People v. Lopez (229 Ill. 2d 322, 2008)

JUSTICE FITZGERALD

delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

Chief Justice Thomas and Justices Kilbride, Garman, and Karmeier concurred in the judgment and opinion.

Justice Freeman specially concurred, with opinion, joined by Justice Burke.

OPINION

Defendant, Mariano Lopez, was charged with first degree murder, armed robbery, home invasion, attempted aggravated arson, and aggravated unlawful restraint. He gave a handwritten statement confessing to the crimes, which was used against him at trial. Defendant was convicted in the circuit court of Cook County and sentenced to a total prison term of 23 years. The appellate court affirmed. 367 Ill. App. 3d 817. We granted defendant’s petition for leave to appeal (210 Ill. 2d R. 315) and now consider whether the trial court erred in denying defendant’s motions to quash arrest and suppress evidence. For the reasons that follow, we reverse and remand.

BACKGROUND

On the morning of July 14, 1998, police responded to a report of a burglary at the apartment of the victim, Hector Andrade. Upon entering the apartment, police found the victim’s dead body on the living room floor in a pool of blood. The victim had been stabbed numerous times and his arms, legs, and head were bound with duct tape. A large-blade knife was found near his body. The apartment smelled of gas, burned-out cigarettes were found near the body and on top of an entertainment center, and the apartment appeared to have been ransacked. Defendant, who was 15 years old at the time, gave both oral and written statements confessing to his part in the crime. Prior to trial, defendant filed motions to quash arrest and suppress the oral and written statements he made to authorities. The trial court conducted separate hearings on defendant’s motions to quash arrest and suppress statements.

The evidence presented at the hearing on defendant’s motion to quash demonstrated that detectives went to defendant’s apartment at approximately 12 p.m. on July 28, 1998, after defendant’s name was brought up while detectives were investigating the victim’s murder. Defendant testified that he was asleep when two police officers arrived at his apartment. His mother woke him, and he went into the kitchen. One officer was standing in the kitchen and the other officer was in the doorway of the apartment. The officer in the kitchen told defendant to put his shoes on because they were going to the police station. The officer grabbed defendant and said, “You’re going with us.” The officer also pushed defendant two to three times, but did not push hard. The officers did not tell defendant they were investigating a homicide; they told him they wanted to ask him questions about gangs. Although one of the officers was speaking to defendant’s mother in Spanish, he did not tell defendant’s mother that she could accompany defendant to the police station. Defendant stated that he went with the officers because, ‘T thought I had to go.” When the officers escorted defendant out of the back door of his apartment, he noticed that another police officer was waiting outside with his gun drawn. Defendant stated that he was placed in the backseat of an unmarked police car but was not handcuffed. Both officers sat in the front seat. The third officer followed behind in a marked squad car. The officers accompanying defendant did not draw their guns at any time.

When he arrived at the police station, defendant was placed in a room and questioned about Hector’s murder. Defendant testified that he was in the room for three to four hours and was questioned “all the time” he was in the room by three officers, except “[t]here would be like two minutes they would go out and they would come right back.” He explained that he was only left alone for a short period of time and the officers never left to investigate any of the information he provided to them. Defendant was not handcuffed during this questioning, but the door to the room was closed, and defendant believed it was locked from the outside with a slide lock. Defendant was never told that he was free to leave and defendant did not feel that he was free to go. Defendant did not see his parents until he signed the handwritten statement admitting to the crime. After he gave the signed confession, he was allowed to see his father. Defendant’s father then signed the statement in defendant’s presence. Defendant stated that he was allowed to use the restroom and was offered food, although he did not accept any.

Defendant’s mother, Maria Luisa Garcia, testified that she was at home with defendant, who was sleeping in his bedroom, and her 18-year-old daughter, who was sleeping in the living room, when two men knocked on the door. She answered the knock and one man said, in Spanish, that he was a detective and then asked about her son. The detective announced, “I’m going to take him.” He also said: “I come for Mariano. I’m going to ask him some questions. *** He has to cooperate with us.” Garcia stated that she did not respond to the detective; in fact, she did not speak to him at all. Even though Garcia did not invite the detective in and did not give him permission to enter, he and the other man walked into the kitchen area of her apartment. The other man did not identify himself and Garcia did not know whether he was a police officer. She thought he was “American” but could not be sure of his race.

Garcia explained that the apartment was “very small.” When the detective and the other man entered the kitchen, defendant heard them and came into the kitchen, without being called. The detective ordered defendant to put his shoes on and said, “Let’s go.” According to Garcia, the officers stood in her kitchen for approximately 30 minutes, without speaking to her, while defendant got dressed and put his shoes on. When defendant was ready to leave, the detective gave defendant a slight push, but “didn’t hurt him.” The detective and the other man then took defendant out of the apartment. Defendant was not handcuffed.

Garcia initially stated that she asked the detective “where are you taking him, why are you taking him,” but the detective would not answer. Later, Garcia testified that she never spoke to the detective after their initial conversation at the door of her apartment and that he never spoke to her. Garcia indicated that the detective never advised defendant that he did not have to go and never told Garcia that she could accompany her son. Garcia did not ask if she could accompany her son to the police station. Further, she did not give the detectives permission to take her son, although she did not object. The detective gave Garcia a business card with his name and telephone number before leaving with defendant.

Garcia testified that her daughter remained in the living room and never entered the kitchen while the detectives were there. Garcia initially testified that her daughter was sleeping during this time, but later testified that her daughter was in a hurry to get to work and, therefore, did not participate in the encounter with the detectives at the apartment.

Garcia stated that she contacted her neighbor, Lydia Villanueva, after the detectives left with defendant. Villanueva speaks English and Garcia asked her to call the number left by the detective. Garcia did not attempt to call herself because she does not speak English and because she was crying and upset. Villanueva came over at around 3 p.m. and called the number on the detective’s business card. Villanueva spoke to a detective, who told her that “he could not say anything.” After that initial call, Villanueva called the police station more than five times to inquire about defendant. She could not get any information.

Garcia testified that her husband returned home from work around 6:30 p.m. She did not have any information about her son or his whereabouts at that time. Garcia explained that her husband left and went to look for defendant because “this detective would not tell us anything.” Garcia first indicated that she did not see any police officers again that day. However, when asked a second time, Garcia testified that a detective called her at 9 p.m. and asked permission to return to her apartment to search it. She gave him permission. At 10 p.m., the same men who came to her apartment earlier in the day returned and searched. At that point, Garcia’s husband had returned after unsuccessfully attempting to locate defendant at various police stations. After they searched and were unable to find anything, the detectives offered to bring her to the police station to see her son. She did not go because she was too upset. Her husband went instead.

Defendant’s father, Mariano Lopez, Sr., testified that he was at work and was not aware of the events of the day until he came home at 6:30 p.m. His wife did not call him at work to inform him that defendant had been taken to the police station. When Lopez arrived at his apartment, Villanueva was there. She told him that she had spoken to the police three or four times and they said that police officers would bring defendant home. At about 8 p.m., Villanueva called the police again. After that call, Lopez still did not know where his son was, so he went to a police station on Racine and another station on Damen looking for him. At the Racine station, Lopez asked officers to help him contact Detective A1 Bautista, whose name was on the business card left with Garcia, but the officers refused to assist him. They also refused to help him locate his son. Lopez did not ask any officers at the Damen station to help him find Detective Bautista. He only asked if his son was there.

Lydia Villanueva testified that she lives near the Lopez family and knows them because her son is a friend of the defendant. On July 28, 2001, at about 2:30 p.m., defendant’s sister, Hilda Lopez, went to Villanueva’s house and told her that defendant had been taken to the police station. Villanueva went to the Lopez home and spoke with Garcia, who gave Villanueva a business card with Detective Bautista’s name and telephone number on it. Villanueva started making calls. She first called the telephone number on the card at 3 p.m. Detective Bautista answered the call and Villanueva told him that defendant’s mother was crying and nervous and wanted to know what was happening. Detective Bautista stated that he was going to ask defendant some questions and bring him back home, and that his mother did not need to worry. Villanueva called the number on the card a second time, at approximately 4 p.m., and spoke to Detective Bautista again. He stated that they were still questioning defendant, that they would bring him home, and that his mother should not worry. Villanueva did not ask where defendant was, and Detective Bautista did not volunteer that information. Villanueva called back between 5:30 and 6:30 p.m. and was told by the person who answered that Detective Bautista was on the street investigating. Villanueva was advised to call back in one hour. She called back at 8 p.m. and spoke to Detective Bautista for a third time. She told him that defendant’s parents were very concerned. Detective Bautista reiterated that they were asking defendant questions and would have him home soon.

Villanueva testified that she never asked Detective Bautista to tell her where defendant was being questioned. Defendant’s parents never requested that she ascertain that information. Villanueva also indicated that she never asked to speak with defendant or inquired as to whether defendant’s parents could speak to him or join him at the police station. Detective Bautista did not volunteer any of that information either. Detective Bautista did question Villanueva at one point about her own son. The record does not provide information concerning the nature of that questioning. Telephone records admitted into evidence showed that five calls were made to the police station from defendant’s home between 2:30 p.m. and 7:30 p.m.

Detective Alfonso Bautista testified that he and his partner, Detective Dennis Keane, were assigned to investigate the murder of Hector Andrade. In the course of their investigation, they learned that defendant was a possible witness to the crime and went to his apartment at around noon on July 28, 1998, to speak with him. At that time, defendant was not considered a suspect.

Detective Bautista explained that he introduced himself and his partner, Detective Keane, to defendant’s mother when she answered the door, speaking to her in Spanish. Detective Bautista asked Garcia if defendant lived there, and then asked if they could speak to defendant. Garcia agreed and invited them into the kitchen area of her apartment. Once inside, Detective Bautista explained that defendant’s name had been mentioned by other people in the course of a homicide investigation and he wanted to speak to defendant. Garcia left the kitchen area to call defendant. After a short while, she returned from the back of the apartment with defendant and a teenage girl, later identified as defendant’s sister. Detective Bautista informed defendant that they were conducting a homicide investigation, that his name had been mentioned by other people they had talked to, and they “needed to — or wanted to ask him some questions.” Detective Bautista also told defendant that he would prefer to conduct the questioning at the police station. He did not advise defendant that he had the option of being questioned in his home. Detective Bautista explained that it is his normal practice to interview witnesses at the police station when investigating a homicide; not on the street or in their homes. However, he admitted that two other witnesses to this crime were interviewed at their homes.

Defendant agreed to accompany the detectives to the police station. Detective Bautista then told defendant’s mother that he wanted to ask defendant some questions, and asked “if it was okay with her if we went to the area rather than at the house to ask the questions.” Detective Bautista also advised Garcia that they would be taking defendant to Harrison and Kedzie, and gave her his business card. Defendant’s sister asked if it was necessary for defendant’s mother to accompany defendant to the police station. Detective Bautista advised Garcia that she could come to the police station if she so desired. Garcia did not indicate that she wanted to accompany her son. She stated that she would call later to check on defendant.

Detective Bautista testified that he and Detective Keane escorted defendant out of the apartment, but did not put their hands on him. On the way out, Detective Keane walked in front of defendant and Detective Bautista walked behind him. Defendant was not given Miranda warnings and was not handcuffed, and the detectives did not draw their guns. No other detectives were present at defendant’s apartment. Defendant was driven in an unmarked car to the police station. The detectives did not offer defendant the opportunity to arrange his own transportation, and defendant did not state that he wanted to take alternate transportation.

At about 1 p.m., defendant was placed in an interview room at the police station. Defendant was not handcuffed and the door was not locked, but it was closed. The detectives questioned defendant for 15 to 20 minutes without giving him Miranda warnings. Detective Bautista did not arrange for a youth officer to be present because it is not “common practice” for a youth officer to be present when a juvenile witness is being questioned. During this questioning, defendant provided the name of a certain individual. The detectives advised defendant that they had to verify the information he provided and continue investigating. Before they left to do so, defendant was offered food. He was also advised that he should knock on the door if he needed anything. Detective Bautista explained that witnesses at the police station are generally not allowed to walk around freely. It is “procedure” for witnesses to be escorted by police personnel if they need to use the bathroom or any other services. According to Detective Bautista, the door to the interview room was closed when he left to investigate, but remained unlocked. Defendant was not handcuffed. At this time, it was Detective Bautista’s belief that defendant was not arrested and was free to leave the station. However, defendant was never told that he was free to go and did not ask.

Detective Bautista and Detective Keane returned to the police station about two hours after they initially questioned defendant. Detective Bautista did not check on defendant, but he believed Detective Keane looked in on him. Detective Bautista indicated that at some point in the afternoon, a female called the police station to inquire about defendant. The female asked if defendant was “okay” and Detective Bautista responded that defendant was fine, that they were still investigating, and that it would be a while because they had to speak to a lot of people. Detective Bautista stated that the female caller did not say that defendant’s family wanted to come to the police station. Detective Bautista did not refuse to provide the caller with information regarding defendant’s whereabouts. Detective Bautista was asked: “Did you ever tell them that you were just going to ask defendant some questions and then bring him home?” He replied: “I never said that.”

Sometime before 6 p.m., Jose Leal was interviewed at the police station by Detectives Bautista and Keane and gave a statement implicating himself, defendant, and William Andrade in the murder. Leal was placed under arrest. At 6 p.m., the detectives reinterviewed defendant without providing Miranda warnings. Detective Bautista testified that, even after Leal’s statement, he did not feel that it was necessary to give defendant Miranda warnings because they still considered him a witness. However, Detective Bautista admitted that defendant would have likely been restrained if he tried to leave the police station at that time. After being confronted with Leal’s admission, defendant made an oral statement implicating himself in the crime. The detectives did not question defendant while he was giving the statement; defendant “just kept talking.” Defendant was then given Miranda warnings and juvenile warnings, and the interview was terminated. Detective Bautista testified that defendant was advised that his parents would be contacted. Detective Bautista denied that he returned to defendant’s house at that time, or any time after 12 p.m. that day.

Detective Keane’s testimony was substantially the same as that of Detective Bautista. Detective Keane stated that they went to defendant’s apartment on July 21, 1998, because they believed he was a “possible witness” to the crime. Defendant’s mother responded to their knock on the door. Detective Bautista introduced himself and Detective Keane to Garcia and she allowed them into her home by leaving the door open and stepping aside. Detective Keane heard Garcia call defendant’s name and then walk into another room in the apartment. She emerged with defendant behind her. Detective Bautista spoke to defendant in English and explained that they were investigating a homicide and they wanted him to go to Harrison and Kedzie to talk. No one told defendant that they wanted to talk to him about gangs. Detective Keane stated that he never spoke to defendant in the apartment. He only spoke to defendant’s sister, who was also present. Defendant agreed to go to the police station. Detective Keane did not tell defendant that he did not have to go or that he could find his own transportation, and defendant did not ask. Detective Keane did not ask defendant if he wanted someone to accompany him to the police station, and defendant did not indicate that he did not want to go alone.

Detective Bautista continued to talk to defendant’s mother and handed her a business card. Detective Keane heard Detective Bautista say the words “Harrison and Kedzie,” but he did not understand the rest of the conversation because it was in Spanish. When the conversation with defendant’s mother was completed, Detective Keane walked out the door and down the stairs with defendant following him. Detective Bautista walked behind defendant. Defendant was not handcuffed and the detectives did not touch him. Detective Keane stated that he and Detective Bautista went to defendant’s apartment alone, and he was not aware of any other officers being in the area. Detective Keane added that he did not return to defendant’s apartment at any time that day.

After hearing this evidence, the trial court denied defendant’s motion to quash arrest, finding that defendant voluntarily accompanied police officers to the station for questioning and was not seized until he was placed under arrest after the 6 p.m. statement. The trial court’s discussion of the facts demonstrated that the court found the testimony of the police officers to be more credible than that of defendant and the witnesses he presented. The matter was continued for a hearing on defendant’s motion to suppress his oral and handwritten statements. At that hearing, the parties stipulated to the evidence presented at the hearing on defendant’s motion to quash arrest and presented the following additional evidence.

Detective Keane testified that he and his partner, Detective Bautista, went to defendant’s apartment on July 21, 1998, after learning that Jose Leal gave a written statement indicating that “Chucky,” identified as William Andrade, and “Biggie,” identified as defendant, told Leal that they were going to rob and kill the victim and that he would get some of the proceeds of their crime. Detective Keane and Detective Bautista brought defendant to the police station and told him about the information they had received from Leal. They did not share this information with defendant at his home or discuss it with his mother prior to bringing him to the police station. Detective Keane stated that they did not advise defendant of his Miranda rights when relaying this information to him because “[h]e was not a suspect in the homicide.” Defendant denied that he was involved and directed the detectives to other people who had information about the crime. Detectives Keane and Bautista advised defendant that they were going to the area where the crime was committed to locate and interview other witnesses. Defendant “said it was fine. He would wait there.” They left defendant in an interview room.

In the course of their continued investigation, the detectives reinterviewed Leal, and he admitted his own involvement in the crime. Leal also implicated defendant and “Chucky” again. Specifically, Leal stated that he was in the victim’s apartment looking for money while defendant and “Chucky” “dealt” with Hector. Leal added that they all ran out of the apartment after “Chucky” stabbed Hector. Leal was arrested after making this statement.

At approximately 6 p.m., defendant was confronted with Leal’s statement. Defendant was not given Miranda warnings. Detective Keane explained that he and Detective Bautista did not give defendant Miranda warnings because they were not sure of defendant’s involvement in the crime. “Jose Leal had now given us 3 different statements about what happened, so we really weren’t sure if Mariano *** had anything to do with anything at that point. We were still conducting our investigation, so we did not advise him of his rights because he was not under arrest at that time.” Detective Keane reiterated later in his testimony that they did not feel they had probable cause to arrest defendant based on Leal’s statement alone, and they had no other evidence of defendant’s involvement when they spoke to defendant at 6 p.m. Detective Keane expressly denied withholding Miranda warnings in order to get a confession from defendant. Specifically, defense counsel asked, “You didn’t do that [arrest defendant] because you wanted to get information out of him before you felt that you had to advise him of his rights, didn’t you?” Detective Keane responded, “No.” Detective Keane explained that after obtaining Leal’s confession, he and his partner “just went in and we told him [defendant] — we spoke to Leal, we talked to several other people and we asked him [defendant] — we wanted to know whether he was involved in this incident or not.”

In a brief statement, defendant admitted that he was involved in the murder. According to Detective Keane, defendant stated, in summary, that he went into Hector’s apartment, that Hector was bound up and stabbed, and that he left the apartment with “those two [Leal and Chucky]” and “proceeds.” After defendant’s admission, the detectives terminated the interview, read defendant his Miranda rights, and contacted defendant’s parents and the State’s Attorney’s office. The assistant State’s Attorney, Steven Fine, arrived sometime after 8 p.m. and began reviewing the case, but did not speak to defendant. Detectives Keane and Bautista likewise did not speak to defendant during that time.

Defendant’s father arrived at the police station approximately 30 minutes after Fine. Detective Velez, who is Spanish-speaking, spoke to Lopez and directed him to the room where defendant was seated. Detective Keane explained that when defendant’s father arrived he was allowed to speak privately with defendant. At approximately 9:15 p.m., defendant was interviewed by Assistant State’s Attorney Fine and was given Miranda warnings. Defendant’s father was present for the interview, and Detective Velez served as his translator. Detective Keane was also in the room.

Detective Keane stated that Fine introduced himself to defendant and gave him Miranda warnings. Defendant agreed to waive those rights and speak with Fine. Fine spoke to defendant in English, and the entire conversation with Fine was translated in Spanish for defendant’s father. The process was lengthy because Fine had to pause after every sentence for Detective Velez to repeat the comments in Spanish for defendant’s father. After Fine wrote down defendant’s statement, it was reviewed by defendant and his father. Defendant demonstrated that he could read English by reading a portion of the statement aloud. Changes made to the document were initialed by everyone in the room. Detective Keane noted that Fine had spelled defendant’s name incorrectly throughout the document, so there were several corrections that were initialed by all the parties present, including defendant’s father. Detective Keane denied telling defendant that he would be free to leave the police station after he signed the statement.

Detective Keane was asked why a youth officer was not notified in this case. He explained:

“Well, up until the point where he implicated himself, we were just interviewing him. We needed facts and we were trying to talk to him about what he knew or what he didn’t know. And he was providing some facts to us. And once he implicated himself, it was terminated and we felt that the parent would have been the best first person to have in that room with him.”

Detective Carlos Velez testified that he was contacted by Detective Keane on July 21, 1998, at approximately 8:30 p.m., and asked to translate for defendant’s parent. Detective Velez went to the interview room and met with Detective Keane, defendant, defendant’s father, and Fine. Detective Velez spoke to Lopez, who stated that he could understand English, but preferred to speak in Spanish. Detective Velez translated for Lopez while defendant was advised of his rights. Lopez did not ask any questions regarding those rights. Detective Velez translated defendant’s handwritten statement, which was read aloud by Fine, and translated while defendant made changes to the document. Detective Velez signed the document, as did all the other parties who were present, including defendant’s father. Detective Velez did not hear Detective Keane tell defendant he could leave if he signed the statement.

Defendant testified, as he had previously, that he was placed in an interview room when he was brought to the police station. The door to the room was locked with a slide lock that was located on the outside of the door. Defendant stated that he tried to get out of the room but was unable to do so because he was locked in. Defendant initially testified that he was allowed to use the bathroom while at the police station. He later stated that he was not allowed to use the bathroom.

Defendant was asked if he knew what a State’s Attorney was, and he replied that he did not. He likewise did not know what a State’s Attorney was when his statement was taken. The State’s Attorney advised defendant of his rights, but defendant did not understand them. He had never been advised of his rights before that time. He did not tell the State’s Attorney that he did not understand.

Defendant testified that his father was not in the room when his handwritten statement was taken. There was a man writing things down and two detectives. The detectives asked defendant questions and he answered them. He did this because the detectives told him he was not leaving the room until he said something, and he believed he could go home if he answered the questions. Defendant stated that he lied to the man writing the statement because he wanted to go home. Defendant indicated that the man writing the statement only read certain sections to him and defendant never reviewed the statement himself. He did admit, however, that he was allowed to make any changes to the statement that he felt were necessary and that he did, in fact, make changes and initial them.

Defendant testified that he did not see his father prior to signing the statement and his father was not present when the statement was signed. Ten minutes after defendant signed the paper, his father came into the room. A police officer gave the paper to defendant’s father and directed him to sign it. Defendant could not recall which police officer gave the paper to his father.

Defendant’s father testified, as he had previously, that he went to two police stations to find his son on July 28, 1998. When he returned home, his daughter told him that police were coming to the apartment to look for evidence related to a burglary. The police came and searched, but did not find anything. Lopez was taken to the police station by officers who searched his apartment. When he got there, he was immediately taken to a room. He was given papers to sign “right away.” He signed them because he believed that they were papers authorizing defendant’s release. Lopez explained that he believed defendant was going to be released because the police found no evidence related to a burglary in his apartment. He never had an opportunity to speak to his son privately and was never advised that his son was being charged with murder. He did not review the papers before he signed them and no one read or explained them to him. Further, no one spoke to him in Spanish. Lopez testified that he was not present when the documents were prepared. He did not see anyone ask defendant questions and then write out the answers. Defendant was present in the room when Lopez signed the documents. Two police officers were present as well, one of whom had searched Lopez’s apartment and drove Lopez to the police station. One of the men told Lopez to sign the document and showed him where to initial.

In rebuttal, Fine testified that he went to the police station on July 21, 1998, sometime after 7 p.m. He waited for defendant’s father to arrive before speaking to defendant. After defendant’s father arrived, Fine went into the interview room with Lopez, Detective Keane, and Detective Velez, who acted as Lopez’s interpreter. Fine testified that he advised defendant of his Miranda rights. Defendant stated that he understood them and did not ask any questions. Defendant agreed to speak with Fine and made an oral statement. After the oral statement, Fine told defendant that he wanted to memorialize the statement and explained that the statement could be taken by a court reporter, videotaped, or handwritten by Fine. Defendant chose to give a handwritten statement. Defendant’s father was present while the handwritten statement was taken. When the statement was completed, defendant read the preprinted portion of the form aloud to demonstrate his competence in English. Fine then read the entire handwritten portion of the statement aloud. Detective Velez interpreted for Lopez while Fine read. Corrections were made to the statement and initialed by everyone present. Wfiien the statement was complete, all the parties signed the statement, including Lopez.

After hearing this evidence, the trial court granted defendant’s motion to suppress with respect to the 6 p.m. oral statement made after defendant was confronted with Leal’s admission. The court found that the detectives had probable cause to arrest defendant after obtaining Leal’s confession and should have advised defendant of his rights and called his parents before questioning him.

With respect to defendant’s handwritten statement, the court found that the testimony of defendant and his father was incredible and that the statement was voluntarily given. The court also concluded that there was attenuation between the oral and written statements. The court made this determination without conducting an attenuation hearing, finding that there was sufficient evidence presented at the suppression hearing to make this judgment. The trial court denied defendant’s motion to suppress the handwritten statement. Defendant’s motions to reconsider the court’s rulings were denied.

The matter proceeded to a bench trial. The parties stipulated to testimony taken at Leal’s trial from Officer Tamara Block, Officer Daniel Principato, a forensic investigator, and Cynthia Engleking-Prus, a forensic scientist. Officer Block testified that she was the first officer to enter the victim’s apartment and observe the murder scene. She noticed that the apartment smelled of gas, which seemed to be emanating from the stove. Upon entering the living room, she saw that the victim was lying on his stomach in a pool of blood with his hands, feet, and head bound with duct tape. He had been stabbed multiple times. Officer Principato testified that he inventoried certain evidence, including four Corona beer bottles, taken from the scene. Cynthia Engleking-Prus testified that Leal’s fingerprint was found on a Corona beer bottle inventoried at the crime scene, and William Andrade’s fingerprint was found on duct tape removed from the victim’s body.

The main evidence presented by the State against defendant was defendant’s handwritten statement. In that statement, defendant stated that he was 15 years old, was in his third year of high school, and could read and write English. Defendant then explained that he saw his friend, Leal, at the St. Paul’s Catholic Church festival on July 12, 1998. Leal asked defendant if he wanted to rob a man with whom Leal worked who was “flashing money” at the festival. Leal cautioned that they would have to kill the man after they robbed him because the man knew Leal. The following day, defendant saw Leal and “Chucky” (William Andrade) and Leal asked defendant again if he wanted to be a part of the robbery. Leal then took defendant and Chucky to the victim’s apartment. The group waited until it was dark and then knocked on the victim’s door. The victim answered and Leal asked him if he could borrow two movies. Leal then pushed the door open and walked in with defendant and Chucky following. Leal and Chucky grabbed the victim and Leal duct taped his hands and ankles while Chucky held him down. The victim was lying on his stomach. Leal eventually went into the kitchen, got a knife, and stabbed the victim “sideways” until he stopped moving.

While the stabbing occurred, defendant looked for money and found the victim’s wallet. Leal also looked for items to steal and found some jewelry, which he put in his pocket. Chucky took a camera. Defendant found some stereo equipment and carried it toward the door. Defendant left the stereo equipment in the apartment because individuals in another apartment were “banging” and complaining about the noise. Before they left the apartment, Leal turned the gas on the stove but there was no flame. Defendant, Leal, and Chucky ran out of the apartment. When they were a few blocks away, defendant gave the wallet to Leal and ran home. A few days later, Leal called defendant and invited him to a movie. Leal stated he would treat because he had $200.

Defendant was found guilty and was sentenced to a total of 23 years in prison. On appeal, defendant asserted that the trial court erred in denying his motion to quash arrest because he was unlawfully seized from his apartment without probable cause in violation of the fourth amendment. The appellate court rejected this claim, finding that defendant voluntarily accompanied the police for questioning. 367 Ill. App. 3d at 822-23. Defendant also asserted that his statement should have been suppressed because the police violated his fifth amendment rights when they engaged in an unlawful “question first, warn later” interrogation technique. The appellate court rejected this claim as well, finding that there was no evidence that the detectives intentionally withheld Miranda warnings in order to secure a confession from defendant. 367 Ill. App. 3d at 825. Defendant now appeals the appellate court’s judgment.

ANALYSIS

Defendant calls upon this court to review the judgments of the lower courts with respect to his motions to quash arrest and suppress his handwritten statement. Defendant, however, has failed to include these motions in the record before us on appeal in contravention of Supreme Court Rule 321 (155 Ill. 2d R. 321). We note that the appellant bears the burden of providing a reviewing court with a complete record sufficient to support his claims of error, and any doubts that arise from the incompleteness of the record will be resolved against the appellant. Foutch v. O’Bryant, 99 Ill. 2d 389, 391-92 (1984).

Defendant asserts that the appellate court ignored its own well-established precedent when it affirmed the trial court’s denial of defendant’s motion to quash arrest. In support, defendant points to People v. Vega, 203 Ill. App. 3d 33 (1990), People v. Armstrong, 318 Ill. App. 3d 607 (2000), and In re J.W., 274 Ill. App. 3d 951 (1995). Defendant maintains that the same facts that guided the appellate court’s judgment in those cases are present here, and argues that the facts of the instant case are even more compelling. The State counters that the evidence in this case shows that defendant voluntarily accompanied the officers to the police station and that none of the procedures normally associated with an arrest were present. The State also contends that the cases cited by defendant in support of his position are readily distinguishable. Neither party asserts that the police had probable cause to arrest defendant at his apartment.

When reviewing a motion to suppress evidence, we defer to the trial court’s factual findings, and we will reverse those findings only if they are against the manifest weight of the evidence. People v. Sutherland, 223 Ill. 2d 187, 196-97 (2006). In this case, the trial court found that the defense witnesses did not present credible testimony. The appellate court upheld this decision, finding that it was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. 367 Ill. App. 3d at 823.

Defendant does not ask this court to review the trial court’s factual findings for manifest error. In fact, at oral argument, defendant specifically stated that no credibility contest existed in this case. Defendant made clear that he accepted the appellate court’s conclusion that the trial court’s credibility assessments were not manifestly erroneous. Accordingly, we review defendant’s claims of error with deference to the fact determinations of the trial court.

The first question before this court is a legal one— whether defendant was unlawfully seized under the fourth amendment. We review this issue de novo. Sutherland, 223 Ill. 2d at 197; People v. Sorenson, 196 Ill. 2d 425, 431 (2001).

The fourth amendment to the United States Constitution and article I, section 6, of the Illinois Constitution protect citizens from unreasonable searches and seizures by the government. U.S. Const., amends. Y, XIV; Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, §6; People v. Lee, 214 Ill. 2d 476, 484 (2005). Seizure occurs when, by means of physical force or a show of authority, a person’s freedom of movement is restrained. United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 553, 64 L. Ed. 2d 497, 509, 100 S. Ct. 1870, 1877 (1980); People v. Bunch, 207 Ill. 2d 7, 18 (2003). For purposes of the fourth amendment, a seizure is an arrest. People v. Melock, 149 Ill. 2d 423, 436 (1992).

“An arrest occurs when the circumstances are such that a reasonable person, innocent of any crime, would conclude that he was not free to leave.” In re D.G., 144 Ill. 2d 404, 409 (1991). When assessing whether a juvenile was seized for purposes of the fourth amendment, we modify the reasonable person standard to consider whether a reasonable juvenile would have thought that his freedom of movement was restricted. People v. Braggs, 209 Ill. 2d 492, 509-11 (2004). In Melock, we considered several factors when determining whether a reasonable person would not have felt free to leave, such as: the intent of the officer; the understanding of the defendant; whether the defendant was told he was free to leave or that he was under arrest; whether the defendant would have been restrained if he attempted to leave; the length of the interrogation; and whether Miranda warnings were given. Melock, 149 Ill. 2d at 437-39. Additionally, courts have considered the number of police officers who sought the defendant; whether the defendant was told he could refuse to accompany the police; whether the defendant was transported to the station in a police car or arranged his own transportation; whether the defendant was placed in an interview room as opposed to a common area; and the method of interrogation. Armstrong, 318 Ill. App. 3d at 613; People v. Williams, 303 Ill. App. 3d 33, 40 (1999); J.W., 274 Ill. App. 3d at 960; Vega, 203 Ill. App. 3d at 41-42. When the defendant is a juvenile, courts have also considered the defendant’s experience with the criminal justice system and his educational background. Armstrong, 318 Ill. App. 3d at 615; Vega, 203 Ill. App. 3d at 43.

With these factors in mind, we now consider whether a reasonable juvenile, in defendant’s situation, would have believed that he was compelled to accompany detectives to the police station for questioning and whether he would not have felt free to leave once there. The facts show that defendant was 15 years old with no criminal record when two detectives came to his apartment and asked him to accompany them to the police station for questioning in regard to a murder investigation. Defendant’s mother was present and did not protest when defendant agreed to go. The detectives gave defendant’s mother a contact number and told her that she could accompany her son to the police station if she chose, but her presence was unnecessary. Defendant left his apartment on his own accord and there was no physical coercion by the detectives. Defendant was not handcuffed, and no guns were drawn. Defendant was escorted to an unmarked police car and sat in the backseat unrestrained. Defendant was not advised that he could decline the detectives’ request to accompany them to the station and was not advised that he could arrange his own transportation.

When defendant arrived at the police station, he was placed in an unlocked interrogation room and was questioned for a short time without receiving Miranda warnings. Defendant was advised that he was implicated in a murder. Defendant denied involvement and gave the detectives information related to the crime. He was then left alone in the interrogation room so detectives could investigate the information he had provided to them. Defendant was not told that he was free to leave the police station. He was not advised that he could move about the police station without an escort. Instead, he was kept in the interrogation room with the door shut and told to knock on the door if he needed anything. Defendant believed the door to the room was locked, even though the detectives denied locking it. Defendant remained in the interrogation room alone for at least four hours before the detectives returned. During that four-hour period, defendant did not speak to his parents. There is no indication in the record that defendant asked to see or talk to his parents. However, the record demonstrates that a representative of defendant’s family was calling the police station during that time to inquire about defendant’s status. When the detectives returned, they confronted defendant with Leal’s statements, which implicated defendant in the crime, and the confrontation prompted defendant to confess.

Defendant maintains that, in light of these facts and the appellate court’s decisions in Vega, Armstrong, and J.W., we should conclude that he was unlawfully seized. In Vega, police went to the 16-year-old defendant’s home and transported him to the police station for questioning. The defendant’s mother was present in the home and although she consented to the defendant’s accompanying the officers, she questioned why the officers could not speak to the defendant at home. The defendant was not advised that he could refuse to accompany the detectives or arrange his own transportation to the police station. It was uncontested that the police held the defendant by the arm when they escorted him to the police vehicle. When he arrived at the station, the defendant was placed in an interrogation room, questioned, and left alone while detectives investigated further based on information he provided. The detectives testified that they did not believe the defendant’s answers to their questions, and further testified that the defendant would have likely been restrained if he tried to leave. The defendant was also pressured to take a polygraph test and was transported to the crime laboratory for testing without his consent. Vega, 203 Ill. App. 3d at 42-43. The appellate court concluded that these factors, combined with defendant’s age and absence of extensive experience with the criminal justice system, demonstrated that defendant was unlawfully seized when he was taken from his home. Vega, 203 Ill. App. 3d at 43.

In Armstrong, police received numerous anonymous calls stating that the defendant was involved in the beating and burning death of the victim. A juvenile officer went to the defendant’s home and asked the defendant’s guardian if the defendant could accompany her to the police station. The officer told the defendant’s guardian that she needed to talk to the defendant, that she would bring him to the station and bring him right back, and if anything else occurred, that she would contact the guardian. The defendant was allowed to accompany the juvenile officer to the police station because the juvenile officer was known and trusted by the defendant’s guardian. In fact, the guardian stated that it would be “no problem” for defendant to go to the police station as long as he was with the juvenile officer. At the police station, the defendant was brought to an open lounge, given Miranda warnings, and questioned. He admitted involvement in the crime. Armstrong, 318 Ill. App. 3d at 610-11. At the time, the defendant was in the ninth grade, was receiving special education, and had not been previously arrested. The appellate court noted that the defendant was the focus of the murder investigation based on anonymous tips. This fact, combined with the defendant’s age, lack of previous arrests, educational level, and lack of any communication that he was free to leave, led the appellate court to conclude that the defendant was unlawfully seized. Armstrong, 318 Ill. App. 3d at 615.

Finally, in J.W., three police officers went to the 14-year-old defendant’s school, where the defendant was in the eighth grade, to question him about a murder. The defendant was called to the principal’s office, asked to accompany the officers to the police station, and was only allowed to obtain his belongings with a police escort. The police took the defendant out of school without contacting his mother; they contacted his grandmother who was not his guardian. The defendant rode to the police station in the back of a police car with no door handles and was never told that he did not have to go with the officers or that he was not under arrest. J.W., 274 Ill. App. 3d at 958-60. When the defendant arrived at the police station, he was escorted to an interview room. The door to the interview room was open. The defendant was questioned by four police officers and was confronted with information placing him at the crime scene. When the defendant denied involvement, he was not told he was free to leave. The appellate court noted that the defendant would have been hard-pressed to leave in any event, as he was a 14-year-old with no means of transportation available that would allow him to leave the police station on his own accord. The appellate court concluded that the number of officers present, information known to the officers, method of interrogation, place of questioning and lack of communication that the defendant was free to leave demonstrated that the defendant was unlawfully seized. J.W., 274 Ill. App. 3d at 961.

While many of the facts present in Vega, Armstrong, and J.W. are present in the instant case, the instant case is still factually distinguishable. In Vega, it was uncontested that the defendant’s mother specifically asked the officers to question the defendant at home. Further, the officers physically coerced the defendant by taking him by the arm and escorting him out of his home. Vega, 203 Ill. App. 3d at 34-35. In Armstrong, the facts show that the defendant was the target of the officer’s investigation, that the officer misled the defendant and his guardian about the nature of the questioning, and that the defendant was allowed to go with the officer because she was known to defendant’s guardian. Armstrong, 318 Ill. App. 3d at 610. Finally, in J.W., the defendant was removed from school by three police officers without his mother’s knowledge or consent and not allowed to even retrieve his belongings without a police escort. J.W., 274 Ill. App. 3d at 954-55.

Here, defendant was asked, in the presence of his mother and adult sister, to accompany the detectives to the police station for questioning. Both defendant and his mother agreed that he would go. Defendant was not handcuffed, and the evidence deemed credible by the trial court demonstrated that the detectives did not make any threat or show of force which would have led defendant to believe that he was required to accompany them. We acknowledge that defendant was 15 years old at the time and had no experience with the criminal justice system. However, the facts are clear that defendant’s mother was present for defendant’s entire at-home interaction with the detectives and she did not object to defendant’s accompanying them to the police station (see People v. Sneed, 274 Ill App. 3d 287, 297 (1995) (appellate court considered fact that defendant was asked, and agreed to go to station, with grandmother present as evidence that the defendant voluntarily accompanied the police)), even when fully advised that the detectives wanted to speak to defendant about a murder. The evidence deemed credible by the trial court demonstrated that defendant was not considered a suspect at the time and was not the target of the detective’s investigation. There is no indication that the detectives did anything that would suggest that defendant was compelled to accompany them or that the detectives misled defendant or his mother about the purpose of their interaction with defendant.

The facts of this case are more like those in People v. McKinney, 277 Ill. App. 3d 889 (1996). In that case, two detectives went to the 17-year-old defendant’s home to question her about the death of her baby. The defendant’s mother was present when the detectives arrived. After a brief discussion at the defendant’s home, the detectives asked the defendant to accompany them to the police station, and defendant agreed. The defendant and her mother were driven to the station in a police car. The defendant was never advised that she did not have to accompany the officers and was never told that she could arrange her own transportation. The defendant maintained that she was told to accompany the detectives in a forceful tone, although this allegation was rebutted. The defendant cited to Vega in support of her assertion that a reasonable person in her position would not have felt free to decline the officers’ request. The appellate court disagreed, finding no evidence that the detectives’ behavior compelled the defendant to accompany them. The appellate court also noted that it was unlikely that the detectives went to the defendant’s home with the intention of arresting her, as the cause of her baby’s death was still unknown. The appellate court found that a reasonable juvenile in the defendant’s situation would have felt free to decline the detectives’ request.

We reach the same conclusion here. Like the juvenile defendant in McKinney, defendant was initially approached by the police in the presence of his mother. Defendant agreed to accompany the police and his mother did not protest. At the time defendant made this decision, he was aware that his presence at the police station was required because of the criminal investigation. Further, the evidence suggests that defendant’s decision to accompany the police was voluntary and not the result of coercion.

Our analysis does not end there, however, because defendant’s initial, voluntary presence at the police station does not negate the possibility that subsequent police conduct was unlawful. See McKinney, 277 Ill. App. 3d at 894; People v. Barlow, 273 Ill. App. 3d 943, 949 (1995). In this case, the facts demonstrate that defendant arrived at the police station at 1 p.m. and was immediately placed in an interview room for questioning. He was interviewed by two detectives for approximately 20 minutes and was advised during the interview that he had been implicated in the crime. Defendant then provided information about the crime and was told to wait in the interview room while the detectives conducted further investigation. Defendant was not taken out of the interview room and escorted to an open area. He was not permitted to walk around the police station without an escort. Instead, he was left in an interview room with the door shut and told to knock if he needed to use the restroom or required other assistance. The detectives testified the room was unlocked, but defendant believed that he was locked in. Defendant was not advised that he was free to leave even though the detectives testified that defendant would have been permitted to leave at this point if he desired. Defendant remained in the interview room for four hours without contact with his family or any other person interested in his well-being. Defendant’s family was calling repeatedly to obtain information about defendant’s status, but they were never advised that he was free to leave; only that he was being questioned.

Although defendant did not receive Miranda warnings, and no other indicia of formal arrest were present, we cannot conclude that a reasonable juvenile in defendant’s position would have felt free to leave the police station. Defendant’s voluntary presence at the police station escalated into an involuntary seizure in violation of defendant’s fourth amendment rights. See McKinney, 277 Ill. App. 3d at 894; People v. Wallace, 299 Ill. App. 3d 9, 17-18 (1998); Barlow, 273 Ill. App. 3d at 950. We recognize that the investigatory function of the police necessitates station-house questioning. See People v. Wipfler, 68 Ill. 2d 158, 168 (1977). However, we reject “the proposed fiction that a person who voluntarily agrees to submit to interrogation at a police station also implicitly consents to remain in the police station while the police investigate the crime to obtain probable cause for the interviewee’s arrest.” Barlow, 273 Ill. App. 3d at 950; see also People v. Reynolds, 257 Ill. App. 3d 792, 801 (1994); People v. Walls, 220 Ill. App. 3d 564, 579 (1991); People v. Stofer, 180 Ill. App. 3d 158, 166-68 (1989). This is particularly true when the person in question is a minor.

Our determination that defendant was illegally seized at the police station does not end our analysis. We must now consider whether the handwritten statement, taken after the illegal seizure, was admissible. The State asserts that we should consider whether there was sufficient attenuation between defendant’s unlawful arrest and handwritten statement to render that statement admissible. The State includes a caveat, however, arguing that we should only make this consideration if the outcome favors the State. If the outcome will favor defendant, the State urges us to remand the matter for an attenuation hearing. Defendant likewise asserts that, if this court were to reach the issue of attenuation, the matter should be remanded for an attenuation hearing because no such hearing was conducted below. However, defendant urges this court to first consider whether his handwritten statement should have been suppressed because it was involuntary under the fifth amendment.

We are presented with two distinct considerations: first, whether defendant’s handwritten statement was voluntary under the fifth amendment protection against self-incrimination, such that defendant understood the Miranda warnings and felt that he had a legitimate choice to exercise them, and, second, whether, for fourth amendment purposes, the handwritten statement was sufficiently attenuated to purge the taint of defendant’s illegal arrest. Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 601-02, 45 L. Ed. 2d 416, 426, 95 S. Ct. 2254, 2260-61 (1975). As the Supreme Court explained in Dunaway v. New York, the fifth amendment voluntariness requirement is a “ ‘threshold requirement’ ” for fourth amendment analysis. Dunaway, 442 U.S. 200, 217, 60 L. Ed. 2d 824, 839, 99 S. Ct. 2248, 2259 (1979), quoting Brown, 422 U.S. at 604, 45 L. Ed. 2d at 427, 95 S. Ct. at 2262. The fact that an illegally seized defendant ultimately received Miranda warnings, waived them, and voluntarily spoke to police does not automatically mean that the causal connection between the illegality and the arrest has been broken for fourth amendment purposes. Dunaway, 442 U.S. at 217-18, 60 L. Ed. 2d at 839, 99 S. Ct. at 2259. However, as the United States Supreme Court instructed in Dunaway, “if the Fifth Amendment has been violated, the Fourth Amendment issue would not have to be reached.” (Emphases added.) Dunaway, 442 U.S. at 217, 60 L. Ed. 2d at 839, 99 S. Ct. at 2259. Accordingly, we first consider defendant’s fifth amendment claim that his handwritten statement was involuntary.

Defendant relies on the Supreme Court’s opinion in Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600, 159 L. Ed. 2d 643, 124 S. Ct. 2601 (2004) (plurality op.), to support his fifth amendment contention. The State counters that defendant misapplies Seibert and that suppression of his statement is unwarranted based on the facts of this case. We conclude that defendant’s statement was involuntary and should be suppressed.

The fifth amendment protects against involuntary self-incrimination