Madonia v. Houston (125 Ill. App. 3d 713, 1984)

JUSTICE GREEN

delivered the opinion of the court:

On May 4, 1982, defendant, J. Michael Houston, as local liquor control commissioner of the city of Springfield, filed with the local liquor control commission of that city (LLCC) a complaint alleging that plaintiff, Hazel Madonia, d/b/a Whirl-A-Way Tavern, had committed certain violations of the city of Springfield liquor control ordinance. On June 18, 1982, following a hearing on the complaint before the LLCC, the commissioner adopted the LLCC findings of fact and conclusions of law and revoked plaintiff’s liquor license effective July 12, 1982. Plaintiff appealed to the Illinois Liquor Control Commission (ILCC), which affirmed the commissioner’s decision. Plaintiff then brought an action for administrative review in the circuit court of Sangamon County. On December 9, 1983, that court affirmed. Plaintiff has appealed to this court. We also affirm.

By the terms of section 4 — 4(1) of the Liquor Control Act of 1934 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 43, par. 112(1)), the local liquor control commissioner has the power to revoke for cause all local liquor licenses issued for premises located within his jurisdiction. Section 7 — 5 of the Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 43, par. 149) authorizes the local commissioner to revoke licenses for violations of municipal ordinances.

The complaint charged that plaintiff violated section 4.44 of the Code of the City of Springfield which states “no riotous, disorderly, indecent, or offensive conduct of any kind shall be allowed in or about [the licensed] premises.” The complaint alleged that plaintiff, the licensee, had violated section 4.44 by “permitting indecent and offensive conduct on a licensed premises, to-wit: prostitution *** with the knowledge and complicity of the licensee through her employees and agents, to-wit: the manager, Samuel Ray LaForce.” The complaint alleged the incidents of prostitution occurred on March 30, 1982, and April 21, 1982. In addition, the complaint alleged the licensee violated section 4.47 by selling or furnishing alcoholic liquor at retail to three female patrons without requiring payments at the time of sale on March 30, 1982. The LLCC found the allegations concerning prostitution to have been proved.

On appeal to this court, plaintiff contends that (1) the administrative decision was contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence; (2) the failure of the LLCC to grant her request for a bill of particulars was a denial of her constitutional right to a fair hearing; and (3) the consideration of hearsay evidence by the LLCC requires reversal.

The evidence of plaintiff’s ordinance violations came entirely from the testimony of Joseph Davis, a detective for the city of Springfield.

Davis testified that he entered plaintiff’s tavern in Springfield at about 4 p.m. on March 30, 1982, and gave 50