Antry v. Illinois Educational Labor Relations Board (195 Ill. App. 3d 221, 1990)

PRESIDING JUSTICE KNECHT

delivered the opinion of the court:

In Shinn v. Illinois Educational Labor Relations Board (1989), 183 Ill. App. 3d 915, 539 N.E.2d 847, this court held educational employees who are not members of educational labor unions and who are required to pay “fair-share” fees to a union which is the exclusive bargaining representative of the bargaining unit in which they are employed, must file written objections in order to obtain refunds of the portions of their fair-share fees attributable to union activities unrelated to collective bargaining. In the present case, the principal question is whether the Illinois Educational Labor Relations Board (IELRB) properly determined the percentage of fair-share fees attributable to union activities unrelated to collective bargaining and thus refundable to objecting fee payors. An additional issue of major significance is whether nonmember fee payors were provided with information relevant to their fees sufficient to enable them to decide whether to object to the fees.

The rationale for the requirement that nonmembers of unions pay fair-share fees to the unions which are the exclusive bargaining representatives, as well as the tension between this requirement and the first amendment right of freedom of association for the advancement of ideas, was described in our opinion in Shinn, as were the Illinois statutes and the IELRB administrative regulations governing fair-share fees. Essentially, the full amount of union dues (excluding amounts attributable to political activities) may be deemed owing from a nonmember salary as a fair-share fee, subject to reduction upon the filing of objections. We will not now repeat what we stated in Shinn concerning these matters.

The present case represents a consolidation of .the objections filed with the IELRB to fair-share fees for the 1985-86 and 1986-87 school years collected under the terms of at least 52 separate educational labor contracts from 207 public school and community college employees, hereafter referred to as the petitioners. The fair-share fees here at issue consist of three components — (1) amounts equivalent to the dues of the National Education Association (NEA); (2) amounts equivalent to the dues of the Illinois Education Association (IEA); and (3) amounts equivalent to the dues of local educational labor unions.

After consolidating the cases involving objections to fair-share fees for 1985-86 and 1986-87, the IELRB held extensive hearings on the objections. The first hearing was held October 20, 1986, and the final session was held on April 14, 1987. Following the submission of briefs and the presentation of oral arguments on November 27, 1987, the IELRB ruled upon the objections in an opinion and order issued April 8, 1988. NEA, IEA, DuQoin Education Association, 4 Pub. Employee Rep. (Ill.) par. 1064, case No. 85—FS—0002—S (Illinois Educational Labor Relations Board, April 8, 1988).

In its opinion and order, the IELRB held (1) as a result of the objectors having been provided with inadequate notice and information concerning the amount of their fair-share fees, the unions are not entitled to any fair-share fees from the objectors for the period preceding April 10, 1986; (2) the notices and information concerning fair-share fees which the unions sent to nonmember fee payors on April 10, 1986, complied with constitutional requirements; (3) individual hearings are not required before fair-share fees may be deducted from nonmembers’ salaries; (4) the delay in the IELRB’s adjudication of the objections here at issue did not violate the petitioners’ constitutional rights; (5) the IELRB’s consolidation of all outstanding fair-share fee objections which concerned the NEA, the IEA, and their local affiliates did not violate any of the objectors’ constitutional rights; (6) nonmember fee payors must pay a proportionate share of the expenses of the NEA and the IEA which are related to collective bargaining, even if the activities of those organizations do not directly benefit their affiliated local unions in the school districts in which petitioners are employed; (7) fair-share.fees may be calculated by determining the percentage of union expenses related to collective bargaining and multiplying that percentage by the amount of the union’s dues; (8) for the 1985-86 school year, the NEA is entitled to fair-share fees equal to 57.19% of its dues, the IEA to fair-share fees equal to 57.40% of its dues, and the local unions to fair-share fees equal to 57.34% of their dues; and (9) for the 1986-87 school year, the NEA is entitled to fair-share fees of 57.19% of its dues, the IEA to fair-share fees of 56.25% of its dues, and the local unions’ fair-share fees equal to 56.53% of their dues.

I. ADEQUACY OF NOTICE

The first question presented for our review is whether, in informing petitioners of the fair-share fees which they were required to pay, the unions provided information concerning the fees sufficient to comply with the requirements of the Supreme Court’s decision in Chicago Teachers Union, Local No. 1, AFT, AFL-CIO v. Hudson (1986), 475 U.S. 292, 89 L. Ed. 2d 232, 106 S. Ct. 1066. In Hudson, the Court held a system established by the Chicago teacher’s union for informing nonmembers of their obligations to pay fair-share fees and handling objections to the fees contained three fundamental flaws. First, the procedure did not protect against the possibility of the objectors’ funds being temporarily used for an improper purpose such as by providing for an escrow of disputed amounts pending resolution of the objections. Second, and most importantly for bur purposes here, the procedure did not provide nonmembers with adequate information about the basis for the fair-share fees. With respect to this matter, the Court stated:

“In Abood [v. Detroit Board of Education (1977), 431 U.S. 209, 52 L. Ed. 2d 261, 97 S. Ct. 1782], we reiterated that the nonunion employee has the burden of raising an objection, but that the union retains the burden of proof: ‘ “Since the unions possess the facts and records from which the proportion of political to total union expenditures can reasonably be calculated, basic considerations of fairness compel that they, not the individual employees, bear the burden of proving such proportion.” ’ Abood, 431 U.S. at 239-40, n.40, 52 L. Ed. 2d 261, 97 S. Ct. 1782, quoting Railway Clerks v. Allen, 373 U.S. 113, 122, 10 L. Ed. 2d 235, 83 S. Ct. 1158 (1963). Basic considerations of fairness, as well as concern for the First Amendment rights at stake, also dictate that the potential objectors be given sufficient information to gauge the propriety of the union’s fee. Leaving the nonunion employees in the dark about the source of the figure for the agency fee — and requiring them to object in order to receive information — does not adequately protect the careful distinctions drawn in Abood.

In this case, the original information given to the nonunion employees was inadequate. Instead of identifying the expenditures for collective bargaining and contract administration that had been provided for the benefit of nonmembers as well as members — and for which nonmembers as well as members can fairly be charged a fee — the Union identified the amount that it admittedly had expended for purposes that did not benefit dissenting nonmembers. An acknowledgment that nonmembers would not be required to pay any part of 5% of the Union’s total annual expenditures was not an adequate disclosure of the reasons why they were required to pay their share of 95%.

Third, the Court held the union’s procedures governing objections were defective because they did not provide for a reasonably prompt decision by an impartial decision maker. The Court stated an objecting nonmember fee payor is entitled to have his objections addressed “in an expeditious, fair, and objective manner.” Hudson, 475 U.S. at 307, 89 L. Ed. 2d at 247, 106 S. Ct. at 1076.

In the present case, the IEA on April 10, 1986, sent to all fee payors of its local unions a letter informing them of their obligation to pay fair-share fees for the 1985-86 school year. The letter informed them the fee which they had been assessed “is equal to the amount of all the local, state, and national dues, not exceeding the amount uniformly required of members. This amount does not include any contribution related to the election or support of any candidate for political office.” The letter further informed fee payors of their right to object to the amount of the fee and provided the addresses of IELRB offices at which the necessary forms and other information could be obtained. Furthermore, the letter informed fee payors that following a full hearing in which the objectors would have the right to participate, the IELRB would ultimately determine the amounts of the fair-share fees which could be properly charged to objecting fee payors for the 1985-86 school year. The letter also explained to fee payors that pending resolution of objections for the 1985-86 school year, the fair-share fee charged fee payors who objected would be reduced to 86.7% of the dues uniformly required of members, which was the amount of the fair-share fee which was finally determined to be required of nonmembers with respect to the 1984-85 school year. Finally, the letter advised fee payors the IELRB might conclude objecting fee payors must pay a fair-share fee for the 1985-86 school year of more or less than 86.7% of the dues uniformly required of members.

Enclosed with the IEA’s April 10, 1986, letter were copies of the following documents:

(1) NEA program budget for 1985-86. This included statements of the NEA’s income as well as its expenditures for each department. Also included were rather detailed descriptions of the functions of each of the NEA departments and programs for which expenditure data was provided. For instance, the portions of this document covering the membership promotion and recruitment activities and leadership activities of the NEA’s affiliate services area read:

1984-85

1985-86

“MEMBERSHIP PROMOTION AND RECRUITMENT $2,817,174 $2,867,026

Program 1.1: Develop membership promotion materials and design membership recruitment programs to assist state affiliates in maintaining 90% of potential. 377,298 239,806

Program 1.2: Provide direct assistance for up to 12 targeted state affiliates in the implementation of a comprehensive membership recruitment program based on building effective locals and supporting state affiliate organizational and program development. 1,813,788 2,174,355

Program 1.3: Implement a program of membership recruitment and service for retired members that includes pre-retirement seminars, publications, a newsletter, support for an advisory committee, and an annual meeting. 441,569 269,067

Program 1.4: Develop and implement an NEA student member program. Provide service component to promote the program through development of materials and model state and institutional programs. Provide staff support to the Student Advisory Committee. 184,519 183,798

LEADERSHIP PROGRAM $1,252,490 $1,573,538

Program 2.1: Provide training through the re- 535,320 gional offices to affiliate leaders as an integral part of Affiliate Services projects in membership recruitment and development, organizing, negotiations, and contract enforcement. Develop comprehensive training projects with state affiliates. 819,538

Program 2,2: Plan and conduct one summer 134,717 143,232 conference for state presidents, presidents-elect/ vice-presidents, secretary-treasurers/treasurers. Plan and conduct six regional workshops/meetings for state presidents.

Program 2.3: Provide for the coordination of 166,206 241,151 NEA urban data retrieval, information dissemination, and problem solving. Plan and conduct three regional seminars for leadership from the 200 largest locals and up to 30 urban settings grouped according to experience; provide support services to NCUEA.

Program 2.4: Provide training consultation and 416,247 359,717 support for regional staff; research, develop, and validate one new package or revise an existing leadership training package.

Program 2.5: Plan and conduct one pre-conven- 10,000 tion conference for student members. Provide specialized training to student chair following election at preconvention conference.”

This document was not audited.

(2) Copies of the NEA’s financial statements for the fiscal years ending August 31, 1985, and August 31, 1984. These statements were audited by the accounting firm of Coopers & Lybrand. They included statements of the NEA’s receipts as well as its expenditures arranged according to the same areas of operation (such as affiliate services) described in the NEA’s program budget.

(3) A copy of a 40-page report of the NEA’s representation fee umpire for the 1984-85 school year. This report stated a preliminary conclusion that 75.98% of the NEA expenditures for this school year were for activities related to collective bargaining. The report further stated since NEA expenditures for legal services and for grants to State and local affiliates for legal services had to be determined on a State-by-State basis, the final NEA fair-share fee percentages for each State would be dependent on the amount the NEA spent for chargeable legal services and litigation in each State. After NEA expenditures for legal services which benefitted affiliates in each State would be factored into the calculations for each State, the average NEA fair-share fee would be approximately 85% of annual dues. This report states the amounts spent on each of the NEA areas described in the NEA’s program budget which the representation fee umpire determined were attributable to activities unrelated to collective bargaining.

(4) IEA budget for 1985-86. This lists expenditures by categories such as president’s office, ad hoc committees, budget committee, School Service Personnel Council, Higher Education Council, et cetera. Within each of these categories, expenses are further broken down into such classifications as professional salaries, legal and secretarial services, rent, telephone, utilities, real estate tax, and audit expenses. No statement of the specific functions of each office or division of the IEA is included.

(5) The IEA’s audited financial statements for the fiscal year ended June 30, 1985. This statement included a balance sheet and a statement of major categories of income and expenses.

(6) Report of the IEA representation fee umpire for the 1983-84 school year. This report states that for this school year, 88.22% of all IEA expenditures were for activities related to collective bargaining and thus chargeable to fee payors. This document contains descriptions of the activities of each major IEA program area (such as governance, membership services, and public affairs) and statements of the percentages of the expenditures for these programs which the fee umpire found were unrelated to collective bargaining.

(7) Copy of an unpublished United States District Court decision in Dolan v. Rockford School District No. 205 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 19, 1985), No. 84—C—20209. This decision determined the preliminary combined NEA-IEA fair-share fee to be charged objectors for the 1984-85 school year was 86.71% of total NEA and IEA dues. The court recognized that following the conclusion of the school year, this figure could be adjusted downward on the basis of an arbitrator’s determination of the unions’ chargeable expenditures. As the basis for its decision, the court relied primarily on the report of the NEA’s representation fee umpire for the 1983-84 school year.

On August 21, 1986, the IEA wrote fee payors concerning fair-share fees for the 1986-87 school year. This letter contains most of the statements included in the IEA’s letter of April 10, 1986. In addition, it states the fees of dissenting fair-share fee payors will be reduced, upon the filing of an objection, to 84.69% of the dues uniformly required of members, pending resolution of the objections by the IELRB. The letter also informed fee payors of the import of the recent United States Supreme Court decisions regarding the obligation of nonmembers of unions within bargaining units to pay fair-share fees. Furthermore, fee payors were informed, with respect to the 1984-85 school year, the NEA representation fee umpire determined 24.02% of the NEA’s expenditures were for activities unrelated to collective bargaining, and for the same period a representation fee umpire determined 11.78% of the IEA’s expenditures were devoted to nonchargeable activities. The letter then states:

“We believe the [local educational labor unions] expend almost nothing on non-chargeable activities because their primary responsibilities are collective bargaining, contract negotiation, contract administration and grievance processing — all chargeable activities. However, out of an abundance of caution, and giving objecting fee payors the benefit of the doubt, we applied the IEA non-chargeable percentage of 11.78% to the locals’ expenditures. After doing so, we computed the average weighted percentage and concluded that, at most, 15.31% of the [local unions’] fair-share fee funded non-chargeable activities.”

The letter concluded with a statement that (1) since experience demonstrated the IEA’s and NEA’s categories of expenditures do not vary significantly from year to year, and (2) because the IELRB would ultimately determine the actual amount of the fair-share fees to be charged objectors for the 1986-87 school year, it was deemed appropriate to rely on the fair-share percentages applicable to prior years in fixing the preliminary fair-share fee to be charged objectors for the 1986-87 school year.

Enclosed with this letter were copies of the following documents:

(1) The NEA’s program budget for the fiscal year 1986-87. The format of this document is substantially the same as that of the program budget for the 1985-86 fiscal year.

(2) The NEA’s program budget for fiscal year 1985-86.

(3) The NEA’s audited financial statements for the fiscal years ending August 31, 1985, and August 31, 1984.

(4) The report of the NEA’s representation fee umpire for the 1984- 85 school year.

(5) The IEA budget for 1985-86.

(6) The IEA budget for 1986-87. The format of this document is the same as that of the 1985-86 IEA budget.

(7) The IEA’s audited financial statements for the fiscal year ended June 30, 1985.

(8) A statement of the IEA’s accrued preaudit expenses for the 1985- 86 fiscal year. This document lists expenditures by general categories, such as “Staff Training and Development,” “Interest Expense,” “Director of Membership Services,” “Memb. Communications, Mgr./Uniserv Area Coord.,” “Bylaws Committee,” and “Higher Education Council.”

(9) Report of IEA-NEA representation fee umpire for the 1983-84 school year.

(10) Unpublished United States District Court decision in Dolan v. Rockford School District No. 205 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 19, 1985), No. 84—C—20209.

In holding the petitioners were provided with adequate information regarding their fair-share fees, the IELRB stated that in view of the Supreme Court’s decision in Hudson, an objection to a fair-share fee can serve two purposes: (1) communication of dissent to the union, and (2) a challenge to the union to prove its claims of chargeable expenses. The IELRB further stated Hudson requires an assessment of the adequacy of an explanation of a fair-share fee in light of the burden which the union has placed on potential objectors. The IELRB stated in each fair-share case, the nonmember has the burden of deciding whether to object, and the type of information which a fee payor requires to make that decision depends on the nature of the decision.

The IELRB noted that here, unlike in Hudson, nonmembers had to dissent in order to obtain an advance reduction of their fair-share fees, and the filing of objections forced the unions to prove their entitlement to any fees. The IELRB also observed the notices sent to nonmembers in this case did not claim all nonchargeable expenses had been eliminated from the fair-share fees and contained no implication that an objection would be futile unless the fee payor was prepared to challenge the unions’ calculations. Rather, the notices stated the IELRB would ultimately determine the precise amount of the fair-share fees. The IELRB stated inclusion in the information sent to petitioners of a more precise functional breakdown of the unions’ expenditures was unwarranted in view of the minimal burden which was placed on potential objectors by the procedures for objection.

Furthermore, the IELRB held an auditor’s opinion as to which expenses are chargeable and nonchargeable need not be included in the information concerning fair-share fees which is initially sent to nonmembers. The IELRB concluded petitioners were provided with information adequate to enable them to determine whether to object to their fair-share fees.

The petitioners argue the information with which they were initially provided concerning their fair-share fees for the two school years in question was inadequate to enable them to gauge the propriety of their fair-share fees, because it did not sufficiently state what expenditures were for activities deemed related to collective bargaining and what expenditures were for activities which the unions regard as unrelated to collective bargaining. Also, petitioners argue that since the fee umpires were not neutral decision makers within the meaning of Hudson, and their decisions did not discuss union expenditures for the current and immediately preceding school years, their decisions did not help to satisfy the applicable information requirements. Petitioners also assert the representation fee umpires’ reports are deficient because they are not audited. Petitioners argue that, at the minimum, the IEA expenditures should have been broken down on a “functional” basis by listing, for instance, amounts spent on fund-raising, collective bargaining, organizing, et cetera-, rather than on an “object” basis by listing amounts spent for salaries, light, heat, rent, et cetera.

The petitioners further note, before having to decide whether to object, they were provided with no information whatsoever concerning the bases of the fair-share fees claimed by their local unions. Petitioners contend, in view of the fact that it is the local unions which actually perform collective bargaining on their behalf, an assumption the locals expend no greater a percentage of their funds on chargeable activities than do the NEA and the IEA is not an effective substitute for specific financial information concerning the local unions.

Petitioners state the IELRB’s decision in effect requires payors of fair-share fees to object and, subsequently, go through a lengthy administrative process in order to receive information concerning their fees. The petitioners maintain no court or administrative agency has previously adopted the IELRB’s position with respect to this issue and focused on the burden imposed on potential objectors in determining the type of information concerning fair-share fees which unions must initially provide to nonmember fee payors.

In its argument on appeal, the IELRB states that before the Hudson decision, an objection by a fee payor constituted the means by which dissent was communicated to the unions. The IELRB asserts Hudson, however, recognized the right of objectors to compel unions to prove the validity of their calculations of fair-share fees before a neutral decision maker. Therefore, the IELRB argues, a fair-share fee objection filed subsequent to Hudson serves the dual purpose of communicating dissent to the unions and challenging them to prove their claims of chargeable expenses. The IELRB notes that in Hudson, unlike in the present case, the union charged all nonmembers 95% of the dues charged members. Thus, argues the IELRB, the nonmembers involved in Hudson did not have an incentive to file objections. The IELRB notes that in the present case, by contrast, the fee payors had to file objections in order to obtain any reductions in the amount of their fair-share fees. The IELRB implies since the nonmembers in the present case were informed objections would trigger an automatic reduction of their fair-share fees, they had a greater incentive to object than the nonmembers in Hudson. For this reason and because the filing of an objection triggers automatic review of the entire amounts of claimed representation fees by the IELRB, the IELRB asserts the nonmembers in this case had a lesser need for information concerning the amount of their fair-share fees than did the nonmembers in Hudson. The IELRB maintains objecting nonmembers being “burdened” by lengthy hearings is an inevitable result of the filing of objections to fair-share fees.

With respect to the fees charged nonmembers for the services of the local unions, the IELRB asserts the unions were not required to provide fee payors with information concerning the finances of the locals because (1) the letters to fee payors stated the locals spent almost nothing on activities unrelated to collective bargaining, (2) the local unions sought to collect fair-share fees in amounts equal only to the overall weighted chargeable percentages of IEA and NEA expenditures, and (3) nonmembers were only required to decide whether to express a general objection to the fair-share fees of the locals.

The IELRB argues, alternatively, that if this court holds the burden placed on potential objectors is not determinative of the required content of the notices of fair-share fees to which fee payors are entitled, the NEA met its burden of providing the petitioners with adequate information concerning its expenditures. The IELRB states the NEA’s program budget revealed and explained the major categories of expenditures, the umpire report explained how the percentages of those expenditures chargeable to fee payors were calculated, and the information as to the NEA expenditures was audited by an accounting firm.

The unions maintain the sole purpose of Hudson’s requirement that the unions provide information to nonmembers concerning fair-share fees is to ensure nonmembers have enough information to decide whether to object to the amount of the fees. The unions assert the information provided to nonmembers concerning the NEA’s expenditures must be considered as a total package. The unions assert in assessing the adequacy of the information provided nonmembers, it is inappropriate to focus on only one or two particular documents included in the information package, as the petitioners have done with respect to the NEA’s fee umpire report.

With regard to the information concerning the IEA expenditures, the unions argue when considered as a total package, the materials provided to fee payors satisfy Hudson’s informational requirements. The unions state the nonmembers were provided with copies of both the IEA budget and IEA umpire report, which contained descriptions of the major categories of IEA expenditures, as well as copies of audited IEA financial statements. With respect to the petitioners’ contention the fee umpire report was prepared by an arbitrator who may have been partial to the IEA, the unions respond Hudson requires an impartial decision maker only at the stage of the proceedings at which the final determination is made as to the percentages of union dues chargeable to objectors — in this case the proceeding before the IELRB — and does not require an impartial decision maker at the point when the amount of the automatic reduction to be granted objectors as a preliminary matter is determined.

The unions do not dispute the information packets sent to nonmembers in April and August 1986 did not include financial statements or budgets of the local unions. The unions assert the presumption local unions expend at least as great a percentage of their funds on chargeable activities as do the NEA and IEA is intended to avoid the time, expense, and burden which would necessarily be involved in providing to nonmembers documents concerning the expenditures of the over 200 local teachers’ unions in Illinois which collect fair-share fees. The unions maintain this presumption operates to the advantage of nonmembers, since the local unions invariably spend greater percentages of their budgets on chargeable activities than does the IEA. The unions assert in deciding whether to object to their local union fair-share fees, the petitioners simply had to decide whether or not to accept the locals’ position a local union invariably spends more for activities related to collective bargaining than do the IEA and the NEA. If a nonmember does not agree with this presumption, argue the unions, the nonmember may file an objection, which then requires the local union to document this presumption in proceedings before the IELRB.

We conclude the petitioners were provided adequate information concerning the amount of their NEA and IEA fair-share fees which enabled them to decide whether to object to the fees. The fee payors were not “left in the dark” as to the basis for their fair-share fees. Instead, the documents provided them — which in the April 10, 1986, mailing consisted of 150 pages of data relating to union finances and in the August 21, 1986, mailing of over 200 pages of the same type of materials — come close to being an exhaustive and detailed list of all union expenditures, which the Hudson Court held need not be provided to fee payors. Hudson, 475 U.S. at 307 n.18, 89 L. Ed. 2d at 247 n.18, 106 S. Ct. at 1076 n.18.

Considered as a whole, the information which the fee payors received provided them with a complete picture of the expenditures of the NEA and the IEA for the time periods in question, and of the nature of the activities for which the expenditures were made. (See Kuehn v. American Federation of State, County & Municipal Employees, Council No. 65 (Minn. App. 1989), 435 N.W.2d 130.) The evidence here supports the unions’ claim that the amounts expended by the NEA and the IEA for their various activities did not change significantly from year to year. Thus, the fact the information provided fee payors to a large extent concerned expenditures for prior years did not detract from its usefulness in helping fee payors to decide whether to object to the amounts of their fair-share fees.

We do not consider the failure of the unions to provide fee payors with information as to the expenditures of the local unions— other than the statement of the presumption set forth in the IEA’s August 21, 1986, letter to fee payors — that the percentages of expenditures of the locals which are not chargeable to nonmembers does not exceed the average weighted percentage of the nonchargeable expenditures of the NEA and the IEA — renders the information provided fee payors constitutionally inadequate. The notice of the use of this presumption was adequate to enable a fee payor to decide whether to object to his or her fair-share fees. (See Hohe v. Casey (M.D. Pa. 1988), 695 F. Supp. 814, 819, 129 L.R.R.M. 2491, 2494-95.) Although the April 10, 1986, letter did not contain a statement of the presumption, a fee payor could reasonably be expected to infer, on the basis of all of the information provided with that letter, the IEA had determined the chargeable percentage of local union dues was roughly equal to that of NEA and IEA dues. A fee payor dissatisfied with this determination could object to the amount of his or her fair-share fee. Upon the filing of objections to fair-share fees, the burden of establishing the validity of the initial determination of the chargeable percentage of local union expenditures shifts to the unions. (80 Ill. Adm. Code §1125.80(b) (Supp. 1986).) Thereafter, each local union, as to the fees over which an objection is filed, has to provide complete information concerning its finances at proceedings before the IELRB if it wants to collect any fair-share fees at all from objectors who are included in a bargaining unit it represents. We hold this procedure does not violate the constitutional rights of the payors of fair-share fees to local educational labor unions.

Petitioners’ contentions concerning the alleged lack of neutrality on the part of the representation fee umpires and the lack of an auditor’s report regarding the breakdown of the unions’ expendítures into the chargeable and nonchargeable categories, do not affect the validity of our conclusion regarding the adequacy of the information provided to fee payors. Hudson requires adjudication of objections to fair-share fees by an impartial decision maker. When nonmembers are first sent information regarding their fair-share fees, no objections to the amount of the fees are outstanding. Objections to fair-share fees are normally filed with the IELRB after receipt of the initial mailing containing union financial information. The IELRB then rules upon the objections. Obviously, under the Illinois procedure for handling objections to fair-share fees, the impartial decision maker referred to in Hudson is the IELRB and not the fee umpire. Thus, so long as objections to fair-share fees are adjudicated by the IELRB, alleged lack of neutrality on the part of the fee umpire who initially determines the amount of the fair-share fees on behalf of the unions is of no consequence with regard to compliance with the constitutional requirements pertaining to the fair-share fee information which must be provided fee payors.

It is also apparent there is not and cannot be any constitutional requirement that the information initially provided to fee payors contain an auditor’s statement as to the amounts of union expenditures which are related to collective bargaining. As the court in Andrews v. Education Association (2d Cir. 1987), 829 F.2d 335, 127 L.R.R.M. 2929, observed, the usual function of an auditor is to ensure expenditures which a union claims it made for certain activities were actually made for those. activities. Adoption of petitioners’ position with respect to this matter would require auditors to make legal determinations as to which expenditures are chargeable and noncharge- . able, in addition to performing the traditional duties of auditors. Although two sixth circuit decisions seem to require an auditor’s verification as to which expenditures fall into the chargeable and nonchargeable categories (e.g., Damiano v. Matish (6th Cir. 1987), 830 F.2d 1363, 126 L.R.R.M. 2727; Tierney v. City of Toledo (6th Cir. 1987), 824 F.2d 1497, 125 L.R.R.M. 3217), due regard for the traditional functions of an auditor does not support such a rule, and we decline to follow these decisions to the extent they suggest such a result. We note parenthetically a United States District Court of the Sixth Circuit has declined to interpret Damiano and Tierney as requiring an auditor to make an initial determination as to whether various union expenditures are chargeable to nonmembers. See, e.g., Lowary v. Lexington Board of Education (N.D. Ohio March 2, 1988), No. C86—1536A, 130 L.R.R.M. 2611.

II. IELRB ADJUDICATION PROCESS

A. CONSOLIDATION OF CASES

All of the petitioners in this case, except the petitioners employed by the Alton School District (Alton petitioners), filed objections to the amounts of their representation fees before the IELRB hearing began. After the conclusion of the hearing, the Alton petitioners approached the attorney for the original petitioners and requested he also represent them. The attorney for the original petitioners acceded to this request. The Alton petitioners opposed being consolidated into the case involving the other petitioners, since they had had no opportunity to be heard before the IELRB. Acting on the unions’ request, the IELRB nevertheless consolidated the objections of the Alton petitioners with those of the other petitioners.

The Alton petitioners argue this procedure unconstitutionally deprived them of a hearing prior to a deprivation of their property. They also point out the IELRB was not presented with any evidence whatsoever concerning the collective-bargaining expenses of the Alton Education Association, to which the Alton petitioners are required by the IELRB’s order to pay fair-share fees. They also state all of the original objectors in this proceeding were teachers, but included among the Alton petitioners are several nonteaching school employees. The Alton petitioners assert that at the IELRB hearing, petitioners’ attorneys did not direct any inquiries to bargaining expenses incurred on behalf of school employees who are not teachers. The Alton petitioners contend unless they are afforded a hearing as to appropriate amounts of their fair-share fees, all such fees previously deducted from their salaries should be returned and no fees should be deducted in the future.

The IELRB asserts the objections of the “Alton petitioners” were properly consolidated with those of the other petitioners because the IELRB’s determination of the proper amounts of the fair-share fees of the NEA and the IEA is applicable to all the petitioners. The IELRB contends failure to consolidate the objections involved in this case could possibly have necessitated the holding of basically the same evidentiary hearing in 200 (the approximate number of educational labor bargaining units in Illinois in which labor contracts containing “fair-share” clauses exist) separate locations with a consequent waste of time, money, and resources of both the IELRB and the parties.

The unions assert the IELRB properly exercised its discretion in consolidating the objections of the Alton petitioners with those of the other petitioners because at the time of the consolidation, all issues had been vigorously contested by the original parties who were represented by the same counsel as the Alton petitioners. Also, the unions assert because fair-share fee objections may be filed throughout the year, the procedure suggested by the Alton petitioners would burden the IELRB with repetitive litigation.

As the petitioners point out, except in exigent circumstances, due process requires minimal procedural safeguards, including an explanation of reasons and a hearing, before one may be deprived of property or a property interest. (See Fuentes v. Shevin (1972), 407 U.S. 67, 88, 32 L. Ed. 2d 556, 574, 92 S. Ct. 1983, 1998; Goldberg v. Kelly (1970), 397 U.S. 254, 266-67, 25 L. Ed. 2d 287, 298-99, 90 S. Ct. 1011, 1020; Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp. (1969), 395 U.S. 337, 23 L. Ed. 2d 349, 89 S. Ct. 1820.) In class actions, due process requirements applicable to members of the plaintiff class include an opportunity to be heard and to participate in the litigation, an opportunity to “opt out” of the litigation, and adequate representation of the interests of absent class members. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts (1985), 472 U.S. 797, 86 L. Ed. 2d 628, 105 S. Ct. 2965.

The present litigation involves a consolidation of cases which each of the petitioners initiated by filing a fair-share fee objection. No attempt was made to join individuals who took no affirmative steps whatsoever to involve themselves in the litigation. Thus, the present case does not fall within the definition of a class action, and the Phillips Petroleum decision is not by its terms fully applicable to the Alton petitioners. However, when an attempt is made to accord binding effect to proceedings at a previously concluded hearing with respect to a party which had no opportunity to participate in the hearing, we deem the action to be sufficiently analogous to a class action, that the requirement of Phillips Petroleum, that members of the plaintiff class be accorded an opportunity to be heard and participate in the litigation, applies. Since the Alton petitioners admittedly did not have an opportunity to participate in the IELRB hearing which preceded the IELRB’s determination of the amount of their fair-share fees, we must hold the collection of fair-share fees from the Alton petitioners under these circumstances violates their rights to due process of law.

If the unions are to collect fair-share fees from the Alton petitioners for the 1985-86 and 1986-87 school years, those individuals must be afforded hearing as to the amount of their fees. This hearing, however, need not be as complex as the previous hearing in this cause. For example, the unions may simply introduce as evidence the transcripts of the hearing in this cause (as well as evidence concerning the expenditures of the Alton Education Association), and the IELRB may take notice of the evidence introduced at the previous hearing, provided thereafter the Alton petitioners are afforded an opportunity to present additional evidence.

The decision of the IELRB is reversed insofar as it requires the Alton petitioners to pay fair-share fees for the 1985-86 and 1986-87 school years. Within 30 days of the filing of this court’s mandate in this cause, the IELRB is to set a date for a hearing on the objections of the Alton petitioners to their fair-share fees for the school years here at issue. Thereafter, the IELRB is to conduct such further proceedings with respect to those objections as it may deem appropriate.

B. TIME AND PLACE OF HEARING

The hearing on petitioners’ fair-share fee objections was held on 24 different days between October 20, 1986, and April 14, 1987. The hearing sessions were held on alternate dates in Chicago and Springfield. The petitioners assert that, contrary to the requirements of Hudson, the hearing procedure utilized in this case did not minimize the burden on them. They contend their fee objections should have been considered at short hearings held close to where they taught, at which the unions should have demonstrated what they spent on collective bargaining and contract administration. The petitioners imply the procedures utilized in this case were primarily designed to meet the convenience of the IELRB and the unions.

As the petitioners note, Hudson stands for the proposition the burden of objecting which is placed on payors of fair-share fees must be minimized. Hearings held closer to the residences of the objectors undoubtedly would have been more convenient for them on the dates when it was necessary for them to testify as witnesses at the hearings. But the great majority of the evidence at the hearing in this cause consisted of testimony of various union officials. Also, it was not necessary for all of the petitioners to be present at all of the hearing sessions, and the petitioners do not argue they desired to be personally present at all of the hearing sessions. Although the IELRB may have taken measures which would have imposed a lesser burden on petitioners than did the procedures which it utilized in this case, we cannot say reversal of the IELRB’s order is required as a sanction for the manner in which it conducted these proceedings.

C. PROMPTNESS OF DECISION

The Hudson Court held objecting payors of fair-share fees are entitled to “a reasonably prompt decision by an impartial decision-maker” (Hudson, 475 U.S. at 307, 89 L. Ed. 2d at 247, 106 S. Ct. at 1076) or, stated differently, “a reasonably prompt opportunity to challenge the amount of the fee before an impartial decisionmaker” (Hudson, 475 U.S. at 310, 89 L. Ed. 2d at 249, 106 S. Ct. at 1078). The Hudson decision was filed on March 4, 1986.

On April 10, 1986, the IEA sent its first mailing to nonmember fee payors in an effort to comply with Hudson. On August 21, 1986, the IEA sent nonmember fee payors a second mailing dealing with their rights under Hudson with regard to fair-share fees for the 1986-87 school year. The NEA’s fiscal year ended on August 31, 1986.

On September 4, 1986, the IELRB consolidated all outstanding fair-share fee objections. The hearing on outstanding fair-share fee objections began on October 20, 1986. Prior to the commencement of the hearing, counsel for petitioners agreed it would be best to hold the hearing at the conclusion of the NEA’s fiscal year. The last of 24 sessions of the hearing was held on April 14, 1987. Thereafter, on May 1, 1987, the hearing officer issued an order which found there were no issues of determinative fact and removed the case to the IELRB for decision. (80 Ill. Adm. Code § 1120.40(f) (1985).) Post-hearing briefs were subsequently filed, and oral arguments were held before the IELRB on November 24, 1987. The IELRB issued its decision on April 8, 1988.

In its April 8, 1988, order, the IELRB stated its decision was issued as promptly as could be expected under the circumstances of this case. The IELRB stated because it relied on evidence of expenditures during the 1985-86 school years in determining the fair-share fees for 1986-87, the hearing could not have commenced until after the close of the IEA’s and NEA’s 1985-86 fiscal years. The IELRB further stated:

“This procedure has been lengthy and time-consuming due to the novelty, complexity and proliferation of the issues in the present matter, and to the need to satisfy the objectors’ repeated demands for a formalized and detailed process. The objectors have therefore not been deprived of any federal constitutional rights.”

The IELRB also held the timeliness of any procedure can only be assessed by “the number of issues, their complexity and novelty, the number of parties, size of the record and the actions of the parties involved.” As an additional basis for holding its decision was rendered in a “reasonably prompt” manner, the IELRB stated the burden on the objectors was minimized by the unions’ voluntary advance reduction of the fair-share fees upon the filing of objections.

Petitioners argue under no construction of the term were they afforded a “reasonably prompt” hearing on their objections, as required by Hudson. They observe petitioner Antry filed his initial objection to his fair-share fees on September 30, 1985, the hearing on the petitioners’ objections did not commence until more than one year after that date, and two years and seven months elapsed between the time An-try filed his objection and the date the IELRB entered its decision. The petitioners contend the IELRB’s consolidation of all pending fair-share fee objections into one case, at the insistence of the unions and over the objection of petitioners, directly affected the novelty and complexity of this case and the size of the record. The petitioners further argue the unions’ voluntary reduction of the amount of the fair-share fees upon objection of nonmembers did not ameliorate the IELRB’s purported violation of the requirements of the Hudson decision in not providing them with a reasonably prompt hearing, since all three of the major procedural requirements imposed by Hudson must be complied with in each fair-share fee objection case. The petitioners imply that when it became apparent their objections would not be resolved within a reasonable amount of time, their contested fees being held in escrow should have been returned to them.

The IELRB asserts that in establishing a requirement for a “reasonably prompt” decision, the Hudson Court was concerned with objection adjudication processes which are entirely controlled by unions and which lend themselves to potentially self-serving and deliberate delays. The IELRB argues this clearly was not the scenario in the present case.

The unions observe that prior to the release of the Hudson decision, neither the IELRB nor the unions could have reasonably expected that prompt scheduling of hearings on fair-share fee objections is constitutionally required. The unions state immediately after the Hudson decision was released, both they and the IELRB took steps to comply with the new requirements for fair-share fee objection proceedings. The unions assert considering this was the IELRB’s first case in an extremely complex and unsettled area of the law and Hudson injected many new issues into fair-share fee proceedings, it is quite understandable that 18 months elapsed between the time the hearings commenced and the time the IELRB issued its decision.

The unions also maintain the consolidation of all fair-share fee objections expedited rather than delayed resolution of the objections for, absent consolidation, individual hearings on more than 50 separate objections would have been necessary. The unions finally state that to penalize them by holding they are not entitled to fair-share fees for the school years here at issue simply because the IELRB took a comparatively long period of time to decide this case, would unduly interfere with the unions’ right to collect fair-share fees from objecting nonmembers.

We hold that when all relevant circumstances are considered, the IELRB’s delay in adjudicating petitioners’ objections did not violate Hudson’s requirement of a reasonably prompt decision. It is noteworthy, in articulating the prompt decision requirement, the Hudson Court used the term “reasonably” to modify “prompt.” In doing this, the Court indicated in determining whether decisions are prompt, the decision maker should not be held to a strict time frame, but instead all pertinent circumstances should be considered.

As the unions assert, delays which occurred before the Hudson decision was released should not be considered in assessing the promptness of the IELRB’s decision, since prior to that time the unions and the IELRB could not have known that, as a matter of constitutional law, they were obligated to decide petitioners’ objections in a reasonably prompt manner. Almost immediately after the Hudson decision was released, the unions took steps to notify fair-share fee payors of the procedures applicable to fee objections for the 1985-86 school year. The hearings on petitioners’ objections commenced in October 1986, less than two months after the close of the NEA’s fiscal year. The scheduling problems inherent in conducting a proceeding involving teachers and other witnesses from many different parts of the State, as well as witnesses who are residents of other States, provide an adequate explanation for the IELRB holding the hearings over a seven-month period. A delay in the proceedings from April until November 1987 for purposes of briefing was not unreasonable, especially when the time needed to prepare the transcript of the hearing is considered. In a case such as this involving many issues of first impression, the filing of the IELRB’s decision approximately five months after oral argument — in April 1988 — also did not represent an unreasonable delay. Cf. Kuehn v. American Federation of State, County & Municipal Employees, Council No. 65 (Minn. App. 1989), 435 N.W.2d 130, 135.

As the unions note, the petitioners repeatedly requested, and still appear to insist, that at the hearing on their fair-share fee objections every NEA and IEA employee should have been required to provide detailed testimony concerning his or her activities during the 1985-86 school year. This obviously would have resulted in an even greater delay in the IELRB’s decision than that which actually occurred. In view of the petitioners’ position as to the manner in which the IELRB hearing should have been conducted, it seems rather incongruous for them to complain they were not provided with a reasonably prompt decision.

Contrary to petitioners’ contentions, it is unlikely consolidation of these cases significantly delayed the IELRB’s decision for most of the petitioners. Given the IELRB’s limited resources, decisions in at least some of the individual cases would probably have been delayed to the same extent as the IELRB’s decision in the present case.

The petitioners cite several decisions in support of their assertion delays of up to 12 months in adjudicating fair-share fee objections are not permissible. (Damiano v. Matish (6th Cir. 1987), 830 F.2d 1363, 126 L.R.R.M. 2727; Tierney v. City of Toledo (6th Cir. 1987), 824 F.2d 1497, 125 L.R.R.M. 3217; McGlumphy v. Fraternal Order of Police (N.D. Ohio 1986), 633 F. Supp. 1074; Hagen v. Illinois Education Association (C.D. Ill. Sept. 13, 1985), No. 84—1313 (unpublished).) As the unions point out, however, the first three of these cases dealt with procedures which had built-in delays, which precluded resolution of fee objections before a certain time period elapsed. (Hagen predated Hudson and is thus of no relevance to Hudson’s prompt-decision requirement.) In the present case, by contrast, the procedures do not assure delays in resolution of fair-share fee objections of the kind which the petitioners experienced. As resolution of fair-share fee objections in conformity with the requirements of Hudson becomes a more routine matter, the objections undoubtedly will be adjudicated in a much more expeditious manner than occurred in the present case.

III. DETERMINATION OF AMOUNTS TO BE ESCROWED

The petitioners assert that, contrary to constitutional requirements, the unions merely guessed at the amounts to be deducted from the salaries of nonmembers as fair-share fees and placed in escrow pending resolution of the objections to the fees. The bases for this contention are (1) the amounts deducted were not premised on careful calculations by the unions, subject to audit, of which of the unions’ expenditures fell within the chargeable and nonchargeable categories; (2) just as the hearing before the IELRB was about to get under way, “the unions were still scrabbling about trying to determine how their employees spent their time for the year in question”; (3) the IEA’s conclusions as to what portions of its expenditures were chargeable to nonmembers were based on the Dolan v. Rockford School District No. 205 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 19, 1985, No. 84—C—2029), decision and the IEA’s representation fee umpire report, both of which dealt with information which was two to three years old; and (4) the NEA’s determinations of its chargeable expenditures were based on a representation fee umpire report which dealt with two-year-old information. The petitioners assert the escrowing of their fair-share fees did not cure the errors in the calculation of the fair-share fees withheld from their pay.

The unions contend the representation fee umpire reports, on which they relied in determining the fair-share fees to be withheld from the objectors’ salaries and escrowed, contained the most recent data as to union expenditures available at the time. The unions also assert the requirement of verification by an independent auditor of— (1) amounts withheld from objectors’ salaries and escrowed and (2) the escrow figure itself — applies only if, upon the filing of objections, the unions choose to escrow less than the entire amount of the previously determined fair-share fees. The unions point out in this case, they escrowed the entire amount of the objectors’ fair-share fees.

The IELRB did not specifically address this phase of petitioners’ argument in its opinion and order.

As noted by the unions, Hudson does not require an audit with regard to the amounts withheld from the salaries of nonmember objectors and placed in escrow pending a decision on the objections, so long as the entire amounts withheld are placed in escrow. A union is required to provide independent verification and an independent audit of the amount of fair-share fees escrowed only when it seeks to utilize a portion of the fair-share fees withheld from the salaries of objectors while their objections are pending. (Hudson, 475 U.S. at 310 n.23, 89 L. Ed. 2d at 249 n.23, 106 S. Ct. at 1078 n.23.) In this case, it is undisputed all amounts withheld from the petitioners’ salaries as fair-share fees were escrowed pending resolution of the petitioners’ objections. Thus, the failure of the unions to obtain audits and verification of the amounts withheld from the petitioners’ salaries and es-crowed did not violate any of the petitioners’ constitutional rights.

The Hudson decision does state unions must provide an “appropriately justified advance reduction” of the fair-share fees of nonmembers. (Hudson, 475 U.S. at 309, 89 L. Ed. 2d at 249, 106 S. Ct. at 1077.) However, the reduction need only be in the amount “undisputably used for political or ideological functions.” (Damiano v. Matish (6th Cir. 1987), 830 F.2d 1363, 1369, 126 L.R.R.M. 2727, 2732.) The unions’ reliance on the representation fee umpire reports for preceding years was a good-faith effort to comply with this requirement. At the beginning of a school year, data concerning the amount spent on political and ideological activities in preceding years is the most accurate data available concerning the amounts likely to be spent on such activities in the ensuing year, absent a projected dramatic shift in a union’s spending patterns. In the present case, there is no evidence of such an alteration of any of the unions’ spending patterns. Moreover, it is apparent that the term “appropriately justified,” as used in the above-referenced portion of the Hudson opinion, relates only to the data which unions must initially provide to all fee payors. As we read the Hudson decision, it does not require unions to premise the amounts withheld from objectors’ pay following the filing of objections on extremely detailed projections of union expenditures in the upcoming school year, absent a substantial shift in union spending patterns from previous years. None of the cases cited in support of this argument support a contrary conclusion. We hold the amounts deducted as fair-share fees from petitioners’ salaries after receipt of their objections were not excessive and were adequately supported by the best information available to the unions at the time.

IV. CALCULATION OF FAIR-SHARE FEES

A. STANDARD OF REVIEW

The petitioners assert that in reviewing the IELRB’s findings of fact as to what union expenses are chargeable to nonmembers, the normal standard of review applicable to administrative agency decisions does not apply. Rather, they assert in cases such as this, which involve first amendment rights, courts must independently review the administrative agency’s factual findings.

As noted by petitioners, the Supreme Court in Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc. (1984), 466 U.S. 485, 80 L. Ed. 2d 502, 104 S. Ct. 1949, a product disparagement action involving a “public figure” plaintiff, held that in determining whether actual malice is present in such cases, courts must independently review the evidence. The requirement of independent appellate review established in Bose has subsequently been applied in cases other than defamation actions where first amendment rights were at issue. (E.g., Don’s Porta Signs, Inc. v. City of Clearwater (11th Cir. 1987), 829 F.2d 1051 (city ordinance governing use of portable outdoor advertising signs).) Some decisions hold this standard of review applies only in situations where the trial court has rejected a first amendment claim. See Daily Herald Co. v. Munro (9th Cir. 1988), 838 F.2d 380; Planned Parenthood Association/Chicago Area v. Chicago Transit Authority (7th Cir. 1985), 767 F.2d 1225.

In most cases involving fair-share fees, including this one, there is no factual dispute as to the amount of money actually spent on various union activities. Rather, the controversy concerns whether the various union activities are related to collective bargaining to the extent that nonmember fee payors may be required to support them. This is basically a question of law as opposed to a question of fact. Thus the principle that findings and conclusions of administrative agencies on questions of fact shall be held prima facie true and correct (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 110, par. 3—110) is inapplicable to this question. Instead, the rule that courts of review are not bound by an administrative agency’s conclusions of l