Heroy v. Heroy (385 Ill. App. 3d 640, 2008)

JUSTICE GREIMAN

delivered the opinion of the court:

In November 2006, the circuit court of Cook County entered an order dissolving the 26-year marriage of respondent David Heroy and petitioner Donna Tuke Heroy. In addition to dissolving their union, the court made findings of fact pertaining to the value of the couple’s marital and nonmarital estates and distributed the marital estate between the parties. Specifically, the trial court awarded David 45% of the marital property and Donna 55% of the marital property. The trial court further ordered that Donna receive $35,000 per month in permanent maintenance as well as retroactive temporary maintenance in the amount of $4,500 per month. Both parties appeal various orders entered in the trial court. On appeal, David disputes the maintenance and property distribution awards ordered by the trial court. Specifically, David contends that the trial court failed to properly consider the relevant factors outlined in the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act (Act) (750 ILCS 5/101 et seq. (West 2006)) in distributing the marital property and awarding maintenance and committed several valuation errors. Donna, in turn, contends that the trial court erred in finding that various real estate holdings acquired by David during the marriage and several accounts established by David during the marriage were nonmarital property. We affirm as modified and remand with directions.

David and Donna married on September 13, 1980. At the time of their union, both parties had obtained law degrees and had established professional careers. Donna was working full-time as a law librarian, while David was a practicing attorney. During their union, the Heroys had three children. Following the birth of the couple’s second child, Donna quit her career as a law librarian and devoted the majority of her time to raising the couple’s children and managing the household. David continued working as an attorney throughout the duration of the marriage and was the primary breadwinner of the family.

On September 30, 2003, Donna filed a petition for dissolution of marriage. David responded with a counterpetition for dissolution of marriage, alleging irreconcilable differences. Thereafter, Donna and David entered into a joint-parenting agreement with respect to their minor son John, which provided for Donna to be John’s primary residential parent and for David to finance John’s educational expenses. In addition, the parties conducted discovery and filed various motions pertaining to the nature and value of their marital and nonmarital assets. The trial court entered a number of summary judgment orders resolving issues related to the value and classification of various assets.

The primary dispute between the parties concerned issues of property distribution and maintenance. Donna requested $63,000 per month in permanent maintenance and 65% of the marital estate. She also requested retroactive temporary monthly maintenance amounting to $10,000 to compensate her for her expenses during the divorce proceedings. David, in turn, proposed an equal division of the marital estate in lieu of any maintenance. The trial court conducted a hearing to resolve the parties’ dispute concerning the distribution of marital assets as well as the issue of maintenance.

At the hearing, Donna and David provided testimony about the roles they assumed during the marriage as well as the standard of living that they enjoyed. At the time of their union, Donna and David had completed their educations and were working professionals. Donna had received a master of library science degree from Indiana University as well as a juris doctorate degree from DePaul University, and at the time of their marriage in 1980, she was employed full-time as the head law librarian at Friedman and Koven. David also held a juris doctorate degree, which he received from the University of Michigan, and was a practicing attorney at Gardner, Carton and Douglas when they married. Following their union, the couple embarked on divergent career paths.

In 1981, Donna was hired as the chief law librarian at Winston and Strawn. She also started her own publishing company, Alert Publications, Inc. (Alert), which published newsletters for use in law and business libraries. On January 7, 1983, Donna gave birth to Elizabeth, the couple’s first child. After taking a three- to four-month maternity leave, Donna resumed her full-time job at Winston and Strawn. Emily, the couple’s second child, was born on February 7, 1985. Donna initially returned to work part-time following Emily’s birth, but resigned her position as chief law librarian at Winston and Strawn in 1987. Following her resignation, Donna never resumed full-time employment outside of the home. Instead, she devoted approximately 10 hours per week to her publishing company, earning $5,000 annually. Donna gave birth to the couple’s final child, John, on April 25, 1990.

David, however, continued working throughout the marriage and was the family’s primary source of economic support. He began his legal career at Gardner, Carton and Douglas in 1976, earning approximately $18,000 per year. His salary rose to approximately $240,000 per year. In 1989 David commenced employment at Neal, Gerber and Eisenberg, where he became the chairperson of the bankruptcy department, earning approximately $350,000 to $475,000 annually. David then transferred to Bell Boyd & Lloyd in 1997, where he was the chairperson of the firm’s bankruptcy department as well as a corporate partner. In 2000, David was named an equity partner at the firm and became a member of the firm’s executive committee. Despite his high earnings, David indicated at the hearing that he expected a 30% to 40% decrease in his compensation over the next two to three years due to fundamental changes in the bankruptcy business. In addition to receiving income from his law firm, David indicated that throughout the marriage he received substantial stock and real estate rental income from Angola Wire Products, Inc. (AWP), a company started by his parents in 1961 that customizes steel wire products. Because David holds the office of AWP’s assistant secretary, he also receives an $800 monthly honorarium from AWE

Despite their different career paths, Donna and David were both actively involved in the lives of their children. When the children were younger, Donna handled all of the details pertaining to their medical care and was active in their social lives. She threw the children birthday parties, planned play dates, and helped them select and make Halloween costumes. Raised Roman Catholic, Donna also took control over the children’s religious upbringing and enrolled them in Sunday School. David, in turn, worked until 7 or 8 p.m. each night, but would read to the children upon his return home. In addition, he taught each of the children how to ride bicycles and spent significant time with them on the weekends.

Each of the Heroy children played musical instruments, and Donna and David were both active in their children’s musical endeavors. They both drove their children to their music lessons and summer music camps and attended their musical recitals. Donna also enrolled in a music note-reading class to better assist her children with their music efforts, while David assumed the role of John’s “Suzuki coach,” which involved a 10- to 15-hour weekly commitment on David’s part.

Donna and David also assumed active roles in their children’s educational lives. The Heroys enrolled their children in private schools, which required significant parental involvement. While their children attended the Lincoln Park Cooperative Nursery School, Donna and David both spent time in the classroom and Donna was president of the school board from 1986 to 1987 and was active on several committees. Following their completion of the Lincoln Park Cooperative Nursery School, the Heroy children attended The Latin School. Donna and David both attended parent-teacher conferences and assemblies at The Latin School and David served as a trustee of the school for nine years.

All of the Heroy children attended boarding school during high school: Elizabeth attended Phillips Academy in Andover, Massachusetts, during her junior and senior years; Emily was enrolled in The Interlochen Arts Academy in Michigan during her junior and senior years; and John began attending Phillips Academy as a freshman in high school and was still enrolled at Phillips at the time of the hearing. David thoroughly investigated the boarding schools prior to enrolling his children in them, and Donna, in turn, helped the children move into their boarding school residences. David and Donna both attended “Parents Weekend” at their children’s schools, and when Elizabeth and Emily completed high school, assisted them with their college selection efforts. Donna traveled with their daughters to visit various schools around the country in which they had expressed an interest, and both David and Donna read over, and provided feedback on, their respective college admissions essays. Elizabeth attended Northwestern University and then transferred to Brown University, while Emily received her degree from New York University. David paid each of his daughters’ college tuition bills. Moreover, upon Elizabeth’s graduation, David helped Elizabeth obtain interviews and secure a job.

The Heroys purchased several upscale residences throughout their 26-year union. Shortly after their marriage, Donna and David purchased a co-operative apartment located at 399 West Fullerton in Chicago. The 3,000-square-foot unit contained three bedrooms, a dining room, living room, and a library, as well as several wood-burning fireplaces. Their residence was located in a vintage building that was equipped with indoor parking, a 24-hour doorman, and a garage valet service. Immediately following their purchase, the Heroys spent' several hundred thousand dollars renovating the residence and Donna indicated that she assumed an active role in the renovation process, selecting various colors and materials to be used in their renovation project.

After John’s birth, the Heroys moved to another co-operative apartment, located at 2450 North Lakeview. They remained in the residence throughout the remainder of their union. The four-bedroom 6,000-square-foot apartment was located in a building erected in the 1920s by famous architect Howard Van Doren Shaw and was featured in a book on Chicago apartments. In addition to the four master bedrooms, the residence contained a kitchen, living room, dining room, library, laundry room, breakfast room, wine closet, and five fireplaces. As with their prior residence, the Heroys also conducted extensive renovation on this apartment, spending approximately $1 million on improvements to the property shortly after the purchase. As with their prior renovation efforts, Donna indicated that she was very involved with the project and had frequent interactions with decorators and workmen. David and Donna both flew to England several times to purchase antiques and lighting fixtures for their home. The Heroys conducted minor renovation on the residence several years later, spending approximately $200,000 to $300,000 on the project. During the divorce proceedings, the parties agreed to sell their marital residence for $7,051,000.

In addition to their Chicago residences, the Heroys purchased a Michigan vacation home in 1989. The couple renovated the house twice, and Donna and David both indicated that they were actively involved in the renovation efforts. Purchased for approximately $235,000, the parties agreed that the value of the residence at the time of the divorce was $768,000. The Heroy family used their Michigan vacation home for approximately four to five weekends per year in the summer months.

In addition to enjoying their summer vacation home, the Heroys traveled extensively throughout their marriage and took a number of domestic and international trips with their children. Their destinations included: California and Florida as well as London, Cornwall, Portugal, Dublin, Prague, Paris, Egypt, and Budapest. Moreover, in 1998 Donna and the children lived in England for six months so they could experience living abroad. When the Heroys traveled, they flew in either first or business class, although David indicated that he purchased tickets in economy class and used his frequent flier miles to upgrade his family to first or business class seats. The Heroys also stayed at high-end hotels and dined at expensive restaurants during their travels. Because some of their family trips corresponded with David’s business travel, David was able to write off some portions of the family’s travel expenses as business expenses.

In addition to spending substantial sums on real estate and travel, the Heroys also amassed impressive wine, art, and antique collections, worth hundreds of thousands of dollars. Moreover, throughout their union, the Heroys employed household help. Most notably, the couple hired Shirley King in 1984 to assist Donna in caring for the children. Shirley worked every weekday from 7 a.m. to 6 p.m. and remained in their employ until the divorce commenced. In addition, the Heroys employed a cleaning woman who worked two days a week, a laundress who worked once a week, as well as various private chefs.

Both parties provided expert testimony about the Heroys’ spending history and Donna’s maintenance needs. Cathleen BelmonteNewman, a certified divorce financial analyst, testified as Donna’s retained financial expert. In performing her lifestyle analysis in the case, Belmonte-N ewman testified that she initially reviewed credit card records, bank statements, and cancelled check records, which she then input into a computerized database. She explained that the database produced a cash flow report that depicted a historical perspective of spending, which she then used to compile a list of projected expenses. In reviewing the Heroys’ spending history, BelmonteNewman indicated that she asked Donna to clarify any charges that were not readily apparent. Belmonte-N ewman acknowledged that her analysis did not include any business expense reimbursements that David received from Bell Boyd and Lloyd because she did not have access to that information. Moreover, Alert’s expenses were also excluded from her analysis. Accordingly, she did not include Shirley King’s $1,500 monthly salary, which was paid by Alert, in the Heroys’ lifestyle analysis. Based on her review of the Heroys’ financial records, Belmonte-Newman determined that between January 1, 2000, to December 31, 2003, the Heroys spent a total of $5.8 million or $1,451 million per year. The $5.8 million figure included legal fees and federal taxes paid by the parties but did not include any expenses for Alert or AWE After compiling the parties’ spending history, Belmonte-Newman concluded that Donna’s projected monthly future expenses amounted to $56,016, which included the children’s expenses, including educational expenses. Moreover, Belmonte-Newman acknowledged that in projecting Donna’s future expenses, she assumed that Donna would have a new residence with a purchase price of $2 million, secured by a 15-year, $1 million mortgage. This assumption was based on conversations she had with Donna concerning Donna’s future living arrangements. Belmonte-Newman also acknowledged that her estimate did not make an allowance for any property settlement, which she conceded would decrease Donna’s projected expenses.

Bruce Richman, a certified public accountant and divorce financial analyst, testified as David’s retained financial expert. He reviewed the Heroy’s financial records, interviewed David, and attended Donna’s deposition to gather information with which he was able to analyze the Heroys’ expenditures from 2000 to 2004. In performing his analysis, Richman utilized a similar methodology to that employed by Belmonte-Newman. Specifically, he input data provided by credit card statements and check registers into a database, and segregated the expenses into various categories including transportation, entertainment, and dependent expenses. Based on his conversations with David, Richman was able to come up with figures representing the Heroys’ annual gross and net expenditures. Specifically, he received data from David’s law firm which allowed him to account for reimbursed business expenses and to ascertain the Heroys’ net expenditures. Richmond also excluded expenses that he deemed “capital expenditures,” including money the Heroys spent on their wine, art, and antique collections as part of their net expenditures.

Richmond reviewed the report prepared by Cathleen BelmonteNewman and indicated that he disagreed with some of her conclusions, specifically, the amount of monthly expenses that Donna reasonably needed subsequent to the divorce. Richman opined that BelmonteNewman’s “report significantly overstates the monthly expenses reasonably needed for Mrs. Heroy.” In particular, Richmond indicated that he felt that Belmonte-Newman’s projected housing cost was “way too high” and that the projections for various other expenses including car, clothing, travel, decorating and repair expenses were also inflated. Accordingly, he made adjustments to various expense projections and concluded that Donna’s reasonable monthly expenses totaled $11,547.

The parties also provided expert testimony concerning Donna’s employability. Grace Gianforte, a licensed clinical professional counselor, was David’s retained expert and provided a vocational evaluation of Donna. Specifically, Gianforte reviewed Donna’s educational degrees, work background and training to determine her future employability and earning potential. She did not interview Donna herself, however, and did not know when Donna stopped working full time. Nonetheless, Gianforte opined that “Donna is eminently employable,” based on the fact that Donna worked for 12 years as a law librarian and 19 years as a writer, editor and publisher for Alert. Gianforte indicated that the publishing industry would provide Donna with an earning potential from between $107,000 to $171,000. Moreover, a career as a law librarian would provide Donna with an earning potential of approximately $127,000 per year. Gianforte did not assess Donna’s earning potential as an attorney, however, because she was aware Donna’s law license had lapsed and, accordingly, she did not consider a legal career to be a likely employment option. Gianforte acknowledged that her conclusions as to the job market for publishers and law librarians was based on national and statewide data and that she did not conduct any research on the job market in Chicago.

Donna, in turn, provided the testimony of two experts who discussed her employment prospects in the publishing and law librarian fields. David Nelson, a journalism professor at Northwestern University and an expert in the newsletter and publishing industry, provided testimony pertaining to Donna’s employment prospects in the publishing industry. After revealing that the newsletter industry was in a state of decline, Nelson opined that Donna did not possess the requisite skill sets to obtain a high paying job in the publishing industry, explaining that “[s]he doesn’t have marketing skills, she hasn’t kept up with industry standards in the newsletter industry or comparable publishing opportunities.” Accordingly, Nelson indicated that the conclusions drawn by David’s expert, Grace Gianforte, regarding Donna’s strong job prospects in the publishing industry were “not supported.” With respect to Alert, Nelson noted several problems with the continued viability of Donna’s publishing company. Specifically, he noted the lack of marketing efforts and the failure to make the newsletters available electronically.

John C. Strzynski, a former national recruiter for law librarians and a qualified expert in the law librarian industry, offered testimony as to Donna’s employment prospects as a law librarian and indicated that he “disagree[d] completely” with Gianforte’s conclusions as to Donna’s employability as a law librarian. Initially, he noted that because of technological advances, the job prospects for law librarians, particularly the prospects for law librarians in Chicago, was “rather pathetic.” Moreover, with respect to Donna’s prospects in finding employment in today’s market, Stryznski opined that “she’s tremendously disadvantaged in any attempt to get back into the law library profession” due to her long absence from the workforce. In the report that he prepared in which he analyzed Donna’s job prospects, Strzynski explained:

“The sad fact is that she is not qualified. She has not worked in the profession for twenty years. This fact alone will prevent her from competing for jobs. Further, she lacks critical technological skills. She has not worked with online catalogs. She has no experience working with imaging systems. She has not created web-based platforms for the delivery of legal information. Third, she will be in competition with many qualified law librarians who have been honing their skills while Ms. Heroy has been away. In conclusion, the simple truth is that Ms. Heroy has not kept up and the profession has passed her by.”

Strzynski, however, conceded that it was possible that Donna could learn the skills necessary to be eligible for a head law librarian position, but indicated that it would be “extremely tough [for Donna] to get back in” to the profession.

In addition to providing the trial court with evidence pertaining to their standard of living, Donna’s maintenance needs and employment prospects, the parties also submitted evidence pertaining to the valuation of various marital and nonmarital assets. Specifically, the parties submitted reports in which their retained experts valued Alert as well as David’s AWP stock and real estate interests.

After hearing 19 days of testimony, the trial court filed a thoughtful and comprehensive written 58-page order on November 21, 2006, in which it made various factual findings and resolved issues pertaining to property distribution and maintenance. In pertinent part, the trial court found that the Heroys’ marital estate was valued at $8.7 million and consisted of two homes, retirement plans, personal property, and Donna’s publishing business. The court further found that Donna and David had vastly different nonmarital estates. Donna’s “nominal” nonmarital estate was valued at $154,012.22 and consisted of an inheritance and her jewelry collection. David’s “substantial nonmarital estate” included his real estate and stock interests in AWP and totaled $4,040,944.80.

After making various findings pertaining to the value of certain property, the trial court made rulings on the issues of property distribution and maintenance. In distributing the marital property the court held:

“Based on the parties’ 26 year marriage, Donna’s age, her limited ability to earn income or acquire assets in the future, David’s earning potential, the value of the marital estate in comparison to David’s income and David’s large non-marital estate, the court finds that it is appropriate to award a disproportionate share of the assets to Donna. Accordingly, Donna is awarded 55% of the marital estate and David is awarded 45% of the marital estate.”

Regarding the issue of maintenance, the court found:

“During the parties’ 26 year marriage, Donna stopped working to devote her time to raising three children and managing the Heroy household. Donna has been out of work for 20 years. As a result, her earning potential and employment opportunities are severely limited. It is unlikely that Donna will ever be able to support herself in any reasonable approximation of the standard of living established during the marriage.”

Accordingly, the court ordered that Donna receive “$35,000 per month in maintenance, which is taxable to Donna and deductible by David. The maintenance is modifiable or will terminate pursuant to 750 ILCS 5/504.” The court further found that Donna was entitled to retroactive temporary maintenance holding: “Donna is awarded maintenance in the amount of $4,500 per month retroactive to November 24, 2003. This is in addition to the $6,000 a month temporary support David paid to Donna during the divorce proceedings.”

Both parties filed timely notices of appeal disputing various rulings made by the trial court. We will first address the arguments that David has raised on appeal.

David first disputes the propriety of the maintenance award. Specifically, he contends that the trial court erred in awarding Donna permanent maintenance because she holds two advanced degrees and is thus capable of supporting herself.

As a general rule, “a trial court’s determination as to the awarding of maintenance is presumed to be correct.” In re Marriage of Donovan, 361 Ill. App. 3d 1059, 1063 (2005). Because maintenance awards are within the sound discretion of the trial court, we will not disturb a maintenance award absent an abuse of discretion. In re Marriage of Schneider, 214 Ill. 2d 152, 173 (2005); In re Marriage of Samardzija, 365 Ill. App. 3d 702, 707 (2006). An abuse of discretion exists only where we can conclude that no reasonable person would take the view adopted by the trial court. Schneider, 214 Ill. 2d at 173; In re Marriage of Hasabnis, 322 Ill. App. 3d 582, 592 (2001). It is the burden of the party challenging the maintenance award to show an abuse of discretion. Schneider, 214 Ill. 2d at 173; In re Marriage of Wojcik, 362 Ill. App. 3d 144, 168 (2005).

Maintenance awards are governed by section 504 of the Act, which sets forth 12 factors to consider in awarding a spouse maintenance. 750 ILCS 5/504 (West 2006). These factors include:

“(1) the income and property of each party, including marital property apportioned and non-marital property assigned to the party seeking maintenance;

(2) the needs of each party;

(3) the present and future earning capacity of each party;

(4) any impairment of the present and future earning capacity of the party seeking maintenance due to that party devoting time to domestic duties or having forgone or delayed education, training, employment, or career opportunities due to the marriage;

(5) the time necessary to enable the party seeking maintenance to acquire appropriate education, training, and employment, and whether that party is able to support himself or herself through appropriate employment or is the custodian of a child making it appropriate that the custodian not seek employment;

(6) the standard of living established during the marriage;

(7) the duration of the marriage;

(8) the age and the physical and emotional condition of both parties;

(9) the tax consequences of the property division upon the respective economic circumstances of the parties;

(10) contributions and services by the party seeking maintenance to the education, training, career or career potential, or license of the other spouse;

(11) any valid agreement of the parties; and

(12) any other factor that the court expressly finds to be just and equitable.” 750 ILCS 5/504 (West 2006).

No single factor is determinative when considering the duration and amount of a maintenance award, and the trial court is not limited to a review of the factors outlined in section 504 of the Act in setting a maintenance award. In re Marriage of Murphy, 359 Ill. App. 3d 289, 304 (2005).

The Act allows for both temporary and permanent maintenance awards. 750 ILCS 5/504(a) (West 2006) (“the court may grant a temporary or permanent maintenance award for either spouse”). As a general rule, “[mjaintenance is intended to be rehabilitative in nature to allow a dependent spouse to become financially independent. Permanent maintenance is appropriate, however, where a spouse is unemployable or employable only at an income substantially lower than the previous standard of living.” In re Marriage of Samardzija, 365 Ill. App. 3d at 708; see also In re Marriage of Pearson, 236 Ill. App. 3d 337, 347-48 (1992). Ultimately, a maintenance award, whether it is temporary or permanent, must be reasonable (In re Marriage of Reynard, 378 Ill. App. 3d 997, 1002 (2008)) and what is reasonable depends upon the facts of each individual case (Vendredi v. Vendredi, 230 Ill. App. 3d 1061, 1067 (1992)).

On appeal, David contests not only the permanent nature of the award but also the amount of the award. We will first address his argument contesting the permanency of Donna’s maintenance award. In this case, David contends that “[a]n award of permanent maintenance is appropriate only where the recipient spouse is unable to support herself’ and that Donna, who has a law degree, and is a “nationally recognized law librarian” and publisher has the means to support herself.

Contrary to David’s assertion, in reviewing the propriety of the trial court’s permanent maintenance award, we must consider not simply whether Donna is able to support herself, but rather, whether she is able to support herself at the standard of living enjoyed by the parties during the marriage. In re Marriage of Keip, 332 Ill. App. 3d 876, 880 (2002) (recognizing that “[tjhe reasonable needs of the party seeking maintenance are to be measured by the standard of living the parties enjoyed during the marriage”). Accordingly, “a permanent maintenance award is justified where the spouse has employment skills but there is a discrepancy between her probable future income and the amount of income that would provide the standard of living she enjoyed while married.” In re Marriage of Selinger, 351 Ill. App. 3d 611, 619 (2004). In addition, permanent maintenance is generally considered appropriate in circumstances where a spouse has devoted significant time to raising a family in lieu of pursuing a career. See In re Marriage of Culp, 341 Ill. App. 3d 390, 398 (2003) (“In lengthy marriages in which the recipient of maintenance served as caregiver for the children, ‘ “[tjhere is no question but that Illinois courts give consideration to a more permanent award of maintenance to wives who have undertaken to *** raise and support the family” ’ ”), quoting In re Marriage of Drury, 317 Ill. App. 3d 201, 206 (2000), quoting In re Marriage of Rubinstein, 145 Ill. App. 3d 31, 40 (1986).

In this case, there is no dispute that Donna was employed full-time as a law librarian when she married David, but that she quit working outside of the home shortly after the birth of the Heroys’ second child, devoting the majority of her time to raising the children and managing the household. Although it is true that Donna did work for Alert throughout the marriage, it was only for approximately 10 hours per week and she earned only $5,000 per year. At the trial, both parties submitted expert testimony pertaining to Donna’s employment prospects. Although the experts expressed disagreement over Donna’s employability and the potential salary that she could earn, there is no dispute that Donna would be unable to support herself at the “lavish” lifestyle that the trial court found the Heroys enjoyed during their 26-year marriage. Indeed, the trial court found that “[e]ven assuming that Donna could earn over $100,000, as opined by David’s experts, her income and assets are not sufficient to approximate her standard of living during the marriage.” The record supports these findings, and, accordingly, we do not find that the trial court abused its discretion in awarding Donna permanent maintenance.

David, however, also disputes the amount of the maintenance award ordered by the trial court. Specifically, he contends that the trial court failed to properly consider and apply the relevant statutory factors and instead erroneously relied on the testimony of Donna’s expert, who overestimated Donna’s needs, in awarding Donna $35,000 per month in maintenance.

In the trial court, both parties submitted expert testimony concerning the standard of living that the parties enjoyed during the marriage as well as Donna’s reasonable monthly expenses. Both experts reviewed data pertaining to the couple’s expenditures from 2000 to 2003 and agreed that this period was the best one to review in order to quantify the Heroys’ lifestyle. Moreover, the experts agreed that $6.3 million reflected the amount that passed through the Heroys’ accounts during the relevant time period. The experts differed as to Donna’s needs, however. Cathleen Belmonte-N ewman, Donna’s expert, prepared a report in which she concluded that Donna’s reasonable expenses totaled $56,016 per month and allocated the expenses among various categories. For example, she allocated $518 per month for groceries, $788 per month for the purchase of a new car every four years, and $4,969 per month for travel expenses.

Bruce Richman, David’s expert, also submitted a report, in which he concluded that Donna’s reasonable expenses were only $11,547 per month. Richman also completed a rebuttal report in which he concluded that Belmonte-N ewman overestimated a number of Donna’s reasonable monthly expenses. In its order, the trial court indicated that it considered the reports prepared by the parties’ competing experts. Ultimately, however, the court adopted neither figure offered by the experts and, instead, found that $35,000 represented a reasonable award of monthly permanent maintenance. Nevertheless, David contends that “the trial court must have relied on [the testimony of Donna’s expert] because its ruling resulted in income to Donna four to five times [David’s expert’s] conclusion of her needs.” He cites several examples of Belmonte-Newman’s most “egregious” calculation errors.

David is correct that some of the estimated monthly expenses that Belmonte-Newman identified did not accord with the actual spending practices of the parties during the marriage. For example, with respect to Donna’s projected travel expenses, Belmonte-Newman included three annual trips to Portland at an estimated cost of $3,600 per year even though Donna had only taken a total of seven trips to Portland over the past four years at an average cost of $400 per year. BelmonteNewman also acknowledged that she included two annual trips to New York in her analysis at an estimated cost of $4,600 per year despite the fact that Donna had taken only four such trips in the past four years at an average cost of $600 per trip. In addition, BelmonteNewman budgeted $788 per month to permit Donna to purchase a new car every four years despite the fact that the Heroys had kept their vehicles for 7 to 10 years during the course of their marriage before making a new purchase. Belmonte-Newman also acknowledged that some of her estimates were not based on historical data but, rather, were based on projections provided by Donna. For example, the $768 Belmonte-Newman allocated to dining, the $641 she allocated to parking, gasoline and toll expenses, and the $518 she allocated to grocery expenses were all based on Donna’s own estimates as to her projected expenses rather than any analysis of historical spending.

We note, however, that the trial court neither expressly adopted nor rejected Belmonte-Newman’s or Richman’s projections. Moreover, unlike Belmonte-Newman or Richman, the court did not allocate any specific monetary amounts toward specific spending categories. Accordingly, David’s argument that the trial court’s maintenance award was based on its acceptance of the specific amounts indicated by Belmonte-Newman regarding travel, dining, and other expenses is based on pure speculation. Moreover, we note that the trial court was not required to make" any such specific findings. See In re Marriage of Reynard, 378 Ill. App. 3d 997, 1004 (2008) (recognizing that in fixing a maintenance award, the trial court is simply required to consider the factors outlined in section 504 of the Act and that “it need not make specific findings as to the reasons for its decisions”); In re Marriage of Turrell, 335 Ill. App. 3d 297, 309 (2002) (same).

In this case, the trial court’s detailed order reveals that it conducted a careful analysis of the relevant factors in fixing the maintenance award. After hearing 19 days of testimony from the parties and from their retained experts and receiving countless exhibits into evidence, the trial court found that $35,000 per month represented a reasonable maintenance award. In arriving at its decision, the trial court identified the “most relevant statutory factors applicable in this case ***: the income and property, marital and non-marital, of each party (504(1)); the needs of each party (504(2)); the earning capacity of each party (504(3)); Donna’s contribution to the marriage (504(4)); the standard of living established during the marriage (504(6)) and the duration of the marriage (504(7)).” In pertinent part, the trial court noted that the Heroys had been married for 26 years and that Donna had been largely out of the workforce for 20 years. Because Donna “devote [d] her time to raising three children and managing the Heroy household,” the court found her “earning potential and employment opportunities [to be] severely limited.” The court also found that Donna and David had “vastly different non-marital estates” and that “[t]he resources of the parties are sufficient for both David and Donna to have a similar standard of living as established during the marriage.” The trial court’s order reveals that the maintenance award was based on its analysis of the expert testimony presented by the parties as well as the relevant factors set forth in the Act. We find no abuse of discretion.

In addition to disputing the trial court’s reliance on BelmonteNewman’s report, David also contends that the trial court failed to properly consider several of the factors identified in section 504 of the Act and thus abused its discretion in setting Donna’s maintenance award. Specifically, David asserts that the trial court failed to properly consider the income-generating potential of Donna’s property award in awarding maintenance. In particular, David notes that Donna’s net property award was valued at $4,189,240, which included nearly $2.8 million in cash. He notes that the trial court made no calculation as to the potential income that Donna could generate by making sound investments.

We disagree that the court’s failure to calculate the income-generating potential of Donna’s property award constitutes an abuse of discretion. Section 504(a)(1) requires the trial court to consider “the income and property of each party” in ascertaining a proper maintenance award (750 ILCS 5/504(a)(l) (West 2006)). The trial court’s order reflects that it did so. In pertinent part, the trial court noted:

“The law does not require Donna to sell assets or impair capital in order to maintain herself in a manner commensurate with the standard of living established during the marriage, particularly since David has sufficient income and assets to meet both his and Donna’s needs going forward. *** However, the court can, and has, considered the income produced from the assets she received in the division of marital assets.” (Emphasis added.)

The trial court was not required to apply various rates of return and make specific findings regarding the amount of income that Donna’s assets could produce. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Zeman, 198 Ill. App. 3d 722, 733 (1990) (rejecting the husband’s contention that the trial court failed to consider the income potential of the wife’s property based on the trial court’s acknowledgment that the wife “ ‘has inherited substantial sums, the majority of which are income producing’ ” even though the trial court made no calculations); see also In re Marriage of Mittra, 114 Ill. App. 3d 627, 632 (1983) (rejecting the respondent’s contention that the trial court’s failure to calculate the income-generating potential of the petitioner’s property evidenced a failure to appropriately consider this factor in awarding maintenance because “[t]he fact that [the trial court] did not determine with mathematical certainty the amount of return does not indicate [it] failed to consider this factor, among several, in fixing the award”).

David also contends that the trial court failed to properly consider the future income that Donna would receive from retirement assets. In pertinent part, David notes that the trial court awarded Donna $963,968 in retirement assets, but failed to specifically mention Donna’s access to those assets or make specific findings as to the potential revenue that Donna could receive from those assets. We acknowledge that a trial court may consider future income from retirement benefits in determining the proper duration or amount of a maintenance award. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Claydon, 306 Ill. App. 3d 895, 904 (1999) (finding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in fixing a six-year temporary maintenance award, in part, because the “petitioner will be able to withdraw interest income from the 401(k) assets awarded to her in approximately six years”); In re Marriage of Harding, 189 Ill. App. 3d 663, 680 (1989) (finding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in declining to award the petitioner maintenance, in part, because she was awarded $560,000 of the respondent’s defined benefits plan which earned $42,000 per year). Although the trial court did not specifically reference the future income that Donna could receive from various retirement assets, the trial court’s comprehensive order reflected that it considered the income of the parties in fixing the maintenance award. We disagree that the trial court’s failure to make specific findings or calculations concerning the future income she could receive from retirement assets renders the maintenance award an abuse of discretion. See Reynard, 378 Ill. App. 3d at 1004 (“Although the trial court must consider all the relevant statutory factors, it need not make specific findings as to the reasons for its decisions”).

We also reject David’s contention that the trial court failed to properly consider Donna’s ability to generate income from employment in fixing the maintenance award. As demonstrated above in reviewing the propriety of the permanent nature of the award, the court carefully considered Donna’s employment opportunities and ability to earn income in ordering David to pay her $35,000 per month in permanent maintenance. David, however, emphasizes that “Donna is a lawyer and an accomplished law librarian,” and relies on In re Marriage of Schuster, 224 Ill. App. 3d 958, 970-72 (1992), where the Second District found that the trial court’s failure to award the husband rehabilitative maintenance did not constitute an abuse of discretion because he was 32 years old, possessed a law degree, and had practiced law for approximately eight years immediately preceding the divorce. We find, however, that the facts in Schuster are is readily distinguishable from the case at bar. Indeed, here Donna was 56 years old at the time the trial court entered the judgment dissolving the Heroys’ marriage and had never practiced law despite the fact that she obtained a law degree. Moreover, although she was employed as a law librarian at the beginning of the marriage, she quit shortly after the birth of the couple’s second daughter and has not worked as a law librarian in nearly 20 years. The trial court recognized these facts, finding:

“At age 56, Donna has limited employment opportunities. She does not have the qualifications to return to the work force and earn sufficient income to maintain her high marital standard of living. This is due to numerous factors, including the evolution of the law librarian profession, her education and experience. The evidence shows that Donna could earn approximately $30,000 a year as a law librarian and may be able to gain skills in a few years to earn a greater salary. According to Donna’s expert, Mr. Fischer, Donna may be able to earn $20,000 working at Alert. Even assuming that Donna could earn over $100,000, as opined by David’s experts, her income and assets are not sufficient to approximate her standard of living during the marriage.”

The record supports these findings, and, accordingly, David’s contention that the trial court failed to properly consider Donna’s earning potential in fixing the maintenance award is without merit.

Finally, David contends that the trial court failed to properly consider his income and future earning capacity in determining the proper maintenance amount. We disagree. The trial court’s order reflected that it carefully considered David’s income. In pertinent part, the trial court noted that based on the income tax return filed in 2005, he earned $1,387,690 from Bell Boyd and Lloyd, and that his total income, including the income he received from AWI’ was in excess of $2 million. The Heroy s’ 2004 income tax return reflected that David’s total income amounted to $1,995,675. The trial court also acknowledged the reports prepared by the parties’ experts pertaining to David’s income:

“Donna’s expert, Allen Berger, a certified public accountant with Blackman Kallick, and David’s expert, Mr. Richman, both prepared ‘cash flow reports’ regarding David’s income for the years 2003 to 2005. Although the experts disagree as to whether certain elements of David’s income constitute ‘cash flow’ there is essentially no disagreement with regard to the net economic benefits David receives from all sources.

As part of his rebuttal report to Mr. Berger’s cash flow reports, Mr. Richman prepared an analysis of Mr. Berger’s cash flow analysis. According to David’s expert, for the year 2005, Mr. Berger determined that David’s net cash flow was $1,565,459. Mr. Rich-man subtracted $268,483 from that figure arriving at a net cash flow of $1,296,976.”

Ultimately, the trial court concluded that “[t]he evidence shows that David will continue to receive substantial income” from his position at Bell Boyd and Lloyd as well as from his various AWP assets. Although David apparently disputes the conclusions drawn by the trial court as to his true net cash flow income, we disagree that the trial court failed to properly consider David’s income in fixing the maintenance award.

Based on a review of the record, we find that the trial court carefully considered the relevant factors set forth in section 504 of the Act in awarding Donna $35,000 per month in permanent maintenance. Accordingly, we find no abuse of discretion and affirm the maintenance award.

In addition to disputing the trial court’s permanent maintenance award, David also contests the portion of the trial court’s order awarding Donna retroactive temporary maintenance. David disputes the propriety of the award, contending that it violated prior court orders and that the trial court failed to adequately explain its rationale in finding that Donna was entitled to retroactive temporary maintenance.

The record reflects that on November 24, 2003, after initiating dissolution proceedings, Donna filed a petition for temporary support. Throughout the proceedings, the parties entered various agreed orders, which called for David to pay Donna nontaxable support in the amount of $6,000 per month. Donna’s petition for temporary support, in which she requested a total of $16,000 per month in maintenance, was continued to trial. At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court found that Donna was entitled to temporary maintenance in the amount of $4,500 per month retroactive to November 24, 2003, the date Donna filed her petition for temporary support.

David, however, disputes the award. He contends that the order contradicts prior court orders, particularly an order entered by the trial court that required Donna to be responsible for the. credit card debt that she incurred (which included more than $80,000 in purchases at Nieman Marcus) during the divorce proceedings. The trial court’s order refutes this contention. In its order, the trial court acknowledged an order entered on July 1, 2004, requiring Donna to be solely responsible for all future credit card purchases. The trial court found the prior order “binding” and reaffirmed that “Donna is responsible for her own credit card debt.” The temporary maintenance award was based on its consideration of Donna’s needs and was not entered to require the marital estate to pay off Donna’s credit cards.

David, however, also contends that the trial court’s award of retroactive temporary maintenance was an abuse of discretion because the trial court failed to adequately explain the basis for the award. We disagree. In ordering temporary maintenance, the court held:

“The court listened to the testimony and analyzed the reports of both parties’ financial experts, Cathleen Belmonte Newman and Bruce Richman. The court also considered the parties’ testimony as to Donna’s spending. Further, the statute requires that the court consider David’s non-marital income. David saved over $1.3 million of claimed non-marital income during the course of the divorce proceedings. Accordingly, Donna is awarded maintenance in the amount of $4,500 per month retroactive to November 24, 2003. This is in addition to the $6,000 a month temporary support David paid to Donna during the divorce proceedings. The retroactive maintenance is taxable to Donna.”

Accordingly, the trial court’s order clearly reflects that its decision to award Donna retroactive temporary maintenance was based on a review of the statutory factors as well as the testimony and reports of the parties’ experts. It was not required to make specific findings in setting the retroactive maintenance award. See generally Reynard, 378 Ill. App. 3d at 1004; Turrell, 335 Ill. App. 3d at 309. Accordingly, we disagree that the trial court abused its discretion in awarding Donna retroactive temporary maintenance.

David, however, suggests that in the event that the trial court’s retroactive temporary maintenance award is proper, the award should have been funded from the marital estate prior to the property division, rather than from David’s postdivision share. We agree. The $6,000 that Donna received in temporary maintenance during the dissolution proceedings was funded by the marital estate and thus, we find that the $4,500 in monthly retroactive temporary maintenance should similarly come from the parties’ marital estate. We note, however, that the trial court’s order merely awarded Donna “maintenance in the amount of $4,500 per month retroactive to November 24, 2002.” The trial court did not specify the source from which the retroactive temporary maintenance was to come. Accordingly, we remand to the trial court to clarify its order to reflect that Donna’s temporary maintenance award should be funded by the parties’ marital estate.

Next, David disputes the portion of the trial court order pertaining to distribution of marital property. Specifically, he contends that the trial court erred in awarding Donna a disproportionate share (55%) of the marital estate.

Section 503 of the Act governs the distribution of marital property and directs courts to consider various factors and distribute marital property “in just proportions” to the spouses. 750 ILCS 5/503(d) (West 2006). These factors include:

“(1) the contribution of each party to the acquisition, preservation, or increase or decrease in value of the marital or non-marital property, including the contribution of a spouse as a homemaker or to the family unit;

(2) the dissipation by each party of the marital or non-marital property;

(3) the value of the property assigned to each spouse;

(4) the duration of the marriage;

(5) the relevant economic circumstances of each spouse when the division of property is to become effective, including the desirability of awarding the family home, or the right to live therein for reasonable periods, to the spouse having custody of the children;

(6) any obligations and rights arising from a prior marriage of either party;

(7) any antenuptial agreement of the parties;

(8) the age, health, station, occupation, amount and sources of income, vocational skills, employability, estate, liabilities, and needs of each of the parties;

(9) the custodial provisions for any children;

(10) whether the apportionment is in lieu of or in addition to maintenance;

(11) the reasonable opportunity of each spouse for future acquisition of capital assets and income; and

(12) the tax consequences of the property division upon the respective economic circumstances of the parties.” 750 ILCS 5/503(d) (West 2006).

As with maintenance awards, decisions concerning the distribution of marital property lie within the sound discretion of the trial court and will not be disturbed on appeal absent an abuse of that discretion. In re Marriage of Joynt, 375 Ill. App. 3d 817, 822 (2007). The Act does not require that property be distributed with mathematical equality; rather, “[t]he touchstone of proper apportionment is whether it is equitable in nature.” In re Marriage of Drury, 317 Ill. App. 3d 201, 211 (2000). Accordingly, depending upon the circumstances of the case “an unequal division of [marital] property may *** be appropriate.” In re Marriage of Kristie, 156 Ill. App. 3d 821, 825 (1987).

In this case, David contends that the trial court failed to properly consider the factor specified in section 503(d)(1) — “the contribution of each party to the acquisition, preservation, or increase or decrease in value of the marital or non-marital property” (750 ILCS 5/503(d)(l) (West 2006)) — in setting the property distribution award. Specifically, David asserts that the trial court abused its discretion in awarding Donna a greater share of the marital property because his “contribution to the acquisition, preservation, and increase in value of the parties’ marital property was extraordinary.” In pertinent part, he notes that he earned 99% of the family’s income since 1987 and contributed $11.9 million from his nonmarital estate. He also contends that his extraordinary efforts resulted in the sale of the couple’s marital home at a price that was more than $1 million higher than the prior sale offers entertained by Donna and her realtor during the court proceedings. In contrast, he contends that “[t]he record unambiguously demonstrates that Donna’s marital contributions were not extraordinary.”

We agree that David made significant financial contributions to the Heroys’ marital estate. However, we note that a party’s “financial contribution to the acquisition of marital assets is only one of several factors to be considered by the trial court in determining the equitable distribution of marital assets.” In re Marriage of Lee, 246 Ill. App. 3d 628, 638 (1993) (rejecting the husband’s claim that the trial court abused its discretion in awarding the wife a greater percentage of the marital assets simply because he made a greater financial contribution to the acquisition of the assets). Although a party’s greater financial contribution may support a disproportionate property award in favor of the contributing spouse (see, e.g., In re Marriage of Jones, 187 Ill. App. 3d 206 (1989); In re Marriage of Guntren, 141 Ill. App. 3d 1 (1986)), “a spouse’s greater financial contributions do not necessarily entitle him or her to a greater share of the marital assets” (In re Marriage of Scoville, 233 Ill. App. 3d 746, 758 (1992)). Indeed, “[i]n a long-term marriage, the source of the assets in acquiring marital property becomes less of a factor, and a spouse’s role as homemaker becomes greater.” Scoville, 233 Ill. App. 3d at 758.

Here, while David’s significant financial contribution weighs strongly in his favor, other factors favor Donna. As the trial court observed, Donna meaningfully contributed to the family unit during the Heroys’ 26-year marriage. She devoted the majority of her time to raising their three children and played an integral part in their educational and social lives. She also contributed meaningfully as David’s spouse by managing the household and entertaining his business associates. At the time of the hearing, Donna was 56 years old and had not worked full-time outside of the house for approximately 20 years. The trial court’s order reflects that it carefully considered the factors outlined in section 503 of the Act, including the contribution of the parties, in setting the property distribution award. Accordingly, although David was the primary economic provider during the duration of their marriage, we cannot conclude that the trial court’s order awarding Donna 55% of the marital estate constitutes an abuse of discretion.

David, however, also disputes the property distribution award because “[Donna’s] disproportionate share of the marital estate was not in lieu of maintenance.” Initially, we note that the Act provides that in distributing the marital property, the trial court is required to consider “whether the apportionment is in lieu of or in addition to maintenance” (750 ILCS 5/503(d)(10) (West 2006)). Accordingly, the Act in no way precludes a trial court from awarding a spouse both maintenance and marital property; rather, it merely requires the court to consider maintenance when equitably distributing marital property. See Jones, 187 Ill. App. 3d at 223 (recognizing that pursuant to the terms of the Act, “[t]he trial court *** is authorized to award either property or maintenance, both property and maintenance, or property in lieu of maintenance”). Moreover, we note that courts have rejected claims that the trial court abused its discretion in awarding one spouse both permanent maintenance as well as a disproportionate share of the marital estate. See, e.g., Kristie, 156 Ill. App. 3d at 823-25 (upholding a trial court order awarding the wife permanent maintenance and 65% of the net equity in the marital home, the “only substantial asset owned by the parties”); see also In re Marriage of Mayhall, 311 Ill. App. 3d 765, 767-70 (2000) (affirming a trial court order awarding the wife permanent maintenance as well as a larger share of the marital estate). Accordingly, we disagree that the trial court’s order providing Donna with a larger share of the couple’s marital estate constitutes an abuse of discretion.

David also contends that the trial court made various valuation and calculation errors in dividing the Heroys’ marital property, thus “shorting David approximately $274,810 in his marital property award.”

In a marriage dissolution action, it is the burden of both parties to provide the trial court with sufficient evidence to evaluate and distribute marital property. In re Marriage of Blackstone, 288 Ill. App. 3d 905, 910 (1997); In re Marriage of Albrecht, 266 Ill. App. 3d 399, 402 (1994). It is the responsibility of the trial court to resolve conflicting testimony concerning the valuation of marital assets. In re Marriage of Schneider, 214 Ill. 2d 152, 171 (2005); In re Marriage of Reppen-Sonneson, 299 Ill. App. 3d 691, 693 (1998). Generally, as long as the “trial court’s valuation of marital assets is within the range testified to by expert witnesses, it will not ordinarily be disturbed on appeal.” Blackstone, 288 Ill. App. 3d at 910; see also In re Marriage of Cutler, 334 Ill. App. 3d 731, 736-37 (2002) (recognizing that “[c]ourts of review have found it acceptable for a trial court to select a valuation between opposing values in evidence when a record contains conflicting evidence on the valuation”). We will not reverse a trial court’s value determination unless it is against the manifest weight of the evidence. In re Marriage of Wojcik, 362 Ill. App. 3d 144, 151-52 (2005); Cutler, 334 Ill. App. 3d at 736. A decision is considered to be against the manifest weight of the evidence “where the opposite conclusi