position that “like kind and quality” means O